

Managing consequences of terrorist attacks in the South East Europe: the Case of Macedonia

Author: PhD Metodi Hadji-Janev, (Assistant Professor of Law), LtC

Abstract

Many governments develop strategies for terrorist attack consequence management focused on reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effects of terrorist attacks, incidents and natural disasters. Given that modern terrorism practiced by radical Islamists occupy and breed from the modern societies weaknesses derived from its historic and political dynamics effective management of terrorist attack in such situation requires more than *post-festum* reaction. Former is especially relevant for the region of South East Europe where complex political, ethnic and religious environment dictate the governments' ability to effectively cope with terror attack(s) consequences. Jasarevic attack in Bosnia, murder attack at Smilkovci Lake in Macedonia and attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria are just recent evidences of the threat that radical Islamists pose to the Region.

Unlike Bosnian and Bulgarian terrorist attacks, during Smilkovci terrorist attack suspect terrorists and targets were with local nationality prefix. Macedonian Government's reaction was swift. Government succeeded to maintain stability, part of the suspected terrorists was arrested and court was provided with material evidence linked with terrorism. However, unlike other two cases Smilkovci consequence management provoked many reactions, thus proving that complex political environment require wider considerations to be taken in to account. Furthermore Smilkovci terrorist attack confirmed (and this is relevant for the rest of the SEE Governments) that if Macedonian Government is about to effectively manage future terrorist attacks consequences needs to consider preventive measures focused on cohesive and resilient society.

Key words: Terrorist attack, Radical Islam, Macedonia, consequence management

1. INTRODUCTION

Modern Terrorism practiced by religiously motivated groups and individuals linked to Al Qaeda and Its Associated movements (AQAM) represents a serious threat to the region of South East Europe (SEE). Although many governments focused on reactive measures against terrorism

there are those who have recognized that preplanned activities defines the quality of government's response. Such activities are especially crucial in complex political, ethnic and religious environments. History, policy, ethnicity and religion are founders of SEE region complex dynamics. Numerous evidences confirm that these SEE's dynamics started to serve as home to a radical Islamists. Recent terrorist attack in Bosnia (Bosnian case), Macedonia (Macedonian/Smilkovci case) and Bulgaria (Bulgarian case) seems to confirm this logic. Although in all three cases radical Islam was involved only Macedonian case provoked suspicion about the alleged motives, i.e. that the attack was linked with radical Islam motives. Macedonian Government response was swift. Only a few days after the attack Government identified perpetrators, came out to the public unite and maintained fair stability after the attack. Nevertheless it seemed that just because the victims and suspect terrorists were Macedonian public has saw ethnic instead of radical Islam motives. Even more there suspicions that the Government did not arrested the exact perpetrators of whom two are on a run supposing in Kosovo. Western diplomats, opposition parties, the Islamic Religious Community (Islamskata Verska Zaednica vo Makedonija-IVZ) and the media reactions have pointed that to be effective in managing consequences of a terror attack Macedonian Government needs to produce wider preventive measures toward resilient and cohesive society.

2. Modern terrorism and managing consequences from terrorist attacks

The asymmetric and unconventional threats of terrorist attacks practiced by religiously motivated non-state actors continue to pose a major risk to our security. Modern terrorist risk assessments do not confirm the well established wisdom that religiously motivated terrorists usually come from the failed and rogue state or from the Middle East. In fact, current experience tells us that the threat comes not just from foreign nationals, but also from individuals born and bred in our communities. Usually, but not exclusively, these individuals are self-radicalized and are ready to commit terrorism for the same cause as the individuals from AQAM. Therefore some governments and many pundits, law enforcement, intelligent officers and homeland security professionals support the counterterrorist strategy focused on prevention (HM Government, June 2011, p. 20).

At the same time it is clear that Osama bin Laden is dead and that the threat from Al Qa'ida inspired terrorism is not. Today globalization and technological development provide numerous opportunities for modern terrorism. The professor Bhagwati's argument that "...when implemented intelligently globalization could be the most powerful force for social good..." (Bhagwati, 2004) applies to terrorist in negative connotation as well. Ralph Peters asserts that globalization and technology is the essential instrument for the rapid spread of terrorist causes and creativity

internationally (Peters, May 23, 2005). Thus it would be not difficult to conclude that modern terrorism practiced by AQAM demands new and immediate responses to often unpredictable and unknown violence. Before 9/11, it was hard to convince someone that civilian airplanes could be used as a bombs or letters as carriers of fatal disease. Today it would be naïve to believe that preventive measures alone can guarantee absolute protection from terrorism.

In reality when disaster occurs, government can only respond, in the middle of the horror and fear of what could yet happen, through the known set of social, political and legal structures. Hence improving national response and mitigation capacities could significantly strengthen resilience and decrease the risks to the public. Planning for emergencies in order to manage them effectively should be a task not just for the government and the local communities, but for all stakeholders (including private sector) too. Only holistic approach can guaranty success in managing consequences of the terrorist attack.

Many governments' security strategies provide framework for development of consequence management focused on reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effects of terrorist attacks, incidents and natural disasters (Pandza, October-November 2011, p. 129-142). Nevertheless the quality of preventive measures and other preplanned activities usually shape the dynamics and effectiveness in managing consequences of a terrorist attack(s). This logic is especially relevant when governments have to apply consequence management actions in politically sensitive or fragile environment (comprised of ethnic, religious and other social issues).

Effective consequence management, (i.e. government's ability to successfully mitigate the risk and cascade effects of conducted terrorist attacks), among other, requires emergency services' swift reaction (to identify and respond) to a terrorist attack and officials to issue appropriate messages to the public in a timely and consistent manner. Political fragile environment is significantly sensitive of how government reacts and addresses the populace. The quality of these measures and actions defines how many lives can be saved and how much of the economic, social and psychological disruption that was the aim of the terrorists can be reduced. Hence in such scenarios if the consequence management process of terrorist attack(s) is not accompanied by effective holistic approach of preventive measures (that will reflect political and socio-economic reality) it will be probably doomed to a failure in advance.

3. Political challenges to managing consequences from terrorist attacks: an urgent requirement for preventive measures

Fragile political (religious, ethnic or social) issues usually build the burden of "political sensitivity" for the authorities in many countries around the globe. These issues predominantly exist

in multicultural environment (countries or regions) and if not addressed accordingly hold potentials to inhibit government's ability to handle terror attack(s) consequences in appropriate manner. Specific ethnicity and/or religion of the perpetrators or the victims may restrain the authorities to define an attack as a terrorist one and thus harm the effective consequence management. On the other hand government's rhetoric and actions if not carefully designed could polarize ethnic or religious issues. Finally, while managing consequences of terrorist attack(s) government could misuse specific incident and launch actions that could produce violence and enlarge consequences. Thus the effectiveness of the consequence management of the terror attack directly depends from preventive measures that will reduce the depth of political sensitivity.

The region of SEE completely fits the profile of the fragile political, ethnic and religious environment that could complicate the management of terror attack consequences. Dynamic history; ethnic tensions; negative image of security services inherited from former Yugoslav conflicts or authoritarian regimes; social instability in the Region (mainly due to economic deprivation) and the West administrations' indecisive policy among others, comprise complexity in SEE. At the same time so far both SEE's governments and the West had hard time to publicly admit that religious extremism is on large in the region and to undertake appropriate measures. Jasharevic's attack on US embassy in Sarajevo (Alic, November 01, 2011), murder of the five civilians at Smilkovo Lake near Skopje in Macedonia (Dimitrioska, April 13, 2012) and suicide attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria (BBC, July 19, 2012) have seriously challenged this indecisiveness.

Macedonian government's approach in managing consequences of terrorist attack did not cause escalation and violence. However it definitely showed that political challenges have serious potential to complicate governments' efforts and political situation in the terrorist attack(s) aftermath. In order to understand these challenges during Macedonian government response to a terrorist attack one should take a closer look on so called "Smilkovci case". The analysis of the Smilkovci incident is relevant not just for the future improvement of the Macedonian response alone, but for the Region of SEE where similar dynamics shape security environment and of course for a global counterterrorist efforts.

4. Macedonian Government's consequence management of a terrorist attack (confront ethnic and religious challenges)

Several parameters have shaped the overall reaction after Smilkovci incident in Macedonia. Government's official position that the incident was "terrorist attack" committed by "radical Islamists" and ability to "maintain stability" after the incident and arrest of suspected perpetrators

(officially charged with terrorism) have mainly draw its initial approach in managing consequences of terrorist attack. Nevertheless, opposition parties' reaction, the Islamic Religious Community reaction, media and Western diplomats' reaction have all played their role which must be taken in to consideration on the mid and long run and incorporated in the future efforts of consequence management. Before we start with analysis let's first look in to the general events of the incident.

4.1. General considerations

On April 12, 2012 a Good Thursday ("Велики Четврток"-Macedonian) four teenagers Filip Slavkovski, Aleksandar Nakevski, Cvetanco Acevski and Kire Trickovski from Smilkovci (village near Skopje) went fishing to the nearby lake. Probably all they wanted to do was to have some fun as the Orthodox Easter was approaching. However the next day all of them together with Borce Stefkovski a 45-year-old man were found dead. Police reported that all of the identified citizens were killed by automatic weapons at close range (Marusic, April 14, 2012). On April 16 national electronic and printed media reported that the abduction and police investigation showed that the victims were murdered from three different weapons (Brunwasser, April, 16, 2012). While four teenagers were killed and lined up, the 45 years old Borce Stevkovski was found dead near his car which led the police to believe that he was the eyewitness who has not been spotted previously by the shooters.

Macedonia was in shock. After quick identification of the victims the police investigation advanced and showed now criminal connections. The teenagers never had any trouble with anyone and did not even have a criminal record. The fisherman was a family man who made regular trips to that lake. Soon government and diplomatic official announcements appealed for calm and cautioned against speculation about the ethnicity of the killers. Officials from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.S. Embassy in Skopje and President Gjorge Ivanov appealed for calm and also cautioned against speculation about the ethnicity of the killers (The US Embassy, August 12, 2012; MIA, April 13, 2012). Since there were no results of investigation speculations grew. Some have suggested that the victims were witness of drug deal and therefore they were killed. Others suggested that they were witness of other illegal activities. All of this was quite acceptable since no one could have believed that something randomly picked up the innocent civilians and shoot them in cold blood.

On April 16 ethnic Macedonians predominantly youth, as a revolt of the murders started demonstrations. Throwing rocks on police several hundred youngsters issued offensive paroles toward ethnic Albanians inferring that they are responsible for the incident, although the

investigation was not completed. However after more than two weeks new shock came from the investigation (Tumanovska, April 17, 2012).

On May 1, 2012 after operation Monster (Монструм) Macedonian Ministry of Interior announced that they have found the murderers. More than 800 members of police had stormed 26 locations and have arrested 20 civilians under suspicion of being alleged with the executors. The court later ordered 30 days' detention for nine of the arrested. The shocking news nevertheless came when interior Minister Gordana Jankuloska announced that the Ministry of Interior will file criminal charges of terrorism against suspect murderers. The Minister has tried to convince the public that the Ministry of Interior has material evidence which lead to the suspected terrorists. Large quantity of weapons and literature with radical ideological content was also found and offered as evidence to support charges. Jankuloska also said that main motive most probably was their idea of killing in the name of Radical Islam and the goal was to create feeling of fear among the public. She carefully categorized this as a dangerous behavior not just for Christianity but for Muslim religion too (VOA, May 1, 2012).

As a response, on May 4 several hundreds of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have protested against the arrest of the men charged over the killing of five Macedonians. During the demonstration the paroles such as “Alah is Great” and other paroles with violent context were issued to the Prime Minister and more interestingly to Ali Ahmeti leader of the position political parties (ethnic Albanian) (Radio free Europe, September 25, 2012).

Opposition has launched series of critics about the Ministry of interior’s position that perpetrators were linked to radical Islam and that the incident was called terrorist act. These critics were welcomed by almost all ethnic Albanian commentators or analysts, negating the fact that the perpetrators were linked with radical Islam. Media have also played their role. Although Islamic Community in Macedonia has previously called for help to prevent radical Islamists’ penetration in Macedonia the institution has too publicly criticized Ministry of Interior’s statement and negate connection between radical Islam and suspected executors (Karajkov, June 11, 2012). Western diplomats were neutral in their statements and call for caution and restrain among the populace. They have also call for fair treatment and rule of law to apply.

Even though the situation was tensed the populace support that both ruling political parties (VMRO-ethnic Macedonian and Democratic Union for Integration ethnic Albanian) had at the time have gave Government credit to stabilize the situation on the ground. The process is still ongoing and we have yet to see the results. Nevertheless, from the above evidence there are significant parameters that one could use in order to analyze Macedonian Government and other stakeholders

response to Smilkovci incident. This evaluation could be helpful to see the deficiencies in Macedonian approach in managing consequences of terrorist attack, to draw conclusions and provide recommendation for improvement.

4.2. Qualitative evaluation of Macedonian approach in managing consequences from Smilkovci terrorist attack

The ministry of interior's statement that some of the perpetrators of vandal incident were arrested and that the criminal charges of terrorism connected would be raised at the first moment created silence. The other part of information that the perpetrators were followers of Radical Islam launched waves of suspicions among the opposition and negation among the ethnic Albanian community. Since we are about to see the results of the process in order to evaluate the Government's position one should use method of analogy in order to draw conclusion about the potential linkage of Radical Islam with the Smilkovci incident.

4.2.1. Radical Islam, terrorist attack and Smilkovci incident in context?

The investigation results that the victims have no criminal records and that there is nothing to imply that they were victims due to the criminal activity (i.e. that they were eyewitnesses) lead us to believe that the motives for the murder have political connection. Possibility that some lunatic has committed a random crime is also unacceptable since the investigation showed that the victims were targeted from three different weapons at the same time. In this context although there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism it is commonly accepted that terrorist acts are criminal acts with political motives (Hoffman, 1998, 32). In the current scenario this means that murder could have ethnic, religious, or mixed political motives. The official charges were supported with material evidence connecting suspected individuals with radical Islam, and Macedonian support to the global war on terror efforts were offered as a potential motive.

Much has been written about presence of Radical Islam in the region of SEE. The connections between mujahedeen fighters in the SEE with Islamic terror organizations are well documented. Evan Kohlmann provides historical evidence about the infiltration of radical Islam in the Balkans during the Bosnian war (Kohlmann, 2004, p. 30). He claims that the role of mujahedeen fighters in the Bosnian war was a continuance of global jihad that started in the Afghan war against the Soviets. Kohlmann propose several reasons for this outcome. Some of the mujahedeen came to Bosnia because they were denied return from Afghanistan in their home countries. Many consciously went to fight a holy war providing military aid intended for the Bosnian army. Bosnian government officially invited them to fight and thus legitimized their presence after the war by granting them citizenship. What is significant according to Kohlmann is that the UN and the

West new about this and did nothing. Christopher Deliso proposes similar arguments about Kosovo. He claims that In Kosovo, where a UN administration replaced Yugoslav rule following the 1999 NATO bombing, the need to placate the province's mafia-connected men of strength manifested acutely in the UN's "don't-rock-the-boat" policy (Deliso, 2006). Detective Kellock member of post-conflict nation building efforts in Kosovo also points to this policy explaining details about his team's conviction of a powerful Kosovo Albanian criminal (Balkananalysis, 2006).

The engines of spreading radical Islam (true Wahhabi Islam) like in the rest of the world were steady and pervasive creation of Dawa infrastructures (Walker, 1995). In Bosnia (Galijashevic, 2006), Albania (Crewdson and Huntley, 2005) and Kosovo (UNMIK, 2001; Robinson and Jennings, 2004), these Dawa infrastructures are used not just as promoters of true Wahhabi to the neighboring Balkan states, but also to confront the secular Muslim politics (BBC, 2006; Bajrovic, 2006; Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2006; BETA, 2006; Taylor, 2001).

In Macedonia even the Islamic Religious Community has asked for help from the Government claiming that radical Islam has penetrated and confronted their authority (AP, September 20, 2010). Asked for opinion over the issue in 2010 Stephen Suleyman Schwartz, a specialist on Islam in the Balkans stated that "...*the problem* (referring to Radical Islam) *is currently worst in Macedonia, where the Wahhabis have real control over the Islamic Community, while those who are not Wahhabis, are mistreated and attacked...., Wahhabis have infiltrated there and in Kosovo, but, as I said, the worst situation is in Macedonia, where the radicals head the community, as well as in Albania, where there is no attempt to control the radicals at all, and where, I would say, they can do what they want.*" (Schwartz, January 8, 2010). The same year when asked about the religious song prizing Osama Bin Laden that appeared on the Internet from Albanians who claimed that are from Macedonia, The Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia have stated "*We do not know about this song, but we don't reject the possibility that such song is generally sang by Wahhabist groups in several mosques in Skopje,*". (Gorin, August 17, 2010). Similar claims about presence and links with radical Islam and Al Qaeda in Macedonia came from March Erin (September 10, 2012). Giving that there are other sources that also confirm Radical Islam and Wahabist presence in the region of SEE and Macedonia for now, it seems that Macedonian government official statements have support under the theses that perpetrators allegedly were Radical Islamists.

4.2.2. Maintaining stability after terror attack - part of the consequence management

During the statement for the press after the operation Monster, Jankulovska was accompanied among others from deputy Minister of Interior (ethnic Albanian member of the

Democratic Union of Integration). That supposed (and it seemed it did) to send a message that the Government (comprised from the VMRO DPMNE political party with the majority popular votes and DUI officially third party by the populace vote but first among the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia) is unite. These statistics and the fact that despite two days of demonstrations described above there were no major incidents, prove that the Government succeeded to maintain initial stability after the attack and thus to avoid political challenges to inhibit its ability to conduct successful management of terror attack consequences (Pavlevski, April 18, 2012).

4.2.3. The role of other actors in the Smilkovci terror attack aftermath and potential implications

Opposition refused to accept the government statement. Their denial went from not accepting the link between Radical Islam and perpetrators to believe and statements that the arrested individuals are not the perpetrators. In fact the opposition accused that the Government is incapable to maintain ethnic coherence and that the accused civilians have nothing to do with the murder. Since the opposition always wants to blame the Governments all around the globe it is understandable why both ethnic blocks of the opposition have accused the Government as irresponsible and have denied accepting the argumentation. The above analyses of radical Islam presence in the region of SEE and previously mentioned Jasharevic case (attack in Sarajevo) or Bulgarian case (attack on the Israeli civilians) clearly confirm that there is possibility that the government was telling the true.

The reaction of the Islamic religious community (IVZ) has been schizophrenic even though this institution's position supposed to be crucial in such scenarios. Their argument was that the perpetrators are not radical Islamists inferring that Radical Islam have no connection to the state. First they have accused the incidents. Next they refused to accept that perpetrators were the real murderer without saying why or offering argumentation for their claims. Considering the fact that only a one year and a half ago they have asked for help from Wahabists and that they admitted that IVZ do not have control over all religious object in Macedonia, even pointing to a person called Ramdan Ramadani as an agitator for radical Islam it is hard to understand what caused the same leaders of the IVZ to announced such decision.

Media (printed and electronic) had significant role that designed and influenced the picture after the Smilkovci terror attack in Macedonia. Both domestic and foreign media (including the regional media) have vigorously observed the incident and the situation in the arrest aftermath. Although there were positive examples of the professional and ethical reporting, which plays an exceptionally important role in these sensitive situations, most of the domestic and some foreign

media reports were quite unprofessional and ethnic oriented. In general both ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian media reports could be described as negative stereotyping, ethnocentrism and xenophobia driven (UNESCO, 2012).

The reports after the victims were found generally went in appropriate manner. Specific media (mainly ethnic Macedonia) have emphasized ethnic identification of the victims which arguably polarized situation. Nevertheless rhetoric toward this direction has increased in the press prepared during the operation “Monster” aftermath. Although media have demonstrated unprofessionalism by publishing footages of several detainees “radical Islam” and the “security threat against Macedonia” from the Islamic fundamentalism and the global terrorism have dominated the reports. One could see these reports from two directions.

The media’s role is to present the truth to the public. Public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues (SPJ, 1996). Contrary to this however, is the view that public accountability along with truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity, impartiality and fairness is the core of journalists’ ethic. (IFJ, May 05, 2003). Even more like many broader ethical systems, journalism ethics include the principle of "limitation of harm."

The issue nonetheless went beyond this dilemma. Reports with inaccuracy and generalization continued especially after the protest on 4th of May. By emphasizing ethnic background of the victims and that of the perpetrators in the context of “radical Islam” and the “security threat against Macedonia” it could be argued that media a priori related the whole religion of Islam to radical structures and with the global terrorism. This rhetoric therefore *located the guilt in the implicit “Other”* which offered a ground for awakening the ghosts from the near past. However, domestic media were not the only to blame from this profession.

Although foreign media tried to factually report the event, purposefully or not, some had made crucial mistakes too. This was later emphasized by the domestic media which as a result thrill anger among the ethnic Macedonians who recalled the old days where West was always seen as a supportive to “the others” (Kostovska, May 18, 2012) On a day when the Associated Press received the prestigious Pulitzer reward for a highest levels of journalism (AP, 2012), the agency has made the same mistake if not even worst as the domestic media. Not just that from the report one can get the wrong picture of what was going on, but the victims were reported as ethnic Albanians in the context of describing violent protests from Macedonia without stating why the protest were held. Instead like in domestic media the report focused on ethnicity, past ethnic conflict and violent

offensive paroles issued from ethnic Macedonians to ethnic Albanians. Thus reading the report without knowing the actual facts one could receive wrong picture i.e. that ethnic Macedonians are protesting against the ethnic Albanians and that at the same time someone had killed 5 fishermen ethnic Albanians, who come from the ethnicity that has tensions with the Macedonian majority since a 2001 uprising by ethnic Albanian rebels (Fox News, April 17, 2012. In addition western foreign journalist agencies have failed to report that during the protests on May 4, 2012 part of the protestors issued Radical Islam paroles and have signals indicating the Radical Islam connectivity (Radio free Europe, September 25, 2012).

The other implication arguably came from the Western Diplomats statements or the US embassy precisely. It is true that some of the Media have overemphasized parts of the official announcement issued by the US embassy and the US Ambassador in Macedonia Paul Wolers, thus creating unintentional impression that the US is not supportive to the Government's position. The reality was that the US Embassy in Macedonia called for caution and rules of law to apply. The only problematic think here is that in other two cases of terrorist acts (Bosnia and Bulgaria) no one from the western diplomats asked for such precaution although like in Macedonia the rest of the SEE governments have history with the application of the rule of law.

Without further elaboration on the subject in this context it could be concluded that the complex political situation could serious challenge Governments in managing consequences of terrorist attacks. Therefore in order for government to be able to successfully cope with the consequences of a terrorist attack(s) especially in politically fragile environment, preventive measures must be considered.

5. Recommendations for the future

Political challenges to effective consequence management urge that these government actions need to be designed in accordance with effective preventive strategy. To be successful in Macedonia, and arguably this is relevant to the rest of the region of SEE, this strategy needs to prevent ethnic and religious issues to be a source for recruitment and reason for committing terror attacks. For this Government could not succeed alone. Complex issues that gravitate in the region's political dynamics require holistic approach that will include all actors analyzed above (i.e. Opposition political parties, IVZ, Media and western diplomats) including populace and regional partners. The Government's center of gravity in the preventive approach however should be populace. All other actors are enablers in government efforts to build resilient local community. To design such community government needs mechanisms that will address grievances, whether real or perceived which might be exploited in the radicalization process. Therefore pursue for social

cohesion must be immediately organized if the government is about to improve consequence management of the future terrorist attacks.

5.1. Government efforts for social cohesion direct investments toward more effective consequence management of terrorist attacks

One of the things that government must protect is populace trust. Although it could be argued that after the attack Government (VMRO-DPMNE and DUI) ensured stability by having support from the majority of the population a fair view could recognize just a short term withstanding from violence. Expressing “hateriotism” during social events (sport competitions for example), forums or during other sensitive events (ethnic or religious) clearly endanger stability by relying on political determinism on a long run.

Government should therefore focus of efforts that are beyond profiteering on short-term ethnic driven issues. These efforts will reduce and discourage tensions among different ethnicities specifically between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The “Ohrid framework agreement” must be interpreted in appropriated manner. Any extended or narrow interpretation further polarize situation on both sides. Excuses such as unfair opposition that will profit from Government’s actions toward tolerance and reconciliation and interpreted as weakness sink under the advantage that both leading political parties have. Their populace trust has been tasted several times so far (especially after the recent parliamentary elections).

Hence to address the essence of the problem Government must stimulate and promote programs and measures toward social cohesion. Achieving social cohesion require sacrifices and readiness to move beyond ethnic-centered emotions and revenge. All efforts must be well measured and design with carefulness. These Government efforts should mobilize brave approach toward accepting the threat from radical Islam and avoiding the trap to present the Islam itself as a problem. Clear, honest and well examined narrative is crucial since the religion in SEE has always been perceived as a full package together with ethnicity, culture and identity. The religion in SEE alone does not determine the identity. Therefore reckless rhetoric (like some media has practiced in Smilkovci incident) is unacceptable. Nevertheless if one considers historic and political dynamics in the SEE (fear among the Macedonians from federalization and secession or “majorization” among the ethnic Albanian) it would be naïve to believe that the Government alone could succeed in these efforts. These dynamics in fact dictate that, to achieve this Government needs to consider Western support, social stability, specially designed programs in education, closer cooperation with the media and regional cooperation.

5.1.1. Accepting the reality, Radical Islam is threat

Government should be brave and careful. It should use all its instruments of power (diplomacy, information, security forces and economy) in admitting that Radical Islam is serious threat to the security. There are many arguments to support this thesis.

Analyzing radicalization process in Western Europe Leiken concludes that there are two kinds of radical Muslims in Western Europe "outsiders" and "insiders." According to him, there is a pattern of a strategic and systematic attempt to recruit the third generation born insiders by Al Qaeda, especially after September 11 and United States operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Leiken, Jul/Aug, 2005: 120-135). This nonetheless is relevant for the region of SEE too. American special police investigator in Kosovo and other sources resignedly admit that the Region of SEE has become "a two-way conveyor belt" for radical Islam, importing foreign radicals and exporting ideologically vulnerable students and a small number of terrorist supporters (Katz, 2005). Although there are many others anecdotal evidence there are many empirical evidence too.

On January 7 2012, a 25-year-old naturalized American named Sami Osmakac was arrested in Tampa, Florida, in the US federal sting operation, while planning a terrorist attack on local nightclubs, as well as the county sheriff's office. He was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against persons or property (Schwartz, January 18, 2012); Another example represents the case of Betim Kaziu, the son of Kosovar Albanian immigrants to US who tried, but failed, to join al-Qaida groups in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. He was found guilty of conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization and avenge abuse of Muslims by killing American troops (Hays, March 03, 2012); Arid Uka, immigrant from Kosovska Mitrovica, is an example of a lone-wolf extremist who became radicalized on his own by reading and watching jihadist propaganda on the Internet. He was sentenced to life for terrorist attack (killing and wounding unarmed US soldiers) committed at Frankfurt airport area. (McHugh David, February 10, 2012). Mevild Jasarevic's case, Smilkovci Case and Bulgaria terror attack are yet other examples that serve to the thesis that radical Islam is serious threat to the SEE's security.

Giving the evidence the government should use its diplomatic efforts and seek support from the West. The logic behind this proposal is also relevant to the global approach against terrorism. Current offensive against AQAM around the globe with such approach could prevent maneuvering space for Radical Islamists and places for new recruiters.

5.1.2. The importance and relevance of the West support

Western Governments' opinion is crucial for the SEE. Although it is not the key to success alone this opinion could significantly contribute in populace resilient indirectly. It will first

discourage ethnic rhetoric by the opposition parties, it will help the Government to earned populace trust in the consequence management of terrorist attack and it will also influence other relevant actors' rhetoric (like that of the IVZ Macedonia, or regional).

For example it could be argued that among others, IVZ's confusing statements after the arrest of suspected perpetrators for Smilkovci terror attack came after they as the opposition saw that the statement from the American Embassy was lacking condemnation of committed terrorist attack (as it was practice in others cases most notably the Bosnian or Bulgarian cases for example (Kouri, April 26, 2012; Greenwood Phoebe, July 19, 2012). Similarly while warning that West should be careful with the approach to Balkan Islam Xavier Bougarel proposes that West has powerful tool to deter Balkan Islam factor to accommodate the radical approach. Precisely he asserts that ..."*the burden of responsibility to compel radical Islamists is in their hands* (referring to Balkan Muslims), *because their integration into Europe will be compromised if they are identified as using Islam to achieve political goals*"... (Bougarel, February 12-13, 1999), p.17). It would be fair to conclude that unlike from the Muslims from the Middle East Muslims from SEE region see themselves in Euro-Atlantic societies (Schwartz, January 18, 2012). The complexity however comes in to full light when the advantage is also a weakness.

As the whole region of SEE move toward the West the AQAM protagonists in SEE do too. Using the human rights as shield and bad image of widely criticized communist security measures they have literally paralyzed successful preventive measures against their activities. In the Balkans, where Western rhetoric of human rights, democracy, and multicultural tolerance is practically a religion in itself, Islamic groups have cleverly using it against local societies and, by default, their Western sponsors. The vocal Tirana "human rights" group (the Muslim Forum of Albania), for example, exemplifies the current generation of Islamist organizations' covert presentation of a fundamentalist agenda. (Deliso, 2007). In addition, ironically, the European Union and United States, referencing human rights concerns, have unintentionally urged SEE governments to legalize religious denominations. Under these demands sects like the Wahhabis groups that have no historical ties to the region and that could pose a terrorism threat have largely dominated SEE's Muslim communities. Nevertheless one should not make direct accusation to the West about Wahhabis proliferation in SEE or about some regional. West has never agitated for this. Instead transition, democratic inexperience and social instability have created the vacuum that Wahhabists have started to fulfill.

West support toward Euro-Atlantic integration will reduce negative forces that stimulate inter-ethnic divisions in the SEE. Although not tested in practice there is general believe that overall

region's integration in to the Euro-Atlantic organizations will influence positive psychological regional perceptions that will relax ethno-centric tensions. In this context democratic values peace and tolerance are pretext of prosperity. However these values could not be preached to a people buried with vengeance from the past. Instead when practiced together with those who are experienced (i.e. the West) these values will stimulate individual citizenship's quality. Thus instead of determinism, choice driven decisions will prevail. Consequently instead of collective identity individual identity will prevail. Precisely the individuals' quality and not the belonging will determine political decisions so the ethnic issues will be avoided during political decisions. To achieve this Government needs to invest in social stability and qualitative education as well.

5.1.3. Investment in Social stability, long path for a greater stability

Many people in today's global society, including many of its most prominent leaders and academics, maintain that terrorist activity is the result of ignorance and/or poverty. (Bueno de Mesquita, July 2005, p. 515–530). A common underlying feature of these approaches is that terrorism should have a greater appeal to those with lesser marketable options. In other words, people with fewer opportunities in the legal or secular world are expected to be more likely to commit crimes, commit suicide, or join religious sects. Since terrorism is often explained through a similar rationale, the intuitive expectation is for terrorist organizations to be populated with those individuals who have the lowest market opportunities. SEE's reality is not far from these views.

Ruined social stability in most of the SEE countries after the violent Balkan conflicts in many rural areas has become ideal for Wahhabis ideology. Economic depression, state disinterest (Center for European Enlargement Studies, 2008) and a legacy of oppression are mainly used in remote pockets of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Macedonia to persuade Muslim youths (Sekulovic, 2006). Their aggressive approach in overtaking the exiting pivotal role in Muslim religious community leadership is more than evident in several SEE countries too. Wahhabi activists keen on keeping under the radar also employ a portable Dawa infrastructure, preaching in private sessions at the homes of would-be converts (Lewis, 2006; Balkananalysis, 2005).

Social programs specifically designed to target long lasting issues among the different ethnic and religious groups are necessary. These programs should stimulate tolerance, and emphasize positive aspects of multiculturalism. Programs focused on development of individual skills and small businesses support that will stimulate tolerance and interdependence based on the business not on the ethnicity are long lasting and demanding. Nevertheless the Government needs to ensure this path if we are about to preserve from aggressive penetration of radical Islamists who

purposefully attack remote pockets where people are socially abandoned and almost forgotten. This is significant for all stakeholders since once that they penetrate and install than they try to lead.

5.1.4. Qualitative education catalyst to resilience community

Many preventive strategies include education as a crucial element to increase community resilience. In order for people to be able to reduce someone's ability to manipulate them they need education. This usually requires challenge to extremist ideologies that justify terrorism and intervention with some extremists who are moving into terrorism. Macedonian government much larger toolkit designed to challenge extremism, extremist groups and terrorism must count on IVZ in Macedonia. Since they are the legitimate body that interprets Islam in Macedonia, Government should pursue in close cooperation with it. This cooperation must not be politicized and should count on opposition as well. Such approach will demoralize any attempts for manipulations and will legitimize official's efforts.

To address the social grievances and ethno-centric orientation Government should ensure practical and skills based education instead of determinist theoretical and boring teaching that have lost contacts with modernity. Only by these approaches Government can contribute toward individualistic and choice driven decision and divorce determinist and collective decisions. Changing education toward modern trends and creating programs that will encourage educators toward implementation of these trends will create a base for future improvement. The audience nonetheless should not just be the population, but the security services as well.

Analyzing how Jasarevic behave during the attack for example, Anes Alic Bosnian expert of the subject, propose that police was hesitant to act decisively (Alic, November 01, 2011). This could lead to two conclusions. First that police like the rest of the society has doubt about the radical Islamist presence. Second that police was insufficiently trained to deal with such scenarios.

Smilkovci incident has confirmed that among others terrorist consequence management in Macedonia, (this is arguably relevant for the rest of the SEE) is highly vulnerable to security services credibility. Although police raid have not showed any excessive use of force or violation of civil rights, the reluctance to accept the reality by the general ethnic Albanian population is debt from the past ruined legitimacy. As a result although many West supported training programs have contributed to the Macedonian police professional behavior Macedonian security service has still long way to go in order to earn the whole Macedonian populace trust. To accelerate the achievements of these objectives programs that will encourage close cooperation and education about this cooperation between police and society (especially in vulnerable areas not just in central cities) are needed.

5.1.5. Media and Macedonian government a special relationship

Like anything else the relationship between media and the Government has its own logic in SEE. In general media can decide how they are going to build their own strategy. They could do it by pursuing the speed and first to report approach, or they can choose the qualitative reporting like those of the New York Times or Washington Post for example. Government - media relationship in managing consequences of terror attack relationship should be build in advance. This is to gain trust and to avoid speculations.

Educative joint training programs and projects for example of what constitute violation of journalists' ethics and national security could improve Security services (Government) and media relationship. Since as we saw this relationship is sensitive and influential the Government needs to emphasize social responsibility and media need to accept such responsibility. This however is not to be misunderstood and media should keep to it highly valued code of conduct by presenting the truth.

5.1.6. Regional cooperation, precious for effective terror attack consequence management

Globalization has flattened the world. Using technology people can travel with higher velocity than ever. In addition the need for economic cooperation and broader security cooperation has relaxed cross-border procedures in many regions. Giving the history of the SEE the region is highly ethnically and religiously interconnected which has been the case in Bosnian terror attack and arguably in Macedonian terror attack. Jasaerevic has traveled from Serbia to Bosnia and has committed the attack. Macedonian police stated that they have material evidence pointing that two of the suspects have escaped in Kosovo.

Even though regional cooperation in SEE plays crucial direct role in reducing the impact of the consequences from a terrorist attack(s), its indirect role is also crucial. Close cooperation could limit the ability of radical Islamists to manipulate authority and to abuse ethnic issues for its own purposes. Close regional cooperation will also send strong signal to the potential perpetrators about the region decisiveness to confront radical Islam and terrorism. Finally investment in regional cooperation is investment in Government's own reputation in the populace and foreign partners' eyes.

From all of the above it will not be hard for one to conclude that modern terrorist consequence management is a full package that links effective preventive efforts with the post attack reactions. The quality of this relationship defines the quality of Governments reaction and its ability to mitigate the risks.

6. Conclusion

Significant evidences confirm that SEE is a perfect match for radical Islamists terrorism. This region's complex political, ethnic and religious environment in many ways requires governments to consider not just reactive, consequence based approach but also proactive and preplanned measures to manage terrorist attacks. Macedonian government has experience this in the Smilkovci terrorist attack aftermath. Even though consequence management was well designed it became evident that Government needs to ensure broader preplanned efforts in order to successfully implement counterterrorist legacy. Precisely, Government needs to direct efforts toward building of a resilient society. Center of gravity in these efforts must be populace and its support. Nevertheless in achieving this center of gravity Macedonian Government needs to consider holistic approach based on brave political decisions, to ensure Western partners' support, effective social stability, qualitative education programs and close cooperation with the media.

REFERENCES

1. Associated Press, (September 20, 2010), *Macedonia: Moderate Muslims Seek Help Against Sect*, retrieved from: <http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100920/NEWS0401/>
2. Associated Press, 2012, *Company awards*, available at: <http://www.ap.org/company/awards>)
3. Alic, Anes, (November 01, 2011), *III-Planned terror attack on US Embassy in Sarajevo*, ISA Intel, available at: <http://www.isaintel.com/2011/11/01/ill-planned-terror-attack-on-us-embassy-in-sarajevo/>)
4. Bajrovic, Amela, (September 14, 2006), *Politician's Murder Raises Tensions in Sandzak*, Institute for War and Peace Reporting
5. Balkananalysis, (January 26, 2006) *Interview with Detective Stu Kellock*. Retrieved June 29, 2011 from at: <http://www.balkananalysis.com/blog/2006/01/13/>
6. BBC, (November 11, 2006), *Some Groups in Rozaje Look Like Wahhabis*
7. BBC, (July 19, 2012), *Bulgaria Blast, Suicide bomber kills Israeli*, BBC News, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18897772>
8. BETA, (November 6, 2006), *Muslimanski ekstremisti sudarili se sa lokalnim vernicima u Novom Pazaru*
9. Taylor, Scott (December 15, 2001), *Bin Laden's Balkan Connections*," Ottawa Citizen
10. Bhagwati, Jagdish, (2004), *In Defense of Globalization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
11. Bougarel, Xavier, (February 12-13, 1999), *Islam and politics in the post - communist Balkans*, paper presented for the Socrates Kokkalis Student Workshop: *New Approaches to Southeast Europe*, Cambridge, 17
12. Brunwasser, Matthew, (April, 16, 2012), *Killings Heighten Ethnic Tensions in Macedonia*, The New York Times, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/world/europe/killings-heighten-ethnic-tensions-in-macedonia.html?_r=3&emc=tnt&tntemail0=y
13. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, (July 2005), *The Quality of Terror*, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3,

14. Center for European Enlargement Studies, (2008) *Using IPA and other EU funds to accelerate convergence and integration in the Western Balkans*
15. Crewdson, John and Huntley, Tom, (July 3, 2005), *Abducted Imam Aided CIA Ally*, Chicago Tribune
16. Deliso, Christopher, (November 14, 2006), *The Black Hole of Europe: Kosovo Interventionists Cover Up their Crimes*, Retrieved June 29, 2012 from <http://antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=10011>
17. Dimitrioska, Pandorce (April 13, 2012), *Five murdered at Iron Lake, There no Suspects*, (Original: петмина убиени кај Железарското Езеро, Осомничени нема), Alfa TV, available at: <http://www.time.mk/read/85fe05db07/a5bc958d44/index.html>
18. Fox News, April 17, 2012, *Macedonia: 5 hurts, 14 arrest in Clashes*, Associate Press, available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/17/macedonia-5-hurt-14-arrested-in-clashes/>
19. Galijashevic, Dzevad, (November 25, 2006), *Teshanji Zavidovici su pravi Al Kaidin Centar*, Nezavisne Novine Sarajevo
20. Gorin, Julia, (August 17, 2010) *Albanian-made Video Praising bin Laden Appears on Youtube*, Republican Riot, available at: <http://www.juliagorin.com/wordpress/?p=2411>
21. Greenwood Phoebe, (July 19, 2012), *Israel accuses Iran after seven tourists die in coach bomb blast*, The Guardian, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/18/israel-iran-bomb-tourists-bulgaria>
22. Hays, Tom, (March 03, 2012), *Betim Kaziu Gets 27 years in Homegrown Terror case*, Huff post New York available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/03/betim-kaziu-gets-27-years_n_1318288.html
23. HM Government, (June 2011), *Prevent Strategy*, The United Kingdom Government
24. Hoffman, Bruce, (1998), *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press 1998
25. International federation of Journalists- IFJ, (May 05, 2003), *Status of Journalism and Journalists ethics*: available at: *IFJ Principles*, available at: <http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/status-of-journalists-and-journalism-ethics-ifj-principles>
26. Jane's Intelligence Digest, (April 1, 2006), *Politicized Islam Grows in Serbia's Sandzak*
27. Katz, Gregory, (December 27, 2005), *Terrorists Said To Be Getting Aid in Balkans*, Houston Chronicle
28. Karajkov, Risto, (June 11, 2012), *Macedonia is it terrorism?*, Osservatorio, Balkani e Caucaso, available at: <http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Macedonia/Macedonia-Is-It-Terrorism-118381>
29. Kohlmann, Evan, (2004), *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe - the Afghan - Bosnian Network*, New York,
30. Kostovska, Vesna, (May 18, 2012), *The Murdered at the Iron Lake were Albanian, According to the Associated press!*, available in Macedonian at: <http://www.bezpardon.mk/ubienite-kaj-zhelezarskoto-ezero-se-albantsi-spored-asoshiejtjed-pres/>
31. Kouri Kim, (April 26, 2012), *The Cutting Edge, The edge of terrorism*, School for the Peace in the Middle East-SPME, available at: <http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=73124&pageid=20>
32. Leiken, Robert, (Jul/Aug 2005), *Europe's Angry Muslims*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84 Issue 4,
33. Lewis, Paul, (August 9, 2006), *Inside the Islamic Group Accused by MI5 and FBI*, Guardian,
34. March, Erin, September 10, 2012, *9/11 Mastermind Osama bin Laden: America's Anti-Soviet "Peace Warrior" and CIA "Intelligence Asset"* <http://truthbroadcastnetwork.com/type/article/911-mastermind-osama-bin-laden-americas-anti-soviet-peace-warrior-and-cia-intelligence-asset/>
35. Marusic, Sinisa, (April 14, 2012), *Grieving Macedonia Buries Five Murder Victims*, BalkanInsight, available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-municipality-mourns-fivefold-murder>

36. MIA (April 13, 2012), President Ivanov appeals for calm, reason, responsibility after deadly incident near Skopje, MIA Headlines, available at: <http://miaweb.mia.com.mk/default.aspx?vId=93043489&pmId=14&lId=2&pageNum=3>
37. McHugh David, (February 10, 2012), *Arid Uka, Frankfurt airport Shooter, Sentenced to life*, Associated Pandza, Jasper, (October-November 2011), *Survival*, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 53, No. 5
38. Pavlevski, Goran, (April 18, 2012), Macedonia maintains stability after murders, SETimes, available at: http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/04/18/feature-01
39. Peters, Ralph, (May 23, 2005), *Myths of Globalization*, USA Today
- Radio free Europe, (September 25, 2012), *In Macedonia, Ethnic Albanians Protest Arrests of Murder Suspects*, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/macedonia_ethnic_albanians_protest_murder_suspect_arrests/2457816
40. Robinson, Matt and Jennings, Christian, (March 18, 2004), *Kosovo Clashes Were Planned*, Says UN
41. Schwartz, Stephen (January 8, 2010), [VOA News Bosnian Service \[Washington, DC\]](#)
42. Sekulovic, Milan. (October 12, 2006), *Oruzjem jacaju Islam*, Vecernje Novosti Belgrade
43. Society of Professional Journalists-SPJ, (1996), *Code of Ethics*, Preamble, available at <http://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf>
44. The US Embassy (August 12, 2012), *Statmen on the killing on August 12, 2012*, The US Embassy in Skopje available at: <http://macedonia.usembassy.gov/news-events2/press-releases/pr2013/u.s.-embassy-in-skopje---statement-on-the-killings-of-april-12-2012>
45. Tumanovska, Marija, (April 17, 2012), Ten have been arrested and five have been wounded, Dnevnik, available at: <http://www.time.mk/read/089992ab9e/b11add6101/index.html>
46. Schwartz, Stephen, (January 18, 2012), *Kosovar Albanian arrested in Tampa terror Scheme*, The Weekly Standard
47. VOA, (May 1, 2012), *Macedonia arrests 20 suspected terrorists*, Voice of America, available at: <http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2012/05/01/macedonia-arrests-20-suspected-terrorists/Official>, available at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1100103/posts>
48. UNESCO, (2012), *Qualitative analyses of the Media report during interethnic and interreligious Relationship in Macedonia, Smilkovci case*, The High School for Journalism, UNMIK, (October 30, 2001), *Who Are Our Fundamentalists?*, UNMIK, Media Monitoring

Metodi Hadji-Janev

Hadji-Janev holds doctorate degree in International Law and International relations since 2009 when he has being elected as Assistant Professor at the Military Academy and Visiting Professor at the Law faculty in Skopje at the University “St Cyril and Metodius-Skopje”.

In 2003 Hadji-Janev was deployed as commander of Macedonian Special task forces in Iraq and has been awarded for distinguish service and has spent almost 16 years in the service. He is the author of the book “Iraqi Freedom: The Road to Babylon” and author of numerous articles published in distinguished journals and books, regarding the organize crime, international terrorism and issues related to cyber-security. Since January 2011 he has been assigned as a Head of Social science department at the Military Academy and Co-director of Advance Research Course “Intelligence Sharing against Terrorism” at NATO Center of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism in Ankara Turkey.