Stojanov, Trajce (2022) Wittgenstein's word vs. children`s world. In: Philosophy with children: accomplishments and projections, 14-15. 10. 2022, Sofija, Bulgaria. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
The usual understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy is the firm division on early Wittgenstein form the Tractatus and later Wittgenstein from the Philosophical Investigations. The "early Wittgenstein" was concerned with the logical relationship between propositions and the world, and he believed that by providing an account of the logic underlying this relationship, he had solved all philosophical problems. The "later Wittgenstein", however, supposedly rejected many of the assumptions of the Tractatus, arguing that the meaning of words is best understood as their use within a given language game. But there are no „two Wittgenesteins“, as there is no any sane individual divided in two completely different subjects. There is only one Wittgenstein, always concerned with the relation between language and the world. When in Tractatus he left one big part of the world outside language, all of his future efforts were directed to integrate that gap, to understand that world of silence. „Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent“ (7) - he says at the end of Tractatus. But this silence didn`t stopped bothering him. Not even „the early Wittgenstein“. Because just before uttering that final judgment on the destiny of the world, Wittgenstein nevertheless knew „the sense of the world must lie outside the world“ (6.41). The world has sense, just it doesn't fit in the words. So, in this paper we will examine the child words and child worlds through Wittgenstein`s philosophy of language. What about children language and their structure of world, especially their sense of the world? Does children`s senselessness language means senselessness world? We have all heard children how construct meaningless sentences. Very often, for example many children frequently are using the phrase „yesterday, when I was adult“, which from merely linguistic perspective is not just incorrect, but also meaningless. But, in the endless children world it has perfect sense. Thus, doesn't learning the rules of language means learning regimes of truth in a Foucauldian sense? If Foucault was wright that power relationships in society are expressed through language and practices, than how we should up bring children through language in order not to narrow down their world, and to subside them to the regimes of truth embedded in the language norms of grown ups? Because children worlds are far more wider than Wittgenstein words.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Humanities > Philosophy, ethics and religion |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Educational Science |
| Depositing User: | Trajce Stojanov |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Apr 2023 08:24 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Apr 2023 08:24 |
| URI: | https://eprints.ugd.edu.mk/id/eprint/31608 |
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