Asymmetric auction mechanism vs bilateral trade inefficiency

Josheski, Dushko and Apostolov, Mico (2019) Asymmetric auction mechanism vs bilateral trade inefficiency. In: Second international scientific conference "Challenges of tourism and business logistics in 21st century, ISCTBL, Stip.

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In this paper asymmetric auctions have been revisited and have been tested in order to proof that Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem does hold when auction is the mechanism of trade. This result is actually an extension of the theorem. In asymmetric auctions bidders are of different types (different CDF’s) i.e. the follow different distribution types, convergence achieved is inefficient, we present a case of double auctions also that is inefficient though efficiency there can be “improved” through k-level of thinking.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Subjects: Social Sciences > Economics and business
Divisions: Faculty of Tourism and Business Logistics
Depositing User: Dusko Josevski
Date Deposited: 24 Dec 2019 08:50
Last Modified: 24 Dec 2019 08:50

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