

Threats to the Critical Infrastructure in South-East Europe posed by Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements: the case of Macedonia

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1. Introduction

None-state actors like Al Qaeda and its associated movements have given new dimension to the international terrorism and security after the Cold War. The 11 September 2001 attacks, attacks in Bali (2002), London (2004), Madrid (2005), Mumbai (2009) and Moscow (2010) attest that these non-state actors' agenda has become global, apocalyptic and critical infrastructure focused. Connections to Al Qaeda by some Muslim groups and individuals from South-East Europe in an age of globalization, corrupt transitions, violent Yugoslavia conflicts and active support to the Global war on terror, rise serious concerns to the safety of the critical infrastructure in the region of South-East Europe (SEE).

Like the rest of the South-East European's countries, Macedonia misses effective strategy that will reduce the risks to critical infrastructure posed by Al Qaeda and its associated movements. Centralized planning and decentralized execution focused not just on immediate threats, but also on preventive measures could ensure effective critical infrastructure protection form Al Qaeda and its associated movements. To be fully effective Macedonia and South-East European's governments need to coordinate, facilitate and stimulate all stakeholders involved in critical infrastructure protection.

2. Al Qaeda and Its Associated Movements (AQAM): Challenge to the global security environment

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, have given new dimension to the concept of security. The John Mearsheimer's argument that many "Cold War" veterans, intelligence officer, pundits, and academics would miss the Cold War predictability of terrorism has become evident (Merasheimer, 1990; Sacks, February 5, 2011). Destruction and confiscation of the enemy's battlefield capabilities or occupation of enemy's maneuver space is no longer criteria for success in fighting modern terrorism employed by Al Qaeda and its associated movements –

AQAM (Nelson and Sanderson, 2011). Without really understanding the threat during the Global War on Terror the US led coalition almost immediately had lost the initiative.

One of the reasons for this was that the US and Coalition forces' approach was conventional and it predominantly relied on direct use of military force. Although Afghanistan and Iraq (considered as sanctuary and support for Al Qaeda) were occupied by coalition forces the strength of AQAM have increased. The problem that no one could have seen from the very beginning was that in this new war there are no front-lines. AQAM don't need substantial fire power, to advance in maneuver or to occupy decisive points. In fact AQAM did not change tactics, they have changed the objectives. Al Qaeda is far more violent and wants more casualties (Hoffman, 1998). Relying on a strategy of mass casualties AQAM's center of gravity is to indirectly (through public opinion) persuade US and Coalition authorities and keep them clear from Middle-East conflicts (Allison 2004). The only way to succeed in this is by attacking the weakest points of perceived enemies. From AQAM's modus operandi it has become clear that they have identified two weak points so far. The first one is modern civilian systems (i.e. sophisticated networks of services and infrastructure that move people, goods, energy, money, and information at higher volume and greater velocities). The second weak point identified by AQAM is western values (pursuit for stability, peace, and prosperity *per se*).

Terrorist attacks on the subway systems and the railway in London, Madrid and Moscow have confirmed that pouring more troupes for protection doesn't provide effective barrier as it does to the conventional threats. AQAM have proven that is easy to employ modern systems we rely upon and use them against us (Flynn, 2004). Development of these systems in virtual security vacuum (after the collapse of communism) has made them soft targets. The architects of these networks and infrastructures were mainly concerned with profit. In fact, the cost reduction and efficiency was their highest priority. At the same time the growing dependence on these networks had not been matched by parallel focus on their security. On a contrary as Stephen Flynn argues "...security considerations have been widely perceived as annoying speed bumps in achieving their goals (referring to the architects of these systems), ...As a result the systems that underpin our prosperity are soft targets for those bent on challenging U.S. power.." (Flynn, 2004). Nevertheless this wasn't the only weak point that US and Coalition failed to protect. There is far more complex and abstract point that remained unprotected.

AQAM successfully shift the fight on US and Coalition soil. Although there was direct retributive element to AQAM's strategy (they clearly want to punish US and Coalition for their policies) intentionally or unintentionally AQAM have threatened US and Coalition's way of life

(Freeman, 2002). Tactics to attack modern systems that ensure wellness and prosperity especially apocalyptic pursue for weapons of mass destruction attack, have created unimagined domestic and international pressure and panic (Huntington, 1996).

In the age of globalization these systems and services that they provide are interlinked, interconnected and go beyond national borders. On the other hand after the Cold War free flow of capital, people, goods, energy, money, and information, (all of which depend on these systems) have begun to equal free market, and foreign investments. Thus the networks of facilities and infrastructures that build modern systems have begun to ensure competitive edge in the age of globalization. At the same time ensuring the continuous provision of essential services to the population (in order to achieve wellness and prosperity) still remains as a core state responsibility. By attacking these barely protected infrastructures AQAM seriously threaten US and Coalition's national systems. Urged to defend US and Coalition have further challenged their way of life by letting AQAM to grow strength from their own mistakes. Explaining why America is at risk Halberstain for example, claims that the Global War on Terror will be ... "Difficult military-intelligence-security challenge: What we do best they are not vulnerable to. What we do list well they are vulnerable to. What they do best we are to a considerable degree vulnerable to..." (Halberstam, 2001).

The immediate response to the 9/11 attacks as an act of war raised many dilemmas. (Goodman and Derek, 2006). Among others was employment of a military power under the International Law of Armed Conflict. The legality of the military operations in Afghanistan is out of the question. Nonetheless, other operations like in Iraq or especially those operations on domestic soils in the name of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have significantly challenged International Human Rights Law. Since financial exchange and economic advantage in the age of globalization has also helped the spread of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, operating under the war considerations in order to protect modern systems and infrastructure that we rely upon became unacceptable (Halberstam, 2001). In this context Giddens writes that "...abuses of basic freedoms and rights are subject to exposure and condemnation today as never before, thanks in no small part to globalization..." (Giddens,1990).

From all of the above it became clear that AQAM's strategy and response to it by US and Coalition has given both, a new meaning and, a new dimension to the concept of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). These new realities affect not just the US and Coalition, but whole world regions. At the same time most of the South-East European countries actively participate in

one or another way in the GWOT (which in fact made them part of the coalition). Therefore the above raised concerns over their CIP from AQAM's attacks remain relevant to South-East European (SEE) countries.

3. South-East European Countries' Critical Infrastructure (CI) in an Age of Modern Terrorism posed by AQAM

Threats posed by AQAM to the SEE countries' critical infrastructure (CI) are unique. The influence of globalization, the process of transition, AQAM's presence in the Yugoslav conflicts' aftermath, and active involvement in the GWOT have mainly contributed to this outcome.

3.1. Influence of Globalization to the Critical Infrastructure in the region of South-East Europe

Much has been written about the impact of globalization. The interest of its influence to the CIP in general comes from the opportunities that modern systems offer and challenges to their protection in the age of AQAM' terrorism. The unidirectional top-down character of globalization did not pass the region of SEE. Economic and financial benefits of globalization as punch line to stability have significant importance for almost all SEE' countries which in fact are considered as developing nations (Wolf, 2004).

In general globalization has receded Cold War reality (Giddens, 1990). This new "Big thing" (Friedman, 2000), i.e. globalization has led to a growing interdependence and interconnection of markets and networks in a number of essential sectors in SEE (Stojanovska, February 14, 2007). At the same time these positive effects of globalization have increased the vulnerabilities in each of these SEE's sectors too.

The wave of Globalization has also broth some negative effects. Many scholars see globalization as intrusions that disrupt the social order, harm the environment, exploit children and women, and threaten traditional cultures and associated moral behaviors. They regard these residual effects of globalization as an essential tool in the spread of international terrorism. (Lewis, May, 2003; Meyerson, June 28, 2007). Explaining that "...*globalization fundamentally is at odds with civility and with an effectively functioning democracy...*" Barber believes that "*globlism is mandated by profit, not cizenship*" (Barber, March 1992). This pursuit for profit in SEE, as in the rest of the world, has neglected security considerations to the modern systems (infrastructure and

services that they provide). The unique influence of globalization to the SEE's CIP however, comes from the fact that parallel to globalization SEE was exposed on rapid ideological transition colored with Yugoslav conflicts and democratization.

3.2. Process of Transition, and Critical Infrastructure Protection in the South-East Europe

After the Cold War freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights emerged as crucial values in the unipolar political environment (Krauthammer, 1990). In this new environment SEE's countries felt unsecured and economically desperate (state organized market for example vanished). The quest to find place under the security and prosperity umbrellas (NATO and EU) required rapid ideological, political, economic and social changes. In order to promote peace and stability throughout the world these values became integrative part of many international institutions and organizations including EU for example (European Union, 2003). Thus, democratization emerged as a regional trend.

Privatization and liberalization have eroded dominant role of public authority in many essential sectors in SEE such as energy, information communications, food and transport. Today private sector businesses in SEE own and operate most of these sectors' infrastructure, which therefore bear the primary responsibility for its protection (Tagarev and Pavlov, 2007; European Commission, 2007). Though this is not unique just to SEE, corrupt privatization of these sectors has shifted the balance between private stakeholders need for profit and government duty to protect in significant favor to the former. In fact, the corrupt transition processes ran in the name of democratization undermined some standards regarding the security in these sectors which previously had existed. As Gyarmati argues, this ruined public faith in democracy (Gyarmati, 2003).

Corruption during transition has contributed to destruction of social stability too. Lost social stability has caused serious disparities within SEE's local communities. As Ignatius adds in this situation "*...local elites become enmeshed in the global culture..., they tend to lose touch with local realities...,...opening a vacuum that gets filled by religious parties and sectarian ideologues*" (Ignatius, 2006). On the other hand Ignatieff argues that during the transition in the age of globalization "*...liberal virtues-tolerance, compromise, reason...remain as valuable as ever, but they cannot be preached to those who are mad with fear or vengeance...*" (Ignatieff, 1993). Fear

and vengeance from violent Yugoslav conflicts have further colored threats to the critical infrastructure in the region of SEE due to the alleged history and ties with the AQAM.

3.3. AQAM's Presence in the Yugoslavia conflicts' Aftermath as a Threat to the South- East European Critical Infrastructure

The collapse of communism in former Yugoslavia challenged victorious Western liberal democracies from the Cold War with the ghosts of decolonization and bipolarity (Summers 2007). Without really understanding the patterns of the conflicts Western liberal democracies believed that process of democratization will reconcile ethnic intolerance alone (Wolf, 2004). Instead global democratization failed to prevent the domino effect of ethnic conflicts to spill over. Starting from Slovenia through Croatia and Bosnia violent conflicts didn't pass Kosovo and Macedonia (Perito, 2004; Phillips, 2004).

Soon these ethnic conflicts in some parts of former Yugoslavia have equaled religious war. Mujahidin's from all over the world have joined Muslim brothers in Bosnia (Labeviere,1999), Kosovo (Jacquard, 2002), and to some extent Macedonia. Helping the Muslim war efforts through military and humanitarian means, along with ethnicity, has made Balkan ideal place for AQAM. Although this presence of AQAM in SEE does not represent significant direct threat to the SEE's CI it requires vigilant and adequate approach in order to suppress its goals and efforts for several reasons.

AQAM have adapted its specific tactics to the SEE's situation on the ground. They have recognized that after the violent conflict in former Yugoslavia the new born political elites and part of the international community's authorities didn't want to harm West's Balkan legacy and thus, made it unsuccessful story (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Overburdened with democratization, multiculturalism, affirmative action and ethnic tolerance, both international communities and local authorities, have closed their eyes while Wahhabiss have started to spread the new (according to them) true Islam. In Kosovo, where a UN administration replaced Yugoslav rule following the 1999 NATO bombing, the need to placate the province's mafia-connected men of strength manifested acutely in the UN's "don't-rock-the-boat" policy (Deliso, 2006). In this context for example Detective Kellock recalls a "very interesting statement made to me by a very senior police officer" following his team's conviction of a powerful Kosovo Albanian criminal (Balkananalysis, 2006).

None of this could have been possible without the steady and pervasive creation of a Dawa infrastructure (Walker, 1995). These infrastructures are designed to be the engine for spreading true

Wahhabi Islam by all possible means (Deliso, 2007). Indeed, as the American special police investigator in Kosovo and other sources resignedly admit, the Balkans has become “*a two-way conveyor belt*” for radical Islam, importing foreign radicals and exporting ideologically vulnerable students and a small number of terrorist supporters (Katz, 2005). Building up the mosques, carrying out aggressive training, and disseminating propaganda that depicts the Muslims globally as victims of the alleged Western “*crusade*” are dominant tasks in communities where Muslims are minority. In Bosnia (Galijashevic, 2006), Albania (Crewdson and Huntley, 2005) and Kosovo (UNMIK, 2001; Pravda, 2002; Robinson and Jennings, 2004), these Dawa infrastructures are used not just as promoters of true Wahhabi to the neighboring Balkan states, but also to confront the secular Muslim politics (BBC, 2006; Bajrovic, 2006; Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2006; BETA, 2006; Taylor, 2001).

Although counterterrorism efforts in SEE can deny clandestine terror cells of AQAM the spreading of Islamic teaching (Dawa) is hard to fight by conventional and direct means. As the whole region of SEE move toward the West the AQAM protagonists in SEE do too. Using the human rights as shield and widely criticized communist security measures they have literally paralyzed successful preventive measures against their activities. In the Balkans, where Western rhetoric of human rights, democracy, and multicultural tolerance is practically a religion in itself, Islamic groups have cleverly using it against local societies and, by default, their Western sponsors. The vocal Tirana “*human rights*” group (the Muslim Forum of Albania), for example, exemplifies the current generation of Islamist organizations’ covert presentation of a fundamentalist agenda. (Deliso, 2007). In addition, ironically, the European Union and United States, referencing human rights concerns, have unintentionally urged SEE governments to legalize religious denominations. Under these demands sects like the Wahhabis groups that have no historical ties to the region and that could pose a terrorism threat have largely dominated SEE’s Muslim communities. Nevertheless one should not make direct accusation to the West about Wahhabis proliferation in SEE. West has never agitated for this. Instead transition, democratic inexperience and social instability and have created the vacuum that Wahhabists have started to fulfill.

Ruined social stability in most of the SEE countries after the violent Balkan conflicts in many rural areas has become ideal for Wahhabis ideology. Economic depression, state disinterest (Center for European Enlargement Studies, 2008) and a legacy of oppression, are mainly used in remote pockets of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Macedonia to persuade Muslim youths (Sekulovic, 2006). Their aggressive approach in overtaking the exiting pivotal role in Muslim

religious community leadership is more than evident in several SEE countries too. Wahhabi activists keen on keeping under the radar also employ a portable Dawa infrastructure, preaching in private sessions at the homes of would-be converts (Karajkov, 2005; Lewis, 2006; Balkananalysis, 2005).

Up to know, there is no evidence of major AQAM attempt or attack to SEE critical infrastructure. However, evidence of individuals from SEE countries involved in major AQAM terrorist attacks around the globe rise serious concerns for SEE security. For example a 2003 Defense & Foreign Affairs report claims that Hussein Zivalj, former Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations, has connections with the broader planning process of 9/11 (Purvis, 2001). As Deliso argues, “...*Bosnian ties to the 2003 Madrid train bombing and the failed attempt on the Pope’s funeral by Bosnia-based radicals in April 2005, to the arrest of a Kosovo Albanian in connection with the London terror plots three months later, and the Bosnia youth arrests in November...*”, are evidence that as he believes “...*attest that two decades of Western intervention, simultaneously with foreign Islamic proselytizing and funding, have heightened the risk of the Balkans as a breeding ground for terrorism...*” (Deliso, 2007).

Furthermore, AQAM in SEE have adapted and became sufficient in using modern technology. A U.S. military official statement that “...*The internet allows the establishment of a worldwide insurgency by non-state actors...*” (Taylor, 2002), remain relevant to SEE. The Sarajevo arrests of late 2005 drew attention not only for AQAM’s Balkan dimension, but for the fact that they had involved a small group of plotters from around the world, most of whom had never met, communicating online, which was not new in SEE (Gumbel, 1997; Abrahams 1997; Schmidt, 2000).

Global trends toward economic and energy efficiency brings further challenges to the region’s CI in the context of AQAM presence. As the Euro-Atlantic integration of the SEE advance the region falls ever more firmly into the grip of multinational corporations looking to fulfill the region’s potential as an energy corridor. Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, and Romania are only some of the regional countries in which new oil and gas pipelines, and accompanying highways, are being planned. While the goal of energy corridor development may be positive (securing energy stability in local and Western countries), it also entail the fact that more pipelines simply means more tangible territory that must be defended from terrorist attacks. As with the Internet and digital communications, an attack anywhere along the network hampers the network. In this context Deliso believes that future collision of global Islam and global industry will meet head-on in remote places like southwestern Macedonia, where the long awaited AMBO

(Albania- Macedonia-Bulgaria Oil) pipeline route is set to exit the country into Albania just north of one of the major covert centers of radical Islam in the country, a mountainous region also infested with cross-border drugs and weapons smuggling (Deliso, 2007).

From all of the above it won't be hard to conclude that AQAM have significant and unique presence in the region of SEE. Although some experts believe that "*Balkan terrorist threat is extremely limited*" many of them agree that the risk of "*white al Qaeda members, even females, recruited from the Balkan Muslim communities are a very real one...*" (Gelevska, 2004; Mc Grory, 2006). Furthermore, regarding the AQAM *modus operandi* of attacking CI around the globe their evident presence in SEE rises additional concerns.

3.4. Active Involvement in the Global War on Terror as Reason for Threats to the South-East European's Critical Infrastructure

After 11 September 2001 terrorist attack almost all international actors have supported the US right to self-defense. However, the later Bush administration's concept of the so-called Global War on Terror and Iraq invasion has not just awaken many controversies, but has also created new Al Qaeda. Despite all controversies willing to benefit in their Euro-Atlantic integration or in their partnership with the US almost all SEE countries have joined military campaign in the GWOT.

While US led Coalition's military operation successfully destroyed almost all Al Qaeda cells in Afghanistan, Iraq invasion and military operations in many Muslim countries (considered as Al Qaeda sanctuaries) have unexpectedly created new, more dangerous Al Qaeda. This new network of associated movements has soon adopted and stroked back. The attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, Mumbai and Moscow have all showed how destructive this network of associated movements could be. Attacking critical infrastructure with impunity as has never seen before these non-state actors have spread fear and have also impact public opinion and some states policy (for example Spain after the Madrid attack). The promises that they will attack all US partners in the GWOT bring to attention the CIP in South-East Europe too.

Republic of Macedonia is active member in the GWOT since 2002. On the other hand as a SEE country all of the above discussions about AQAM threats to the CIP remain relevant to Macedonia too. One way to reduce these treats is to establish appropriate approach to the CIP. Since Macedonia shares common challenges and perspectives in many ways as the rest of SEE countries, recommendation for Macedonian CIP's improvement in the context of AQAM threats with

appropriate adjustments could be applicable to the rest of the SEE countries' CIP (EU Comision, 2007).

4. Critical Infrastructure Protection from AQAM: the Case of Macedonia

The importance of choosing adequate approach in CIP in current complex security environment with AQAM presence requires comprehensive approach. This could be achieved only if we apply complex system analysis, considering patterns that go beyond conventional understanding of the problem. Therefore we need to start looking in to the existing legislation, organizational design (i.e. dedicated agencies and existing mechanism), the strategy for CIP, and social readiness for defense in the Republic of Macedonia.

Macedonian legislation for CIP does not centralize responsibility only in one governmental authority. It consists of both, provisions that directly locate responsibility and the leading role of specific agency, and provisions that imply responsibility such as bilateral business agreements and corporate security ("The Official Gazette of RM", No.9/04). International legislation further facilitates legal background for CIP in Macedonia. This is understandable since cyber-security and environmental protection are on the security agenda in most of the international organizations to whom Macedonia is party. Many international organizations have taken steps to raise awareness, establish international partnerships, and agree on common rules and practices. European Union (EU), the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the G8 Group, NATO, the OECD, the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank Group (UN Resolution 57/239 of December 2002).

Macedonia also misses (which is more or less true for the rest of the SEE countries) a legal document that contains summarized list of dedicated critical infrastructure. Instead, the network of laws regarding the CIP gravitates over the several ministries. This include Ministry of interior, "Law on Internal Affairs" (The Official Gazette of R.M no.92/09), Ministry of defense "Law of Defense" (The Official Gazette of R.M no.8/92), and "Law for changes and addition of Law of Defense" (The Official Gazette of R.M no.5/03, 06 and 08); Ministry of transport and communication "Law of Security in railway traffic" ("The Official Gazette of RM", No. 40/07), "Law of transport of dangerous materials" ("The Official Gazette of RM", No. 92/07), "Law of Security in railway system" ("The Official Gazette of RM", No.48/10), The law of public transportation in ground traffic ("The Official Gazette of RM", No.114/09, No. 83/10, No. 140/10), The law of internal sailing ("The Official Gazette of RM", No. 55/07, No.26/09, No. 22/10), The

law of electronic communications (“The Official Gazette of RM”, No.14/07, No.55/07, No.98/08, No.83/10 No.48/10), The law of air traffic, (“The Official Gazette of RM”, No.24/07, No.103/08, No.67/10); Directorate for protection of classified information, The law of classified information, (“The Official Gazette of RM”, No.9/04), Crisis management center Law on Crisis Management” (“The Official Gazette of RM” No. 29/05) and Protection and rescue directorate The Law on Rescue and Protection” (“Official Gazette of RM”, No. 36/04). Thus, organizational structure for CIP in Macedonia is highly decentralized and cross-governmental agencies (institutions) based. This network of institutions consists of the institutions of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, infrastructure facilities of energy supply companies, information and communication technologies, infrastructure facilities that ensure the provision of vital goods, transport and traffic infrastructures (Hadji-Janev, 2011). Facts that current security threats posed by AQAM are also network oriented raise serious concerns in choosing the right strategy for CIP.

Facing the new security challenges numerous states have highlighted the importance of CIP in their respective national security strategies Center for Security Studies (2009). Additionally, academic environment around the world more consistently have begun to provide scientifically inspired analyses on CIP. Nevertheless, recognizing the necessity for CIP is not enough. Successful CIP requires not just dedicated institution, but also appropriate strategy that can enable this protection.

Republic of Macedonia does not have specific strategy for CIP. Although it is arguable whether or not one is needed, one thing is clear, Macedonia needs operational design on the ground that will enable effective CIP (something that strategy should give). Most CIP strategies follow a similar methodology. A first phase aims to assess risks to the critical infrastructure. Protection measures are then designed in order to reduce these risks (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2007). This NATO based approach is followed by most of the EU members. Regarding Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic efforts this choice could be the right one. However, one should be very careful when accepting this for granted.

For effective CIP in the current environment Macedonia misses centralized planning and decentralized execution (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Up to now, all of the by the law dedicated governmental institutions have been involved in decentralized, their own-based, exercises (even on international level). However, except in theory and in documents, in practice there has not been any progress in planning and organizing cross-institution based exercise (not to speak about the private enterprises). Decentralization is fine. But if it is not coordinated appropriately it might produce dangerous outcome. No matter how old-fashion might sound for

successful CIP in the context of AQAM threats, Macedonia needs centralized decision making. Furthermore, from the analysis above it became clear that private corporate security is neglected in the overall process of CIP.

5. Searching for More Effective CIP from AQAM's threats

Regardless of notion that CIP is not an isolated policy area but fits in the broader framework of counter-terrorism and civil protection policies, Macedonia needs an overall cross-institutional analysis which will determine current critical infrastructure. Good starting point is to look in what NATO or most of the NATO's and EU's members consider as critical infrastructure. For example one could look in European Program for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure (EPCIP) and the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network - EUCIWIN (Brimmer, 2006). This will be in compliance with the Macedonian political elite's efforts and will also expand harmonization process not just in the security, but in overall social areas.

Accepting the NATO based approach in CIP strategy Macedonia needs to reconsider relationships with private security corporate in the context of CIP. NATO accepts the presumption that no critical infrastructure can be 100% secured. This means that the efforts in CIP need to focus on early warning, prevention, perpetrators (terrorists or criminals) mistakes and reducing the consequences. All of this includes and considers corporate security. Therefore, the designated corporate security should not be avoided in CIP planning, management and execution.

No matter how expensive it might be, Macedonia needs centralized approach in managing the planning process in CIP. In fact, Macedonia needs to fulfill the gap between theory and practice. This will also help to analyze and further improve existing legislative, organizational structure, mechanisms and methodology in CIP approach. Recent fatality of terrorist attacks and its aftermath consequences overrun the costs of preventive approach to protect critical infrastructure.

In order to be effective in this centralized planning process Macedonian government needs to coordinate, facilitate and stimulate all stakeholders that build security network in CIP. In terms of coordination recent practice shows that many governments in fact have established cross-sector advisory boards for CIP (The National Infrastructure Advisory Council in the United States, the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC) in Australia or the Association of Italian Experts for Critical Infrastructures (AIIC), are some of the examples). The goal of facilitation should be support of the specific elements of the security network (especially private corporate) and enable them to work efficiently by creating a network-friendly environment. Governments can promote the

networks, advise them (e.g., by creating general frameworks for interaction or by developing model agreements. An example for such case is the exemption for Information Sharing and Analysis Centers - ISACs from the Freedom of Information Act - FOIA in the United States). Network stimulation activities should undermine AQAM abilities to use everyday social and governmental weaknesses and at the same time attack on a lower resistance mode. Therefore best way to organize effective CIP from AQAM in Macedonia and the rest of the SEE is to stimulate social readiness for deterrence and defense.

6. Conclusion

The concept of security after the Cold War has changed. Non-state actors as AQAM have started to pose asymmetric, network-based and unconventional threats around the globe. Corrupt transition, process of democratization, violent Yugoslav conflicts and active support to the GWOT in an age of globalization have all mainly contributed to the unique threats that AQAM pose to CI in SEE.

Like most of the SEE countries Macedonia lacks effective strategy that will not concentrate against immediate danger or prosecution after the fact, but on preventive security measures as well. In order to be effective this strategy should rely on centralize planning and decentralize execution. Regarding the AQAM modus operandi the strategy needs to consider coordination, facilitation and stimulation on all stakeholders (especially private sector) for effective CIP. Ultimately, without SEE's government support to improve social readiness for deterrence and defense, there will be no effective protection to the critical infrastructure from potential AQAM threats.

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