Socially - optimal level of co-determination of labor and the European directive on workers' councils

Josheski, Dushko (2012) Socially - optimal level of co-determination of labor and the European directive on workers' councils. Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal , 4 (20). pp. 1-13.

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Abstract

In the past employee interest and influence have been presented mainly through trade unions and collective
bargaining (economic regulation). Socially optimal levels of co-determination may be prevented by the
existence of high fixed costs of establishing councils. Job security can resolve the adverse selection problem
and raise economic efficiency i.e. worker or agent will work efficiently or socially optimal. Codetermination
reinforces well functioning social democracy, recent studies discover that consultation and
participation increase than innovativeness of the company. The US and EU approach to employment are
different under common and civil law, that differ in many ways. The US employment –at- will is liberal
individualist model, laissez-faire approach and any regulation is considered to be potentially welfare
reducing. And mandatory employment rights model; EU model that seeks it’s rationale in the previously
mentioned market failures (agency problems, hold-up problems) caused by asymmetric information and
incomplete employment contracts, and the presence of monopolies, monopsonies that reduce workers
mobility. Harmonious relations between” social partners” – labor and management are the aim of the
European Work Council directive. European law continues to focus on workers and shareholders interest.

Item Type:	Article
Subjects:	Social Sciences > Economics and business
Divisions:	Faculty of Tourism and Business Logistics
Depositing User:	Dusko Josevski
Date Deposited:	21 Nov 2012 19:10
Last Modified:	21 Nov 2012 19:10
URI:	https://eprints.ugd.edu.mk/id/eprint/1597

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