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**Three Essays in
Theoretical
Economics with
Applications to
Global
Correlated
Games Optimal
Taxation and
Cheap Talk
under Common
Knowledge**

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This book contains three essays in theoretical Economics Covering Global Correlated Games Optimal Taxation in the Ben-Porath Model and Cheap Talk under Kripke Semantics and Common Knowledge. First one has a title: Global correlated signal games unique equilibria: Currency attacks with(out) sterilizations and bank runs with heterogenous cost and diamond search model as global game. Second has a title: Optimal taxation in Ben-Porath model. Third one is entitled: Cheap talk, Kripke semantics, common knowledge and two examples of boom, bust & asset. These three papers are also part of the computational economics project or interest in the computational economics of the authors. paperback will be part of the repository at Faculty of Tourism and Business Logistics, Goce Delcev University, Stip, North Macedonia.

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