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VIOLENT GROUPS OF YOUTHS: THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE AND TERRITORIALISATION

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Abstract: The present study aimed to identify the reasons and motivations that facilitate the emergence of violent culturally-motivated groups of youths. Culture is a tool for integration, recognition and affirmation on a territory that is marked using specific codes of recognition.

Therefore, the study analysed the causes and conditions that, in an urban setting, favour the formation and affirmation of groups of foreign adolescents who exercise power, control and violence in specific parts of the city. The study was conducted in the city of Milan. It classified specific origins, attitudes, socio-economic conditions, parenting and intra-familial responsibility and membership practices in which violence becomes an element that reinforces and assigns roles and gratification within the group. The gangs are hierarchically structured and model themselves within precise value schemes that conflict with those proposed by society. Their movements are then established and confined within a space where graffiti serves to identify their territory.

The qualitative research method provided information through data obtained directly from the municipality of Milan. The method reconstructed the dynamics of belonging, inclusion and continued membership in the gangs. Sociological theories on the formation of criminal gangs from the 1960s to more contemporary times have contributed to the creation of a theoretical and conceptual framework that is reflected and applied here. This research project was begun in Milan in 2017, and has provided considerable and valuable results in the context of social anthropology of violence by adolescents from other cultures.

Key words: Baby gang, culture, violence, urban criminality, vandalic graphitisme

Introduction

The ability of large Italian cities to attract commerce and jobs makes them attractive to migrants and foreign citizens in search of a new life and new opportunities. Milan is certainly one of the Italian cities with the highest number of immigrants. Multiculturalism and the multi-ethnic dimension lead to a high concentration of people with the same ethnic origins. These individuals recognize each other and form ethnic groups and socio-cultural entities to which they relate. In these dynamics, we see a desire to relive a past that is now gone, in which the need to flee or abandon their country of origin risks generating a feeling of exclusion from their cultural roots. Having been excluded from their cultural reality, they find it difficult to find

an identity in a process of integration and social inclusion. They suffer mourning and cultural amnesia, putting them at risk of living as cultural hybrids in which the abandonment of their homeland and failure to integrate in the host country may lead to criminality and violence that hamper inclusion and integration.

Theirs is a sentiment of nostalgia and entitlement, of collective reaffirmation, a desire to reposition themselves socially, proud of their culture (despite having abandoned it, as concerns their intimate connection with their homeland) while lacking symbolic and cultural references with respect to the host country. This is a latent condition of "inadequate" individuals in which the symbolic perception of the foreigner is aggravated and compromised by delinquent activities that are strongly desired and identifiable.

Milan's image as an industrial and commercial city with an abundance of personal opportunities and new forms of transnational economy creates favourable conditions for the settlement of numerous ethnic groups that may recognize each other and join in gangs in the name of cultural pride and belonging, potentially generating a dangerous tendency toward specific forms of delinquency. These same forms can lead to scenarios of violence that hinder and compromise attempts to integrate in the social fabric.

Youth gangs

Like many European and Italian cities, Milan's suburbs are characterized by a multi-ethnic and multicultural presence that is structured and professionally integrated within the urban area. In particular, certain areas have a significant presence of foreigners, and Latin Americans in particular, who tend to organize themselves in gangs of youths that control specific neighbourhoods.

The family obviously represents the first environment in which an individual establishes relationships before turning to the outside world, and intra-familial relationships represent an important element of assessment when it comes to behaviour; absent or broken nuclear families and absent parents are important elements in the psycho-social formation of the individual in terms of affectivity, protection and security.

Economics are also added to this: if the family finds itself in a situation of instability and economic precarity, the anxiety and affectivity of the social environment in which the individual grows may be impacted. Economic difficulties can also force young people to abandon their studies and therefore leave the school environment which constitutes a primary place for education for youth, a fundamental space in which to construct the first extra-familial socialisation relationships.

Last but not least, the social context in which the individual lives is also important. The absence of social points of reference can represent a destabilising element in the psyche. Hostile and violent environments devoid of control and social security create fertile soil for psycho-social evolution.

The absence of familial control leads teens to declare their total autonomy and independence. Because the parental educational model is lacking, new behavioural models are sought

and are found in groups of friends through the identification of dominant personalities. The group becomes a family system in which the teen establishes bonds of dependence, subjection and in which he internalises the group's values and normative framework. The adult-adolescent relationship is compromised as the adult figure is replaced by the group-adolescent relationship. In it, the teen feels strong and legitimised in any action. He may assume delinquent antisocial and/or vandalic behavioural models, adopting a cognitive behavioural scheme of opposition and misbehaviour, seeking to escape the boredom of everyday life through a variety of more exciting forbidden stimuli.

As a member of the group, the teen perceives his membership in society through the gang. His acceptance in the gang depends on loyalty to its precepts and codes, and to its social, value and behavioural demands that are expected, organised and mandatory. Therefore, any behaviour failing to comply with expectations may lead to immediate expulsion.

Regarding the sociological theory of urban violence, in 1955 Albert Cohen posited the existence of a specific social breakdown caused by a profound discrepancy between the affirmation of a dominant value-bearing middle class and the formation of a subculture representing conflicting values. According to Cohen, this divergence cannot be bridged and it becomes impossible to envisage a point of convergence; thus, this impossibility represents the element from which a subculture develops, a subculture forged by violent and delinquent values and behavioural models. It constitutes the result of a refusal to accept a dominant middle-class culture in antithesis to a culture of poor individuals who cannot attain ambitious socio-cultural goals or achievements that are accessible to the middle class. Their profoundly marked condition of poverty impacts their ability to reach cultural objectives, leading to hostility toward, and isolation from, the middle class. For such individuals, adopting the behavioural models of a violent and delinquent subculture appears to be a response to a lack of socio-cultural affirmation.

This theory was developed by a number of sociologists in 1960, before the formulation of the differential opportunity theory (Richard Cloward, Lloyd Ohlin) which examines the birth of the violent subculture based on an analysis of the social context, as an environment unable to allow every individual to achieve the same objectives, and as an element contributing to their resulting lack of integration. Thus, it would appear that non-integration and insufficient economic resources are the etiological factors triggering the formation of violent gangs.

In this regard, scholars believe it possible that gang members form criminal gangs to seek refuge from these elements (disadvantaged socio-economic conditions and difficulties in reaching life objectives) and see themselves in other members.

The individual's social position is considered the starting point from which impeding or facilitating elements for the achievement of objectives emerge. Therefore, gang violence becomes a response, a means to adapt to the social context of origin in which the actors involved live and function.

Another theory we should consider is one developed by Franco Ferracuti and Marvin Wolfgang, who consider that gang violence is not actually the result of a response to missed opportunities as posited by other theories, rather a form of expression normalized by specific

models and codes of recognition that are shared by members. A gang is a group, a collective consciousness that uses violence to express its purpose, to adhere to the group's rules, and as an expression of the organisation and its members. This approach considers that individuals develop within an enclosed space in urban areas habitually frequented by youth, where they spontaneously and naturally gather.

Therefore, the mandatory nature of norms and compliance with rules is necessary to maintain order and social control in any territory, whether urban or suburban. This is not a form of manipulation, or a set of prohibitions and limitations on collective and individual expression, rather a mechanism to maintain social stability.

Walter Reckless (1961) stated that containment factors favour social conduct within the framework of legality. "Inner" containment is the individual's intra-psychic sphere: self-control, a high degree of socialisation, determination, willpower, a sense of responsibility. "External" containment represents the social environment in which the individual functions and acts: this includes social structural prohibitions applied by institutions. External containment can therefore be ascribed to societal expectations, the level of education reached and prospects of success. Because these values are related to the external context, they encourage adaptation and conformity, integration and social identification.

Sociologist David Matza (1964) considered that the theory of the delinquency of the subculture depends on the perception of the act, a perception that changes if the person perceiving is the delinquent individual, the author of the act itself - and the group to which he belongs - or the person accusing him. Matza considered that a person acting within a group expresses himself through a value scheme supported by the group itself, which often does not perceive its own delinquency. Instead, it tends to justify delinquency by the need for recognition and legitimacy in the group, even justifying it in the name of group spirit. This type of delinquency does not inevitably lead to the approval and internalisation of delinquent behavioural forms, but the trend is one of neutralisation of norms.

The theory of neutralisation releases the individual from the obligation to comply with established norms, which are "suspended" by delinquent behaviour. So, we can state that delinquency is a choice through which the individual expresses his identity, his self; it is a pragmatic and symbolic model of affirmation. Therefore, its action has a circular effect responding to delinquent behaviour through feedback from social interactions. Communication through social control can re-dimension the value of these behaviours, amplifying and/or trivialising them. This is why the individual is free to choose whether or not to behave in a delinquent manner. Travis Hirschi (1969) adds, however, that delinquent behaviour is simultaneous with the weakening of the individual's social bonds. Because attachment (familial and friend social environment), involvement (consistent involvement in non-delinquent actions that reduce the amount of time available for acts of delinquency), commitment (to studies, professional and economic activities) and conviction (acceptance and internalisation of legal norms) may be absent, the degree of delinquency depends on the accentuation or attenuation of these elements.

Consequently, delinquency in criminal gangs occurs through a relationship conditioned by conflict and by other individuals who motivate and generate oscillations and optional social itineraries by other individuals. But how much influence can the group have? There have been several theories on this, and many scholars have developed different theories on group delinquency.

So, we should consider how much the group aspect can influence violent delinquent behaviour. Philip Zimbardo developed a theory on violence by individuals within a specific context of power and control.

The psychologist posited that the personality of these individuals is contaminated by a socio-psychological phenomenon of "de-personalisation". In this de-identification process, any person can develop a state of de-individuation or depersonalisation (Lucifer effect) in a precise context and in the presence of specific and limited roles and actions.

Violence becomes the glue and a social integration element within a group of individuals who are motivated by goals. So, violence is no longer a behaviour to be remedied or corrected, but a specific intention to generate consensus within the group. Behaviours not approved by the group could weaken links among members, causing defections and fragility. The group acts according to parameters accepted by all individuals who share their value and legitimacy. And it is precisely through adherence to these actions that a transitory group spirit is born within the group, a spirit governed by rules, behaviours and attitudes that forge its existence as a strengthening and edifying principle. The group acts and establishes laws, and admonishes, warns, accepts and ejects members. In this way, it has a shared conscience that prevents members from making autonomous choices or actions outside the control or without the legitimisation of the group itself. Thus, collective violence appears to be moved by a spirit composed of multiple individuals who share a specific cognitive-cultural heritage: a set of rules, behaviours, ideas and attitudes characterising a cultural system. The group's cognitive-cultural heritage is exemplified by elements at odds with the external value framework. The very construction of this opposing heritage pushes group members to act through a symbolic conception of the other, which is manifested as a principle affirming superiority and neutralising any external social or judicial norm.

Thus, the cognitive dissonance characterising a state of value, social and psychological dissent pushes the individual to join delinquent and violent gangs that establish membership on a value scheme in opposition to that of the outside world. However, as the primary psycho-pathological motivation, that same cognitive dissonance is rooted in individuals living in a profound state of emotional, social and psycho-relational fragility. Because these weak and isolated individuals do not share cultural and value models, they seek groups and individuals expressing a consensus and an emotional (love bombing) and subsequently socio-normative partnership.

Therefore, group membership is based on an emotional and social state created in the participant through a personological condition of psycho-social fragility and instability. Dissatisfaction, isolation and failure to share the external values system (family and society) create an existential malaise in the individual that can push him to seek to assuage his internal (isolation) and external (social isolation) suffering. He finds a remedy to the malaise through individuals

who share his own value system. This is why, through a process and a specific initiation ritual, the group initiates a selection mechanism that transmits the importance of belonging. Indeed, "belonging to a group" means rising to a status of superiority and otherness, developing contempt and disinterest with respect to others. Moreover, because the "other" is positioned in a state of apparent inferiority on a hierarchical scale of values, he/she acquires a role defined in functional key: or represents an initiation/affiliation process or, through the gang's value schemes, leads to criminogenic actions that seek to affirm acceptance of the rules and practices.

Acceptance in the group cannot be considered the fruit of co-optation or an obligation. It satisfies a fragile psycho-social state in which the group's actions characterize its very existence and serve a dual purpose. First, it represents a liberating act from a constrictive, frustrating, insecure and stressful present. Second, the youth is freed from the status of "boy" to become a "man"; no longer dependent on parental figures, he becomes autonomous, declaring himself independent in the society in which he lives.

The gang exerts strong pressure, and under favourable conditions of admission, becomes an alternative behavioural and cultural model that replaces the societal model promoted by the civil system that is a source of constant disappointment: scholastic failures, difficulty in professional integration, precarious social environment, and familial and parental instability.

For a value system based on violent and dissonant precepts and behaviours to be considered valid, it must express and respond to a malaise observable in delinquency typical of the developmental phase of the individual (being adolescent offenders). Indeed, growth and the transition from childhood to adolescence assigns responsibility to the youth that the adult world perceives through different relational means and expectations. Therefore, the outside world relates with the teenager through interactions and demands that sometimes contradict those experienced in childhood. The teenager is required to interact with the outside world on two levels: the first interpersonal and the second intrapsychic. The world relates to the youth no longer as a child but as a teenager, so he is required to respond to this stimulus and message through binding attitudes and obligations. Therefore, the youth with a tentative and fragile personality may see himself not yet as adult but no longer a child. He finds himself between two worlds and may not feel he belongs in either of them. This generates a conflict, a crisis, a crescendo of relational difficulties generating uncertainty and insecurity. The youth feels unable to deal with the problems of the adult world and, in this delicate phase of development, his sense of inadequacy has serious repercussions in the personologic construction of adolescence. This inadequacy is translated in his representation of his body, in his relationships with members of the same or opposite sex, in his construction of his personal identity, in the strengthening of his value system and his desire for greater autonomy and independence (Augusto Palmonari, Maria Luisa Pombeni, Kirchler, 1989).

For the teen, these complex and not-yet solidified changes may represent a source of profound uncertainty and insecurity. The many behavioural obligations and profound physical, social and psychological changes he undergoes may lead to behaviours that are not always supported by a reassuring gratification principle. According to Albert Bandura (1993), teens tend to per-

form actions they consider themselves potentially able to fulfil (Palmonari, 1995), thus making their behaviour safe and effective. It is clear that external stimuli from the family environment, school, society and peer groups, as well as the dominant values of the social context, may have a traumatic impact on this transitional process of identity affirmation and construction. Moreover, having lost the childhood rights they once enjoyed and not yet able to handle new subjective experiences, teens may feel inadequate, unappreciated, and also to a certain extent bored.

In addition to the family, which represents the first interaction social nucleus, relationships with peers are an important element in the development and maturation of the teenager's personality. The group constitutes an important medium for forming and sharing opinions and in constructing the self and others (Salvini, 1994). And it is precisely the desire for greater autonomy and the formation of the identity that pushes the teenager to interact with peers and distance himself from family dependencies. Relationships with persons outside the family environment strengthen the self and contribute to a gradual emancipation process through the formation of a personal values system. Within the group, the youth experiments with and takes on new social roles that differ from those he holds within the family. He acquires characteristics and connotations typical of the reference group based on specific behavioural, social and sexual models.

Group membership is shaped by values and symbolic schemes, "creating" a new, unique and evolving environment free of the obligations of the adult world. Adolescents' relationships are modified, are subject to difficulties and weaknesses, changing as their body and cognitive abilities change, leading teens to separate themselves from significant reference adult figures (Palmonari, 1993).

Thus, the collective experience of the group impacts the formation of the adolescent's social identity and, in the case of delinquent gangs, plays a structural role in the commission of delinquent and violent behaviours. If the group is cohesive and compact, it will act through much more amplified behaviours (Nicholas Emler and Stephen Reicher, 2000) since the acts are performed with others.

Violence serves as a sign of belonging and, as such, takes on a cultural dimension as well. This characteristic prompts a negative reputational mechanism that is the main goal of youth gangs. As a form of delinquency, violence as a behaviour and an integral element in the identification of the group can be considered "normalized". Indeed, group membership presupposes an experiential model of total consent, of sharing of a cultural and values system that is accepted, regulated, legitimised and invoked by the group itself.

The group becomes a new nest of sharing through the interdependence of the members and through the commission of different types of illegal actions. This is how that group spirit mentioned above is created and replaces the family. In addition to sharing the values system, participation in the group is also based on time spent with other members, facilitating the socialisation process through its own communication channels. A sense of superiority and proud difference from others promotes the creation of an ethnocentric vision of otherness that establishes a strong feeling of "US" and "THEM". Moreover, the adoption of a specific language

connected to gang violence and aggression forges the image of a group at odds with the social environment. A strong and manipulative bond is formed that is difficult to break due to the dominance the group exercises over the teenager, whose loyalty is continuously "put to the test" through initiation tests of courage. So, violence represents not only a sign of belonging, but one of trust, pride and advancement within the gang.

It is clear that the psychological dimension of a criminal gang can be considered as linked to a group of individuals who violate laws intentionally as a distinctive sign, but also of individuals suffering from specific problems. In this case, the individuals share goals, languages, and value and territorial systems since they act within a given area. Their criminal activities, performed mainly as a group, may also be considered pathological disorders that, within the group, would be fulfilled with respect to the individual action of the individual member.

Breaking rules as part of the group may represent an initial, embryonic, element of delinquency, before becoming an antisocial attitude. The processes leading an individual to perform violent antisocial acts can be summarized in three distinct phases: the beginning, continuation, and orientation that leads to acquiescence.

The first, the starting phase of normalised violence, can be expressed through anti-conformist, sometimes rebellious behaviours that are structurally directed to generate affirmation, gratification and respect from others. Such feedback is rewarding for the individual who then tends to repeat the behaviour to strengthen relations and the perception others have of him. While the beginning of delinquency may be arbitrary, repetition of the behaviour in response to positive feedback pushes the individual to continue and perpetuate the behaviour as a challenge.

This leads to consolidation and stabilisation as a source of fulfilment, recognition and socio-economic gratification. Dissonance with the external regulatory system, which is perceived as wrong and unjust, creates an inclination to prefer the group's values and rules system and to reject and negate the external one, which is the source of failures (scholastic) and negations (prohibitions), thereby compromising family relations. So, rebellion meets not only a need for gratification, but even success.

The family - and the adult world in general - often tends to consider these phases on a superficial level, thereby limiting parental responsibility and the possibility of neutralizing the delinquency, pushing the individual not to consider his actions as an "offence". Thus, during the stabilisation phase of delinquency, there is confusion in responsibility: neither the teen nor the gang feels responsible, which is attenuated by their parents' attitude. Moreover, precisely because the deviancy and the commission of the offence are backed by collective will, the individual may perceive his act as being induced by the group and not deliberately meditated. The orientation of group behaviour further limits the sense of responsibility in the individual's criminogenic actions. So, the individual cedes responsibility to the group, which promotes actions that are also perversely aimed at satisfying a desire for gratification. The stabilisation of collectively induced violence motivated by a perverse sense of gratification can be related to the perception of an absolute insensitivity to, and denial of, suffering by the victim, who is believed to feel no pain: this vision and conception further legitimize the criminogenic action.

While every action planned by the leader, who is a charismatic and authoritative character, is endorsed by the entire group and shared to the point of legitimising brutality, violence becomes the identifying mark of cultural membership in the group: not embracing it would mean compromising the values scheme within which the group itself is forged and symbolically represents itself to the outside. Acting without consensus would threaten the gang's image and stability.

While the first stage of acceptance of the value system is followed by the second phase of execution and formalisation of the value systems and precepts characterising the group, the third phase of total involvement and habituation may escalate to an "acceptance phase". We can consider acceptance as a process of total adhesion and control over the individual who must respond directly to the group. The process of neutralisation of the self in favour of a group portends a manipulative and conditioning process of the initiate who, it is important to remember, shares its dependence.

However, harassing and violent behaviours highlight clear links with bullying, i.e. through oppression and abuse of power exercised by several individuals against shyer, more insecure and defenceless youths and/or peers. Such actions may trigger complex intra-psychological dynamics in the victim with the risk of emotional repercussions that can lead to suicide, social isolation and skipping or dropping out of school. Intervention is necessary in these cases with a strengthening of the presence of the adult and the institutions, i.e. the specific and fundamental responsibilities of the adult world. The phenomenon can be traced to two fundamental paths: the first related to an underestimation of the problem, and the second to the creation of a nostalgic and pejorative sentiment that considers that every age has its problems. A third tecnica option that is perhaps the most desirable, is to reinforce the structures and figures in the teenager's social, civil and school world.

The group's actions are not those that the individual would perform on his own. Because it is subject to conditioning stimuli, the group spirit acts in the name of a new subject, a social identity that requires continuous confirmation. Group membership means feeling valued, acquiring a specific role and obtaining gratification, all of which strengthen the personality. The role played and the functions performed establish the individual's identity and sense of security. As we mentioned, the individual considers the group as a new family promoting new value and behavioural schemes that teaches him until he is considered worthy of membership and of praise.

Intrafamily communication and a greater presence of so-called "educational agents" (family, school, institutions) are key aspects of prevention that should take greater account of the relationship between the objectives that the adolescent may pursue and the socio-familial resources or context. This also includes a school capable of stimulating the student through additional socialisation-oriented educational activities. Judicial authorities can also contribute significantly to prevention, through greater protection of minors, timely rehabilitation interventions and a reorganisation of the law with regard to minors.

Gang members are described as violent and aggressive individuals but at the same time fragile and insecure. It is in this aggressiveness and insecurity that we encounter the communication and motivational behaviour significance of behaviour in search of a social space,

the construction of an identity through an adaptation process that responds to the difficulties caused by interaction with a social world to which they feel they do not belong. In this context, the acquisition of security appears to be much more possible because the behaviours taken to belong to the group are more aggressive and violent, replicating value and behavioural schemes reflecting the delinquent culture of the new social environment of belonging.

This place signifies not only an ineffective ability to control at-risk situations but, in some respects, pays scarce attention to minors during their development process. A failure to listen to the needs of youth and inadequate attention to their feelings could be factors making it more difficult to identify at-risk situations. Underestimating delinquency prevents timely interventions, since attention is paid to the phenomenon only when expressed in dramatic and seemingly unexpected ways, signalling solidly entrenched behaviour and delinquent value schemes. In considering the responses from the sample considered, we realise that not only the actors “closest” to the minor, like the family, are involved, but institutions and socialisation agencies as well. These, in particular, are considered responsible for a passive attitude that reduces the value of delinquency indicators such as labelling used by teens in different social contexts.

Minors who commit group offences are predominantly male, with an average age of around 15 and half years, for the most part from underprivileged suburban neighbourhoods. This factor supports the hypothesis of a link between delinquency and a lack of socialisation and recreational opportunities. Another indicator on which to reflect is the link with the school; not only because most of the minors reported to the police are registered at a secondary school, but because statistics show that are the offences committed at or near schools.

Conclusions

Ethnic criminal gangs often “specialise” in a particular type of offence, especially economic. We can conclude that the formation of these groups can also be explained if we consider the Milanese area (because it is densely populated) as a pool of potential customers and trafficking suitable for gang survival, dedicated to drug dealing, theft and possession of illegal goods.

First of all, we can state that the indigenous nature of gangs present in other cities may prevent ethnically orientated ones from establishing themselves in the territory. For well-documented historical reasons, large southern Italian cities traditionally tend to consolidate power in families that control the markets and territory, and that also aggregate gangs of Italian youths. This would appear to prevent the emergence of other competitors in the same urban and suburban contexts.

However, unlike Rome and/or Southern Italian cities, Milan has not historically been controlled by Italian groups through collective violence. The social, cultural and economic dynamics of the Milanese area have not permitted a historical rooting of Italian criminal gangs. So, it represents virgin territory with a high percentage of foreigners that has allowed these very foreigners, in a multi-factorial perspective, to form gangs and act collectively to control the territories with no opposition from local Italian gangs (at least in the majority of cases).

Data from the already mentioned 2015 Report of the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multi-ethnicity reveal the challenges for the region and the actions and interventions that the community and its institutions could and/or have already planned and implemented for a change of perspective.

With respect to recent migratory flows, Italy and the Lombardy region in particular are seeing definite growth in the number of asylum residence permits granted and asylum requests "that have more than doubled in absolute terms at the national level: (+29,000) and in relative terms represent one-fifth of new entries in 2014 (7,500 in 2013).

Lombardy ranks as the top region in the number of temporary structures for immigrants: according to the Ministry of the Interior, 544 structures were operating in the region as of 10 October 2015, representing 18% of all temporary structures in the country. Moreover, Lombardy and Sicily lead the country in the number of immigrants housed in shelters, accepting approximately 13% of the country's total (8% in 2014).

Changes impacting the migration scenario pose new challenges that will have to be addressed at the European and national levels, but the regional level as well. In particular, in the future, regional and local authorities will also be required primarily to house, assist and integrate asylum seekers (see chapter 2 of the Report). However, the costs of housing and charity borne by the regions and municipalities, in particular those under the greatest pressure such as Lombardy, require adequate support through economic aid mechanisms at the European level.

After World War II and until the significant foreign immigration phenomenon, Milan had never experienced "neighbourhood gangs" that controlled or sought to control the territory. Petty crime in Milan's suburbs was extremely fragmented, committed by individuals of different ages who often fought amongst themselves or acted individually or in small groups of three or four. Since Milan became one of the destinations of interest for organised crime, organised crime has moved into Lombardy and the north in general, with very different methods of penetration compared to those of their respective areas of origin. In northern Italy, the various Mafias never sought to control the territory (though they are widespread in certain areas of the south), instead investing illicit funds in lawful business.

Because of these differences, we can consider Milan and its dynamics as potential fertile ground for a type of crime connected more to territorial control by gangs identified by their unique ethnicity.

Sometimes, to strengthen the sense of belonging, these gangs create "ideologies" that pre-establish "enemies" to be fought (racism, gender-based violence, etc.). While the decision to join a gang depends on a particular family and social context, a decisive role is also played by the expectation of easy money and increased power.

The freer the territory the gang seeks to conquer is from the control of other similar groups, the easier it will be to win. Otherwise, the gang seeking affirmation will have to resist attacks from the gang resisting a loss of control. Maladapted youth, whether foreign or Italian, may find it more desirable to submit to an already existing petty crime gang, rather than fight to replace it.

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DRINKING WATER SECURITY

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Abstract: This small compilation shows that the critical infrastructure (drinking) water supply is exposed to a wide range of threats. This can on one hand be compared with the threats against, for example, a steel mill or iron works (delivery, cyber-attack in the production area, etc.). On the other hand, drinking water is our most important food (see German magazine Crisis Prevention 4/2016, pp. 20-24) and thus the threat against drinking water supply systems can influence the security of a municipality, a district or - in a coordinated action - an entire region in a malevolent manipulation. In the event of an intended interruption and / or destruction of the water supply lines, the consequences are initially similar to those in the event of unintentional intervention. However, it must be assumed that the perpetrator(s) will try to disguise the damaged area or will try to select a location with difficult access so that a repair is as complicated and time intensive as possible.

Introduction - some examples

In 1998, a (probably teenage) hacker attempted to break into the SCADA system of the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona, trying to affect the control of the floodgates. However, the authorities involved in the investigation agree that there was no access to critical control components.

In 2003, members of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) placed four incendiary devices at the Ice Mountain® Water Company's production facilities in Stanwood, Mecosta County, Michigan. ELF's "allegations" against Ice Mountain® were named "water theft for financial enrichment".

In November 2005, a farmer from the Ravensburg, Germany area sunk two opened canisters of pesticides at the water intake point in western Lake Constance near Sipplingen; his motive: "revenge on the justice".

For the Republic of Northern Macedonia, there is a general lack of safe and clean drinking water. 43 percent of the rural areas have problem with unsafe drinking water supply. Similar is the case with the wells, fountains and springs, where malfunction of the water up to 60 % is registered. Furthermore there is no existing wastewater treatment plant which could eliminate the wastewater pollutants before their discharge into water bodies.

This small compilation shows that the critical infrastructure (drinking) water supply is exposed to a wide range of threats. This can on one hand be compared with the threats against, for example, a steel mill or iron works (delivery, cyber attack in the production area, etc.). On the other hand, drinking water is our most important food (see German magazine Crisis Prevention 4/2016, pp. 20-24) and thus the threat against drinking water supply systems can influence the security of a municipality, a district or - in a coordinated action - an entire region in a malevolent manipulation.

The manipulation of water infrastructure with malevolent intention – history and present

Historically, the oldest form of water (or more precisely the prevention of use or access to water) to be used as a weapon has been performed in antique times. There are many examples in which the interruption and / or destruction of water supply pipelines to a hostile empire, an enemy city, and an opposition camp led to the population suffering water shortages. But even in the 21st century, a crisis situation can arise through intentional or unintentional interruption and / or destruction of the water supply lines (to a location, a property, a critical infrastructure such as a hospital). An unintentional interruption / destruction of the water supply lines can be caused, for example, by excavations, if a fresh water line is damaged or destroyed; hence the ingress of contaminants into the drinking water system is made possible. Some examples can be found in chapter “Unintentional contamination of drinking water ...”. In the event of an intended interruption and / or destruction of the water supply lines, the consequences are initially similar to those in the event of unintentional intervention. However, it must be assumed that the perpetrator(s) will try to disguise the damaged area or will try to select a location with difficult access so that a repair is as complicated and time intensive as possible.

Indirect influence as disturbance factor - prevention of the use of waterways

Another indirect use of water as a “weapon” in a broader sense is found in a potential flooding of an area below the surrounding water level (dam, polder landscape in the Netherlands, canals in central England) or in the draining of waterways used for shipping (waterway junction; in Germany e.g. at Minden or at Magdeburg). An example can be found near Wolverhampton / Great Britain. The Shropshire Union Canal is under(!)crossed at one point by a main road. The channel nowadays is used only for sport and leisure shipping. However, should the canal be drained by the mechanical destruction of the canal (e.g. with a dredger or crane vehicle) or by blowing up the bridge, this would result in an interruption of (recreational) navigation.




Fig. 1: Underpass of „primary road“A5 beneath (!) Shropshire Union Canal, Position 52.6942275 North - 2.1895914 West between Wheaton Aston and Brewood (satellite picture taken from google maps, based on own experience of the author)

Direct influence on the water quality with malevolent intention – history and present

For the historically anchored method of using water as a weapon through the poisoning of drinking water wells or reservoirs, there are several examples which, however, can sometimes not be scientifically substantiated. Nowadays, while planning preventive and reactive measures for crisis situations (e.g. in the context of the preparation of an emergency and crisis management concept), it is to be assumed that the offender(s) will select contaminants to be brought into the drinking water system, which will be hard to detect in routine (quality) controls – if not impossible to detect (see chapter “Current Protection Mechanisms”). The German Fraunhofer Institute has developed a system for checking contaminants (see chapter “Innovative Protection Mechanisms”).

Aspects not considered

The following aspects will not be considered in this article:

- Waterboarding (not only because the international perspective is highly controversial);
- Water used to repel pirates to prevent boarding of merchant ships (this has been and is common practice, for example, in the Horn of Africa region / Somali Basin, as evidenced by the Best Management Practices Handbook (BMP5); this handbook is published by an extensive consortium of signatories and is meanwhile available in the fifth revised edition);

- Water cannons use by the police (for this purpose there is the relevant police service order (Polizeidienstvorschrift, PDV) 122 "Use of water cannons and water fittings" („Einsatz von Wasserwerfern und Wasserarmaturen“).

Unintentional contamination of drinking water in Germany and the United States - examples

This chapter deals with the inadvertent contamination of drinking water, using some examples from Germany and the United States.

The first example to be mentioned occurred on the evening of Pentecost in 2014, residents of Weddewarden (small village near Bremerhaven, Germany) had complained about a salty taste of the water. Fast tests confirmed an undetermined contamination. The drinking water supply was then stopped until the following Wednesday; drinking water was supplied by the fire brigade and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). 300 households with 600 inhabitants were affected. According to the authorities (Gesundheitsamt), a health hazard had never existed; this was confirmed by laboratory tests.

The pollution occurred in March 2014, but has not been detected until June 2014; reason unknown. This means that the contamination was lurking in the fresh water system for more than three months.



Fig. 2: A fresh water "bubble" installed by the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) Bremerhaven (source: <https://www.thw-bremerhaven.de/aktuelles/aktuelle-meldungen/artikel/trinkwasser-fuer-600-menschen/>) © THW Bremerhaven

In 2016 alone, contamination by germs in drinking water was detected in several cities in Germany, for example in Neumünster (August 2016), in Eitorf near Bonn (October 2016), in

Ramsen near Kaiserslautern (also in October 2016) and in Salzgitter (December 2016). All these cases were caused by unintentional introduction of germs and / or pollutants into the local drinking water network. In the cases mentioned above, safe supply could be restored within a few days. The latest example of unintentional water contamination is the town of Wadern in Southwest Germany (late August 2019).

In the United States of America, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the 1993 outbreak of *Cryptosporidium* in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has been estimated to have killed between nearly seventy and more than one hundred people and affect the health of over 400,000 people. The contamination of the local drinking water was caused by the combination of heavy rainfall and overflowing manure reservoirs contaminating the rivers and the Lake Michigan located off the coast of Milwaukee. The local sewage system was unable to remove this contamination, causing (partially long-lasting) diarrhea. The outbreak of *Cryptosporidium* in Milwaukee is to date the greatest epidemic in the history of the United States.

Another relatively recent example on the subject of “unintentional contamination of drinking water” can be found in Flint, Michigan. There, the change of the fresh water provider was intended to save approx. US \$ 200 million over a period of 25 years.




Fig. 3: Flint, Michigan, water supply sketch (by author); previously used line (Detroit, MI to Flint, MI), projected line (Karegnondi, MI to Flint, MI), intermediate supply line used up to the 1960s and from May 2014 (Flint River)

However, after the re-arrangement of the water supply, the population’s complaints about the inadequate quality of their drinking water rose very quickly. The water was contaminated

with extremely high levels of lead, trihalomethanes (THM), legionella and other pollutants. This contamination has been proven after protracted protests by the population and despite initial denials by the city administration. It is due, among other things, to the fact that the necessary additives had not been added to the drinking water, which were intended to prevent the seepage of lead from the over-aged water pipes. Normal water quality in Flint, MI could be achieved again after more than 2 ½ years of supplying the population with bottled water in April 2018; the overall costs were approximately US \$ 450 million.

Before considering the question of intended contamination (intentional sabotage, intended terrorist attack), the following chapter “Current Protection Mechanisms” deals with the quality control measures of some German and foreign water suppliers (Berlin; San Antonio, Texas; Singen am Hohentwiel; Phoenix, Arizona). Furthermore the possibilities of unintentional and intentional contamination of water supply systems are discussed.

Current protection mechanisms - continuous verification of raw water

The water supply systems of Berlin and San Antonio have a certain set of parallels when it comes to the protection of the population’s water supply. In both cities, drinking water is extracted from wells distributed throughout the city. In Berlin’s West, the waterworks and associated wells are in the area of the Havel, in the Southeast they are located near the rivers Spree and Dahme. San Antonio has a network of mostly artesian wells distributed throughout the city, fed by the Edwards Aquifer.




Fig. 4: Edwards Aquifer, Texas (Source: www.edwardsaquifer.net)

Both municipal waterworks continuously check the quality of the raw water entering the water-works; if too much pollution / (possibly intended) contamination is detected, the affected

well is mechanically disconnected from the mains, an alternative supply is established over uncontaminated strands, and once the causes have been removed, the formerly polluted / contaminated well can be reconnected to the mains.

The continuous inspection of the raw water ensures a substantial quality of the water, which is fed into the production process; at the end of this process, clean drinking water will leave the water works, meeting the requirements of the relevant regulation; in Germany, this refers to the revised Drinking Water Ordinance ("Trinkwasserverordnung") of 2018.

Current safeguards for the finished product - multi-week cycle

The situation is different after feeding the drinking water from the water works into the supply network.



Fig. 5: Drinking water sampling station in New York (Source: www.dreamstime.com)

In expert interviews, it was confirmed that the quality control of the drinking water is based on a cycle of mostly several weeks. At designated sampling points (in Berlin for example in schools, kindergartens, hospitals, local authorities; in New York City, NY on one of almost 1,000 sampling stations) a sample is taken at regular intervals and sent to the affiliated laboratory for a comprehensive analysis.

Secondly, both water suppliers in Berlin and in San Antonio rely on an attentive, critical clientele: If the supplied drinking water changes in color, smell and / or taste, the consumers usually report very quickly to their water supply company. This is where the weak point in the system can be found, because if a terroristic group (of whatever motivation) succeeds in introducing a sufficient quantity of toxic, colorless and odorless poison into the water supply system as it leaves the waterworks, the above mentioned areas (municipality, district, region) will be affected.

Current Infrastructure Protection Mechanisms - Examples Singen Water Works at Hohentwiel; Phoenix, Arizona

The weak points are the accesses to the water networks as well as the storage areas of the treated drinking water. Physical safety (of the drinking water well and) of drinking water storage tanks in Germany are widely ensured by a suitable range of measures. These include, for example, simple fences, barred windows, access control in the form of code cards or locking systems, video surveillance, motion detectors and others. These measures are generally sufficient, as there are several redundancies in each system.

In the United States, in contrast to Germany, only between two-thirds and three quarters of the population are connected to a community water service (CWS). For malicious intentions, this opens a wide variety of ways to conduct individual manipulations, for example, at the pumping station of a house, a small settlement, a village.

The larger water supply systems in the United States, such as the Central Arizona Project (CAP) and the Salt River Project (SRP) in Phoenix, Arizona, include a ramified water supply



Fig. 6: Entrance door to water storage in Schlatt unter Krähen (photo by author)



Fig. 7: Water pumping station in Glendale, AZ (photo by author)

and distribution network, which, however, are similar to most of the electrical power grids – they are running above ground / on the surface, the area of the pumping stations is usually accessible by a motor vehicle, and the sole protection is often a simple fence! For this very reason, these infrastructures are relatively vulnerable to physical attacks / manipulations. With only advanced basic knowledge of hydraulic engineering and supply technology, manipulation / sabotage would be quite feasible; this could include an interruption / physical destruction of the equipment as well as the targeted introduction of a contaminating substance. The consequence of the former would be a supply shortage (which would be immediately noticed by the population), the second would possibly - strongly depending on the substance - lead to an unnoticed and creeping contamination of consumers in the affected area.

Consideration of potential perpetrators (groups)

After discussing these examples of unintentional contamination and the presentation of currently used protective mechanisms, the question now arises to what extent intentional sabotage or an intentional attack with (bio- or chemo-) terroristic background could be detected

in time or would actually have a chance of success. This terrorist background should not, must not be limited to Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Similarly, other groups or individuals, such as Timothy McVeigh (the so-called "Oklahoma bomber"), the mathematics professor Theodore "Ted" Kaczynski (the so-called "Una bomber") or other individual perpetrators or terrorist groups with different motivations may use the contamination of water for their purposes. The question arises: Who would choose this type of attack on the drinking water supply as a terrorist or sabotage act? As part of the author's dissertation project, the psychological aspects of an attack on water supply systems are discussed. The origin of a perpetrator or perpetrator group in the field of Islamist extremism is assessed as very unlikely, since their attacks are usually aimed at a very short period, if possible with a symbolic selection of the attack date; a large number of immediately injured or killed victims should go along. Considerably more likely to contaminate the drinking water supply is the frustrated, from his perspective wrongly dismissed employee of a waterwork, or a lower-placed candidate in a town mayor's election. The perpetrator profile of a mentally disturbed person who aims to contaminate the drinking water without any apparent connection remains a challenge for criminal psychologists anyway for all kinds of attacks, whether it will be on water supply systems, electricity grids or a so-called soft target, e.g. a shopping mall, a sports stadium or a concert venue. Another possibility is the coordinated action of environmental activists, see the above-mentioned example of the Earth Liberation Front, which justify an attack with public arguments that are difficult or impossible to understand.

Assessments of various authorities

On October 10, 2001, almost exactly one month after 9/11, Ronald L. Dick, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI, reported on "Terrorism: Are America's Water Resources and Environment at Risk?" and made it clear that the FBI considers all threats directed against water supply systems as very serious, be it a terrorist threat or a threat from another direction. The attacker(s) would have to

- be able to obtain and use very large quantities of a toxic substance;
- have advanced basic knowledge of the water supply network;
- have access to critical points of the network.

This would be relatively unlikely in a large city or metropolis, as there are several steps to secure the quality and quantity to be delivered. However, in a smaller community, in a rural environment, or targeted against individual blocks of flats, this can be regarded as an option. Dick recommends perimeter protection of the source, the waterworks and the critical points, but could not provide more precise measures. The FBI sees the possibility, but not the probability of contamination of the drinking water. In his presentation, Dick distinguishes between the physical destruction (e.g. of aqueducts), the introduction of pathogenic substances into the production or cleaning process (e.g. disinfectants) and the post-productive introduction of contamination in the vicinity of the target (e.g. a hospital, an office building, a school). However,

directly after the attacks on 9/11, the FBI did not have a “general or specific threat information of a planned attack on the nation’s water supply”.

A threat to the population through contaminated drinking water is also seen by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), set out in the report of the Federal Government on “Risk Analysis in Civil Protection”. In this publication, several sub-scenarios are considered, such as the “targeted application of a toxic substance [into the drinking water] in a building with high public traffic”, for example, schools / kindergartens, employment agencies, but also shopping centers, amusement parks, sports stadiums, or the “release of hazardous substances into a natural water” such as a little river, leading to the water works. Other scenarios are more indirectly aimed at the contamination of drinking water, such as the targeted damage to a storage tank of industrial hazardous goods or the targeted release of toxic substances from dangerous goods container. This threat may also apply to military installations.

The Swiss Association of Gas and Water (SVGW) points out in its recommendation for “sabotage protection of drinking water supplies” that there are many independent Swiss water supplies, which each supply a small number of inhabitants. Their sources of water are mostly wells and groundwater, sometimes provided to the consumer without any processing – as it is of very high quality. Beyond that, drinking water is often processed in decentralized water processing sites.

The assessment that these utilities are of secondary importance for an organized sabotage attack because of their small size is not shared here. The expected media response to a large-scale, possibly bloody attack is understandably greater than the contamination of the water supply of a small mountain village. However, there have been cases in the past, where crime, acts of violence and robberies “in the village” occurred and the - mostly unanimous - statement of the local population repeated again and again like a millet, that they thought “those things only happen in the big cities”. Important here is the consideration of the perpetrator’s motivation, see the following chapter on islamistic / religiously or politically motivated terrorism and the “Lonely Wolf”.

The same leaflet of the SVGW points out that water supply systems, in particular after the water has left the processing plant, is at risk for sabotage. It is considered understandable that despite high safety standards in the waterworks or during the production or cleaning process



Fig. 8: Unprocessed water in Austria (photo by author)

there is a significantly higher risk of an intelligently executed attack on a drinking water system after leaving the waterworks / elevated tank and on the way to the consumer, possibly even a very short distance before the actual tapping point.

The SVGW rightly draws attention to the special nature of the supply chain of the product "drinking water", because "usually food is delivered in batches or in packages for sale or delivery." Drinking water, on the other hand, is supplied continuously through a mostly extensive piping system whereby a precise designation of a contaminated batch is not easily possible. Nevertheless, water supply authorities have the potential to isolate contaminated volumes of drinking water and to initiate appropriate countermeasures.

In a personal interview with the author, the Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of San Antonio Water Systems (SAWS) commented as follows: "If a contamination is detected / noticed, the corresponding valves are closed, the affected area is sealed off, and the water supply is ensured via another line in the corresponding area. The water supply network in San Antonio is almost like a spider web. The pumps are all centrally monitored and controlled from the main building; in case of crisis this is possible from the backup center as well."

This also explains why San Antonio does not name any "critical infrastructures" in the area of water supply, because most (!) hospitals and authorities in the Texas metropolis have per se an emergency supply. In the aforementioned interview, a hospital in northern San Antonio was cited, which holds an emergency stock of the average water demand for four hours (!); other hospitals and authorities have their own wells (400 to 600 feet deep, i.e. 130 to 200 meters), some of them are artesian wells.

Islamistic / religiously motivated terrorism

For Islamistic or religiously motivated terrorism, a definition can be found e.g. in a police information brochure in Rhineland-Palatinate. The terms Islamism, Jihadism and Salafism are defined building on one another. "The term Islamism refers to a religiously motivated form of political extremism. (...) Islamists see instructions for an Islamist state and social order in the scriptures and commandments of Islam." Furthermore, the definition by Rothenberger and Müller, who see a frequent link between religious terrorism and religious fundamentalism, can be used. "Although this kind of fundamentalism is found in the history of each of the three monotheistic world religions, [Islamist terrorism] is currently the most violent of this form."

Politically motivated terrorism

In this paragraph, the groups of socio-revolutionary and ethnic-nationalist terrorists are summarized under political terrorism, as both have a strong underlying political bias. "In the case of socio-revolutionary terrorism, terrorists seek political and social revolution based on Marxist-Leninist / Maoist ideals." On the other hand, the term "ethnic-nationalist terrorism (...)" describes terrorist groups that represent a minority or an oppressed population", where the main objective is "an independent state, or at least a measure of political autonomy".

The phenomenon “Lone Wolf”

A comprehensive article on the phenomenon “Lone Wolf” can be found in the magazine “Die Kriminalpolizei” (Journal of the union of the German police). The article states that less than two percent of all terrorist attacks have been conducted by a Lone Wolf. These perpetrators cover an “ideologically (...) broad spectrum.” Often, the term “Lone Wolf” refers to intentional acts of persons who often “pretend to act for political beliefs”; they do “not belong to an organized terrorist group or a terrorist network.” The Lone Wolf is often described as “the product of the self-radicalization of an individual”, with a possible “mixture of personal grievances and political ideological motives” as a trigger. Some of the names below are inextricably linked to the “Lone Wolf” phenomenon, though not all are considered to have been terrorists, but assassins:

- Lee Harvey Oswald (Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Dallas, TX, 22 Nov. 1963)
- Theodore (“Ted”) John Kaczynski (shipping 16 letter bombs to different people in the USA, time frame from 1978 to 1995)
- Timothy James McVeigh (Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City, OK, 19 Apr. 1995)
- Volkert van der Graaf (Attack on the Dutch right-wing populist politician Pim Fortuyn, Hilversum, 06 May 2002)
- Anders Behring Breivik (Oslo and Utøya, Norway, car bomb in Oslo, followed by youth camp on the island, 22 July 2011)
- Stephen Paddock (shot on visitors to a music festival, Las Vegas, NV, 01 Oct. 2017)
- U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan (shot dozens of his comrades at Fort Hood, TX; he argued that this was “an attempt to protect Taliban leaders in Afghanistan from American troops”, Fort Hood, TX, 05 Nov. 2009)

The Comment of a spokesman for the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command “We have not found any links to terrorism, or any international or domestic extremist groups at this time” is basically the essence of the Lone Wolf phenomenon.

A report of the RT-News notes that, for example, the German Federal Armed Forces (and probably other military worldwide as well) prepare more intensely than before for attacks conducted by Lone Wolves (e.g. chemical attacks on the drinking water supply of military installations). This coverage was triggered by the Christmas market attack on the Breitscheidplatz in Berlin on 19 Dec. 2016. Europol is also quoted as saying that “Lone Wolf terrorists could carry out devastating attacks on transport infrastructure”, including, for example, the water supply systems of a (large) city.

The State of New Jersey’s Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness Intelligence Bureau conducted a terrorism threat analysis in New Jersey in May 2008. Thus, the likelihood that a Lone Wolf (not 100% synonymously referred to as a “homegrown terrorist”) sees a worthwhile goal in the contamination of a drinking water system is considered as relatively high. In the past - without mentioning details - some suspects were found with a “significant amounts of contaminants”.

An extensive bibliography on the Lone Wolf phenomenon can be found in the Homeland Security Digital Library: Lone Wolf Terrorism – A Brief Bibliography; by Greta E. Marlatt. A short,

but very precise analysis has been published by Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 5, No. 5/6 (December 2011), pp. 43-50.

Examples of different contamination attempts (more detailed)

A first example of an intentional poisoning to be mentioned here was uncovered in November 2005. The perpetrator was “a farmer from the Ravensburg area”, who’s motive was “revenge on the judiciary” because he “felt unjustly treated in an unspecified case”. The farmer “had sunk two open canisters with pesticides at the water intake point in western Lake Constance near Sipplingen.” This water intake is located about 300 meters from the shore, in about 70 meters depth and “although samples from the raw water and the treated drinking water had proven evidence of a contamination with the herbicide agent atrazine and other toxic substances, the permissible limits of the Drinking Water Ordinance [at that time the version of 2001] have not been exceeded”, so the message of the authorities. Similar examples can be found e.g. in the years 1972 (New York), 1977 (North Carolina) and 1985 (Arkansas) beyond the Atlantic; in these cases the perpetrators were not individuals but extremist and / or radical groups.

Generally, the assessment of the risk potential in such events, especially with regard to the dose, is a challenge, considering toxicity, concentration or the present amounts of hazardous substances. An ampoule containing 2 ml of hydrogen cyanide is certainly to be judged differently than a truckload of methylated spirits.

Examples of other attempts to use water as weapon (for flooding) or to interrupt the production process (of bottled water)

A completely different approach is followed by a 1990s attack attempt in which a hacker broke into the SCADA system of the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona (50 miles / 75 km east of downtown Phoenix) and might - if successful - have influenced the control of the flood gates to the Salt River / Rio Salado. Nevertheless, the investigation authorities agree that there was no access to critical control components.

A third example of malevolent manipulation in water critical infrastructure occurred in 2003, when members of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF, also a radical grouping) had deposited four incendiary pits in the production facilities of the Ice Mountain® Water Company; ELF’s “allegations” against Ice Mountain were for “water theft for enrichment”. This Nestlé Waters company sources its water from two groundwater wells at Sanctuary Spring in Mecosta County, Michigan and / or Evart Spring in Evart, Michigan.

Innovative protective mechanisms - a selected system

At this point, an insight into a selected system for quality control of drinking water should be given with some selected technical tools.

System number 1 is an online measuring tool called EasyMeasure. The “sensor consists of an antenna with a transmitter and a receiver.” But it is not a usual antenna as used for radio or television reception. The liquid (i.e. the drinking water) flows directly through it, and by applying




Fig. 9: Simplified sketch of EasyMeasure (source: <https://phys.org/news/2014-12-sensor-quality.html>)

a minute electric current, the “antenna receives information about the properties of that liquid.” Hence, if turbidity, ionic concentrations or salinity in the liquid change, the output signal changes as well, and hence the affected section of the pipeline system can be sealed off and a thorough examination can be initiated.

System number 2, the AquaBioTox system, was presented at the SafeWater conference in Zurich in November 2016; below excerpts from the concept paper are summarized.

“As part of the (...) AquaBioTox project, a generic online broadband toxicity sensor was developed and prototypically implemented. It is based on the “taster principle”: The vitality of very fast-reacting, biological micro-organisms that are exposed in a bypass of the drinking water pipeline is monitored online by a camera with automatic image analysis to diagnose significant changes in a short time.”

In the AquaBioTox system concept, different bacterial strains are used, “which change their fluorescence in the event of toxic damage” / contamination. This covers a relatively broad spectrum of potential venom scenarios while at the same time achieving high sensitivity and a low false alarm rate.




Fig. 10: Basic Principle of AquaBioTox Sensor System for measuring toxic components in drinking water (Source: Bernhard, Thomas, et al.: Breitband-Biosensor AquaBioTox zur onlinefähigen Trinkwasser-überwachung)

Further parameters of the water (e.g. temperature, pH, oxygen content) must be kept permanently constant in order to “stabilize the environmental conditions of the microorganisms (...) so that a clear correlation between abnormal vitality behavior of the microorganisms and the toxicity of the water is maintained.” During the development of AquaBioTox, two bacterial strains were “modified so that they react with a significant change in color or fluorescence upon contact with various chemical substances.” This means that the bacteria increase their color intensity in case of contamination of the sample water to such an extent that these changes can be recorded by means of sensitive measuring probes.

System number 3 is similar to number 2, but it uses *gammarus pulex*, a species of amphipod crustacean found in fresh water across much of Europe. The system has been installed by the Berlin Water Works, the animals of less than an inch length are “living” in a toximeter for about a week to detect irregularities of the water, then they will be transferred to the “recreation area” to feed and rest. Animal protection authorities see no problems at all with this practice.

Final considerations

From which direction, from which countries can a terrorist attack with biologically active substances be expected? One of the many possible answers can be found in the essay “Bioweapons, Biodiversity, and Ecocide” (Dudley, Woodford, 2002). The authors express their assumption that the following countries have undergone active research programs for the development of biological weapons around the turn of the millennium:

- some former USSR states (Russia, Kazakhstan),
- Syria, Iraq, Iran,
- North Korea, Taiwan, China,
- Israel, Egypt, Libya, South Africa,
- Romania, Bulgaria,
- Pakistan, India, and - please note -
- Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States.

The extent to which these are state-tolerated, subsidized or even implemented programs cannot be taken from that source. Nevertheless, Dudley and Woodford state that “several major international terrorist organizations, including but not limited to the al-Qaida network, (...) are likely to have the financial resources and political contacts necessary for access to modern biological weapon cultures and production technologies.” The development of the last one hundred years is briefly, yet impressively summarized in the aforementioned essay. Some examples include:

- Germany, which carried out research on anthrax and cholera in the First World War (the use of chlorine in chemical warfare is not discussed here);
- Romania and Argentina have tried to infect local livestock,
- in St. Petersburg (Russia), relevant authorities wanted to spread the plague;

- Japan, which used unspecified biological weapons against Asian neighbors in the period 1932-1945 and pest-infected fleas against China during World War II;
- China itself, where several 10,000 people have been abused for bioweapon experiments with anthrax, plague and smallpox;
- the Soviet Union, which also explored the suitability of anthrax, plague and smallpox for use in biological weapons in the 1980s and 1990s.

While “many of the bioweapons cultivated and tested in the early decades of the 20th century were (...) not highly infectious organisms,” the “current biological arsenals [of] diseases that are highly infectious and contagious, are easy to produce and use” are well provisioned. These arsenals are said to “cause high morbidity or mortality in human (...) populations.” Examples include smallpox, plague, classic pest and African swine fever, rinderpest, bird flu, and foot-and-mouth disease. Likewise, the assumption that “bioterrorists are unwilling to jeopardize their own lives in the development and use of highly contagious human diseases” can no longer be held against the background of the now-frequent suicide bombings worldwide. Students from Bremerhaven University of Applied Sciences, master degree program “Integrated Safety and Security Management”, worked out some very impressive scenarios in the years 2012 to 2015 on this topic. Some of them have occurred in similar form as real attacks within a few years (Nice in July 2016, Berlin in December 2016). Another very oppressive scenario included a suicide terrorist who purposely became infected with Ebola and served more or less as a breeding ground for Ebola viruses. Various attack scenarios were planned with the cultures obtained with the help of other terrorists. The subsequent considerations of the students on preventive measures usually led to the conclusion that - with intelligent execution of the attacks - these terroristic acts could not be prevented.

Conclusion

It should be noted that the ability to manipulate, sabotage, contaminate drinking water supply systems is well established. A malevolent intervention in the field of raw water may be detected in the area of extraction or in the water works themselves, so appropriate countermeasures can be taken against the contamination. For a malevolent intervention after the drinking water has left the production plant (the waterworks), i.e. when the supposedly clean drinking water is in the distribution network, various scenarios can be created, in which a malevolent intervention could lead to success. This applies in particular to simply secured, aboveground deposits, pumping stations, etc. Nevertheless, there have been very few attempts in the past to carry out a terrorist or sabotage act via the contamination of the drinking water. This does not mean that this threat can be completely ignored; this article seeks to encourage waterworks operators and water company management levels to critically review existing security measures and mechanisms.

URBAN DISASTER RESILIENCE OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS

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Abstract: For difference from risk paradigm, which is possible to measure given its use of probabilities and the size of potential loss, resilience paradigm focuses on increasing the essential functionality of the system to absorb, adapt and recover from a disturbance, and is thus difficult to measure. The plethora of studies have shown that resilience concept may facilitate the understanding of the stability and security of complex systems, especially systems where human interaction, be it rational or irrational, has a significant influence. With this in mind, in the first part of this paper we will analyze how the concept of resilience has been applied in different context. The second chapter will analyze the application of the resilience concept in national, community and organizational security, focusing on socio-technical systems where human and technical interaction has a significant influence. Finally, we will draw the possibilities of the application of the concept of resilience in the urban disaster context.

Key words: Urban disaster resilience, Security, Socio-Technical systems, Critical infrastructure protection

1. Introduction

The concept of resilience is probably one of the best-known new international concepts, which have gained attention since the economic crisis in 2008. Since then, this global challenge has redirected general focus at all tiers from “faith” in unstoppable progress to more desirable stabilisation and preparedness. Being the major places of globalism, cities across the World have suffered from the crisis. Therefore, they have profoundly embraced the postulates of resilience, transforming them with “urban” footprint– urban resilience. The creation of this significant concept has been in the agenda of many international organisations. However, the concept of urban resilience is still a novelty, with accompanying implementation problems. This is a very important issue in the field of urban design, a part of urbanism very much connected to concrete functioning in situ.

The “implementability” of the concept of resilience in urban design is an important issue for Serbia. As a post-socialist country, it has witnessed various problems and general inconsistency. With a strong motive to cope with them, local authorities and institutions often try to directly implement foreign-arisen concepts and knowledge, without any local adaptation. The results of these forceful acts are usually questionable (Lazarević et al; 2018).

A particular stream in organizational resilience tackles the issue of critical infrastructure resilience, which is the interplay of national (as these are objects of national importance), community (they provide benefits and welfare to the communities they use their products and services) and organizational (as they are socio-technical systems) resilience.

2. The resilience as an contemporary concept

The word „resilience“ is turning into a panacea among urban scholars since it has been used more and more commonly when any urban topic is being discussed, be it a theoretical debate or an implementation into every day urban practice and policy (Meerow et al, 2016). Nevertheless, the meanings of resilience in academic circles are arenumerous, depending on the aspects or disciplines which examine the concept (Chelleri, 2012): Organisational resilience: “ability of an organization to anticipate, prepare for, and respond and adapt to incremental change and sudden disruptions in order to survive and prosper” (BSI, 2014); Psychological resilience: ability of an individual to easily adapt to life tasks in the face of social disadvantage or highly adverse conditions (Pечић, 2015); Energy resilience: the term close to energy independence; Constructional resilience: construction design which both enables the absorption or prevention of damage and protects from complete destruction (Jennings et al, 2013); Disaster resilience: the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflicts – without compromising their long-term prospects (DFID, 2011); Computer resilience: ability of a computer system to provide qualitative service level without the failures which trigger its normal functioning.

One of the definitions of urban resilience clarifies that it is a “capability [of a given urban area] to prepare for, respond to, and recover from significant multi-hazard threats with minimum damage to public safety and health, the economy, and security” (Klein et al, 2003). Furthermore, “100 Resilient Cities” movement, established by 100 Rockefeller Foundation, is oriented to cooperating with the stake-holders relevant to urban resilience. It links urban resilience with “the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience” (Rockefeller Foundation–RF, 2017).

There are three resilience capacities: absorptive, adaptive and restorative. Absorptive capacity is the degree to which a system can automatically absorb the impact of system perturbations and minimize consequences with little effort. Adaptive capacity is the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization for recovery from negative event. The restorative capacity

is the ability of a system to be repaired easily – either to its original, or to a completely new (better) state (Keković et al, 2014).

3. The application of the resilience concept in national, community and organizational security

Altered nature of security risks and threats created within globalization process new security environment, forcing creators of national security strategies to anticipate the sources of threats and to define appropriate mechanisms for response to different forms of security threats addressed to states and its citizens. The concept of resilience is taken from technical sciences and implemented in the security strategies of great powers as a potential solution for strengthening capacity and system preparedness for responding to threats as well as the rapid recovery, regardless of intelligence analysis and assessment of relevant institutions.

When it comes to national security, the resilience is implemented in the security strategies of economically stable countries and as such is focused on the adaptive capacity of an individual, community or system with the aim of maintaining an acceptable level of functioning, structure and identity. (Keković, Dinić, 2016) In 2013, the World Economic Forum presented the definition of government resilience as an ability to adapt to change, to resist destructive influences and recover to the desired equilibrium, established before an unwanted event occurred, while preserving the continuity of vital functions. (World Economic Forum, 2013)

It is interesting to notice that in national security issues we have trend quite different from trends in community resilience. Whilst there is a “neoliberal” trend in “new security paradigm” towards decreased government and institutional engagement, there is also an expecting increased responsibility for national security resilience. In fact, most global powers have incorporated in their strategic documents the notion of resilience, be it explicitly (USA, United Kingdom), or implicitly (Russia, China). The traditional threats to national security targeted at defence and security capacity were broadened by the Australian and UK governments after 2007, and now their respective national security strategies incorporate national and community resilience that may concern responses to climate change, threats to critical infrastructure, cyber warfare, natural disasters and other emerging issues. (McAslan, 2010)

National security within a certain range of operations and reference protection facilities (such as individuals, organizations and territories) is focused on the example of preventive measures and the detection of various forms of security threats. Adoption of resiliency as a strategic response to contingent events aims to strengthen the readiness of the national security system, reduce the vulnerability of the system, and its ability to absorb negative effects, retain vital functions and recover over the shortest period of time.

Increasing global interdependence and the “flooding of threats” has been also influenced and supported by the national security strategies of small countries. They have recognized in different ways the importance of implementing elements of resilience, i.e. building preventive capacity for effective response to a wide range of threats and effective remediation of consequences.

The implementation of the resilience concept in the national security strategies of certain states shows the awareness of the strategic document creators about the rapid increase in unknown security risks and threats and the need of the state to improve and implement its protection function in the best possible way.

The concepts of community disaster resilience has been most often used in discourse of climate change, sustainable development and urban planning. Namely, an aspect of cultural ecology is the need for human societies to adapt to environmental extremes. In this respect, a definition of resilience that expresses the robustness and adaptation capacity of social networks is one of the most promising developments for disaster risk reduction. A community that can successfully cope with disaster risks is disaster resilient.

Disaster resilience of communities and larger regions is a particular aspect of the national security. Furthermore, the concept of disaster resilience has been of interest for urban planners. According to the UN-Habitat, urban planning may be one of the most important tools in reducing vulnerabilities and risk (UN-Habitat, 2007). It can help cities to significantly increase their resilience in coping with disaster risks and climate change (IFRC, 2010). Its importance relates to its potential to ensure planned adaptation. This consists of developing and investing in urban areas in order to reduce risks from climate-related impacts (and other hazards) and provide better protection for inhabitants, housing, infrastructure and enterprises (Bicknell et al, 2009).

The dominant narrative considers organizations to be complex socio-technical systems and as such characterized with an ability to adapt. The adaptation is generally done through the process of organizational learning, which is perceived to be the main factor behind the organizational resilience. In socio-technical systems, people's actions modify system resilience. Therefore a system's adaptability may arise from its social aspects (Walker, 2006).

A particular stream in organizational resilience tackles the issue of critical infrastructure resilience, which is the interplay of national (as these are objects of national importance), community (they provide benefits and welfare to the communities they use their products and services) and organizational (as they are socio-technical systems) resilience.

4. The concept of resilience in the urban disaster context

Security issues and threat in urban context can emerge from different sources and are various. Modern cities are mixture of elite quarters and deteriorated locations, regenerated modern places and run-down industrial building that don't work, as well abandoned construction sites (Treu, 2016: 2). An adequate assessment of the urban security situation may be derived only if the overall analysis of the objective indicators of the presence of security threats is complemented with the analysis of the views of city residents on whether they are threatened in the place of their everyday life. Visual images of buildings and its design and interconnectivity of streets have strong impact on how city residents perceive its significance and whether they feel satisfied and safe (Lazarević et al, 2017).¹

¹ The example of security threat considering urban environment might be outdoor sexual violence. Rape, for in-

Similar to other global theoretical concepts, resilience faces many definitions in the urban context. For example, OECD defines resilient cities through measures organised in four sectors: economy, society, governance, and environment (OECD, 2016). (Fig. 1)



Fig. 1. Measuring city resilience.

(Source: OSCE, Retrieved from: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-policy/resilient-cities.htm>)

Focusing on socio-technical systems where human and technical interaction has a significant influence, some authors implies the term “urban renewal”. Urban renewal project planned with the idea of shared responsibility, have potential to give certain public spaces a new role of promotion sociability and social cohesion. Both urban renewal and distributed responsibility are increasingly being used by governments and public sector organizations to effectively influence the public resilience (Lazarević et al, 2017).

Synergy in the processes of urban regeneration implies different professions working together, alongside joint stakeholders who, in most cases include: representatives of local government, investors, businesses and members of the public (Lazarevic et al, 2016:10). Building secure urban environment requires a long-term dedication, bringing together diverse parties,

stance, tends to occur in area characterized by construction sites, urban renewal, parks and temporary lodgings. These, and many other concerns, have guided urban planners to develop principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design.

stakeholders, scholar, NGO and citizens to rebuild a safer urban community with the whole city, center and suburbia. Communication and collaboration between experts, local community and government representatives is important in terms of socially responsible management and planning, and also for clarifying responsibilities and institutional arrangements.

Urban renewal should be oriented in accordance to meet various social, technological, economic, political and cultural objectives. These project oriented to promote security should focus on regeneration centered on the quality of public spaces, as well as renewed network of material and immaterial services and cultural mediation between different generations and cultures (Treu, 2016: 8). Destruction of existing social networks, expulsion of vulnerable groups and adverse impacts on living environments should be avoided.

Along with identifying the factors of urban renewal, professionals should be open to explore concepts which bring new light to how resilience could be enforced. While concept of fragility or "zero tolerance" is defined as a strong sensitivity to a stressor, antifragility is associated to generating positive responses to stress instead of harm. Antifragility describes cautious actions, being strongly related to risk management, and, as we may propose, represents a component to be included within the urban renewal and community resilience factors. As new risks can emerge overnight, constant assessment should be made to detect whether the urban renewal is facing benefits or impairments in coping with unexpected events or in the phases of expecting it. The question, as always, is one of proportion (How much of each concept/strategy?) and relevance (What kinds of dangers deserve the different concepts?), and ultimately, given uncertainty, of bias (When in doubt, which concept should receive priority?) (Lazarević et al, 2017).

For the urban resilience, the vulnerability and capacity assessment is crucial for the operationalization of decisions and measures to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience due to the disasters. The number of the city population at disaster risk is increasing significantly, due to uncontrollably growing settlements and hazard-prone areas. The lack of capacity of the cities and local governments to regulate construction and land use exacerbates the vulnerability of the people (Kekovic, Ninkovic, Džigurski, 2016). In order to raise the overall level of urban resilience for all citizens, it is desirable that prevention strategies and strategies for urban development are based on a careful assessment of vulnerabilities and capacities. Such strategies should allow the actors of urban resilience to find ways to protect and improve people's lives, empower vulnerable groups, and promote institutions in the prevention of catastrophic events.

The initial step in setting up an adequate set of the vulnerability indicators can be to identify the basic elements of the vulnerability. Some authors (Nathan, 2009) suggest two dimensions of vulnerability: exposure and insufficient capacities. Exposure can be physical exposure and socio-ecological exposure. The insufficient capacities for prevention, preparedness and respond to disaster can be divided into: physical weakness, legal vulnerability, organizational vulnerability, technical vulnerability, political vulnerability, socio-economical vulnerability, psychological and cultural vulnerability (Nathan 2009). On the other hand, vulnerability could be comprised of three segments. The first one relates to negative event or hazard itself. The second concerns the functional role of object or value that is endangered. Perception and awareness of risk exposure

is the third segment of the vulnerability. Individuals and communities may oppose the risk only after being aware of this risk (Barroca et al., 2006).

Depending on the criteria of analysis, some indicators are context-specific. In measuring sensitivities and possible vulnerabilities in the context of human settlements resilience and sustainable development it is appropriate to select indicators for changes in the human health and sanitation (percentage of people with access to safe water, mortality etc.). New threats induce new vulnerabilities and therefore could significantly change the indicators. Urban settlements populated by different social groups can increase potential for conflicts, especially when changes in environmental factors occur.

More than half of the world's population now lives in towns and cities, and by 2030 this number will swell to about 5 billion. (UNFPA, 2017) Key aspects of social, economic, technological and natural systems function differently in urban areas than in rural or camp settings. Urban systems have specific features due to the density, diversity and dynamism of cities. (WVI, 2017) Rapid urbanization is also inducing uncontrolled and densely populated informal settlements in hazard-prone areas. The lack of capacity of cities and local governments to regulate building standards and land use plans exacerbates the risk of those living in vulnerable conditions. Not only cities and local governments, but in the first place their citizens, need to increase their capacity to reduce both the damage and the recovery period from any potential disaster. Disasters capacity building starts with individuals taking responsibility for their actions and moves to entire communities working in conjunction with local, state, and federal officials, all of whom need to assume specific responsibilities for building the national quilt of people safety. (Keković et al, 2016)

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in urban settlements is a multi-dimensional, complex problem requiring knowledge and experience from a wide range of disciplines. It also requires a methodology which can collate and organize this knowledge in an effective and transparent manner, in order to develop a prototype multi-hazard disaster reduction model. Kekovic, Dzigruski and Ninkovic offers models for enhancing existing urban settlements urban resilience , in order to be better prepared to confront natural and man-made hazards (Keković et al, 2017). For that purpose, the joint use of Morphological Analysis (MA) and System Dynamics (SD) models is proposed, which may enable identifying and comparing scenarios, i.e. risk reduction strategies, preparedness and mitigation measures, for different types of hazards.

SD model offers a detailed insight into system behaviour, but it meets an impasse when it tries to push its simulation run into the future. MA scenarios can be developed using the standard General Morphological Analysis (GMA) model framework. The simulation could be run in segments, with inputs to SD model modified as the inferences from the MA scenario being used as a changing inputs fed into the SD simulation against time. Such merging of the two methods may be significantly more powerful than either of them serving alone for disaster management assessment and planning in urban settlements.

The main purpose of the model is to allow for the different policy options available to emergency managers to be evaluated before an emergency situation occurs. The utility of the model

may be confirmed through a set of experiments designed for testing the efficiency of management procedures. Methodology used for testing is sufficiently general to be applied to different types of disasters, as well as conceptually oriented towards the type of an accident. (Figure 2)




Figure 2: SD disaster management model

The source: Keković, Z., Ninković, V., Džigurski, O. (2017). Combined Morphological Analysis and System Dynamics Approach in Urban Disaster Management

The simulation could be run iteratively, in time segments, with inputs to SD model modified as the inferences from the MA scenario being used as a continuously changing inputs fed into the SD simulation. The results obtained from the SD model simulation may then be used as input in a new GMA matrix for defining of new disaster management scenarios. Thus, the behaviour of the analyzed system in a longer time frame may be observed, which can finally result with the identification of the optimal disaster management strategy.

Conclusion

The plethora of studies have shown that resilience concept may facilitate the understanding of the stability and security of complex systems, especially systems where human interaction, be it rational or irrational, has a significant influence. In that sense, this paper provides insight on basic concepts that can contribute to enhancing national, community and organizational security through urban resilience strategies.

The quality of whole community can be raised when all the significant factor, social, political, cultural and security, are considered in establishing disaster resilience strategy where both physical and psychological needs of the citizens are satisfied. This also leaves space for other urban and security scholars to raise new questions in regard to public urban spaces resilience and public preparedness of its citizens before creation and implementation of urban renewal projects.

An evaluation of precise indicators of resilience oriented urban renewal based on antifragility can strengthen the understanding of security experts, urban planners, local authorities and citizens on the connection of physical, social and technical characteristic of the environment by reducing vulnerability and increase resilience due to the disasters.

Further research in this field could provide a broader list of precise indicators for evaluating successfulness of urban renewal projects that should be implemented in the future.

Together with the increase of the literature discussing the potential implementation of resilience construct, this concept has been fundamentally criticized both in natural and in social sciences. However, the critics that challenge the possibility of precise, constructive and scientifically fruitful application of the resilience concept in social sciences have not provided enough arguments to discard resilience as a fallacious analytical concept. (Keck and Sakdapolrak, 2013; Pavićević, 2016)

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USING OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE SITUATIONS²

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Abstract: The article deals with a possibility of creating a knowledge database of asymmetric threats on the basis of experience of previous operations. The main content of the database should consist of experience from previous missions, such as information about mission environment, goals of the mission, enemy in the area of engagement etc. The core of the system is a knowledge database, serving as a comprehensive source of historical information, and components supporting the assessment of risk for future missions. The experience of combat use in operations demonstrated the need for an improved training for the mission. Decision Support System is a tool which improves process of planning and executing mission in asymmetric warfare. In performing tasks in missions the system should contribute to an overall increase of combat effectiveness and protection of human lives in particular.

Keywords: Decision Support System, asymmetric warfare, knowledge database, mission.

1. INTRODUCTION

Definition of asymmetric threats or warfare has various forms as disproportion, differentiation and disharmony between two or more parties in a conflict. Asymmetry is an inherent feature of crises and wars (primarily terrorist activities). The growing importance of asymmetry in present conflicts (military, terrorist and other) led to considering asymmetric threats as a separate specific area of armed operations. Typically, this area is characterized by complications, ambiguous and uncertain situation and lack of complete and reliable information on one's own and on enemy forces. However, each country perceives the definition of asymmetric threats in a different way.

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According to NATO documents the asymmetric threats usually arise in relations: strong-weak or large-small. Asymmetric threats are most often posed by a party which seeking the confrontation is unable to resist the enemy in a symmetrical manner i.e. using the same or similar means of warfare. The weaker, poorer armed party of the conflict tries to choose the means of confrontation in a way which minimizes the possibility to exploit the overwhelming combat potential by opposing party. The case of asymmetric actions is having a place also when one party made a breakthrough in some technology or achieved technological revolution which increases its possibilities and the combat ability of the armed forces.

In terms of preparation for the actual operation and management of peace support operations is necessary to pay attention to the use of decision support systems. Sophisticated information has a crucial role in these systems.

2. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Decision support system (DSS) is a tool which improves process of planning and executing mission in asymmetric warfare. The core of this system is a knowledge database, serving as a comprehensive source of historical information, and components supporting the assessment of risk for future missions.

Decision support system could be used to support:

- planning at the Operational level – especially in monitoring risks in the Area Of Responsibility, managing allocation of Force Protection and pre-deployment of Force Protection,
- planning at the Tactical level in intelligence management and threat analysis – by risk assessment of the mission plan,
- mission rehearsal by mission review and simulation of potential events during the mission (short briefing based on potential risk),
- mission execution by the terrain data collection and status reporting.


Managing information in military area is not optimized. Military planning originally focused on scheduling and deployment with less emphasis on the supply of information for mission execution (leaving that for logistics).

Current systems do not guarantee the proper (optimal, needed etc.) service level in this area. By identifying the informational content required, the following gaps in current systems can be found:

- the lack of standard asymmetric threat models and information,
- the lack of tools supporting mission planning / execution for protection against asymmetric threats,
- the lack of implementation of more sophisticated methods of data processing and filtering e.g. reasoning techniques.

We participated in the Multinational Project “Smart Information for Mission Success”, which can be used for mission planning, execution and training (Picture 1).

The core of the system is a knowledge database which defines the information scope. This scope is used as a basis for structuring the knowledge which is contained in the knowledge database. Each mission has its parent mission, except for missions at strategic level. At the lowest level (lower than tactical level), mission only consists of one or more tasks. For the model of the database, asymmetric threats are any threats, often using non-conventional weapons and terror to achieve its goals.



Picture 1 Decision Support System in Asymmetric Warfare

The goal of the project is to demonstrate a tool which supports management of information and can be used in order to improve process of planning and executing daily missions in asymmetric warfare. The core of the system is a Knowledge Database, serving as a comprehensive source of historical information, and components supporting the assessment of risk for future missions.

Military planning still focuses on scheduling of operations and deployment of forces, mostly due to the decreased appreciation of supplying adequate information required for mission execution. The Decision Support System with Knowledge Database can offer a solution to that problem by providing methods and tools which extend the results of planning by using information schemes for mission execution. The system aims to develop a set of new mission supporting tools that aid force protection in an asymmetric warfare context, both in urban and non-urban environment. Knowledge Database creates basis of Decision Support System in Asymmetric Warfare.

3. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM WITH KNOWLEDGE DATABASE

Military experts start to consider information as the main factor that determines victory or defeat. Therefore, a decisive aspect that influences the success of the combat, regardless of the nature of mission, will be the ability to effectively acquire, generate, transmit and manage information. The core of the system is a knowledge database which defines the information scope (Picture 2).



Picture 2: Knowledge database - the core of the system

This scope is used as a basis for structuring the knowledge which is contained in the knowledge database. The requirements which define the knowledge database are derived from analysis of user needs and analysis of example scenarios of the knowledge database use.

The concept of a mission is defined as different types of activities performed by military units. The most important part of a mission is task to be performed in order to achieve a specific purpose. The terms used in a mission are presented below.

Superior mission: A higher level mission, in which the current mission takes part.

Mission Characteristics: The following characteristics of the mission represent mission concepts:

- **Order:** A communication written, oral or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. There are different types of orders for planning: Fragmentary order, Operational order and Warning order.

Description (tasks, area, units, time, objective, purpose).

Course of Action: optional parameter which described a detailed plan how to perform a task.

Commander Intent: a clear and concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain and the desired end state.

Mission Type: the type of the mission: offensive, defensive, stability, etc.,

Rules of engagement: Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and continue combat engagement with other forces encountered:

- Mission procedures: Procedures of executing tasks during the mission e.g. standard operating procedures related to the mission.

Mission Assessment: a result of analysis of data from previous missions, which include mission reports, results from reasoning techniques, applications and lessons learnt from previous missions.

The following terms are important when describing a mission, but they are not a part of the mission concept itself:

Environment: the environment in which the mission will be executed is described in the Environment concept. The mission environment is associated with the Operational area (each operational area has a specific environment),

Other assets: assets other than military units taking part in mission execution, involved in mission, e.g. NGOs or Humanitarian organization protected during stability mission. Assets are described as parts of mission concept,

The forces concept comprises a series of resources employed by the forces to achieve the mission goal. The different types of assets are following:

Means of war: these are the means used for warfare. They include weapons and sensors etc.:

- Weapon: A weapon that is chemical, biological, radiological nor nuclear is considered a conventional weapon used by military groups. Sensor: Equipment which detects and may indicate or record objects and activities.
- Vehicle: A self-propelled, boosted, or towed conveyance for transporting a burden on land, sea or through air or space.

Civilians: Sometimes civilians can be part of Civil-Military Operations. Host-nation support and care of displaced civilians and they represent a value for the mission.

Construction: Some buildings that are of special value for the success of the mission.

Humanitarian organizations: A private, voluntary organizations with no governmental established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development-related projects and organized at local, national, regional or international level.

Military unit: A military element whose structure is prescribed by a competent authority.

Asset VIP: A person of high level of authority who is to be protected as a part of mission goals.

To describe asymmetric threats in knowledge database the following terms are used.

Asset: Anything that has a value to the part of the conflict. Contrary to its popular meaning, in this document "Asset" means also "objects unable to perform any action by themselves".

Threat: It is a potential cause of an incident that may result in personal accident to military organization or other assets. Threats are realized in incidents. Examples of threats are:

- IED explosion,
- Mortar and rocket attack,
- Sniper fire,
- Attack a humanitarian convoy,
- Attack on a patrol, a base, a check point, a helicopter and other.

Event: Anything that occurs and is recorded in the system,

- **Incident:** An event that may happen to any asset. The difference between the terms “threat” and “incident” is that “threat” means a possible menace, whereas “incident” means something which has already happened.

Vulnerability: A weakness of an asset that can be exploited by one or more threats. Vulnerability is a characteristic of an asset.

Force protection: All measures and means that can be used to minimize a vulnerability of any asset to any threat in any situation, or to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.

The environment of the mission is usually defined as weather and terrain of an area. The concept of the environment in project is defined by the following terms:

Area of Operations: An operational area, which is defined by a commander for land, air or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Area of operations is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. The area of operations in the project is classified according to the type of area where the military operation is conducted into:

- **Area of influence:** It is a geographical area where a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command or control,
- **Area of interest:** It is the area of concern to a commander relative to the objective of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations,
- **Base:** It is a location from which operations are projected or supported.

Usually an area can be described by the environment that surrounds it, in project the area of operations does not cover all aspects of the environment and it is only a military term. Therefore, we introduce the concept of actual area as follows:

Actual area: An area, which contains the Area of Operations and its surroundings where the mission is being conducted.

Other aspects describing the environment of the area are weather, sides and background.

Weather: The weather of the area where the mission is conducted. The area includes the Area of Operations and its surroundings. The information about the weather can be stored in the database as:

- Actual weather: Information about observed weather conditions,
- Weather forecast: Prediction of future weather conditions,

Background: Background information about the area where the mission takes place. e.g. its history, culture, religion, behaviour, life style, and any type of additional information on the environment,

Sides: General information about the forces taking part in the mission. This includes Own Forces and Enemy Forces.

4. CONCLUSION

Knowledge Database and system development for decision making support are important elements of international crises management. It can be very useful for mission planning, mission execution and mission training. The core of the system is a Knowledge Database, serving as a comprehensive source of historical information, and components supporting the assessment of risk for future missions.

The knowledge base will allow automatic data update from sensors detections reporting on mission environment. The system will also support the analysis of asymmetric threat history and models, the exploration of information related to the specific type of mission and threat. The system will provide effective access to all data stored in the knowledge base, which will update data from the structured process of gathering lessons learnt

Most of the advanced armies in the world have formal mission support concepts, command computerization and well developed databases with algorithms for these kinds of systems. The features of these systems were defined on the basis of factual and deductive databases with generalized knowledge, expressed in the procedural layer at the operational – tactical layers.

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ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY AND URBAN LIVING OF THE FAMILY

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Abstract: Modern living is complex with many elements that are necessary for quality and safe arrangement of the space. The different urban approaches must respect the requirements of citizens and be systematically regulated and guaranteed. Often, this respect is not carried out in a manner, in the interest and at the request of the citizens. Other motives and influences dominate which make the unsafe space to be located for the living of numerous families. There are opportunities for innovation and changes in this field that are processed in this paper.

The environment requires a modern and long-term approach with the sustainability of resources that are necessary for life and for people's work. Urban living is changing and requires constant improvement, not degrading the conditions of already built areas and spaces. The opportunities for changes that are listed refer to the model for increasing of the participation of citizens by their regular participation in urban and spatial planning. Sustainable development advocated by international organizations and structures becomes an obligation for governing elites at the local and state level.

Keywords: environment, security, family, urban living, urban building

1. Introduction

The environment is related to the safety, quality of life and urban living of the family. Dynamic living and profit orientation for urban construction often neglect people's needs and jeopardize their environment and security. What happens as occurrences in separate environments with illegally building objects, or by changing urban plans without consent with the citizens is the basis for serious concern of the residents. Especially in urban areas, these phenomena also affect the quality of life and the safety of people. Most often, the violation of the regulations suffers the youngest, considering that the safety of movement, education, sport and play, recre-

ation are endangered, and especially for access to the educational and health institutions that are indispensable.

The family can be viewed and analyzed from multiple aspects. The family is a social community of its members, mostly parents and children, although there are many families with one parent, then families without children and family communities, which are made up of members of several generations. Common to all families, regardless of the number of members or as number of generations living in them, is the fact that members live in a community, usually within a single residential unit or within the same household. The urban families have specific needs that they implement in urban communities that need to be arranged and secure. In socially sociological terms, the family as a part of the community has responsibility for its members, their participation, behavior and action in the immediate environment. What is the environment and what is the impact of it on the quality of life of the family is an issue that is constantly current. Family relationships are very important for the good functioning and even for the survival of the family. The family is said to be the basis or foundation of any society, and only stable families create a stable society as a whole. The organization and functioning of the family as social and economic integration are largely influenced by the cultural frameworks, educational opportunities, security, demographic and many other different characteristics.

The authorities often put before the citizens who have set or voted for them in front of a committed act. The reactions of the citizens comes after they become aware that something is being built, and that something will be an obstacle to their normal living in the urban space. Mass building especially in urban communities affects people, by the investors who see their profit opportunity, on the existing and future residents. The reflection of the quality of life, and especially of security, are questions that are most often recognized by the ex post or after things happen and are difficult to be correct.

Knowledge and desires about that how to change the space are increasing. The reactions of the people who emphasize their demands and dissatisfaction with the polluted air, from the overcrowded urban areas that they organize in many things, are also growing. It all points out that new approaches and activities are needed in the construction of the urban and the environment, which will incorporate in its foundations the quality and security of the family life.

2. Methods

Analytical and comparative methods and several practical tools for collecting data and representations from different documents and analyzes have been applied. They present information about the situation in the area of environment and safety, as well as the quality of life and urban living of the family.

The specific cases of phenomena based on diversity of interests and understandings about the use of space and urban planning are also shown. It analyzes the role of competent bodies that are obliged to provide the citizens with an insight into the urban documentation and procedure for adopting documents that are of interest to the community. The goal is to give the

answer to the question: How to increase the influence of families in the period of urban planning and implementation of security measures in the urban environment in one city?

Also by applying the "case report" method, it is perceived how citizen participation in space planning is realized. How much they really influence to adapt spatial and urban planning according to their needs.

When analyzing the data used by different sources and based on their synthesis, the possibility is to reconsider the organization in the creation of the social and urban environment for the benefit of the families. Personal experiences and data that came to the research phase of the studied phenomenon are also presented.

3. Data analysis

The work is based on publicly available information on the environment and urban living and family planning in one city and the links to security and the safety environment. Their explanation is not detailed but synthesized to extract the idea, the need and the change that is inevitable in order to achieve a rational effect.

Infrastructural buildings are numerous and complex. They constitute the entire infrastructure that surrounding the inhabitants in the urban area. These are existing and planned, underground and overhead structures and installations, lines, facilities and other types of technical installations, land, water or air traffic infrastructure, power lines, product pipelines, telecommunications infrastructure, water and sewage systems and other buildings of vital importance to humans. The whole infrastructure is connected with the housing and security of the users i.e. people living on a regulated infrastructure. Otherwise, any dangers can pose serious threats, as well as threats to the health and life of people and their safety and security.

The system should be arranged to provide safe and quality living. How to achieve sustainability of the system, not to disturb the already orderly urban space inhabited by citizens. The policy of urbanization of space and the provision of qualitative conditions for the life and work of citizens is often changed under the pressure of various influences. This violates the safety and security of living. Several concrete examples follow.

Example No. 1. Before a nine-story building that is built according to standards, a new higher and wider business building is being built in front of it in green space. It overshadows, conceals and deplores the previous one. The elements and standards on which they had been built are being damaged and violated to citizens who bought apartments in the first built building. And then, like mushrooms on the rain, buildings are built on green surfaces with the approval of the local government, with blessings from the central government. Roughly cut trees and are concealing life and security space. Parking for the numerous vehicles was not considered, so people, instead of on the sidewalk, are moving along the highway. The safety of children, parents, entire families is violated. There is no space for emergency vehicles, firefighting and other official vehicles.

Example No. 2. In a peaceful street traced a hundred years ago with small family houses, the purpose of use is changed without the consent of the citizens and from small ones they

become bigger buildings. The previous urban forms are changed and they become amorphous, impersonal. As no one thought that the buildings should provide space for people's movement, for the children's needs, for adults, for the elderly. It is likely that someone else should think about passing and parking the cars, but there are always duty-payers for unnecessary parking penalties.

Example No. 3. Entire districts of an old neighborhood in the capital are being converted and from residential become business, with lined up cafes, restaurants, fast food stores or are shaped in so-called bohemian streets. For people who live in the same space is not planned, nor is it perceived that the quality of their living is being violated. Their safety and security are jeopardized and therefore they constantly express their dissatisfaction. Unfortunately, the effect of this is not felt and does not reach decision-makers who manage the space from a position of monopoly in power.

Example No.4. In a modern urbanized settlement in which the green areas are well planned, with the change of the detailed urban plan from the local government, new buildings are foreseen that were not envisaged in the general urban plan. Citizens are protesting many days, coming out on the street to prevent building machines from building, but there is no benefit why the police suppress them, not the one who builds. The building is growing rapidly along with discomfort of the citizens who can express this in the next local elections. But the buildings remain as evidence of voluntarism for those who need to respect the plans and needs of people living in the same space.

Example No. 5. The data indicate that in 2002, the green areas in the capital totaled 75,649 m², while in 2013 - 34,994 m²; in 2017 it was reduced to 18,680 m². This is a reduction of green areas by about 75%. From the data provided, it can be noted that the focus of ecological degradation of green areas is concentrated in the city center. Trees that have historical significance are destroyed, and they are like lungs for the inhabitants. The newly planted stalks are not maintained and irreversible are lost the green areas in urban space.

Example No. 6. Related to reducing green areas is air pollution. The polluted air that breathes everyone living in urban areas is deadly and is a decade's problem. It is considered to be a consequence of poor spatial planning, pollution of the environment and the living space of people. There are many things about the problems and consequences of this, but there will be no changes. Air emissions come from combustion plants and use of energy facilities, the use of fuel oil, household oil, wood and briquettes and exhaust gases from vehicles, as well as from emissions from technological processes. Specific measures are planned, programs, strategies, but there are no effects of pollution reduction in the past years.

Example No. 7. Although with the detailed urban plan was not foreseen, with a local government decision, a family two-storey building is being converted to a hotel. Next to it the next building is being transformed into a service for informatics, and the next one, in a medical office, the other in a consulting firm, and the last in a national radio station. Other buildings on the same site on the ground floor become business premises with a purpose for a catering facility that disturbs neighbors with noise, smoke from cooking and inappropriate behavior of drunken

guests. There are inevitable the big shops for gamblers at every step. So, from a restricted access road, it becomes a crowded area where people cannot move, there are no sidewalks, no vehicles can be used, there is no space for parking, there is no greenery, a child cannot play on the street because to play on it is unsafe and risky.

Example No. 8. Citizens with a public request indicate that the principles guaranteed in the Law on Spatial and Urban Planning are violated, for: balanced spatial development; rational arrangement and use of space; conditions for human living and work of the citizens; sustainable development and protection and promotion of the environment and nature. They point out that the process of adopting the plans is extremely non-transparent, unethical and contrary to the interests of the citizens. The direct decision-making of the citizens, individually and collectively, is avoided for matters of crucial importance for their living in an urbanized area, which is contrary to the Law on Local Self-Government. There is a lack of information and there is non-transparency in the adoption of the plan, which gives rise to doubts about the legality of the procedure and the competencies of the municipal bodies. A homogenized urban community is completely destroyed, where for years there has been a complete symbiosis of plant and animal life, and the citizens enjoy the privileges of a peaceful and peaceful life.

Other numerous examples that exist and are a reality that violate the principles of safe living and a healthy environment can also be listed. It does not change the image that has been created and which does not reflect the needs of the citizens, that is, the members of the families and their security. The space does not allow for a more detailed elaboration of events and occurrences that are most often negative, but also from the shown one can get the impression of the complexity of the situation and the problems that the members of urban families face.

4. Opportunities for change

How can all this be changed, which is necessary to put an end to urban chaos that endangers the lives of people? New models of urban planning are very important for the inclusion of all the elements that are significant for people's lives over a long period of time. Different interests and positions are found in society especially when it comes to space, its purpose and use.

Differences are also encountered in the families depending on their social status, income and urban environment. Yet their common interest is the security and well-being of urban living that must be provided by the responsible institutions at the national and local levels. It could improve social inclusion that is contrary to social alienation which is very much present in the urban living.

Within this framework, the need for securing modern means and technologies that makes the space urban, but also designed and safe for modern living, is perceived. What innovations are necessary to change and improve the quality of life of a family in an urban space? It is primarily about quality housing accompanied by an efficient widely available diversified transport in order to improve the mobility of people and their accessibility to the workplace. Safe transport is also needed for all generations of young children, students, employees, retirees in order to ensure their movement. An inevitable part is the environment that covers the elements of clean air,

healthy drinking water, quality drainage and waste water treatment, modern disposal of waste and hazardous substances, brightness and ventilation of the space. There are no doubts that the constant power supply (electrical, gas, thermal) and broadband Internet are the preconditions for modern and safe living. They are associated with basic human rights and the realization of these guarantees conditions and opportunities for a better quality and security of life.

The quality of life in urban agglomerations and even in medium-sized cities cannot be assessed if there is no security that must be maintained continuously. From traffic to physical and every kind of security. Security must be seen as a product, that is, a service that is expensive, it refers to numerous users and which must be constantly created, maintained and invested in it. Without continually building security that is not related to the modern concepts of urban space, the quality of life of family members cannot be assessed. It expresses the needs that must be respected in the planning stages of space and in its sustainability in the long run.

Urbanization is the only way that can absorb surplus of capital, and in doing so produce a multiple value, which is actually a feature of the market operation. The idea of "the right to city for all" is the strongest argument the citizens have in the political and social conflict of different interests. Human rights are in conflict with neoliberal market logic, which through private ownership and profit making outweighs all other human aspects of society's living as a whole. The right to a city is a collective right and as such, depends on the possibility to change processes in conditions of capitalism, especially in developing countries. In such complex conditions it becomes impossible to talk about higher ideals of urban identity of the city, equal citizenship, belonging to one and the same city of different categories of citizens. Even the perceptions of the same city are becoming contrary to the very different living conditions in the various micro environment on local level. Most often in decision-making processes many of the social groups are excluded, and they live the consequences of this way of solving because their real needs are left out, or are declarative and insufficiently articulated in the processes of urban planning and decision-making.

Therefore family members must participate in the planning of the space for all mentioned elements, from urban plans, infrastructure, security, to the smallest details about traffic solutions that will mean safety for children, adults and the elderly, that is, for all age groups of one family.

Numerous innovations have been created in terms of living patterns. Some of these innovations are already in use and have positive effects, creating the cities of the future. It remains how these innovations can be improved and modernized according to the needs of the citizens in order to shape them as segments of urban or city living, which is complex and incorporates numerous systems that enable this type of living.

It starts from the view that: "The settlement is a built, functionally unified space on which the living and working conditions of the people are provided and for satisfying the individual, common and general needs of the inhabitants and the community, in accordance with the law." (8) It points to the basis for social development as a process in which living conditions, working conditions and social conditions are built up as complex relationships in urban living. For all this

to be realized, it is necessary to plan and strategically build and regulate the space for living and working, that is, necessary spatial and urban plans and their realization.

The Law on Urban Planning in Article 5 stipulates that: "The preparation, adoption, implementation and monitoring of the implementation of the urban plans are in the public interest. The urban plans determine the type, purpose, area, location and dimensions of the area, the land and the buildings that are in the public interest. In the area covered by the urban plans, harmonization and alignment of the public and private interests is carried out in a manner that the priority realization of the public interest will be measured and planned with the least damage to the private interest."(8)

5. Participation of the citizens

The right of the citizens is to participate in the urban development of their city. This is accomplished through the model of "active participation in participatory planning". By definition, this model refers to the participation of citizens in the planning and construction of the city. As active users of the urban area, it creates an opportunity with various initiatives and creatively to establish direct communication with the relevant services of the city administration. They can thus contribute to a better outlook for their city. A well-conceived and feasible approach in a genuine democratic society, but in practice, the impact is often only declarative.

The inability for timely action against excessive building of residential and business buildings on park surfaces and the implementation of plans force the most urban municipalities to find alternative solutions to prevent chaos in urbanism. Some of them adopted under the pressure moratoriums on the implementation of existing ones urban plans. Others cannot prevent the realization of decisions made even though citizens organize protests for days and months, blocking even the streets that have already been blocked, as indicated in the previous examples. The detailed urban plans that are applied are usually the old and the planning period for which they are adopted is overcome. Therefore, without consulting with citizens, the decision should not be made whether a building will be built somewhere in a crowded urban area. Local government is obligated to respect the opinion of citizens and legal entities and they actively participate in the planning process and preparation of planning solutions to prevent attempts to usurp the environment and bring harmful detailed urban plans. Enabling joint decision-making will enable human and safe living and better conditions for the citizens and for their greater security.

The modern urban planning of space envisages as a multifunctional and diverse space that is aesthetically orderly, environmentally sound and accessible to many citizens, whereby space can be used by everyone as their own needs. For urban planning from an ecological aspect to be successful, it should take into account all the physical elements in the space and how they communicate with one another. The relationship and ratio between different buildings, their functionality, the relationship of objects and streets, parks, the distribution of greenery and other things are the elements that form complicated connections. This applies both between the built and the free space, as well as the connections that are formed between the space and the

people, and through this it affects the overall social and security environment. From an ecological point of view, it would mean enough available green spaces that would have been fitted in a way that could be used by different age groups, at different times of the day or year for different purposes. It would be optimally planned to be at a distance of 10 to 15 minutes from the home, a distance that users of the space could walk on foot or using a bicycle. Healthy ecological living is not only a need for every individual for healthy living conditions, but it is in the domain of human rights and environmental justice. Disturbances in the quality of healthy living pose a threat to the overall functioning from the health and economic aspect of the individual, and then to the city as a whole if these problems persist in the long run.

It is estimated that the creation of the urban space and its contents are regulated mostly by the interests and wishes of the investors. Their request changes the existing plans and the citizens are placed in the position of observers, ignored by the authorities in the city, who assesses before the public "that all acts that are done are for the benefit of the citizens".

We are witnesses of frequent requests addressed to city authorities by citizens to change the decisions taken with urban solutions and the arrangement of space. Usually, the need for objects of cultural, historical, educational, health and security character is not taken into account.

Citizens affiliated with several non-governmental organizations issued a public appeal and indicated that "The rule of law in a state is seen in the approach to addressing the space that is non-renewable resource in urban areas." They require a moratorium on the construction and revision of detailed urban plans; not to grant consent for detailed plans if they do not comply with the general principles; legal operation of urban and other institutions and bodies; to the Public Attorney who, by function, should protect the state property and the protection of the interest of the citizens, as well as respect for the building's heritage. They point out that a maximum inclusive process is needed in the adoption of plans that will prevent the destruction of space.

The involvement of the local community in the processes of urban planning has several positive sides. Greater participation contributes to greater legitimacy and effectiveness of planned activities. Urban planning, especially in the public space, affects all residents equally, hence the issue of involving citizens in the decision-making processes and inclusion in the same. This is also due to the practices of a number of city administrations, and at certain moments to the very institutional and legal framework, which stipulates obligatory consultation with the public and its involvement in the planning process, in accordance with the Aarhus Convention, which is ratified in the country in 1999. (9) It is often the case that citizens are opposed to certain plans drawn up by the city administration, and hence, in many cases, there is a conflict between the decision made by the administration and the citizens. It is also important to analyze to what extent citizens think that their active involvement would affect the planning process itself, i.e. how the institutions are ready to include the remarks that the citizens would have on the proposed plans.

Public spaces belong to all citizens, and hence they should be appropriately planned, in order to serve as communication corridors that should express the identity of the space, the cultural features of the settlement in the city and the city as a whole. Public spaces should be

adequately lit, equipped with appropriate urban equipment so that they can be useful to the citizens and safe for families, and especially for children.

The best urban plans are characterized by well thought out and developed street network. From numerous experiences with planning of traffic networks, it has been shown that cities with networks of more smaller streets work better in relation to cities that have larger streets and in smaller numbers. This is due to the fact that the smaller streets are more pedestrian-oriented, since the smaller streets are easier to cross and more prosperous as a result of slower traffic.

Residents of a Balkan capital recently protested in front of their building by sending a petition to the city administration, demanding to ban construction of residential buildings in green spaces that they see as a valuable oasis in a crowded urban environment. Expansion of pedestrian zones in the central core of that city opened a critical discussion about the lack of creativity by the administration and for the inability of fire and ambulances vehicles to have access to that area.

Citizens lose trust in the authorities they have chosen. Local and city authorities are privileged to make decisions; they ignore the opinion of citizens, and even when the identity of urban space is destroyed. It is required that the detailed urban plans be in the interest of the inhabitants primarily, and their desires and needs. They should be at the center of the whole urban process, because the inclusion of citizens should not remain only at the level of the legal framework, but this should be done as comprehensive as possible. Public calls, polls, and explanations about procedures should be much more common and visible to citizens with predictions when and how citizens can get involved in the process.

Increased noise, increased pollution even in the summer period, dust from local construction sites is constantly present because it requires stopping with the uncontrolled construction of new housing units. Instead, every free space should be converted into greenery and parks and in the planning and arrangement to include experts who will respect the wishes of the citizens, not the profits. (4) It is considered that an audit of all controversial plans should be carried out, i.e. a review of all detailed urban plans and all issued building permits. It is estimated that the process of excessive urbanization is a consequence of the fact that the local self-governments are still forced to provide most of the funds in their budget through the payment of the communal construction fee (utilities), which encourages building anywhere.

6. The Green surfaces

It is estimated that parks and green areas are more and more disappearing. There are a small number of field inspectors to prevent unauthorized construction activities. The lack of data on the number of inhabitants, or the absence of a census limits the real possibilities for proper urban planning.

A green development strategy is needed to provide cities and reduce the spread of polluted areas. Where there are not enough green areas, they need to be expanded to achieve a standard of 25 square meters of greenery per capita, and 20% greenery on a building plot. Citizens'

health is directly related to the availability of urban greenery, according to the World Health Organization.

As an example to be pointed out is the ban on cutting forests for a longer period of time made by in the neighboring state in the west. There is forbidden to cut forest for timber and export timber for the next 10 years. It is a method to restore the lost forest fund, which has been severely reduced for the past years of intensely illegal cutting and destruction of forests.

Similar things should be done in terms of cutting a forest or part of the forest on the pipeline route that extends along the state. Also, the construction of infrastructure (roads, railways, airports) does not mean the possibility of destroying the forest fund. The environmentalists and numerous civic associations have expressed and repeatedly expressed their revolt through protests, but this does not prevent investors from lowering the forest fund by looking at their own interests. It is similar with the greenery in the urban areas. Initiatives for retention of greenery versus concrete structures are present in many local communities. Building permits are issued in places where there are children's playgrounds, entertainment facilities, green recreational belt, arranged paths and the like. This violates the rights of citizens and families who are beneficiaries of those areas, and which with urban solutions are being replaced for other purposes.

Afforestation cannot be just a propaganda action that takes place in a day or several days of the year. They are well-known examples in the countries where afforestation is not only a civil duty, but also an obligation that determines the citizens for proper treatment. In some states if students do not plant at least 20 trees a year they cannot graduate. Or if the government does not spread the green space according to established standards in the urban parts of the country it cannot have the support of the citizens. It takes a long period to renew the forest fund and green areas in the cities, which means worse air and pollution in urban areas. Also, the ban on the export of wood and timber for a certain period will mean a reduction in the cutting of forests. Gasification is expected to lead to a reduction in the cutting of forests and conversion of timber into firewood, which certainly has an impact on the environment.

These are just a few examples that show the possibilities that need to be systematically regulated and as a commitment to a healthy environment. It is important to educate new generations about the meaning of the environment and how it affects their future and the maintenance of a healthy life, clean air and water and all the elements that mean safe and healthy living. However, this is just one step that is not a guarantee of success, because they need a strategy and a policy for a healthy environment, with the renewal of the forest fund and greenery in urban areas, in which processes must involve all citizens, not just government officials. Only in this way are possible positive and long-term changes.

7. Sustainable development

Theoretical concepts for sustainable development are different according to the material, ideological and composite basis. Therefore, attention should be paid to them and to their theoretical basis that influences decision-makers. Namely, the "sustainable development" model works best if it is accepted by the cities themselves, which should base their development

programs on sustainability. It is necessary “for local authorities to accept the principles of sustainable development in their attempts to provide economically efficient, socially inclusive, culturally conscious and environmentally sound cities. Cities must develop sustainably and promote sustainable communities or are at risk of not developing at all “(10). In other words, the cities, that is, the city authorities, the exit to the problems that many cities face should seek in creating integral policies and programs that are based on the fundamentals of sustainable development. This means to replace so far segmented programs, which consequently have many negative consequences in the very functioning of the city and the overall social setting. As a sustainable city concept, it is relatively new and is increasingly popular in both developed and developing countries. Of course, each state and city should find an adequate model of sustainability, in accordance with their own problems, needs and capacities to translate this concept into local policies and practices.

The United Nations, aware that the protection and promotion of the human environment is the main issue affecting people’s well-being and economic development around the world, they celebrated June 5 as the World Environment Day. The celebration of this day provides an opportunity to expand the foundations for deepened thinking and responsible behavior of individuals, enterprises and communities in the conservation and improvement of the environment. (5)

The UN suggests that understanding the different types of pollution and how it affects our health and the environment will help to take steps to improve the air around us. Often it cannot be seen, but air pollution is everywhere. A man cannot stop breathing, but he can do something about the quality of the air. Nine out of ten people around the world are exposed to levels of air pollutants that exceed the levels of safety set by the World Health Organization.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development states our resolve “to ensure lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources”. (6)

In today’s urban areas certain groups that owned economic and political power shape the space and can choose to live in ecologically cleaner environments. Ecological planning mainly involves public spaces in cities that, in the interests of economic development, become private property. The conflict between the public good of all citizens and the interests of private capital is getting bigger. With this, less attention and funds are allocated for the security of the citizens. (7)

The Macedonian legal system has regulated the protection and the right to a healthy environment with several legal acts, including the highest legal act. Namely, in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, the Constitution stipulates, in Article 43, rights and obligations that relate directly to the environment: “Everyone has the right to a healthy environment. Everyone is obliged to promote and protect the environment and nature. The Republic provides conditions for the exercise of the right of citizens to a healthy environment. “(11)

However, the Macedonian air is five times more polluted than the European one, according to the media and the report of the United Nations. (2) (3). Residents of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania are exposed to one of the largest concentrations of polluted air in Europe, which is five times greater than the EU’s national and European guidelines.

"Air pollution in cities in the Western Balkans causes between 15 and 19 percent of total mortality and reduces life expectancy by 1.1 to 1.3 years," the report says. An alarmingly high level of air pollution reduces life expectancy. Air pollution is the cause of one in five swoon deaths in 19 cities in the Western Balkans, according to the preliminary results of the Report prepared by the UN Environment Program. (3)

There are numerous factors involved in the planning of the space, such as the environmental, social, cultural and economic conditions in which the process of planning a certain space or city takes place. The local community, the non-governmental and business sectors are involved, making the space a product of the community. The obligations are on the institutions that, in turn, are an expression of the political mood and diversity in a certain period of time in a society at the local or central level to regulate planning. It is often influenced by political decisions, political power and various interests of citizens, the non-governmental sector, the business community, informal lobby groups directly affected by certain urban interventions.

The responsibility of the local authorities increases to the consistent respect of the interests and security of the citizens who use and live in the space that is being regulated. Application of the principles of good governance and the inclusion of the mentioned groups and actors in the planning process becomes a necessity. In the world, the principle of inter-party cooperation is increasingly being applied when it comes to policies that affect large groups of citizens. In order to come to this, it is often necessary to overcome the division of "left or right" and to think in the direction of what is best for "all" (Beck, 1997: 42; Giddiness, 1994) (12). Mouffe (2000; 2005) (12) thinks that this inclusive approach is "good governance" when promoting a post-political society or a vision where political divisions are removed. Despite its commitment to broad consensus and inclusiveness, it is almost impossible to take into account and resolve all and all of the needs and requirements. There is always a conflict of interest that cannot be foreseen or incorporated and it will emerge outside the system, in the form of protests or new types of grouping for interest groups, related to developmental needs or the safety of living.

Organizing in NGOs that lobby for certain issues is not enough and often citizens react after the fists are adopted, or more precisely when the realization of some kind of impotence that threatens their living conditions and working conditions threatens to endanger security of living.

Political parties promise programs that take sustainable development, healthy environment and security, but no one reminds them of their promises of clean air, drinking water transported to cousins through asbestos pipes, the arrangement of local roads, n. The story goes on until the next election promises when only the parties are backing who did not do for the citizens, as alibis because another (they) will do for them.

8. Conclusion

The issues and elaborations in this paper are of interest and require more understanding of the contribution of citizens in urban planning and the construction of a safe environment. The paper points out the needs for a better understanding of the interests of families who are under pressure on security issues in the urban environment. Urban planning implies that space

interventions do not just need, but must be made in order not to violate the rights of people to health and safety life. This principle of fairness must first of all respect the planners and those who make decisions about urban development and development.

The right to life, to space and to a healthy environment, or to sustainable development, is the responsibility of the current ones in relation to future generations. With continuous education of the citizens, as well as systemically regulated safety legislation, the quality of life and the urban living of the family shape the basis for successful growth and development. This creates quality living, work and social conditions that encourage the individual to creatively create and care for the future and future of the family.

Also, by raising awareness of the creation of a specific policy for protecting the environment and safety for people who are an obligation of the institutions, responses are sought and activities for a safe urban environment and for social connections for building inclusive ties of urban communities are initiated.

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URBAN HEAT ISLAND EFFECTS OVER THE URBAN SECURITY: CASE STUDY OF THE CITY OF SKOPJE

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Abstract: The main aim of this paper is analyzing the correlation between the concept of environmental and urban security threats especially climate change and urbanization with the Urban Heat Island (UHI) phenomena. In that direction, the rapid growth of urbanization all over the World leads to negative impacts from different aspects. The urban area of the city of Skopje has been rapidly increasing in the past few decades. The rapid urbanization and industrialization are the main route causes of the UHI phenomena. In order to investigate the influence of the urban area expansion over UHI effects over the city of Skopje, in this paper, we use two Landsat Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus satellite images, from 20 August 1999, and 24 August 2018. The correlations between land surface temperature, the vegetated areas, and the urban areas were analyzed and the results indicate that the UHI has significant influence over the city's urban and environmental security.

Keywords: Urban Security, Environmental Security; Urban Heat Island; Land Surface Temperature, Skopje.

Introduction

The term environmental security can be defined as ecologically sustainable development or development that meets the environmental and ecological needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own environmental and ecological needs (Khramtsov 2006). In other words, environmental security is a set of conditions, processes, and actions that ensure the ecological balance in the environment and does not lead to vital damage (or threats of such damage) caused to the natural environment and people (Abanina et al. 2019). Environmental security should be assessed at different scales, namely from global (to understand some processes of global change) to regional (to understand processes in specific areas) to urban (to consider the processes of urban development) (Du et al.

2013). The urban expansion will affect not only local but global climate as well. Direct loss in vegetation biomass from areas with a high probability of urban expansion is predicted to contribute about 5% of total emissions from tropical deforestation and land-use change (Seto, Güneralp, and Hutya 2012). Urbanization is accompanied by rapid social and economic development, while the process of urbanization causes the degradation of the natural ecology. Many environmental problems have been demonstrated in the developed regions, such as change in land use type (Zhang et al. 2013), loss of biodiversity (Knapp et al. 2018), deterioration of air quality (Lewis 2018), increased heat island effect (Herath, Halwatura, and Jayasinghe 2018) and so on. Under this condition, the structure and function of the urban ecosystem have been destroyed, which seriously threatens the urban ecological and environmental security (Li et al. 2019). One of the environmental problem that urbanization has caused, is the Urban Heat Island (UHI) phenomena, which can be defined as an urban area that is significantly warmer than its surrounding rural areas due to anthropogenic activities. This phenomenon affects both environmental security and human health. Remote sensing and geographical information systems (GISs) have been widely applied to environmental and ecological security evaluation, especially in evaluation of the UHI effects. With the use of RS data, observation of Surface UHI (SUHI) is possible through Land Surface Temperature (LST) maps.

The urban area of the city of Skopje has been rapidly increasing in the past few decades. Previous research has investigated the UHI effect over the city of Skopje, using Landsat 8 satellite data in the period from 2013 – 2018 (Kaplan, Avdan, and Avdan 2018). The results showed presence of UHI in several sub-areas in the city of Skopje, and strong correlation between the with land use/land cover. However, since the analyses are made a short time period, it is hard to determine the relation between the urbanization and UHI. In order to investigate the influence of the urban area expansion over UHI effects over the city of Skopje in the last two decades, and to evaluate its environmental security, in this paper, we use two Landsat Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+) satellite images. Thus, two satellite images acquired on 20 August 1999, and 24 August 2018, have been used for retrieving SUHI map over the city of Skopje.

Data and Methodology

Skopje is the capital of the Republic of North Macedonia located in the center of the Balkan Peninsula. The population of Skopje is estimated to be more than 700.000 citizens. In the last few decades, the urban area of Skopje has been significantly expanding. Skopje has been built in the Skopje Valley along the river Vardar (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Republic of North Macedonia

In order to investigate the SUHI effect over the capital, the city of Skopje, two Landsat ETM+ satellite images have been used in this study. Landsat ETM+ or Landsat 7, is a middle-spatial resolution Earth observation satellite, launched in 1999 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). Aquifers images in the visible, near infra-red (NIR), middle infra-red part (MIR) of the electromagnetic spectrum with 30 meters', and in the thermal region with 60 meters' spatial resolution. Even though Landsat 7 had Scan Line Corrector (SLC) failure in 2003, part of the images still can be used for spatial analyses.

As the SUHI effect is the strongest in the summer periods, in this paper we use two images, one from 20 August 1999, and one from 24 August 2018. The images were downloaded from the USGS webpage, and before the analyses the images were pre-processed. The part of the image from 2018 over the city of Skopje was not affected by the SLC error.

As stated before, the SUHI can be best observed through thermal satellite sensors with LST maps. However, since Landsat satellites only provide thermal band, additional calculations are needed in order to retrieve LST information. Several studies on this topic can be found in the literature (Ekercin, Orhan, and Dadaser-Celik). In this paper, we use the algorithm developed by Avdan et al. (Avdan and Jovanovska 2016) adjusted for Landsat ETM+. The adjusting has been made with updating the coefficients of the thermal band that can be found in the metadata of

the satellite image. After the LST maps have been retrieved, the SUHI area has been extracted using the following expression (Ma, Kuang, and Huang 2010):

$$SUHI = \mu + \frac{\sigma}{2}$$

where μ is the mean LST value of the study area, and σ is the standard deviation of the LST.

In order to extract the build-up/urban area of the city of Skopje, as well as the vegetation cover, various remote sensing indices can be used. Thus, in this paper, the Normalized Difference Build-up Index (NDBI) has been used for calculating the urban area, using the MIR and NIR portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, and the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) has been used for calculating the vegetation cover, using the NIR and red portion of the electromagnetic spectrum over the city of Skopje in 1999 and 2018, respectively. Afterward, the relationship between LST, NDVI, and NDBI, has been calculated and analyzed. The NDBI and NDVI values have been extracted using the following expressions:

$$NDVI = \frac{NIR - Red}{NIR + Red}$$

$$NDBI = \frac{MIR - NIR}{MIR + NIR}$$

Results and Discussion

In order to investigate the impacts of vegetation and build-up areas over the UHI, a correlation coefficient between the LST, NDVI and NDBI results of the study area. The results from the performed statistical analysis are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Correlation Coefficients between the investigated variables

Year	LST-NDVI	LST-NDBI	NDVI-NDBI
1999	-0.55	0.64	-0.67
2018	-0.57	0.65	-0.68

The results from the visual analysis of the land cover showed that the vegetation area has decreased from 1999 to 2018, especially in the central part of the city. It has been noticed that the vegetated area has been replaced with urban areas. The results from the LST, NDVI analyses are shown in Figure 2-5.




Figure 2. NDVI - 1999




Figure 3. NDVI 2018




Figure 4. LST - 1999




Figure 5. LST - 2018

The statistical analyses and the comparison between the area affected from UHI in the city of Skopje, indicate that the UHI area has increased by approximately 50%. By observing Figure 4 and Figure 5 it can be concluded that the UHI area has increased in the central part of the city. The statistical increase of the UHI area is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Area affected by UHI

Year	Study area (km ²)	UHI area (km ²)
1999	46	8.4
2018	46	15.6

In this paper, the relationship between land cover and UHI of the city of Skopje has been studied. While in (Kaplan, Avdan, and Avdan 2018) it was concluded that the UHI area increased for approximately 10% for four years, in this study an increase of 50% has been noticed in the last twenty years. As shown in many studies, the negative correlation between LST and NDVI indicates that the green areas can weaken the effect on urban heat island, while the positive correlation between LST and NDBI means that the built-up land can strengthen the effect of urban heat island in the study area. Thus, in order to weaken the UHI effect, the green areas should be increased, and green walls and green roof should be considered, especially in the dense populated areas. Aside from increasing the green areas, several other methods have been used to mitigate the UHI effect such as coloring the rooftops and the roads with white color.

Conclusion

Urban security is essentially a part of the national security of the state. Starting from this conclusion, governments faced with the accelerated trends of urbanization and globalization, to ensure a safe ambiance for their own nations, need much more than just military force. This implies redefining all actions of policymakers at all levels of government.

For instance, in the mid-twentieth century, there were some 2.5 billion people on earth and a third lived in metropolitan areas. Today, there are 7.4 billion people, and 54 percent of that much larger number now live in or around cities. By 2050, there will be a minimum of nine billion people on Earth, of which two-thirds will live in metropolitan areas, according to the UN.

All these demographic changes are closely correlated with urban security. The Republic of North Macedonia and its capital, Skopje, are inevitably affected by these processes. In this paper, we investigate the UHI effect over the city of Skopje in order to analyze the urban and environmental security of the capital in the last two decades. For this purpose, two satellite images from Landsat ETM+ was used. It was concluded that the area affected by the UHI phenomena has increased by approximately 50% since 1999.

As the main recommendations of this research on the creation of urban thermal islands and the possibilities for their mitigation and reduced impact on urban security, several different approaches can be pointed out: Afforestation of the roads and dense urban zones, building green roofs and green parking, creating vertical gardens and installing cold roofs.

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THE SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF VIOLENCE CRIME OFFENDERS

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Abstract: Taking into account that violence offences such as murder, rape, and sexual intercourse with a child are characterized by severe consequences, significant vulnerability of women and children, huge dark figure, as well as complex and underexplored etiology, the purpose of this paper is to analyze, interpret and evaluate the sociodemographic characteristics with the aim of determining who the criminal offenders in the Republic of Serbia are.

The survey was conducted in 2018, and it included 90 male convicts, aged between 20 and 77, who were serving their prison sentences for the criminal offences of murder, art. 113, and aggravated murder, art. 114, the criminal offence of rape, art. 178, and the criminal offence of the sexual intercourse with a child, art. 180 of the Serbian Criminal Code. They were serving their prison sentence in penitentiary institutions in Niš, Požarevac-Zabela, Padinska skela and Sremska Mitrovica, in the Republic of Serbia.

The results of the survey indicate a diversity in terms of the age structure of the offenders of violence crimes. The largest number of murderers is aged between 14 and 50, rapists between 20 and 50, and pedophiles between 20 and 30. Regarding the other sociodemographic characteristics, the results indicate that the largest percentage of the offenders of violence crimes were born and live in urban areas, have completed secondary education, had been mainly unemployed before serving the sentences, as well as that they are technicians in different fields, unmarried, and of diverse socioeconomic statuses. In terms of their criminal record, murderers and rapists had already committed property offences, violence offences, and drug-related offences.

Key words: sociodemographic characteristics, violence offences, murder, rape, pedophilia.

Introduction

Violence is the most severe form of a denial of human rights: the right to life, the right to personal integrity, the right to dignity - the rights which are guaranteed by both national and international law. Everyone has the right to life, freedom and protection (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, art. 23, 24. and 25).

Violence is one of the leading causes of death among the population aged between 15 and 44. According to the estimations of the World Health Organization (WHO), 1.6 million people die as a consequence of violence every year. The number of those who are injured and suffer the consequences of emerging physical, mental, sexual, or health issues is significantly larger.

Violence offences characterize all societies. Violence stems from a complex interrelation of a large spectrum of determinants. The existence of either real or imaginary conflict between two sides with opposing motives incites violence. Whether or not the criminal offence is to be committed, as well as the possible means, instruments and consequences of it, depend upon the interaction between the offender and the victim in a given conflicting situation.

Experts in different fields, such as jurists, psychologists, criminologists, criminalists, sociologists, philosophers, etc. have investigated the phenomenon of violence.

We are currently witnessing an increasing incidence of school violence, violence against emotional partners, children, violence at sport matches, etc. Based on everyday reports of different forms of violence, such as fights, murders, domestic violence, given in press and some informative programs, it seems that violence has become more and more frequent.

Various approaches to defining the phenomenon of violence crime have been offered in the literature, and they essentially differ in terms of the classification of crime offences which belong to this type of crime. What they have in common is the view that those are the offences in which an instance of interpersonal violence, characterized by brutal and aggressive treatment of the victim or some other object, is displayed (Pakes & Winstone, 2007).

The study of the sociodemographic characteristics of violence crime offenders, committing offences such as murder, rape and sexual intercourse with a child, represents the affirmation of the approach to this crime phenomenon as a complex one, resulting from the interplay of numerous social and personal factors (Baić, Kolarević, 2013; Baić, Kolarević, Gojković, 2015; Momić, Hošek, Radovanović, Radulović, 1995; Wolf, Radovanović, Radulović, 1995), and as such is the topic of this paper.

Previous investigations of the sociodemographic characteristics of violence crime offenders in Serbia have focused mainly on murderers and rapists, but not on the offenders of the sexual intercourse with a child, except for those who committed the offence of child pornography, art. 185 of the Serbian Criminal Code (Baić, Ivanović, Oljača, 2019. in press). This investigation focused on determining the most significant sociodemographic characteristics of the offenders of child pornography, art. 185, as well as on the specificities of the execution of the offence. The paper included 62 male adults, aged between 18 and 70. The results showed that the offenders of child pornography are exclusively males of the average age 36.6 years, varying in terms of their employment status, and ranging from workers in different fields to students and retirees. Regarding other sociodemographic characteristics, the results indicate that the majority of the offenders have completed secondary education, that they are both employed and unemployed, unmarried, gravitating from urban areas, and with no criminal record.

The results of the survey tackling the sociodemographic characteristics of the offenders of murder, conducted at the onset of the century (Kron, 2000; Simeunović-Patić, 2003; Kovačević,

& Kecman, 2006; Gajić, Milatović, Golubović, Dadasović, Ralević, & Golubović, 2016) point towards a shift in the age structure of murderers, who at first were aged between 30 and 40, and then between 40 and 50. In terms of their social and employment statuses, the results indicate that the majority of murderers have completed secondary education and had been unemployed before serving the sentence, that they are unqualified workers, craftsmen, clerks, technicians in different fields, etc. mainly unmarried, and of diverse, but predominantly lower socioeconomic status. Regarding their criminal records, most of murderers had already been convicted for property and violence offences³.

The results of the survey focusing of the sociodemographic characteristics of the offenders of rape (Baić, Kolarević, Ranković, 2018) indicate that the majority of rapists are aged between 30 and 40, the average age being 35 years. In terms of other sociodemographic characteristics, the results show that rapists are mainly unqualified individuals, unemployed, unmarried, of a lower socioeconomic status, gravitating from both urban and rural areas. Regarding their criminal record, the largest percentage of convicts had already been convicted for property and violence offences, including the criminal offence of rape⁴.

The results of the survey concerned with the sociodemographic characteristics of the offenders of child pornography (Baić, Ivanović, Oljača, 2019 in press) indicate that the average age of pedophiles is 36.6 years, as well as that they widely differ in terms of their employment status, ranging from workers in different fields, to students and retirees. In terms of other sociodemographic characteristics, the results show that the majority of the convicts have completed secondary education, that they are both employed and unemployed, unmarried, gravitating from urban areas, and with no criminal record.

The sexual exploitation of children in travel and tourism has become a widely discussed topic among many agencies for the protection of children, charity organizations, etc. starting with the UN's Global Study on the Sexual Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism. The study has become the most comprehensive audit of the current state of affairs. Affordable trips and new technology, which provides an easy access to information, are considered the major causes of the spread of sexual exploitation all over the world. The offenders do not have prototypical pedophile profiles; they are present in all spheres of life, and do not regard themselves as serial pedophiles. What they have in common is a very small chance of being discovered, arrested and sentenced. They choose countries with weakest laws, in which there is not the rule of law. In North Africa and the Middle East, numerous factors such as temporary marriages, wars, and the poor status of women contribute to pedophilia. Due to the inefficient law enforcement, pedophile tourism has flourished in the poor countries of South Asia and Latin America.

³ The number of the criminal offences of murder in Serbia from 2000 to 2012 was ranging between 120 and 215. For example, in 2000, 212 murders were registered, while in 2009, 142 murders were registered. According to the report of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, 76 murder offences were registered last year, which is a significantly lower rate compared to the past 30 years.

⁴ According to Eurostat's report, in 2015 the member countries of EU registered 215.000 sexual offences, almost 80.000 of which were rapes. According to the data, 90% of the victims of rape and 80% of the victims of sexual assaults were female, while 99% of the convicts for sexual offences are male.

Taking into account that violence offences such as murder, rape, and sexual intercourse with a child are characterized by severe consequences, significant vulnerability of women and children, huge dark figure, as well as complex and underexplored etiology, the purpose of this paper is to analyze, interpret and evaluate the sociodemographic characteristics with the aim of determining who the criminal offenders in the Republic of Serbia are, along with specifying the sociodemographic characteristics they have in common.

2. Methodology

2.1 Sample and procedure

In determining the sociodemographic characteristics of the offenders of murder, rape, and pedophilia, the current survey has taken the following characteristics as distinctive: age, personal qualification, employment, profession, marital status, family income, birth place, residence, criminal record and the type of criminal offence they had been sentenced for.

The survey included 90 male convicts, aged between 20 and 77, who were serving their prison sentences for the criminal offences of murder, art. 113, and aggravated murder, art. 114, the criminal offence of rape, art. 178, and the criminal offence of the sexual intercourse with a child, art. 180 of the Serbian Criminal Code. A detailed record of the sociodemographic characteristics of the sample are given in the Results section.

The survey was conducted at the beginning of 2018, in penitentiary institutions in Niš, Požarevac, Padinska skela and Sremska Mitrovica, in Serbia. Before taking part in the survey, the convicts had signed a consent, which provided information about the aims and anonymity of the survey, accounting for the confidentiality of information. The participation in the survey was voluntary. The questionnaire was distributed in a pen and paper format.

2.2 Instrument

For the purpose of the survey, the authors constructed a questionnaire aimed at collecting basic sociodemographic information, as well as information about the criminal records of the convicts.

2.3 Data analysis method


In order to gain insight into the frequency of certain categories of responses, the authors opted for the frequency and descriptive methods of data analysis.

3. Results

3.1 The age of violent crime offenders

The results of the survey indicate that the majority of violent crime offenders in Serbia are aged between 20 and 30 (27%), then between 31 and 40 (26%), and between 41 and 50 (25%). A somewhat smaller percentage (13%) is aged between 51 and 60, and 61 and 70 years (6%) (Graph 1).


Taking into consideration the specific results, the offenders of murder are mostly aged between 31 and 40 (37%), the majority of the offenders of rape are aged between 20 and 40 (48%), while 60% of the offenders of pedophilia are aged between 20 and 40. Based on the age structures presented, it can be concluded that none of the life periods is critical for violent crime activities, since murderers, rapists and pedophiles can be found among the young, the middle-aged, as well as the elderly.



Graph 1. The age of violent crime offenders

3.2 Personal qualification

The results of the survey indicate that the smallest portion of violent crime offenders comprises unqualified workers who have not completed elementary education (5%) and persons who have a high professional degree (5%). 23% of the participants have completed elementary education, while the largest portion of murderers have completed secondary education (64%) (Graph 2).




Graph 2. Personal qualification

What the three groups of offenders have in common is the fact that the largest percentage of them have completed secondary education. Taking into account all participants' responses, it can be noted that 64.4% participants have completed secondary education, 23% have completed

elementary education, 8.8% of the participants have higher or high professional qualification, while 3.3% have only partially completed elementary education. To sum up, the largest number of murderers, rapists, and pedophiles have completed secondary education.

3.3 Previous employment status


Taking into account the responses of all three groups of offenders, it can be said that the majority of them are unemployed (44.4%), permanently employed (42.2%), temporarily employed (7.7%), while 4.4% of them are part-time employees, and only 1.1% of them are retirees (Graph 3).



Graph 3. Previous employment status

3.4. Profession


The results of the section of the survey focusing on the offenders' professions indicate that the offenders belong to a diversity of professions, and that none of the professions is particularly prominent, but a slightly larger number of them are unqualified workers (20%) (Graph 4).



Graph 4. Profession

3.5 Marital status


The results of the section of the survey focusing on the marital status indicate that the violent crime offenders are mainly unmarried (47.7%) and married (23.3%). They are followed by the ones living in a domestic partnership (11.1%), the divorced (14.4%), and finally the widowers (3.3%) (Graph 5).



Graph 5. Marital status

3.6 Socioeconomic status


For the purpose of the current paper, the socioeconomic status was determined on the basis of the offenders' family income. According to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, the average net wage in February 2019, in Serbia was 52,426,00 RSD. 22% of the offenders' families have up to 20,000 RSD monthly income, while 29% of the offenders' families have 20-40,000 RSD monthly income. 37% of the offenders' families have 40-60,000 RSD monthly income, whereas only 12% of offenders' families have a monthly income higher than 60,000 RSD (Graph 6).



Graph 6. Socioeconomic status

3.7 Birth place


In terms of birth place, the results indicate that the vast majority of violence crime offenders were born in urban areas (80%), while a significantly smaller portion was born in rural areas (20%) (Graph 7).



Graph 7. Birth place

3.8 Residence

Regarding the violence crime offenders' residence, the situation is almost the same as with birth place. Around 72% of the offenders live in urban, while only 28% of them live in rural areas (Graph 8).




Graph 8. Residence

3.9 Criminal record

The results of the survey of criminal record indicate that pedophiles had not been convicted previously, contrary to murderers and rapists, who had been convicted in 26.6% of cases (Graph 9).

Criminal record



Graph 9. Criminal record

3.10 The types of previous criminal offences of murderers and rapists

With the aim of acquiring an accurate presentation of the criminal record of the offenders before being convicted of rape or murder, the authors engaged in determining the structure of the previous criminal offences.

The results indicate that the murderers had mostly been convicted of property offences (25%), frauds and fights (15%), drug-related offences, larceny, rape (10%), and finally for attempts of murder, murder and illegal possession of firearms (5%) (Graph 10).

The types of previous criminal offences of murder and rapists



Graph 10. The types of previous criminal offences of murderers

Considering rapists, the results show that they had mostly been convicted of property offences (32%), then murder, illegal possession of firearms and larceny (16%), rape (10%), and finally domestic violence and causing serious body injuries (5%) (Graph 11).

The types of previous criminal offences of rapists



Graph 11. The types of previous criminal offences of rapists

Summing up the responses of the offenders of rape and murder, it can be concluded that they had primarily been convicted of property offences (30%), rape, murder and illegal possession of firearms (6.67%), fights (5%), drug-related offences (3.33%), attempts of murder and frauds (1.67%), and domestic violence, present only among rapists (1.67%).

4. Discussion and conclusion

With the aim of determining the sociodemographic profiles of the offenders of rape, murder, and sexual intercourse with a child, and enabling a more precise identification of the offenders, the paper investigated the modalities of their most important sociodemographic characteristics.

In the course of the analysis of all three groups' data, significant differences were noticed with the offenders of pedophilia. With the offenders of murder and rape, there were not any significant deviations noticed.

The surveys that had investigated the demographic characteristics of murderers, rapists and pedophiles in Serbia (Simeunović-Patić, 2003; Kovačević i Kecman, 2006; Gajić i dr., 2016; Baić, Kolarević, Ranković, 2018; Baić, Ivanović, Oljača, 2019 in press), indicate that, in a phenomenological sense, the population is heterogeneous, differing in terms of certain sociodemographic features. The results of the survey go in favour of the view that violence crime offenders (murderers, rapists, pedophiles) belong to different age structures. The largest number of murderers is aged between 14 and 50, of rapists between 20 and 50, and pedophiles between 20 and 30. In terms of other sociodemographic characteristics, the survey indicates that murderers, rapists, and pedophiles were born and reside in urban areas, that they have completed secondary education, that they had mainly been unemployed before serving the sentences, that they are mainly technicians in different fields, unmarried and of a different socioeconomic status. Considering their criminal records, except for pedophiles, murderers and rapists had already been convicted of property and violence, as well as drug-related offences.

Summing up the information about social status, it can be concluded that it is not favourable, since the majority of the offenders had been unemployed, belonging to a lower socioeconomic status. Criminal record data indicate primarily that pedophiles had not been convicted, contrary to murderers and rapists, who had been convicted of property and violence offences. The lack of information about the previous criminal activity of pedophiles is not a reliable in-

indicator of their criminal tendencies. Instead, it may indicate the insufficient control of their criminal activities, and the presence of the so-called dark figure. Pedophiles, like rapists, are people of compromised instinctive dynamisms, which increases the likelihood of the recurrence of criminal activities (Baić, 2018). On the other hand, if we take into consideration the fact that the execution of some property offences, such as larceny, includes violence, we can suppose that murderers and rapists were more prone to violent behaviour in their criminal records. Violence is often regarded as related to aggressiveness (Hickey, 2003), which is one of the basic dimensions of personality, representing a crucial predisposing factor of the inclination towards violent crime offences over other types of offences (Otašević, Jovanov, Oljača, 2014).

All of the abovementioned leads us to a conclusion that murderers, rapists and pedophiles comprise a heterogeneous population in terms of their sociodemographic characteristics, i.e. that social characteristics are only an intersection of many etiological factors, whereas criminal behaviour definitely comes as a consequence of many intertwined psychological and situational factors (Baić, 2018).

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OPEN-SOURCE DATABASES RELATED TO URBAN SECURITY ISSUES

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Abstract: Progressive urbanization of cities worldwide, appearance and expansion of so-called global cities (or world cities, megacities), global interconnectedness of large economic and trade urban centers, and rapid technological development of contemporary cities are just some of the most obvious advancements within global urban trends in the last decades. However, as urban history teaches us, with every new global development – from maritime economics and trade, colonization, and different industrial revolutions, through development of telecommunication, electric power transmission and tourism, all the way to environmental issues, globalization and the last ICT revolution – cities were the focus of some of the greatest pressures which appeared under these changes, primarily in the form of various population and infrastructure issues.

The immediate manifestations of these changes were mirrored in general population safety and security problems appearing constantly throughout history. As time went by, these urban security issues were addressed differently. In earlier stages of urban development, responses to security issues were mostly ad hoc, rarely institutionalized, based on simple solutions, and short-term oriented. With the advancement of urban infrastructure and management, these reactions became more complex, better informed and followed by long-term goals. Besides that, the diversity of stakeholders in this process developed as well. Today, there is a multitude of actors interested and involved in planning and executing various solutions for contemporary urban security issues. Traditionally, national and local government, are still key providers of security in this context, but often they are implementing solutions in partnership with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, private enterprises, the media, and academia.

The development of information and communication technology (ICT) in the last two decades brought some new possibilities for dealing with urban security challenges and threats, and the most important place in the development of these possibilities have the aforementioned non-state actors. New ICT environment brought up various and diverse means for automatization of collection, management, and use of important data regarding different urban security issues, for instance the traffic safety data, crime rates and distribution data, pollution data etc. These

aggregated datasets and data clusters, covering urban areas for decades back, today represent a precious resource for diagnosis of the existing urban security conditions, and also bear the potential for making precise estimations of trends regarding the concrete issue.

In this manner, the authors of this paper will try to make an overview of the most prominent existing databases regarding urban security, and discuss the need for open-source databases which are covering datasets related to urban security issues. This overview will also try to detect the urban security issues which are not addressed sufficiently and properly within these databases, and thus make the appropriate recommendations and directions for future developments in this field.

Keywords: open-source databases, urban security, big data, cities, information and communication technology (ICT)

Introduction

Progressive urbanization of cities worldwide, appearance and expansion of so-called global cities (or world cities, megacities), global interconnectedness of large economic and trade urban centers, and rapid technological development of contemporary cities are just some of the most obvious advancements within global urban trends in the last decades. However, as urban history teaches us, with every new global development – from maritime economics and trade, colonization, and different industrial revolutions, through development of telecommunication, electric power transmission and tourism, all the way to environmental issues, globalization and the last ICT revolution – cities were the focus of some of the greatest pressures which appeared under these changes, primarily in the form of various population and infrastructure issues.

Direct manifestations of these changes were mirrored in general population safety and security problems appearing constantly throughout history. As time went by, these urban security issues were addressed differently. In earlier stages of urban development, responses to security issues were mostly ad hoc, rarely institutionalized, based on simple solutions, and short-term oriented. With the advancement of urban infrastructure and management, these reactions became more complex, better informed and followed by long-term goals. Besides that, the diversity of stakeholders in this process developed as well. Today, there is a multitude of actors interested and involved in planning and executing various solutions for contemporary urban security issues. Traditionally, national and local government, are still key providers of security in this context, but often they are implementing solutions in partnership with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, private enterprises, the media, and academia.

The development of information and communication technology (ICT) in the last two decades brought some new possibilities for dealing with urban security challenges and threats, and the most important place in the development of these possibilities have the aforementioned non-state actors. New ICT environment brought up various and diverse means for automatization of collection, management, and use of important data regarding different urban security issues, for instance the traffic safety data, crime rates and distribution data, pollution data etc. Different state institutions, as well as private companies “release vast amounts of data at various spatial

and temporal scales” (Barthelemy, 2017:38). These aggregated datasets and data clusters – big data, covering urban areas for decades back, today represent a precious resource for diagnosis of the existing urban security conditions, and also bear the potential for making precise estimations of trends regarding the concrete issue. Briefly, big data is “enriching our experiences on how cities function, and it is offering many new opportunities for social interaction and more informed decision-making” (Batty, 2013:277).

In this manner, we will try to make an overview of the most prominent existing databases regarding urban security, and discuss the need for open-source databases which are covering datasets related to urban security issues. This overview will also try to detect the urban security issues which are not addressed sufficiently and properly within these databases, and thus make the appropriate recommendations and directions for future developments in this field.

ICT, data and databases for managing urban security

The digital revolution inevitably influenced the way we see and discuss about contemporary cities and its security. Information and communication technologies have been exerting a growing and pervasive influence on the nature, structure and enactment of urban infrastructure, management, economic activity and everyday life (Kitchin, 2014: 1). Shift toward information and communication technology (ICT) solutions that try to solve urban problems and provide services more efficiently over the past several decades are expressed in the idea of smart cities (Batty et al., 2012). This set of initiatives, strategies and approaches seek to transform urban governance, management and the way of living with the use of modern digital technology (Kitchin and Dodge, 2017: 1). Smart city should be able to actively generate smart ideas in an open environment through fostering clusters or Open Data or developing proper living labs while directly involving citizens in the co-creation process of products or services. As a concept, it is described in various ways but a general definition involves implementation and deployment of information and communication technology infrastructures to support social and urban growth through improving the economy, citizens’ involvement and governmental efficiency (Hollands, 2008). Through implementing information and communication technologies into municipal services, cities turn into being more intelligent in their management of resources (Bakıcı et al., 213: 137).

Smart city technologies are promoted as an advanced way to counter and manage urban insecurities and risks through the effective and efficient delivery of services (Paraušić, 2018). The smart city initiative fosters the idea that the best way to govern a city protects vital values, enable citizens satisfying level of wellbeing and participation is through technology, especially open and real time available data. Hence, the development and usage of databases in research and management of urban security is strongly in line with the idea of smart city.

Much detailed information about cities was available long before the advent of computing. Very large datasets, such as national censuses, government records and surveys that provide information about cities and their citizens have a long history. Data typically available included the overall population, its age and sex composition, educational level attained, household size, etc., on a local government level or even on a finer scale (Wang and Moriarty, 2018: 45). Ad-

ditionally, businesses and private companies have collated significant amounts of data about their operations, markets and customers. However, these datasets often rely on samples, are generated on a non-continuous basis, the number of variables is quite small, are aggregated to a relatively coarse spatial scale, and are often limited in access (Kitchin, 2014: 3). As a result, these large datasets have been complemented by individual research (questionnaire surveys, case studies, city audits, interviews and focus groups, and ethnographies) that capture a relatively limited sample of data that are tightly focused, time and space specific, restricted in scope and scale, and relatively expensive to generate and analyze, to provide additional depth and insight with respect to specific phenomena. Much of what we know about cities to date then has been gleaned from studies that are characterized by data scarcity (Miller 2010). Furthermore, traditional data collection could be costly, increasingly difficult, liable to error, and out-of-date.

Introducing big data and databases in research and practice on urban security gave hope to much more sophisticated, wider-scale, finer-grained, real time understanding and control of the city and urban life (Kitchin, 2014: 3). Some of these data are generated by local governments and state agencies, some by private companies, and some by non-governmental organizations and regional and international organizations. For urban managers these datasets provide abundant, systematic, dynamic, well-defined, resolute, relatively cheap data about city activities and processes, enabling the possibility of real-time analytics and adaptive forms of management and governance (Kloeckl et al. 2012).

Some known ways in which technology contributes to improvement of urban security include emergency telecommunication, surveillance and wireless video streaming, predictive policing with the help of ICT, social media monitoring etc. Many city governments now use real-time analytics to manage aspects of how a city functions and is regulated. For example, in transportation data from a network of cameras and transponders are fed back to a central control hub to monitor the flow of traffic and to adjust traffic light sequences and speed limits and to automatically administer penalties for traffic violations (Dodge and Kitchin 2007). Also, the police forces might monitor cameras and live follow incident in order to efficiently and timely direct resources to particular locations. Air and noise pollution, water levels and the like could also be followed by authorities, specialized agencies but also citizens.

Social media/networks have immense impact on nearly every sphere of modern life. The city is no exception; hence the urban environment presents itself with an unprecedented quantity of information in the form of items such as comments from Twitter and Facebook, reviews from TripAdvisor and pictures from Instagram and Flickr. As Ciuccarelli and associates notice: "By posting pictures, checking in at specific places, and sharing georeferenced content as part of their everyday experiences, people are—more and more—making information available on how they live in, use, and perceive urban spaces (Ciuccarelli et al., 2014: 5). Collecting, analyzing and presenting time-based geo-located social media data on urban life represent new way to visualize urban life and events and problems in urban areas. Conceptualizing this type of database could be significant source of knowledge for urban security provision and management and dealing with security threats.

Promoting the citizens' participation, there is growing number of applications available that could be helpful in citizen reporting, social platforms to discuss security problems in the city, emergency applications for alerting family and friends (Habeeb Rahman, 2013). These platforms function as databases of events people report almost every day, and refer to such urban security threats as sexual violence and harassment, crime, vandalism, bad traffic or some signs of physical or social disorder (Paraušić, 2018). They represent unique set of human experience and potentially have great academic and practical value. The idea with these platforms is to make the data useful for individuals, local communities and local administration to identify factors that cause behavior that leads to violence and work on strategies for solutions. The great advantage is the availability of the data, where interested persons (officials, researchers, citizens) could have real time information about what is happening in their city.

Also, in line with participatory approach is an initiative to introduce interactive dashboards, the data shared with citizens through online, interactive data visualizations. Dashboards provide a means of collecting together and displaying a number of indicators through a common graphic interface (Lake, 2013). These dashboards graph and map indicator data, providing detailed information about city performance and trends, without citizens needing to learn how to handle data or use specialist visualization software (Kitchin et al. 2015: 7).

As we may conclude, technology, data and databases have major impact on how we perceive, understand and govern the contemporary city. Factual data can be statistically analyzed and visualized to reveal patterns and trends about urban security related issues. They provide basis for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of urban polices and measures and to develop new interventions. Existing databases represent desirable resource in explaining and understanding urban security, and research based on these data provide results that are equally usable both for responding and for dealing with security challenges (Dimitrijević and Paraušić, 2017: 12). Consequently, the open data is not just changing the way urban security is studied, but also the relations between government and the public, the urban security provision and management. Presenting in detail all the ICT solutions for addressing and tackling urban security problems goes beyond the objectives of this paper. Therefore, some of the most prominent existing databases regarding urban security are presented and discussed in the next section.

Overview of Open-Source Databases Related to Urban Security Issues

What are the main primary sources for open-source databases and repositories of data related to urban security? Firstly, much of the used and freely available data comes with the Open Data movement or idea. Although it is vast and all-present, Open Data related to urban issues could be put into a subcategory of Open Government data. In this context, "open data can be powerful force for public accountability – it can make existing information easier to analyze, process, and combine than ever before, allowing a new level of public scrutiny" (Yu & Robinson, 2011:182). Many governments around the world have Open Data portals available for public use, and the number of cities worldwide providing free urban data is growing daily. That is why many existing databases related to urban issues use these data as their primary sources.

The other large pool of data for aggregated global urban databases are social networks. Their importance at the beginning of the 21st century is essential for various aspects of social life, and the added value of social networks are automated big data practically ready to be used in complex research. Today, there are 4,4 billion internet users, around 3,5 billion active social media users, with around 3,4 billion of them using mobile social media (Datareportal, April 2019), which represents an unprecedented source of both quantitative and qualitative data. Social networks also provide the possibilities for crowdsourcing.

In this chapter, we will provide an overview of databases that use urban data from major world cities and thus have a global scope and could be used for various comparative research in different security-related issues.

UN-Habitat Urban Data

One of the most comprehensive databases on urban data is certainly the UN-Habitat's Urban Data, which contains "urban indicators data" that is "analyzed, compiled and published by UN-Habitat's Global Urban Observatory" (UN-Habitat, 2019). Its global reach is based on the system of collecting the data from all the UN member states, and at the moment it covers 220 states and territories, 741 cities, and 103 indicators: "Urban statistics are collected through household surveys and censuses conducted by national statistics authorities. Global Urban Observatory team analyses and compiles urban indicators statistics from surveys and censuses. Additionally, Local urban observatories collect, compile and analyze urban data for national policy development. Population statistics are produced by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects" (UN-Habitat, 2019).

World Urban Database and Access Portal Tools (WUDAPT)

World Urban Database and Access Portal Tools (WUDAPT) presents an "international community-based initiative to acquire and disseminate climate relevant data on the physical geographies of cities for modeling and analyses purposes" (Ching et al, 2018). It has a database which is structured within hierarchy that present different levels of detail, for which the data is collected through "crowdsourcing, Geowiki tools, freely accessible data, and building typology archetypes" (Ching et al, 2018). The idea behind the project is "to acquire and store urban data using a common framework and to link these data to available methods for climate analysis and for current and what-if scenario development" (WUDAPT, 2017:3).

WUDAPT provides three-level products, Level 0, Level 1, and Level 2, depending on details. The lowest level of detail (L0) is transforming urban landscapes into the Local Climate Zone (LCZ) through local expertise, Landsat remote sensing data and software. Within WUDAPT database, L0 data cover something over 120 city regions around the world. It could be used for weather research and forecast modelling, and by anyone interested.

Level 1 is more detailed and could be used for weather and climate, urban air flows, urban radiation, mean radiant temperature, urban energy consumption, air pollution, CO₂ and GHG emission, biodiversity, urban master plan, land use plan, green master plan, new town plan etc. Also, the scope of potential users is larger - environment scientists, climatologists, meteorolo-

gists, engineering consultant companies and design firms, education institutions, NGOs, urban designers, town planners, city government planning departments, transportation offices, public works departments, zoning boards etc. (WUDAPT, 2017:5).

Level 2 data cover complete urban landscape with additional information on individual urban elements like buildings, streets, parks etc. The information covered by the L2 data could have added value with information on the types and structure of buildings and other individual elements, which could be acquired through remote sensing. More details and properties could be provided through Open Data such as census data, and through crowdsourcing as well (WUDAPT, 2017:6). The visualization of L2 data is given in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1. WUDAPT Level 2 product (3D morphological data of Kowloon Peninsula, Hong Kong)
(Source: WUDAPT, 2017:7, http://www.wudapt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/WUDAPT-Briefing-Doc_20170630.pdf)

Urban Data Platform

The Urban Data Platform represents a “joint initiative of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) of the European Commission. It is a key component of the Knowledge Centre for Territorial Policies and aims at providing access to information on the status and trends of **European cities and regions**, as well as to the exploration of EU supported integrated urban and territorial development strategies” (European Commission, 2019). It has several features related to urban data for European Union member countries.

The first and main feature is the Urban and Territorial Dashboard platform, which provides up-to-date data on cities and functional urban areas for the following categories: population dynamics, health, transport and accessibility, environment and climate, urban development, security and safety, and social issues. The following feature are Trends, which visualizes population trends in the EU cities, and gives an overview with a possibility of comparing different cities. The feature Thematic Analyses provides reports with in-depth analyses regarding different indicators.

Urban Data Platform also provides two tools for urban data. The first one, STRAT-Board, gives an insight into the integrated approach to urban and territorial development as supported by EU provisions and tools. The other one is the NUTS Converter, which provides a conversion of European regional statistical data between different versions of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics classification (European Commission, 2019).

UrbanData2Decide (UD2D)

One of the upcoming portals for urban big data is UrbanData2Decide project, which was created in 2014 by consortium of Vienna Company SYNYO, University of Oxford, Malmö University, The Open Data Institute, IT University of Copenhagen, Centre for Social Innovation from Austria, and many European city partners. The project's aim is to "extract and process information from two rich sources, namely public social media and open data catalogue" (UD2D, 2019). The data collected is then visualized, supported with the experts' advice, and made ready for local governments and their decision-making process, so they could tackle issues like urban safety and urban security.

The motive behind the UD2D was the fact that urban governing officials confront various challenges on everyday basis, and have to react to them in timely manner with critical decisions to make in that process. Based on that, the idea was simple – to provide these urban decision-makers with their own Open Data boosted with additional data like citizen-generated content (crowdsourcing from social networks), and various Open Data catalogues, repositories, hubs, platforms etc.

For effective use of data collected, the consortium developed two systems of their own – UrbanDataVisualiser and UrbanDecisionMaker. The first one, UrbanDataVisualiser "aggregates, structures and visualize data using a multi-layered and multi-dimensional approach" (UD2D, 2019). After that, "the framework uses data mining, sentiment analysis and visualization techniques... to develop a proof-of-concept demonstrator to showcase the information using intuitive and clear dashboards" (UD2D, 2019). UrbanDecisionMaker, on the other hand, "will complement this bottom-up approach by integrating external experts and advisors using scientific multi-round expert integration methods and tools like Delphi method, a structured communication technique, developed as a systematic, interactive forecasting method which relies on a panel of experts" (UD2D, 2019). The complete concept of the project is visualized in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2. UrbanData2Decide concept explained
(Source: <http://www.urbandata2decide.eu/project-overview/>, accessed on May 15th, 2019)

Conclusion

Today, a lot of urban open-source information is available through digitalization of cities themselves, which can be a pool for abstracting information and analyzing it for better understanding and improving contemporary urban life. It means that people living in cities “can now provide local knowledge through a bottom-up approach, contributing information through the use of widely diffused technologies”, e.g. by “posting pictures, checking in at specific places,

and sharing georeferenced content as part of their everyday experiences, people are—more and more—making information available on how they live in, use, and perceive urban spaces” (Ciuccarelli et al, 2014:5). Accordingly, there are numerous tools for obtaining and analyzing these vast data in practically real time.

ICT solutions and databases for securing the city are beneficial in many ways for providers and researcher alike. Real time city data analytics, databases, apps and dashboards provide a powerful means for making sense of, managing and living in the city and for predicting future scenarios. Rather than basing decisions on intuition or clientelist politics or periodic/partial evidence, it is possible to assess what is happening at any time and to react and plan appropriately (Kitchin, 2014: 7). Moreover, usage of reliable, easily available and timely data provides a deeper, more holistic and robust analysis.

Databases presented are only those with the biggest scope and from prominent sources, but it should be mentioned that there are plenty of local government databases, local initiative projects and private databases related to local and regional levels of analysis of urban data. Databases of bigger scope are useful for plethora of potential research in context of global trends, for example pollution or crime rates caused by rapid urbanization. However, local or regional databases are useful as well, especially when supported with data from big databases. In that manner, these databases could be used for determination of safe and unsafe locations in the city, for geolocating the risk areas cross-referenced with data about the nearest police stations or health services, etc. For instance, big data could help in dealing with emergencies and urban crises in real time through using real-time social networks data like photographs for augmenting “remote sensing observations of transportation infrastructure conditions in response to emergencies” (Thakuria et al, 2018:6). Also, big data could help in monitoring structural health of buildings, waste management, traffic congestion, urban energy consumption, urban health and well-being etc. (Wang & Moriarty, 2018), and could be used by local governments for designing the safe and secure city parameter measurement procedures (Setiyono & Supangkat, 2018).

For modern urban management, it is of utmost importance to bear in mind two substantial facts – “data is essential for evidence-based policymaking and effective investment in and management of infrastructure in a city” and that “comparative analysis and knowledge sharing is crucial to respond to emerging global challenges the associated demand for sustainability planning, resilience and emergency preparedness” (UN-HABITAT, 2016:43). In the intersection of these two facts, the internet with its timely data availability about modern urban issues is located, and should be used extensively for dealing with all the urban challenges of today.

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THREATS FOR URBAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND HOLISTIC SECURITY STRATEGY. RIGA CASE

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Abstract: A complex security environment of the beginning of the 21st century has created new security threats and challenges enhanced by rapid technological development. Challenges of political, social, military and criminal domains are further threatening urban populations and critical infrastructure. Urbanization is continuous global trend, and as cities grow and further expand, armed conflict and violence are urbanizing as well. In recent years urban areas suffered from siege warfare, aerial and artillery bombardments, heavy street fighting, major terrorist attacks, major public disorder and internal disturbances, organized crime organized urban violence. Abovementioned security threats and challenges apply also for Republic of Latvia and the capital city of Riga and law enforcement institutions have to address those threats effectively in order to maintain public security and safety and protection of critical infrastructure. However, it is obvious that law enforcement institutions and military institutions alone cannot solve urban security problems and challenges, therefore, comprehensive and holistic strategy towards local needs of the urban population is required which includes decrease of inequality, creation of jobs, substantial investment in public services, transportation networks, and infrastructure in urban areas. Therefore, improvement of social and economic conditions of urban population together with robust, visible and proactive law enforcement institutions- this is holistic strategy for security for urban environment in the future.

Key Words: Urban, Security, Threats, Strategy, Riga

1. Introduction

Throughout history, cities have been the engines of economic development and growth, centers of power and wealth, hubs of culture and scholarship, and drivers of innovation and entrepreneurship. (Konaev, 2019: 9). Over past few decades alone, the move to cities has provided tens of millions of people in developing countries with unprecedented access to electricity, running water, sanitation, education, employment and communications. And in today's increasingly

connected and networked world, cities are the hub that facilitate the flows of goods, people, ideas, and capital which sustain, deepen and expand global commerce, investment, prosperity, productivity, and almost limitless human potential. However, a complex and unpredictable security environment of the beginning of the 21st century has created fundamental and simultaneous security threats and challenges for political, economic, social, environmental and military security of states and societies. Those threats and security challenges fully apply for urban environment. Rapid development and scope of simultaneous security threats for urban security, such as radicalization of societies due to ideological, political, economic and security challenges, weak institutions, urban poverty and inequality, marginalization and exclusion, environmental degradation, youth unemployment, impact of uncontrolled migration, terrorism, further development of organized crime networks and high crime rates, drug trafficking, cyber threats, CBRN threats, rapid development and use of new technologies- all abovementioned security threats are just a few that will fundamentally impact urban security environment and, subsequently, effectiveness and efficiency of legal and institutional framework of security sector to address those threats and effectively protect critical infrastructure and public safety and security.

The aim of this paper is to analyse security threats and challenges for generic urban environment, legal and institutional framework of security sector of Republic of Latvia, offer holistic security strategy for urban environment and, in particular, public safety and security in Riga, the capital city of the Republic. Riga is extremely important urban centre for Republic of Latvia due its geographical position, historic importance, economic input, size and density of population, political importance, critical infrastructure. One has to analyze current and future development of urban environment and, subsequently, security risks, threats and challenges to urban environment and population in order to develop comprehensive approach for improvement of effectiveness and efficiency of legal and institutional framework to maintain urban security and safety and protect population and critical infrastructure. Further aim of this paper is answer to several fundamentally important issues. Firstly, is it still relevant approach to maintain existing institutional framework of military, security and law enforcement sector- armed forces to address external military threats, security and intelligence services- address intelligence and counterintelligence issues and police forces/ law enforcement institutions- address internal security threats and ensure public safety and security, taking into account the fact that the line between external and internal security has blurred? Secondly, would it be right approach by a state to use military forces and capabilities in order to support police/ law enforcement institutions during peace time in order to protect urban population and critical infrastructure? Thirdly, is current legal framework effective to counter security threats and challenges to urban environment? Does institutions of a state's security sector have enough legal tools to counter security threats and challenges in more effective and timely manner?

2. The Future of Violence and Warfare Urbanization

Firstly, one has to address and analyze current and possible future of global and regional security environment, and further implications on urban security. Urbanization is a relentless

trend and , as cities continue grow and expand, armed conflicts and violence are urbanizing as well. In recent years cities like Aleppo, Sana'a, Raqqa, Donetsk and Mosul have suffered siege warfare, aerial and artillery bombardments, and heavy street fighting (Konaev , 2019:10). Major cities in Europe, Asia and Africa are being targeted by terrorist groups and/or "lone wolf attackers" inspired by ISIS. In Latin America where urban violence is fueled by organized crime networks and transnational drug trafficking, cities in Mexico and Brasil have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. (Konaev, 2019:10). Therefore, one has to understand drivers behind urban violence and warfare, assess key demographic, technological and political developments that will shape future urban conflicts and violence.

The global urban population has increased from only 13% in 1900 to nearly 30% in 1950, and in 2008, with some 3,3 billion people living in cities, marked the first time in history when the majority of world's population was living in cities. (Konaev, 2019:18). By 2050 , the United Nations estimates that urbanization- gradual shift in residence of the human population from rural to urban areas- combined with overall population growth could add another 2, 5 billion people to the world's cities, culminating in over two-thirds of globe calling urban areas home (UNHABITAT, World Cities Report, 2016) . Subsequently, one of the major demographic trends of the recent decades has been the remarkable increase of large cities and megacities, those with the population of over 10 million inhabitants , especially in low and middle income of the world, and particularly in the global south. In 1950 , there was only one megacity- New York City, by 1990, there were ten. By 2019 , their number has increased more than threefold, and today, there are 31 megacities, Tokyo, Delhi, Shanghai, Mexico City, Mumbai and Sao Paulo being the largest ones. (Konaev, 2019:38) By 2030, the United Nations estimates there will be 41 megacities , where close to 9% of all global population will live (UNHABITAT, World Cities Report, 2016). However, while urbanization as well as population growth are global trends, these processes are by no means happening at the same rate across different regions. Nearly 90% of the projected 2, 5 billion increase in the world's urban population will take place in Africa and Asia, and just few countries- India, China, and Nigeria- will together account for about 37% of this expected growth (UNHABITAT, World Cities Report, 2016). Yet another problematic trend of the further global urbanization is challenge for state and local authorities to keep up with the growing demand for public services and infrastructure. Furthermore, while inequality has increased around the world, these are urban areas where inequality is more obvious than rural areas. In fact, nearly one billion people now live in urban slums and informal settlements, largely without access to basic services such as housing, running water, electricity and sanitation (Konaev, 2019:21). Moreover, youth are in forefront of this unprecedented demographic shift, and it is estimated that as many as 60% of all urban dwellers will be under the age of 18 by 2030 . However, young people all around the world are facing serious difficulties in finding employment and sustained existence, therefore, becoming breeding ground for recruitment into street crime, organized crime networks, drug trafficking, terrorist networks and other violent and illegal formations. Reserach shows that low levels of economic development, stagnant economic growth, and sharp inequalities among different social groups tend to correlate with internal conflict, human rights

violations and repression, as poor and especially poor and populous countries tend to be more volatile and violent. The multifaceted fragility that emerges from the combination of high population density, urban poverty, dwindling resources and poor governance therefore make large number of cities particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, terrorism, criminal activity, and political and social unrest (Raleigh, 2015). The surge of urban warfare and urban violence are also a function in changes of armed conflict. These changes refer to decline of interstate conflicts and the technological advances that impact, how, when and where armed conflict unfolds (Konaev, 2019:20). One would argue that today's conflicts predominantly involve government security sector forces (army (including army special operations forces), police (including police special operations forces), national guard and security and intelligence services) fighting different insurgent, terrorist and organized crime groups and networks. Subsequently, for weaker insurgent, terrorist and /or organized crime groups that lack the capacity or inclination to control urban territory or take the state's security forces head on, cities still offer an array of lucrative, high value, high-visibility soft targets, including airports, metro stations, shopping malls, hotels, concert halls, restaurants, and religious and cultural sites- all of which are endowed with practical and symbolic value.(Konaev, 2019: 20) Finally, the urbanization of conflict is also being facilitated by advances in military and civilian technology especially in areal and space-borne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities which have added to the complexity of urban conflict. Yet another fundamental trend of urban conflict and violence is that not only police and law enforcement institutions but also military institutions worldwide have recognized the fact that their future military operations will highly likely take place in urban environment. It means that military forces will have to man, train and equip the forces for operations in highly dense urban areas. For example, the most recently updated December 2017 US Army and US Marine Corps manual on Urban Operations clearly states that global urbanization patterns are making military operations in cities both- inevitable and the norm .(MCTP, Urban Operations, 2017). Obviously, military, security and law enforcement institutions are of utmost importance on effectively addressing security threats and challenges, however, a network of non- governmental organizations and humanitarian and development agencies are facing increasing challenges within further urbanization of warfare and violence. Significant implications for humanitarian and development agencies which are tasked with keeping cities working for their people in the terrible conditions of conflict, disaster and violence . These efforts expand beyond the provision of immediate humanitarian aid , including food, water, and health services , but also the repair and maintenance of damaged and destroyed critical urban infrastructure such as water treatment facilities , electricity, and hospitals (Konaev, 2019:22). As immediate negative result of increasing military operations in urban environment, acts of terrorism, and violence of organized crime networks have also fueled some of the worst displacement crises since World War II. Nearly 60 % of the worlds 19,5 million refugees and 80% of 34 million internally displaced persons live in cities and urban slums (UN High Commissioner for Refugees Report, 2017). Worse still, as forced displacement crises have become increasingly protracted,

now lasting an estimated average of 25 years, many cities that host refugees fleeing war and violence in neighboring countries, have seen the outbreak of violence or even acts of war.

3. Development of Urban Environment

However, one has to admit that, although, urban environment has several generic criteria, each city is unique due to their own individual historical, cultural, local, regional and international context. Because of significant differences between cities, as well as between the characteristics that distinguish urban areas from rural ones, there is no single standard definition of an "urban area", or an "urban population" that is applicable or acceptable to all countries around the world, or even in the countries within the same region. According to the UN Population Division list of definitions used in censuses in 232 countries, the criteria for 'urban' characteristics includes population size, population density, type of economic activity, level of infrastructure, or a combination of these and other factors. Furthermore, one could typically think of cities as "a layered and interacting series of complex adaptive systems involving actions, interactions, and transactions" or "complex living organism with its own flows, networks and rhythms" (Williams and Selle, 2016). Taking into account all abovementioned definitions, one useful and common approach is to view urban environment as an urban triad, comprised of complex man-made physical terrain, the urban population, and the infrastructure upon which the city depends. (Joint Publications/Urban Operations, 2013).

Complex and multidimensional man-made physical terrain is superimposed on existing natural terrain. Buildings, streets, and other man-made structures and infrastructure vary in type, function, form and size, material, and construction, all arranged in different patterns—planned and unplanned. Typically, the physical terrain may be modern built and developed around the core of "Old City", and therefore, it is paramount for military and police forces to fully know and understand this physical terrain in order to develop effective and efficient strategy and tactics in order to maintain public security and safety and fight organized crime networks and/or terrorist groups. Secondly, all urban missions in both—military and police—operations inevitably unfold amidst an urban population of significant size and density to very significant spectrum—ranging from small towns with several thousand inhabitants to the megacities with a population of over 20 million people (Konaev, 2019:26). And while rural areas usually contain relatively homogeneous social groups, the population of cities is often much more diverse with respect to people's cultural, political, socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, clan and other possible affiliations, and the sheer number of such groups and identities is compressed into a single geographic area. Finally, the city's infrastructure links the physical terrain and the urban population. A robust, complex, interconnected and interdependent system of systems that provide the urban population with essential services such as electricity, water, sanitation, security, safety and law enforcement, health, education, transportation, and communications, as well as political and administrative functions, economic activity, and cultural organizations and structures. The urban infrastructure also serves the surrounding region and could be critically important to the continuous and efficient functioning of the entire state, nation and even often, neighboring countries. Because

of abovementioned facts of interconnectedness of urban services and public facilities damage, disruption, or destruction of any portion of urban infrastructure has significant and cascading effect on the systems and services upon hundreds of thousands of people depend. Damage to essential infrastructure and services such as water supply and electricity has an immediately destabilizing and life-threatening impact on city's residents. (Konaev, 2019:27). One could, therefore conclude, that the urban terrain is and will increasingly be one of the most complex and challenging environments for law enforcement and military operations.

4. Law Enforcement and Military Operations in Urban Environment

The nature and scope of urban violence and military conflict vary across different cities, countries and regions. For example, in Latin America where 80% of the population lives in cities, urban violence is primarily linked to organized crime and related illegal and illicit economies, especially transnational drug trafficking. The causes of urban violence are multifaceted, complex, and ultimately, particular for each country. However, there are shared characteristics which are rooted in countries' history, economic structure, proliferation and fragmentation of criminal networks, weak, corrupt and ineffective law enforcement, judiciary and military institutions, as well as entrenched urban poverty, inequality, and unemployment, particularly, among the youth. This is security environment where law enforcement institutions, military and state security agencies will operate in the future.

One of the most important criteria for success for law enforcement and military operations in urban area is trained, armed and motivated manpower with high effectiveness in order to provide visibility, presence factor and ability to act quickly and overwhelmingly in order to maintain public security and safety. Physical presence of law enforcement institutions in both- stationary and mobile way- is extremely important in order to decrease reaction time to address security threats and challenges in effective and efficient way. It is increasingly challenging task, taking into account the fact that within last decades both-land area covered by cities and size of population has rapidly increased. Abovementioned fact requires comprehensive approach in order to ensure coordination efforts between military, state security and law enforcement institutions, including use of military personnel and military capabilities in support of security services and law enforcement institutions in peace time in order to enhance safety and security. Brasil and Mexico are examples of employing military to fight organized crime networks and drug trafficking networks. Another fundamental operational requirements for police and military operations in urban terrain is to isolate opposite forces, terrorist groups and organized crime groups inside the city or certain part of a urban area- to seal off, both physically and psychologically, the urban area operations from sources of support, denying the freedom of movement and severing ties between one group with other terrorist or criminal group. Current and emerging technologies is extremely important driver that will fundamentally impact future police and military operations in urban terrain. Technological superiority with an access to effective intelligence collection, intelligence processing and high- speed communications enables information superiority over adversaries, the ability to influence and control the flow of information going into

and out of the area. Attaining information superiority and asserting control over the information environment is extremely important in order to facilitate decision-making, shape public opinion. (Konaev, 2019: 39). Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, and peer-to-peer messaging like WhatsApp and Telegram have fundamental impact of people's mind and information flow through these links has ability to provide information to thousands and even millions people within very short ammount of time, which could impact public opinion, provide terrorist networks and organized crime networks with information in short notice, and even cause acts of public demonstrations and acts of violation of public safety and security, therefore, it is an increasing challenge for military and police forces to keep up.

Increasingly important issue for law enforcement and military institutions operating in urban environment is intelligence gathering, analysis and distribution in order to provide military and police forces with required information. Accurate and timely intelligence of all sorts (OSINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT and types of intelligence) about possible security threats, risks and challenges, as well as, about capabilities, personnel, locations and activities of insurgents, terrorist networks, and organized crime networks is absolute imperative to success in urban environment (ADRP Intelligence, 2012). Yet another area where emerging technologies are undermining the traditional dominance of state security sector institutions is air superiority. Indeed, recent years have seen terrorist networks and organized crime networks increasingly using commercially available rotary- winged drones and even military unmanned areal vehicle (UAV) systems for reconnaissance, surveillance, and other missions.

5. Threats and Challenges for Urban Security of Riga

The aim of this chapter is to analyze how abovementioned security risks, threats and challenges apply to Republic of Latvia and, subsequently, to the urban security of the capital city of the Republic- Riga, and how law enforcement and military institutions addresses current and future security challenges and threats in order to protect and maintain public safety and security. Latvia is a "small" state- one of the least populous and least densely populated countries of the European Union with a territory of 64, 589 square kilometres and a population of less than 2 million people, including significant ethnic minorities. One might argue, however, that the key feature determining the definition of "small" state is not simply the size of the territory, population and economy. One could rather emphasize the heavy dependence of "small states" for their own security and defence arrangements upon a politically powerful and military capable global actor, or upon a security and defense organization where such an actor plays a prominent role. (Rublovskis and Associates, 2013:14). In this light, very important issue is to adress key security and defence issues. The size and capability of the armed forces, the size and capability of the entire security sector, including law enforcement and state security institutions, the size of defence and security budget-both real money and as a percentage of GDP- will determine wether or not the state should be viewed as "small" from the perspective of security and defense (Rublovskis and Associates, 2013:14). Therefore, as a small state and small nation, Republic of

Latvia has certain security mentality. One may emphasize role of external factors in shaping the small state security mentality (Vayryanen, 1997:98).

However, threat perception and threat assessment is rather well addressed within the framework of national security and defence legislation. National Security Law, National Security Concept, State Defense Concept, National Police Law, State Security Services Law, Latvian National Armed Forces Law and other documents related to security and defense, outline variety of security threats to national security of Latvia. According to the Latvian legal framework on security and defense, the most important threats which could be applied to urban security are following: public disorder, internal disturbances, threat to public safety and security, acts of terrorism, ethnic and/or religious conflict, weakness of internal administrative and institutional capacity of the state, uncontrolled/illegal immigration, activities of organized crime networks, threats to urban critical infrastructure, threats of hybrid warfare, welfare recession, humanitarian crisis, cyber threats and variety of other threats to urban security.

Institutional framework of state security sector which is tasked to address national security threats consists of national police forces, municipal police forces, state security services and armed forces/national guard. According to the State Defence Concept (SDC), the size of personnel of National Armed Forces consists of 6500 professional military personnel, 8000 part-time National Guard personnel, and 3000 reserve military personnel- together 17500 military personnel (State Defense Concept, 2016: 13). National Police forces consists of 7000 personnel and Riga Municipal Police has close to one thousand personnel- 987. (Report of Municipal Police, 2019:4). The capital city of the Republic of Latvia Riga is the largest and the most important political, economic, financial, social and cultural hub in Latvia with population of 696 681 in 2018 (Report of Municipal Police of Riga, 2019:2). However, one has to admit, that population of Riga has significantly decreased since 1990 from close to 1 million inhabitants to current figures.

Taking into account threat perception and threat analysis which is outlined in national security and national defence documents, one has to conclude that majority of security threats and challenges which are mentioned in national security documents of Republic of Latvia, and which are extremely important for other countries and other capital cities, for example London, Paris and Berlin, is not high priority in Riga. The capital of Latvia has not suffered from the terrorist attacks with high casualties, there is no well armed organized crime network which controls certain districts of the capital, and there is no substantial urban violence, therefore, law enforcement institutions are mostly engaged in routine procedures in maintaining public safety and security in Riga. Taking into consideration that the main task for urban security in peace time is maintenance of public safety and security, protection of critical infrastructure- the main security institutions responsible for the task are: Riga Municipal Police and Latvian State Police. However, in order to develop effective strategy for urban security, one has to develop further comprehensive approach which should fundamentally improve following aspects: firstly- effective prevention of crimes, terrorism acts, internal disturbances and other unlawful actions. It requires effective protective/criminal intelligence, improvement of cooperation and intelligence information sharing among various institutions of security sector. Secondly, it requires enhanced

presence effect of law enforcement institutions within the entire territory of the limits of the city . It also requires rapid introduction of technologies into urban security protection network in order to significantly increase surveillance, detection and data sharing capabilities. Thirdly, it requires improved rapid reaction time by law enforcement institutions in order to effectively counter any unlawful action and, subsequently, improvement of law enforcement personnel skills, improvement of logistics and technological progress which should be rapidly introduced within law enforcement institutions. Representatives of security sector has to be definitely included in urban development planning in order to provide sound and professional security expertise.

7. Conclusions

One would conclude that global and regional urbanization will be persistent trend , and, subsequently, urban warfare and urban violence will be permanent feature. Rapid development of technology will further impact urban security, on one hand , it will enhance state security institutions to address threats and challenges effectively , on the other hand, it will enable terrorist networks and organized crime networks become even more organized and more lethal. Use of military personnel and capabilities in peace time in order to support law enforcement institutions in combating terrorist networks, organized crime networks will increase in the future, providing the presence effect, rapid reaction effect, and effective protection of urban critical infrastructure. However, law enforcement institutions and military institutions alone cannot solve urban violence problems in long-term without comprehensive and holistic strategies towards local needs of the population, decrease of inequality, creating jobs, substantial investment in public services, transportation networks, and infrastructure in urban area. Improvement of social and economic conditions for marginalized, poor urban communities, in line with robust, visible and proactive law enforcement and military institutions – this is holistic strategy for urban security in future. However, the fact that majority military conflicts and increase of urban violence in several regions and areas will be permanent trend, one would argue that future policy efforts in order to prevent, contain, reduce and effectively maintain crisis consequence management efforts will face substantial political, economic, financial, military and other problems. Ultimately, urban security will have increasing impact on global and regional security.

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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS

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Abstract: Public and Private Security strategies are focused on enterprise is more likely to be a strong bottom line performer than a company whose management views strategy as secondary and puts its priorities elsewhere. A winning strategy fits the circumstances of a company's external situation and its internal resource strengths and competitive capabilities, builds competitive advantage and boosts company performance. The emphasis of strategic planning in the current era is to help firms move into emerging markets, or invent the future of the firm. Strategic planning should result in managerial workers throughout the organization thinking strategically and wondering about how the companies adapts to its environment and how it will cope with its future. This paper is founded on three theories; Value Based Management (VBM), Industrial Organization (IO) and the Knowledge Based Management theories (KBM). These theories, used as strategic management tools serve to align an organization and its environment in order that it attains and sustains viable competitiveness for the sake long term survival. Private Security Companies (PSCs) as businesses serve to protect values and prevent crime. Private security is best explained as a delegation of authority/power from the security sector to an individual or individuals, in line with legal powers given by the state. The security sector is an exclusive domain and the monopoly of the ruling political elite in a state, or the state as such. In this paper author is defining the terms and strategies for public and private partnership in their sector in Western Balkans urban areas.

Key words : Public space, Police, Private security companies, Strategy, urban areas.

1. INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty and permanent vulnerability accompany modern humans throughout their lives. Humans, the rational beings, live in technical and social surroundings. Such environment creates threats to social order, property and ecological systems in general. If a human being is unable to protect himself/herself, he/she will fall victim even to the smallest threat. Therefore, humans strive to the best possible protection in pursuit of safety and a better quality of life. Protection and security, in general, constitute a part of the total protection mechanism in a community. These activities are primarily directed at protecting individuals and property using bodily, technical and combined (integral) protection. Public and private security systems appeared concurrently with the industrial revolution and this fact is very often used as a platitude in the etiology of this field. A permanent disproportion between security needed by individuals in a society and the security services offered by the state produces new trends and phenomena in the so-called 'privatization of the security sector' (Ahic&Nadj: 2018). These trends narrow down the police work. Specifically, the state delegates a significant portion of security-related activities to the

private security sector, which systematically limits the monopoly of the state that was the exclusive provider of the security services up until recently, through the police and other formal state supervision bodies. Having this in mind, to discuss police and private security strategies in urban areas, one needs to clarify basic terms of public and private space and area in every sense.

Throughout the history, the term security purported various meanings. Political philosophy and doctrine define this word in different ways. Etymologically, the word security derives from Latin *securitas*-atis, meaning safety, the absence of danger, certainty, self-confidence, fearlessness, sheltered (*securas* lat. - safe, secure, free from care, confident, fearless, etc). This etymology served as a foundation for the use of this word in different countries. Two pertinent terms are used in English language: security and safety.

The term security is used in the sense of national security, which implies protection of national interests, whereas the term safety means the ability to act in order to prevent undesired situations, or conditions that may cause security-related implications. The terms *securite* and *surete* are used in French language; the term *bezbednost* is used in Russian language in the meaning of the absence of material misery. The Italian word is *sigurezza* (*sicramente*-safe), while it is *siguri* in Albanian and *sicherheit* in German language. In our language, the words *sigurnost* and *bezbednost* are used to the same extent. These words have almost the same meaning, but they are not entirely synonymic. *Sigurimi* / *Obezbeduvanje* / *Bezbednost* (safety) derives from the word *bezbedno*, basically meaning safe, secured with the highest confidence, tough, unwavering, uninterrupted. On the other hand, *sigurnost* (security) implies a condition, or a feature of a person or a thing being safe. In other words, it implies that something or someone is safe from harm. More specifically, it implies the absence of danger, safety, determination, firmness, clarity, distinctness, consistency, etc. The most general meaning implies 'a condition measured by the degree of threat'. Public security is generally perceived as a comprehensive security within a community or a group.

Private security is best explained as a delegation of authority/power from the security sector to an individual or individuals, in line with legal powers given by the state. The security sector is an exclusive domain and the monopoly of the ruling political elite in a state, or the state as such. As we are defining the terms here, it is necessary to tentatively define private security from the safety and political view points respectively.

Private security can be defined as a specific and dynamic system of social control exercised by a government in order to provide a high degree of personal safety to its citizens and protect the economic interests. The government does this by giving up on a part of the monopoly it has over the security sector and by transferring it to individuals, agencies and companies involved in security business set up as a commercial activity. However, the governments restrict their scope of activity through laws, by-laws and codes of ethics for employees in the private security sector (Ahic&Nadj: 2018).

When strategic police and private security managers constantly analyze their competitive environment, they understand their transient urban security situations in changing environments. With the appraised knowledge they are able to locate and establish good competitive

positions since, against threats they are able to take advantage of available opportunities to gain and sustain competitive advantage. Evaluation of the competitive urban environment may well be approached through application of strategic management theories such as the resource based view, the industrial organization view and the knowledge based view, among many others developed to assist in understanding the forces of competition in the security arena and hence come up with correct strategies which if adopted are capable of propelling citizens, security organizations to better business positions. The purpose of this paper was to assess the types of security threats prevalent in urban areas in Western Balkan, and strategies adopted by police and private security firms in urban areas in countering the crimes. A strategy focused police organization, private security companies, enterprise is more likely to be a strong bottom line performer than a company whose management views strategy as secondary and puts its priorities elsewhere. A winning strategy fits the circumstances of a company's external situation and its internal resource strengths and competitive capabilities, builds competitive advantage and boosts company performance. The emphasis of strategic planning in the current era is to help firms move into emerging markets, or invent the future of the firm (Thompson et al, 2008). Strategic planning should result in managerial workers throughout the organization thinking strategically and wondering about how the firm adapts to its environment and how it will cope with its future (DuBrin: 2009).

This paper is based on three well known theories: Theory of Systems (TS), Value Based Management (VBM) and the Knowledge Based Management theories (KBM). These theories, used as strategic management tools serve to align an organization and its environment in order that it attains and sustains viable competitiveness for the sake long term survival. Private Security Companies (PSCs) as businesses serve to protect values, prevent criminal occurrences against contracting clients; criminal tendencies in which case having attributes such as gang attacks, kidnapping, murder, vandalism and theft, etc. The police service, while charged with law enforcement obligations has evidently been overwhelmed and the public, businesses and other institutions have had to look elsewhere to enhance their protection. This has seen the resultant rapid rise in the number of PSCs over the years. Undoubtedly PSCs play a crucial role in complementing state security services.

The rapid growth of criminal incidents in urban areas in Western Balkans has been matched also by a marked rise in the number of private entities going into the business. In spite of this, incidents of criminal occurrences have gone up over the years and new crime types like organized crime have arrived to complicate the role and effectiveness of police and of PSCs.

Consequently, the paper seeks to examine the strategy trends related to the crime prevention within the security sector industry in/and to assess measures that maybe taken into account to deal with shortfalls.

1.1 Concept of Strategy

Term "strategy" etimologically comes from Greek language and it mens (stratos: to lead ahead). A strategy is an integrated overall concept and plan of how an organization will achieve

its goals and objectives (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005). According to Thompson et al (2008) a company's strategy is management's action plan for running the business and conducting its operations. Strategy is concerned with an organization understanding its position in its external environment. If an organization's position in the external environment is clear then development inside the organization should aim to achieve strategic fit with the external environment (Claire 2008). Wheelen and Hunger (2006) state that organizations that engage in strategic management generally outperform those which do not. The attainment of an appropriate match, or "fit," between an organization's environment and its strategy, structure, and processes has positive effects on the organization's performance. The three most highly rated benefits of strategic management are; clearer sense of strategic vision for the firm, sharper focus on what is strategically important and improved understanding of a rapidly changing environment.

2. Public and Private Security Strategies Models in Urban Areas

A strategy is an integrated overall concept and plan of how an organization will achieve its goals and objectives (Ahic, 2009). According to Thompson et al (2008) a company's strategy is management's action plan for running the business and conducting its operations. Strategy is concerned with organization understanding its position in its external environment. If an organization's position in the external environment is clear then development inside the organization should aim to achieve strategic fit with the external environment (Claire 2008). Wheelen and Hunger (2006) state that organizations that engage in strategic management generally outperform those which do not. The attainment of an appropriate match, or "fit," between an organization's environment and its strategy, structure, and processes has positive effects on the organization's performance. The three most highly rated benefits of strategic management are; clearer sense of strategic vision for the firm, sharper focus on what is strategically important and improved understanding of a rapidly changing environment. 3 A clear and reasoned strategy is management's game plan for pleasing customers and improving its financial performance. A powerful strategy that delivers a home run in the market place can propel a firm from a trailing position into a leading one, clearing the way for its products/services to become the industry standard. There is no escaping the fact that the quality of managerial strategy making and strategy execution has a highly positive impact on revenue growth, earning and return on investment (Thompson et al 2008). On the overall, strategic management process has five stages; goal setting, analysis, strategy formation, strategy implementation and strategy monitoring/evaluation. Goal setting clarifies the vision for the organization while analysis puts together information needed for strategy formulation and implementation steps. Strategy monitoring/evaluation and control actions measure performance and provide a consistent review of environmental issues and making corrective actions when necessary.

2.1 Concept of Crime/nality

Crime is an act or omission forbidden by law that can be punished by imprisonment and/or fine. Examples include murder, burglary rape, robbery and drunken driving. However, most

of the classical authors defines crime as an intentional act or omission in violation of criminal law (statutory or case law), committed without defense or justification, and sanctioned by the state as a felony or misdemeanor. Criminal behaviors attribute the use of force, stealth, fraud, to acquire material or symbolic resources. Criminality is a style of strategic behavior characterized by self-centeredness, indifference to the suffering and needs of others, and low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). There are four main categories of crime; personal crimes, property crimes, inchoate crimes, and statutory crimes. Personal crimes are offenses against the person resulting in physical or mental harm to another person. They include assault, battery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, homicide, rape, sexual assault and other offenses of sexual nature. Property crimes are offenses against property: They do not certainly involve harm to another person but interference of another person's right of use and enjoyment of their property, e.g. theft, robbery, burglary, arson, embezzlement, forgery, false pretenses, and receipt of stolen goods. Inchoate crimes are partially committed crimes, like attempted robbery, solicitation, and conspiracy. Statutory crimes are violation of a specific statute and can involve either property offenses or personal offense. An example includes alcohol related crimes such as drunk driving and selling alcohol to a minor. Proliferation of private security providers is a result of high levels of violence and crime, combined with a lack of confidence and trust in the public police force (Abrahamsen et al 2005). At the same time, there is a perception that criminals are increasingly collaborating with law enforcement agents; an outcome of this perception shows in the overall mistrust in the police forces and ironically they are perceived as part of the problem instead of being seen as a path towards fighting crime and reestablishing the public order (Abrahamsen et al 2011). The result is an increased count of crime occurring in the country. If we reflect these concepts to urban areas, we face the necessity of strategic planning in reducing threats and crime acts in public and private security jurisdictions.

The existing theories and opinions of various authors and writers whose arguments support the body upon which this research is based. This is followed by an inquiry on both the environment and the organization interface, defining the environmental challenges, including organizational reactions to the environment based on Ansoff's model of organizational capability. Finally, there are response strategies; including strategic and operational reactions of organizations to counter the effects of the environment as ways of making adjustments that aim towards the strategic goals of organizations. Theoretical Foundation Achieving a competitive advantage position and enhancing firm performance relative to competitors are the main objectives that business organizations strive to attain. Raduan et al (2009) notes that firms with planning systems more closely resembling strategic management theory generally exhibit superior longterm financial performance relative to their industry. Strategic management theories therefore exemplify justifications for why firm's industries differ in performance. The evolution of strategic management has been pegged on theories of management. As such, this study is based on three theories; Resource Based View, Industrial Organization View (TS Theory of Systems) and the Knowledge Based View. While the internal environment perception is supported by the Resource Based View, the Industrial Organization view leans on the external perspective. The Knowledge

Based View arises out of the Resource Based View and focuses on the perception that more and more organizations rely on information at the core of decision making towards strategic positioning aimed at competitiveness.

2.1.1 Resource Based View

Resource Based View Firm resources can be classified into three categories, physical capital resources, human capital resources and organizational capital resources (Barney 1991). These resources are not homogeneous and are limited in mobility. An organization endeavors to translate the resources and capabilities to its strategic advantage as long as they are valuable, rare, and non-imitable and the organization is willing to exploit available opportunities. The Resource Based View emphasizes strategic choice, charging the firm's management with the important tasks of identifying, developing and deploying key resources to maximize returns (Fahy, 2000). According to Ainuddin et al. (2007), certain types of resources owned and controlled by firms have the potential and promise to generate competitive advantage and eventually superior firm performance. Firm resources including all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm can enable the firm to conceive and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991). He says that all the resources that the firm has access to may not be strategically relevant but only some resources may lead it to implement strategies that reduce its effectiveness and efficiency. While a competitive advantage arises when an organization is implementing a value creating strategy that is not also being implemented by current or potential competitors a sustained competitive advantage occurs when competitors are unable to replicate the benefits of this strategy. According to Barney (1991) there are certain conditions that resources must present to enable the firm to sustain its competitive advantage: rareness, value, imperfect imitability and non-substitutability. The resources must have four attributes; they must be valuable, in the sense that the firm exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in its environment; they must be rare among a firm's current and potential competition; they must be imperfectly imitable; and there cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for this resource.

2.1.2 Industrial Organization Theory

Industrial organization builds on the theory of the firm, a set of economic theories that describe, explain and attempt to predict the nature of a firm in terms of its existence, behavior, structure and its relationship to the market. It is about organizational designs and organizational structures, relationship of organizations with their external environment, and the behavior of managers and technocrats within organizations. Industrial organization views the organization's external market positioning as the critical factor for attaining competitive advantage, which means the traditional Industrial Organization perspective offers strategic management a systematic model for assessing external competition within an industry. The structure of a market, how a market is functioning, is the concept behind the industrial organization theory (Tirole, 1988), rather than the conversion process, products and costs of an individual organi-

zation (Ramsey, 2001). Bain (1959) provided the Structure Conduct and Performance Paradigm which is used as an analytical framework, to make relations amongst market structure, market conduct and market performance. The market structure will determine its conduct and thereby its performance. The Industrial Organization theory puts a focus on the market a company operates in, rather than the company itself (Ramsey, 2001). It is reflected in the structure conduct performance model, which claims that there is a “causal link between the structure of a market in which a company operates, the organization’s conduct and in turn the organization’s performance in terms of profitability” (Ramsey, 2001). Thus, the industrial organization theory focuses on the whole industry and market conditions of a company (Ramsey, 2001) and the central analytical aspect can be used to identify strategic choices, which companies have in their respectively industry (Porter, 2008).

2.1.3 Knowledge Based View

Knowledge based capabilities are considered to be the most strategically important ones to create and sustain competitive advantage (DeNisi et al, 2003). The sustainability of the knowledge based competitive advantage depends on the following association; knowing better certain aspects than the competitors, along with the time limitations competitors have to acquire similar knowledge despite the amount of money they are willing to invest to achieve it (Zack, 2002). The change from manufacture to services in the majority of developed economies is based on the manipulation of information and symbols and not on the use of physical products (Fulk and DeSanctis, 1995). The economic change of material based production to information based production created a revaluation of the firm workers. Increasingly we find knowledge workers at the core of the organization functions; concept and technology designers, as well as finance and management people. Other individuals are considered to be in the firm’s periphery, as a consequence their responsibilities change permanently and they are defined by the tasks they perform at the moment. This way, a new differentiation in labor arises (Child & McGrath, 2001). The Knowledge Based View of the firm is an extension of the Resource Based View of the firm because it considers that organizations are heterogeneous entities loaded with knowledge (Hoskisson et al, 1999). The invisible assets, like tacit knowledge or trust, cannot be transacted or easily replicated by competitors, as they are usually founded in organizational history (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). According to Curado (2006) knowledge is considered to be a very special strategic resource that does not depreciate in the way traditional economic productive factors do, and can generate increasing returns. The nature of most knowledge-based resources is mainly intangible and dynamic, allowing for idiosyncratic development through path dependency and causal ambiguity, which are the basis of the mechanism for economic rent creation in the Knowledge based view of the firm. As such knowledge is therefore an explicit resource that stands at the very core of an organization either public or private.

2.1.4 Environment and Organization Interface (Urban Areas)

In the last half century there has been a widespread agreement between academics and practitioners in the literature that business environments have become increasingly multidis-

disciplinary and complex and that a major escalation of environmental turbulence has taken place (D'Aveni, 1994; Day and Reibstein, 1997; Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998; Normann, 2001; Galbraith, 2002). Within any industry, the shifts of turbulence can be caused by four defining factors which move concurrently; the strategic budget level, unpredictability of change, novelty of change, and frequency of change. The turbulence level within an industry can vary from; steady turbulence, in which the environment remains in a constant, to; shift in turbulence, which is a rapid departure from one level to another; and finally, drift in turbulence, in which the transition of turbulence from one level to another is gradual (Kiple & Lewis, 2009). In the wake of environmental complexities, planning models allow for anticipation of the future. The models, complemented with analysis of the organization's culture, strengths and weakness can be used to define requisite strategic issues useful in outlining the organization's future. Because of constant changes in the environment deriving the strategic plans is an iterative one. There is strong empirical support linking a positive causal relationship between formalized strategic planning and achieving optimal financial success of a business organization (Ansoff, Brandenburg, & Radosevich, 1971). Against environmental turbulences, Ansoff's matrix on organizational capability provides a useful strategic planning tool to link organizational marketing strategy with the general strategic direction. It provides a framework that allows growth opportunities to be identified through the consideration of new or existing markets or products.

The four sequences of strategy employed in the matrix include; market penetration strategies (selling products and services to the existing market in order to achieve growth in the organization's market share), market development strategies (developing new market segments for existing products or services), product development strategies (developing new products and services for the existing market), and diversification strategies (developing new products and services for new markets). As a strategic planning tool, the Ansoff Matrix links marketing strategy with the general strategic direction of the organization. It assists in highlighting the risks that a singular growth strategy may expose the organization to as efforts shift from one matrix segment to another.

2.2 Response Strategies

Strategic responses are the set of decisions and actions that results in the formalization and implementation of plans designed to achieve a firm's objectives (Pearce & Robinson, 2010). Dean and Sharfman (1996) explain response strategies as those choices made by managers that commit important resources, set important precedents and/or direct important firm-level actions besides shaping a firm's direction. The appropriate response strategies guarantee a competitive edge that ensures the organizations remain relevant (Ndung'u, Machuki & Murerwa, 2014). There is need to understand the challenges, opportunities and threats that are provided by the external environment, so that the organization can take advantage of the opportunities and avoid threats (Xu et al, 2003) through the application of appropriate response strategies. For effective strategic responses continuous scanning of both internal and external environment is a prerequisite so as it keeps abreast of all environmental variables underpinning current and

future business operations of the firm (Thompson & Strickland, 2003). It is only those firms that have put in place appropriate response strategies that will survive and achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Mathooko & Ogutu, 2014). The environment in which organizations operate is never constant and given its composition and forces therein, it presents unique challenges to organizations and their management and hence the need for crafting of appropriate and sustainable response strategies (Mathooko & Ogutu, 2014). A major escalation in environmental turbulence means a change from the familiar world to that of new things, new technologies, new competition, new customers and a new dimension of social control (Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990). Although several explanations of strategic action/responses have been developed, two views have been particularly dominant – industry structure and managerial cognition. The industry structure view assumes complete rationality on the part of strategic decision makers and contends that industry structure influences the timing and effectiveness of strategic actions. In contrast, the managerial cognition literature suggests that bounded rationality prevents top managers from developing a complete understanding of their environment (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). If an organization's strategy is not matched to its environment, then a strategy gap arises. The degrees to which response are viable will also vary considerably depending on the region or country involved. The implications of specific response will depend on its social, environmental, and economic context (Grant, 2011). Strategic response is about restructuring by adopting new strategies that match the challenges from the environment (Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2008); bringing about alterations to the extensive organizational goals, purpose, strategy or mission. According to Ross (2011) strategic responses are the decisions that are concerned with the whole environment in which the firm operates, the entire resources and the people who form the company and the interface between the two. Strategic responses consider what the organization needs in the future to achieve its desired aims and establish an approach to change considering the key players, barriers and enablers of change. They focus on the effectiveness of the entire organization and require more resources to implement. It is through strategic responses that an organization is able to position and relate itself to the environment to ensure its continued success and also secure itself from surprises brought about by the changing environment. Often organizations find strategic responses difficult to handle especially when the external environment brings with its extreme turbulences. A rethink of ways of going about responses is essential. Products or services offers, target customer segments or markets, products or services distribution, position in the economy etc. These are some strategic aspects that organizations find themselves having to deal with. According to Pearce and Robinson (2011) executives of companies employ response strategies in order to deal effectively with everything that affects the growth and profitability of the company so that it can position itself optimally in its competitive environment by maximizing the anticipation of environmental change. An organization is considered efficient and operationally effective if it is characterized by coordination between objectives and strategies. Therefore, there has to be an integration of the parts into a complete structure, that is, operates as a system. PSCs are facing huge crime challenges. And as much as they are usually first line against many criminal tendencies, the industry is turbulent

and changing very first given the rising number of competing entities that are entering service in the industry and the rising levels of criminal tendencies. To survive, therefore firms need to put in place sustainable response strategies in order to weather the storms of turbulences. An operational strategy is the total pattern of decisions which shape the long-term capabilities of any type of operations and their contribution to the overall strategy through the reconciliation of market requirements with operation resources (Pitt, 2000). According to Ross (2011) operational responses involve actions that are taken to improve operations in an organization. This could be through designing and controlling the processes of production and redesigning business (Ross, 2011). An organization is considered efficient and operationally effective if it is characterized by coordination between objectives and strategies. Therefore, there has to be an integration of the parts into a complete structure, that is, operates as a system (Mathooko & Ogutu, 2014). It involves crafting and implementing operation strategies which specify the policies and plans for using the organization resources to support its long-term competitive strategy (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2008). The responses applied depend on the managers' understanding of relevant contingencies, including contextual factors that affect competitors' resources as well as their own (Holcomb et al., 2009). According to Ross (2011), operational responses include; product or service, process, research and development, location, inventory management, quality, capacity and human resource responses. However, all firms even in the same industry grouping; do not respond to operating environment in the same way (O'Regan et al., 2012). Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) assert that the management system used by a firm is a determining component of the firm's responsiveness to the environmental changes because it determines the way that management perceives the environment, the impact on the firm and decides what to do through implementation. These operational responses are responsible for ensuring that business operations are efficient in terms of using as few resources as needed, and effective in terms of meeting customer requirements. In essence, operational responses are technical decisions which help execution of strategic responses.

3. Conclusions

With respect to types of criminal threats prevalent in Western Balkans the paper found vandalism to be the leading crime experienced by PSCs. Theft, burglary and robbery, organized crime and gang attacks, guns and knife attacks were found to be closely rampant while other significant crimes were vehicle theft and terrorism related crimes. The least reported crimes include kidnappings, rape and sexual assaults. To counter these crimes PSCs adopted liaison with state security agents as a leading strategy, especially at local urban level. Other strategies adopted include improved levels of vigilance, revised Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), additional training of personnel, use/additional technology and employment of additional personnel, pre-emptive techniques, culture change, as well as the application of new defensive techniques. Use of security dogs to compliment guards, backup services were the least adopted strategie in countries of Western Balkan.

On measures that can be employed to address deficiencies in strategies adopted, PSCs need to spend more effort on strategic analysis of their operational and general business environ-

ments in accordance and compliance with suggestions of countries Chamber for private security. This would assist in cultivating a better understanding of trends and dynamics in the industry in order to come up with appropriate strategies that if adopted would be bring forth effective crime prevention. Such analysis should align with appropriate business theories and model if success and growth have to be assured. The paper found that many PSCs adopt strategies that do not adequately help deter prominent crimes. Vandalism was the most prominent crime, followed by possibly violent cases of theft, burglary and robbery, gun and knife attacks as well as other organized crime gang attacks. For any society prevalence of such crimes border on anarchy and loss of order, depicting a situation of moral loss. But without adequate policing in countries of Western Balkan, PSCs still resort to involve law enforcement in their dealings; most almost certainly to deal with aftermaths of such occurrences. This is supported by the known lack of working relationships between the police and PSCs in any given day. The result is even more proliferation of crimes since beside lack of cooperation, deterrent strategies are rarely employed. Ostensibly, while the growth of PSCs stems from the inadequacy of the police to tame criminal incidents the same firms mostly resort to involving the same police service to mitigate crime incidents.

3.1 Concluding Remarks -Recommendations and Implication on Practice, Policy and Theory

When teams pull together, they have a better understanding of the expected outcomes. Uncertainties become clearer in the long run and meeting challenges and shortcomings are easier to address positively. The PSF industry has had innumerable strategy challenges over the years and these affect outcomes of their operations and successes. This paper finds lack of cohesion between PSCs towards addressing crime. While PSCs might be in competition commonalities should push them to work together in approaching the basic ground. This relationship should be based on, among other things, swapping of background information in their environments of operation. Beyond this, individual firms can then redefine individual strategies as needed. An extension of collaboration needs to be enhanced between the police and PSCs. This is especially important since, beside the police being the legally tasked law enforcement agency PSCs alone are maybe prepared to deal with violent crime types but are more spread out than the police. Cooperation would greatly enhance proper crime management in the urban area. Among the strategies adopted by PSCs culture change needs to be at the core. Like with other industries, culture has a huge impact on the success of implementation of adopted strategies. Where change is not managed successfully good strategies adopted will always come a cropper. Finally, PSC managers need to build on detailed strategic analysis developing strategies to adopt against criminal tendencies. PSC managers should to be constantly scanning their environments for changes and to adjust strategy when needed to. In doing so they are able to correctly adopt strategies that address crime in the way that the environment presents itself. Implication on Practice tell us that when environments change culture change often becomes paramount. A core focus on culture change within the internal environment of all organizations enables effective implementation of adopted strategies with a common understanding of the expected outcomes. This paper shows how much changes in situations should change culture of operation of organizations

that strive to remain relevant. Firms should therefore be designed to be fluid and in resonance with their urban environment. This paper emphasizes 2/3 of all PSCs being small in size, and with less than 50 personnel the implication is that many of firms are small time operators whose abilities to invest in new relevant crime prevention training and employment of technology to augment typical prevention methods are curtailed. The paper complement creation of overall universal standards and expectations to strive to, either by the government or umbrella bodies that cover private security entities. The findings of this paper are helpful to strategic managers in understanding the effect of lapses of adopted strategies in the face of public, private business and general operational challenges. This is in light of failure to properly assess the environment of business existence in urban area. Addressing these lapses would map challenges to appropriate strategies and hence help in correctly addressing the challenges correctly with the correct tools and methodologies. When one measures implication on Theory Concepts, then this paper contributes necessary knowledge that should inspire scholars and researchers to think beyond the findings to expand research in strategy formulation and adoption. Future researchers are also able to exploit the findings of this paper as a resource to build upon. Other future comparative researches and papers may be carried based on the parallels of this research. At the end, one needs to refer to limitations of the paper research: While strategic management has other constituent facets this study's focus was on strategies that PSCs have adopted in protecting the values and against crime. Planning, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages have not been addressed. It is true that planning has a bearing on strategy adoption and that implementation, control, monitoring and evaluation have a huge impact on the success of any strategy. Ignoring these can obviously give a false bearing of findings. The paper assumed that all PSCs in the study have similar operational and human resource capabilities. In reality this is not true and reflects on why certain strategies are not adopted by some PSCs. Capacities and capabilities have a bearing on choice of strategies adopted in many cases.

If we would need to give suggestions for further expertise, papers or researches then we need to stress that this paper focused on strategies and plans adopted by PSCs to deal with crime in countries of Western Balkan. While the growth in numbers of such firms in some countries like Serbia is high, a majority of them remain small and are poorly positioned for growth. In the end they either stall at the same points or die out. There is need to research on how small PSCs position themselves for growth, especially in the competitive urban setups in North Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in smaller countries like Monte Negro or Kosovo. This paper is suggested in light of the continuous reliance of PSCs by private and public security agencies in Western Balkans.

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EDUCATIONAL MODELS AS PEDAGOGICAL SUPPORT OF SAFE SCHOOLS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

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Abstract: The improvement of the quality of education is a current issue that can be researched from several aspects, among which one of the essential indicators is to ensure a safe climate and environment in an educational context. The sustainable educational concept for safe schools is being promoted in the paper through research of the influence of the educational extracurricular models, as a pedagogical support for reducing violence among pupils of different ethnic, urban and cultural backgrounds. The results from the research that was carried out give answers in the form of final findings of the set research questions, such as: the representation, frequency and types of project models in primary schools, which aim to strengthen the safe environment in the schools in the urban environments. The research objective was focused on the assessment of the influence of the educational models that are implemented as extracurricular project activities, on raising awareness of the pupils for a safe school climate in the urban environments. The issue was analyzed through empirical research, as well as through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the relevant documentation and the results of the target groups included. Because of the multidimensional and specific setup of the research, the analysis contains the views and the needs of the relevant stakeholders in the educational process. In this paper, the focus is put on the results from the research of the pupils’ views. The hypothetical frame shows that the educational models influence the strengthening of the educational concept for ensuring a safe school environment in the urban context.

Keywords: Educational models, safe schools, urban environment, pupils, violence

Introduction:

Although constantly present, violence and all its forms of manifestation dramatically actualized at the beginning of the 21st century, finding a place in school curricula, discipline and above all in empirical studies. However, despite the strengthening of research in this domain, there is a surprising lack of theoretical and empirical guidelines to direct efforts to promote scientific approaches and the practical application of remediative and prophylactic solutions in the school environment. School violence and climate in a developmental context puts this research in a place where a variety of theoretical understandings of a wide range of modalities of violence and

its manifestation in the school are merged. This research paper presents a stimulation and support for other researches in this area. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is a matter that has aspirations to ascertain, but also to open up a series of important questions from the domain of school violence in our country. The obtained results from the evaluation survey suggested that the modalities and the attitudes of students of the high school student population for school violence are present in our schools. The obtained results from the evaluation research suggests on a conclusions about the modalities and the attitudes of students from the high school student population for school violence, present in our schools.

Contents of the paper

Analysis and interpretation of the results obtained from the examination of students attitudes

In the framework of this survey, a total of 356 secondary school students from 6 municipalities on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia were interviewed. According to the analyzed data, 69% of the respondents came from the urban environment, compared to 27.2% coming from rural areas (Table 1).

Table No. 1			
Question no. 2: Place of residence			
	f	%	V%
City environment	245	68.8	71.6
Rural environment	97	27.2	28.4
Unanswered	14	3.9	
N=	356	100	100

Of the surveyed respondents, 58.4.% were female and 41.6.% of the respondents were male. The target group is involved in the implementation of the project "Safe Schools" and "Peer Mediation". The survey is targeted in the direction of obtaining relevant data suitable for quantitative and qualitative analysis of the attitudes of the students from different municipalities for implementing the project models.

Table no. 2			
Question no. 1 : City in which your school is located			
	f ⁵	%	V% ⁶
Gostivar	53	14.9	14.9
Kichevo	20	5.6	5.6
Prilep	84	23.6	23.6
Skopje	89	25.0	25.0
Struga	34	9.6	9.6
Tetovo	76	21.3	21.3
N=	356	100	

Considering the fact that the project models are realized in multiethnic environments, it is expected that the respondents will correspond with this feature. Of the 356 students surveyed, 58% are of Macedonian nationality, 36.2% are of Albanian nationality, 3.7% are part of Turkish nationality, and 2.5% of respondents reported that they belong to the category - others. (Table 3)

Table no. 3			
Question no. 6: Nationality			
	f	%	V%
Macedonian	205	57.6	57.6
Albanian	129	36.2	36.2
Turkish	13	3.7	3.7
Other	9	2.5	2.5
N=	356	100	

Of the surveyed students, the highest percentage is in secondary vocational education (76%), 23% of students are part of secondary school gymnasium education, and only 6% of the sub-sample is from secondary arts education. (Chart 1)

⁵ f (frequency), мк: фреквенција

⁶ V% (Valid Percent), мк: валиден процент

Type of secondary education in which you study




Chart No. 1 Students frequency by type of secondary education

If we analyze the success of the students who are active participants and “consumers” of the project activities, and also take into account the fact that the selection of students for participation in the project models is most often done by the professional services of their schools in consultation with the class managers, evident are the data that point to the conclusion that a significant factor in the choice of students is the student’s levels of achievement from the previous year, expressed in percent 54% of the students are with excellent level, 28% achieved very good level, against the students who achieved good level in the previous year (16%), ie sufficient level (2%).

Success from the previous school year




Chart no. 2 Percentage frequency of students levels of achievement

These data point to a number of questions and dilemmas that deserve serious further analysis and re-examination of the attitudes and opinions of the relevant subjects that make the selection of students. The question arises: Are excellent students have been chosen as a model of nonviolent behavior or maybe these students have more developed leadership abilities among students, compared to students with lower achievement. Secondly, the question arises - can the choice of students start with a “dose of prejudice” towards students with lower learning

achievement-that the one who manifests violent behavior can not meet the requirements for strengthening the concept of safe schools by manifesting nonviolent behavior?

The frequency of students in the survey by gender resulted in 42% of male vs. 58% of female students. Table No.4

Table no. 4			
Question no. 5. Gender			
	f	%	V%
Male	148	41.6	41.6
Female	208	58.4	58.4

From the data of the seventh question from the first part of the questionnaire, data are obtained on whether students use public transport to the school. This data is directly related to the potential opportunities for manifesting various types of violent behavior, such as: physical, psychological and bullying. Most of the students reported (67%) that they use public transport, despite the statements of 33% of the students who stated that they do not use public transport home-school-home. (Table 5)

Table no. 5			
Question no. 7: Do you use transportation to get to school?			
	f	%	V%
Yes	238	66.9	66.9
No	118	33.1	33.1

In terms of examining students' attitudes about the frequency of violence in their schools relevant to the conceptual layout of the project models, specifically for promotion of the concept of "safe schools", data have been obtained that show that almost half of the students declare that in their school there is no "never" violence (61.2%), almost three times less than the respondents (17.3%) reported that they saw violence several times during the year. Almost identical is the percentage of students' statements that indicate that the violence is present "several times a month", ie "daily" (10% and 8%), and only 4% say that the violence is present "once a week". Regarding the type of violence, students in the first place emphasize psychological and verbal violence, as opposed to sexual violence that is ranked as lowest. As occasional violence that occurs in their school life, single out vandalism and bullying. (Table 6)




Chart 3 Ranking of the types of violence according to students and teachers

Table no. 6

II - part

Question no. 1: How often do the above types of violence occur in your school?

		N	%	C% ⁷
Frequency of types of violence	Never	1479	61.2	427.5
	Several times a year	418	17.3	120.8
	Several times a month	234	9.7	67.6
	Once a week	93	3.8	26.9
	Daily	192	7.9	55.5

It is very correctly for the research to pointing out that the researchers' expectations regarding the question: **Where do violence occur (different types) "go in an unexpected direction", that is, the classroom is the most pointed place where the violence takes place, contrary to the expectations that it should be the "safest" organized unit.** The data review indicates that 37% of the students mark the classroom, the second place in the occurrence of the violence is stated "near the school" and in the "school yard", followed by "school hall" and "public transport". (Table 7)

Table no.7

Question no. 2: Where do these types of violence occur?

		N	%	C%
Where did the violence occur?	Classroom	438	36.7	143.1
	School hall	163	13.6	53.3
	Schoolyard	223	18.7	72.9
	Near the school	228	19.1	74.5
	In public traffic	143	12.0	46.7

⁷ C% mk: percentage of the case

Within the quantitative part of the research, the question arises in the context of the mechanisms for recognizing the violence and encouragement for reporting by the students. Half of the respondents (53%) answered that they have the ability to recognize and report violence, and 15.2% have no ability to recognize and report violence.




Chart no. 4

Chart no.4 Frequency of students according to possession of mechanisms for recognizing violence and encouragement for reporting

We should not overlook the fact that indicates that there is uncertainty among high school population with regard to this issue. (Chart 4). **Hence the conclusion is that in the future, it is necessary to work on this component of the project models, that is, working on strengthening the abilities of the students for getting to know and recognizing the different types of violence, as well as their encouragement in taking the next adequate steps.**

The students were asked a question through which was examined their perception of their personal safety in the school. More than half of the students (60% V) regard the school as a safe environment, despite the classmates who reported that they do not feel safe, that is, they are not sure about their safety in schools, expressed in percentages (23.2% V) or (18% V) who "do not know" whether they are safe in schools. When analyzing these data, the eight percent (8%) of students who did not answer this question at all should also be considered. These data correspond with the students' attitudes regarding the frequency of violence, which are analogous related to the sense of personal safety in the school. On the other hand, the reason for the insecurity and the absence of personal security in the school can be asked in the statement of 37% of the students who say that the violence occurs in the classroom. (Table 8)

Table no. 8			
Question no. 3: Do you feel safe at school?			
	f	%	V%
No	76	21.3	23.2
I don't know	58	16.3	17.7
Yes	193	54.2	59.0

An individual review of the question by which the ways in which students behave in situations of violent behavior among them are detected suggests that they most often apply two alternatives. In large percentage (68.1%) they apply mediation among the involved parties and in the situations of violent behavior inform the school teams for safe schools (32%).

Exactly such approaches and this kind of abilities are expressed among students who were involved in the project "Peer Mediation" and are part of the teams.

These data are in favor of establishing the benefits of the project activities and the developed competencies for "positive transfer" in practical situations.

The summary review of the results of the question by which students' attitudes about the impact of the extracurricular activities provided by the project "Safe Schools" and "Mediation among peers" for prevention of violent behavior are examined, show that 28.4% of the students reported that the same have a sufficient influence, but on the other hand with a close score of (27.1%) reported that they are not sure about the impact of the activities in which they participate in the prevention of violent behavior. There is also an attitude of students expressed in percentage of 12.6%, who consider that this type of activity has no influence at all in preventing violent behavior.

Table no. 9				
Question No. 6: The impact of extracurricular activities with students from different ethnic communities, as part of the project models "Safe Schools" and "Mediation among peers" for the prevention of violent behavior.				
		N	%	C %
Extracurricular activities provided by the project	No influence at all	621	12.6	184.3
	Not enough influence	501	10.2	148.7
	I'm not sure	1336	27.1	396.4
	Enough influence	1397	28.4	414.5
	Huge influence	1066	21.7	316.3

The research re-introduces issues related to the original conceptual layout of the project models. Namely, in extracurricular activities (sports competitions and fair play tournaments, training on topics of non-violent communication, organized school days dedicated to nonviolence, posters, school clubs for mediators, etc.), through which in a creative and immediate way

models of nonviolent behavior should be promoted, students are actually active stakeholders and participants.

This established project cycle is accompanied by the need in the future by the organizers and implementers of the project models (professional services and teachers) to work on raising the awareness of students for applying the principles of the project models in everyday life.

Conclusion:

From the summary qualitative analysis of the data, it can be concluded that the students were involved in a number of extracurricular activities that have the greatest influence in resolving interethnic conflicts and in improving security in the school. The analysis shows that the most common are the mediation trainings organized by the OSCE Office in Skopje, followed by other trainings, seminars and workshops: sports activities, USAID project for interethnic integration in education; debates about safe schools; lecturing on human trafficking, peace and tolerance; debates on prevention of violence, week of different cultures; inter-ethnic camp for prevention of intercultural violence; project for intercultural exchange; safety lectures - MOI; exchange of students among cities; clubs for mediators; days against discrimination; creating page on the school website; PHV- promoting human values; poster making, etc.

From the numerous data regarding the realization of the project activities and their influence on the students, a wide range of answers is received, which ultimately directs to the general conclusion that students express satisfaction with the overall project concept and their treatment in the same. Forty-five per cent of students ticked the statement "I'm satisfied" and 19% "I am very satisfied", compared to 5% of students who ticked they are "not at all satisfied", when they were answering the question of how satisfied you are with the project models "Safe Schools and Mediation Among Your Peers".

In this part of the analysis, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that in the project model "Mediation among the peers" are not included all the respondents from the research, which, on the other hand, are fully included in the project model "Safe Schools". This is an argument that justifies the attitude of that category of students (17.4%) who reported that they are not familiar with the project models, and "symptomatic" is the data of 3.4% of the students who did not answer this question at all.

Such results indirectly speak about the character of the project model "Mediation among peers", whose concept is planned and realized numerous trainings and workshops intended for students. They are qualified as very interesting, with a high degree of interactivity in the realization of content in the field of mediation, topics for which this population shows a high sensitivity, as well as acquiring new acquaintances with students from other schools and from different ethnicities. Particularly important is the fact that mediation trainings are organized outside of the school, and after active participation, students receive a certificate for participation in training.

These data point to recommendations in the next phases of realization of the project models, the entire project student population to be included in the project model "Mediation among peers".

The students are asked to indicate which subjects have most helped them in planning and realizing the activities of the projects "Safe Schools" and "Mediation among peers ". Most of

them said that it is the subject Ethics, and also the subjects: civic education, Life Skills Education, Sociology, Native language.

From the analysis of student responses, their attitudes regarding their conviction of the purposefulness of the project activities in which they are actively involved are perceived. They say that their activities help to reduce violence, at the same time they have opportunities to get to know and overcome prejudices and stereotypes towards different ethnicities and cultures as a prerequisite for quality coexistence. For the first time, they are informed about how to act in situations when violence is manifested. They say that through their activities they develop abilities to resolve conflicts and daily problems with their peers, receive advice on preventing violence, strengthen their communication skills, especially in the area of non-violent communication, etc.

If these results are approaches to further analysis of the target and content placement of the aforementioned subjects, probably will follow an expected justification regarding the possibility of correlation and integration of corpus contents in the field of multicultural education, non-violent communication and types of communication will probably follow.

Such knowledge, among other things, leads to the detection of the need for further analysis of curricula and curriculum courses Ethics, Civic education, Life Skills Education, Sociology, Native language in the direction of integrating with new content of the aforementioned areas.

The research vision of this research, but also with regard to the basics of the project models, is to determine the students' competence at the level of "awareness" and the practical application of the acquired knowledge and the developed skills in the field of multicultural education in everyday situations.

The relatively high average (60%) of students declared that "sometimes" learned knowledge and acquired skills are applied in everyday life, despite these attitudes are the views of 21% of their classmates who proactively behave in everyday life.

The relevance of these data is in favor of the conclusion of the positive and functional reflection of the "project mission" on the attitudes and behaviors of students in everyday life in multiethnic environments. Following these and other data from the research with the other target groups, which "cross-analyzed" give the same result, the need for continuation and expansion with the realization of the two project models with a wider sample of the high school population, but also for simultaneous starting with the realization in early school age also.

Always open question about the sustainability of project activities is set in this context, and it opens up opportunities for inter-institutional access and treatment in the process of finding the most appropriate responses, translated into solutions.

The summarized results of the students surveyed provide an opportunity to increase their educational needs, expressed as needs for organizing trainings/workshops that will be in function of learning, and in their life in multiethnic environments for preventing and overcoming violent behavior. However, it can be noted that the following topics are most often emphasized: encouraging moral values; ethical tolerance; respect among students; multicultural parties; human trafficking; patterns of behavior outside the school;; "Lets get rid of stereotypes and prejudices"; types of violence and prevention of the same; tolerance (religious); joint production

of traditional clothes; workshop for displaying the consequences of physical and psychological violence; topics for verbal communication; openly talking about violence; exchange of customs; school without stereotypes; nice behavior bon-ton; a society without prejudice - "My safety is your safety" and other suggestions for topics and trainings.

Citing the numerous topics for training and workshops for preventing and overcoming violent behavior by students is not just a "one sheet of analogy" of knowledge in the field, but rather indicates a developed awareness of the students about the need to strengthen their knowledge, development of the moral values necessary for the modern civil society, as practical models for preventing and overcoming violent behavior among peers, regardless of their ethnic "sign".

Their most common suggestions that suggest improvement of the project "Safe Schools" and "Mediation among peers" refer to the need to include more students from their schools, emphasize the need to organize a larger number of workshops in the field of multiculturalism, furthermore, according to their opinions, a greater popularization of the project should be undertaken and there should be greater awareness at the local community level, to present more topics at the school level, and seminars and workshops to have an interactive character.

From the abovementioned analyzes regarding the students' attitudes about their safety at school, their ability to recognize the violence, the application of the mechanisms learned from the project models "Safe Schools", etc., we can conclude that the implementation of the project models, "Safe Schools", has a positive impact on the attitudes and educational needs of students, which means that the first special hypothesis "Implementation of the project models "Safe Schools" positively influences the attitudes and the needs of the students", and is sustainable and accepted.

Also significant data for analysis (according to the Tukey test) and concluding are the explicit attitudes of students about the influence of extracurricular activities with students from different ethnic communities for the prevention of violent behavior as an integral part of the project models "Safe Schools" and "Mediation between peers ". The dispersion of attitudes towards cities is evident, ie this phenomenon plays a dominant role in the city of Prilep, followed by Skopje, and with less pronounced, according to the students' attitudes about the influence of this type of extracurricular activities, the municipalities Struga, Tetovo, Gostivar and Kichevo.

These data confirm the idea that in the future there is a need for additional project program activities with students from multiethnic environments that deviate from the average.

The concluding knowledge confirms the second special hypothesis: "There is a statistically significant difference in the attitudes of the students from different municipalities in the implementation of the project models "Safe Schools", for differences in the attitudes of students from different municipalities in implementing the project models "Secure schools".

Conclusions as recommendations

- The data point to a number of questions and dilemmas that deserve serious further analysis and re-examination of the attitudes and opinions of the relevant subjects that make the selection of students. The question arises: Are excellent students have been chosen as a model of nonviolent behavior or maybe these students have more developed

leadership abilities among students, compared to students with lower achievement. Secondly, the question arises - can the choice of students start with a "dose of prejudice" towards students with lower learning achievement-that "the one who manifests violent behavior cannot meet the requirements for strengthening the concept of safe schools by manifesting nonviolent behavior"?

- It is very correctly for the research to pointing out that the expectations regarding the question: Where do violence occur (different types)" go in an unexpected direction", that is, the classroom is the most pointed place where the violence takes place, contrary to the expectations that it should be the "safest" organized unit.
- We should not overlook the fact that indicates that there is uncertainty among high school population with regard to this issue. Hence the conclusion is that in the future, it is necessary to work on this component of the project models, that is, working on strengthening the abilities of the students for getting to know and recognizing the different types of violence, as well as their encouragement in taking the next adequate steps. This conclusion and recommendation correlates with the attitudes of the relevant representatives of the MOI Prevention Units who suggest that the concepts for "Safe Schools" and "Mediation among peers" should be implemented in the early school age, ie in primary schools, in order to provide continuity in this process and prevention "with appropriate age". On the other hand, the reason for the insecurity and the absence of personal security in the school can be found in the statement of the students who say that the violence occurs in the classroom.
- Exactly such approaches and this kind of abilities are expressed among students who were involved in the project "Peer Mediation" and are part of the teams. These data are in favor of establishing the benefits of the project activities and the developed competencies for "positive transfer" in practical situations.
- The research re-introduces issues related to the original conceptual layout of the project models. Namely, in extracurricular activities such as: sports competitions and fair play tournaments, training on topics of non-violent communication, organized school days dedicated to nonviolence, posters, school clubs for mediators, etc., through which in a creative and immediate way models of nonviolent behavior should be promoted, students are actually active stakeholders and participants.
- This established project cycle is accompanied by the need in the future by the organizers and implementers of the project models (professional services and teachers) to work on raising the awareness of students for applying the principles of the project models in everyday life.
- It is necessary to emphasize the fact that in the project model "Mediation among the peers" are not included all the respondents from the research, which, on the other hand, are fully included in the project model "Safe Schools". This is an argument that justifies the attitude of that category of students who reported that they are not familiar with the project models, and "symptomatic" is the data of the students who did not answer this question at all.
- Such results indirectly speak about the character of the project model "Mediation among peers", whose concept is planned and realized numerous trainings and workshops intended for students. They are qualified as very interesting, with a high degree of inter-

activity in the realization of content in the field of mediation, topics for which this population shows a high sensitivity, as well as acquiring new acquaintances with students from other schools and from different ethnicities. Particularly important is the fact that mediation trainings are organized outside of the school, and after active participation, students receives a certificate for participation in training. These data point to recommendations in the next phases of realization of the project models, the entire project student population to be included in the project model "Mediation among peers".

- The obtained knowledge, among other things, leads to the detection of the need for further analysis of curricula and curriculum courses of the subjects Ethics, Citizen Education, The class hour at which Ethics, Civic education, Life Skills Education, Sociology, Macedonian/Albanian language in the direction of integration with new content in the field of multicultural education.
- The relevance of these data is in favor of the conclusion of the positive and functional reflection of the "project mission" on the attitudes and behaviors of students in everyday life in multiethnic environments. Following these and other data from the research with the other target groups, which "cross-analyzed" give the same result, the need for continuation and expansion with the realization of the two project models with a wider sample of the high school population, but also for simultaneous starting with the realization in early school age also.
- Citing the numerous topics for training and workshops for preventing and overcoming violent behavior by students is not just a "one sheet of analogy" of knowledge in the field, but rather indicates a developed awareness of the students about the need to strengthen their knowledge, development of the moral values necessary for the modern civil society, as practical models for preventing and overcoming violent behavior among peers, regardless of their ethnic "sign".
- Their most common suggestions from the students that suggest improvement of the project "Safe Schools" and "Mediation among peers" refer to the need to include more students from their schools, emphasize the need to organize a larger number of workshops in the field of multiculturalism, furthermore, according to their opinions, a greater popularization of the project should be undertaken and there should be greater awareness at the local community level, to present more topics at the school level, and seminars and workshops to have an interactive character.
- There is a relatively large variety of statements among students from different cities, in terms of "mechanisms for recognizing violent behavior and encouragement for reporting them."
- There is an evident dispersion of views in different cities.
- Concluding findings once again confirm the hypothesis of the existence of differences in the attitudes of students from different municipalities for the implementation of project models "Safe Schools" and "Mediation among peers".

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COOPERATION BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND MUNICIPALITIES FOR PUPILS' HEALTH AND SAFETY

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Abstract: The issue of school safety is lately one of the most discussed global issues related to the children and schools. Each attempt of school violence or other accident raises new debates and activities for intensifying measures for school security.

The **aim** of the paper is focused on the role of the local authorities in the field of school security. In that terms we investigate the collaboration between schools and local authorities to find out what kind of activities are being implemented for pupil's health and safety.

The **method** that we used is descriptive. For data gathering we used descriptive method and triangulation of qualitative and quantitative techniques, such as content analyses, interviews and survey.

Content analyses was focused on the relevant documents related to the strategic plans and actions of municipality related to the school security, acts and reports for implemented activities. Sample for the interview was consisted of school principals and officials from municipality that participate and coordinate these activities. Survey was made with 101 school representatives including teachers, advisors and school principals and 119 parents.

The **results** from the content analyses and interviews show that main activities of the municipality are related to security control of traffic near school, control of food, security from violence in school and cyber security. Results from survey point out that the weak sides in current school situations are the following: lack of security in schools, low level of hygienic standards in the schools and school yards, and violence among children, including fights and bullying.

According to the respondents, security should be one of the priority for investment and reform.

There are no easy answers how to ensure school security. On one side there are certain acts and recommendation what school has to do for children safety, but on the other side there are no developed mechanism for assesing to what level they are implemented and how well the schools are prepared to ensure the security.

Recommendation is that more cooperation between local authorities and schools is needed and security measures have to be more intensive especially related to traffic and cyber security and security of school violence particularly in schools with mixed ethnic students. The best value

is always education and training, building strong and healthy relationships, improving counseling and mental health support, and proactive communication and collaboration

Key words: schools, municipalities, cooperation, health, security

Introduction

The issue of school safety is lately one of the most discussed global issues related to the children and schools. Each attempt of school violence or other accident raises new debates and activities for intensifying measures for school security. Process of decentralization in our country brought changes in the process of school financing and management that implies changes in managing the activities towards pupils' health and safety.

In this paper we investigate the role of the local authorities in the field of school security. In that terms the research is focused on the collaboration between schools and local authorities aiming to find out what kind of activities are being implemented for pupil's health and safety.

Method

For theoretical and empirical research we have developed methodology adequate to the nature of the phenomena we want to explore. We chose the descriptive method for data gathering with triangulation of qualitative and quantitative techniques, such as content analyses, interviews and survey.

Content analyses was focused on the relevant documents related to the strategic plans and actions of municipality related to the school security, acts and reports for implemented activities. Sample for the interview was consisted of school principals and officials from municipality that participate and coordinate these activities. Survey was made with 101 school representatives including teachers, advisors and school principals and 119 parents.

Results of the content analyses and interviews with representatives of the local authorities

The applied research techniques, according to the purpose and tasks of the research, led to results that show variety of adequate forms of action of the local government and schools in the function of students' safety.

We will present some of the **general measures** of the municipalities for protection and assurance of the safety of citizens and material goods. In accordance with the Law on protection and rescue, decisions were taken on the establishment of the Headquarters for Protection and Rescue and Rescue Units. These bodies should assist in preparing and implementation of measures for protection and rescue of people and material goods from war, natural disasters, epidemics and other disasters, and elimination of the consequences caused by them as matters of public interest.

Representatives of municipalities refer also to other activities in the field of protection and rescue of people and material goods related to educational institutions such as regular maintenance of the equipment and devices for fire protection in kindergartens and schools, regular maintenance of hydrants in order to act successfully in case of fire, regular pest control to ef-

fectively destroy harmful rodents that can cause infectious diseases and epidemics, and other measures towards better quality of the health and safety of the citizens and the environment.

In some municipalities (for example, the municipality of Karposh), representatives also reported on the activities for investigation and maintenance of the equipment for lightning protection and protective grounding in kindergartens and schools in order to detect possible defects on time and bring them to proper condition. Municipalities regularly maintain the chimneys, diodes, air systems, air and water heating systems, heating boilers for central heating in the primary schools and kindergartens under the authority of the municipality. (Општина Карпош, 2018)

According to the Macedonian legislative, the local self-government has competencies and obligation for prevention and improvement of the **safety of traffic and roads on a local level**. (Министерство за локална самоуправа, 2015) In regard of this, the activities of the municipalities for traffic education of young people are significant. The Municipality of Karpos in cooperation with relevant state institutions (State Council for Safety in Traffic and Roads, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and others) traditionally organizes a traffic education manifestation "Children's traffic light", which is held at the regional and state level. (РСБП, 2010), The municipalities are involved in the campaign called "Let's protect children in traffic" with a series of activities that should contribute to reducing the number of killed and injured children in traffic accidents.

In the municipalities there are also assigned persons for **control of food for kindergartens and primary schools**. The authorized person for control and safety of food performs sporadic internal control of the number of meals that should correspond with the number of children, check their quality, control the declarations and specifications of the products, control of the hygienic sanitary conditions in the kitchen and the places where children are staying. Checklists are prepared and filled daily by staff for evidence of the number of meals, number of children, list of children who are allergic to certain allergens, list of ventilation and daily cleaning of the premises, weekly disinfection list and detailed cleaning of the kitchen, control of the kitchen, the material that is used and its origin. Control is also made of the implementation of good hygiene practice and good manufacturing practice, distribution of food to other premises and thermal stability of the hot meal that are carried out. The audit is carried out according to the "Rulebook on control and safety of food and materials" and the Law on safety of food, prepared by the Food and Veterinary Agency. (Закон за безбедност на храна, 2015)

Local authorities also plan to organize trainings, information meetings, workshops with the employees directly involved in the preparation of food for children in order to raise awareness and to follow the scientific and research trends in accordance with the legal regulations of the European Union.

Results from the content analysis and interviews with the representatives of the schools (directors, pedagogues and teachers)

The analysis showed that schools undertake a series of adequate measures, activities and initiatives to ensure the safety of students in the school. For example, in the primary school

Vlado Tasevski professional team developed Program for protection of students from abuse and violence for the current school year 2018-2019 (ООУ Владо Тасевски, 2018). The program has a number of goals among which are: defining and implementation of procedures in case of student violence, creation of climate of tolerance and respect, etc. According to the program, different activities and expected effects are planned for each month targeting specific goals related to the protection of students, with assigned responsibilities of school staff, pupils and parents for their realization.

Within the program, educational workshops, film presentations and cooperation with all relevant factors are foreseen. Special emphasis is placed on recognizing and reducing all types of violence in the school, fostering non-violent communication, encouraging the desired ways of behavior with adequate rewards, professional support and corrective mechanisms for violent incidents or in case of harassment.

The program also defines **interventional activities** according to the levels on violence, abuse and neglect:

1. On the first level, activities should be taken by the head teacher or class teacher in cooperation with parents, with group of students or individually.
2. On the second level activities should be initiated by the head teacher in cooperation with pedagogue, protection team or school director, and with compulsory participation on parents. If this is not effective, the director initiate pedagogical measures and educational - disciplinary procedures, according to the legislative.
3. On the third level, activities are taken by the school director in cooperation with the team for protection, with compulsory engaging on parents and, if necessary, other authorities such as: Centers for social work, local self-government, medical institutions, and police.

In terms of providing students' safety, schools make contracts with security agencies for 24 hours student protection and with an insurance agencies for protection against injuries of any kind. This option is offered to parents at the beginning of the school year and parents make insurance for their children via schools. (ООУ Лазо Трновски, 2018) Student insurance through agencies is not mandatory, but experience has shown interest and acceptance by the parents.

Other activities for increasing the security are the following:

- the school has provided trainings for all teachers for protection and safety of students in case of natural disasters, earthquakes, fires and floods.
- the school in cooperation with the police realized lectures on traffic safety and security and the consequences of the use of firecrackers and other explosive materials
- in the annual program of work, the school has prepared programs and action plans that are realized during the school year in relation to prevention of violence, bullying, prevention against infectious diseases, etc.

From the results of the survey with teachers and parents, we present only few that are related to the risks and threats to students' safety.

We posed questions about the biggest threats, obstacles or difficulties that negatively affect the improvement of the safety and quality of education. Most frequent answers of the respondents are summarized in the following list of weaknesses:

- Lack of discipline during the lessons.
- Inappropriate use of internet opportunities and social networks by students, parents and teachers and insufficient awareness of possible cyber treats.
- Insufficient information, poor communication and cooperation between the parents and the school.
- Lack of security in schools (school provision, poor hygienic conditions)
- Schools yards are not efficiently used.
- Lack of financial resources in schools.

Lately, there are ideas for purchasing video cameras and metal detectors in schools but it should be reconsidered is investment in this equipment garancy for school safety. Our schools usually have limited sources and this purchase is not the optimal solution. There are many examples, when thousand denars are spent for expensive equipment for video control but it only gives a false sense of security. Most of the cameras are not in order, there are no money for maintenance or replacement so it is only illusion that they enable protection for thefts or violence. Instead of that, we should invest on education and training, on establishing strong and health relationships, proactive communication and colaboration and adequate counseling and mental health support.

Conclusions and recommendations

The results from the content analyses and interviews show that main activities of the municipality are related to security control of traffic near school, control of food, security from violence in school and cyber security. Results from survey point out the weak sides in current situations in schools such as: lack of security in schools, low level of hygienic standards in the schools and school yards, and violence among children, including fights and bullying.

According to detected weaknesses in the current situation in schools, areas of action for increasing the security should be the following:

- Better cooperation between local and central government. The municipalities are not able to make interventions in the implementation of education policies directed by the central government. Adminsitrative procedures are complicated and relationship between local authoties and MES and the BDE are not at the satisfactory level, mainly because of the ignorant attitude of the state institutions. Educational policies and reforms always go top-down without interest of the state institutions for the experiences of teachers and practitioners. There are frequent changes imposed by the central government without previous analyses of the effects or pilot testing of the innovation before their implementation to whole population. For these reasons, reforms are ineffective and have no sustainability.
- According to the respondents, security should be one of the priorities for investment and reform. For effective investmnet, changes in the way of financing in education and the

redistribution of block grants in schools are needed. Directors have no freedom in fund management decisions. Municipalities are legally obliged to complement the budget in schools where necessary. Central and local government should make changes in the system of calculation and division of the block grant for more effective school functioning.

- Security measures have to be more intensive especially related to traffic and cyber security and security of school violence particularly in schools with mixed ethnic students. It is important to raise the awareness of cyber violence and possible implications of cyber crime that they can committed, possibility of hacking, virus dissemination, etc.
- To invest more in education and training for building strong and health relationships, with proactive communication and collaboration
- To improve counseling and mental health support.
- Insufficient utilization of large courtyards in schools. Municipalities should implement projects for greater utilization of the yards in the schools, through greater involvement and cooperation with the private sector (public-private partnerships, etc).

There are no easy answers how to ensure school security. On one side there are certain acts and recommendation what school has to do for children safety, but on the other side there are no developed mechanism for assessing to what level they are implemented and how well the schools are prepared to ensure the security.

National debates and international events such as this conference are significant for raising of the security awareness in order to become part of the contemporary school life like other school priorities.

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STRENGTHENING LOCAL DISASTER RESILIENCE

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Abstract: This is an era of unparalleled resources and technological advancement, but for too many people it is also an era of insecurity. We are going to need new ways of doing globalization that respond to this insecurity. In order to build a resilient society, it is necessary to implement the integrated disaster risk reduction in each local community. The author focuses on the significance of urban security through reduction of disaster risks. Also outlined is the use of the risk assessment cycle to be used during the process of preparedness, providing a way of selecting measures to control and manage disaster risks as a product of the likelihood and impact of the risk identified. It then outlines the role of local authorities in the field of urban security in order to minimize the growth and spread of the disaster thus allowing people to leave safely. Community-Based Disaster Resilience seeks ways to help communities effectively use local resources and capacities to adopt measures to reduce their vulnerability. The community based approaches to disaster resilience recognizes the fact that in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the first response always comes from the community itself. It also recognizes the fact that in many cases, top down approaches may fail to address the specific local needs of vulnerable communities, ignore the potential of local resources and capacities and may in some cases even increase people's vulnerability. To build local disaster resilience in the nation, post-disaster recovery, including the physical reconstruction of communities, should encourage and reward places for implementing resilience measures such as land use, building above base flood elevations, enhanced building codes, and risk-priced disaster insurance. This paper explores the concept of community resilience and outlines some of the recent frameworks and tools that have been developed to understand. To adopt a resilience-based approach to disaster management, a coordinated and cooperative effort is needed to enhance capacity to prepare for, withstand and recover from disasters. The author underline that there is a need for moving from reactive to proactive disaster policies.

Key words: Disaster resilience, urban, security, local authorities.

1. Introduction

Disaster risks continue to dominate the results of annual Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS). This year, they accounted for three of the top five risks by likelihood and four by impact. Extreme weather was the risk of greatest concern, but survey respondents are increasingly worried about environmental policy failure: having fallen in the rankings after Paris, "failure of

climate-change mitigation and adaptation” jumped back to number two in terms of impact this year. The results of climate inaction are becoming increasingly clear.

The world is facing a growing number of complex and interconnected challenges—from slowing global growth and persistent economic inequality to climate change, geopolitical tensions and the accelerating pace of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Global risks are intensifying, but the collective will to tackle them, appears to be lacking. We are drifting deeper into global problems from which we will struggle to extricate ourselves. There has never been a more pressing need for a collaborative and multi stakeholder approach to shared disasters problems. As disaster risks crystallize with increasing frequency and severity, the impact on global value chains is likely to intensify, weakening overall resilience.

Disasters in urban areas are experienced when life support systems fail in the face of pressure from external stress, resulting in loss of life, damage to property and the undermining of livelihoods. However, they are not natural events or ‘acts of God’, but products of failed development. For the majority of people at risk, loss to disaster is determined more by processes and experiences of urban development and governance than by the physical processes that shape natural or human-made hazards. It is likely to be most useful to service providers, practitioners and policy-makers engaged with regional and rural communities that are vulnerable to, or working to recover from the effects of disasters. As urban vulnerabilities increase, the urgency of the need to respond to these changes is going to intensify. Beyond adaptation measures, addressing urban vulnerability to disaster will require households, businesses and governments to avoid exacerbating dangers. The affordability of disaster resilience is set to become an increasingly important issue.

At present, spending on recovery is almost nine times higher than on prevention.⁸ Turning that around will not be easy: building support for pre-emptive spending and action— particularly if it involves major disruptions such as relocation— can take many years of dialogue and planning. There is no time to waste.

This paper presents an overview of global trends in the incidence and impacts on cities of disasters associated with natural and human-made hazards. However, the conceptual distinction between disasters associated with natural and human-made hazards is increasingly becoming blurred, as many human actions and practices, such as the construction of human settlements in flood-prone areas, exacerbate human-made hazards. While the focus here is primarily on disasters that register direct impacts at the community level and above, the characteristics of small-scale disasters whose impacts are largely felt at the individual or household levels.

The consequences of disasters, resulting from intensive industrial and technological development, have become one of the major threats. There is a need to place emphasis on the topic of disasters because we have personnel, social and organizational responsibilities in ensuring that organizations and country are safe from such danger. Disaster risk mitigation refers to all actions taken to reduce the negative effects of future events on the built environment and human

⁸ Szoenyi, M. (2018) Flood Resilience Alliance: A Look at Five Years of Supporting Communities Building Resilience against Floods”. Zurich Insurance Company

community. However, even if personal experiences and public information programs enhanced this awareness as compared to that of pre disaster times, it has not yet led people to take. It is not possible to eliminate the occurrences of disasters, however, it is possible to reduce the risk and consequences.

2. Integrate disaster management planning in local development processes

One of the most important steps is to strength resilience as a permanent and binding activity. Each national society has been assigned crucial roles and responsibilities under their respective Government's policies, legislation, strategies and plans, which this material will help us to undertake them more efficiently and effectively. Today, disasters are increasing in frequency and destructive capacity. Disaster occur daily, claiming the lives of thousands of victims. It has a long lasting heritage of close cooperation with governmental, regional, local and international organisations, scientific and expert communities, as well as of the private sector. The aim of this paper is to emphasis establishing safer and more united communities. Over time, this special event attracted more attention worldwide, with the increasing involvement of numerous countries in raising civil society awareness of disaster prevention, risk reduction and resilience.

Resilience programmes play a crucial role in saving people's lives and preventing material losses by improving the capacity of national structures of civil protection. However, while prevention is a vital factor, it is also a complex task that requires adaptation to each new situation. Many emergency response simulation exercises should be inspired from the various types of risks that exist to specialize the response capacity and proper handling of emergency interventions. We should focus on areas, such as, risk assessment through the adoption and development of national and local mechanisms.

Legislation requires entities responsible for building a resilience to report back on their work, and set targets for accountability within the protection and rescue system. In accordance with the Protection and Rescue Law ⁹ there is obligation to carry out specific measures, activities and steps to protect and save the lives of the people jeopardized as a consequence of natural and other disasters. National legislation clearly establishes decentralized mechanisms and responsibilities of the of the local government proposes the Plan for Protection and Rescue, monitors the status of realization of decisions passed by the local government unit council related to prevention and mitigation of consequences caused by disasters. Local government is responsible for the preparedness of protection and rescue forces and encourages community participation. Community should identify the source of funding and other resources required for preparedness. Ideally, it should establish a specific line item, or funding source, in the overall national budget for building preparedness capabilities prior to disasters. It should also outline how additional emergency disaster funds might be allocated in the face of a major disaster. In paragraph 4 of Article 6 of the Protection and Rescue Law clearly defined principle on which the

⁹ Official Gazette of RM issue No. 36/04, 49/04,86/08 and 93/12

protection and rescue in the country is that “municipalities are obliged to promptly organize and take preventive and operational measures”.

Strengthened local disasters resilience is concerned mainly with two objectives, increasing the capacity to predict, monitor and reduce or avoid possible damage or addressing potential threats and strengthening preparedness for response to a disaster or assist those who have been adversely affected. Effective emergency stand-by capacity is a critical component of a preparedness system, also it is important an effective early warning system that applies sound scientific information and risk knowledge is in place and able to communicate warnings to mobilise action in all at-risk communities.

The Disaster Management Rules, which build on the Protection and Rescue Law, 2004, lay out a framework and institutional setup for strengthening Disaster risk management. This includes establishing disaster management committees and developing disaster management plans at all level. However, the disaster management planning process should be further strengthened. This will help overcome the impediments related to viewing disaster risk reduction as a separate subject and help ensure risk reduction measures are prioritized amid the numerous demands on local officials. At the same time, it will help ensure disaster preparedness measures (e.g., strengthening capacity for community first aid, pre-positioning stocks, and promoting safe urban construction) are also prioritized.

Importantly, local development planning processes are very well placed to strengthen disaster resilient planning themselves. The context-specific nature of disaster risk is well understood at this level of administration, and channels of communication through local leaders and other community representatives can be opened. Additionally, at the local level, cross sector barriers hindering coordination and holistic approaches that may exist at the union and state or region level are less evident. Thus, local levels of government administration can thereby relate to and respect bottom-up processes. Moreover, they are also the final level of central resource allocation. Combined, this makes them crucial for effective disaster management planning.¹⁰

3. Urbanization and disaster risk

The last decade has seen an unprecedented number of disaster events unfold worldwide. The global incidence and impacts of disasters from 1996 onwards illustrates extensive damage both in terms of mortality and economic losses. Impacts were highest for natural disasters, with earthquakes being the deadliest. Floods and windstorms accounted for the greatest number of disaster events and also affected the greatest number of people. Windstorms were most costly compared to other disaster types. Even with a time span of ten years, comparing the frequency and impacts of disaster types can be problematic. Large infrequent events or individual flood or earthquake events can distort aggregate measurements of impacts associated with each hazard and disaster type. Far longer time spans would be needed to capture infrequent disaster types. However, longer time spans would subject disaster impact data to the effects of changing

¹⁰ Implementation of the community disaster resilience framework, pg. 43

underlying human development contexts, including urbanization. In the new urban millennium, natural and human made disasters are likely to have their greatest impact in cities where half of humanity is expected to reside.

Experience from recent disasters also points to a central role for sustainable human settlements planning and management in risk reduction.

We present an examination of the root causes of vulnerability exposed to disaster risk. The impact of patterns of growth of cities and of the many intermediate and smaller human settlements on disaster risk is reviewed. Then, the ways in which urban processes generate risk through modifying the physical environment and through the extent and impact of poverty in urban slums is examined. And, the role of urban management and, in particular, of building construction, urban planning and the influence of international action on urban development experience of, and future potential for, disaster risk reduction.

Increasingly, urban planners are looking for ways in which infrastructure, land use and disaster risk reduction and response planning can scale down from master plans at the city level to semiautonomous local planning and action zones. However, experiences of managing disaster risk in larger cities should not be uncritically applied in small urban areas where political, economic, social and environmental contexts and capacities will differ.

By supporting Sustainable Development Goal Target 1.5: “By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other... shocks and disasters”.

In addition, we present the initiative for ‘building the climate resilience of the urban poor’. A new way of working together for enhanced outcomes at community city, national and global level.



Picture 1. Initiative for “building the climate resilience of the urban poor’, Climate action summit 2019, A Race We Can Win

4. Disaster resilience

Community resilience starts with the premise that resilience is an integrated approach, not one based on a single system, sector, or discipline. It also assumes building on and learning from existing success stories. The principles just listed exemplify the integrated and participatory nature of resilience that is required to reduce disaster impacts. Increasing resilience through shared responsibilities by individuals, families, communities, the private sector, faith-based organizations, nongovernment organizations, academe, and all levels of government.

What do we mean within the term Resilience? The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to change by coping or adapting in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction. Disaster resilience is the ability of individuals, communities, organisations and states to adapt to and recover from hazards, shocks or stresses without compromising long-term prospects for development. According to the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2005), disaster resilience is determined by the degree to which individuals, communities and public and private organisations are capable of organising themselves to learn from past disasters and reduce their risks to future ones, at international, regional, national and local levels.

DFID (2011a, 6): ‘the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict—without compromising their long-term prospects’.

Hyogo Framework of Action (UNISDR, 2005b, 4): ‘the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure’.

Disaster resilience is part of the broader concept of resilience – ‘the ability of individuals, communities and states and their institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term changes and uncertainty’ (OECD, 2013b, 1).

In conceptual terms, vulnerability and disaster resilience are closely related. Some authors see vulnerability as the opposite of disaster resilience, while others view vulnerability as a risk factor and disaster resilience as the capacity to respond (Manyena, 2006, 436, 439-443). Disaster resilience has been described as both **an outcome and a process**. Practices focused on **outcome** have tended to adopt top-down reactive approaches which can favor the status quo and take attention away from inequalities resulting from insecurity and disaster (Manyena, 2006, 438). As a **process**, building disaster resilience involves supporting the capacity of individuals, communities and states to adapt through assets and resources relevant to their context (Manyena, 2006, 439). For some, this implies enhancing peoples’ rights and addressing socio-economic, gender and environmental inequalities that exacerbate vulnerability (Andharia et al., 2010, 11; Oxfam, 2013).

5. Community disaster resilience through urban development

Unlike rural development, which provides opportunities for strengthening community disaster resilience through specific programmatic and funding-related interventions, opportunities for strengthening the resilience of urban communities can be found in the wider processes of urban governance.

Involving urban communities and other members of the informal economy to identify hazard patterns and current risks, and engaging them in a discussion on future risk as part of urban planning processes will improve understanding of the local disaster risk landscape. Accordingly, this can help prioritize and influence public and private investments that derive economic benefits while reducing risk. Such an understanding can be part of a larger community consultation, public hearing, and city visioning process undertaken, for example, during the land use (spatial) planning process. Moreover, when engaged in participatory planning, these communities can also feel and exercise ownership of the plans and resulting investments. They will thus be better partners in the implementation, operation, and maintenance of subsequent processes (e.g., ensuring clean and well-maintained drains and waterways, proper disposal of solid waste, etc.).

Before beginning the process of measuring a community's resilience, it is imperative to understand and assess the risks and vulnerabilities inherent in any complex nexus of people, natural systems and built environments. Indeed, vulnerability is an inevitable component of any community (Cutter et al., 2008; Fenton, Kelly, Vella, & Innes, 2007; Maguire & Cartwright, 2008), and arises from the intersection of human systems, the built environment and the natural environment (Fenton et al., 2007; Maguire & Cartwright, 2008). In the literature on community resilience, vulnerability is discussed in the following terms:

- **Physical and environmental vulnerability:** The most obvious factor contributing to community vulnerability is proximity to hazard-prone areas. The risk of fire, flood, drought, cyclone, earthquake and the subsequent disruption of potential contamination sites increase the physical and environmental vulnerability of communities.
- **Vulnerable infrastructure:** The vulnerability of the built environment is related to location and proximity to sources of environmental hazards or threats. Poorly constructed buildings and infrastructure, including roads and other transportation channels, industrial and commercial developments, and certain types of housing (e.g., manufactured homes, caravans) intensify the vulnerability of the built environment in communities (Borden, Schmidlein, Emrich, Piegorsch, & Cutter, 2007).
- **Economic vulnerability:** Communities reliant on a single economic sector for their livelihood (e.g., tourism, agriculture) are more vulnerable than those with more diversified economies (Cutter et al., 2008). These vulnerable communities will usually experience greater difficulty recovering from a disaster.
- **Social vulnerability:** There are certain demographic and social characteristics that make some communities more vulnerable than others. Social vulnerability arises from inequality, which in turn affects access to resources and information (Cutter et al., 2008). Social indicators of increased vulnerability include: age (e.g., the elderly and the very young), gender (e.g., women are more likely to be vulnerable than men), socioeconomic status

(e.g., the poorer members of the community are more vulnerable), populations with special needs (e.g., physically or intellectually disabled groups, homeless people), culturally and linguistically diverse populations, and Indigenous populations (Cutter et al., 2008; Tierney, 2006; Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001)

However, the resilience approach shifts the focus to processes and resources that enable communities to overcome these intrinsic vulnerabilities and adapt positively when faced with challenges.

Local governments often do not bear the responsibility for local hazard-related decisions such as development in high hazard zones, failure to adopt and enforce rigorous building codes, or insufficient attention to policies to limit vulnerability, instead shifting the burden to the federal government for response and recovery

Policies and local government land-use controls that were designed to make hazardous areas safer, such as those to construct levees to protect flood-prone areas or seawalls to protect coastal areas, have in some areas led to intensified development, thus increasing the potential for catastrophic losses

Many of these changes are transformative and long lasting and, coupled with the nation's inability to act decisively to counteract climate change, portend a future where we are more vulnerable to hazards at multiple scales. Extreme natural events (either unprecedented magnitudes or intensities of natural hazards or the unprecedented consequences of more routine hazards) may become normal occurrences under changing climatic conditions or changes in economic circumstances and social conditions.¹¹ Low-probability/high-consequence events and highly improbable ones like earthquakes take on more policy interest as these events become more probable. From a policy perspective, these unlikely events pose significant risk management challenges, starting with how to encourage investments to lessen the impacts of these disasters.

Disaster resilience is most effective if its development starts with the local community and its residents. In the same way that disasters are local, so too is the need for building capacity for resilience at the local level. There is a sustained need for coalitions at local to regional scales to involve the whole fabric of the community in building resilience for collaborative problem solving as they identify their hazards, debate mitigation options, communicate risk, set priorities for recovery should a disaster occur, and implement resilience enhancing strategies through zoning laws, building codes, and land use decisions. However, not all resilience activity is locally based or driven.

The Protection and Rescue directorate plays a pivotal role in providing guidance for policy and program development and necessary data and information to assist local communities, thereby alleviating some of the un-intentional erosion of resilience through poorly informed national -local decisions. Because there is lacks an over-all vision of resilience or coordinating strategy, it is necessary to engage in a policy review, to examine our programs, policies, and

¹¹ Susan L. Cutter ,at all Disaster resilience..

procedures in low-income communities, this same mechanism can be used to facilitate actions to promote disaster resilience. If a culture of resilience is established and actions taken such as those suggested, we would become a more resilient nation. If we could spend some of the finance now used for disaster response or recovery and instead invest these resources to build resilient communities, particularly in vulnerable areas, we would save not only lives but money as well. The focus on disasters also responds to global trends in increasing numbers of such events, in people affected and made homeless by disaster, and in the economic impacts of disaster, especially on the poor and marginalized. Human vulnerability also plays a large role in determining the scale of disaster. Small hazard events can be turned into large disasters where high vulnerability means many people are at risk, emergency response is inadequate and critical infrastructure is fragile. Where vulnerability is low, emergency services are adequate and critical infrastructure is resilient, large disasters can be avoided even from large hazards.

Mapping disaster risk and its constituent elements of hazard, vulnerability and resilience, or capacity to cope, is a fundamental element of any strategy to reduce risk. This is the case at local as well as urban and national levels. Risk mapping in urban contexts is complicated by the many overlapping hazard types and the dynamism of the social and economic landscape. A lack of data to complement assessment techniques, such as census data, poses an additional challenge to risk assessment. Participatory approaches present opportunities for overcoming some of these challenges by enabling communities to have greater control over information and interventions, thereby enhancing their resilience.

Protecting critical infrastructure and services will influence response and reconstruction capacity in the period after a disaster has struck a city. The potential for cascading events to affect multiple infrastructure systems makes it paramount that critical infrastructure and services are protected and, where possible, managed independently of each other to prevent contagion effects. However, networks of communication and exchange between such services are vital in ensuring a certain minimum level of functioning during and after a disaster. In the post-disaster period, local governments are the best placed to coordinate relief and reconstruction efforts. Partnerships with community groups and international development and humanitarian agencies are necessary in pre-disaster planning, which is needed in allocating responsibilities and developing operating guidelines for relief and reconstruction. Reconstruction should also be seen as an opportunity to build risk reduction into development. However, reconstruction may even fail to return survivors to pre-disaster conditions. Useful lessons on integrating long-term development goals within reconstruction work are emerging from recent disasters.¹²

Successive disasters can reduce the resilience of people or households to subsequent shocks and stresses. Small disasters can pave the way for large events by eroding people's assets and the integrity of critical infrastructure, progressively lowering society's thresholds of resilience.¹³

¹² Enhancing urban safety and security, Global report on human settlements 2007, United nations human settlements programme, (UN-Habitat), Earthscan in the UK and US in 2007, Part IV Natural and Human-made Disaster, 165 pg

¹³ Kasperson et al, 1996

Everyday hazards may be hard to avoid for those at risk and, indeed, become an intrinsic part of livelihood and

survival strategies. In this way, everyday hazards and small disaster losses can mistakenly become accepted as an expected part of life. In turn, this can have the perverse effect of lowering the willingness of individuals at risk or development agencies to invest in risk reduction thus creating a vicious circle where poverty and marginalization coincide with disaster risk.¹⁴ Large events that damage critical infrastructure or urban economies will similarly undermine the capacity of individuals or emergency services to resist even everyday hazards, potentially making small disasters more frequent.

6. Conclusion

Comprehensive investment to raise awareness of communities in understanding disaster risk and relevant measures that foster disaster resilience (e.g., diversifying livelihoods, hazard-resilient housing construction, protecting the natural environment, and improving social capital) is required. This will derive community disaster resilience benefits across all relevant sectors.

There is need for improved skills in community participation, negotiation with public authorities and the private sector, as well as community knowledge about development planning, sources of funds available for resilience building at the local level, and criteria for assessing community projects for them to be eligible for specific funding.

Technical skills on disaster-resilient construction are needed, especially because many of the community-based projects funded through local development funds are implemented by communities themselves. Such skills will also be useful in the post-disaster context, when social protection programs are tapped for involving the affected communities in reconstruction related activities. Skills development on resilient livelihoods-resilient techniques.

Enhanced capacity of communities to understand disaster risk information including early warning (i.e., weather forecast and seasonal forecasts) and to take actions to save lives, livelihoods, and property is required. In addition, the capacity of communities to properly maintain defensive infrastructure such as embankments needs to be strengthened.

Since the administrators and the committee members need to facilitate the communities in the village development planning process and in formulating the disaster management plans, it is necessary to strengthen their capacity to understand hazards and disaster risk (and how disaster risk is changing), facilitate participatory processes, develop disaster management plans as outlined in the Protection and Rescue Law, and integrate priority actions identified in the disaster management plans to their development plans. Moreover, they need the skills to package, present, and negotiate funding for resilience-building measures with the Local authorities and to act as a feedback mechanism to the communities.

¹⁴ Blaikie et al, 1994.

Finally, Local authorities should also have the capacity to undertake post-disaster response and damage and needs assessment.

It is crucial to develop the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience in order to provide high-level guidance on disaster management to national and local governments, business and community leaders. While the strategy focuses on priority areas to build disaster resilient communities across country also recognises that disaster resilience is a shared responsibility for individuals, households, businesses and communities, as well as for governments. The strategy is the first step in a long-term, evolving process to deliver sustained behavioral change and enduring partnerships.

The author uses the expression “shared responsibility” to mean increased responsibility for all. It recommends that state agencies and municipal councils adopt increased or improved protective, emergency management and advisory roles. In turn, communities, individuals and households need to take greater responsibility for their own safety and to act on advice and other cues given to them before and on the day of a bushfire. Shared responsibility does not mean equal responsibility ... there are some areas in which the state should assume greater responsibility than the community. For example, in most instances state fire authorities will be more capable than individuals when it comes to identifying the risks associated with bushfire; the state should therefore assume greater responsibility for working to minimise those risks.’

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THE ROOTS OF MODERN (URBAN) TERRORISM IN THE COLD WAR ERA

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Abstract: During the Cold War era, global security was continuously disrupted by crises caused by confrontations between the Western and the Eastern Bloc and charges of espionage, as well as various forms of terrorism. The spark that ignited terrorist activities were the numerous violations and restrictions of human rights and civil liberties. Terrorist groups sprang up around causes such as national liberation, secularization, religious freedom restrictions, anti-imperialism and anti-war movements, and materialism and consumer culture. Terrorist activities were for the most part a consequence of Cold War tensions. As these incidents were still infrequent, the international community was more focused on the antagonism between the superpowers. Curiously, various terrorist activities escalated in the detente period. For a time, it was believed that terrorist organizations would lose their purpose with the end of the Cold War. In fact, the opposite happened: the emergence of the New World Order and globalization led to the worldwide escalation of terrorism.

Key words: Cold War, terrorism, nationalism, secessionism, fundamentalism

1. Introductory remarks

The long-awaited peace after the end of the Second World War was established on apocalyptic rhetoric and mutual accusations exchanged between political officials of the United States and the Soviet Union, each accusing the other of endangering global security with their systems. The ensuing Cold War era was marked by numerous crises which threatened to push the world into a new war, however, thanks more to the mutual fear of its actors rather than any other factor, this conflict was avoided. Thus, a kind of balance of power was established based on a politics of mutual threats and constant rivalry. As neither power could secure hegemony on a long-term basis, the balance of power took on the character of long-term competition - especially in the domain of the nuclear arms race and the so-called space program. The world spent

in excess of four decades in a state of fear from a possible conflict of planetary proportions with an extremely uncertain outcome.

Quite naturally, such circumstances yielded resistance (minority activism) in the form of urban or rural guerrillas, a response to the ultimatum policy of world powers. Rebellions against materialism and imperialism, misery, greed, wars, religious proselytism, apartheid and segregation, created the basis for the birth of an alternative society led by various human rights movements (from the hippy movement to the Greenpeace movement), as well as those who saw a way out in anarchy, nihilism, murders and the destruction of the existing order and social values - like numerous sects¹⁵ and various terrorist organizations. Rebellions and protests became endemic in the developed world (especially in the United States and Western Europe) soon spreading to the Islamic zone of the African and Asian continents. Yet, despite this, terrorist acts during this period were still sporadic and did not attract the attention of the international community (to the degree) that the antagonisms of the world powers did (Hobsbaum, 2004).

Of particular significance was the year 1968 which was marked by global student protests (from Los Angeles and Paris to Belgrade) with an explicit demand for changes to existing social relations. According to State Department data, 1968 represents a groundbreaking year during which the "number of international terrorist incidents" reached a three-digit number (125) for the first time. Yet, although evidently numerous, the impact of these movements in confrontation with dominant regimes remained marginal. The Soviet answer to the student rebellion in Prague (the Prague Spring) was a military intervention resulting in the student **Jan Palach** (1948-1969) publicly setting himself on fire in protest. In the United States, 1968 is the year of political killings. In April 1968, **Martin Luther King** (1929-1968), a strong opponent of black segregation and a human rights activist, was murdered followed, two months later, by the assassination of **Robert Kennedy** (1925-1968) who, as the Democratic Party candidate in the upcoming presidential election, advocated a detente policy, the end of the Vietnam war, and a reconciliation with Cuban President **Fidel Castro** (1926-2016)¹⁶ (Milicevic, 2008: 657-678).

Faced with a negative domino effect which their antagonisms provoked, world leaders made the decision to hold back and reconsider. However, while, on the one hand, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were being concluded, SALT-1 in Helsinki in November 1969 and SALT-2 in Vienna in June 1979, it was precisely at this time, during the detente period, that terrorism experienced an escalation. It is indicative that the major intelligence agencies (the CIA and the KGB), who want-

¹⁵ In the United States, as the country that was the ideological inspirer of most of these movements, fatalist sects appeared offering their followers death as the "way out" of the present state of society. In 1969, Charles Manson (1934-2017) founded the first religious colony in California called the Family. It would lead 9 of its members into death, while ten years later (November 1978) the Peoples Temple sect founded by Jim Jones (1931-1978) forced 914 of its members into suicide.

¹⁶ The basic characteristic of the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy are the fact that their perpetrators, **James Earl Ray** (1928-1998) and **Sirhan-Sirhan**, were not prepared by illegal or terrorist organizations, rather the CIA as the so-called Manchurian candidate (under the influence of LSD and hypnosis). Although they were caught immediately after committing the murders (*in flagranti*), they could not remember anything due to "programed amnesia". As to the mental state of the assassins, it is sufficient to say that a notebook was found in Sirhan's apartment which contained one lone sentence: "*RFK must die*".

ed to maintain the status quo, played a major role in "heating up" (rather than calming down) tensions, in contradiction to the efforts of their political leaders. Terrorist acts gained in breadth and publicity because unlike assassinations, as a political form of struggle, the victims of their crimes were becoming, increasingly less, individuals and, increasingly more, places where a large number of people gathered - from patrons of cultural and sports events to passengers in airplanes and on railway platforms (Kršev, 2017: 296-301).

2. The dispersion of terrorist organizations: from ultra-left to ultra-right

As the world was bipolar, so terrorism had its extremes - from the far left to the far right, complemented by national-separatist and religious-fundamentalist organizational forms. Although they appear to differ in the motives behind their actions, all terrorist organizations enjoy a well-organized, mutual cooperation, as they have a common goal - the destruction of the existing system of relations and causing fear and insecurity among the population (Laker, 1999: 545-547).

Certainly, the most infamous ultra-left terrorist organization was the Red Brigades (Brigade Rosse) which operated in Italy between 1970 and 1982. Although their ideology was based on a Communist platform, their activities were focused on kidnapping and murdering prominent figures from the world of politics and business. They resorted to using extremely brutal, and unpredictable, methods which caused everyone to feel unsafe. They were involved in around 300 kidnappings, the most famous being the kidnapping of former Prime Minister **Aldo Moro** (1916-1978) on March 16, 1978 which resulted in the killing of his five-member security detail. Moro's lifeless body was found two months later in the trunk of a Renault 4 parked in front of the entrance to the Christian Democratic Party's headquarters in Rome. The last activity the members of this organization managed to do was abduct the General of the NATO Pact, **James Dozier**, in Verona in 1981. This was followed by a comprehensive action of the Italian security forces: NOCS (Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza) and the Polizia di Stato - the general was released while the kidnappers, like most of the members of the Red Brigades, were liquidated or arrested (Pullella, 2012).

According to publicity and utilized methods, the Red Brigades are comparable to the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF) or the Baader-Meinhof Group which operated in Germany. During the years 1970 to 1978, the group carried out over 30 abductions and killings, among which the most famous was the abduction of the industrialist and former SS officer **Hans Martin Schleyer** (1915-1977) in Cologne in September 1977. The activities of this extremist organization would come to be subdued with the liquidation of its leaders, **Ulrike Meinhof** (1934-1976) and **Andreas Baader** (1943-1977). An even shorter lifespan was had by the Revolutionary Cells (Revolutionäre Zellen) terrorist organization founded in 1973 by **Wilfried Böse** (1949-1976) and **Brigitte Kuhlmann** (1947-1976). The group was liquidated when the Air France plane was freed from terrorists on July 4, 1976, at the airport in Entebbe (Uganda), by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) (Barnet, 1984).

Airplane abductions have become a more frequent target of terrorist attacks, with high ransoms being sought for their "landings" and the release of hostages. The high ransom demands are accompanied by the terrorists seeking the release of imprisoned members of terrorist organizations where there is a connection, and a cooperation, with other extremist groups. All extremist groups express a desire for international cooperation. One of the most famous aircraft hijackings (Lufthansa plane on the Mallorca - Frankfurt line) in mid-October 1977 was carried out by members of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). For the release of passengers and crew, the terrorists demanded, in addition to money, the release of captured members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the RAF (Gaćinović, 2011: 78-89). This was especially pronounced in ultra-left terrorist organizations (The Baader-Meinhof Group, The Revolutionary Cells) trained in the Middle East by members of the Palestinian terrorist organizations. In return, the German ultra-left gave logistical support to the Arab terrorist group Black September led by **Ali Hassan Salameh** (1940-1979) to carry out a massacre over Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich (Bar-Zohar, Mišal, 2014: 223-234).

The most infamous terrorist, who participated in all major operations, was **Ilich Ramirez Sanchez-Carlos** (The **Jackal**), who was hired by all - not only the intelligence services of the Eastern bloc countries, but also numerous ultra-left, national liberation and Islamic-fundamentalist terrorist organizations. The actions he organized represented small "socialist revolutions", among which the most famous was the abduction of 11 energy ministers from the meeting of OPEC countries (oil exporting countries) in Vienna in December of 1975 (**Abdel-Aziz**, 2015).

Ultra-right organizations are most present in Italy, Germany, Spain and France. By their appearance and iconography, they resemble fascist phalanxes, and as they mimic them in all other respects (from greetings, to addressing), they have received the name "neo-Nazi". Unlike their left colleagues, their goals are not prominent personalities but massive casualties and panic among the population. One of the most infamous actions was conducted by a member of the Italian National Front (Fronte Nazionale), **Pierluigi Pagliai** (1954-1982), when he placed a bomb in early August of 1980 at a railway station in Bologna when 85 people were killed (Kamm, 1982).

Poverty and national and religious intolerance have played a decisive role to the emergence of nationalist organizations during the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to Yugoslavia, national problems and demands for separation (of provinces and republics) are also present in other countries, especially in Ireland and Spain, where the public is facing separatist terrorism. Its protagonists are the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which advocates for the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom, and Euskadi and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) whose goal is to separate Basque Country from Catalonia and Spain.

As these are "regional" terrorist organizations, the victims were of "local" character as well. The goals of the IRA were British institutions in Northern Ireland - from churches to police stations. As the "broader" British public needed to be introduced to the IRA's requests, its terrorists placed a bomb in downtown Birmingham, in November 1974, killing more than 20 and injuring about 200. The terrorist attacks gradually ceased and, as of 1986, when Jerry Adams came to

the head of the IRA's political branch, Sinn Féin, he returned IRA's "non-institutional fight" to the institutions.

The first victim of the ETA was the head of the San Sebastian police station **Meliton Manzanas** (1906-1968). Five years later, they succeeded in carrying out the assassination of Prime Minister **Luis Carrero Blanco** (1904-1973), who was the potential successor to Dictator **Francisco Franco** (1892-1975). With the arrival of King Juan Carlos to the head of the state, the movement gradually lost its intensity. During its operation, the IRA killed about 3,000 people, while the ETA's effect was three times less (Laker, 1999: 539-543).

3. The appearance of religious terrorism

The second half of the sixties of the twentieth century brought the "antipode" to the phenomenon of "offensive secularism" - religious terrorism. In fact, there is an escalation of Islamic fundamentalism, in the Arab world, as a reaction to the overstated secularization of societies coming from both the East and the West. Islamic fundamentalists, such as the ultra-left and ultra-right organizations, view their methods as completely legitimate in their struggle for national and religious liberation. In addition to the "individual goals", where the victims are specific individuals, they increasingly resort to methods of "mass violence" - the indiscriminate selection of victims, hostage crisis and public executions. As it turns out, the mass execution of innocent people has a greater effect on the internationalization of their religious and political demands than the liquidation of a single "guilty" person (Hofman, 2000:78-90).

Religious terrorism first appeared in Egypt, which was under the influence of the "spirit of the East" and enlightened socialism.¹⁷ The revolutionary regime of **Gamal Abdel Nasser** (1918-1970) dealt with Islamic fundamentalism and the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Nasser viewed Islam as the "main culprit - the cause of the nation's disease", the reason for the backwardness of the Arab world, and decided to take the most radical actions against it. Regime populism and the revolutionary secularization of society are contributed to by the successfully implemented nationalization of the Suez Canal. However, as religious freedoms were at stake at one point, a movement was born around **Abul Al Maududi** (1903-1979) which awakened an awareness among Egyptians and promoted the struggle for religious rights. He demand of his supporters that they not retreat before external pressures, rather which they organize themselves and oppose "non-religious secularism". While addressing the public, he called Muslims to jihad which he claimed to be the primary Islamic principle (a holy war that will lead to a revolutionary takeover of the government for the benefit of the entire human race). **Maududi's** ideas

¹⁷ Sayyid Qutb was imprisoned as a religious fanatic in an Egyptian prison between 1954 and 1964 when he was released after an intervention by Iraq. However, next year, the El Mukhabarat intelligence agency learned that he was preparing the assassination of President Nasser, so he was rearrested and executed in 1966. After Nasser's death, **Anwar al-Sadat** (1918-1981) came to the forefront of Egypt, who gradually released members of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, because of his compromise policy with Israel, the "brothers" (members of the Islamic Jihad) led by Khalid Islambouli (1955-1982) carried out an assassination attempt on him during a military parade in Cairo on October 06, 1981. The KGB was behind the assassination.

have attracted numerous followers, including **Sayyid Qutb** (1906-1966) who restored the work of the Muslim Brotherhood (Armstrong, 2007: 289-295).

Having been threatened by the possibility of being prosecuted by law, the organization split into several factions, most notably al-Fatah, founded by **Yasser Arafat** (1929-2004) in 1959 in Cairo, followed a few years later by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa and other extremist organizations (Starović, 2014: 143-147).

A similar situation occurred at the other end of the Islamic world - in Iran, where secularization was carried out by shah **Mohammad Reza Pahlavi** (1919-1980) under the influence of the "spirit of the West". Pahlavi transformed Iran from a lagging feudal society into an urban, industrialized and modern civil society through his "White Revolution.". Its secularization however, like the one in Egypt, was accompanied by repressive methods against Islamic believers. A dictatorial regime was implemented with the help of the SAVAK (secret police). The brutal torture and abuse of his own people led to the establishment of the opposition movement for freedom of religion - the Mujahedin-e Khalq, whose leader soon became Ayatollah **Ruhollah Khomeini** (1902-1989). In his "theology of anger", Khomeini blames the Americans and the Jews, as well as their intelligence agencies, for the situation in the Arab world. Although he was soon imprisoned and then expelled from Iran, Khomeini thrived and (with the help of the KGB) organized a coupe in late 1978. The Iranian Revolution was a historic turning point - it proved that Islam was not condemned to failure, that it could confront the mighty secularist forces and prevail in that struggle. The revolution in the Muslim world was perceived as a revolution that changed the social system - like the French Bourgeois Revolution or the October Revolution. Hence, it eventually became an inspiration for thousands of Muslims around the world to organize themselves in the fight against global imperialism¹⁸ (Armstrong, 2007: 303-308).

An important moment in gaining "international legitimacy" was the election of Yasser Arafat, in 1968, to the position of the chairman of the PLO. He banned Al-Fatah and other Palestinian organizations from any kind of terrorist activity outside of Israel - specifically beyond the "occupied" Palestinian zones (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank - Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho and Hebron)¹⁹ (Gačinović, 2011: 544-546). Although this initiative was only partially accepted, he managed to convince the international community that "terrorism within ethnic borders" was legitimate, i.e., for such terrorist organizations to be treated as "national liberation movements", which meant that the PLO was to be treated as a national-liberation movement and entitled to a "chair" in the United Nations. When he first addressed the General Assembly of the UN on

¹⁸ Under the influence of the Iranian Revolution, **Abdul Yusuf Azzam** (1941-1989) goes to Afghanistan where, with the help of the CIA, he establishes the **Taliban liberation movement** against Soviet occupation. On the other hand, a member of the Turkish ultranationalist organization Grey Wolves, **Mehmet Ali Agca**, in an assassination attempt, wounds **Pope John Paul II** (1920-2005) in Rome in mid-May 1981. Agca engaged the KGB, via the Bulgarian intelligence agency, with the intention of stopping the civilian uprising in Poland (Solidarity) with the pope's murder.

¹⁹ Opposing the "treacherous" Arafat policy, Palestinian extremists led by **Wadie Haddad** (1927-1978) and **George Habash** (1926-2008), with the help of the KGB, established the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine*, PFLP) which continued with international terrorism.

November 13, 1974, Yasser Arafat said, "I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand", (Neff, 1994).

While trying to justify the brutal use of force in achieving national goals, the longtime PLO ambassador to the United Nations, **Zehdi Labib Terzi** (1924-2006), in an interview for the New York Times in September 1984, uttered a sentence that would become the principle of terrorist organizations, "If you want to be heard, you have to make noise." In fact, he thought that, "the bombing campaigns, mass casualties and airplane abductions had a greater effect, as they aroused the conscience of mankind and the media's attention-more so than the long-standing plea of the international community in protecting the rights of the Palestinians", (Rosen, 1984).

Terrorism became "transparent" as almost all terrorist organizations advertised after the terrorist act - taking responsibility for their actions (in order to publicly state the reasons for the attack and the goals of their fight). But, in spite of that, finances -who finances terrorist organizations and how the money is transferred - is a major element in unraveling terrorist activities. Yet, unlike the transparency that accompanies the act itself, cash flows are often secret and unconnected so that it is difficult to determine who is in fact behind a terrorist act - who is the end client, rather than the mere executor. That is why, at its regular 27th session in 1972, the UN General Assembly decided that, in order to combat international terrorism, banks had to give up their policy on secrecy of data, the anonymity of clients, i.e., that they must report "money laundering", as well as all other suspicious transactions (Adams, 1986).

This was first noticed when the United States blamed the Libyan agent **Abdelbaset al-Megrahi** (1952-2012) for the fall of a PanAm airplane over Lockerbie (Scotland) on December 25, 1988, given that the State Department was convinced that Libya was behind the attack, i.e., that the bomb on the passenger plane was revenge executed by the President of that country, **Muammar el-Gaddafi** (1942-2011), for the shelling of his residence in Tripoli at which time his daughter was killed. Under pressure from the international community (which imposed sanctions on Libya), Gaddafi acknowledged responsibility while the Libyan state itself had to pay compensation to the families of the murdered passengers as well as the American airliner. However, it was later determined that only three days after the incident, \$ 11 million was transferred from several bank accounts in Tehran to unrelated accounts at several Swiss banks owned by the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (which did not take responsibility). Based on an analysis of international money transfers, the conclusion was reached that Lockerbie was revenge executed by Khomeini's regime for the downing of an Iranian passenger plane, shot down over the Persian Gulf by American marines six months earlier (Berger, Kobešćak, 2013).

At the beginning of the 1980s, group terrorist actions gave way to individual (suicide) attacks as the primary attack methods utilized by Islamic fundamentalism. Jihad became the individual obligation of every believer, "until all the countries that were once Muslim are returned to Islam". There is a movement of shaheed (martyrs) who have the "honor to sacrifice their lives for faith." The first suicide bombing was carried out by members of Hezbollah (the Party of God), on October 23, 1983, at the barracks of US Marines and French legionaries stationed in Beirut, which resulted in the death of over 300 US and French soldiers (Sejdžmen, 2006: 9-10).

The frequency and deadliness of terrorist attacks in Europe (1965-2000)



SOURCES: The Washington Post, July 17, 2017.

4. The end of the Cold War and the temporary suppression of terrorist activities

The end of the Cold War - the collapse of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union - hinted at the “end of history”, that is, the triumph of liberal democracy as a universal concept of social order. The victory of capitalism as a world system was complete and unconditional, and the period that followed October 1990 clearly indicated that it was a new historical milestone, which was given the symbolic name Globalism or the New World Order. However, it would soon become apparent that the “great expectations” from the New World Order were premature²⁰ (Fukojama, 2002).

By the end of the Cold War, mankind could finally take a break from the turbulences its crisis had caused, bringing civilization to the edge of the Third World War. The “great expectations” of the New World Order proved to be more and more certain because the only destabilizing zone in Europe was the area of the Western Balkans - the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) and, to a degree, the Russian Federation, in its marginal parts located along the Caucasus or behind the Ural Mountains: Ingushetia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-1994), where conflicts on a

²⁰ The defeat of socialism and the unsustainable planetarization of capitalism did not mark the “end of history” and the end of socialist ideas (on social protection and justice, a society of equal opportunities, the rule of law and the legal state) - on the contrary. The time that came showed that the “great expectations” had been disappointed and that socialist (revolutionary) ideas were still alive.

national and religious basis were taking place. Outside of Europe, an ethnic conflict was taking place in **Rwanda** (1994) between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes.

Most of the terrorist organizations, at least those of the ultra-left and ultra-right orientation, had disappeared from the international political scene with the end of the Cold War. In addition to them, the most famous security agencies of the Eastern European bloc, led by the KGB, the Staatssicherheit and the Securităţii Statului, were relegated to the pages of history. A similar fate was experienced by extremists like Carlos, the Jackal, and the symbol of terrorism in the Cold War era. As all "friendly" regimes had begun to deny him their hospitality, he finally found refuge in Sudan in 1993. But only briefly, he was extradited to France, the following year, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment (**Abdel-Aziz**, 2015).

Terrorist attacks in the last decade of the twentieth century were only sporadic occurrences still far-removed from Western civilization. Hence, in the United States, all the security agencies, led by the CIA and the FBI, viewed emerging forms of terrorism as secondary security priorities (Korać, 2014: 158). However, although spared from external terrorism, America has a problem with internal terrorism from psychopathological fanatics. The largest attack of this kind was carried out in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 by **Timothy McVeigh** (1968-2001) who placed a bomb at the entrance to a federal building which resulted in the death of 168 people. This act was retaliation for the siege of Mount Carmel (1993), when FBI agents killed 76 members of the Davidians sect and their leader **David Koresh** (1959-1993) (Jenkins, 2019).

In addition, outside US state borders, extreme organizations carry out occasional attacks on its missions and representative offices. Thus, guerrillas of dictator **Mohammed Farah Aidid** (1934-1996) attacked a column of US marines in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, which was protecting the UN humanitarian mission in Somalia, killing 18 soldiers (Wasdin, Templin, 2011), while the biggest terrorist act was executed by members of the Egyptian wing of the "Islamic Jihad" on August 7, 1998 when 224 people were killed in synchronized "truck bomb" attacks on US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Brown, 2018).

Given that terrorist acts were sporadic, the reaction of the international community was also sporadic. It was still unaware of the kind of threat global terrorism posed to civilization, so that, not only, was direct action lacking, but so was prevention. The first concrete step was taken by the Security Council on August 13, 1998. UN Resolution 1183 condemned the bombing and proposed broader cooperation in the fight against terrorism, as well as the apprehension and punishment of the culprits of the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. This resolution was followed by UN Resolutions 1189, 1214, 1267, which condemned the civil war in Afghanistan, the Taliban movement and its leaders, **Osama bin Laden** (1957-2011) and **Ayman al-Zawahiri**, who had (as was established) orchestrated the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salam. It was also assessed that Islamic radicalism was a threat to global peace and security, which ended the matter (Skakavac, Skakavac, 2017).

After the situation in the Balkans had calmed down and UN Resolution 1244 (1999) was adopted, it appeared that all the regions were stable and that all investments were safe, given that the UN, as well as the NATO forces, guaranteed for them. The existing turbulences, in the

Sudan and on the island of Timor in the Malay Archipelago, were far from posing any danger to the New World Order. Civilization awaited the year 2000 fearing only "millennium bugs". However, it soon turned out that the New World Order had its angry opponent in global terrorism, primarily in its radical - religious variant. An immediate reason was needed to settle with it, for direct action to be taken, and the world did not have to wait very long.

5. Conclusion

It is often said that terrorism that escalated during the Cold War period (1965-1985) belongs to the age of traditional terrorism. The emergence of terrorist organizations during this period was, in most cases, a kind of "response" to antagonisms caused by the bipolar division of the globe. Although they differ, both in the ideological as well as the national and religious sense, these organizations have the same, nihilistic, attitude towards all social values and cultural practices, and so consequently they share the methods and, almost the same, goals. From this point of view, almost paradoxically, it seems that the precursors to "global integration" were terrorist organizations who acted in unity (regardless of their specific differences) while the international community was still divided, occupied with its own disputes.

With the end of the Cold War tensions in the early 1990s, terrorism was temporarily forgotten as a form of struggle for the achievement of political goals. It appeared, at that moment, that with the end of the Cold War confrontations, all reasons for the existence of terrorist organizations had ceased to exist. Civilization sincerely hoped that the New World Order and Globalization would bring long-awaited peace and prosperity to humanity. However, it was not to be. The reasons for this are numerous and we cannot list, much less elaborate, on them here. However, the place and role of the United States, in the New World Order, stands out as the only global force that has contributed to new destabilization and polarization through its "ultimatum policy". Such circumstances gave birth to new terrorism launched by countries of the global south. The feeling of discrimination, economic backwardness, national inferiority and religious proselytism have given a new foundation for the revival of terrorism, on a global scale.

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THE URBAN SECURITY THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE CRIMINAL POLICY AND THE CRIME STATISTICS IN MACEDONIA

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Abstract: The urban security is an issue of public interest and is of utmost importance given the fact that the majority of the population lives in the urban areas and in our country it is considered that a great portion of the population spends most of the time living and/or working in the capital of the country no matter the official place of living declared. Therefore, it is of great significance to get knowledge about the crime trends in urban areas as well as to focus on the representation of the property, violent and other specific types of crimes in order to get better picture regarding the security in urban areas.

The authors first refer to the significance of the criminal policy and its main objective of prevention and suppression of crime, especially in the cities. Furthermore, the institutions and mechanisms for achievement of the latter are examined. Given the aforementioned, the study consists of several parts: criminal policy for dealing with crime in urban areas and analysis of relevant legislation regarding the property and other selected is elaborated, second - determination of the crime trends according to several variables about the adult perpetrators and children as an even more important issue to discuss and deal with and presentation of the municipalities according to the number of persons convicted.

In the conclusion, the author's state that a serious problem in urban areas is the property crime and that, unfortunately, although the reported property crime is dominant in the whole crime range, a majority of the cases remains unsolved and this situation threatens urban security even more. Another issue to be dealt with is the increasing violence among children.

Key words: urban security, crime, property, public order.

1. Introduction: urban security and urban crimes

The Urban Security is a broad concept that is associated with a range of human freedoms and rights of the citizens, but also with the so-called "common functions of life" in a society, where safety is *conditio sine qua non*. First, with the globalization, together with the process of migration from village to city, many other processes "migrated" as well. As some criminologists

stated decades ago “the number of crimes decreases as the distance from the large city increases” (Sutherland and Cressey, 1955: 155). Cities are faced with many challenges, namely not only to address classic crime and violence, but also to touch upon the prevention of narcotic drugs use, radicalization, corruption etc.

As a multidimensional concept, urban security is under threat of many factors of a different nature; therefore, in the widest sense of the word in the scope of these factors we can start, for example, with the fact that pollution in cities is an alarming problem (environmental risk factors), the number of road traffic accidents in the city streets is becoming a “burning” issue... all the way to the fact that crime in urban areas is also the first reason for endangering urban security in the narrow sense. Another phenomenon connected to this issue is the so – called fear of crime (feeling unsafe) that rises among the citizens in urban areas, especially in particular areas of the cities (Abdelhalim and Shehayeb, 2011: 65).

According to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, on a global level, two-thirds of the world population will reside in the urban areas – the cities, by 2050 (UNODC: 2019).

Therefore, it is not incorrect to anticipate that the urban crime and urban safety will become even more acute problem.

If one takes a look at the crime statistics about our country²¹, will inevitably conclude that that the most common types of crimes are the crimes against property, the crimes against traffic safety, the crimes against life and body, the crimes against legal traffic and crimes against public order. Many types of violations are also part of the urban security challenge, like the drug abuse, traffic and public order violations, radicalization etc. But in this analysis we will focus on the abovementioned selected types of criminal offences only. As the legal traffic crimes are not typical to the physical security, they are excluded from the analysis.

So, the most common manifestation forms of the urban crime in our country are the property crimes, public traffic crimes and some types of crimes against the body and against the public order.

2. Criminal policy actions for prevention and suppression of urban crimes

The fight against every form of crime, including the above-mentioned, as the most common manifestations of urban crime, is carried out on many levels and from many subjects in one state. The principles on which it is based, and in serious countries that do not leave anything to chance, but carefully plan and create, are in fact the principles of the criminal policy.

There are different definitions of the term of criminal policy. According to some legal theorists, criminal policy is part of the political science, but much of the object of its study passes in the wider criminal law field (Bačić, 1986).

As a legal discipline of the criminal law area, it is considered a science. Its subject consists in the legal methods and means to combat crime; this definition, as one can notice is being very restrictive in nature (Камбовски, 2004: 48).

²¹ Perpetrators of Criminal Offences, Publications of the State Statistical Office, available at: www.stat.gov.mk

According to the lawyers that take theoretical-practical approach, the criminal policy is a "scientifically based activity of society in the prevention and repression of crime, a practice of suppression of crime and effective strategy of fighting against it (Камбовски, 2004: 48). The middle term in this view is the sentencing policy of the courts in the context of the application of sanctions imposed by the legislator in the determined limits. In fact, most of the authors observe criminal policy as "a science that involves not only penalties (repression) as a mean of combating crime, but it includes the general commitment of the society and its institutions in the fight against crime, creating terms and conditions in the foreground for removing the causes, conditions, motives leading to crime, including resocialization and social adaptation of persons who have been subjected to criminal sanctions" (Арнаудовски, 2014: 36).

From the definitions and points of view elaborated above, we can conclude that the criminal policy focuses mainly on two areas: sentencing policy and prevention that can be direct and social (Арнаудовски, 2014: 27).

Main holders of the social prevention role are the following institutions in the society: a) the family, that has principally socializing role, affects the educational and developmental processes in children, but is also modeling the behaviour of other members in its scope (Milutinović, 1984: 335-339); b) the educational institutions - schools, that supplement and continue the educational function of the family; c) the work and workplace; d) the media, (Milutinović, 1984: 443-483); e) the civil society etc. (Деаноска – Трендафилова, 2016).

When it comes to the issue of prevention and repression of the crime in the urban areas, the actors of the criminal policy in our country would be: - the courts, that should not only sanction, but also prevent further crimes by imposing stricter sentences to perpetrators in areas where certain crime is prevailing, - the police, that should discover and also prevent crime, especially certain types that become common in the cities (traffic crimes, for example, crimes against the public order etc.), - the private security sector (especially prevention of property and certain crimes against the body and life), but also schools, families and social services when it comes to children in conflict with the law (Сулeјманов, 2001: 439).

Even UNODC in its Safety Governance Approach points out that in order to make urban environments safe, it is important to address "the multi-causal factors of violence, crime and insecurity".

Citizens are a very important preventive factor in case they are properly and well informed and active. In order an adequate criminal policy to be developed, it is important to obtain information about the trends and types of crime most commonly represented in the urban areas.

3. Short theoretical elaboration of the commonly manifested urban crimes

3.1 Crimes against the property

The group of crimes against the property comprises of criminal acts that signify illegal seizure of others property, rights, or illegal obtaining financial advantage for the perpetrator or for another person. It is a group of crimes known since the beginning of humankind and denotes a "classic crime". It existed in all social formations. Today, it is present in many forms (burglary, theft, robbery, fraud, damage and unauthorized entry into a computer system - com-

puter crime, fraudulent bankruptcy, causing bankruptcy with reckless operation etc. (Деаноска – Трендафилова, 2013). The criminal law with the incrimination of these actions in fact protects the defined property rights as a set of subjective civil rights that belong to the subject in the law. In fact, the criminal law in a great manner stands to the definitions and determinations set up in the civil law (Камбовски and Тупанчески, 2011: 280).

The offences incriminated in Chapter XXIII of the Criminal Code can be classified into several subgroups according to the different criteria, namely: according to the intention of the perpetrator – there are crimes of “greed”, according to the effects on the property - crimes of damaging other’s property or other acts of increasing the property of the perpetrator or third person, according to the object of attack: offenses against property on movable objects and offenses against property in general, property rights and interests (Камбовски and Тупанчески, 2011: 281).

The following are some specific features of these crimes: the intentional forms of the forbidden actions are punishable and the negligent forms are not incriminated. Furthermore, these offences often have special objective on gaining illegally assets. In some cases, if the victim is a member of the family, the procedure is initiated by a private accusation and the public prosecutor is not in charge (See, Art. 263, Macedonian Criminal Code). Several forms and types of property crimes conclude of the element of aggression and violence, like some types of aggravated theft (Art. 236), robbery (Art. 237) and armed robbery (Art. 238) are (See: Macedonian Criminal Code).

The group of offenses against movable property (objects) consists of the following crimes: theft, aggravated theft, robbery, armed robbery, embezzlement, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle etc. The group of offenses against property in general, property rights and interests includes: damaging items, damaging others’ rights, illegal construction, damaging residential and commercial buildings and premises, fraud, computer fraud, consumers fraud, insurance fraud, fraudulent bankruptcy, extortion, concealment etc. Regarding the crimes against movable objects, the theory of apprehension is accepted in the Macedonian legislation. Explicitly, the theft is considered perpetrated when the factual possession is interrupted and new possession established (Камбовски and Тупанчески, 2011: 284).

The group of offences against the property in general, the property rights and interests protects not only the movable objects, but the real estate, too. Crimes sui generis in this chapter are the computer incriminations, such as the damaging and unauthorized ingoing computer system, preparation and insertion of computer viruses, computer fraud etc. These crimes have complex object of protection and therefore, constitute a special subgroup within the property offences chapter (Deanoska – Trendafilova, 2013).

3.2 Crimes against the safety of public traffic

In this group of criminal acts (Chapter XXVII), the activities are criminalized in the field of traffic as a typical social sphere of danger. With the increase in the number of traffic participants, there is a growing risk for their safety (Камбовски and Тупанчески, 2011: 395). These

crimes are similar to the crimes from the chapter of crimes against the general safety of people and property, and their main difference is that in the second group, the danger it is much larger and wider in scope and intensity. The sphere of traffic, in our country, is regulated in many different laws.

The group of traffic crimes includes the following offences: acts against the safety of people and property in the traffic and acts against air traffic safety, or more specifically: endangering the safety of traffic (Art. 297), jeopardizing the safety of traffic with dangerous action or means (Art. 298), misconduct in traffic supervision (Art. 299), failure to provide assistance to a person injured in a traffic accident (Art. 301), abduction of an aircraft or ship (art.302) etc.

The act of endangering of traffic safety incriminated in Art. 297 of the Criminal Code is the most common offense in our case law from this chapter, especially through the form of paragraph 1 of this article, which covers the road traffic and its constitutive element is the endangerment of public traffic. In order this crime to take place it is necessary that the so-called objective condition of incrimination is fulfilled, that is, as a consequence, a person to be physically injured or a significant property damage to occur (See: Macedonian Criminal Code, Art. 297, para 1).

3.3. Crimes against life and body

These acts constitute the first group of criminal offences in the systematics of the Special Part of the Criminal Code (Chapter XIV) and the object of protection by these incriminations is the highest legal good and value, which are life and the integrity of the body.

According to the criterion for the closer object of protection and the type of the attack (injury or endangerment), we can divide the crimes from this chapter into several subgroups: crimes of deprivation of life (all types of murders and homicides), crimes of destruction of future life (foetus) – illegal abortion and forced sterilization, crimes of bodily injury, crimes of endangerment and crimes of abandonment (rejection).

Due to the representation in practice, from this group of criminal acts, the analysis will further include the acts of bodily harm, as well as the crime of participation in a fight as a crime of endangering.

There are two basic forms of endangerment and harm of the bodily integrity. The bodily injury referred to in Art. 130 of the Criminal Code that sanctions the less serious form of injury and health harm, and the severe bodily injury referred to in Art. 131 of the Criminal Code representing the more serious and specific threats and harms of bodily integrity and even of life (ordinary severe bodily injury, particular injury inflicted on the body, affliction (causing scars) etc. The bodily injuries are accompanied by physical and mental pain, decrease of life functions, damage to health, etc.

The participation in fight incriminated in Art. 132 is an offence of abstract endangering resulting in death or bodily injury of a person who is part of the fight (Камбовски and Тупанчески, 2011: 79).

3.4. Crimes against the public order

This group of crimes is covered by the Chapter XXXIII of the Criminal Code and its generic object of protection is the public order which in a wider sense is identified with the social and legal order, while strictly sensu it equates with the safety of the citizens and their sense of peace and non-threat (Камбовски and Тупанчески, 2011: 542). Given the broad and generally abstract object of protection in this chapter we can find crimes that are so different that it is sometimes difficult to find a solid connection between them.

According to the internal systematics, these crimes are clustered in the following groups: crimes against the activities of officials while performing official duties, crimes opposed to public order and peace and public security in the narrow sense and other acts against the public order. This group includes: preventing an official from performing an official duty, attacking an official while performing security duty, participating in a crowd that will prevent an official from performing official duties, violence, organizing resistance, autocracy, self-government, criminal association, terrorism etc.(Камбовски and Тупанчески, 2011: 542-550).

One of the more common crimes from this chapter, especially when it comes to children in urban areas, and especially in schools, is the act of violence as a typical delict of bullying (as violent behaviour). The offence encompasses several forms with regard to the action of the perpetration, while the consequence of the crime is the causing of uncertainty and fear in the public (See: Macedonian Criminal Code, Art. 386).

The crime trends are extremely relevant to follow for determination of the adequate criminal policy, and particularly, for the future sentencing policy.

As already highlighted, several categories of crimes dominate in the official statistics, with significant variations being noted in the different phases through which a criminal process passes, in the broader sense of the word.

Namely, if we take into account the figures of the reported, accused and convicted persons, we will undoubtedly notice the significant share of the property crimes.

4.1 Adults

The following table shows the figures for reported, convicted and convicted persons for the total crime, versus the property crime for a period of ten years.

Table 1. Number of reported, accused and convicted perpetrators for the general versus property crime in the period 2008-2017²²

	Reported Total/ property crime	Accused Total/ property crime	Convicted Total/ property crime
2008	26409/ 16207 (61,3%)	11310/ 4249 (37,5%)	9503/ 3770 (39,6%)
2009	30404/ 20205 (66%)	11905/ 4515 (37,9%)	9801/ 3952 (40,3%)

²² Source: State Statistical Office, Perpetrators of Criminal Offences, (Publications for the period 2008 – 2017), available at: www.stat.gov.mk

2010	30004/ 19846 (66%)	11239/ 4210 (37,4%)	9169/ 3612 (39,4%)
2011	31284/21956 (70%)	12219/ 4501 (36,8%)	9810/ 3850 (39,2%)
2012	31860/ 22292 (69,9%)	11311/4263 (37,6%)	9042/ 3652 (40,4%)
2013	34436/24595 (71,4%)	12279/4822 (39,2%)	9539/4073 (42,6%)
2014	37164/25745 (69,2%)	13699/4585 (33,4%)	11683/3965 (33,9%)
2015	26069/15856 (60,8%)	11951/4863 (40,7%)	10312/4296 (41,6%)
2016	20502/12262 (59,8%)	9320/3745 (40,2%)	8172/3370 (41,2%)
2017	20582/12816 (62,2%)	7423/2745 (36,9%)	6273/2427 (38,7%)

From the data in the table above, it can be concluded that the property crime is significantly dominant in the total number of crimes reported during one year in the Republic of North Macedonia, that is, from the lowest 59.8% of the share of the property in the total reported crime, to surprisingly high 71,4%. Hence, it can be concluded that the movable property and the property rights of citizens in our country are among the most endangered.

The share of crime is not at all negligible when viewed through the prism of accused and convicted perpetrators. About 37% to 40% of the total number of defendants are also charged with property offenses, and about 39.7% of the total number of convicted persons committed a criminal act against the property when it comes to the number of convicted persons.

As public traffic crimes are second on the list of most committed types of crimes, the comparison is made between the figures for the total crime versus the public traffic crimes in the table below.

Table 2. Number of reported, accused and convicted perpetrators for the general versus public traffic crime in the period 2008-2017²³

	Reported Total/public traffic	Accused Total/public traffic	Convicted Total/public traffic
2008	26409/3167 (11,9%)	11310/1998 (17,6%)	9503/1885 (19,8%)
2009	30404/3064 (10%)	11905/2030 (17%)	9801/1903 (19,4%)
2010	30004/2834 (9,4%)	11239/1878 (16,7%)	9169/1764 (19,2%)
2011	31284/2898 (9,2%)	12219/1901 (15,5%)	9810/1770 (18%)
2012	31860/2846 (8,9%)	11311/1724 (15,2%)	9042/1595 (17,6%)
2013	34436/2882 (8,3%)	12279/1839 (14,9%)	9539/1670 (17,5%)
2014	37164/2849 (7,6%)	13699/1858 (13,5%)	11683/1708 (14,6%)
2015	26069/2710 (10,4%)	11951/1538 (12,8%)	10312/1432 (13,8%)
2016	20502/2679 (13%)	9320/1373 (14,7%)	8172/1322 (16,1%)
2017	20582/2628 (12,7%)	7423/1215 (16,3%)	6273/1165 (18,5%)

²³ Ibid.

About 10% of the total reported crime falls out to the crimes against public traffic. The share in the numbers of accused for this type of crime is on average 15,4% and regarding convicted persons 17,4% of them are convicted for public traffic crimes. Having into consideration that the traffic violations are very high in the cities, we can conclude that the public traffic remains to be a great danger for the urban security.

Table 3. Number of reported, accused and convicted perpetrators for the general versus crime against life and body in the period 2008-2017²⁴

	Reported Total/life and body	Accused Total/life and body	Convicted Total /life and body
2008	26409/982 (3,7%)	11310/1182 (10,4%)	9503/835 (8,7%)
2009	30404/937 (3%)	11905/1306 (10,9%)	9801/905 (9,2%)
2010	30004/982 (3,2%)	11239/1278 (11,3%)	9169/872 (9,5%)
2011	31284/1024 (3,2%)	12219/1385 (11,3%)	9810/945 (9,6%)
2012	31860/1122 (3,5%)	11311/1311 (11,6%)	9042/881 (9,7%)
2013	34436/943 (2,7%)	12279/1505 (12,2%)	9539/920 (9,6%)
2014	37164/1006 (2,7%)	13699/1412 (10,3%)	11683/924 (7,9%)
2015	26069/939 (3,6%)	11951/1182 (9,9%)	10312/790 (7,6%)
2016	20502/898 (4,3%)	9320/1079 (11,5%)	8172/761 (9,3%)
2017	20582/796 (3,8%)	7423/1087 (14,6%)	6273/664 (10,5%)

The crimes against life and body are generally on the third place, but far beyond the property crimes and public traffic crimes figures. About less than 3% is their part in the total reported crime, but this percent is higher when it applies to the accused and convicted persons – 11,4% and 9,1% respectively.

In the following table we can see how the crime trends regarding the public order crimes manifest.

Table 4. Number of reported, accused and convicted perpetrators for the general versus crime against public order in the period 2008-2017²⁵

	Reported Total/public order	Accused Total/public order	Convicted Total/public order
2008	26409/861 (3,2%)	11310/608 (5,3%)	9503/537 (5,6%)
2009	30404/953 (3,1%)	11905/705 (5,9%)	9801/592 (6%)
2010	30004/959 (3,1%)	11239/638 (5,6%)	9169/535 (5,8%)
2011	31284/869 (2,7%)	12219/775 (6,3%)	9810/665 (6,7%)

²⁴ Ibid.


²⁵ Ibid.

2012	31860/1075 (3,3%)	11311/691 (6,1%)	9042/601 (6,6%)
2013	34436/1153 (3,3%)	12279/758 (6,1%)	9539/622 (6,5%)
2014	37164/994 (2,6%)	13699/1033 (7,5%)	11683/931 (7,9%)
2015	26069/909 (3,4%)	11951/916 (7,6%)	10312/821 (7,9%)
2016	20502/629 (3%)	9320/738 (7,9%)	8172/653 (8%)
2017	20582/656 (3,1%)	7423/458 (6,1%)	6273/401 (6,3%)

From the data presented above, one can conclude that the portion of public order crimes regarding all three criteria is not big, namely it presents about 3% in respect of the reported, about 6,4% in case of accused persons and averagely 6,7% of the convicted adults perpetrated a crime against public order.

To conclude, from the figures presented in the four tables above, it is evident that the crime trends of the respective groups of offences as well as the general crime is decreasing. There are some slight fluctuations in the ten years period in some points, but the fall of the crime figures is more than obvious. Furthermore, we can also summarize that about 76% of the reported crimes in the period from 2008 to 2017 consist of the four types of crime covered with this analysis. These offences also constitute about 72% of the accused persons and about 73% of the total number of the perpetrators convicted and it is the number of convicted that is the official and relevant for the crime analysis.

Chart 1. Convicted perpetrators 2008-2017



In the following tables we will elaborate on the data about the convicted perpetrators for selected (most common) property crimes and those are: theft, aggravated theft, robbery, armed robbery and theft of electricity, heat energy or natural gas.

Table 5. Convicted adults for the most common property crimes in the period 2013-2017²⁶

	Convicted (property crimes) total	Theft	Aggravated Theft	Robbery	Armed robbery	Theft of electricity, heat energy or natural gas
2013	4073	1331	1845	119	19	/
2014	3965	1112	1634	147	17	232
2015	4296	1197	1687	99	18	411
2016	3370	799	1027	60	7	845
2017	2427	495	699	39	8	627

From the available statistic data, it is apparent that the crime trends are decreasing, but what is more important is that the different types of theft constitute about 75% of the total number of convicted for all the property crimes. This means that the risk to every citizen to be a victim of theft is very high.

In respect to the other types of crimes elaborated, we can emphasize that the bodily injuries are the most common of the acts against life and body, the violence is also very represented among the crimes against the public order, but on the second place just below the thefts is the endangering traffic safety as a public traffic crime. Traffic violations and crimes also remain one of the biggest threats to life for the citizens, especially in urban areas.

Table 6. Convicted adults for selected crimes against the life and body, public order and traffic safety in the period 2013-2017²⁷

Year	Bodily Injury	Aggravated b. injury	Threatening with a dangerous instrument during a brawl or a quarrel	Fight participation	Violence	Endangering traffic safety
2013	559	189	94	50	190	1662
2014	526	211	103	49	321	1700
2015	474	169	72	40	275	1421
2016	487	145	57	39	232	1313
2017	423	137	58	24	146	1159

The crime trends are also decreasing in these specific criminal offences.

²⁶ Source: State Statistical Office, Perpetrators of Criminal Offences, (All publications for the period 2013 – 2017), available at: www.stat.gov.mk

²⁷ Ibid.

5.2 Children

Children, unfortunately, very often come in conflict with the law and commit actions that represent crimes. It is considered that this is caused mainly by the lack of care and education provided to the child by the family, school, and society (Kажзep, 1996: 285). Therefore, the sanctions provided by the law for children are mainly of protective and educational character (Марјановиќ and Каневчев, 2010: 412). In the following table we will present the data about the general crime taking into consideration the numbers of reported, accused and convicted children.

Table 7. Total crime – Children: reported, accused and convicted perpetrators in the period 2008-2017

	Reported	Accused	Convicted
2008	1355	981	715
2009	1519	1030	748
2010	1244	750	547
2011	1163	1002	722
2012	1001	778	556
2013	1005	657	473
2014	972	712	461
2015	772	456	348
2016	587	702	468
2017	578	554	368

In respect to the crime in total, we can conclude that generally in all categories for children the trends are going downwards. But if we take a deeper look at the statistical data, we can notice that in certain cases, the developments are different. Therefore, let us take a look at the following two tables.

Table 8. Children – convicted for property crimes in the period 2013-2017²⁸

Year	Convicted for property crimes (total)	Theft	Aggravated Theft	Robbery	Armed robbery
2013	353	56	247	25	/
2014	267	35	183	23	1
2015	198	45	112	18	/
2016	257	31	163	38	2
2017	251	46	165	26	2

²⁸ Ibid.

Table 9. Children – convicted for selected crimes against the life and body, public order and traffic safety in the period 2013-2017

Year	Bodily Injury	Aggravated bodily injury	Threatening with a dangerous instrument during a brawl or a quarrel	Fight participation	Violence	Endangering traffic safety
2013	15	14	3	6	16	24
2014	14	20	/	6	66	14
2015	20	7	1	11	37	28
2016	20	21	5	22	74	22
2017	17	5	2	2	26	32

When it comes to property crimes, they are declining in numbers, but big fluctuations (rises and falls) can be seen in the cases of aggravated bodily injury, participation in fight and violence. Also, there is an increasing trend when it comes to public traffic crimes. This is an alarming issue seeking special attention by the competent institutions.

5. Macedonian Geography of Crime

It is a commonly known fact that the majority of the population in Republic of North Macedonia lives in the urban areas – the cities, especially emphasizing the fact that a large portion of the Macedonian population is concentrated in the capital city of Skopje.

As according to the data presented in the publications of the State Statistics Office, the municipalities that constitute the list of top six where most of the perpetrators have committed crimes (excluding the city of Skopje and its 10 municipalities) in the period of 2013 – 2017 are as follows:

Table 10. Municipalities and crime in 2013²⁹

	Municipality	Number of perpetrators (adults)		Number of perpetrators (children)
1.	Tetovo	836	Tetovo	69
2.	Strumica	539	Veles	31
3.	Stip	423	Kavadarci	19
4.	Veles	409	Kocani	19
5.	Ohrid	339	Strumica	19
6.	Prilep	338	Stip	19

²⁹ Source: State Statistical Office (2014), Perpetrators of Criminal Offences in 2013, Skopje

Table 11. Municipalities and crime in 2014³⁰

	Municipality	Number of perpetrators (adults)		Number of perpetrators (children)
1.	Strumica	674	Kumanovo	107
2.	Veles	668	Kriva Palanka	69
3.	Tetovo	610	Tetovo	49
4.	Stip	530	Bitola	30
5.	Gevgelija	473	Strumica	20
6.	Prilep	417	Kocani	20

Table 12. Municipalities and crime in 2015³¹

	Municipality	Number of perpetrators (adults)		Number of perpetrators (children)
1.	Prilep	781	Gostivar	38
2.	Tetovo	423	Prilep	32
3.	Stip	385	Kavadarci	24
4.	Ohrid	363	Kicevo	18
5.	Strumica	330	Negotino	16
6.	Veles	317	Kocani	13

Table 13. Municipalities and crime in 2016³²

	Municipality	Number of perpetrators (adults)		Number of perpetrators (children)
1.	Tetovo	571	Veles	16
2.	Prilep	553	Stip	14
3.	Stip	466	Tetovo	14
4.	Ohrid	362	Sveti Nikole	13
5.	Bitola	294	Gostivar	12
6.	Strumica	290	Ohrid	12

³⁰ Source: State Statistical Office (2015), Perpetrators of Criminal Offences in 2014, Skopje

³¹ Source: State Statistical Office (2016), Perpetrators of Criminal Offences in 2015, Skopje

³² Source: State Statistical Office (2017), Perpetrators of Criminal Offences in 2016, Skopje

Table 14. Municipalities and crime in 2017³³

	Municipality	Number of perpetrators (adults)		Number of perpetrators (children)
1.	Prilep	448	Gostivar	50
2.	Tetovo	435	Tetovo	36
3.	Stip	371	Stip	22
4.	Bitola	314	Kicevo	15
5.	Veles	289	Debar	11
6.	Strumica	288	Zelino	11

From the tables and data presented within them, we can conclude that in the period of five years covered with the analysis, the municipalities of Prilep, Tetovo, Stip, Bitola, Veles, Strumica, Ohrid, and Gevgelija, namely eight Macedonian cities are the territories where most of the crimes are perpetrated by adults. In respect of children, several more (mainly urban areas) represent the group of highest child-crime municipalities.

Skopje and its municipalities are excluded from this part of data analysis.

But when it comes to Skopje as a capital of the country, we can see that according to the fact that it is the biggest city, it is also known for having the higher crime numbers.

Table 15. City of Skopje – Perpetrators – Adults and Children³⁴

	Skopje (10 municipalities total) Adults/Children	Municipality with highest numbers of crime Adults/Children
2013	3098/154	Centar 1838/33
2014	3280/482	Centar 1876/116
2015	2329/77	Centar 881/25
2016	2577/ 280	Centar 2054/73
2017	1193/130	Centar – 1010 /32

The city of Skopje territory, consisting of ten municipalities, as we said, remains to be the largest urban area and consequently with highest numbers of crimes committed annually. As we can note, the trend is generally decreasing (with mild fluctuations) with highest fall of the numbers spotted from 2016 to 2017 where the drop is more than 50%. The same applies to the trends of crime regarding children, where fluctuations are stricter.

³³ Source: State Statistical Office (2018), Perpetrators of Criminal Offences in 2017, Skopje

³⁴ Source: State Statistical Office, Perpetrators of Criminal Offences (All Publications for the period of 2013 – 2017), available at: www.stat.gov.mk

The municipality of Centar among the ten Skopje municipalities is leading by the number of perpetrators of crimes on its territory both regarding adults and children and the generally decreasing trend is noticed here as well.

6. Conclusions

From the overall analysis it can be concluded that in our country the crime is predominantly performed in the urban areas. This is largely due to the fact that the population in the rural areas generally decreases, and consequently the crime also “moves” into the cities.

What is most characteristic of the crime of an urban environment is that, on a daily basis, citizens face thefts, traffic accidents and certain types of violent crime such as acts of participation in a fight, violence in general, inflicting bodily injuries, etc.

Hence, the most common types of these crimes were taken into account in the analysis and their trends were presented for a period of five or ten years. It must be emphasized that although certain crimes against the safety of public traffic, against public order and against life and body make the “list” of the most common crimes, still far above them are criminal acts against property that are characterized by impressive figures. Namely, up to 70% of the reported crime annually in our country has a property crime character (with the theft in all its forms being most prevalent). And in the total number of convicted persons, the property crime has a significant share, namely almost 40% of the convicted persons, committed a crime against the property.

But the following question arises: where the number of almost 70% (in the part of reported property crime cases) melts up to 40% in the part of the convicted persons? If we look at the available data according to other indicators, we will notice that the perpetrators of a large number of reported property crimes have remained unknown, and consequently, the following phases of the criminal prosecution have not been realized.

It is also worrisome that the figures referring to traffic offenses are very high. Let us emphasize here that we do not refer to traffic violations, but to crimes which represent a higher degree of wrongdoing. The most common is the criminal act of endangering traffic safety, an offence where the objective condition for incrimination is the existence of a bodily injury to a person or causing significant material damage.

Subjects of analysis were also certain crimes against life and body (i.e. body injuries and participation in a fight as more relevant and more common in practice) and the crime of violence as a crime against the public order. What is upsetting is that violence as a criminal offense in the cases where children are perpetrators (in times of a global downward trend of general crime) is increasing every year.

From the above, it follows that the different actors who have competencies in the direction of providing greater security and safety for the citizens, should undertake concrete and appropriate criminal-political measures, whether it be prevention or sanctioning.

Namely, in the area of traffic crime, the role of the police in the preventive sense, as well as role of the courts (judicial sentencing policy), in the part of the sanctioning of such crimes,

is crucial. Although the aforementioned can be generally applied for property crimes as well, however, due to the fact that many of the perpetrators of property crimes, primarily heavy thefts and burglaries, remain unknown, the most appropriate method for dealing with this type of crime seems to be prevention. Moreover, due to the limited capacities of the police in terms of personnel, the role of the private security is intensified in this domain. Private security is an important foundation of human and other resources that can contribute to the protection of the homes of the citizens and the property in general.

As to the problem of violence in children, a new system for addressing it is needed. The role of the family and school, as is often stated in literature, is vital, but unfortunately, in practice, the effects are not sufficiently visible in our country. Therefore, additional research and identification of good practices from other countries is needed in order to create a model for a different approach.

Finally, the analysis shows that in each of the years covered by the analysis, the largest cities are at the top of the list of municipalities according to the number of committed crimes. Namely, only one rural municipality, and only in one year, appears on the respective lists when it comes to the municipalities outside of Skopje, while when it comes to the ten Skopje municipalities, on the top of the list is always the municipality of Centar with the highest number of perpetrators on its territory.

So, the property crime and major cities (urban areas) are the two main determinants on which the criminal policy should be built in the coming period. This process covers various institutions in the society such as the police, the primary and secondary schools, the family as a basic social cell, but also the social services in respect to prevention, while the courts with their sentencing policy can seriously attribute to the fight against the urban crime, especially considering the fact that one of the aggravating circumstances taken into consideration in the process of determination of the sentence is the frequency of a certain type of crime in a particular territory.

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NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN FUNCTION OF SECURING “LIGHT” URBAN TARGETS

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Abstract: The optimal level of security in every society, among other things, undoubtedly depends on advanced technologies, which basically represent one of the main pillars of the overall security system. Their implementation in creating developmental security policies, both in the state and private security sectors, becomes even more dominant, especially in the last few years, when the targets of the terrorist attacks are so-called “Light” urban targets. If we consider the complexity of the urban terrorism, but especially its unpredictability from an operational point of view, it is undoubtedly that the technical security will be the key to preventive anti-terrorist protection.

The fact is that we are living in a time of very rapid technological development, where modern technologies are fast developed and upgraded on a daily basis. In this context, we need to be fully focused on their application in the function of finding appropriate solutions for specific security issues, especially when it comes to urban terrorism. The ultimate goal is timely, efficient, safe and professional action in any eventual emergency.

For these reasons, this document’s aim is to demonstrate the need of continuous introduction and implementation of new technological advances in security systems and their complementarities with other security methods. At the same time, the aim is also to present several modern solutions that are used in technically more developed countries, or in certain critical infrastructures, where the need for permanent monitoring and use of technical solutions is obligatory.

Key words: terrorism, technical security, easy targets, advanced technologies

Urban targets as a reality of today

The statistics show that the trend of attacks on “light” urban targets is steadily increasing. The specific form of threat to relatively open targets for attack primarily because of their easy

accessibility and concentration of people to a certain space at a certain time makes this problem very complex.

The use of modern weapons, advanced technologies on the one hand and the more frequent use of low-tech means of attack in the form of improvised explosive devices, various handheld and easily accessible items, vehicles, assets, substances etc. with simple tactics and less sophisticated attacks on the other hand, makes this security problem quite complicated.

According to the special euro-barometer "European attitudes towards security" published in December 2017, security and especially terrorism, are at the brink of concern, with a significant drop in the percentage of respondents who think that the EU is a safe place to live³⁵. Therefore, a more exploited topic is the creation of new European policies aimed as an existential need protecting vulnerable public places. The attacks in Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, London, Manchester, Nice and Stockholm, where as a subject of a terrorist attack were used the weaknesses of those "light" targets³⁶ also imposed an active involvement of the Union through action plans for support in the protection of public spaces.

If we look again at the economically dependent countries of tourism through the prism of the need of adequate security, we will see that tourism as a global phenomenon is an important source of income for many regions of the world, which represent a driving force for national economies. While tourism manifestations that are basically "light" urban targets are an important element in attracting tourists and also are an integral part of tourist offers. However, the manifestations have other important roles, ranging from the cultural development of the community to the display of the national identity, etc. It should be noted that manifestations most often contribute to the development of tourism at the specified destination and influence the growth of the overall competitiveness of the destination³⁷. Consequently, natural beauties, cultural and historical sites and cultural manifestations, as parts of the main drivers of the development of tourism are looking for an adequate protection.

The negative security impact on any segment of the tourist offer can cause serious consequences. This means that it is necessary to find a balance between improving security and maintaining openness in public areas, even though the risk will never be completely eliminated. As an example characteristic of RSM, we will mention the Ohrid Summer Festival, which basically represents the most important cultural event held in several locations in the city, part held on the open stage and part in important cultural and historical monuments. This event is often visited by senior state officials, but it is characteristic that there is often high attendance and concentration of visitors. The Ohrid Summer Festival generally represents a symbol of the city of Ohrid and is a tourist brand that undoubtedly needs to be fully protected. From here one of the goals of this paper is to emphasize the need for adequate protection of all "light" urban targets, including tourist events that are exposed to phenomena that endanger the safety and

³⁵ <https://efus.eu/en/topics/%AActivity%25/16622/>

³⁶ European commission Bruxelles, 18.10.2017. COM(2017) 612 final

³⁷ Nevena Ćurčić, Željko Bjeljac, Aleksandra Terzić, BEZBEDNOST TURISTA I POSETILACA NA MANIFESTACIJAMA U URBANIM SREDINAMA

security of visitors in general, also in this paper will be offered some technical solutions in order to increase the level of security.

The fact is that reducing the risk of attacks on “light” urban targets and reducing the impact of attacks is a shared mission among many stakeholders, including state and local governments, the general public, owners and operators, and all security capabilities³⁸.

This imposes the need for even greater cooperation between the public and the private sector in order to improve the safety of vulnerable locations such as transport centers, pedestrian zones, tourist sites, shopping centers, religious buildings, concert gardens, squares, parks, restaurants, sports facilities, etc³⁹. Recent terrorist attacks have shown the need to share best practices and useful solutions to improve the protection of public areas, including the implementation of advanced technologies in the function of finding appropriate solutions to specific security issues, especially when it comes to urban terrorism. However, with the operational measures of states and professionals, measures for detecting threats will be improved, the sensitivity of public spaces will be improved, cooperation between all stakeholders in the security system will be improved and the consequences of possible attacks will be properly managed⁴⁰.

Need for continued security

Past experience has shown a compulsory need for security, as a factor for the smooth running of life needs, while events from the present have a direct impact on the creation of certain security systems and procedures that are continually improving and complementing.

One of the primary goals in everyday life is certainly the need for security. Traditional ways of security are increasingly suppressed by the pronounced threats. Physical, operatively technical and cyber security are becoming increasingly dominant in terms of secure people, facilities, events, critical infrastructures and data. The new types of threats first of all require organization of security for 24 hours every day without exception, with the inclusion of advanced security systems which follow the technology and the achievements of public closed facilities or open spaces.

The securing of facilities (property) means a coordinated activity of authorized persons and security agencies that, together with technical means of surveillance and detection, mechanical means of interference and other means of coercion, undertake actions in order to prevent unauthorized access to the protected object, detection, neutralization of criminal activity and other types of threats, protection of people working in it, objects and documentation, and maintenance of public order and peace⁴¹. The functions of the security domain are generally delegated by the respective ministries through legal binding guidelines. In some cases, security

³⁸ https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-Soft-Target-Crowded-Place-Security-Plan-Overview-052018-508_0.pdf

³⁹ https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0424_cisa_soft-targets-and-crowded-places-resource-guide.pdf

⁴⁰ European commission Bruxelles, 18.10.2017. COM(2017) 612 final

⁴¹ Security-Practicum 2004-3. Dorevski p.151

competencies may overlap by two or more entities, which in some way constitutes an increase in security, but only with the condition of good coordination of security institutions. But in spite of the division and / or overlap of security matters, only one authority needs to be the carrier of both the activities and the possible liability.

Certainly, the wide range of risks and threats that follow the public facilities, undoubtedly requires one particular systemic approach in the direction of collecting and exchanging information and a more intense action of intelligence activities. The security concept is first determined on the basis of risk assessments, then the areas of protection are developed through an access control system, physical, operational and technical technological measures. In order to protect all parts of the infrastructure, and above all the most vulnerable parts, requires the implementation of standard operating procedures, equipment, means and human resources.

Based on the already defined security needs, including the critical parts of the facilities, it is necessary to provide physical and psychological methods and security techniques, through the system, which consists of achieving 4 effects: deterrence, delay, detection and rapid response.

The threat of terrorism is one of the most disturbing aspects of modern life. Defined acts of terrorism as well as goals, the huge number of potentially dangerous items, including firearms, IEDs, toxic chemicals, highly flammable substances and other threatening objects require a high level of commitment of the human factor and material resources to trace it, ie , to discover the danger that threatens the designated protection zone.

The general measures on which is based the security of the object that is actually a subject to protection can be grouped into:

- Building urban measures, which include the architectural characteristics of the facility, arrangement of the surrounding terrain, functionality of individual units and the required security needs,
- Organizational measures, which cover the organization of security services, staff deployment, training and improvement, etc.
- Operational measures, which cover the organization and collection of information, surveillance of protected areas and the use of repressive practices; and
- Technical measures, which include the use of means and devices for detection, identification and signalization of adverse events.⁴²
- More specific factors affecting the applicability and implementation of the above mentioned protection measures are:
 - The macro and micro location of the object,
 - The type, meaning and value of the content in the object,
 - The activities that are performed, the organization of work, the technological processes that are performed in the objects that are subject of protection,
 - The possibilities and forms of communication and movement in and around objects,
 - Climatic characteristics and macro location of objects, etc⁴³.

⁴² Milan Bagojevik- Alarm systems Faculty of Occupational Safety and Health-Nis 2011 p.203

⁴³ Milan Bagojevik- Alarm systems Faculty of Occupational Safety and Health-Nis 2011 p.203

The security system should be able to hinder, deter, discover, redirect, retain, for offenders of criminal acts and it can be realized through: physical, electronic technical, mechanical security, preventive security.⁴⁴

Physical security represents the securing of persons (life, physical integrity) that is performed for their personal protection and securing property from access of uninvited persons, destruction, damage, unlawful seizure and other forms of harmful actions, carried out by security personnel.⁴⁵ Mechanical security is founded on the installation of physical barriers, rails ramps, for interference, diversion and control of the approaches and movement in secured objects and premises. It is also a prerequisite for the functioning of technical protection, alarm systems and access control systems⁴⁶. Electronic technical protection and CCTV -Technical security is performed using technical means and devices in order to prevent illegal actions directed at persons and property. While anti-diversion protection is an activity that deals with the study, planning and implementation of organizational and technical security measures (which foresee the application of a number of technologies) in order to protect persons and objects that can be targeted by terrorist and various raiding activities and represent a special approach in the fight against terrorism. During the anti-diversion inspections, it is necessary to use several devices for detecting the initial lighters, explosives, dangerous goods of the range of toxic, ionized, flammable materials including the equipment and devices for handling suspicious objects (de-activation, neutralization, etc.).

Considering the fact that "light" urban targets represent target of acts of unlawful action and endangering of various forms, the strong motivation of the security personnel, as well as the utmost conscientious and professional performance of the work tasks, are an essential element for successful and professional performance of this very responsible task.

All this also applies to urban "light" targets:

- Creation of adequate security conditions for smooth functioning of the company,
- Ensuring adequate protection of public spaces and their capacities;
- Ensuring the protection of facilities, devices and installations of importance of the state;
- Enabling the undertaking of additional measures and activities in situations of increased threat and emergency situations.

Security and apply of advanced security equipment to protect "'light' "urban targets

There are a number of equipment and devices used for the purpose of providing "light" urban targets, but it is necessary to ensure that it is used and complies with the specifications required in the domestic and international regulations as well as the ability and the sensitivity

⁴⁴ Z.Dorevski, Security-Practicum 2004 Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for Security of Persons and Property - Skopje, p. 120

⁴⁵ Law on Private Security Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 166 of 2012

⁴⁶ Z.Dorevski, Security-Practicum 2004 Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for Security of Persons and Property - Skopje, p. 120

of the equipment to detect prohibited items, depending on the objects, the space, the activities and the working conditions.

Many hazardous substances are used in everyday life (the economy, medicine, chemical industry, etc.). Also, the hazardous properties of certain substances are controlled and used in areas where there is no completely safe.

The fact that such dangerous substances can very easily be found in the hands of criminal or terrorist structures is more than plausible. The impact then can be multiple on both living organisms and material goods, and this can be done directly, indirectly or in combination. The dangerous action depends on the type of dangerous substance and purpose. Dangerous substances and sabotage terrorist acts are closely linked, because dangerous substances are heavily used for the execution of sabotage terrorist acts. When a dangerous act of dangerous march is directed towards the deliberate demolition or burning of certain objects, the poisoning or destruction of humans, animal and plant life, then it is a deliberately performed dangerous activity which is a diversionary terrorist act.⁴⁷

An important segment in determining security is the definition of preventive security measures in the protected area. Here a special place take the definition of the security zones of movement, movement control, access and surveillance of persons and vehicles, definition of critical zones, identification cards (badges), lighting, security barriers - perimeter fence, security forces, as well as the implementation of advanced systems and work procedures, documents required for entry, checking employees and visitors from the aspect of their criminal past, etc.

The development of technology has undoubtedly contributed to the sophistication of new models of security devices, which help identify certain illicit substances or objects that impair safety of "light" urban targets.

Scanning with the help of X-ray technology is a testing process that requires a high level of commitment of the human factor and material resources to find the danger in the huge number of analyzed cases. Scanners used for control have common properties, to help to decide whether to bring in the baggage, bags, and items in the controlled zones of the protected zone. Security scanners and all the equipment used must be complementary to the human factor, who should be professionally trained and highly motivated. The finding of dangerous materials is very complicated because the spectrum of contents in baggage, bags and items that are controlled is very wide, and the problem of locating hand-made explosive devices is complex due to the similarity of substances, specific density, etc.⁴⁸. Therefore, the X-ray systems are constantly improving and allow scan with detailed information on the composition and contents of the baggage, bags and objects with a high number of details.⁴⁹

The latest technology systems include the detection of explosives, narcotics, weapons, and other prohibited items and substances. There is a wide range of systems with a wide range of di-

⁴⁷ Group of Authors: Fundamentals of Anti-Dissertation Protection, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia - Security Institute, Belgrade 1998

⁴⁸ <http://www.x-rayscreener.com>,15.05.2015

⁴⁹ <http://www.x-rayscreener.com>,15.05.2015

mensions and performance, including systems that analyze fluids and determine their chemical composition, in order to determine whether it is for threat or not.

Here we should mention ST (computer tomography), a technology that provides 3D picture and high resolution. A huge number of airports and other critical infrastructures use technologies that provide high security control and full scanning. In order to increase security, the need for the implementation of ST technologies is increasingly imposed. The system tests the unique density of a substance when electromagnetic radiation passes through it.

The mathematical algorithms that are programmed in the system software build a 3D image of each object. Information can be presented on the display, using a tomography of each subject that provides a 360 degree view of the subject⁵⁰.



Security services carry out a survey of persons using metal detector doors, handheld metal detectors and manually. All persons not depended on the facility, and when it comes to an increased level of threat based on the risk assessment, it is necessary to carry out control with detectors. The development of technology that has been observed in recent years, and on the basis of the needs of more and more protection, there are additional innovative detection systems even to the smallest objects that threaten and possess the person. Also often used is the technology that has the ability to detect the trace of explosive devices on the persons, millimeter radiation or MMW (Millimeter - Wave) with a radiation length between 1mm and 10mm (enough to breaking the fabric and enable resolution).

It is a fact that security requirements are rising more, not just at airports, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, but also on all critical infrastructures and high-risk facilities.

One of the central concerns experienced by practitioners and security managers in companies is, of course, access control. The large number of physical access control systems used today are based on countless keys, dials, cards, and so on. All these methods provide only seemingly safe security. Biometric verification technology is the only true answer that needs to be implemented as a replacement for physical devices. Today, more and more airports, but also companies with serious risks, are redirected to positive identification using biometric models

⁵⁰ <http://www.x-rayscreener.co.uk/x-ray/#other-tech>, 15.05.2015

for confirming the identity and have real representation who tries to gain access to a certain restricted zone. Biometrics refers to parameters related to human characteristics.⁵¹

Today in the world of constant development there are technologies that provide security coverage of a number of critical infrastructures such as civil aviation, railways, highways, communication centers, power systems, water supply centers, dams but also major events and other security areas that are not forested as critical. Here we will mention mobile inspection vehicles that contain ST technology, modern technologies capable of detecting explosives, liquid explosives, chemical warfare means and toxic substances, also harmful, flammable, strong oxidizing, highly corrosive or dangerous unknown chemical substances in a fast and contactless way. The technologies installed in these vehicles can scan the human body and major targets, detect radioactive and special nuclear materials from their emitted gamma rays and neutron radiation, and online analysis of other hazardous materials.



<http://www.nuctech.com/en/>

⁵¹ <https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF8#q=biometric+security+technology> , 15.06.2015

Drone and antidote protection

The drone, in technological conditions, is an unmanned aircraft. Drones are more formally known as UAVs or Unmanned Aircraft (UASes). In essence, an unmanned aircraft is a flying robot that can be controlled from a distance or fly autonomously through software-controlled flights in their embedded systems that work together with inbuilt sensors and GPS.

Today, drone technology is grounded in a number of applications ranging from the needs of agriculture to military activities as the military's leverage in intelligence and even as a means of attack.

From a commercial point of view, the use of drones in the past decade has seen a significant increase. In addition to surveillance and delivery applications, unmanned aircrafts are used in journalism, search and rescue, disaster response, asset protection, wildlife monitoring, firefighting, communications, health, agriculture and many other purposes.

There is no doubt that the benefits of the drones are enormous in all aspects of life, but there are also security threats, especially from the aspect of terrorist strategies and weapons, so that they enter in a huge risk factor. Drone technology lasts for a long time, from the initial simple "balloons" to the sophisticated models we have today with widespread use in all spheres of life. The unmanned 'balloons' full with hot air, hydrogen or helium equipped with bombs that Austria used to attack Venice in 1849 actually were the pioneers of drone technology.

Throughout recent history, there have been a number of acts of unlawful conduct caused by unmanned aircrafts, differing in terms of which means were used for the attack and for what purposes the drones were used, but there are also those that showed only the other side of the 'medal', and the potential that bring the drones with them.

The use of drones as a means of attack is no longer just a concern for the future, but a reality of the present. Increasing the number of specific new technologies effectively diffuses power and makes it available to the lowest level. Experts fear that the drones have given terrorists almost perfect solution for spreading terror and a vast space for a terrorist act. Many solutions are being put on, but no one is firm, governments are looking for more reliable and affordable solutions by asking for answers in technology.

The use of drones easily infiltrate the entry barriers, ie they eliminate access control, especially for open or semi open spaces, and cause chaos. The wide range of possibilities in terms of precision, range, load capacity, use of explosive, chemical, biological and radiological weapons further technical sabotage with the drone itself, and all this is done remotely and with equipment that is publicly accessible so this problem makes it complicated.

An uncontrolled drones operation is a major threat not only to the surrounding air traffic. The 1current (or in the preparation of the EU) legislation regulates drones operation in order to minimize risks and improve safety. However, the legislation does not help or is not sufficient enough to actively resist the attacks of the unmanned aircrafts. Unfortunately, ways to deal with such air threats are limited and are closely dependent on many factors. Coping needs to be directed towards identifying and neutralizing before an act is done an act of unlawful action by security and intelligence services arises by collecting and evaluating threat-related information.

As a disadvantage here appears in an unplanned (random) attack on individual groups. In the protection of unmanned aircraft, of course, radar systems and active defensive measures are included.

There are many ways to minimize the threat directly, but in certain cases it is certainly almost impossible. Unfortunately, there is no universal solution or procedure that guarantees success. Some protection solutions are: network coverage (limited for small areas), birds of prey, radio frequency blockers of GCS GPS signals, breakdown of command channels and sending false signaling ie hacking directed to specific drones, anti-air weapons (applicable to larger aircrafts), firearms which is quite effective method but limited due to the range and also the sound as a danger to panic etc. All of these methods have their own advantages and disadvantages based on the circumstances and situations. These measures should be selected according to the conditions.

Of course, there are ways for improvement, firstly from the aspect of developing safety standards, strictly applied to manufacturers and secondly suppliers that can help reduce risks and build a better future for drones. Anti-drone protection is becoming an ongoing topic in security circles with a range of methodologies and technology for preventing drone abuse. The security system of all countries and security institutions in the field of anti-drone protection needs to be active in the prevention of drone attacks.

Conclusion:

Attacks targeted at "light" urban targets, whether behind them are political, religious, and separatist or other types of organizations, or terrorism, industrial spying, and hacker attacks, represent one of the most dangerous global threats of today. The national security no longer involves exclusively military strategies, but rather it seeks to eliminate non-military threats by noticing the real danger and effectively eliminating it. Often this represents the creation of a strategic of national security through a thoughtful and comprehensive process including the safety of "light "urban targets as part of the security concept of each state.

Security systems are in constant development in order to meet the requirements arising from the practice. The implementation of modern systems depends on many factors, but it is basically that the security justification for investing in equipment and assets must not be subject to economic justification.

The acts of unlawful treatment as a source of threat, presented through threats and terrorism as one of the most exposed threats of today, requires greater interest of the state and companies operators in the elimination of acts aimed at the security of the state through the vulnerability of these capacities. Necessity in recognizing, opposing and post-crisis recovery from all kinds of threats that accompany the present is an obligation of all stakeholders in security and it should function impeccably in the established system of each state.

The concept of security of "light" urban targets represent a complex and interdependent set of measures, plans, activities in perceiving, finding and defining the possibilities and conditions for the applicability of advanced technologies, determined and designed to deal with new risks

and dangers as one of the key preconditions for the proper functioning of security. Due to the specifics of the security and use of specific means and equipment, it is necessary to be specified to specialize the employees, as well as the management personnel of the security. Contribution to the general security can be given by each employee - engaged in certain "light" targets regardless of the job position set according to the organizational setup. Developing such a consciousness is a process that lasts, i.e., changes staff awareness regarding the safety and dangers that the staff themselves and the institution can be exposed to.

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THE ROLE OF THE SERVICE FOR FOREIGNERS' AFFAIRS IN THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract: For the past few years, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina records growth in legal migration trends, primarily in tourism but also approved temporary and permanent residence of foreign citizens in BiH. On the other hand, there is also growth in irregular migrations as a side-effect of migrant and refugee crisis in the region, which also reflected on BiH. The control of movement and stay of foreigners in BiH must be efficient, especially in the domain of detection and processing of security-interesting foreign citizens. The Service for Foreigners' Affairs has a key role in these processes, undertaking steps and actions within its competences with establishment of official cooperation with other institutions and law enforcements agencies in BiH, as well as on the international level. This paper will present the operation of the Service for Foreigners' Affairs, data on undertaken steps in processing and removal from BiH of foreigners who present a security threat to BiH or are linked to illegal activities that present endangerment of national security. The paper will also review the problems and challenges that the Service faces in its work.

Keywords: national security, irregular migrations, security challenges, expulsion of foreigners

INTRODUCTION

Geo-political affairs, global and regional challenges as well as push-pull factors, which are mostly of economic, socio-political, cultural or security nature, operate as initiators of migration movements. Geographically, push-pull factors are the ones that move people from one place and attract them to a new location (Rosenberg, ThoughtCo, Jan 29, 2019). Migration phenomena and processes, and especially irregular migrations, certainly increase the risks and threats to both national and regional security. Efficiency of confronting such phenomena depends on established security systems, readiness of competent agencies and level of their mutual cooperation and exchange of information. Specificity and complexity of polity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is comprised of two entities: Federation BiH and Republika Srpska, and Brčko District, definitely reflects on the security system in BiH. On state level, there are BiH Intelligence-Security Agency (BiH ISA) and BiH Ministry of Security with seven independent administrative or-

ganisations in its composition: BiH Border Police (BiH BP), Service for Foreigners' Affairs (SFA), State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies, Agency for Police Support, Agency for Forensic Testing and Expert Evaluation and Agency for Education and Professional Specialisation of Staff. On entity and cantonal levels, there are, in addition, 12 Ministries of Internal Affairs, and Brčko District Police.

Pursuant to Article III, para 1. item f) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, creation of policies for immigration, refugees and asylum is under exclusive competence of BiH institutions on state level, in line with which the BiH Ministry of Security creates, takes care of and implements the immigration and asylum policies.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is recording positive growth trend of legal migrations while, on the other hand, it faces increased influx of irregular migrants on its territory since late 2017. Specificity of irregular migrations when it comes to mass influx and movement of irregular migrants reflects in the fact that they illegally cross the state borders. They also hide their identities, which brings certain security risks and threats, primarily from organised crime and terrorism.

1. SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RISKS OF IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS

When we talk about risk of organised crime, Europol estimated that more than 90% of migration movements towards the European Union (EU) were assisted by crime groups. Mass migrations bring huge financial profit to organised crime groups, which gained profit of 3 to 6 billion EUR by smuggling migrants during 2015 (EUROPOL, 2017). In the period between 2011 and 2015, thousands of Syrian asylum seekers who were on the way to Europe, relied on smuggler networks for crossing of border between Turkey and Greece (Achilli, 2016). Another worrying fact is that migrants might be forced to join organised crime groups and their networks, while such crime groups are also involved in human trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundry (CoE, 2014).

On the other hand, the relation between migrations and terrorism showed itself as very complex, because the analysis of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 pointed out possible connection of irregular migrations and terrorism. Investigation of immigration history of 94 terrorists, who operated in the USA in the period 1990 to 2004, including 6 hijackers from Sept 11, showed that 59 terrorists committed multiple immigration violations and frauds (Kephart, 2005)⁵². Continuous immigration pressure on the EU, combined with earlier terrorist attacks in Europe, brings huge concern that movement routes of irregular migrants might be used for return of radicalized foreign fighters to the EU (Europol-Interpol, 2016:10-11). According to some estimates, so far, more than 5,600 foreign fighters returned to their homes (Barret, 2017). Terrorist attacks in Paris, in November 2015, when 130 persons were killed, pointed out the present threat from terrorists passing via migrant route. Terrorists have, in the group of 198 other

⁵² Violations and frauds referred to: misuse of issued visas, forging travel documents, and visas as well, cases of applying for asylum upon arrival to the USA, obtaining false identities, forging driver licenses, birth certificates, social security cards, information upon arrival to the USA and getting married out of interest, in order to obtain the right of residence and to be naturalized

migrants and 47 asylum seekers, arrived to Greek island of Leros, and using Western-Balkans route, reached France (Faiola and Mekhennet, The Washington Post, April 22, 2016).

Also, very interesting information came from BuzzFeed journalists, who were told in Turkey by an unnamed ISIS operative that ISIS already transferred more than 4,000 fighters among refugees to Europe (Giglio and al-Awad, Jan 29, 2015). Mullins highlights the issue of infiltration of terrorists among refugees and asylum seekers, who are arriving to Europe since 2011 and are responsible for at least 13 terrorist attacks in 7 European countries (Mullins, 2019).

Given all of the above, it is obvious that the immigration services have a very important role in the fight against irregular migrations, organized crime and terrorism, contributing to protection of national security of their respective countries. Given that BiH as well has migration phenomena, following questions rise: In which manner and how efficiently does the Service for Foreigners' Affairs confront these challenges? Are there set mechanisms on the basis on which security-interesting foreigners in BiH may be detected and processed?

2. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SERVICE FOR FOREIGNERS' AFFAIRS

We find it very interesting and useful to provide an overview on the manner of solving the issue of movement and stay of foreigners in BiH before the establishment of the Service, bodies that were in charge of the issue, and to highlight the reasons that brought to the need to establish an agency on state level. Works in the aforementioned field were carried out by cantonal Ministries of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska and Brčko District Police. Organisational units were under the name "Department for Foreigners", and there were 16 of them. Even though this issue was regulated by law in entire BiH, the difference in its application by the Departments was more than apparent. Operational cooperation between the Departments for Foreigners was not satisfactory, and additional problem was lack of adequate database and Centres for accommodation of foreigners that would enable the authorities to, after decision-making, safely remove foreigners from BiH.

Mentioned shortcomings pointed out the need to establish an agency on state level, which, in the end, resulted in establishment of the Service for Foreigners' Affairs, which started its operations on October 01, 2006. For the purpose of continuity of operations that moved under the competence of the Service, we have established the manner of takeover of civil servants and employees, equipment, documentation, material and technical means from entity, cantonal Ministries of Internal Affairs and Brčko District Police.


2.1. Establishment of the Service for Foreigners' Affairs

Service for Foreigners' Affairs was established by the Law on the Service for Foreigners' Affairs ("Official Gazette BiH", # 54/05, 36/08) from 2005, as an administrative organisation within the BiH Ministry of Security, with operational independence. Article 3 of the Law stipulates the competencies of the Service, of which we would like to highlight the ones that are the most important for this paper: foreigners' stay registration, verification of invitation letters, check-ups in the visa issuance procedure, approval and extension of stay, inspection works, operative field

work, collection, processing and exchange of information, cancellation of stay, expulsion measure, placing foreigners under supervision in the Immigration Centre and removal of foreigners.

2.2 Organisational structure of the Service for Foreigners' Affairs

The Internal Organisation Regulation established three Sectors in the Service: Sector for Operative Support, Sector for Readmission, Reception and Accommodation and Sector for Administration, as well as the organisational units outside of the Service's HQ: Immigration Centre and Service's field centres.



Map 1: Organigram of the Service for Foreigners' Affairs

There are 16 field centres of the Service, as follows: Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, Istočno Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Doboj, Livno, Bihać, Travnik, Orašje, Trebinje, Bijeljina, Goražde, Ljubuški and Brčko.



Map 2: Field centres of the Service for Foreigners' Affairs

3. CONTRIBUTION OF THE SERVICE FOR FOREIGNERS' AFFAIRS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF BIH

Service for Foreigners' Affairs directs its operation through preventive and repressive activities. When talking about prevention of irregular migrations, as well as other phenomena that might present security risks and threats in BiH, the Service can, through numerous activities, prevent issuance of visas and arrival of security-interesting foreigners to BiH, and efficiently detect presence of such foreigners in the country. On the other hand, using available mechanisms, the Service can use repressive measures on foreigners and remove them from the territory of BiH. The significance of activities of the Service in order to confront the mentioned phenomena was recognized through adoption of state-level strategic documents: Strategy in the Field of Migrations and Asylum and Action Plan 2016-2020, Strategy for Integrated Border Management in BiH 2015-2018, Strategy for the Fight against Organized Crime in BiH 2017-2020, and Strategy for Prevention and Fight against Terrorism BiH 2015-2020.

3.1. Verification of invitation letters

Procedure of verification of invitation letters⁵³, done by the Service, is a preventive activity and presents a significant tool on the basis of which one can prevent irregular migrations or disable arrival of security-interested foreigners from the visa-regime countries to BiH. During the procedure of the verification of invitation letter and operative field inspections, if the Service establishes facts that show that the obtained visa might be used for irregular migrations or that there are security concerns for arrival of foreigners to BiH, the Service will reject the request for verification of the invitation letter. In the period 2014-2018, the Service verified 24,529 invitation letters, whilst it rejected 894 requests for verification of invitation letters, mostly to citizens of Nigeria, Uganda, Syria, Egypt and Libya (Report on work of SFA for 2018: 15-16), thus preventing foreigners in intention of obtaining a visa⁵⁴.

No	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Verified requests	5,258	5,545	4,334	4,720	4,672
2.	Rejected requests	191	356	111	166	70

Table 1: Verified and rejected requests for verification of invitation letters

⁵³ The invitation letter is actually a letter with which a citizen of BiH or a foreigner with approved permanent or temporary residence in BiH, or local legal person or foreign legal person registered in BiH, invites a foreigner to come to BiH for a certain purpose for a certain period of time. The invitation letter is issued on a stipulated form and has to contain a statement that the issuer of the invitation letter is taking over the obligation to provide accommodation, cover medical treatment, provide existence costs and all other costs that might occur during the stay of the foreigner in BiH, provided that the foreigner cannot cover those costs, as stipulated by the Article 32 of the Law on Foreigners

⁵⁴ The Services uncovered as *modus operandi* the attempts of foreign citizens to apply to various business conferences, cultural events, fairs, sport competitions, as well as meeting BiH citizens via social networks, in order to obtain verification of invitation letters on the basis of which they would apply for a visa, come to BiH, and then try to illegally move towards Western Europe, which was all unmasked with such approach of the Service, detection and preventing them to come to BiH in the first place

3.2. Check-up during visa issuance procedure

Second significant preventive tool are the check-ups that the Service carries out during the application for a visa, or DCM BiH or BiH BP visa issuance procedure upon request by diplomatic consular mission of BiH (DCM BiH) or BiH Border Police in the event of visa issuance on the border. After a foreigner applies for a visa, DCM BiH or BiH BP sends a request via system to check-up the foreigner. The Service uses the system to inform the competent body on the results of the check-up, especially those results that show that the issued visa might be used for the purpose of irregular migrations or that there is a security threat, so the visa application could be denied⁵⁵. In the period 2014-2018, the Service carried out 121,370 check-ups using the aforementioned approach, and disabled 577 foreigners to obtain a visa (adjusted in accordance with the Report on work of SFA for 2018).

No	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Number of check-ups	17,247	18,165	22,972	30,474	32,512
2.	Number of proposals for rejection of visa	119	175	98	70	115

Table 2. Number of check-ups and number of Service's proposals for rejection of visa issuance to foreigners

3.3. Detection of security-interesting foreigners through registration of stay address

By registration of stay address, the Service efficiently controls the movement and stay of foreigners and develops preconditions of detection of security-interesting foreigners. The Law on Foreigners stipulates the obligation to register the stay address of the foreigner as well as the deadlines to do so, and the Service uses inspection controls to determine if the Law is being respected by the applicant. It is important to emphasize that the Service developed and launched, on June 12, 2018, the System for online registration of stay of foreigners in BiH - "E-stranac", which improved the security aspect of the stay registration and enables more efficient search and locating of foreigners in BiH (Klix, June 12, 2018). In the observed period, the Service recorded continuous growth of registered stays, with significant growth during 2018 (Report on work of SFA for 2018: 7).

No	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Number of registrations	607,933	604,721	629,996	695,926	913,863

Table 3. Number of registrations of stay of foreigners

⁵⁵ Aside to the invitation letter, the Law also stipulates other documents that foreigners might use to apply for a visa and to justify the purpose of the travel. One of the reasons are tourist visits that foreigners attempt to use to obtain a visa which they want to use for a completely different purpose. On the one hand, foreigners are trying to avoid the invitation letter verification procedure so the authorities wouldn't know to whom they are actually coming, while, on the other hand, they try to obtain a visa to legally enter BiH and illegally leave towards the EU countries. In order to prevent such occurrences, the Service is checking the issued tourist vouchers and establishes professional cooperation and exchanges information with DCM BiH so their employees would have necessary facts, be well prepared for the visa interview with foreigners, and make a right decision and reject a request in detected misuse cases.

3.4. Approval/extension of stay

The procedure of approval/extension of temporary or approval of permanent residence carried out by the Service is also very significant. Inspectors for foreigners use operative field check-ups to detect attempts of exercising unfounded right to stay, which results in request rejection⁵⁶. In the period 2014-2018, the Service approved/extended 57,302 requests to stay, whereas 1,213 requests were rejected (Report on work of SFA for 2018: 27-31).

No	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Number of approved/extended	11.022	12.633	11.519	11.372	10.756
2.	Number of rejected	179	175	351	285	223

Table 4. Number of approved and rejected requests for approval/extension of stay

3.5. Cancellation of stay, expulsion and placing foreigners under supervision in the Immigration Centre

Gathered information on irregular migrations or movement and stay of security interesting foreigners result in implementation of operative activities by the Service in the field. That is when the Service detects foreigners in irregular status, foreigners that misuse the already approved stay or foreigners that are a security threat to BiH. To such foreigners, the Service cancels the stay, expels them, and places them under supervision in order to implement measures of expulsion from BiH (Articles 96, 106 and 118 of the Law on Foreigners, "Official Gazette BiH", # 88/15). The measures that the Service implements in line with its competencies are of extreme importance for the protection of national security of BiH.

Legal framework of placing foreigners under supervision provides for a safe system of removing foreigners from BiH after the decision on expulsion from BiH is made. This procedure is also enabled by establishment and functioning of the Service's Immigration Centre, with seat in Istočno Sarajevo⁵⁷. In the period 2014-2018, the service cancelled 2,766 stays (visa-free, temporary and permanent), 197 cancellations with expulsion measure, 3,559 expulsion measures and placed 2,589 foreigners under supervision (adjusted in accordance with the Report on work of SFA for 2018). It is obvious that during 2017, and especially 2018, there was an extreme growth in number of expulsion measures and placements under supervision as a consequence of increased influx of irregular migrants to BiH.

⁵⁶ Foreigners attempt to exercise the right to stay on the basis of a fictitious common-law marriage or marriage with BiH citizens out of interest, residence on the basis of work permit in fictitious companies that can eventually be connected with money laundry, stay on the basis of fictitious education and other similar situations

⁵⁷ Service's Immigration Centre was established in July 2008 and it has capacity of 120 places. Its establishment created preconditions for more efficient removal of foreign citizens from BiH, because after the decision is made, they can be placed under supervision until their removal

No	Measure	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Cancellation of stay	900	733	560	348	225
2.	Cancellation of stay with expulsion	59	52	31	38	17
3.	Expulsion	380	294	418	927	1,540
4.	Placing foreigners under supervision	218	193	311	897	970

Table 5. Undertaken measures against foreigners

Out of total number of expulsion measures, we believe that it is important to mention that the Service, in the given period, adopted 45 measures against foreigners who present a threat to public order and security in BiH, mostly citizens of Republic of Serbia, China, Republic of Turkey, Montenegro and North Macedonia. Also, the Service pronounced expulsion measures to foreigners who were sentenced for crimes committed in BiH, after serving prison sentence, mostly to citizens of Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, Republic of Croatia, Albania and North Macedonia (SFA information from May 14, 2019).

No	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Security threat	4	16	15	5	5
2.	Crime	13	32	15	21	33

Table 6. Expulsion measures for foreigners who are security threats and were sentenced for crimes committed in BiH

3.6. Removal of foreigners

Removal of foreigners from BiH carried out by the Service is very important in the context of executing measures against foreigners, especially when we talk about foreigners that present a threat to the security of BiH. After pronounced measures which order foreigners to leave the territory of BiH, majority of foreigners leave BiH on their own within the set deadline. However, the Service also executes forcible removals and returns foreigners, as well, on the basis of readmission. In the period 2014-2018, the Service removed 1,145 foreigners from BiH (adjusted in accordance with the Report on work of SFA 2014-2018). Drastic increase of removal of foreigners in 2017 is evident, especially in 2018, as a consequence of the increased influx of migrants to BiH.

No	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Removals	61	30	22	359	673

Table 7. Number of removals of foreigners from BiH

On the other hand, the Service also implemented the assisted voluntary return through the Project "Prevention of Illegal Migrations in BiH and the region and voluntary return of illegal migrants", and it supports IOM in the implementation of the Project "Assisted Voluntary Project and Reintegration of AVRR". In the period 2014-2018, 1,996 foreigners left BiH in this manner (adjusted in accordance with the Report on work of SFA 2014-2018).

3.7. Cooperation and exchange of information between the Service and other police and security agencies

Implementing everyday activities within its competencies focused on prevention of irregular migrations as well as arrival of security-interesting foreigners to BiH or detection, processing and removal of such foreigners from BiH, the Service constantly cooperates with other police and security agencies. Having in mind the significance of inter-agency cooperation and exchange of information, the Service for Foreigners' Affairs carries out its work and tasks in cooperation and with support from, primarily, BiH Intelligence-Security Agency (ISA)⁵⁸, BiH Border Police (BiH BP), State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), entity and cantonal Ministries of Internal Affairs and Brčko District Police, which also, within their competencies, take place in the system of national security of BiH.

Implementing everyday operative measures within its competencies, the Service gathers very useful operative information on irregular migrations as well as the information that could be connected to occurrences under competency of other police and security agencies. Such information are analysed, assessed and timely delivered to other agencies for further action, where the Service provided 654 pieces of information in the observed period. The Service emphasizes that the delivered information were of extreme significance for detection and processing of crime perpetrators, and especially highlights the extraordinary cooperation with the BiH Intelligence-Security Agency (Report on work of SFA for 2018).

No	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1.	Number of exchanged information	141	179	111	66	157

Table 8. Layout of number of exchanged information

3.8. Support of information systems to the work of the Service

Central database on foreigners, stipulated by Article 129 of the Law on Foreigners, enables recordkeeping on foreigners, access to and efficient exchange of information. This system, called "The Information System of Migrations", is comprised of 4 modules, as follows: visa module, border module, stay module and asylum module. As one can conclude from the presented structure, this system can be accessed and used by the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs with DCM network, BiH Border Police, Service for Foreigners' Affairs and BiH Ministry of Security: Sector for Asylum and Sector for Immigration. Aside to them, data in the system can also be accessed by the BiH Intelligence-Security Agency, police and other competent bodies.

In the context of fight against irregular migrations, organised crime and terrorism, it is important to mention the Registry of Particular Foreigners (RPF), as a subsystem of ISM. "In RPF, we have records on all foreign citizens who received the decision on expulsion, cancellation of

⁵⁸ In line with Article 8 of the Law on Foreigners, the BiH Intelligence-Security Agency implements the security check-up of foreigners, in order to determine threat to security of BiH and it is the only one competent for estimate that a foreigner is a security threat to BiH

stay, sentence for a crime, prison sentence or financial fine of 1,000 BAM or higher, cancelled or terminated visas, who were declared as undesirable in BiH, whose citizenship of BiH was revoked, who were expelled by the decision of the BiH Council of Ministers, who were prevented to enter BiH by the decision of the BiH CoM, as well as foreign citizens whose presence is a threat to national security of BiH. The database also holds records on all legal and private persons who are subject to international restrictive measures of forbidden entrance to or transit through BiH, the "Consolidated list" (Report on work of SFA for 2014:25). All competent bodies in BiH are obliged to provide the aforementioned data to the Service to enter it into the system, except for the data on rejection of entry of foreigners which are entered by the BiH Border Police. The Service has access to the system in all procedures within its competencies, and BiH BP during the control of crossing the state border.

On the other hand, the biometric system that the Service uses is very significant, and it enables collection, analysis and processing of biometric data, primarily fingerprints and photos of foreigners who apply for a stay in BiH, as well as the irregular migrants. Usage of the biometric system enables the exchange of information between the Service and other law enforcement agencies and this system is beneficial to both the Service and other partner security agencies in BiH.

4. THE ROLE OF THE SERVICE IN INCREASED INFLUX OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN BIH

Since late 2017, Bosnia and Herzegovina started facing increased influx of irregular migrants. In 2018, the Service for Foreigners' Affairs registered and biometrically processed 23,902 migrants, mostly from Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Per Service's data, number of arrivals of irregular migrants is significantly growing in 2019, where the Service, in the period Jan 01 to April 30, 2019, registered and biometrically processed 6,034 migrants coming from Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Morocco and Algeria (SFA information from May 14, 2019). It is noticeable that there has been a change in the structure of irregular migrants where in the beginning there were asylum seekers and refugees and now it is mostly the movement of economic migrants. In line with its competencies, the Service registers and biometrically processes migrants, undertakes measures, receives the intentions for applying for international protection – asylum in BiH, at the same time profiling migrants, interviewing them, gathering useful information and sharing them with other police and security agencies.

Having in mind increased influx of migrants, the problem in BiH was also the lack of accommodation capacities, because migrants slept in parks and other convenient places, even making tent settlements. In October 2018, in Sarajevo Canton, temporary reception centre "Ušivak" was opened for that purpose, and its operations are coordinated by the Service. In Una-Sana Canton, in the period July-October 2018, 4 temporary migrant accommodation centres were formed, "Bira", "Miral", "Sedra" and "Borići", currently coordinated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In line with the decision by the BiH Council of Ministers from March 11, 2019, the Service will take over the management and coordination of the centres from the IOM.

After illegal entry into BiH from Montenegro and Republic of Serbia, migrants use the same modus operandi as they did in the previous transit countries by hiding their identities, and by misusing the institute of international protection-asylum in order to avoid sanctions and gain the possibility of free movement for continuing the trip to the EU countries. Migrants mostly move towards NW Bosnia, namely, Bihać and Velika Kladuša, with purpose to illegally cross the border into Republic of Croatia. Increased influx of migrants into the said area, namely, their longer stay due to strengthening of border control by Croatia and inability to leave BiH, caused tensions with local residents, as well as mass protests of Bihać citizens who demanded the problem to be solved (Oslobođenje, October 20, 2018). Movement direction of migrants towards NW BiH, towards Bihać and Velika Kladuša, has been recognized as the historical direction of migrant smuggling (IOM, 2017:27). Having in mind that Europol earlier estimated that more than 90% of migrants use smuggling networks, BiH Minister of Security Dragan Mektić confirmed it by stating that there is firm evidence of existence of organized crime groups that smuggle illegal migrants over BiH territory, and police and judicial bodies implement decisive steps in order to terminate those channels and punish human traffickers (Nezavisne, Jan 04, 2018).

We have earlier pointed out the risk of possible movement of terrorists among irregular migrants, which was confirmed by the case of terrorists that passed through Western-Balkans route and committed terrorist attack in Paris. Bartko highlights that the key connection between irregular migrations and terrorism may be proved by the fact that uncontrolled irregular migrations make the identification of security-interesting persons complicated for the authorities (Bartko, 2017). The danger of the terrorist infiltration among migrants being realistic in BiH was proved by the Service in early 2019 when it detected, among the migrants, 5 persons linked to international terrorism. They were detected through cooperation and exchange of information between the Service and local and international partners, primarily through exchange of biometric data (Klix, Feb 19, 2019). This case emphasizes the importance of the biometric system used by the service, as well as the general usage of biometric processing of irregular migrants and significance of cooperation and exchange of such information in the procedure of detection of security-interesting migrants.

Mullins, through several examples, shows that fingerprinting migrants and checking across INTERPOL or Schengen Information System (SIS) brought to detection of terrorists among migrants. Mullins also presents examples that intelligence exchange, profiling and interviewing migrants and by inspecting their mobile phones, also detected terrorists, and highlights the significance of cooperation of immigration and intelligence services (Mullins, 2019).

5. CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS THAT THE SERVICE FACES IN ITS WORK

The Service was founded by Law from 2005. The Regulation on internal organisation and systematisation of positions is from that period as well, and it established its internal structure and number of employees. Positive growth trend of legal, as well as illegal, migrations in BiH significantly increased the scope of work of the Service, which is rendering services to both BiH citizens and the foreigners. Aside to the positive growth trend of migration movements in BiH,

and especially the increased influx of irregular migrants, the budget of the Service remained the same throughout the past years. BiH Council of Ministers approved the Service in 2018 to employ only 14 additional employees. Strategy in the Field of Migrations and Asylum and Action Plan 2016-2020 recognized the importance of reorganisation and strengthening of the Service. Strategic goal "Improve the system of control of movement and stay of foreigners in BiH" foresaw the improvement of operation of the Service in order to create the preconditions for more efficient control of movement and stay of foreigners. The improvement foresaw adoption of the new Law and Regulation on internal organisation of the Service, but that activity has not been implemented.

In early 2019, influx of irregular migrants in BiH grew for more than 100%, which is why the Service faced new challenges and new problems in its work, primarily due to lack of human resources and equipment, and Director of the Service Slobodan Ujić warned about it (N1, March 11, 2019). Lack of human resources complicates the registration, profiling and interviewing irregular migrants, as an important tool for detection of their countries of origin in order to establish identity and remove them, as well as for detection of potential smugglers and terrorists among the migrants. However, adequate profiling and interviewing requires interpreters, and there is a lack of them for some rare languages, while the level of training of the Service's staff is very important for these processes. In this light, it is important to mention that during April 2019, 30 inspectors for foreigners successfully completed the specialisation training in profiling and debriefing, carried out by experts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX).

When it comes to removal of foreigners to their countries of origin, an additional problem is the fact that BiH does not have any readmission agreements concluded with the countries from which the most of irregular migrants come. Implementation of the readmission agreement with neighbouring countries is hampered by a particularly shortened readmission process. The cooperation of the Service with countries of origin of irregular migrants in the process of establishing identity and issuing travel documents for the purpose of removal is not at a satisfactory level. Given the increasing influx of irregular migrants, there is also a lack of migrant detention capacity at the Immigration Centre to ensure that they are removed after the measures are taken. The management and coordination of temporary reception centres in the Una-Sana Canton, imposed by the BiH Council of Ministers' Decision, also represents an additional engagement and challenge.

The fact that irregular migrants use the same modus operandi in all countries of the Western Balkans and that authorities in those countries face the same problems and challenges in work with irregular migrants was confirmed at the "Regional Meeting on Readmission in the Western Balkans", which took place in Sarajevo on May 14, 2019. The meeting was organized by Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) Centre and IOM, where participants expressed the need for a regional approach to the phenomenon of irregular migrations and joint acting of all countries⁵⁹.

⁵⁹ Author of this paper participated in this meeting on behalf of BiH

CONCLUSION

One of the important preconditions for accession of BiH to the EU integrations, as a strategic foreign-policy goal, is the efficient border management. Readiness of the Service for Foreigners' Affairs to support reaching that goal is very important. By overviewing the preventive and repressive measures that the Service implements and adopts on daily basis, we can say that the Service deserves its place in the security system of BiH and that its role in the protection of national security is very important. Aside to the fact that it lacks human and material-technical capacities, the Service showed that it can, with full effort, respond to migration challenges and that it is a reliable partner in the fight against irregular migrations, organised crime and terrorism.

Having in mind the current migration situation in BiH, the Service needs urgent staffing, raising the competencies of its officers by specialized training, procurement of specialized equipment, specialized vehicles and other necessary IT equipment, and expanding the capacities for detention of migrants in the Immigration Centre. Strengthening cooperation with the countries in the region and the countries of origin of migrants in order to improve the process of establishing identity, readmission and the removal of foreigners to the country of origin are very important. On the other hand, it would be necessary to initiate the process of amending the Law on the Service and the Regulation on Internal Organization in order to enable its reorganization and operational improvement. By this approach, the Service would improve the prevention and fight against irregular migration in BiH, and in a more efficient way minimize the security risks and threats from irregular migration for national, regional and security of the EU.

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WEST BALKANS MIGRATORY ROUTE: CHALLENGE FOR REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA AND THE SECURITY OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

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Abstract: Migratory crisis were a great security challenge for all the European states, but above all the Balkan ones. Hardest hit were the states outside the European Union (EU) referring here to the region of West Balkans which was one on the main corridors for this migratory wave. Reason for this was the fact that these states had to bear the burden of additional border security. For Republic of North Macedonia all of this was additionally burdened with the fact that certain portion of its border which needed additional security was with an EU member state. Republic of North Macedonia was one of the transitory states of the so-called "West Balkan Route" which was very active and reached its peak during 2015 and the beginning of 2016, and which engulfed the entire region of South – Eastern Europe and Europe in whole. During this period some 800.000 people passed through North Macedonia. Their status varied depending during which phase of crisis they crossed its territory. One of the fundamental elements of this analysis are the planning, organizing, coordinating, and implementing of the complex action for managing the migratory crisis on the territory of Republic of North Macedonia in the period between January of 2015 and October of 2017. This period had proven it's self to be a serious test for the capacities of this country and its institutions.

Key words: migratory crisis, Republic of North Macedonia, West-Balkan route, urban environments

Introduction

One of the key years for the migration towards Europe was without a doubt 2015. This is the year when we witnessed what was till then an unprecedented flow of migrants towards the European Union. Leaving their homes mostly in the Middle Eastern and North African states, due to poverty and armed conflicts, a large number of people reached a decision to cross hard, thousands of kilometers long journey into the unknown. Their final destination was to be the safety, stability, and prosperity which Europe or more precisely, the European Union has to offer. In this 2015, one of the main routes towards the "promised land" was the West Balkan route. Large portion of this route crossed through the states which were members of the European

Union (Greece) and its Schengen Zone (North Macedonia, and Serbia), ending up all over the European Union member states. Struck by poverty and the wars raging in the nineteen nineties, the West Balkan state themselves are "de facto" also migratory by tradition, which is why the migratory route through these states was just a "transit route". Still, regardless of the fact that these states were just "transitory points", their institutions, and especially the healthcare and social assistance ones, coupled with the insufficiently developed economy, proved not to be prepared for the great strains of the mass migratory wave. Migrants, especially those on the North Macedonian southern border with Greece, presented both a security and a humanitarian challenge for the residents of the city of Gevgelija, geographically located at the very border, and as such due to its location most often used as an entrance point on to the territory of North Macedonia.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF MIGRATORY CRISIS AND ITS PHASES

1.1 Phase 1: Beginning of 2015 - June 18, 2015

First phase marks the very beginning of the migratory crisis which came at the beginning of 2015, and lasted through to 18th of June of 2015 (date of adopting of the changes in the Law for asylum and temporary protection. During this phase the migrants entering the territory of North Macedonia had the status of illegal migrants who have basically illegally entered, transited, and exited our state.

During this phase, in the period between April and May of 2015, after realizing that the migratory crisis is progressing, and that with each passing day continually increasing numbers of people are coming into North Macedonia are requesting asylum, the Government of Republic of North Macedonia, established a so-called **Inter-ministry committee**, composed of large number of ministers. Its primary goal was to adopt an appropriate strategy regarding the challenges out in the field, and above all to conduct appropriate coordination in tackling the migration crisis.

There was also the establishing of an **Operative committee** consisting of representatives of numerous ministries. This committee gave suggestions and implemented the decisions of the inter-ministry committee. Operative committee was run by the state secretary at the Ministry of Interior Affairs, who later became point of contact for Republic of North Macedonia during the migratory crisis.

As pressure at the southern border increased, and in accordance with the evaluations of the Ministry experts out in the field, it was established that the person coming to North Macedonia, most often requested asylum just so that they can enter the country, possibly get a break at the Collection Center for asylum seekers, and then move on north to their "final destination". For them the final destinations were the west European countries such as Germany, Sweden and others. Till this point the people entering North Macedonia had to request asylum, by starting procedure for right to asylum, or get status of illegal immigrants and be held up at the Collection Center for foreigners.

Because of this the Ministry of Interior Affairs suggested changes to the Law for asylum and temporary protection which was adopted on 18th of June of 2018. These changes allowing

immigrants the use of public transportation, served the purpose of protecting the safety of the Macedonian citizens and increasing the safety of the migrants, who were falling victims of the smugglers charging hundreds of Euros for transport. This also allowed the possibility to register the transitory migrants. Changes to this law also introduced category "Intention to submit request for recognizing the right to asylum (intention to asylum)" which basically means that at a border crossing or onto territory of Republic of Macedonia a foreigner can orally or in written form express intent for submitting request for recognizing right to asylum. Police officials would written down personal data of foreigners expressing this intent and issue them a paper confirming their intent. After this police officers would explain to these people that they have a 72 hours deadline for submitting official request for right to asylum before officials at the Collection center for asylum seekers or leave the territory of Republic of North Macedonia.

This action proved correct the presumption that most of the asylum requests (till then some 1500) were fictive, meaning these illegal migrants just intended to get access to Collection center for asylum seekers (open unrestricted center) instead of being put at the Collection center for foreigner (restrictive movement type center). There they would get a couple of days rest and move on to some of the west European states. After the adopting of this measure, by the end of 2015 only 86 asylum requests were made, and almost none of those 86 stayed in Macedonia to see their asylum request resolved, but rather left North Macedonian territory.

It is very important to point out that at this stage Republic of North Macedonia was suffering a lot of criticism by international organizations dealing with protection of human rights, as well as non-government organizations such as Amnesty International, for inappropriate behavior towards the illegal immigrants and inappropriate accommodation conditions at the Collection Center for Foreigners, where the migrants had to be held up in accordance with back then existing legislation.

1.2 Phase 2: Introduction of changes to the Law for asylum

Second stage began after the introduction of the "intent for submitting request and recognition of right to asylum" which was adopted on 18th of June of 2018. This is a phase during which transit of migrants along the "west Balkan route" was allowed, while at the same time Republic of North Macedonia was facing serious challenges in managing the registration of migrants, their transit and transport from its southern to its northern border. During this period there was opening of two temporary transit centers. One was at the southern border, near Gevgelija seated company "Vinojug" and the other was at northern border crossing "Tabanovce".

Having in mind that with each passing day number of migrants coming from Greece to North Macedonia was constantly increasing, Inter-ministry committee started undertaking other measures for better border control. So, **on 19th of August of 2015, Government of Republic of North Macedonia reached a decision for introduction a state of emergency at its southern and northern border**⁶⁰. This decision was to last for one month and served the following purposes:

⁶⁰ First decision for introduction of state of emergency was adopted by the government of Republic of North Mace-

- Inclusion of the Army and its human and mechanized resources located out in the field along the Southern and Northern borders;
- Channeling the entrance of migrants through the registration check point constructed at famous "Rock 59" and initiation of their process of registration;
- Opening of two temporary transit centers near "Vinojug" Gevgelija, with capacity to hold 1,500 people, and at "Tabanovce" with capacity to hold 500 people, where there were conditions for hold back of 4 to 6 hours;
- Providing mobile first aid units at this centers, with the purpose of giving appropriate health care assistance for the people in need;
- Providing proper safety for the Macedonian citizens; When looking at the safety through the prism of the number of migrants transiting through this state one needs to have in mind that some 800.000 people transited through North Macedonia (this is more then 1/3 of the total Macedonian population). These measures proved correct because there was no single more serious incident where life and health of the Macedonian citizens was threatened. There were also no severe incidents between the immigrants themselves as well. It is interesting to mention that during this period there were cases of women migrants giving birth to their children on Macedonian territory and getting full medical treatment – children were often named after the doctors delivering the babies. There was even a male Macedonian police officer who met and grew fond of a female immigrant from Syria. They married and still live together in North Macedonia.

By the end of August, and into September and October of 2015, situation became alarming. This was due to the fact that huge number of human and material resources were used for the purpose of providing appropriate border security, and properly channeling all the people who wanted to enter and transit through North Macedonia (usually daily numbers ranged between 3 and 5 thousand, while there were days when these numbers peaked to between 10 and 12 thousand). Ministry of interior affairs had to allocate 1 million Euros a month just for the purpose of managing the crisis. This presented a serious financial challenge for a country such as Republic of North Macedonia.

It is at this period that a financial aid was request straight from the European Union, as well as individually at bilateral level from some European states. On several occasions there were donation conferences held with the representatives of the diplomatic core in Macedonia, during which technical-material donations were made. These donations were directly intended for the migrants and consisted of blankets, beds, mattresses, thermo-isolation foils, sleeping bags, canned food, etc.).

On top of this material assistance, there were also requests for human resource assistance, due to the fact that largest portion of the border police was engaged in securing the Southern and Northern borders. Border police was under constant engagement bringing them under serious security risks, which additionally burdened the normal functioning of the security forces

donia and in accordance with the law, it could last for maximum 1 month. After this period expired, Republic of North Macedonia parliament adopted a decision for prolonging the extent of the state of emergency till 31st of December of 2015, followed by several 6 month extensions.

out in the field. Initially, assistance was requested from the European agency for border and coastguard watch – FRONTEX. Unfortunately they pointed out that they have no legal possibility for sending their forces outside of EU territory.

What is characteristic of this period is that at bilateral level, the EU member states (as well as EU its self) started to acknowledge the needs for joint action, and providing of material-technical assistance for appropriate border security and registration of migrants. Republic of North Macedonia was becoming more and more present during EU’s political, strategic and operative level, meetings regarding this issue.

During all of these meetings the Macedonia side was pointing out the need for joint efforts by all the countries located along the route, regardless whether they were just transitory states or so called “final destination” states. It was also pointed out that these states need to share information regarding the numbers of migrants that can be processed at any given day. When it came to the migration policies and policies for recognizing right to asylum Republic of North Macedonia made it clear that it is prepared to respect all decisions reached at EU level, in spite of the fact that it is not an EU member state.

On 25th of October of 2015, at a high level meeting in Brussels, Belgium, where Macedonia was represented by George Ivanov, back then president of the state, it was agreed that each state nominates a single point of contact. There was also an agreement on forming of appropriate organizational network which would hold video conferences at contact points in Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, and Greece. These conferences were initially held once a week and later once every two weeks. This network was coordinated by the Office of the President of the European Commission, Jean Clod Junkers. Point of contact for the migrant crisis in Republic of North Macedonia was and still is the Ministry of Interior Affairs State Secretary. Goal of this network is to exchange information regarding the ongoing situation in all of the states, problems they have faced in the past two week period, as well as the number of new and existing migrants on their territories.

Additionally, requests for manpower assistance by North Macedonia were answered and on 21st of December of 2015, several countries started a joint operation participated by police officers from North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria. They were almost immediately aided by police officers from the “Vishegrad group” member state, meaning Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland⁶¹.

⁶¹ Initial plan was for the joint operation to last till 31st of December 2016, but after the great results out in the field as well as the newly created situation which was greatly helped by the foreign policemen (after the closing of the border foreign policemen proved very useful in security the border from illegal crossings), the joint operation was initially extended till 30th of October of 2017, and with the latest request by all states and their positive response – this mission was extended till 30th of October 2018. At any given moment there were about 150 foreign policemen at the Macedonian-Greek border helping the Macedonian police officers. So far as part of various rotations some 2,300 foreign police officials have taken part in this mission.

Czech Republic	507	Slovakia	245
Hungary	411	Austria	220
Poland	330	Serbia	219
Croatia	251	Slovenia	145

Faced with the challenge of registering the migrants, providing safe transit and their hand-over to other states, Republic of North Macedonia initiated organizing of meetings of Police Directors of states along the migration route (North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria). This was also done with the purpose of improving communication between states along the West Balkan route and timely exchange of information with the goal of undertaking joint measures. As a result of this, on 18th of February 2016, in Zagreb, came the signing of a joint statement confirming agreement for introduction of a Joint Registration Form as way of profiling the migrants who would be let through. This form would be filled out at the Macedonian-Greece border in presence of police officials from the remaining four member state coming out of this initiative. This action made it possible for migrant background check to be done in one place, so that from that point on they could be more easily transported by train from North Macedonia all the way to Austria. There was also an agreement for more timely exchange of information about the number of migrants that the states could take in. This was done so that North Macedonia could let through only as much migrant as Serbia could accept. Same principal was introduced between each of the bordering states all the way north to Austria.

It is also necessary to point out that during this period (18th of June 2015 – 08 March 2016) there was an introduction of the category “refugee” and “economic migrants”. This came as a result of a recommendation from UNHCR which suggested that residents of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, get statue of refugees, while all the others get status of economic migrants. Goal of this recommendation was to give people from the states engulf in war priority over residents of the other Middle East and North African states who were trying to exploit the West Balkan route for the purpose of requesting asylum in some of the West European states.

Unfortunately the measures of this joint statement were short termed. On 08 March 2016, Republic of North Macedonia got a notification from Republic of Slovenia that “a decision has been reached for reintroduction of a full Schenge control” which basically meant that this state can no longer accept migrants on its territory, thus bringing to official shut down the West Balkan route!

1.3 Phase 3: Closing the West Balkan route

Period from accepting of Slovenia’s notification on to May of 2016 which is basically the period right before the shutdown of the route was very hard. Republic of North Macedonia security forces were faced with great challenges. Same went for the members of the foreign police forces who were very helpful in managing this process. After the closing of the route and due to untimely notification about its closing⁶², some 2000 migrants found themselves stuck on North Macedonian territory, while at one point in the so called illegal camp in Evzoni there were about 13.000 people applying constant pressure to be let in on territory of Republic of North

⁶² Republic of North Macedonia was informed that from this point on no migrants will be allowed to come through. This did not allow sufficient period for preparations and gradual reduction of number of people who at that moment were transiting the route. Because of this many people found themselves stuck in the countries along the route, without a proper status and a possibility to move on.

Macedonia so they can advance on towards the West European countries, despite the fact that this was forbidden.

During this period there were daily attempts by these migrants to illegally enter the state – in mass and forceful manner. On daily basis there were over 100 attempts for illegal border crossing. We witnessed several more serious incidents when larger groups of migrants, most of which grown up males, pushed on the fence, stoned the Macedonian police (policemen were injured in the process). Police was forced to use tear gas and shock bombs to repel and disperse the gathered.

After constant alarming about this situation and with the help of the international community, Greek authorities were pressured to dislocate this camp further from the border and deeper into Greek territory. This led to significant easing up of pressure in the period between May and June of 2016.

It needs to be pointed out that this situation was also aided by the two agreement signed during this period, one being the EU-Turkey agreement for resolving the refugee crisis⁶³ and the other was the Agreement for relocation within the EU (so-called quota agreement).

Unfortunately these agreements had flaws and setback in their implementing⁶⁴.

⁶³ Agreement between EU and Turkey for the resolving of the refugee crisis predicts that by 2018 among other things Brussels gives Turkey 3 billion Euros. These funds came on the top of the 3 billion Euros which the Union already promised in November of 2015.

The Union will also have to provide termination of the visas for the Turkish citizens by the end of June of 2016. Key part of the agreement is that for each refugee or migrant returned from Greece to Turkey, one Syrian will directly be moved from Turkey to some of the EU member states.

In accordance with this agreement, the EU “will help Greece tackle the mass influx of refugees” and will provide an “efficient response to the hard humanitarian situation out in the field.” Basically the EU took it upon its self to provide Greece with additional help for managing its borders, including those with Macedonia and Albania, provide proper functioning of the refugee accommodation centers by 100 percent identification, registration and security check, of the refugees, and provide sufficient admission capacities. Agreement with Turkey also obligates top men of the 28 EU member states to continue close cooperation with the West Balkan states which are not EU member states, “With the goal of providing them with all the necessary help.” It was also agreed that all existing agreements about relocation and voluntary humanitarian admission with Turkey be immediately put into action. This agreement also predicted opening of new routes for refugee movement and increasing efforts in the fight against smugglers. EU was to conduct close cooperation with NATO for the purpose on deploying large number of ships into the Aegean Sea with the goal of talking smuggling efforts.

⁶⁴ Estimates about success of implementing the **agreement between EU and Turkey** vary – for some experts number of people sent back to Turkey is small and this process is taking far too long, while for others it is a success and considered as the only possible way for preventing greater influx of migrants from Turkey into Greece. According to information from Greek counterparts, Greece is facing many problems when sending back the migrants from Greece to Turkey, mostly due to mass applying of the migrants for asylum and prolonging of process for processing these requests, as well as Turkey’s stance to allow back only migrants found on the Greek islands and not on Greek mainland. According to data coming from Macedonian Ministry of Interior Affairs, just in August of 2017, some 3,650 new migrants showed up at the Greek island. Looked at on monthly level this is the greatest number of newly arrived migrants since June of 2016.

1.4 Phase 4: Calming of tensions

Forth phase started with the closing of the route and easing up of tensions at the Macedonian-Greek border and has lasted ever since. This phase is characterized by constant efforts for reviving the route in illegal manner, through use of service of smugglers or through individual attempts for illegal transiting towards the final destination.

After the closing of the route, some 2,000 migrants found themselves “stuck” in Republic of North Macedonia. In the past period their numbers have come down to only some 40 being left.

Portion of these 2,000 immigrants voluntarily went back to Greece and tried to get integrated into the program which was result of the EU-Turkey agreement, others were sent back to Greece as part of the readmission process, some used the possibility for family unification with members of their families who had already gained asylum in some of the European states, and some simply left the interim refugee admission center and have most likely illegally left territory of Republic of North Macedonia, most likely heading to Serbia.

In this period (May 2016 – October 2017) efforts have constantly been invested in:

- Support for further strengthening of capacities of the border security system;
- Support in protecting states borders, and prevention of illegal crossing into the state;
- Support for more efficient and speedy voluntary and forced return to the country of origin or to the state from which migrants have entered North Macedonia;
- Support in the fight against migrant smuggling trade;
- Timely exchange of data and information;
- Joint and broad approach in managing the migrants.

In the first two areas significant support is already provided through special EU⁶⁵ measures and programs and through direct aid from the EU members states provided at bilateral level as

⁶⁵ **EU regional project conducted by IOM**

Regional support for managing sensitive migration in West Balkan and Turkey

Final goal: Final goal of this project is the development and putting in action a system for managing migration in all seven states users of the IPA funds (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) and all of this in accordance with EU standards. Countries using the IPA funds are in different stages of EU membership negotiations but all of them are working together towards improving their policies, laws, and institutions for managing migrants/borders. This is why all states which use IPA and strive for membership into the EU share common strategic goal which is a well balanced regional approach in resolving the migration problem.

Specific goals: Specific goals will be directed towards strengthening some of the key areas in the system for managing of the process of migration, with focus on exchanging non-personal information with other regional states, thus contributing towards establishing of mechanism for assisted voluntary return to the country of origin.

Target group/users: Seven states who use IPA, (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey)

Activities/Special measures:

1. Improvement of exchange of insensitive information and data at different regional levels;
2. Establishing of mechanisms for voluntary return at regional level and operative cooperation with certain states of origin outside the West Balkans;

part of the Joint operation. So far at various points in time various states that are part of the Joint operation have deployed more than 2.300 foreign police officers. At any given point in time in the period of almost two years (21st December 2015 – 30th October 2017) there was a constant presence of 150 foreign police officers.

On top of the EU donations which were part of the special measures, at bilateral level on two occasions the Czech Republic donated funds in the total amount of 1.8 million Euros. These funds were used for obtaining 25 terrain vehicles, as well as 45 other vehicles. Also as part of bilateral assistance Slovakia donated 1.500 pairs of boots for the border police. This assistance was worth 110 thousand Euros.

It is also important to point out that as part of the efforts against illegal migration there was a constant battle with the migrant smugglers. During 2015 and 2016 as well as from 1st of January to 28th of September of 2017, some 361 smugglers have been apprehended and prosecuted for the attempted smuggling of 2.118 immigrants.

1.5 Special measures for Republic of North Macedonia

This chapter offers presentation of the three special measures introduced for Republic of North Macedonia with the goal of reducing the consequences of the fact that the migratory route crosses its territory:

1. Special measure directed at strengthening the capacities of the West Balkan states for more efficient tackling of the increased migrant wave from 7th of October of 2015. As part of this measure Republic of North Macedonia was given 3 million Euros. These funds were used by the Macedonian Ministry of Interior Affairs, Macedonian Ministry of Health, and Gevgelija and Kumanovo municipal authorities, and resulted in the buying of 33 terrain vehicles.
2. Special measure for support of Republic of North Macedonia and other West Balkan states users of the IPA2 (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) for improvement of the capacities for managing the borders and the migrant crisis - IPA 2016 starting from 15th of February 2016. Implementing of this measure was done through a contract with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and led to allocation of 10 million Euros, of which 9 million were used while 1 million Euros were left as a reserve. Funds from this special measure were used for obtaining equipment (3.5 million Euros) hiring Foreign advisor for migration (Croatian former chief of border police), covering of expenses for the engagement of the foreign police officers (accommodation, food, and petrol for the vehicles they came with and used for border supervision), interpreters, different types of training and other similar measures.
3. Evaluations of the scope and numbers of interpreters needed for forming a regional West Balkan interpreters pool in cooperation with the Migration Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI), as well as designing and implementing of a pilot project in two key West Balkan states;
4. Improvement of identification and evaluation of the vulnerability of the migrants and refugees, and ensuring the inner state mechanisms have functional crisis management system.

3. Special measure for voluntary return of the people “stuck” along the route, including those in Republic of North Macedonia, after the closing of the West Balkan route. This measure greatly helped reducing the number of migrants who found themselves in North Macedonia after the closing of the route, through their returning to Greece, and from there on to their country of origin or inclusion in some of the EU programs for relocation.

1.6 New trends and developments

From the last trimester of 2016 onward, there have been cases of so-called secondary movement of migrants which means movement in direction opposite from the general movement of migrants – attempts for illegal movement from Serbia through North Macedonia and into Greece. In most cases these are individual cases of people who have spent certain time in Serbia, and after several unsuccessful attempts to move towards Hungary or Croatia have decided to head back to Greece. Main reason for such decision is the fact that in Greece they can enter the EU relocation Program, option which is not available in North Macedonia or Serbia. Additional motive are the financial funds that are being given to them in Greece while they wait for their request to be resolved.

Having in mind the fact that in Serbia and North Macedonia these options are not at their disposal, as well as the fact that prices for smuggling have increased due to increased state introduced measures, it can be expected that in the future there will still be illegal crossing of the Macedonian-Serbian border in direction opposite from the general course of movement.

It is hard to express any predictions on the possibility of new mass wave of migrants towards West Europe because such a prediction depends on many factors – above all the implementing of agreement between the EU and Turkey. As for the role of North Macedonia in such new development, well this will depend on the actions of the services of its neighboring states in the region – Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania.

1.7 Expected future threats and possible new wave

North Macedonia is still used as a transit state by the migrants. Security situation along the borders with its neighboring states is stable and favorable. Although illegal migration and waves of migrants have decreased, the main threat in tackling the migrant crisis remains to be the illegal attempts and migrant smuggling coming from Greece.

Reports by Europol point out to the fact that lately there has been use of alternative routes along the West Balkan route. Due to increased security measures along the Hungarian border and the rest of the West Balkan states, large number of immigrants are now trying to reach Romania, Croatia, and Slovenia. This is confirmed by the increased number of migrants apprehended along the Serbian-Romanian border or the Romanian – Hungarian border. At the same time there are indications that the Romanian city of Temishvar located close to both the border with Serbia and Hungary is developing into a migrant’s smugglers center.

“New form” for smuggling migrants into the European Union is the use of charter flights from and to small regional airports, due to the fact that often the smaller airports do not have strict security checks as the case is at the bigger airports. Prices for this type of service vary, but in some cases smugglers charge ten times the price of the regular plane ticket for the same destination. Smugglers use this form of smuggling because it makes easier the secondary movement of the migrants thus countering the increased security measures for border management along the migration corridors and the main transport centers.

1.8 Statistical data for the period between 2015 and 2017

- From the beginning of the migrant crisis to October of 2017, Republic of North Macedonia has been transited by about 800.000 migrants, while validation paperwork has been issued to a total of 477.861 foreign citizens;
- During the course of 2015 and 2016, five border incidents have been registered along the Macedonian-Greek border, while throughout the entire 2017 not a single incident has been registered;
- From 21st of December 2015, to October of 2017, about 2,300 foreign police officers have taken part in various rotations as part of aid to Macedonian border efforts along its southern border;
- From 19th of November 2015 to 28th of September 2017, about 46.782 migrants have been caught in the act of trying to illegally cross the southern border. All of them have been sent back to Greece;
- Throughout entire 2015, 2016, and all the way to 28th of September 2017, some 361 people have been caught trying to smuggle 2,118 immigrants. These 361 smugglers have been subjected to criminal charges.
- Confirmation that Republic of North Macedonia has been used only as a transit state can be seen through the fact that during 2015 there have been only 1.578 requests for asylum, while in 2016 that number got cut almost in half with only 760 such requests.

When it comes to accommodating of migrants in the Skopje located Collection center for foreigners, it can be stated that during 2016, some 750 migrants have been accommodated. Of those 750 migrants, 581 were male, while 169 were female, if put through age perspective 563 adults, and 187 minors. If looked at by state of origin, most of the migrants came from Syria – 184, followed by Afghanistan – 162, Pakistan – 119, Iran – 100, Iraq – 66, Morocco – 41, Algiers – 17, and smaller number of them from other states.

On 28th of September of 2017, there were only 21 person (migrants) in the Collection center for foreigners.

2. INFLUENCE OF MIGRATORY WAVE ON URBAN ENVIROMENTS

Migrant crisis along the West Balkan route proved to be a great challenge for Republic of North Macedonia, and especially the city of Gevgelija. General public showed concerns regarding safety and security issues. Relief came in the fact that North Macedonia was just a transit point,

which is why the migrant's first and most important goal was to leave territory of Republic of North Macedonia as soon as possible, and head out for some of the West European countries. This is why the subject of influence of the migratory waves over the urban environments will be looked at through the prism of worldwide experiences. All over the world there are great number of examples which can be used to look at the challenges urban environments meet when faced with the pressure of uncontrolled influx of greater number of people, most of which in the form of migrants.

2.1 Cities as more desirable centers

Cities are usually always in the front lines of migratory wave hits. Greatest numbers of refugees or migrants almost always follow the same pattern of migration – from villages through smaller cities and on to the greater urban city environments⁶⁶. According to data coming from the UNHCR (United Nations Refugee Agency), in 2018, 13.5 million refugees (about 58 percent of the total number of refugees worldwide) and 32,2 million internally displaced (about 80 percent of people from this category) have found safe haven in larger, middle size, or small urban environments.

We should not be surprised at all by the fact that the refugees (migrants) chose the big cities as their safe haven – mostly due to the fact that globally the number of city environments is increasing.

It is expect that by 2050, over 68 percent of the global population will be living in urban areas, with Africa and Asia leading the way in this centralization of population⁶⁷.

It is understandable that a great influx of people can cause serious consequences when it comes to availability of public services – transport, healthcare, and police. Still it should be taken in consideration that larger metropolis areas have better capacities to absorb these kinds of influxes. Some of them create their own strategies for protection and care for refugees, while other work on resolving this issue with the central authorities , as well as other cities which have experience in this area.

Fact and experience lead to the fact that the best strategy is the all-encompassing one, which includes great number of government organizations, private sector, and non-government organizations. Especially effective are strategies which offer easily accessible accommodation (cheap housing), access to labor market, education and job training.

It should also be pointed out that that at global level, greatest number of refugees do not live in the well developed cities of Western Europe and North America. Reason for this is the fact that in most cases they are part of the population with lowest monthly income, and as such can live in the “makeshift” homes. This is why access to the services offered by urban settlements is far from the reach of these people. There is also the fact that in the urban areas themselves

⁶⁶ Moggah, M.R. (2018) “Refugees and the City: The Twenty-first-century Front Line” in World Refugee Council Research Paper No.2. Vol.2, p.p. 18

⁶⁷ www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html, looked at on 10th of May,2019;

there are very large social and economic discrepancies. When you add to this the political turbulences, growing insecurity, xenophobia, and marginalization, it is not hard to presume that these people will become easy subject of criminalization (real and perceptive one).

2.2 Urban migration: challenges and possibilities

Numbers show that in 2015 and 2016 about 1.5 million refugees have stationed themselves in the cities all over Western Europe.⁶⁸ When faced with such influx of people city infrastructure and services always find themselves under pressure. This caused tensions which can be used by all sorts of nationalistic elements and political parties, thus changing and influencing state migration policies. Initial perception of city residents is that these incoming people represent a threat to the public law and order. Ignition capsule are usually individual cases in which young migrants and refugees conduct illegal activities against old town residents (one of the more famous cases is the police report according to which in 2015 and 2016, in the German cities of Cologne, Hamburg, Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Stuttgart, and, Bielefeld, about 1.200 women have been sexually assaulted by about 2,000 people of Arab or North African descent). This kind of new or information brought new wave of migration policy restrictions, while all migrants were generally perceived as criminals and sexual offenders.

Contrary to those believes, most commonly the refugees cannot be brought in connection with the increase of crime at a certain location – research has shown that refugee communities are less prone to crime then the rest of the communities at certain urban areas. A 2017 research by „New American Economy“ has shown that level of crime in cities with constant refugee communities has actually gone down. Most often reason for this is their fear of violating the law which would directly lead to their deportation, thus leading them to have greater self-control. Same conclusion can be reached when looking at data in connection with the rise of violent extremism and terrorism at urban environments.

When it comes to availability of job vacancies, most often there is a short term negative effect caused by influx of available workforce, while and mid and long term this situation actually turns into a positive influence, especially in the part of deficient work forces positions, or for job positions which are considered undesirable for the other residents of the urban environments.

Taking into consideration all the factors it can be concluded that city – urban environments have better capacity and potential to integrate the migrants without any greater difficulties (both mid and long term). What needs to be done is preparation and implementing of adequate strategy for promoting, protecting, and supporting refugees (migrants), organizing a system for collecting and sharing information with the goal of improving institutional coordination. This can be done by encompassing greater number of state and non-government element for the purpose of promoting equality in use of services promoted in favor of the immigrants, such as training and adaptation programs, educational programs, and other similar type of programs, which are most often organized the United Nations and other non-government organizations.

⁶⁸ ec.europa.eu/echo/node/4115, looked at on 11th of May 2019;

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PROTECTION OF PIPELINES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS

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Abstract: Pipelines are an integral part of energy infrastructure and because of the length of spreading they are often the most vulnerable to attacks. Pipelines can be attacked by vandals or terrorists and can be the intended target for thieves or even sabotaged by the competition. It is not easy to prevent hostile, armed groups that attack the pipeline, and the consequences of the attacks and theft can be serious: hundreds of people die from these works each year. The second consequence can be fuel shortages or price increment locally, nationally or even on international level.

Energy resources are a very important factor for the survival of each state. As a part of critical infrastructure of each country, they represent a very suitable target for terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, pipelines are difficult to protect and it can easily be damaged. They are spreading on large distances, and their location can be placed on the web sites or in the company's literature. The aggravating circumstance is that many pipelines are spreading through conflict areas. In addition, a typical attack can include 2 or 3 terrorists, three shovels, 5 kg explosives, roll wire and battery. In this paper we will examine a protection of pipelines from terrorist attacks, actors that are included in protection and modalities of their operations.

Key words: Pipelines, terrorism, energy infrastructure, critical infrastructure

Introduction

In the modern world, the provision of sufficient amount of energy, necessary for the economy and social needs of the community, is one of the most important responsibilities of the state. In conditions of a growing lack of energy resource resources, state power and government stability are differentiated through the possession of energy resources. Also, the fight for energy products has become a struggle for domination and the establishment of a monopoly on the world economic market. Energy security is inextricably linked to the establishment and preservation of energy infrastructure at the strategic and tactical level. For that reason, energy infrastructure is defined as a part of critical infrastructure.

The term critical infrastructure is (re) born after 9/11 events. Although critical infrastructure has been exposed to multiple types of hazards including national events, technical failure, human error and criminal act, since 2001 a special type of danger had been identified-terrorism.

When choosing target of attacks, terrorists are focused on those whose destruction will not only have an echo and impact on the public opinion but will also undermine the political and economic stability of the state. The oil fields, pipelines, tankers and refineries, as an integral part of energy infrastructure, represent the ideal target for the attack. In the countries with a large oil and gas sector, terrorist attack can cause significant disruption across multiple industries, pushing up costs and driving down economic growth.

Terrorist attacks on remote infrastructure like pipelines are hard to defend against, because of the length of spreading. This type of infrastructure extends to the ground underground and underwater, which further complicates its protection, more accurately provides numerous opportunities for terrorists to attack. By attacking or even controlling areas of critical energy infrastructure, terrorists can undermine not only the power and stability of the attacked government, but also can produce the economic weakening of the entire region.

Energy infrastructure as a part of a critical infrastructure

Critical infrastructure (CI) includes a wide range of vital sectors such are transport, production and distribution of energy, information and communication systems, health services, systems for water and food supplies, financial services, and state infrastructure. The partially or the completely cancellation of these infrastructures can endanger the company, national security and lead to a variety of problems. Countries are trying to identify and analyze a critical sectors, subsectors, processes, and objects using different methodological and political approaches in order to protect it. Increased interdependence between critical infrastructures and complexity of larger operating systems has made critical infrastructures particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and natural hazards, human error and technical problems, as well as new forms of cybercrime, terrorism and cyber – wars (Micovic, 2016:36). Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) relates to activities that relate to a protection of infrastructure of crucial importance. This includes people, physical assets and information-communication systems that are necessary for maintaining national and international security, economic stability, public and legal order and security.

The term critical infrastructure become official term of public policy in 1996, when President Clinton, after a terrorist attack in Oklahoma, signed Executive Order (EO) 13010 - Critical Infrastructure Protection, thereby establishing a joint public-private commission to develop a national strategy for protection of critical infrastructure and ensuring their continued operation. The EO identified the following specific infrastructure as critical: "telecommunications; electrical power; gas and oil storage and transportation; banking and finance; transportation; water supply; emergency services (including emergency medical services, police, fire and rescue); and government services" (EO 13010, 1996: 37347).

In October 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure created by EO 13010 issued its final report. In this report we can find definitions from a vast and diverse set of industries, technologies, people and traditions. Further, in the context of energy infrastructure, for us is important a definition of Gas and Oil Production, Storage and Transportation "A critical infrastructure characterized by the production and holdings facilities for natural gas, crude and refined petroleum, and petroleum-derived fuels, the refining and processing facilities for these fuels and pipelines, ships, trucks, and rail systems that transport these commodities from their source to systems that are dependent upon gas and oil in one of their useful forms" (Critical Foundation Protecting America's Infrastructure, 1997:B-2).

Every country identifies which sectors are considered as CI, but a number of sectors are likely to be regarded as CI by all countries. The energy sector is a prime example of this, and according to EU it includes:

1. oil and gas production, refining, treatment and storage, including pipelines;
2. electricity generation;
3. transmission of electricity, gas and oil;
4. distribution of electricity, gas and oil (CTED and UNOCT, 2018:34).

The energy sector is extremely vulnerable, as it has a significant impact on several other sectors critical infrastructure within the economy. Global nature of the energy industry - and its impact on global economy - requires serious consideration of the resolution of its vulnerabilities. Production and supply of energy resources rely on a complex infrastructure system which is among the most critical in the world. These include pipelines, plants, refineries, flow stations, distribution lines, terminals, fuel tanks, electric power poles, pumping stations, processing plants, containers and tankers (CTED Trend Report, 2017:4)

At the strategic level, energy security does not only apply to the safe exploitation and delivery, ie supply, but also to safe transport as a separate process (Parezanovic, 2014: 19). In addition to accessing energy resources, it is necessary to provide reliable and continuous supply, since the crisis situations with energy sources do not occur only at the source of the energy products, but also along the length of the pipeline. A safe transport of energy products includes a protection of pipelines from very different threats. Therefore, pipelines are an integral part of the energy infrastructure whose main characteristics are the large length of spreading, and most often extend in the territories of several countries and relatively easy access. As a result, their physical protection is significantly more difficult and involves comprehensive security capabilities of each state as well as the coordination of several countries. That is a challenging process, especially because pipelines are spreading through the territories of several states, from which some of them can have a problematic, even conflict security situation. The attack on a pipeline in one country not only jeopardizes the energy, economic and security architecture in that country, but can endanger the entire region.

CIs are attractive target for terrorist attack for a variety of reasons. Ackerman et al. identified at least five possible reasons for choosing this kind of targets. Firstly, they may be an

appealing target because of their strategic value for societies. By attacking these facilities, they can disrupt, damage or destruct a key operation of a society. That could have a cascading effect on integrated infrastructural systems and tremendous psychological impact on population. A second reason is that certain terrorist groups may have an ideological predilection to attack CI because they see various infrastructural entities as embodying the very “injustices” they are trying to redress. Third, other groups may attack CI because infrastructural targets have a particularly resonant symbolic value as well as a potentially impact. Fourth, still other groups may do so in order to rally or express their solidarity with their proclaimed constituents, in particular those on whose behalf they purport to be fighting. Fifth, some groups may do so because they are seeking to obtain maximum publicity without causing large number of casualties. However, in many cases it is probable that terrorist groups will decide to attack infrastructural targets for a multiplicity of reasons rather than for only one reason (Ackerman, et al. 2007:170-171).

The motivation of terrorists to carry out an attack on pipelines stems from several interconnected factors, among which the most significant are the extent of potential damage, media coverage of attacks and the availability of targets. A successful attack on pipelines will result in distribution problems, which directly and indirectly reflect to economic losses, diminishes the quality of life of citizens, and creates temporary or permanent economic trouble, or even an environmental damage. Dependencies from oil and gas increase level of pipelines vulnerability. The threat to pipeline is made more acute by the extensive reliance by industry and economy which exacerbate the effect of cross-sector and transnational dependences. Also, a simple attempt, even a failed one or that causes very limited damage, might provide the desired level of media response, particularly because of it the great economic value. The final decision as to which CI to target will depend on the group’s operational capabilities to launch a particular attack. Pipes are relatively accessible targets, and the attack on them does not require a lot of resources. Terrorists should have little skill and a suitable opportunity for attack, which makes this target more vulnerable.

Characteristics of the pipeline

In order to enable the more effective and successful protection of pipelines from terrorist attack, it is necessary to know the characteristics of the pipelines themselves. The main characteristics of pipelines are se follows: 1) function, 2) size, 3) material 4) position and 5) pressure.

The main function of pipelines is delivering of large volumes of processed natural gas at high pressures over long distances. The size is typically 5 to 150 cm in diameter. The material that could be used for pipeline fabrication covers a wide range high-strength carbon steel, cast iron, wrought iron, steel, plastic or copper. However, the oil and gas pipelines are, generally, made from steel, and in particular, either low-carbon steel or low-alloy steel which consist 98 to 99 percent of iron. The small amounts of carbon (0.001 to 0.3 %), manganese, molybdenum, titan etc. are added to improve mechanical properties, such as strength and toughness. The materials that should be used for the oil or gas pipelines are provided in standard EN 14380 4(European standard EN 14380) Typical values of pressure are from 5 to 100 bar.

The pipelines, in the most cases and in term of this paper, belong to the pressure equipment which is divided into high-risk equipment and low-risk equipment according to the health and safety of people and the environment. High-level risk equipment presents a threat to the safety of people and the environment, because failure can result in potentially catastrophic consequences. Therefore, the "Regulations on the inspection of pressure equipment during the lifetime of use" (Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, 87/11) determines the inspection requirements and the inspection period for each type of pressure equipment. Determination of the hazard level and category of pipelines is done according to Diagrams 6-9 of Annex I - Distribution of pressure equipment to the level of danger, "Regulations on the inspection of pressure equipment during the lifetime of use". When determining the category of pipeline, the relevant size is the nominal diameter, i.e. the product of the pressure and the nominal diameter of the pipeline. In addition to these two values, the state of the fluid (liquid or gas) and the group of fluids (group 1 or 2) must be taken into account for determining the category of pipelines and hence the level of danger. The failure of the pipeline is due to overpressure, corrosion, undiscovered material faults or welded joints or improper handling, as well as the occurrence of a hydraulic shock. The test period is defined in Annex III - Schedules of Periodic Inspection, "Regulations on the inspection of pressure equipment during the lifetime of use" ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 87/2011). An external inspection of the pressure pipeline is scheduled for 5 years, the internal inspection is not foreseen and the hydro or pneumatic test of 5 years. The gas pipelines shall be tested according to the "Rules on conditions for the safe transport of natural gas by pipelines under the pressure greater than 16 bar" (Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, 37/2013 and 87/2015). The piping system should be calculated, designed, tested, fabricated etc. according to EN 13480.

Modalities of the terrorist attacks

Terrorism-related threats against critical infrastructure have multiple dimensions. In the UN document The protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism attacks we can find one general classification on terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure depending on:

1. their nature: physical versus cyber
2. their nature: insider versus external
3. the context in which they occur: isolated versus multiple targets (CTED and UNOCT, 2018:17).

Physical threats to critical infrastructure can take a variety of forms. Their common characteristic is that they aim at destroying an infrastructure, weakening it or rendering it inoperative in full or in part by intervening on its physical structure, mechanical components etc. Although cyber threats differ from physical one in nature, the end result may be the same. Cyber threats vary but may include: manipulate system of data; shut down crucial systems; limit access to crucial systems or information.

While the protection of critical infrastructure from outside attacks is given a significant attention, insider threats have been the object of comparatively less attention. Insider perpetra-

tors have undisputed advantages because they are in position to observe processes undisturbed. Insider perpetrators are often company employees or suppliers, and they can either be the main conspirators or act as accomplices to outside actors.

Threats against critical infrastructure can be either isolated or sporadic acts, or part of a broader plan to attack infrastructure at the same sector, belonging to an identical owner, or located in the same geographical area (CTED and UNOCT, 2018:17-20).

The above classification of modalities of terrorist attacks can also be applied to cases of attack on pipelines. The most significant division of modalities of terrorist attacks is on physical and cyber-attacks, although these two attacks can occur simultaneously. Physical attacks on pipelines are the most common and they show the level of potential vulnerability that could occur if pipelines rupture or damage after terrorist attack. The fact that pipelines run largely underground reduces their exposure to external threats, but required marking still emergency responders, homeowners – and terrorists – where pipelines are located. Rather than trying to uniformly protect their entire systems, operators emphasize the security of especially vulnerable areas, such as river crossings, control centers, junctions, and storage tanks (Parfomak, 2004:6). Therefore, the pipelines are easily accessible relatively easily, whether the attack is made from water, air or land. Pipelines can be damaged with explosives or by other mechanical means that cause disruption of flows or causing a release of pipeline contents. The most common are attacks on land by using explosives, bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This means that terrorists will physically place an explosive device near a pipeline that can be activated immediately, a slowed down or delay activation. In suicide attacks, terrorist explosives are activated immediately, while in the event of a slow dawn or delayed activation terrorists have strategy of withdrawal from the place of the attack. Also, attack can be realized by using vehicle bomb. Vehicle bombs are able to deliver a sufficiently large quantity of explosives to cause potentially devastating structural damage. The attack on the pipelines can also be carried out by mechanical means, in order to reach leakages and a possible explosion. If an attack is carried out by a bulldozer, or by using other construction machinery, physical damage can be inflicted, that is, due to the impact, it can explode the fuel tank, and in this way, the pipelines will be damaged.

While physical attacks on pipelines have been more common, cyber-attacks on pipeline systems are becoming more frequent as systems are computerized. Cyber-attack become more sophisticated and target of this kind of attack connected to pipelines are numerous. They can attack from data system to pipeline safety system. This kind of terrorist attack are particularly dangerous because they can be executed from anywhere, and the consequences may be different from overload to damage of the system. For example in order to reduce costs and optimize operations oil and gas companies are deploying more and more IoT sensors so they can closely track flows and data related to production operations. This has resulted in increased connectivity between IT and OT networks, which has increased the attack surface and hence the risk.

Less likely are terrorist attacks using chemical and biological attacks. Namely, in the case of these attacks it is necessary first to find an adequate place where the agent pour in the pipeline. In the case of a chemical attack, it is also necessary to determine which chemical agent to

pour in order to react with oil and gas that flow through the pipelines, as well as the amount to be poured to reach the reaction at all. In the case of a biological attack it is also necessary to determine which biological agent to pour in order to survive in oil and gas flowing through pipelines, as well as the place where this agent will come into the environment in which people live. So terrorist attacks of this kind are too complex and less likely to occur.

What constitutes an additional danger is that the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are not just actors outside the critical infrastructure system. Terrorists recruit employees who have the necessary knowledge or an approach to make the attack more successful with more success. Employees who know vulnerable places pipelines greatly facilitate the execution of the attack itself. The self-attack of op pipelines can be an isolated attack but also the beginning of a chain reaction and a part of a larger plan.

Phases of terrorist attacks on pipelines

Terrorist operations are typically well prepared for attack in order to achieve the highest probability of success. Terrorists avoid an adversary's strengths and concentrate on their weaknesses. Terrorist attacks vary depending on the target of attack, the existing resources, goals, but generally they run through three phases, preparatory or pre-attack phase, attack phase and escape and exploitation phase. Understanding of activities in these phases can help not only in recovery after terrorist attack, but also in preventing it by recognizing preoperational activities.

Graph 1: Phases of Terrorist Attack



Source: Authors

Pre-attack phase include a number of activities that will enable the successful attack. Firstly, terrorist perform initial target selection that include collecting information on a number of targets. This phase represents the collection of information on a number of potential targets from diverse of source. The information can be gathered from open sources like internet (texts, picture, video, and maps), media and newspaper, but also from another people that can provide information (informants, insider and sympathizers). Potential targets need to be screened based on vulnerabilities/noticed point of failure, expected number of mass casualties, symbolic value and potential to generate a height level of media cover. A number of potential targets that will be screened is defined by the capabilities of terrorist group.

Targets that are recognized as vulnerable and potentially adequate for terrorist attack are going to be observed or put under the surveillance. Initial surveillance can last a few days, weeks or even years. The goal of this phase is to anticipate existing security measures (presence of

guard force; reaction time of response unit; any hardening of structures, barriers or sensors; staff), procedures and routines of employees, availability of transportation into target site, types of vehicles that are allowed on the grounds and complacency of staff and employees.

Analyzing the data collected, its resources and capabilities and probability of success of the attack, the terrorists select the specific target. After selecting a specific target, terrorists carry out detailed surveillance and planning of attacks. In this phase terrorist gather information on the target's current patterns, usually days to weeks. The attack team confirms information gathered from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities. During this phase they develop detailed security assessments and prepare operations, define modality of attack, decide on type of weapon. Also, they design and test escape routes, and prepares all means that are needed (procure a base of operations in the target area-safe houses, find a way for border crossing, forged documents, means of transport, and weapons of attack). Finally, if it is necessary, they recruit specialized operatives. All activities realized during pre-attack phase should improve a chance for success. In the last moment of surveillance, they need to ensure that nothing significant has been changed in environment and that plan of attack is still applicable. In some cases, they organize rehearsal attacks in similar or simulated conditions.

Attack phase - The realization of the terrorist attack implies a flashy action in accordance with a pre-prepared plan. Once terrorists reach this phase of their operation, the odds favor a successful attack against the target. Element of surprise is very important, so terrorists carefully chose time of attack. Since terrorist are the attacker, they possess an important tactical advantages that include realization of diversions and follow up or secondary attacks, and engagement of security and support positions to security measures and neutralize target reaction forces.

Escape and exploitation phase - Escape plans are usually well rehearsed and executed, in except with a suicide operation in which attacker has been killed, but escape can be necessary for support personnel. Also, escape usually involves rapidly moving away from the place of the attack, possibly hiding in safe houses, and eventually crossing the state border. All those activities are well plain in order to enable a safe departure route for attackers. Exploitation is the primary objective of the operation and terrorist attack must be properly publicized in order to achieve an intended effect. Media control measures and prepared statements are examples of preparations to effectively exploit a successful terrorist operation. Terrorist effectively use strategic communications that mean the media report are prepared for carefully selected audiences. Successful attacks that gained favorable attention provide notoriety and support such as funding and recruiting to the terrorist organization.

In literature we can find the Terrorist Attack Cycle that includes all previous mentioned phases and activities. It graphically shows the order of most important activities. The cycle symbolize that terrorist will conduct next attack, after realization of previous one.

Graph 2: The Terrorist Attack Cycle



Source: "Understanding the Attack Cycle and Vulnerabilities", A Report by Stratfor Threat Lens, Internet: <https://lp.stratfor.com/terrorist-attack-cycle-threat-lens-report>

Phase of terrorist attack on pipeline are very similar to previously explained phases of terrorist attack in general. When they chose a pipeline as a target for their operation, terrorist activities should be aligned with the characteristics of this type of infrastructure. In order to acquire all the necessary knowledge about the pipeline position and their characteristics, it is necessary to collect data from open source as well as from secret one. These data are provided by search of the Internet, but also through the employees (former and current) and other persons that possess knowledge (experts in the field of energy, construction). Information can be provided by intelligence services of other states that have an interest in destabilizing the state in which the attack is planned. Also they will organize surveillance along the pipeline to anticipate security environment in order to find a convenient place at which they will conduct the attack.

Most important decisions are about place, time and modality of attack. Definition of the precisely place of attack give a lot of opportunities for the terrorist, because the pipelines extend over long distances, and their location can be posted in company websites. But, most part of the oil and gas pipelines are located below the ground, making them more secure of all external factors and risks. Also, pipelines are usually built outside settlements airports, railway and ports. Unlike refineries where there are various security systems such as video surveillance and access control, pipelines are in most cases unprotected. In accordance with their goals and capacities, terrorists can decide whether to attack a pipeline on land, under water or even underground. In pre-attack phase, after the selected attack site, they will implement a detail surveillance of the location and select the modalities of the attack itself. This decision include decision on weapon, the perpetrator of the attack (if he needs to possess special skills and knowledge), the possibility of purchasing weapons and their delivery at the scene of the attack. They also need to prepare the arrival of the attackers, and to test escape routes after the attack. Finally, it is necessary to

prepare media reactions in the event that the attack is successful or unsuccessful, which will be released immediately after the attack.

The execution of a terrorist attack on the pipeline is the shortest stage in this process. Since attackers on the pipelines do not generally enter in restricted spaces, their arrival at the place of the attack is easier. With a swift attack in accordance with all the prepared activities, terrorists will try to provide maximum damages to the pipelines. Although the attackers will mostly retreat after the attack, a particularly dangerous situation could perform if terrorists decide to attack workers who had repaired the damage. Armed attacks from ambushes or surprise mines make workers more focused on personal security than on removing damage, which provides the impact of the attack bigger and more dangerous.

Escape phase as the final phase of a terrorist attack implies the implementation of an imported escape procedure, but it may also include improvisation if the government forces cut off the path. Given that the pipelines are mostly unprotected, terrorists are relieved to escape from the scene of the attack. Terrorist attacks on pipelines connect two spheres of public interest, fear of terrorism and fear of energy insecurity. For this reason, the media will cover the attack carefully, and terrorist will try to use this media attention to show their strength, attracting and sympathizers, collecting financial resources, recruiting and radicalizing new members. The destabilization of the energy security of one country would mean the instability of the government itself, which is the biggest motive for terrorist attacks on the pipelines.

Minimizing the vulnerability of pipelines to terrorist attacks

Measures taken to protect the pipeline from terrorist attacks are part of measures against terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure in general. Accordingly, in the literature, the focus is on recommendations for development national strategies for reducing risk to CI. The most countries have been providing security measures for their CIs long before CIs protection established itself as a policy field in its own right. Focus on CIs protection is put on because that is increasingly transversal task. The interdependence between sectors, with the potential for cascading effect in case of accident requires the ability “to see the big picture” as a condition to effectively coordinate prevention, response and recovery actions across sectors (CTED and UN-OCT, 2018:23). Such activities represent a good base for the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks. However, the pipelines have numerous specificities (pipelines extend over long distances, mostly they are not covered by video surveillance and physical and technical protection). For this reason, in addition to the implementation of the protection of energy infrastructure (with emphasis on all of its components including pipelines), the emphasis on protection should be placed on prevention, physical security (including technical security), personal security and cyber protection measures, as well as respond and recover from terrorist attack.

Preventing terrorist attacks on pipelines represent an integral part of protection energy infrastructure. This protection ultimately depends on the coordinated activities of intelligence services, the law enforcement community and implementing security procedures by all stakeholders. The fundamental importance in preventive activities is also the criminal law, that is, how

much possibilities it offers for the proactive activity of the agencies and services themselves. Effective security measurer requires the integration of physical, personnel and cyber-security elements.

In addition to good legal regulations, the work of all services related to the protection of pipelines, some of the recommendations for the protection of pipelines are paying the attention to the following activities:

1. Explosions or fires of a suspicious nature affecting pipeline systems, facilities, or assets;
2. Actual or suspected attacks on pipeline systems, facilities, or assets;
3. Bomb threats or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats to pipeline systems, facilities, or assets;
4. Theft of pipeline company vehicles, uniforms, or employee credentials;
5. Suspicious persons or vehicles around pipeline systems, facilities, assets, or right-of-way;
6. Suspicious photography or possible surveillance of pipeline systems, facilities, or assets;
7. Suspicious inquiries from people asking about pipeline system, facility, or asset operations, vulnerabilities, or security practices;
8. Suspicious individuals applying for security-sensitive positions in the pipeline company;
9. Theft or loss of sensitive security information (detailed pipeline maps, security plans, etc.) (US Department for Homeland Security, 2018:25)

Respond plan: the attack on pipelines involves a number of harmful consequences, from leaking gas and oil that not only represents economic loss, but seriously threatens the environment. Also the cessation of the flow of these resources as a result of a terrorist attack can have numerous negative economic consequences. Response activity should include preventing or minimizing the consequences of the terrorist attack as loss of life, injury, physical damage of pipelines or disruption in flow of resources, in order to provide immediately relief.

Recovery - The recovery phase can include the development, coordination, and execution of "service and site-restoration plans". These plans include the reconstitution of Government operations and services, as well as different assistance programs to address targeted needs (e.g., to provide housing). Restoration can be effected through public assistance programs, as well as through private-sector, non-governmental programs (CTED Trend Report, 2017:13). Recovery commonly identifies long term action in order to support reconstruction efforts. That include not only repairing physical infrastructure, but restoring status quo in terms of communities' social and economic well-being.

Conclusion

Critical infrastructure has become a very important place for terrorist attacks due to the scale of consequences that the attacks have on the given society. Due to their characteristics, pipelines become one of the tempting targets. Hazardous materials transported through the pipeline infrastructure pose an exponential consideration when assessing risk. Catastrophic damage to the physical pipeline infrastructure would also create a cascading disruption in the

supply chain, and ultimately the organizations serviced by the commodity. The effects of any disruption would cascade to the many industries that are dependent upon a stable and reliable flow of natural gas and petroleum products.

For those reason, facilities for the production of oil and gas are high-value targets for terrorist attack. They represent the same security problems as any other critical infrastructure target, and thus can be protected by the same security measures. Unfortunately, pipelines are difficult to protect and can easily be damaged. They spread over large distances, and their location can be placed on the company's web pages or in the company's literature. For this reason, the protection of the pipeline from terrorist attacks has many specificities that must be considered not only by the government but also the management of the critical infrastructure itself when they organize the protection against terrorist attacks, as well as the measures that will be implemented if the terrorist attack occurs.

Acknowledgment

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IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN TOURISM

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Abstract: At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, new types of threats and challenges to global and national security have emerged, which a lot of countries and their governments, as well as international organizations need to deal with. All these unconventional threats, intensified by the process of globalization and internationalization, had a huge impact on the whole international community in the past few decades, penetrating into almost every social sphere. At the same time, they have made it (almost) impossible for the world to deal with.

It is really important to emphasize the fact that these new security threats and challenges, not military, had gone beyond the traditional definition of security and, at the same time, imposed a new perspective of it, meaning that the environment needs to deal with more dynamic and difficult to handle challenges and threats. All of this has made the international security more complex, including states, as well as non-governmental actors from the world scene, making the states, but also civilians more vulnerable as a final result of the intense process of the globalization in every social field.

Terrorism, as one of these new, unconventional threats, and perhaps one of the most discussed issues at many public debates in the past few decades, managed to accomplish its main aim, and that was to terrify the whole world and make the civilians live in fear and in expectation of the next terrorist attack. Terrorists, carefully mapping the locations and targets, using violence and killing hundreds of people in the world, have succeeded in attracting attention of their target groups, making terrorism a global issue.

Terrorists almost always target popular tourist destinations or big metropolises in order to diminish their popularity and reputation, making tourists consider them unstable destinations, which in turn causes a decrease in the number of tourists. This strategy has negative consequences in short-, as well as in long-term, and the state where the terrorist attack had occurred faces great challenges in order to overcome the outcomes, but also to prevent future attacks.

In this paper, the terms terrorism and tourism and their relation will be presented briefly. Further, a few examples of terrorist attacks in different tourist destinations and metropolises will be presented, as well as example of terrorist attacks on airports in Istanbul, as part of the critical infrastructure, but at the same time as one of the most popular touristic destinations, with an aim of getting a clearer and broader view of the implications of the terrorist attack in a certain touristic destination.

Keywords: tourism, terrorism, terrorist attacks, touristic destinations.

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the impact of the globalization was starting to grow immensely; the borders were no longer a barrier for trading and cooperative agreements around the globe, which was the initial goal of the Berlin wall falling. With this, we can pose the question: "With this dream of internationalization and economic intertwinement, were the consequences of this new constellation predicted?" By eliminating the barriers between the countries, the ones who got the bigger end were the criminals, and inevitably – terrorists. The countries were having an even harder time fighting this phenomenon, which was already well known, but it had struck so hard that it had to now be more precisely defined on an international level, so it could be easier to standardize it, and over-time effectively fight it.

Terrorism, as one of these new, unconventional threats, and perhaps one of the most discussed issues at many public debates in the past few decades, managed to accomplish its main aim, and that was to terrify the whole world and make the civilians live in fear and in expectation of the next terrorist attack. Terrorists, carefully mapping the locations and targets, using violence and killing hundreds of people in the world, have succeeded in attracting attention of their target groups, making terrorism a global issue. Terrorists almost always target popular tourist destinations or big metropolises in order to diminish their popularity and reputation, making tourists consider them unstable destinations, which in turn causes a decrease in the number of tourists. This strategy has negative consequences in short-, as well as in long-term, and the state where the terrorist attack had occurred faces great challenges in order to overcome the outcomes, but also to prevent future attacks.

In order to explain the impact of the terrorist attacks on popular touristic destinations, in this paper, a few examples of terrorist attacks in different tourist destinations and metropolises will be presented, but also examples of terrorist attacks on the airports in Istanbul, as part of the critical infrastructure, which at the same time is also popular touristic destinations. The main aim of this paper is getting a clearer and broader view of the implications of the terrorist attack in a certain touristic destination.

Defining terrorism theoretically

Same as any other term in the social studies field, terrorism does not have just one exact, broadly accepted definition although many authors have tried to. Firstly, it is important to note that terrorism is not a new social phenomenon, it is quite the opposite, but the reason it has gotten so much more attention and coverage in the past 3 decades was its rapid expansion and the reconstruction of its shape, content, and ways of funding, organizing and acting, as well as its transition from international to global level. Again, this transition from an international to a global level was a direct and negative globalization consequence. On the other hand this phenomenon gained a huge mass media coverage, which managed to portray terrorism as a much more violent act than it really is, with a huge number of civil and material victims.

It is thought that terrorism is neither a philosophy, nor a movement, but a tool that would be used to put civilians in fear, which would cause psychological fear and sense of insecurity.

Modern day terrorism, as a multi-dimensional political phenomenon, could be theoretically defined as complex form of organized gathering, not so often individual or institutional political violence, characterized not only by physical and psychological methods, but by sophisticated technological methods of political war as well. These methods, which are used in times of politic and economic crisis, but also in times of politic and economic stability, all lead to a systematical attempt of achieving “the big goals” in a morbidly spectacular manner.

In 2002, the Sixth committee of the UN comes close to a broad definition when it posts that terrorism is: “Criminal acts, calculated on purpose in order to produce a state of terror in society, done by a group or certain people, which in a political sense are unacceptable, no matter of the reasons of the act. These acts may be related to political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnical, religious or for other cause (Miloshevska 2016:16).

The EU also came up with a unified definition of terrorism: ‘any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States’ (EP Research Service 2015).

Defining tourism theoretically

The term “tourist” has been used since 1800 when Pegge wrote: “A traveler is nowadays called a Tour-ist.” in his book - “Anecdotes of the English language”. After that, the word tourist got broadly accepted by many writers in France around the 1830, which lead to the use of the word tourism as well (even though a popular opinion is that the word roots from “Grand tour” – which was a trip around 17-19 century for the English aristocrats around Europe as a way of recreation and education on the other European cultures).

According to the modern theory, we can divide the definition of tourism in two:

- Definition from an aspect of demand
- Definition from an aspect of supply

In both two concepts, there is a subdivision: a conceptual and a statistical definition of tourism. From the aspect of demand, the oldest is the conceptual definition of Hunziker and Krapf which says: “Tourism is a sum of the phenomena and the relationships arising from the travel and stay of non-residents, in so far as they do not lead to permanent residence and are not connected to any earning activity (Hunziker and Kraft 1942).

Linkage between terrorism and tourism

The fact that tourism and global terrorism, both got adapted to the process of globalization and all its impacts led to a notable growth in the numbers of tourist migration in the past couple decades.

The paradoxal linkage, as Sonmez calls it, between these two phenomenon's is apparent, firstly because of their mutual characteristics which globalization imposed, which are the following: passing the country's borders, the inclusion of citizens of different world-wide countries and the usage of communication technologies, which only amplifies the fact that terrorists carefully target some well-known tourist destinations, in order to achieve their goals, such as gaining media coverage, hitting the economy, ideologically opposing on tourism etc.

The important thing that country leaders and international politics creators (especially in the economy and tourism sector) need to realize is that the tourist's demands and expectations when it comes to touristic destinations are related to the safest possible destination in political and economically stable state. Easy and quick availability to information helps potential tourists to make their decision related to this issue. It is important to emphasize the impact of the media, especially their (non) transparent press release about the security in certain touristic destinations. Power of the media and the wide specter of possibilities of getting information on global level were misused by the terrorists, they were used as a tool for communication and transmitting their political messages to the official governments and states.

Knowing the fact that tourism is a major financial pillar for a few countries, the tourists are used as a powerful weapon in order to destabilize the incoming economy by portraying a negative image of the country as an unsafe destination. If we try to analyze if the number of visitors in a certain touristic destination after a terroristic attack has lowered, stagnated or grew, there is different data, but in all, the risk of terrorism does affect negatively on the touristic demand. According to K. Basu and V.S. Marg, the influence of terrorism on tourism is negative and it usually lasts for roughly a year. The World's Touristic Organization also shared this opinion in their 2005 report, in which they stated that the pattern of tourists after terroristic threats did not change, although they result in temporary changes, but that never completely stopped them.

Terrorist attacks in Egypt

Tourism on the Middle East plays a big role in the general growth of that region, and the report posted by the Global Futures and Foresight Report in 2007 estimates that the number of tourists in this region would grow from 61 million in 2009 to 150 million in 2020.

Directly and indirectly, tourism in Egypt, as one of the most notable destinations in the region, has reached around 13% from the GDP, as well as 2.5 million of employments which makes 11% of the total number of employees of 2010.

Luxor 1997

17 November 1997, in Luxor, Egypt, a terroristic attack occurred in one of the most famous Egyptian tourist attractions – Deir El Bahri, in which 4 Egyptians and 58 tourists got killed, and it is considered that the ones held responsible for this were the fugitive leaders of Al-Gamaa al Islamaja, trying to provoke the "Initiative for non-violence" from July 1997, to destabilize the Egyptian economy, and provoke the government, which would result in empowerment of the support of anti-governmental forces.

Terroristic attack in Sinai, 2004

After the attack in Luxor, on 7 October 2004, a few bomb attacks occurred on the Sinai Peninsula which were quickly defined as terroristic. The first one was on a hotel in Taba, while the other two were on a camping spot in Nuveiba, in which Israeli tourists were staying. According to the Egyptian government. The responsible for the attacks were a group of Palestinians, whose cause was to contra-attack Israel.

Terroristic attacks in Cairo, 2005

A few months after the Sinai terroristic attack, Cairo became a victim of 3 terroristic attacks, from which one was on April 7th, when a suicide bomber shot himself near the Al-Husein mosque. The second terroristic attack happened on April 30th, while the 3rd one happened only 3 a few hours later when two armed women shot themselves, which is also the first terroristic attack in Egyptian modern history, held by females.

Terroristic attacks in Sharm el Sheik, 2005

July 2005, in one of the most popular Egyptian touristic spots – Sharm el Sheik, a few terroristic attacks happened one after another. The victim count was immense – 88 dead and 200 injured, which has to be the worst terroristic attack in Egypt since 1981. The main objective of the attacks were the tourists, which explains why it took place on the day of the Egyptian revolution – 23.07.2005 – a period when the tourist frequency was much higher. Responsible was held the same Islamic terroristic organization which took responsibility for the Sinai and Cairo attacks.

Analysis on the impact of terroristic attacks on tourism in Egypt

Egypt, in the past 2 decades was a victim of a few terroristic attacks, as it was shown that this location always attracts publicity, especially when it comes to negative trends, which was carefully used by some extremist terroristic groups, whose objectives were fulfilled to some extent.

According to the World's touristic organization, three years after the Luxor massacre, Egypt has been named as a tourism leader on the Middle East, by the number of tourists checked in, which is a 14,7% growth since the Luxor attack in 1997. In the following chart, you can see the analysis of arrived tourist's right after an attack, and the following year.




Chart 1 : number of touristic departures in Egypt from 17.11.1997-17.11.1998 69

In the chart, you can see a drastic fall in number of tourists in Luxor, but only in the first 4 months, while in the following period, the number of tourists, grows. The conclusion is that the named terroristic attack, made little to no difference in the general tourism and economy statistics, quite the contrary, when the number of tourists gets to even 500 000.

The following analysis shows the impact on the visits in Egypt, after the Sinai terroristic attacks in the period after the attack in Sinai and in the period after the terroristic attacks in Cairo and Šarm el Shaik. It shows the implications of these attacks in October, showing the negative effects in the first four months as well as after the attacks in Cairo, when the number of tourists goes down to 700 000 in the next two months.




Chart 2. Number of touristic departures in Egypt, 2 years after the attacks in Luxor⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Trading economics, available on: <https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/tourist-arrivals>

⁷⁰ Trading economics, available on: <https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/tourist-arrivals> [visited: 15.08.2017]




Chart 3. Number of touristic departures from 2014-2015⁷¹

Terroristic attacks on the Istanbul airports

In the past couple years, the number of terroristic attacks in Turkey has peaked immensely, especially by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), as well as Daesh, a radically leftist oriented terroristic group DHPK-C and the Kurdish separatist group TAK. In the following part, the attack on the Ataturk airport will be mentioned.

Terroristic attack under the Ataturk airport, Istanbul, 2016

On 28.06.2016 on the Ataturk airport in Istanbul, a terroristic attack took place, where the victim count was – 48 dead and 239 injured. This imposes the question: did this terroristic attack have any implication over the number of passengers, including the tourists.

The following graph shows the number of tourists that have arrived in Turkey, which could be used as a comparison between the numbers of tourists arrived in June, when the attack took place, and the same period the next year.



Chart 4 number of touristic departures in Turkey after the attack in Ataturk airport 2016-2017 ⁷²

⁷¹ Trading economics, available on: <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/tourist-arrivals> , [visited: 15.08.2017]

⁷² Trading economics, available on: <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/tourist-arrivals>

Conclusion

The touristic sector, as one of the main income source in some countries, was purposely chosen as a tool in order to shake up one country's national economic stability. In the past 30 years, the process of globalization and internationalization has allowed information to spread quickly around the globe, and the mass media became the loudspeaker for terrorist, a fact that can be perceived as an advantage, as same as a disadvantage of globalization, especially for the countries that were targets of terroristic attacks. On the other hand, tourists have the right to know the security state of their potential tourist destination.

The results on the basis of statistical data was surprising, knowing that tourists did not get stopped by the terroristic attacks that happened even a few months after one. Knowing that one of the terroristic attack's aims is destabilization of the economy through tourism, namely – ruining the reputation of a touristic spot, it did not do much of a harm, quite the opposite – it gave the destination a bigger media leverage.

To wrap everything up, the consequences on tourism could only be felt in the first four to five months. According to the analysis, it could be easily concluded that the terrorism and terrorist attacks are overrated, not considering the number of human victims and infrastructure damages, but considering the long term impact, especially when it comes to the impact in tourism.

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URBAN SECURITY PROVIDERS: STATE, NON-STATE AND PRIVATE ACTORS⁷³

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Abstract: We live in a predominantly urban world. Contemporary cities are places of new opportunities, improvement of social wellbeing, cultural and artistic enjoyment, the dominant civilizing factors and hubs of innovation. But cities are also sources and theatres for numerous and diverse problems, ranging from crime and violence, to inadequate provision of communal services. That is why it does not come as a surprise that scientists and practitioners more and more discuss about urban security. The city, area of unprecedented social, political and economic complexity, is arguably one of the emerging referent objects, a level of analysis marked by specific security dynamics.

This paper is concerned about one important dimension of urban security – its provision. More precisely, objective of the study is to describe, analyze and understand providing of security in the urban context, as well as actors i.e. providers responsible for protecting important values from significant urban security threats. We argue that there are several types of urban security providers: state, non-state and private. It is discussed that state security providers (national, regional and local authorities, police, armed forces, emergency protection services and other agencies) are most active actors in protecting citizens from serious security threats, and bare most responsibilities in the field of urban security provision. However, upwards, downwards and horizontal shifts in steering activities and power, caused state provider to lose their monopoly in securing urban environment, which gave rise to non-state (international and national NGOs, citizens' organizations, media, schools) and private actors as urban security providers. There is also a preposition that in order to achieve optimal level of urban security all involved actors must cooperate and work together in a network of diverse and interconnected urban security providers, creating what is called nodal or plural security provision.

For theory and practice of urban security, it is of utmost significance to identify and explore security providers, and understand their role and responsibilities, due to rising urban population, diversity of urban settlements and complexity of contemporary urban security problems (challenges, risks, vulnerabilities, and threats).

Key words: urban security providers, state actors, non-state actors, private actors, networked security provision

⁷³ The paper represents the result of Project 47011 financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

Introduction

We live in a predominantly urban world. Contemporary cities are places of new opportunities, improvement of social wellbeing, cultural and artistic enjoyment, the dominant civilizing factors and hubs of innovation. The leading institutions in education, research, medical care, and finance are found there. The factories and service companies that depend most on skilled labor are concentrated in cities, ensuring that well managed cities can be economically self-sufficient. By the very nature of the activities they host, in their structures and in their monuments, cities are also powerful symbols that embody the pride of a nation.

However, cities, especially larger ones, are particularly vulnerable because all their systems are interdependent, and the vulnerability of one system can have a major impact on other systems (Bugliarello, 2003: 499). Unless the population can be assured a reasonably safe and secure life, no amount of social services or economic resources would make life in the city sustainable (Branscomb, 2006: 225-226). As we may conclude, cities are sources and theatres for numerous and diverse problems, ranging from crime and violence, to inadequate provision of communal services. That is why it does not come as a surprise why scientists and practitioners more and more discuss about urban security. The city, area of unprecedented social, political and economic complexity, is arguably one of the emerging referent objects in security studies, a level of analysis marked by specific security dynamics.

This paper is concerned about one important dimension of urban security – its provision. More precisely, objective of the study is to describe, analyze and understand providing of security in the urban context, as well as actors i.e. providers responsible for protecting important values from significant urban security threats. In order to achieve this goal, the paper is structured as follows. First, the basic conceptions on security provision are outlined. In the second part we focus on specificities of security provision in the urban environment. Third, characteristics, role and activities of state and non-state security providers are addressed, as well as nodal form of security provision. Finally, some of the approaches and strategies for urban security provision are proposed.

Security providers

Security providers, in the most general sense, can be identified as actors involved in achieving security and responding to security problems in order to protect vital values. These are all forces and entities engaged in the protection of important values against serious security threats (Lipovac, 2014). Some authors differentiate macro (international) and micro (sub-state) levels of actors that participate in reaching security (Møller, 2000). It is commonly considered that there are state and non-state security providers, with private security providers sometimes considered as separate category. State or public providers are usually military, police forces, different levels of government, intelligence, emergency protection services etc. Non-state providers could be non-governmental organizations, citizens' associations, media, private companies. Non-state actors are not "new" in the security provision arena. As Elke Krahmman stated they "have not only proliferated disproportionately over the past two decades, [but] also significantly

expanded their contribution to the making and implementation of security policies" (2005: 9). Which security providers will be active in providing security and what will be the scope of their responsibilities depends mainly on the level of security, i.e. discussed unit of security, as well as on the nature of the security problems (challenges, risks, threats).

Although state actors, i.e. national government, regional and local authorities, police, military, other services and agencies, are traditionally recognized security providers, modern security provision is increasingly becoming the task of a network of actors. To signify the complexity of security provision, adjectives such as nodal, plural or polycentric are often used. These terms serve to indicate the fact that the provision of security should not be limited to state actors and their activities (Dupont and Wood, 2007:99). Within the complex network of actors in charge of providing security, the state actors, private security as well as individuals have specific roles (Button, 2007). There is also a notion of "security governance" described as network of growing range of diverse security providers, "a fragmented mode of policy making that includes state and non-state actors" (Krahmann, 2005: 11) on different levels, from individual to international. Provision of security is the duty of numerous formal and informal, legal and illegal actors who attach specific significance to security, carry out various activities in accordance with different interests (Dupont and Wood, 2007: 111).

Urban security providers

Considering security providers at the city-level, the authors who question this issue are either examining security in the city in its entirety (Devroe, 2013; Meško et al., 2013, Virta, 2013), or they are trying to explain security provision through one of the segments or problems (such as crime prevention and repression, emergency, social delinquency etc). Providing urban security includes models, strategies, and practices for identifying and controlling problems and risks associated with crime and antisocial behavior in the city. Broadly speaking, this process refers to the constellation of institutions, actors and actions, whether central or local, formal or non-formal, public or private, commercial or voluntary, which provide social control, conflict resolution and protection from threats (Recasens et al., 2013: 372). Providing urban security includes different levels, actors and contexts, and in particular their interconnectedness.

Security providers in contemporary cities are numerous, which depends on the many factors that are affected by the specificity of the urban environment, which relates to the size of the city, its appearance, the functions it has, the socio-demographic structure of the population, built environment. The security response will also be heavily influenced by the nature of the security problems that dominate in one city. We can therefore expect different ways of providing security in the highly violent cities of Latin America, post-industrial cities of the Far East, developed cities of Europe, overpopulated cities of Africa, or the capitals of post-communist countries. The nature of the provision of urban security can be influenced by legislative and constitutional solutions regarding the political organization of the country (whether it is federal or unitary) (Devroe, 2013).

In general, two broad types of urban security providers could be identified. The first group consists of state actors who are also official representatives of the government. In one city, those are primarily police (national or local), local authorities, then numerous consultative bodies, civil protection services, emergency management sectors and other specialized agencies and services. Within non-state actors, very roughly, we can accommodate representatives of civil society - citizens, civic initiatives, non-governmental organizations, as well as growing private security sector.

Public security providers in the city

State or public security providers are usually seen as having the most prominent role in the city. They have the widest spectrum of activities and responsibilities for securing the satisfying level of urban life quality, coordinate numerous services and organizations directly and indirectly affecting different spheres of urban security. Local government, national and local police forces, local security councils, and emergency services are the most recognizable in the security provision in urban environment.

Local government is one of the key - if not the key - state security provider at the city level. This stems from the fact that the local government is in charge of a wide range of activities and responsibilities, which relate to almost every area of urban life, and therefore different dimensions of urban security. Local government, in accordance with the authority and degree of power and autonomy at their disposal, can be responsible for responding to a whole range of threats immanent to urban environments. These may be traditional threats to security, such as urban crime, protests and rebellions, as well as contemporary threats such as natural disasters or the consequences of introducing modern information and communication technologies.

In the area of crime prevention and security enhancement in the community, in contemporary urban context, local government is seen as an equally important entity as well as the police. City administrations play a key role in identifying crime risks and vulnerabilities and ensuring that safety and security policies are tailored to meet local needs, including the involving communities and other relevant non-state actors (UNODC, 2016). The principles of good governance in the city require that local authorities and leaders must be responsible for improving security in urban areas.

Expanding the authority of local government in the area of urban security is justified by the fact that local problems require a local response, and that local actors are main experts in solving them. Thus, the local government is seen as a leader in achieving a safer city environment, which implies a holistic approach in creating a policy of urban security (US Department of Justice, 2001: 18-19). City governments have multiple regulatory powers related to crime prevention and control, but also to a range of other resource distribution and executive powers that can also be used as levers to reinforce security and address root causes enabling insecurity.

European institutions have shown growing interest in urban security, and especially for the role of local administrators in its achievement and enhancement. The Council of Europe has published important publication - *Prevention of Violence - A Guide for Local Authorities* (2002)

- which emphasizes the central role of local government in crime prevention and security for citizens. In this sense, local government can be involved in the prevention of crime in the city, through the prevention of crime, the creation of social policies, policies for vulnerable groups such as young people, minorities, women, then activities related to traffic security, cooperation with the police, the judiciary, the private sector, and encouraging citizen participation.

In addition to the local government, the most visible and most prominent state security provider in the city is the police, since crime and various social deviances are traditionally widespread in the cities. When security management is understood primarily as crime prevention, this activity is usually observed within the community policing model.⁷⁴ According to this concept, the police and the community work closely to identify problems, set priorities and find solutions to issues such as crime, drug abuse, fear of crime, social problems, environmental problems and other types of anti-social behavior and threats to the working and living environment (Meško and Lobnikar, 2005). Community policing is characterized by a decentralized organization whereby police officers obtain legitimacy for their work from the community they serve in addition to the traditional sources of legitimization (e.g. laws, the ruling power and other political structures) (Hahn, 1998).

National police, as well as local police forces, can operate in the city. These two security providers may have different powers and be under the control of various state authorities. National police is usually under the authority on the state level, while local police forces are run by local government.

Recognizing the importance of promoting security and crime prevention, the Council of Europe issued the European Urban Charter (Council of Europe, 1992), pointing out that effective crime prevention involves, *inter alia*, the involvement of all members of the community, and that the effectiveness of the urban security policies depends on the close cooperation between the police and the local community. Law enforcement must involve local communities and support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address conditions that give rise to public safety issues and fear of crime. Upholding human rights and the rule of law are vital for enhancing safety in cities (UNODC, 2016: 4).

While it is commonly understood that local government and police have the greatest responsibility in controlling crime and security, other actors also play an increasingly important role in achieving urban security. First of all, those are local administrative bodies, schools, social services etc.

As urban security providers, some cities hold local security bodies with a very diverse composition and duties (Devroe, 2013). These councils are established in municipalities or cities as consultative bodies on crime and security issues (Meško and Lobnikar, 2005). Authors point to several significant advantages of these councils: "democratization of formal social control and control over the police; cooperation of (responsible) citizens and knowing each other; development of more active cooperation between all local key persons; facilitating of "safety conscious-

⁷⁴ Community policing can be labeled as a philosophy and organizational strategy which emphasizes cooperation between citizens and the police (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994).

ness" and discussions on local problems and "communities that care" mentality" (Meško and Lobnikar, 2005: 364-365).

There are indications and ideas that in the future, security professionals in the city - urban security managers - might appear. This assumption stems from the complexity of security management in cities and the fact that security provision, especially in urban areas, is a job for professionals (Meško et al., 2013: 291).

It should be noted that in some cases state security entities could be perceived as a source of danger and insecurity. In cities marked by high rates of crime and violence, poor economic performances, poverty, rapid and unplanned urbanization, imperfect electoral processes and corruption, security forces are more often than not seen as agents of violence and intimidation, rather than protection (Brähler, 2014: 17). Local and national government lose control over certain parts of the city, that are left to criminal actors such as drug traffickers, youth gangs and paramilitaries (Arias, 2006; Arias and Goldstein, 2010; Goldstein, 2004). Those who have means react with gating themselves in well protected communities, with private guards and expensive alarm systems. The poor and marginalized groups and citizens feel abandoned in security matters or even threatened by state security forces and seek protection elsewhere. Large segments of the population are forced to share urban space with illegal actors and respect them in return for minimal protection (Campbell and Brenner 2002).

Non-state providers of urban security

Upwards, downwards and horizontal shifts in steering activities and power, caused state provider to lose their exclusivity in securing urban environment, which gave rise to non-state (international and national NGOs, citizens' organizations, media, universities) and private actors and their role as urban security providers. However, their number, range of activities and level of importance differ considerably, bearing in mind that each city has its own protection system, which vary greatly with its size, the nature of the perceived threats and how the city is organized to face them. This section examines the nature and capabilities of non-state actors which enables them to help address urban security threats either in collaboration with governments or independently.

Citizens can actively participate in the achievement and improvement of their own security, by organizing on the neighborhood level and by establishing good cooperation with local authorities and the police. In many cities, especially in the United States, there are organized citizens groups in neighborhoods actively involved in providing security. The so-called Neighborhood Watch is a national program where citizens take responsibility for neighborhood surveillance, report suspicious activities and disturbing behavior to their neighbors (Tulumello, 2018). This program emphasizes the role of the community in providing timely information to law enforcement agencies, primarily the police.

Non-governmental organizations, like Red Cross could play important role when emergency occur in urban environment.⁷⁵ This is due to expertise and knowledge, as well as experience of the organization and its personnel in facing serious threats. NGOs contribute directly and indirectly to security by offering services such as humanitarian aid, emergency protection, lobbying governments etc. (Krahman, 2005). Universities and colleges could have well developed research thrusts, often in cooperation with other institutions. They could also offer academic programs, short training courses, seminars, etc. in the area of security.

In discussion about provision of security in the city, the question on private security inevitably arises. Past decades have witnessed a remarkable expansion of the private security sector.⁷⁶ This development marks the emergence of public-private security network that plays significant role in urban security provision. In the literature, the private sector has been usually seen in two main ways. First, there is a tendency to associate the rise of private security with erosion of state sovereignty (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007). Widening the scope of activities of private security providers is seen as decentralization of security, and distancing from traditional state centric understanding of the phenomenon (Davidović and Kešetović, 2007: 25). Second, when private security actors are considered in the literature on non-state authority and governance, they are frequently regarded as illegitimate actors (equal to mafia or militias) (Musah, et al., 2000; Cilliers and Mason, 1999; Hall and Biersteker, 2002). Neither of these positions is completely wrong, but is undoubtedly problematic.

Under urban private security providers we usually consider private security companies whose core activities consist of the day-to-day provision of security.⁷⁷ They provide service to individuals, businesses, governments, and international organizations. The services offered by private sector range from basic manned guarding to alarm, patrol and response services, as well as more sophisticated surveillance and satellite tracking systems (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: 239). The very nature of this security provider means that it sells service (i.e. security) on the market, where public actors are only one of many security providers.⁷⁸ The activities and expertise of the private sector made them preferable provider of security in the city for richer

⁷⁵ In the United States, for example, prominent among the NGOs in the area of urban security are federally funded research and development center - the Homeland Defense Institute at ANSER (Analytic Services) - and the National Academies (National Academy of Sciences (NAS), National Academy of Engineering (NAE), Institute of Medicine (IOM) and National Research Council (NRC)), which, although private, are chartered by Congress to provide advice to the government and conduct a large number of studies pertinent to homeland defense (Bugliarello, 2005: 288-289).

⁷⁶ Some of notable examples of this expansion are private security companies Securitas and G4S. The Securitas group has over 300,000 employees in 53 countries worldwide. G4S is the world's largest security company measured by revenues. It has operations in more than 90 countries. With over 570,000 employees, it is the world's third-largest private employer, the largest European and African private employer, and among the largest on the London Stock Exchange.

⁷⁷ Private military companies are not discussed here, because we are more interested for everyday security provision that impacts life and wellbeing of citizens, in contrast to massive involvement in military operations.

⁷⁸ Authors discuss this especially in relation to private policing. See Johnston, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader, 1997.

layers of society. But this can have political implications on questions such as who is secured and how. Those who pay are also able to play a powerful role in determining the security agenda.

Relations between the public and the private security sector are very important for achieving a stable security situation in the city. These relationships can take the form of cooperation, ignorance or interference. If there is a proper balance between these entities, clear and precisely regulated relations and readiness for cooperation, defined competence, responsibility and division of labor, their capacities will be multiplied, which will affect the prevention and suppression of crime and other urban security threats (Davidović and Kešetović, 2007: 30). Engaging the private security sector to protect the property of private businesses, increasing the safety of residents in certain parts of the city and neighborhoods, allow the police to redirect their resources to organized crime and other serious forms of crime.

Nodal urban security provision

In academic debate about security provision in the cities we can find notions about two important changes in the urban security (Boddy, 2008; Coaffee et al., 2008). First, physical security has shifted from an overt militarized landscape of decades past to a more camouflaged landscape currently prevalent in cities. Second, security policy and planning have become more decentralized, currently undertaken less by singular, public entities and more by networks of public and private actors (Németh, 2010: 2488).

Security provision in cities is increasingly seen as a task of a network of many actors, whose success in protection of basic values, such as the quality of life, public order and peace, and the well-being of citizens depends on mutually agreeable cooperation (Stenning, 2009). The realization of urban security requires cooperation and partnership between state and local authorities and organizations (state police, local police, consultative bodies, civil protection services, emergency management sectors), as well as the involvement of civil society representatives - citizens, civic initiatives, non-governmental organization (Meško et al., 2013: 285).

There are also stances that state actors' importance in providing security in cities has been reduced and that they are just one of the many providers in the political arena. These claims have been criticized by some researchers, stating that, despite the fact that changes in the allocation of management activities and power have led to the loss of a monopoly in defining social interests, values and policy implementation, state entities continue to be unique actors in public life, due to the fact that they have significant resources, such as legitimacy and authority arising from law, constitution, taxation and the ability to legitimately use force (van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004: 152; Hoppe, 2010).

Even if efforts and demands for cooperation and coordination between different subject and entities in urban security provision are strong, the authors point to the fact that providing security at the local level remains the primary responsibility of state actors (Meško and Lobnikar, 2005). In spite of the partial loss of direct control, state actors continue to have a central position due to the exclusive power and resources (Rhodes, 1997; Peters and Pierre, 1998).

Concluding remarks

Provision of security in urban environment is a complex task. It involves many entities, groups and individuals who react to protect vital values from serious security threats. Furthermore, characteristic of the city, its structure, size, environment, demographics, social and economic status, influence the urban security provision. Structural factors, such as political organization and system on national level, the importance of the city in relation to other cities in the country etc., may dictate which urban security provider will have the primary role in the specific urban environment, and the relations between them.

At this place, it will be useful to overview some of the recommended strategies and policies in successful urban security provision. UN-Habitat's Safer Cities Programme suggests several preconditions for cities to develop effective strategy for enhancing security. First, they need an adequate institutional framework and resources to address the issue. Second, they need to develop a role that does not completely delegate the responsibility of a safer community to the police or to specialized organizations. Third, they need mechanisms to ensure participation of as wide a range of citizens as possible, such as consultation practices, public education and neighborhood-scale initiatives. Fourth, they need measures of transparency, such as anti-corruption initiatives, regular reports updating progress on initiatives and the ability to change course over time in response to changing concerns (Whitzman, 2008: 127).

Based on historical examples and contemporary experiences some authors conclude that key interventions in establishing efficient urban security provision include pacification and proximity policing, schemes focused on at-risk youth, urban renewal and slum upgrading and urban governance (Muggah, 2012: 53). Preventing the onset of offending behavior and incivility, enforcing the criminal law, enhancing democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies, and reducing social inequalities in household income and in access to education, employment, healthcare and housing (Meško et al., 2013: 289) could also be seen as preferable approaches for urban security provision.

It should be noted that development of one universal model for urban security provision is not possible, bearing in mind the specificities of different urban environments and complexity of urban itself. However, we believe that successful urban security provision requires holistic approach and cooperation and coordination between multiple security providers who operate in the urban environment. All policy makers should conceive urban security as a goal for a broad set of policies, those aimed at directly reducing the likelihood of crime and those indirectly promoting security through the improvement of societal cohesion, wellbeing and safety for all citizens.

For urban security practitioners it is of utmost significance to identify and explore security providers, and understand their role and responsibilities, due to rising urban population, diversity of urban settlements and complexity of contemporary urban security problems (challenges, risks, vulnerabilities, and threats). The changing nature of security providers is not only transforming the making and implementation of security policies, it also has serious implications for the theoretical analysis of security. Security needs to be broadened beyond the state as the

primary unit of analysis, both in terms of its object and subject. Studying and understanding security provision on a city level could be step forward to this request.

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PSYCHOSOCIAL SKILLS OF PRIVATE SECURITY STAFF/PROFESSIONALS

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Abstract: Rapid social and economic changes are accompanied by a number of risks that adversely affect the psychological state of people. People's psycho-social problems are one of the most complex issues, since various factors influence their occurrence and maintenance. The "cause" of a problem arises not only in one single person, or in a single characteristic of the environment.

The need to acquire psychosocial skills in the work of professionals is necessary to strengthen their individual capacities and to adequately address emerging professional challenges with individuals. Therefore, professionals should permanently complement and strengthen their knowledge, abilities and skills to work with people if they want to be successful in their profession.

In the curriculum for acquiring the necessary qualifications for obtaining a private security license, there is a theoretical preparation of candidates for basic psychological processes, related to life cycles, individual development, motivation and emotions. Professional security agents during work are increasingly exposed to stressful situations. Hence the need for developing skills for dealing with stress related to the profession, strengthening their psychosocial skills for adequate communication (verbal and nonverbal). It is also important to develop communication skills, active listening, effective speaking, solving communication problems, frustration, conflict management and their dismissal.

The acquisition of psychosocial skills among professionals is more than necessary for both the professionals themselves and the community where the services of professional providers are implemented.

Keywords: psychosocial skills, private security professional, conflicts, stress.

Introduction

Rapid social and economic changes are accompanied by a number of risks that adversely affect the psychological state of people. People's psycho-social problems are one of the most complex issues, since various factors influence their occurrence and maintenance. The "cause" of a problem arises not only in one single person, or in a single characteristic of the environment.

The need to acquire psychosocial skills in the work of professionals is necessary to strengthen their individual capacities and to adequately address emerging professional challenges with individuals. Therefore, professionals should permanently complement and strengthen their knowledge, abilities and skills to work with people if they want to be successful in their profession.

As a beginning we will emphasize several general factors connected with good professional psycho-social skills. Such factors help identify something we should or shouldn't expect in the relation to others. They help us be realistic and maybe modify some of the demands we put on ourselves and some of the demands imposed on others.

Can psycho-social skills be learned?

Sometimes the question is asked if qualities we talked about above can be learned. If the answer is positive, the surveyor is usually reserved regarding such learning, because it looks like a bit of premeditated, manipulative approach to human relations. In this case it would suggest that we learn social skills to gain power over others and to get what we want from them. The answer is that of course it's possible to learn to be socially manipulative, but that is not the subject of our education. To acquire adequate psycho-social skills doesn't represent a cynical social manipulation, but a sincere care for the well-being of people in the moment and for their future achievements.

The basic pointer for the competency of any profession, are skills. To be competent in communication means to have good developed communicational skills. The competency can be determined as a set of knowledge, skills and values. Competency in itself also contains evaluation element for the quality of use, so basic are the following criteria:

- Appropriation, as a degree to which some behavior is acceptable and justifiable, i.e. the skills are used in the real moment.
- Success and efficiency, as a degree to which an expected result is achieved, i.e. the skills are used with a certain goal achieved with their adequate application (Spitzber, 2003, according to Hargie, 2006).

The professional competency includes the efficient usage of three types of skills:

- Cognitive – the professional knowledge which also gives a mark to the profession and differs it from others;
- Practical – special practical skills crucial for the profession and
- Communicational – with their help the professionals have the ability for effective interaction with users and other experts.

It is interesting that education in different professional areas traditionally was directed toward the first two types of skills which goes in addition to recent convictions that communication, although marked as essential for success in many professions, by itself is inborn and unchangeable.

The communicational skills are also practical skills who are the base for cognitive skills, because different shapes of communication are based on each intervention regardless of the theoretical and practical approach.

Robbins and Hunsaker (1996, according to Hargie and Dickson, 2004), imply that in order to become competent in any skill it is necessary for the person to understand such skills conceptually and behavioristically, to have the opportunity to exercise it, to gain feedback about how well to apply it, to use it often enough so it becomes an integral part of its behavior repertoire.

Communication skills

The world is full of good speaks men. But it isn't that full of good interlocutors. Most often problems in communication appear when two individuals speak at the same time, there is an inadequate listening of the interlocutor, understanding of the interlocutor is missing and contains only speaking between two individuals competing who will say something first – egocentrically talk. In professional life it is sometimes necessary to speak formally and to keep to the subject. In other cases it is enough to be free with others regardless if they are users, heads, colleagues, subordinates, guests or any other people.

To be a good interlocutor it also means to speak on the real level adequate to our listeners. In professional life we are often in a situation where we speak to people who have lesser quantum of knowledge about things we already know through the offered content in communication or have much lower level of understanding or verbal fluency. Without communicating with them by a higher ground or patronize, we must formulate our sentences so they can follow us. While doing this we should be aware that regardless how much the problem we speak about is important to them and how well we have explained it, they can have a limited range of attention. After a used a sentence of two their attention weakens, and after that all of our eloquence is wasted. In such cases it is vital we often pause and check if the listeners follow us.

Another characteristic of a good interlocutor is the non-presence of irritating characteristics which are connected with the usage of speech or gestures. The constant repeating of some unnecessary expressions such as: **you know, so on, I think and like that**, can irritate even the most patient listeners. As much as irritating is the constant play with your glasses or phone in your hands.

To be a good listener

The ability to hear is also an important part of an effective communication as much as the ability to say what you want. Good listening supposes showing equal interest for what you tell as to what others have to say.

Why are communication skills important?

Recognizing the interlocutor's signals is important so we could know which communication skills to use in a certain moment to establish good communication.

Learning to effectively communicate can help in daily personal and professional relations with rest of the people we're in contact with. Communication is a transfer of information from one subject to another with the help of symbols. Good communication skills can help us develop satisfying and healthy relations with people. On the other hand poor communication skills can hinder the path of forming and keeping of such and can bring to misunderstanding, bad feelings and conflicts.

Types of communication

According to the form there are two types of interpersonal communication:

VERBAL – it relates to specific words we can use as much good as the tone and strength of our voice.

According to Argyle (1983), non-verbal communication functions in 4 different ways:

1. Communicational interpersonal behaviors and emotions;
2. Self-presentation;
3. Rituals and
4. Support of verbal communication.

NON-VERBAL – it relates to the body speech, own face expression and gesticulation.

Professional relations mainly, but not singular, express themselves through spoken language. Professional private security personnel should have basic knowledge of non-verbal communication.

There is a comprehensive literature about non-verbal communication which covers different aspects of analysis of non-verbal signals and body speech where are included (eye contact, face expression, head movement, gestures and movements, body attitude and movement and distance and orientation). The joint theme in this literature is that many things, from friendship to animosity to deepest intimacy can be expressed through these signals and our social skills would be handicapped if we ignore their importance.

The punctuality of the marking of non-verbal signals is influenced by: the intensity of emotions, the sensibility of the interlocutor, the expressing of emotions, the interest and attention of the interlocutor.

The establishing of successful communication influences the relation to others, the image of yourself, self-respect and work success.

There is a number of specific problems we must face when communicating with people on a professional level. How do we communicate with shy and socially inconvenient people to work with? How do we tell bad news perceptively and yet sensitively, how to manage confrontations, and critic others? Certain difficulties appear while communicating with people of other ethnicities.

Skills for managing conflict situations

And now a quite different problem – the conflict. Some people find pleasure in conflicts. They often choose sensations, excitement and challenge in conflicts. Typical for them is that they maybe really feel little antipathy for people they are in conflict with. They mostly forget their anger in the moment when the conflict is over, so for them it isn't more than a recreational game. There are other people who like the conflict because it allows them to impose their view; they don't see a great pleasure in conflict as much as they want to dominate over others. While for other people conflict is important only as a remedy for fulfilling of their needs, interests and plans. They really care about the problem and how to impose their own will while solving it.

- During the professional work there are users of services who create conflicts regardless the prescribed procedure employees apply during their work. Mostly their demands and needs don't correspond with the real situation and principles used in the work. Managing such users demands input of great energy by the employees in solving of conflicts.

General directions for managing of conflicts;

- Don't take verbal attacks too personal, because the personal attacking you probably behaves so with most people;
- Have a constant attitude and show understanding to people prone to conflicts so at least they know their place when it's about you;
- Don't be surprised by the conflict, find out who potentially could face you and when and be prepared;
- Don't instantly allow to be pushed in defense. People finding pleasure in conflicts know how to put you in a position where you will have to justify and apologize yourselves for your behavior; all they need to do is to still find mistakes in your apologies;
- Instead going in defense mode, identify an area of behavior of the other person and find information about him or her and
- Limit the time of discussion since the start.

Steps in resolving of a conflict

There are six basic steps in resolving of conflicts:

- Creating of effective atmosphere;
- Clearing of perceptions;
- Focus on needs;
- Building of positive power;
- Look in the future and
- Generating of possibilities.

The *first* step that must be done is to create an effective atmosphere which will enable the approach to resolving of the conflict.

The *second* step is clearing of perceptions – they are lenses for us to perceive ourselves, others, our relations and situations we face. It must be known that perceptions are formed under the influence of many factors (learning, family, the education system of a society).

The *third* step – functioning based on individual needs, has several key aspects:

- The needs are of the basic parts of a relationship;
- Often needs and wishes are mixed and
- The personal needs of individuals should also include the needs of the relationship.

The *fourth* step is building of positive power. Every relationship also includes power. Because people often limit the way it is perceived and use it as a remedy to control or manipulate someone else, the power is perceived as a dirty choice. People choose a way they use power and if they will allow to be used. The power can be used positively and negatively.

The *fifth* step – look in the future, in the learning of past is contained the idea for effective disappointment of conflicts, starting from the fact each relationship and every conflict have their past, present and future. The past, present and future are connected and their merging in the dynamic process of improving gives the basis of existence.

The *sixth* step – where possibilities are generated, is our ability to discover new possibilities in relationships and to resolve conflicts using packed truths and limited ideas we rely on during time of stress and insecurity. It is known that each journey starts with the first step, but each guide should know that the first step is uncertain and it's not good for him to follow a large one meaning the inability to approach specific solutions. For this purpose a plan for action and establishing of the necessary activities contained in the seventh step is needed, called development of a ladder for action.

The resolving of conflicts has the following advantages:

- Clearing of situations;
- Implementing of new rules;
- Modifying of goals;
- Appearance of competitive spirit and
- Understanding of the need to respect hierarchy.

The deficiencies of conflict resolving are:

- Loss of energy and time;
- Emotional stress;
- Organizational shakes and risks and
- Worsened communications.

For resolving of conflict the following strategies are applied:

- Avoiding or ignoring of conflicts – in the beginning it looks like the problem is solved, but the hidden problem that is a potential danger for a new conflict remains. It is a strategy for creating of feelings for non-existence of conflict;

- Mitigation of conflict – it is a situation of finding a solution to a conflict through nice words with discussion, respectively it represents an open, decent attempt to make differences in opinions past. It usually is temporary and unhappy solution, because the true problem is ignored;
- Coercion – it is a manifestation of aggressiveness because of dissent in opinions and attitudes. The compromise is a known strategy of bargaining and
- Opposing – it appears regarding a problem where the parties have a different opinion or interest.

Managing confrontations

In the work (professional) engagement of the private security employee there is an integrated part for managing formal confrontations. There are three simple manuals: Predict – Avoid – Answer

Predicting means to think in front and to identify the types of confrontations which are possible to appear.

To avoid confrontations doesn't mean run away from them; it means to identify ways to deactivate if they don't have a useful goal.

Off course, if people are determined to create a conflict it isn't always possible to be avoided. But, most effective strategy to do this is to emphasize positive things (as things we can do, not those we can't, areas we can agree on instead those for which an agreement is impossible). Positive things have a unifying and disarming effect. This strategy by itself doesn't necessarily gives solutions, but it changes the atmosphere where these solutions are to be made and makes them more probable. It isn't a surprise that positive commentaries from one person often lead to positive commentaries from someone else.

The third direction for managing formal confrontations, responding, means to have a proper answer if and when a confrontation appears.

While working with "inconvenient" users the HEARD technique can be used.

Hear – meaning hear out the user – what he has to say, while not interrupting him while talking because it's very wrong.

Empathies – to show empathy and understanding to the user's needs.

Ask – to ask the user what to be done to solve his problem.

Respond – Reacting by giving solutions. At the same time we should know what are our solutions and how far can we go in offering solutions for the problem.

Deliver – to inform the user what is agreed upon and the time frame for achieving of the agreed upon.

If the profession private security professional stressful?

Professional stress and professional combusting have become often used terms especially in the period of the nineties of last century in industry and especially in human resources sectors. According to the reports of the National institute for professional safety and health (NIOSH),

one quarter of employees see their work places as number one stress in their life and three quarters believe the worker today is at much higher work stress than in previous times. Work stress research initiate that work stresses have many sources, and the professional stress has many reasons. So some stresses appear while routinely working, some are connected with the role of the worker in the organization, some with inter-personal relations, some with improving of career, others are connected with the stressors in the work environment, or climate and organization in the work place etc. In interaction with all these causes for stress also connected are individual characteristics – the features of the worker’s personality. These characteristics include level of susceptibility/resilience to stress, emotional stability, anxiety, tolerance, perfectionism, and the need of self-showing, too great expectations from actions, social support present in its family or the community.

Professional stress isn’t only the employee’s problem he must face alone. It is also a problem of the organization which feels the negative effects of the worker’s stress. For the employee the negative effects are: increased problems with the physical health, psychological pain and changes in behavior. For the organization the negative effects are: decreased productivity, increased number of missing work days from employees, ill period, decreased profit. That is why this should be treated as a joint problem and to look for ways to control the sources.

To adequately handle professional stress, the private security professionals gain skills to handle stress, with the only goal to decrease the reasons and consequences which bring to serious health disruptions. There are two types of strategies:

Strategies for prevention of professional stress

Strategies mostly mentioned in the literature are grouped as:

- Institutional/organizational strategies to prevent and manage work stress and
- Personal, individual strategies to handle stress.

Institutional strategies

These strategies encompass development of programs for prevention and managing of work stress and inclusion of the employees in such programs. The development of programs for institutional prevention and managing of professional stress includes for phases: identification, intervention, evaluation, supervision.

Individual strategies for prevention and managing of professional stress

There are several group strategies for individual managing of stress: Strategies focused on the problem, Strategies focused on emotions/feelings; Strategies focused on social support, Strategies focused on self-helping and Strategies focused on physical and mental relaxation.

The goal of these strategies is to stop the appearance of stress or to control the level of stress.

Conclusion

Private security professionals should constantly upgrade and strengthen their knowledge, capabilities and skills for work with people if they want to be successful in their profession. The need of acquiring psycho-social skills in the work of the private security professionals is necessary for strengthening of their individual capacities and adequate handling of newly occurred professional challenges with individuals. Psycho-social skills enable us to work with other people professionally but also to find ourselves. Many people who accept themselves as they are mostly try also accept and understand others. A great psychologist once said "to love our neighbors as we do ourselves", not more than us but as much as. The background of these words is that love creates no limits between us and others. If we are capable to have understanding for what is humane than we will be able to understand our neighbors. They have similar hopes, dreams and fears as we do. Although they have a different way of healing their wounds, they also feel pain as we do.

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COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM-MACEDONIAN CASE

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Abstract: The Syrian conflict has its reflection at global level, mainly through the processes of radicalization and recruitment most visible through the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon (FTF), as well as terrorist threats and plots on sensitive targets within urban centers. These phenomena also affected the security of the Republic of North Macedonia imposing previously unknown challenges for the security services, but also society as a whole. The quick radicalization and recruitment of FTF for the terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq required a quick and adequate response by government institutions, and other actors in society as well. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept promoted globally in 2015 gives a primary role in prevention from radicalization and engagement in terrorism. It involves stakeholders not traditionally connected to security. The first response on the FTF phenomenon by the Republic of North Macedonia and other countries was mainly through its security institutions, legal and repressive measures. While the CVE efforts were promoted mainly by international partners, the important prevention role was recognized by Macedonian policymakers recently. The government established new institutions, introduced new strategies and with other actors, especially within the civil society, started to focus more on the local community. This paper critically explores and assesses measures taken by different stakeholders: government, religious communities, civil society organizations (CSOs), international and partner countries. It illustrates the level of implementation of CVE measures by type of projects, target audience, opportunities, and obstacles. The paper is based on desk research and personal experience of the author in interaction with involved stakeholders and serves as a useful basis for future projects and initiatives.

Key words: countering violent extremism, radicalization, terrorism, prevention, foreign terrorist fighters

Introduction

From the beginning of the FTF phenomenon, there was no precise information on the exact number of Macedonian citizens that left for Syria and Iraq. In other Western Balkans countries, authorities and researchers regularly provided information, by this facilitating the monitoring on the phenomenon. As of October 2018, 156 Macedonian citizens have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist organizations, including 10 women, while 35 died, 88 have returned and 15 were still there. The development of the situation affected their movement within those countries

and the returning process. After the collapse of the “Caliphate”, Macedonian citizens, including women and children, were trapped in refugee and prison camps waiting for their repatriation in the country.

The CVE concept in North Macedonia was introduced in 2015, mainly through the US support and with the need to prevent future radicalization and recruitment of FTF. CVE counters the processes of radicalization and not involves prosecutions, arrests, or threats of force. It seeks to mobilize and empower actors that are not traditionally related to national security (local governments, educators, social workers, and civil society). Its main focus is non-radicalised individuals that should be prevented against the appeal of radical ideas. This can be achieved through public information campaigns and capacity-building across communities and targeted programs in schools, universities, youth clubs, mosques and churches, prisons, or on the internet (Neumann, 2017).

Radicalization and recruitment in terrorism were intensified with the escalation of the Syrian conflict in 2012. The first measures by the government institutions and civil society began in 2014 and became visible after 2017. This provides a time framework for review and access of the CVE efforts in North Macedonia.

Government

National coordinator and National committee

Due to the political crisis in 2015, CVE was not on the government agenda until 2017. Former Macedonian officials rarely spoke on this subject, mostly referred to it on international conferences. There were no initiatives by the former government on the FTF phenomenon and only a few activities can be noted within the CVE context. Also, the migrant crisis escalating in 2015 also distracted security institutions from extremism and terrorism. During the peak of the FTF phenomenon, Ministry of Interior (Mol) and then National coordinator for counterterrorism (CT), Toni Jakimovski (currently prosecuted for serious crimes), took only limited number of activities. This includes an international conference in Ohrid (October 14, 2014), titled: “Terrorism: Prevention of radicalization of the youth population” with representatives of security services to better understand these phenomena, but also to find adequate prevention models (Mitan, 2014). In 2015, Mol and OSCE organized training for early identification indicators of violent extremism and radicalization and raise awareness to use the community as a mean to CVE (MIA, 2015). Since 2016, the position of National coordinator was not filed which furthermore undermined national CT and CVE efforts.

The newly elected government in 2017 has included CVE highly on its agenda and started to work more closely with other stakeholders. On August 14, 2017, government appointed the new National coordinator for CVE and CT, Borche Petrevski from the Mol, and his deputies: Xheladin Ajvazi from the Ministry of education and science, as a deputy CVE coordinator, and Zlatko Apostoloski from the Mol, as deputy CT coordinator (Official Gazette, No.110, 2017).

In addition, a new National committee for prevention of violent extremism and fight against terrorism was established, chaired by the National coordinator and his deputies. Composed by 22

members (and 22 deputies), employed in government institutions (Government, 2018) it had its first meeting on September 29, 2017, which was a new chapter in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism and outlined the need of bigger involvement and coordination of all institutions (Government, 2017). For this purpose, the Committee will sign Memorandums for understanding with number of institutions to strengthen the coordination and overall institutional approach toward prevention of radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism (Government, 2018). The Committee strengthened the cooperation with the civil society as well. It organizes donor meetings aimed to inform the foreign missions, international organizations and local civil society organizations (CSOs) working on CVE related projects on funding opportunities. In front of donors, CSOs present their past, present and future projects, and foreign missions present the type of projects that would support, achieved results and plan to support in future (Skopje1, 2019).

The national committee establishes operative teams (Integrated Task Forces) at the national and local level with dealing with different aspects of the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. At a local level, groups in local communities will act in the prevention of violent extremism composed by different actors within the society (Government, 2018). National Committee established cooperation with the municipalities and plans to establish Local prevention Councils (LPC), composed by local government representatives (ZELS, 2018). In October 2018, the Committee, Center for Common Ground, and the municipalities of Chair, Gostivar, and Kichevo signed a Memorandum for the project "Strengthening the local communities resilience from violent extremism in Macedonia", supported by the UK and Kingdom of the Netherlands. The project emphasized the importance to work in local communities especially in places more vulnerable to these risks, where people know each other, communicate and exchange information (Nova Makedonija, 2018). These municipalities will establish community action teams (CAT), responsible for developing local plans, including activities, which will build partnerships and links between communities and central government. The program will be piloted in these municipalities as outlined in the National Strategy and Action Plan and implemented by the Centre (Search) for Common Ground from October 2018 until October 2020 (British Embassy Skopje, 2018).

National coordinator emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive institutional and societal response in CVE, the need for inclusion of the CSOs and role of education in different aspects of prevention of radicalization and extremism. The Coordinator and the Committee continue coordination and cooperation with religious leaders and groups, actively participate in projects run by CSOs and invite representatives of the civil society on workshops and CVE related training. Youth are priority target group and therefore Agency for youth and sport and Ministry of education are also represented in the Committee (Government 2018).

Besides national efforts, the Government further expands regional cooperation with CT and CVE coordinators in the region. On November 15, 2017 in Pogradec, Albania, the first Memorandum for cooperation in the fight against violent extremism and radicalization was signed (Mak-fax, 2017). National CT and CVE coordinators from the Western Balkans countries in organization

of the EU regularly gather twice a year for experience sharing and planning of joint activities for joint benefit and better results (Government 2018).

Ministry of interior

The main role of the Mol was mostly on conducting repressive measures. In the beginning, the lack of legal mechanism against the FTFs was among the main excuses why state authorities couldn't act against their recruitment. Western Balkans countries adopted law changes but not in a synchronized way, timing, and prescribed sentences. As a result, laws sanctioning different sentences were changed in different periods as well as predicting different sanctions. The article 322 of the Criminal code was amended in September 2014 in order to make punishable activities related to the FTF phenomenon: creation, organization, recruitment, transport, equipment, training, or another form of preparation, financing, helping and hiding evidence regarding of a person or a group in a foreign army, police, paramilitary/police units, organized groups or individually abroad. Those involved in these activities will receive up to 5 years in prison (24 Vesti, 2014). Besides the law changes, other existing legal mechanisms should not be overlooked and could be used for countering radicalization. Those include law provisions sanctioning ethnic, religious hate, which were not appropriately used to counter radical propaganda. Changes in the criminal code didn't stop radicalization and recruitment process but have a preventive effect and limited new travels. Future recruiters, facilitators, and propagandists became aware that can be prosecuted.

The new legal mechanisms enable police to use special investigative measures and conduct intelligence and evidence gathering activities. As a result, Macedonian police took the action "Cell" (August 05, 2015) in Skopje, Kumanovo, Struga and Gostivar aimed at FTFs, recruiters and facilitators. In total, 36 radicals were suspected, 9 arrested (mostly returnees), and 27 were still in Syria. Rexhep Memishi, considered main recruiter, was also arrested (Vecer, 2015). Police action continued as "Cell 2" (July 09, 2016) when four FTFs returnees were arrested from Skopje, Tetovo and Kumanovo (Vecer, 2016). In the new "Cell3" (August 12, 2016) five Macedonian citizens from Kumanovo and Skopje were arrested in Istanbul on their way to Syria. They were recruited by returnees and visited lectures by radical preachers in their hometowns (Kurir, 2016). These suspects were typically charged for recruitment and support, and rarely for participation in a terrorist group which indicates that police and prosecutors cannot secure enough evidence that would enable them to charge and prosecute FTFs. All arrested persons were prosecuted under the new law provisions and after admitted guilt made a deal with Public prosecutor in order to receive shorter sentences (MKD, 2016). With goal to receive shorter sentences, 5 of 11 arrested in "Cell1" admitted guilty and received different sentences ranging 3 to 4,6 years, or in total 15,7 years in prison (Meta, 2016). After the Appeal, they have been sentenced to 3 - 6.6 months. On March 25, 2016, the other 6 were sentenced from 5 to 7 years in prison (Meta, 2016). In October 2016, after admitted guilty, those 5 arrested in "Cell 2", received sentences ranged 2.4 - 2.9 months (Public Prosecution, 2018). On March 22, 2019, seven repatriated FTFs also

admitted guilty with expectation to receive short sentences, and 6 received 6, while one 9 years in prison (Religija, 2019).

Besides the repressive measures, the new MoI, Oliver Spasovski, also took steps to enhance CVE considering it important for the Macedonian multiethnic society and enhancing readiness for response to any kind of extremism (Libertas, 2016). MoI actively participates in building of an inclusive community resilient to radical and extremist ideologies through early detection of all forms of extreme activity in the community and prevention, further developing the concept of “partnership with the community” (Ministry of Interior, 2018). In July 2017, MoI had its first meeting with the representatives of the Orthodox, Islamic, Catholic, Evangelical-Methodist and Jewish religious communities. They emphasized the need to react on misuse of religion and respect for religious tolerance and diversity (Ministry of Interior, 2017). MoI also express readiness to work closely with civil society. In November 2018, a Memorandum of understanding was signed with “Civil-center for Freedom” to jointly work on education and prevention of radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism (Jordanovska, 2018).

National strategy

There was a “National Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for counter terrorism 2011-2015” and the similar version was adopted in March 2016. However, there was no special CVE strategy or a separate CVE chapter. Prevention was only mentioned as a CT measure envisioning training of local communities, local self-government, CSOs, and private sector and religious leaders for identification, prevention and countering extreme manifestations. The EU and the US State Department reports have criticized the Strategy and Action plan as imprecise.

The new Government agenda for a more dedicated work on CVE, on March 6, 2018, produced the new National strategy for prevention of violent extremism (2018 – 2022) and the new National strategy for fight against terrorism (2018-20122) with Action plans were adopted, prepared by the National committee, CSOs, think tanks, religious and local communities, youth organizations, school and women organizations Government, 2018).

“The National Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for Preventing Violent Extremism (2018-2022)” is a broader framework for future actions. Most of the Strategy content is a kind of a theoretical review for violent extremism and radicalization. It provides technical details, definition, previous research, and analysis of the threat from terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism. The key areas, activities, and stakeholders are not well presented and their role is not well defined. Future activities are aimed at: strengthening institutional capacities, coordination and cooperation, work with communities and activities at the local level. It recognizes the role of Ministry of education and science, Ministry of local government, Ministry of labor and social affairs, Agency of sports and youth, Commission for relations between the religious communities and religious groups, and other institutions participating in the Committee. It anticipates training of families, prison personnel and religious leaders to identify early signs of radicalization. It also develops measures and means to counter disinformation that strengths polarization narratives. The Strategy outlines the need for the creation of Integrated Task Forces

for implementation of coordinated, cross-institutional activities between state and community, the establishment of permanent State working groups for coordination and assessment of the activities for CVE and CT for each strategic priority. At the local level, it predicts creation of CAT for improvement of cooperation between state and local authorities and improved training for identification of early signs of radicalization. Specific goals for CVE include: 1) Prevention, which includes strategic goals or strengthening institutional capacities, public awareness, strong and resistant community, and internet radicalization prevention. 2) Protection, which includes proactive institutions for the prevention of basic values, human rights and freedoms, an increase of trust between relevant institutions and citizens for protection from radicalization and violent extremism. 3) Implementation, which includes the establishment of a set of measures for early radicalization prevention. 4) The response, which includes strategic goals for de-radicalization, reintegration through re-socialization and rehabilitation and coordination and cooperation. The document emphasizes cooperation on regional, state and local level, improved coordination and cooperation (joint teams and bodies) and works with communities. This could be also seen in the strategy logo: “strong families, strong communities and strong state” Government, 2018).

Religious communities

The Islamic Community (IC) claims that they have been very loud and reacted on Salafism and regularly asked state institutions to first respond and stop this teaching in the country. The IC has worked with believers on this issue and tried to maintain control over the mosques and preserve traditional Islam (Spasovska, 2016). The IC has argued that radicalization and recruitment was a result of radical, militant lectures (usually at night) in the mosques, which are not under their full control and without IC permission (Jakov Marusic, 2016).

Besides this fact, there is an impression that IC remained silent on these tendencies and rarely spoke in public. In the first period of the Syrian conflict, ICM was rarely present in public and refused to admit the religious-ideological basis for the recruitment. Namely, as other religious communities in the region, there was a tendency to show that Albanians were leaving for Syria for financial motivations, not religious or ideological ones. The IC claimed that the FTF phenomenon could not be controlled, because every travel was individual, not organized, not for religious reasons. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict was an internal issue that excludes any foreign participation (Makdenes, 2014). The IC changed this position in 2014 when more seriously approached this problem by more direct messages, public reactions, and participation of its representatives on various CVE events in the country and the region.

Most of the public statements were delivered by the head, Sulejman Rexhepi who said that FTF were manipulated in the name of religion, and were indoctrinated with messages of a “wrong Islam”. Therefore, he recognized the need to empower the moderate voice of peace about the true Islam, increase the number of preachers, and prevent the believers against terrorist propaganda (Adamovski, 2015). Rexhepi also said that FTF phenomenon is in contrary to the teachings of Islam. It doesn't represent Jihad, which is when the believer (citizen) stands to defend his own country not to fight in Syria and Iraq. If someone should die, that should be for his own country

Macedonia (Dimeska, 2014). Rexhepi thought that the appeals of the religious leaders gave results regarding radicalization prevention and they have influence over the people. That's why, all together should work on prevention, both on a local and global level, and these activities should be led by state institutions, helped by the religious ones. IC publicly supported the initiative for laws amendments concerning participation in foreign wars, (Religija, 2016) and the police action "Cell". IC used the opportunity to reaffirm its stance that the "Islamic state" doesn't represent Islam, and makes no compromise with violence in the name of religion. IC wants a legal state, elimination of extremism and the violence and called on cooperation with all international bodies (Dimeska, 2014).

In December 2014, the IC launched its project: "Stop radicalization & involvement in terrorism", aimed at preventing further departures by potential fighters and re-socializing returnees, even in prisons, where they would receive training for crafts. The Project envisioned to encompass 700 mosques in North Macedonia and the Diaspora. It included public campaigns, workshops, and meetings on radicalism, as well as the inclusion of relevant subjects in the curricula of religious schools to strengthen the moderate voice of peace in Islam (Dimeska, 2015). Specific actions include calling the believers not to go to Syria; specialized lectures at "Isa Beg" Madrasa as well as at the Faculty of Islamic studies, treating the topic of Jihad as a part of the curricula within these religious institutions; debates by the Union of young Muslims and women-Muslims, round tables with IC scholars and presentation on the media. It was envisioned this program to be supported by government agencies, foreign embassies, the EU, OSCE, and USAID (Adamovski, 2015). Unfortunately, the government didn't have understanding for this program and besides it was first of this kind in the region, has yet to be implemented.

In November 2016, IC organized counseling in Struga with the participation of the head Rexhepi, imams from Struga and neighbor municipalities, OSCE and US embassy representatives. The goal was to raise awareness in the mosques to counter extremism and prevention of radicalization (Religija, 2016). IC has also become much more active on social networks, trying to confront or deter people with radical views that divert from moderate Islamic teachings. Increasing numbers of Macedonian imams, including the head Rexhepi, are taking to social networks for this purpose. It is not also rare for imams to participate in online chats when radical ideas are being propagated to try to deter or warn people (Mejdini, Dzidic, Rudic, Tomovic, Jakov Marusic, Ristic (2017).

Civil society

Although CSOs were among the first that initiated and implemented CVE related projects, there is a general impression of a limited response by the civil society. There were with only a few CSOs that have been interested in this topic and supported by international donors. Recently, there was a growing interest mainly motivated by available foreign funding and recognized opportunities CVE to be seen as a source for income for the CSOs. There are no examples of civil society activists to initiate and implement projects driven solely by their motivation and enthusiasm to work on these issues. This explains why NGOs without any previous interest,

suddenly became very interested in CVE funded projects. Another constraining factor for CSOs is the sensitivity of extremism and terrorism as topics and not all want to interfere in areas without previous knowledge, expertise, and experience. Also, there was a lack of interest at the central and local government level to support projects and ideas coming from the civil society. Therefore, CSOs largely depends solely on foreign donors. With their support, they implemented CVE related activities, mainly research (reports, policy papers), organization of conferences and workshops and recently, community-based projects.

Research

Analytica think tank implemented the research "Assessment of Macedonia's efforts in CVE, view from civil society" (September 2015 - September 2016), that analyses country's progress in addressing the challenges stemming from the increased number of FTF and support the national authorities and other stakeholders in planning and decision-making. The project was funded by the US embassy (Analytica, 2016). Another project is "Working towards Resilient Communities" (2017-2018). It covers Macedonian context of violent extremism, factors, and drivers, high school experience with this phenomena, CSOs and community engagement, opinions of religious preachers and academic community, analysis of online propaganda, as well as research on focus groups. The project was supported by the Embassy of the Netherlands (Analytica, 2018).

Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) also contributed research efforts. Their report: "New Battlegrounds: Extremist Groups' Activity on Social Networks in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia" focuses on the social network activities of these groups and aims to explain the discourse of online sites that primarily promote "Islamic state". It explores the content of these pages, their attitudes towards democratic processes, other religious communities, and state security institutions, as well as sermons on jihad and support for prominent members of various violent extremist groups (KCSS, 2017). The KCSS report: "The unexplored nexus: Issues of radicalization and violent extremism in Macedonia" analyses the drivers behind this phenomenon. 40 institutional and civil society representatives from Macedonia which are directly engaged in CVE were interviewed. It explores the context of violent extremism, including the religious life and specifics of the FTF phenomenon, the institutional response resilience of the community, and drivers of radicalization, including distrust in the system, "Global Jihad" lure, internet and friends. The project also aims to improve the cooperation between Kosovo and North Macedonia (Qehaja and Perteshi, 2018).

Community-based projects

One of the first community-based projects was "Mother Schools for Countering Radicalism", implemented by Analytica (December 2016 - March 2017), in cooperation with Austria based "Women Without Borders". It enhances the capabilities of mothers to deal with the phenomenon of radicalization in their relationship with children. The project provides training for mothers to empower them to preempt and react to early warning signs of radicalization in their children

(Analytica, 2016). However, it included a selected number of women from the most vulnerable municipalities.

Broader community outreach has the project “Communities against violent extremism” launched by “Civil – Center for freedom” supported by the US embassy. In June 2018, “Civil” signed Memorandum for partnership and cooperation with several municipalities and the MoI. The project provides a space for citizen engagement, education, mentorship, partnership and support of institution and communities in these efforts for improving the communication of all stakeholders. The project includes mobilization, education and strengthening the local communities. Through creative multimedia events that send messages of peace v.s. violence, respect to diversities v.s. hate, equality, solidarity, and freedom to overcome motives and potential for conflicts and radicalization (Jordanovska, 2019). Within the project, meetings were organized in Chair, Veles and Gazi Baba Kumanovo, Lipkovo, Tetovo, Tearce, Struga on topic “Communities against violent extremism” with representatives of local government, police, school workers, director of schools, school associations, psychologists, pedagogues, NGOs, and parents. “Civil” emphasizes continuing cooperation at all levels and all sectors in the society and the system and multidisciplinary approach in prevention against violent extremism. At the national level, there are joint activities with the National Coordinator. (Jordanovska, 2018). At the local level, there are public events where artists, writers, activists that send messages related to the fight against violent extremism, radicalism, and terrorism (Jordanovska, 2018a). Multimedia events “Together for the same purpose” included video projections, music, and stage performance by high school students (Civil, 2019).

Online campaigns

Considering the threat from online radicalization, projects that aimed to produce counter-messaging are very important. In general, government efforts have been very limited in the region and the same refers to CSOs initiatives. A rare example includes the “Nexus - Civil Concept” project “Story2Tell”. It captures a story of Macedonian citizen who returned home after the conflict in Syria and Iraq. It delivers information about the process of extremist radicalization and recruitment, personal experience, temptation and vulnerability to radical ideas. It initiates critical thinking, awareness of the radicalization process and extremist propaganda, and serves as an education and awareness-raising tool for the broader community (Resonant Voices Initiative, 2017). Kumanovo based “Center for intercultural dialogue” in cooperation with “Peshkar Productions Limited” from the UK and “Out of the Box International” from Belgium, organized the training ‘Youth Alternarration: Combating Radicalization of Young People in Online Spaces’ (March 05-09, 2019). This project increases the capacity of youth organizations to combat extremism and violent radicalization online, by inspiring young people to create positive and alternative content online and promotes the importance of cross-sectoral cooperation (CID, 2019).

International partners

Initial CVE efforts could not be implemented without the support of international partners (international organizations, foreign governments, and embassies). The US is the main donor in North Macedonia, mainly through grants for local NGOs, and mainly supported researches and conferences. The US considers North Macedonia a strategic and certain partner in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. On various occasions, including conferences and workshops, the Ambassador was as a keynote speaker sharing views and thoughts on this issue (Libertas, 2016). EU became more involved after 2016 when the EU Delegation announced that in the next years will allocate funds available to North Macedonia to support CSOs who work on the issue of radicalization prevention. For this purpose, the EU Delegation, in cooperation with EU TACSO Project, organized a seminar: "Fight against violent extremism" for 30 representatives of CSOs (EUIC, 2017).

OSCE Mission activities include training, participation in international conferences, advisory workshops, etc. In 2015, the OSCE Mission focused on building capacities of the first line police officers by initiating and facilitating the "Prevention from Violent Extremism and Radicalization that lead to Terrorism (PERT)" project). The particular objectives were to strengthen the capacity of first line police officers in CVE and raise their awareness on the utility of utilizing community policing techniques and develop tools and training programs to enhance the capacity to detect and prevent violent extremism at an early stage. OSCE also developed modules on "Sensitizing Teachers and School Staff to CVE" to empower secondary school teachers on the threat of radicalization. (WBCTi, 2018); OSCE also organized roundtable discussions on the draft version of the Strategies and Action Plans, and youth role in CVE, as part of the activities to engage youth and CSOs in CVE (OSCE, 2017).

Media

Violent extremism and terrorism seem not to be attractive topics for Macedonian media. In general, security topics are not attractive. There is a lack of public debates, conferences, panels or TV shows where representatives of various stakeholders could share their views. There was no investigative journalism and media mostly used statements or comments after major events. As CVE issue was not present in the political discourse, there were a few statements by academic researchers and scholars from the Macedonian universities. Families and friends usually refuse to talk for their experience because of fear or shame. Those willing to speak always do that under the condition of anonymity. Also, there is no adequate approach, terminology use, and knowledge on this phenomena. This could prove sensitive considering multiethnic composition of Macedonia, stigmatization or informing one community to see offending.

Conclusion

CVE concept was mainly understood and implemented within the context of the FTF phenomenon and the Syrian conflict. Although some of the recent projects have more general

appeal most of the activities are still aimed at countering religious radicalization. Government and civil society response toward the FTF phenomenon is belated and overall CVE policy is at the crossroads. There is a need for activity accordingly to other tendencies concerning radicalism and extremism. There was no continuation of the action by different stakeholders (religious communities and civil society) and different projects were implemented at different time. Their total number is still very low compared to other countries in the region. Religious leaders had an only limited role and inter-religious dialogue is still not explored resource in CVE, especially important for producing counter-narratives and countering religious inspired extremism. It is important religious leaders to work more closely with the government which is not a case with North Macedonia. Community-based projects are still rare and developed recently and there is still a need for a public awareness raising, especially among the youth and schools. There was no coordination as well as local, national and international level and coordination efforts came recently. A comprehensive approach is still imperative. There should be an overall CVE effort that includes cooperation at a national and local level between the ministries, civil society actors, religious groups, media, and community leaders.

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CREATING URBAN EUROPE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION (CONSPECTUS-THESIS)

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Abstract: The main attention of the text is focused on the chronic problem of philosophical, i.e. axiological-theoretical and culturally-typological defining of the internal and external **European borders**. This problem has a number of controversial implications and consequences, among others, military-strategic and security dilemmas, also. On one side stand the creators and visionaries of the concept of the united Europe (EU) and its harmonious and hierarchical wholeness (among others, for example, Jürgen Habermas). On the other side, stand the skeptics, that is, the critics of the theory and the social and political practice of this concept, which think that this concept is distorted in something that has nothing to do with the previous virtuous intention and humanistic conception (among others, for example Elmar Holenstein, Erhard Busek, Hans-Magnus Enzensberger, Ernesto Laclau, Mitja Velikonja, Maria Todorova and also Jürgen Habermas by itself, once again).

The problem with defining European borders is further complicated by the famous statement of one of the EU's main creators, General Charles de Gaulle, about "Europe from Atlantic to Ural". Till this day the statement has been interpreted differently, which introduces additional dilemmas and challenges (geostrategic, economic, political, cultural, axiological, confessional, ideological, etc.)

The article is supported with a relevant literature, with works by foreign and world-renowned and recognized authors, as well as works by authors from the Balkans and Macedonia.

Key words: Europe, significance, definition, borders, transcontinental

The one who knows himself will admit that East and West cannot be separated.

(Johann Wolfgang Goethe, 2004)

In the opera 'Lohengrin' by Richard Wagner the emperor collects the army in the eyes of its military campaign and announces: 'The Kingdom is threatened from the East'. It seems to be a permanent feature of the German themselves - given that modern Austria is referred to as a trade mark at the east, and in the thousand-year period as 'Eastern trademark' (Ostmark) (...). The term 'Balkanization' is already long-standing, but similar terms exist in relation to Russia and Turkey, as with all other countries, which is evidence of huge uncertainty, and which is, among other things, a consequence of ignorance. (Underlined by – D.S.)

(Erhard Busek, 2007: 15-16, 67)

"Europe can become powerful only together with Russia"
(Vladimir Putin, MMXVII: 75-80)

We are starting from the important and accurate statement of Erhard Busek to the importance of **knowledge** for a particular country or region in the process of formation of our conceptions of them, which, through the long history - especially the East-West relations on **European** soil - is full of prejudices, negative stereotypes and propaganda fabrications (read: lies) and stupidities, especially when it comes to the production of enemies, something that the western propaganda/ media machinery has been successful for several centuries. (Velikonja, 2007: 141-149; Dzeparoski, 2016: 33; Skalovski, 2018). Hence, because of the professional ethical duty we admit that, first, our level of **knowledge** in the field of **international security** is far from being competent and professional, and second, because of the small space that this text allows, we cannot go into more deeper analysis of conceptual importance of **urban** and urbanism in general. (Gajmer, 2008) For the same reasons, we cannot go into deeper and more comprehensive logical and philosophical-sociological analysis of the squash that predominates in the attempts to define Europe and Europeanism. (Velikonja, 2007: 33-36) So - in the form of conspectus-theses - we will be satisfied only with reduced analysis of the problem of defining the European borders from a culture-philosophical, i.e. even more narrowly focused, from a **cultural** point of view.

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Historically, the problem of defining the European borders is not so new, (as are new, for example, the EU and NATO), if the "age" of Euro-Atlantic geostrategies vs. the Eurasian geostrategies is known, i.e. the centuries-old co-placement and opposition of the European East with the European West, for which a huge professional and art literature was written and we cite the words of the great Johan Wolfgang Goethe as a positive example. (Kapriev, 2015: 5-21; Skalovski, 2010: 93-97). With the end of the "Cold War" in the 20th century, these geo-strategies were re-actualized/intensified in all their controversy, testified by the words of Vladimir Putin, among others, and which only to the ignorant, i.e. only those who "suffer" from chronic **ignorance**, lack of education, dogmatic blindness and lack of information can "sound" as illogical, unexpected, shocking, threatening and "indecent proposal".

As a rule, the first to be hit by these transcontinental geostrategies and geopolitics are the small states and "vulnerable regions" that are usually found on the border/transcontinental belts of the big continents and subcontinents, which include the countries of the Balkans, including Macedonia, in fact, as countries on the "line of fire". But, as we announced, we continue with the analysis of **cultural** aspect, i.e. acculturation/interferential and other synchronous and diachronic processes and mutual influences. Of course, they cannot be separated from the complexity of the totality of social and especially **political** phenomena and processes of a dynamic age of the 20th/21st century, filled with rapid and radical changes and **unexpected turns** and

“shocks” at all levels, which, as it has been up to now - for example with the new Russian-Turkish alliances - are **yet** to come. (Zinoviev, 1999)

All these current and future, predictable and unpredictable changes and milestones actually determine the premises of the attempt to define **European** (internal and external) **borders**, in order **to overcome them**, and the great problems and obstacles that stand on that path, which additionally make more difficult the creation of the **identity** of a united Europe, i.e. of **European society**, as a **unity of differences**, among other things, from a security aspect. (Aceski, 2011: 125-224). Finally, if these problems and difficulties - mostly inherited from the traumatic and “forgotten” European past - are not found out and recognized by the **European intellectual elite**, which is the main creator of the benevolent **idea** of a united Europe, then the reasons for the deep moral and political **crisis** of unity of the states that are now members of this Union will not be understood. (Laclau, 1996; Habermas, 2010/2014; Osten 2005; Milošević, 2000) In fact, it turned out that the good will of European unity (at least culturally?!) is not sufficient to comply with the positioned and increasingly **opposite economic** interests of the big/old members of the Union, which remain for the new and far smaller and weaker. For the same reasons, it won't be possible to understand either mutual animosity, skepticism, latent antagonism, or the policy of **postponing/prolonging** the admission of new members into the Union - for a distant and **uncertain** future.

1. Defining European Borders

As far as we can, we stick to the **cultural** perspective and continue our conspectus mostly on the analysis of Austrian politician and analyst Erhard Busek and the Swiss philosopher of culture and cultural scientist Elmar Holenstein. We have already said that the first difficulty is the definition of European borders with greater ontological, anthropological and cultural foundations, because conventional, mainly geographical definitions are insufficient, and we do not find out and understand almost anything from them. This problem dates back to ancient times (Herodotus), and in recent decades analysts have been seriously dealing with it from various discursive, disciplinary and interdisciplinary aspects.

The conclusions of Holenstein are most explicit and categorical: “Europe cannot be defined culturally and typologically. (...) Europe cannot be axiologically (value-theoretically) defined. People's value representations do not build a harmonious and hierarchically subordinate whole”. (Holenstein, 1989: 167-168). The problem is additionally complicated by the famous statement of one of the main EU creators - General **Charles de Gaulle** - for “Europe from Atlantic to Ural”, which is still interpreted and discussed to this day. During the Cold War period and the bloc division, his intention was (with the departure of France from NATO) to distance Europe from the United States and the USSR/Russia, yet in his “definition” of the European borders he most explicitly put **Russia**, which brought additional **dilemmas** (geostrategic/military, economic, political, cultural, axiological, confessional, ideological, etc.), and which continue **to this day**. Of course, at the time, **Turkey** was still not a relevant and strong “player” of the great and extremely dynamic Eurasian transcontinental space from Normandy to Vladivostok. (Davutoglu, 2013:

95-115). Moreover, it is known that De Gaulle was not only a skeptic about the role and place of **Britain** in the EU, but was also the biggest **opponent** of its membership in the Union (then the European Economic Community). His opposition turned out to be anticipatory and justified (?!), having in mind the current and controversial events around Brexit.

Knowing the different **historical** genesis of the origin and structure of the former empires - for example, Britain and France, unlike Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia/USSR - it becomes clear that they cause irreconcilable and chronic conflicts of interests at all levels of the value hierarchy, starting from the confessional, through the political, ending with the scientific and technological. The problem is further complicated when one takes into account that the roots of Europe (Oxidant) are in the East: in the Hellenistic-Roman, Jewish and Biblical worldviews, which **are not European, but Eurasian**, and which, as such, cannot be isolated from the Orient (the Arabs, the Middle East, Turkey) and the Middle East (India) in the further development of our history. (Hobson, 2004: 181-322; Said, 2003: 267-302)

A dose of optimism about the possibilities of integration and a higher degree of **dialectical** unity of opposites implies the conclusion of Elenstein that Europe can be **juristically**, i.e. only cultural-**historical** (empirically) defined, primarily because of similar **legal** conventions, **norms** and legislations in different European societies and **states**. (Holenstein, 1989: 167-192) The juristic and legal homogenization is mostly insisted at the time of "human rights" - with particular emphasis on the particularity of **women's** ethics and **women's** rights in general. (Simonovska/Skalovski, 2012: 114-168) Perhaps starting from this juristic-cultural concept - based on past positive and negative experiences - should be positively considered in the further analysis of the possibilities for a higher degree of European (Eurasian!) integration, which must include in itself a higher level of previous theoretical/scientific, axiological and systemic "universalization" and "cultural geography", as conditions for its possible practical realization. (Holenstein, 1989: 182-190; Habermas, 2014: 35) This despite the fact that all these terms and categories are already largely banished, commercialized, **ideologized** and distorted by their original and authentic meaning, together with the notion of **democracy**, which has become the most effective instrument and sophisticated method for seduction and manipulation of the broad masses in Western societies. (Lash, 1996)

2. "Western" and "Eastern" Europe

With the shifting of the EU's external borders to the east, the simple division to the West and the East, as provided by the Iron Curtain, went into disrepair. The very widespread ignorance of these countries is no longer an argument for their stacking into 'eastern' countries.

(Erhard Busek, 2007: 61)

As we continue deductively with our analysis, the problems with the definition of the subject to our research grow. Busek's critical assessment that ignorance is not an argument is accurate and self-explanatory, but not sufficient. In fact, **ignorance has never been an argument** in any area of scientific research. On the contrary! This is all the more so in social and humanistic sci-

ences, which in the time of postmodernism, postcolonialism, neoliberalism and the general **crisis of European sciences** - started hundreds of years ago - are losing their "teleology", sense and meaning for human life, above all because of the loss of "objectivity" and "critical distance" in the process of knowing the "world of life," which includes the life of animals and the whole biodiversity. This is especially true when it comes to evaluating the world of the life of civilizations and cultures that are **different** from European or Eurocentric, which are summarily and traditionally labeled as "Western". (Husserl, 1991: 108-110; Dzeparoski, 2016: 33)

At a time of general commercialization/profitteering and a sharp decline in the quality of scientific research, today's Euro-Atlantic space is filled with numerous "experts", "analysts", "Fachmanns", and a series of cabinet-digital "intellectuals", "advisers" and ordinary charlatans and "Hochstaplers" of all "colors" who take the right to **judge** for civilizations and cultures on whose territory they have never set their own feet. They are most present in the **mass-media** and repeat as parrots and recite early-learned doctrinal attitudes. From the point of view of professional scientific ethics, this is the ultimate moral **irresponsibility**. With the help of **global media** and propaganda machinery (today digitized), these "scientists" have a major impact on the awareness of "ordinary people" in the countries they live in, as well as on the external **policies** of the countries in which they live and work (predominantly members of EU and NATO), and for which they are well **paid**. (Chomsky, 2003; Скаловски, 2018)

These "culturologists" have created misrepresentations of some civilizations and cultures, and the world as a whole. Their ignorance/unacquaintance created negative myths, ideological fictions, **stereotypes** and prejudices to the degree of mass anxiety, schizophrenia and hysteria, efficiently promoted with the help of global media. (Chomsky, 2003: 6-7; Said, 2003: 269-310; Busek, 2007: 5-120; Dzeparoski, 2016: 33-39) With the cessation of the existence of the Eastern bloc and the USSR, the EU and NATO are further losing the sense and the geo-strategic expediency of its existence and propaganda success, regardless of the fact that many of the EU's creators had humane, moral and peaceful intentions: from Immanuel Kant, through Edmund Husserl, to Jürgen Habermas. This "will for peace" and well-being was essentially conceived primarily in the interest of the **citizens** of Europe, that is, "ordinary people" as **free entities** of that social action on all levels, and not in the interests of the alienated economic, political and "cultural" elites and new power centers that bureaucratise, etatize, exploit/digitize and **militarize** Europe at a new, **supra-national** level. (Holenstein, 1998: 230-253; Habermas, 2014: 7-11; Enzensberger, 2011; Žižek, 2008: 413; Dugin/Savin, 2018). In the cultural, semiological, and general theoretical terms, these new centers of power have created a new, hegemonic, classical/postcolonial, and **ideological Eurocentric metadiscourse**. (Velikonja, 2007: 33-34, 145-149)

It is perfectly clear that positive and legitimate ambitions and authentic visionary ideas for a united Europe are used and abused in some geo-strategic (Bloc) interests, which are not at all "cultural", and which today are radically changed, redefined, and shifted from bipolar towards multi-polar, from eurocentric to polycentric, multicultural and multi-confessional. The new world reality consists of new, strong and prosperous economies, and new and strong economic, political, military, cultural and intellectual **elites** that are unwilling to unreservedly accept and

implement European and Euro-American systems of economic, political, cultural, as well as ideological **values**. Ultimately, the global economic crisis can be interpreted as a conflict of interest of the old and new economic and political elites, which, especially **European** and American, are losing their past power and hegemony in the strong competition in the international market of natural and human **resources**, above all intellectual. (Lash, 1996) In a word, **Europe** and the United States are no longer the only center in the world, and no longer apply to the **paradigm** of modern society and state, ruled by freedom, justice, prosperity, solidarity, democracy, and above all - **enlightenment, knowledge** and **high culture**. (Velikonja, 2007: 6-7) The world - including **Europe** - is in front of a major **milestone**, which is hardly accepted by the great (post)imperial powers that have ever ruled and managed with it, above all the US, and which themselves are in front of a major milestone. (Zinoviev, 1999)

One of the key factors in this milestone will be the **knowledge/acquaintance** of the history and "genealogy" of civilizations and cultures that are **similar** and **different**, and are in the European "internal" borders, and which, as we emphasize, make it difficult to define its "external" borders. A positive contribution to the reduction of ignorance is given by Erhard Busek, already mentioned, and his Open Gate to the East, although from the time of his analyzes (2003) the world/European conditions radically changed, in favor of the **East** , i.e. his great economic growth, above all **Russia** and China, and then **Turkey** and India. Global economic expansion is followed by a great **cultural** "expansion," which together requires a new **perception**, a new "mapping" of those **spaces**, and a strenuous mental engagement. This should be the new spirit of world **multiculturalism** and **polycentrism**, and building more **trust** among nations, as an important condition for a stable peace, prosperity and sustainable development of all. (Davutoglu, 2013: 95-115)

Of course, these changes will still affect the processes of integration, disintegration and **reintegration** of the European continent, and the overcoming of the narrow Eurocentric horizon. These open perspectives are very objectively analyzed and predicted by Busek with **good intent**. Namely, while always and in all relations **interest** is predominant, above all the **economic** - today "**green**" economy - his statement impresses and gives hope that "the overcoming of the borders in culture is presupposed, and this contributes not only to the overcoming of the political borders, but in overcoming the boundaries in the minds and hearts." (Busek, 2007: 190) (Underlined by - D.S.)

These statements are especially important for the Balkans and Macedonia. Although geographically located in South-Eastern Europe, problems with defining the internal and external Balkan borders are similar to those in Europe, especially after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Moreover, a significant factor is the markedly **negative** psychological and general axiological association, bad, "barbaric" reputation and metaphorical exploitation that prevail in today's cultural and political nomenclature when the words "Balkans", "Balkanian", "Balkan" and "Balkanization". (Todorova, 2001: 52-53)

If we return to the heading of this brief chapter, "Western" and "Eastern" Europe (paraphrased by Busek), we will see that this relation is not sufficiently precise, especially in relation

to **South-East** Europe. No matter which premises we use first to set off - ideological, political, confessional, cultural, ethnic, and military-strategic - we cannot avoid all the heterogeneity and complementarity that remained after the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. This must be complemented with the Non-Aligned Movement, which in the meantime has been formed (in Belgrade!), and today is largely desolate, but still persists, and in which Serbia remained a member, despite its approaching to the Eurasian Union, where Russia is dominating. Busek is aware of the impossibility of establishing standards, criteria and principles for locating and defining all local and regional specifics: for example, the idea of **Pan-Slavism**, which is Croatian-Czech, and then taken over by Russia, or the idea of **Yugoslav** origin, originating in Croatia, and then taken over by Serbia. It was realized in "soft" totalitarian variant of "communism" of J.B.Tito, which by the end of his life did not accept to replace the Pan-Slavic Hymn Hay Slavs (Hej Sloveni) (with the text created in Slovakia), and which was actually (musically) the same with the Polish, and which after the collapse of SFR Yugoslavia to date is Poland's national anthem. In the last years there has been a growing "yugonostalgia", in the **same** political entities that were the **main** protagonists of its bloody disintegration, which was caused, inter alia, by the intransigent mutual accusations of "exploitation" of the developed and advanced Northwest versus the undeveloped and lagging South East, and vice versa.

From our side - due to these historical facts and artifacts, controversies, tragedies and traumas, on the West-East - West-Southeast line, we must sincerely acknowledge our confusion and insufficiency of accustomed acceptable standards, criteria and principles, thus leaning towards Franz Karl Plural's "consolation" statement that there is still a lot of work to be done about creating "an emotional connection with the great Europe", but that "the basic European idea is not jeopardized." (Plural, 2015: 2). This only confirms the positive "tension between the idea and reality" and the realistic hopes of accomplishing the utopian impulse. (Habermas, 2014: 35). Of course, after the events with the Tirana Platform and especially the Prespa Agreement, the "attractiveness" of the EU for the citizens of "Northern" Macedonia is significantly reduced, and the "European" future of Macedonia is seriously questioned.

3. Turkey and Russia as countries that are transcending the European borders

It seems that the conclusion for the Balkans as an Ottoman heritage is not at all exaggerated.

(Marija Todorova, 2001: 16-17)

...Russia is a massive physical symbol for the inter-continental exchange of goods and ideas.

(Elmar Holenstein, 1998: 193)

We fully agree with the summing conclusion of Ellenstein for Russia, and with Todorova's summing conclusion about Turkey, we **completely disagree**. Not only is the conclusion for the Balkans as an Ottoman heritage **exaggerated**, but it is precisely in those stereotypes against which Todorova is fighting, and of which - at least ourselves, whom we consider as **objective**

analysts and evaluators of the “other” - we endeavor to fully be free, but it does not work out at all. (Dzeparoski, 2007) And here we completely agree with Busek that “we have not yet managed to confront with “what is different”. (Busek, 2003: 97)

Unfortunately, apart from other her **excellent analyzes** and huge erudition, in this case there is growing suspicion that the respected Todorova has stepped with her feet on the territory of Turkey (or Macedonia?!) from the 80s of the 20th century onwards. In spite of the irony, Todorova falls into the trap of stereotypes that are characteristic of Eurocentrism, or the “Euro-Atlantic” mode and system of thinking and valuation (which is in a chronic axiological breakdown!), even when making hermetic textual analysis, and this is precisely when she should be on “her own terrain” - in the Balkans. Her “linguistic” obsessiveness comes to light even when – she pays such a little attention to the political ingenuity of Kemal Ataturk – she cuts it down to the “crucial meaning of language” and the decisive implementation of “language reform”. It turns out that the famous Turkish businessman Rahim Koch has the right to cynicism when he often notes that “of course, the Ottoman Empire is responsible for everything and anyone.” (Busek, 2007: 97) Thus, it is a great misconception to think that Todorova spiritually corresponds or consistently follows the footsteps of Edward Said’s discursive concept of Orientalism, unlike, for example, Noam Chomsky, John M. Hobson, her compatriot Cvetan Todorov, Erhard Busek, the outstanding Turkish analyst and politician Ahmet Davutoglu, and a number of other analysts of world civilizations and cultures and their **histories**. (Hobson, 2004: 108-109, 322; Said, 2003: 9; Busek, 2007: 13-30; Todorov, 2010; Davutoglu, 2013: 345-346)

In his cultural analyzes of Russia, Elenstein starts from the structural analyzes of the great linguist Roman Jakobson, and he observes Russia in all of its “rainbow colors” (Regenbogenfarben), and in all its dialectical unity of opposites (Einheit von Gegensätzen) and a wealth of uniqueness in multiplicities (Einheitlichkeit in der Vielfältigkeit). These opposites have created a structural whole of **intercultural contrasting points** out of Russia: rationalism - emotionalism, materialism - spiritualism, reductionism - methodical pluralism, atomism - holism, individualism - communitarianism. These cultural and axiological antipodes form a rich interferent and spectral space that extends to the vast Eurasian territory, and where for centuries and millennia intertwine and complement the different cultures of “Russia and the West”, “Asia and Europe”, “the Orient and the Oxidant”, and which through history give this space a slow but sure prosperity and development, without radically distorting the Man-Nature-State relationship, just as it happened in the West. (Holenstein, 1998: 194-217; Jakobson, 1966). In contrast to the more economically developed West and the relative stability of cultural systems, the East did not fall into the conformist “illusion that life without ‘a spirit’ is possible.” (Busek, 2003: 159-164)

On the other hand, Todorova is too reductionally burdened with the “Ottoman heritage”, forgetting that the modern Bulgarian state was re-established as early as 1878/1908, i.e. 1912, and in all subsequent years, i.e. the two world wars, the role of Turkey in relation to Bulgaria is marginal, which means that modern Turkey is an irrelevant factor in the process of creating the modern Bulgarian **national** and **cultural** identity. I hope we do not think that today’s 10% Turkish minority in Bulgaria is an important factor in the process?! Finally, let us recall that Bul-

garia became a member of NATO in 2004, and the EU in 2007, and Turkey's membership in the EU has been stubbornly rejected for decades?! It remains unclear why this refusal lasts when, in the same period there is a spread with acclamation of the impression that "if you ever find yourself in the land of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, it will be difficult to see the difference between the European and the Asian side"?! (Busek, 2007: 110)

4. The Balkans as a "transcendent" European subcontinent

Analysis of the Balkans in a homologous way arises from the previous "diagnoses" for Russia, Turkey and Bulgaria, while its "transcendence" moves in reverse, too. Namely, apart from the direction towards the Southeast, it historically moved in the direction of the Northwest, coming in contact with a confusing semantic creation and a spiritual meta-level that cannot be geographically precisely defined, and which in Western Europe has never been seriously understood and accepted. It is the term Middle Europe (Mittle Europa), which should refer to the former Habsburg monarchy (Busek, 2007: 53-56), during which, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries, there was a **national** awakening and cultural revival of a series of Western Slavic and South Slavic nations, including the Serbian, Bulgarian and **Macedonian**. This means that the former Empire has survived for centuries, despite the fact that it contained German/Austrian, Slavic, Hungarian, Romanian, Jewish and many other Catholic and Orthodox ethnic and confessional "inputs".

Thus, all of this long, intricate and tangled economic, political, cultural and "confessional" **history** - which has not yet been sufficiently scientifically explored - confirms once again the inability of detached/separated analysis of the history of the Balkan, South Slavic and Eastern European peoples, whose interconnectedness, interdependence and complementarity are so great that it prevents any isolated analysis of the cultural and political/national **identity** of every particular and individual Balkan nation and state, from antiquity until today.

Unfortunately, despite nearly 200 years after Johann Wolfgang Goethe wrote his beautiful and ingenious "Oriental" verses in his West-Eastern Diwan (West-Östlicher Divan), **the perception** of the Orient as a civilization (the perception of space-time), including the Balkans, still remains in a phase of positive emotions and **moral** goodwill (Kant), but with questionable and dubious **political** will! The cooperation of Johann Wolfgang Goethe with Vuk Karadzic is certainly an example of positive emotion and goodwill to get acquainted with the Serbian, namely the Balkan, namely the "Oriental" culture. Of course, this is the first condition, but in order to improve the Balkan/European/world conditions and the global "coexistence", much more **good political will is needed**, and finally, but not least, more **knowledge**, mutual trust, interest, **sincerity** and being informed about the "other", because, as Federico Mayor points out, "the other one is each and every one of us". (Dzeparoski, 2007: 7)

But in order for this beautiful metaphor does not remain only poetic, philosophical or linguistic play of good words, and erode into empty polytechnic rhetoric, our analysis must suffer a cruel awakening (Rude Awakeining)! The question of Europe's borders is a matter of the limits of the new age **Occidental rationalism**, because the phrase Another Europe (L'autre Europe) of

Fernand Braudel, as a hallmark for Russia can surely be a hallmark for the Balkans, too. (Holenstein, 1998: 205; Davutoglu, 2013: 95) We have to get the courage and admit: the question of the borders of one (sub)continent is a matter of the boundaries of one **Mind**; a Mind that has been degraded from a **speculative to instrumental** Mind. (Horkheimer, 1988: 283-293). Further philosophical and cultural analysis of this economical degradation and "colonization" of the mind in the context of the Balkans will be left for some next occasion, for which Busek gives us an excellent "Schlagwort": "The talent for distinguishing ghosts is now needed ever since; the critical mind and its use is an old achievement of the European spiritual history, which should be used as soon as possible - in the interest of Europe!" (Busek, 2007: 207)

Until then, we will have to fight the burdens and traumas of the past that come from all sides, but **above all from ourselves, and then from the great powers**, who constantly change their places, which requires courage to raise the question: did the former treatment of the Southeast/Balkans, summarized in the Nazi slogan "Economic region Greater Germany", is substituted with another slogan: "Economic region Greater America"? Hence, in order to avoid a new repetition of the tragic history, only with new "players" (e.g. China), great efforts will have to be made and more steps taken to establish **more equitable** economic and any other partnership relations, which will always have to be in a mutual and **common interest**, regardless of the huge difference in the strength and power of the partners, that is, **precisely because of that**. In order to achieve this, one must avoid unserious, improvised and hasty initiatives and hasty and irrelevant approaches that will not gain the democratic confidence of the public, which in the Balkans - including in Macedonia - is not only skeptically getting "cool" in relation to its European future, but it also becomes increasingly "more allergic" to the EU. (Palacio, 2016: 7)

When we talk about Euroscepticism, which is expanding, we have to mention the initiatives for regional micro groupings, some of which have already been partially accomplished, and we will list only two examples: the Visegrad Group and the Western Balkans. These groupings only further increase the total semantic confusion that occurs when plenty of insufficiently thought-out and elaborated strategies are put in place that cannot answer the elementary pragmatic question: who with whom and for what?! This question is only transposed development of the crucial question that Busek rightfully repeats implicitly: "Do we know what we want?" (Busek, 2007: 54, 2070)

5. Instead of a Conclusion - new questions

You cannot make a choir from soloists!
(An old music proverb)

The formal academic rules require us to draw a conclusion from the analysis of the topic of our short article - the **problem of defining the European borders**. However, on the basis of what we have outlined briefly, every honest and modest intellect will admit that this is not only impossible, but that every new scientific "discovery" unfolds the knot of European history up to

infinity, and sets new and fresh **issues**. We will try to summarize them in a sublimated form of section-questions:

Knowing that Europe has always been preoccupied with its own borders, both internally and even more with the external ones, raises the question of how strong those new borders of Europe will be, and to what extent will the horizons of the new European cultural space extend? Who will remain/stay out of those borders and **why**? Will “we” and “our” remain within those European borders, and those “others” will remain in the group of “Non-Europe”, “Still-not-Europe” or “Never-Europe”? (Velikonja, 2007: 141-149) Who are those who are “at the gates of Europe” and “long for it” and who are they (will be) who will be placed on a long “waiting list”? Who are those who will pay the joining to Europe with the lowest, and who with the highest price - at all costs?! (read: Macedonians?!) Who gain and who lose by “entering” Europe, while the **elite** society of New Europe is being created and the hegemony of the new trans-national classes and orders? Who are the “old” and “proven” Europeans (with a pedigree), who are the “newly born” (born and raised in the Balkans, and “came down from the mountain”), who as such deserve to be marginalized and subordinated? Finally, but no less important: **for** whom or **against** whom will be drawn the new borders of Europe, and who will be its new friends and “enemies”? In a word, will the New Europe create new bipolarities, multi-polarities and antagonisms with the “others” in the world, of which it will be “threatened” and will have to defend, or its borders will remain “open” to **dialogue** and **cultural** cohabitation with the “others”?

Of course, we could continue to deal with our logical, philosophical and cultural issues and a number of other questions and sub-questions, which would cause losing their substance and would reduce it to obsolete missionary and ritualism in the narration of the glittering fairy tale and the myth of European values, such as freedom, democracy, well-being, solidarity, modern technology and **high culture**. So, the Conclusion of our text will be finished with the statement of the contemporary Bulgarian philosopher Georgi Kapriev, which has **universal** meaning, and which as such does not need an additional “Macedonian” comment:

We do not become more Europeans, if we are becoming more ‘western’ or more ‘eastern’. We do not need any inflated politically correct ‘balances’, which in fact are always hypocritical. It is enough for us to be ourselves. And we are ourselves when we show from our point of view the whole scope of European culture.

(Georgi Kapriev, 2015: 20)

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(In Cyrillic)

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CHALLENGES IN URBAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN SERBIA

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Abstract: One of the basic principles in managing emergency situations is that the crisis is resolved in accordance with the principle of proximity, ie primarily where it is ongoing, i.e. at the local community level. This principle has also been applied in the legislation in the Republic of Serbia, putting most of the responsibility for preparation and management of emergency situations on local self-government units, i.e. municipalities and cities. However, systemic (normative legal) solutions were not followed by the necessary legal-institutional operationalization, material-technical investments, professional support from the national level and appropriate measures in terms of HR management

The Law on Emergency Situations, in force from 2009 to 2018, showed in practice a series of weaknesses (reactive orientation, non-functionalization of the standardized protection and rescue system, normative non-compliance with international standards and obligations of the Republic of Serbia, etc.), due to which in November 2018 the new Law on reducing disaster risk and managing emergency situations was adopted.

The new law lays down the responsibility for the management of emergency situations on municipalities and cities and implements a number of new obligations. However, decentralization of responsibilities has not been followed by decentralization of resources, which could have an impact on the results of the implementation of the Law. In this paper we will try to define more precisely the potential problems in applying the new law and point to possible solutions.

However, we believe that in the area of emergency management, even if the new Law is implemented consistently, it cannot give real results without running a commonly conceived inter-sectoral policy aimed precisely at "recognizing" the risks of disaster and systematically, planning and integrating it into towards their reduction.

Key words: urban crisis management, local community, Serbia, disaster risk reduction, resilience

1. Introduction

After abandoning the system of the All people's defence and social self-protection and a lot of years of legal vacuum and institutional confusion, the emergency management system in the Republic of Serbia has been integrally set and normatively regulated under the Law on the Emergency of December 2009, whereby the main principle was that the crisis was to be resolved primarily in the place where it had occurred, and thereby a large portion of responsibility was put upon the local governments (towns and municipalities). The Law, among other things, envisages that in the event of the state of emergency a certain number of local factors charged with governance should assume responsibility for actions through the work of a town, that is, municipal headquarters for emergency management. In that sense, responsible persons are the following:

- town/municipal officials - Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Assistant to Mayor;
- Town/Municipal officers at managerial positions - Heads of town/municipal administrations;
- Directors of town/municipal utility companies

Competent organizational unit of a town/municipal administrative authority in cooperation with a representative of a regional organizational unit of, Emergency Management Service of Ministry of Interior, performs expert and administrative and technical affairs for the need of municipal headquarters operation.

However, systemic solutions were not followed by necessary legal and institutional development of the system, material and technical investments, technical support from the central lever or adequate staff measures. Some states of emergency that occurred since the adoption of the Law, and particularly after unprecedented May 2014 floods, indicated to four main defects of the newly established system:

- lack of by-laws regulating performance of specific activities in the course of emergencies;
- insufficient number of measures at the republic level, in order to establish institutional framework for preventions and response system in the case of emergencies;
- Insufficient capacities of local governments to respond to emergencies - primarily due to insufficient funds and other resources, but also due to lack of local procedures for action in emergencies;
- Low level of knowledge and skills among EHQ.

After three-year work under which all international experiences, best practice and local, i.e., Serbian specificities were observed, a new Law on Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Management⁷⁹ was adopted November 21, 2018, and it regulates this subject matter. The main goals of the new Law solutions are primarily in a comprehensive norming of preventive measures and activities dedicated to disaster risk reduction, efficient response in case of a disaster, such as

⁷⁹ Law on Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Management, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 87/2018

efficient retrofitting so as to ensure recovery and normalization of living and working conditions in certain territory. In keeping with that, and in line with the documents adopted at the Second and Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (Hyogo Framework for Action up to 2005 and Sendai Framework for Action up to 2015), new Law puts forward principles, planning document and measures and activities that should contribute towards more efficient disaster prevention, strengthening resilience of both individuals and communities to consequences of disasters and other hazards and raising the level of readiness to respond in case of a disaster or any accident. When it concerns solutions regulating response system in the state of emergency, they are mainly relying on the existing solutions, provided that things proven to be non-functional or insufficiently efficient in the practice were eliminated.

In the following text we will present the crisis management capacities of Serbian town Novi Pazar, based upon the analysis conducted within the project of SKGO-Stalna konferencija gradova i opština Srbije (SCTM - Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities) with support of Government of Kingdom of Sweden in context of program Support to Serbian Municipalities on the Road to EU Accession: Enabling High-Quality Services, Stakeholder Dialog and Efficient Local Administration. (Kešetović, 2018).⁸⁰

2. Crisis management in town of Novi Pazar – case study

2.1. Town of Novi Pazar

The Town of Novi Pazar is located in the south-east part of the Central Serbia and it belongs to the Raška Administrative District. It covers the area of 742 square meters, and 99 populated settlements are located in its territory which are classified in 6 town local communities and 20 rural communities with the total of 105,490 inhabitants.⁸¹

Only in the recent times, the Town of Novi Pazar and its wider surrounding were affected by a large number of disasters which caused huge material damages, such as floods, earthquakes, landslides, hails, snow drifts, droughts and forest fires. These disasters caused huge consequences and damages on infrastructure, material and cultural assets, environment and agriculture, and still represent permanent potential threat.⁸²

The Risk Map mentions the earthquake as a high risk of a low probability (2) and with major consequences (4), whereas the flood probability is extremely high (2), but its consequences are low (2), and thereby this risk is moderate. Likewise, risks of rock slides and landslides are mod-

⁸⁰ This material has been formulated on the basis of the relevant documents content analysis, primarily Risk Assessment, and documentation related to constituting and functioning of the Town Emergency Headquarters (Decision on Emergency Headquarters Constitution, Rules of Procedure of Town Emergency HQ, Work Plan of the Emergency HQ for 2018 and Proposed Work Plan for 2019 and the Reports on the Work of HQ for 2016 and 2017) and analytical and information material developed by HQ in the past period, as well as other available secondary sources.

⁸¹ http://devinfo.stat.gov.rs/SerbiaProfileLauncher/files/profiles/sr/1/DI_Profil_Novi%20Pazar_EURSRB002001007003.pdf

⁸² Petrović, M. (2018) Analysis of the initial state of functioning framework in line with the existing normative enactments in the Town of Novi Pazar, related to action in the states of emergency, with the recommendations and instructions for their improvement, SCTM: Belgrade

erate, and their probability is high (3), and consequences low (2). Finally, the risk of fires is low, for its probability is high (4), and consequences minimal (1). Risk of earthquakes is unacceptable, and risks of rock slides, landslides and erosion; floods; and fires, explosions and outdoor fires are acceptable.

Based on the analysis of scenarios for the most probable unwanted event and risk assessment, we may conclude that the risk of fires, explosions and outdoor fires is low, whereas the risk of landslides and floods is moderate which indicates to the fact that it is acceptable, and there is a need to undertake certain actions in order to reduce risks of the mentioned disasters. High level of risk requires risk treatment, as well as the need to undertake actions to reduce level of earthquake to the acceptable level.⁸³

2. 2. Crisis management in town of Novi Pazar – organizational aspect

Town emergency management HQ (EMHQ) is comprised of 31 persons, i.e., management: Commanding Officer of the HQ, Deputy Commanding Officer, Chief and 28 members. Commanding Officer of the Town HQ is, per his position a Mayor, Deputy Commander is Deputy Mayor, and Chief of HQ - Head of Emergency Management Department of the Serbian Ministry of Interior.

Per the number of its members the HQ is relatively big one, and its composition is heterogeneous, which can be an advantage, given the different experiences and expertise of its members, but in some cases, it may reduce the efficiency of decision-making process. However, there are only three female members of the HQ, and when forming the HQ one should take more care about gender equality and about participation of a person dealing with the improvement of the status of vulnerable groups and gender equality. Time-wise, joint working experience of the current composition of the HQ is relatively modest (2,5 years), however certain number of members have multi-year experience in the working in the HQ. HQ operates in line with the Rules of Procedure adopted on May 28, 2011. Work of the HQ is public, and openness of the HQ operations is ensured by presence of media outlets at the HQ sessions, organization of press conferences, issuance of statements, and via announcements posted on the municipal web page. Municipal HQ may decide to exclude the public while deliberating upon certain issues that might entail certain level of secrecy. HQ session is convened by the HQ Commanding Officer, and in his absence Deputy Commanding Officer. Decisions are made by majority votes. In the exceptional cases (disasters, accidents, technical and technological accidents) two thirds of the HQ members should be present for the proper operation of the HQ and lawful decision-making process, whereby the absent HQ members may cast their votes via telephone or e-mail, if the circumstances allow. HQ operates and decides only at its sessions and cannot transfer its decision-making right to its auxiliary working bodies. In the course of each year, the HQ holds regular sessions, and if necessary, extraordinary ones. Rules of Procedure on the HQ envisages that sessions shall be held four times per year, i.e., at least one session per quarter. In the extremely urgent cases, when there is a threat of occurrence, or disasters or other accidents occurred - emergencies, and if the

⁸³ Town of Novi Pazar (2017) Disaster and other Hazard Need Assessment

situation requires urgent undertaking of protection and rescue measures of people and material goods, HQ Commanding Officer, upon the proposal of Chief of HQ, may order undertaking of necessary measures from the purview of the HQ, with the obligation to inform the HQ thereof at the subsequent HQ session. For more efficient performance of its role, the HQ adopts its Annual Work Plan, and may also adopt Operational Work Plans. The HQ informs the Town Assembly of Novi Pazar about its work by submission of its Annual Report on the Work. In order to hold HQ session, it is necessary to have majority of the total number of its members present, and only in the exceptional circumstances it may be held with the smaller number of its members.

Turnout of the HQ members at the session is satisfactory and at average 25 members attend sessions. HQ members are very active at the session and act as a team. In case of impossibility of a member of the HQ to attend the HQ session, entities or organisations tend to send adequate replacement. Maximum turnout time of the HQ members in case of urgent convening a session due to the state of emergency is 30 to 60 minutes. In the period 2016-2018, the HQ held in total 25 session out of which 9 regular and 16 extraordinary. The following table shows the number of regulate and extraordinary session of the HQ in 2016, 2017 and 2018.

Table 1: Sessions of the Town Emergency Headquarters

	2016	2017	2018	total
regular	4	2	3	9
extraordinary	13		3	16
Pronounced emerg.situat.	1 (flood)			
Drawn conclusions	69	8		
recommendations	1	2		
Public call	1			

Source: Annual Report on the EMHQ

Dynamic of sessions is conditioned by the current type of problems, and thereby in 2016, when the state of emergency was pronounced in March due to floods, even 17 sessions of the HQ were held, out of which 13 extraordinary, whereas in 2017, only two sessions were held, which is lower than envisaged under the Rules of Procedure (4).

Besides the adoption of plans and reports on the EHQ work, being its regular activities, documents adopted at the HQ sessions refer to floods (operational plans for defence from the second order floods; annual plan for flood measures and risk reduction) and landslides, i.e., erosion as the consequence of floods (Decision on determination of erosion-prone areas and anti-erosion measures) and response of the competent services in the winter period. The same applies for the undertaken measures which refer to removal of unlawfully built facilities which pose a threat in case of increase of water level, designed rehabilitation of landslide and undertaking of other measures for the sake of better preparedness and raising of capacities for flood defence. Besides, the Annual programme for measures and works at flood risk reduction, in addition to the infrastructure works, should include vulnerability assessment, education and other activities focusing on strengthening resilience of the population, and particularly of members of vulnerable groups.

The HQ work plan for 2018 also envisages deliberation upon the funding issues of protection and rescue system, training of EHQ and commissioner and deputy commissioned of CP, CR specialized units, companies and other legal entities of importance for protection and rescue; warning system; fire protection in the summer months; found and destroyed UXO; and organisation and equipment of protection and rescue forces at the level of the town. Other risks the Town of Novi Pazar is exposed to were not subject to more serious deliberations at the HQ sessions. Neither were represented significant issues such as prevention, awareness raising and education of citizens and the similar.

Department for Emergency and Defence Affairs and EHQ of Novi Pazar have regular communication and excellent cooperation with the Emergency Management Sector and its branch, i.e., Department for Emergency in Novi Pazar.⁸⁴

(Self) perception of operations and functioning of the HQ may be observed on the basis of the survey results/written questionnaire completed by the total of 11 members of the HQ. However, some respondents did not answer all the questions, hence it is not possible to consistently classify the answers. Likewise, certain completed questionnaires have minor contradictions.

As per the structure of the surveyed sample of 11 respondents, 10 males and only one female. The biggest part of respondent - 9 is older than 55, two are in the group from 45 to 55, while one respondent did not give data on his/her age. As per level of education, 9 respondents have university decree, and two colleague degree (VI level of vocational education). Four respondents have 10 and more years of service, and three respondents have two, i.e., three years of service, while the years of service of the others varies from 4 to 8 years of service. Even six respondents did not give any data on the number of emergencies in the course of their terms of office in the HQ, and the answers to the question of the current legal framework for management and response in the emergency either are not provided or are scarcely provides. HQ members did not undergo any training sessions, i.e., professional development, nor did they take part in exercises, i.e., crisis situations. Representative of the Centre for Social Work is a sole exception, for he passed the exam in safety and protection at workplace and took part in the exercise of management of wounded persons in the state of emergency organized by RC, as well as one representative of the local Red Cross who regularly participate in different training sessions and exercises. One representative of the Community Health Centre took part in exercises related to fire and floods.

After being asked to evaluate the work of the Emergency Headquarters of Novi Pazar from 1 (very poor), through 2 (not that poor), 3 (good), 4 (very good) and 5 (excellent), four respondents evaluated its work with 3 and the other four with 5, and another three respondents evaluated it with 4, so that the average evaluation mark of the HQ work is 4.

Respondents positively, whit the high mark (above 4), evaluated the cooperation with certain entities within this emergency management system. The best cooperation is with the Town

⁸⁴ It concerns the assessment of competent town services for emergency. However, the fact that a representative of the Emergency Management Sector did not attend the meeting with experts and SCTM representatives does not fit into this assessment.

Administration - the average mark is 4,73, and it is followed by the Armed Forces of the RS - 4,5. Town Council - 4,36, Councils - 4,33, Mol and Town Assembly - 4,3 and Raška District - 4. The cooperation with the non-governmental organisations, particularly with the Red Cross, was positively evaluated.

They mentioned the following as the major contribution to the attained results of the EHQ work: response in floods, as well as preventive work, i.e., preparation for floods, good prevention, quick response, quality plans and terrain reclamation and prevention of epidemic. However, the respondents were reluctant to specify omissions in the past HQ work, and only two of them mentioned poor organisation as shortcoming, i.e., use of better organisation, while the other mentioned the problem related to the catchment Pazarište. Lack of equipment and insufficient level of activities of certain HQ members, lack//not functioning of hydrants in buildings, insufficient number of fire-fighting vehicles and lack of service for lifts in residential buildings were mentioned as problem related to HQ work. Most respondent evaluated the total capacities of the Town of Novi Pazar as partially adequate to the realistic needs for emergency management, and three of them believed that they are completely adequate, i.e., in line with the needs.

On the basis of the analysis of the Annual Report on HQ work, one can conclude that the HQ deals more with the routine topics and problems imposed by immediate situation, rather than with strategy and long-term efforts to develop and improve the functioning of the system. The minutes from the sessions do not indicate to any conflicting standpoints, conflicting opinions and discussions about important issues and problems, but one can get impression that the HQ operates and functions in a bureaucratic fashion. Materials analyzing certain problems and proposing adequate measures and activities are rare. It is necessary to set clear goals and time frame for their realization in terms of the EHQ work, and to prioritize those goals and to set monitoring, i.e., way to follow the progress through previously identified indicators.

3. Conclusion

Despite analytical efforts in this Analysis, we could not have get comprehensive, detailed, precise and completely clear picture about the adequacy of the capacities and functional qualification for risk reduction and response in the emergency given the fact that local actors lack critical observation of the current state of affairs, most important weaknesses, difficulties and problems and possible way for their resolution with adequate time framework and set of indicator to follow the progress in this area.

In general, one can conclude that the Town of Novi Pazar has significant normative capacities to manage over the states of emergency, but that there is a need for their further development, improvement and tailoring and operationalisation in lien with new national normative framework. When it comes to functional capacities, the situation is significantly unfavorable and there is not only significant room, but also urgent need for the improvement of conditions in this area. It primarily refers to the need to set up an efficient and effective civil protection system.

Despite all official assurances regarding good cooperation of the Town Service for the emergency management and regional organizational unit of the Emergency Management Sector,

based on direct insight (for instance absence of a representative of the regional organizational unit at the meeting about the implementation of the Project with the Swedish partners), and on the basis of some situations in the field and OSCE statements one can conclude that there is a lot of room, and need, to improve this cooperation in order to increase the total efficiency of the system.

Managerial members of the Town Emergency HQ are (maybe excessively) satisfied with the way the HQ operates and functions. However, the Rules of Procedure envisaged holding four sessions a year, but, for example, in 2017 only two were held. The HQ, within its capacities, engaged to improve capacities of the protection and rescue system and develop relevant documents and instructions. It is extremely positive that the HQ is acting pro-actively, actually that it tends to, besides preparation and response in the state of emergency, deals with prevention and reduction of risks, particularly from floods, in line with the Town capacities. In the course of each year, the HQ continuously monitor field conditions regarding the most important risks, in the first-place floods and landslides, and instructs to the entities to undertake all necessary measures. Likewise, plan to prepare all entities for the winter season is regularly prepared and all necessary measure are undertaken so as to keep the normal life in the winter time. A good coordination and cooperation with the other entities were established. According to the allegations of the actors, precisely thanks to such work and dedication of the municipal HQ and all local entities, consequences, even in the most extreme states of emergency, such as 2016 floods, consequences were the least possible.

Certain weaknesses and shortcomings in functioning of the overall emergency management system were observed and they should be rectified in the coming period:

- although normative documents were adopted, there is still a need to adopt the missing ones
- lack of training and unpreparedness of the EHQ members to manage over the state of emergency
- lack/absence of an efficient civil protection system
- poor conditions of the early warning system
- lack of exercises, i.e., emergency simulations
- lack of educations of the population about emergencies
- small amount of funds that are allocated under the annual local budgets for emergency management
- material resources, i.e., technical resources used for protection and rescue are old, partially broken and far from sufficient.

At the strategic level, a **thinking paradigm** about risk reduction and emergency management should be completely changed in the Town Administration. A Copernicus switch from reactive strategy, in which town administration waits for a solution and/or instructions from the top (republic level), complies with them mechanically and formally (like ticking the boxes in already prepared form) not taking into account adequacy, functionality and applicability of the solution, and routinely repeats mantra that one dinar invested in prevention saves seven

dinars in the recovery, into the administration assuming responsibilities and leadership, acting proactively and acting in practice in line with verbal statement that the development of a more resilient community is its priority, and investment in the prevention is an investment, not a cost is indispensable. This implies development of the overall local disaster risk reduction and emergency management strategy along with the engagement of all available town resources. The EHQ and competent town service may be responsible entities, organizers and coordinators of this job, but a full contribution and dedication of all resources in the town administration are needed for success. The Strategy should identify short-term, medium-term and long-term goals, and action plans should operationalize their implementation per specific segments in the adequate time, financial and organisational framework (development of a matrix) with clearly identified indicators adequate to monitor the progress and level of implementation of the set goals. All the aforementioned implies a sincere dedication (not verbal, rather practical, working) of the administrative top and application of the existing organisational culture and inherited democratic and political forms.

In line with a new proposed strategic paradigm in the development of an efficient disaster risk reduction and emergency management system, it is extremely important to establish **public private dialogue** which is fully lacking both at central and local level under which the current rare and one-way communication is narrowed down to disseminations of messages by competent authorities ("from the top down"). It is necessary to (both at the central and local level) set an effective two way communication, i.e., dialogue between the state and society, i.e., competent state authorities and non-governmental sector, that is, civil society organisations, academia, professional and volunteering association, media, citizens per place of residence, in order to identify, analyse and treat risks, prioritize problems and optimize solutions (crisis planning), increase resilience and improve preparedness and response in the state of emergency. Only this way awareness raising and prevailing of understanding that building disaster resilience is the task pertaining to the whole community and to each and every individual, and not the service to be expected to be delivered by the state may be achieved.

"Wild construction", i.e. town planning chaos is particularly serious problem in the territory of Novi Pazar and it entails serious consequences on different aspects of emergency management (landslides, floods, earthquakes, access roads for fire fighters and ambulance, etc. In such a situation immediate risks might have special importance, if the Government of the Republic of Serbia would be required to, based on the Disaster Risk Assessment of the Town of Novi Pazar, designate risk zones which would represent grounds to prohibit every type of construction in that area. However, matters related to town-planning are fully under the competence of the town. Namely, according to the Charter of the Town of Novi Pazar, the Town, when discharging its authorities, through its entities, adopts spatial plan of the Town and adopts urban plans in line with the Constitution and the laws. The Town Assembly, in line with the law, adopts spatial plan and urban plan and regulates utilisation of the development land and appoint a chief urban designer. A Chief Urban Designer, who by his/her function is a President of the Commission for Plans, coordinates development of planning documents and coordinates work among entities

competent for town planning affairs and public enterprises and other institutions involved in the procedures of development and adoption of planning documents. Activities should be undertaken, through the coordinated actions of the competent services and entities, in adequate **urban planning** and its normative regulation which must take into account of not only current but also future risks (particularly in the context of climate change). This should be followed by an efficient sanctioning policy, i.e., application of the available repressive measures for violation of urban rules. In that regards, SCTM will make special analysis which should focus on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and town planning, i.e., spatial planning. While, at least to a certain extent, the issue of urban chaos is not solved, town entities for transportation and car parking should undertake all available measures to enable the passage for emergency vehicles.

Efficient and effective system for prevention of occurrence and mitigation of emergency consequences (risk reduction) and successful fight against them results from synchronized and coordinated actions of the all state and social actors and citizens with developed awareness and responsibility for their own and for the safety and well-being of the whole community. In that sense, it cannot be a "service" to be provided by one or more (town, republic) services/agencies for the state of emergency, as much as they are ready, trained, equipped, the overall conditions should rather be provided starting from physical (town planning, space designing, elimination of landfills and cleaning of canals, and the similar) up to social (opening and stimulating public-private dialogue, raising the awareness and resilience of citizens and institutions) so as to enable competent services to, with the assistance of all other actors, fill their role. Only then one can speak about the robust system and disaster resilient community. Town Administration of Novi Pazar, in that sense, has a significant part of a responsibility. Hence, one should not be waiting for solutions or instructions from "the top", but set the development of a resilient community as the priority and in that sense ensure, despite the current political divisions and conflicting group interests, strict and consistent compliance with (and improve) applicable laws, regulations and professional rules primarily in the town planning and other areas, and secure necessary funds and liberate local creative potentials with regional association of capacities and funds.

A number of problems and obstacles in establishing an effective crisis management system identified in town of Novi Pazar is also present in other cities in Serbia. On the other hand, there are significant differences in personnel and material technical capacities, as well as in the level of awareness and responsiveness of competency of responsible managers. Different are also problems related to the type and level of risk in cities, concentration of population and critical infrastructure, level of economic development, etc. Nevertheless, we consider that the proposed systemic measures in this paper are more or less applicable to crisis management in all Serbian cities.

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CYBER RISK AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF LEADERSHIP

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Abstract: Knowledge and awareness of computer risks is still low. It is necessary to increase the computer awareness among all employees in the institutions, both in the state sector and in the private sector. Computer risks are challenges that do not know boundaries, and international cooperation is often needed in response to these challenges, and it is therefore necessary to develop international cooperation, following the recommendations of the Cyber Crime Convention, in order to rapidly exchange information, electronic evidence, in the direction of prevention and suppression of all risks arising from cyber-crime.

In order to successfully address cyber risks, it is necessary to invest heavily in cyber security, to prioritize this by the public and private sector. More and more should be invested in national security of states, primarily because of the cyber risks that come if there is no good network protection due to the more frequent use of networking by all institutions. These networks should be safe, mostly because sensitive information is passed through them, and if this information comes into the hands of criminal structures, in that case the state can be easily compromised, the normal functioning of crucial infrastructures can be obstructed (electricity, water, telecommunications, land-air traffic, health system, etc.).

In order to improve the network and Internet vulnerability of cyber risks, it is necessary to have a harmonized law with the European, which will allow democratic information system supervision, which will provide national security, human security, in order not to lose the belief in information technology and its development, which certainly has positive sides that facilitate and improve the life of the individual.

Key words: cyber risks, national security, information technology, cyber security.

INTRODUCTION

The value of cyber security should be crystal clear to life sciences and health care boards and leadership. Cyber security attacks and data breaches seem to be in the headlines almost daily and sobering statistics are everywhere. The number of patient records impacted has nearly

tripled in just one year, jumping from 5.5 million breached records in 2017 to about 15 million in 2018. Health care data is valuable, and cyber security incidents can mean major costs for companies. Operations, for example, could be held hostage, the supply chain could be disrupted, legal fees could mount, and organizations could suffer meaningful but often difficult-to-quantify losses of reputation and consumer trust.

New ways of working lead to new opportunities but also to new risks. Benefits from the Internet itself, from the use of clouds, social media benefits have led to the emergence of new risks, as well as the development of existing risks. Following this rapidly changing risks by organizations, companies will be challenging for them. Cyber threats are one of the fastest growing and dangerous threats that every institution, company, individual who uses information technology is facing today. The development of information technology is a major concern of cyber threats, as well as an increase in the cost of prevention and protection against them. Cyber security has become an integral part of each institution's strategy, and is essential. Over the years, the management of each institution has understood the seriousness of computer threats and how much damage a cyber-attack can cause, and have begun to improve the cyber security budget, as well as aligning cyber security with business goals, in order to create a culture of security and cyber hygiene.

Any institution / organization that is exposed to cyber risk can suffer loss of data, theft of confidential data, thus losing confidence in the public, all of which negatively affects the competitiveness, the reputation of the organization.

When cybercrime is democratized, the number of cyber-attacks is rising. In 2018, attacks with the Ransom ware virus, which were aimed at profit, were characteristic. Only one in five IT security experts were stating that their organization was the victim of a cyber-attack. There is no day where an organization is not a victim of a cyber-attack. Because of this, good management is needed by a management team of a company, managers need to manage the risks that come from cyber-attacks, not just relying on IT solutions, having adequate expertise in cyber security, and setting up a framework for managing the risks of cyber-attacks, to have a plan of action, which risks will be treated, which will be handled, which will be mitigated, increase the budget for cyber security and have a well-staffed team.

Cyber-attacks can penetrate any system of institution / organization, break through the firewalls, without IT experts being aware of it, and can inflict huge damage on the attacked institution.

Government institutions are mainly focused on protecting the country's key infrastructure from cyber-attacks, such as energy (telecommunications, water supplies, transport networks, etc.). These attacks may be for the purpose of stealing sensitive, confidential information, state secrets, which may be compromised by a state, or the attacks to be for economic gain, the resale of stolen data (personal, clients, financial data, and trade secrets) and the like. More computer attackers use Ransom ware virus. Damages from computer attacks are difficult to say for sure, but are estimated at \$ 400-500 billion a year.

This paper will provide a foundation for organizations looking to better understand cyber risk including; a systematic process for defining and comprehensively categorizing sources of cyber risk, a description of key stakeholders and risk owners within the organization, and finally, outline the basics of how to think about calculating cyber risk appetite.

UNDERSTANDING CYBER SECURITY AS A QUESTION FOR RISK MANAGEMENT, AND NOT ONLY AS IT QUESTIONS

With the adaptation of the Internet and technology, we have made it an integral part of our lives. Every day we learn that bank accounts are hacked and robbed, our intellectual property is illegally copied, and critical infrastructure has been hacked and may stop working at any moment (Melissa, 2012).

Digital connectivity continues to transform the way we live and work. Nearly 4 billion people around the world are connected to the Internet in 2017. Cross-border transmission of data has increased by 45 times between 2015 and 2016, and is expected to increase further in the future. It is interesting that in the business sphere, the flow of data now has a greater impact on the growth of value added tax worldwide, more than the traditional trade in goods, and also new technologies create great opportunities for small and large companies (Clinton & Barrack, 2018).

Since the beginning of the Internet, cybercrime has been developing every day more and more in all its forms. During 2018, the latest trends and threats facing cyber security today are in the categories of virtual currencies, the Ransom ware virus, and cyber-attacks on information systems at government departments. Nowadays one who can pay can easily get and buy appropriate tools to perform any kind of cyber-attack.

Anonymity on the Internet serves as a shield and a small risk of detection.

Today there are no more curious amateurs who exploit the weaknesses in computer systems, but now criminal groups that operate in many countries are organized, because cybercrime knows no borders, and infiltrate computer networks, and their goal is financial gain.

Payment service providers (banks, processing centers, etc.) impose increased cyber security. They are obliged to carry out annual assessments of security risks that should include computer risk and to report significant incidents related to cyber-attacks.

The threats and weaknesses of cyber-attacks are changing daily, as well as the standards of how to respond to a computer attack. It is necessary to improve the approach to making computer security expertise, and in the Board of Directors there should also be a cyber security expert with diverse knowledge.

It should be understood that Cyber Security is not just an IT problem, it is a question of risk management.

Cyber security means that precautions should be taken to avoid or reduce any disruption from a cyber-attack, seizure of data, and so on. Cyber security covers not only the protection of confidentiality and privacy, but also the integrity of data that is vital. The consequences of compromising cyber security are potentially much larger because information can be more easily distributed. Cyber incursions are very harmful, costly, and damage to reputation.

According to some research in 2017, 46% of companies reported being victims of a cyber-attack (The Care provider Alliance, 2017).

That is why cyber security is a high priority for both governments and the private sector, for businesses, and work needs to be done to raise awareness of each employee, primarily what are the consequences of a cyber-attack and how to initially protect it.

Certain companies in the Boards have no cyber experts, but there must be members who are responsible for overseeing both computer security and other traditional risks, economic risks. New data should be available to make an analysis and to predict a potential future risk, the impact of that risk, and how it can be mitigated. The awareness that at any moment we may be victims of a cyber-attack should be at our highest level.

Cyber risks and the traditional risks have differences. For example, companies themselves cannot be fully protected from cyber-attacks, because cybercrime is evolving every day and new modules for committing crimes in this area appear. Developed countries invest heavily in cyber security, and it is in the top three risks to national security. It should be an example for many companies, especially those large corporations, who need to be aware that they must invest in cyber security. Companies need to assess cyber risk from different perspectives.

But we should recognize that analyzes of cyber security and cyber risks are one of the newer ones, and it takes time to acquire practice, knowing how to do these analyzes, that is, it takes time to mature. We need to be aware that some managers can show bias and not tell the real situation regarding cyber risks. We are aware of this because a large percentage of IT experts do not report at all when a cyber-attack occurs, as long as that attack does not cause great harm to the company, and these experts filter out the negative results in a number of cases. It is therefore necessary to create a culture of behavior, honesty and transparency in communication, timely reporting of cyber risks, in order to be quickly prevented in order not to allow greater damage to the company, which could not be repaired later.

Cyber risk is commonly defined as exposure to harm or loss resulting from breaches of or attacks on information systems. However, this definition must be broadened. A better, more encompassing definition is "the potential of loss or harm related to technical infrastructure or the use of technology within an organization."

Events covered by this more comprehensive definition can be categorized in multiple ways. One is intent. Events may be the result of deliberately malicious acts, such as a hacker carrying out an attack with the aim of compromising sensitive information, but they may also be unintentional, such as user error that makes a system temporarily unavailable. Risk events may come from sources outside the organization, such as cybercriminals or supply chain partners, or sources inside the organization such as employees or contractors.

Combining these two dimensions leads us to a practical framework for inventorying and categorizing cyber risks:

Internal Malicious: Deliberate acts of sabotage, theft or other malfeasance committed by employees and other insiders. For example, a disgruntled employee deleting key information before they leave the organization.

Internal Unintentional: Acts leading to damage or loss stemming from human error committed by employees and other insiders. For example, in 2013, NASDAQ experienced internal technology issues that caused backup systems to fail.

External Malicious: The most publicized cyber risk; pre-meditated attacks from outside parties, including criminal syndicates, hackers and nation states. Examples include network infiltration and extraction of intellectual property, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that cause system availability issues, business interruptions, or interfere with the proper performance of connected devices such as medical devices or industrial systems.

External Unintentional: Similar to the internal unintentional, these cause loss or damage to business, but are not deliberate. For example, a third-party partner experiencing technical issues can impact system availability, as can natural disasters (RSA, 2016).

Company directors should require management to confirm that a serious and appropriate approach to cyber security has been taken. We are aware that many companies operate according to previous strategies from the past, where each sector or department takes decisions independently of others, without taking into account the interdependence of information technology that carries the present, that is, the current way of functioning.

Managing risk is a balancing act for organizations of all sizes and disciplines. While some organizations take on too much risk, others arguably do not take on enough. Complicating this equation is the emergence of cyber as one of the most impactful sources of risk in the modern enterprise. In fact, cyber security is now increasingly reviewed by corporate boards of directors and often discussed with financial analysts who see cyber security risk as an imminent and paramount business risk. Because the consequences of cyber security failures can be damaging to business revenues and brand reputation, CEOs have lost their positions as a result of data breaches and inept preparation and planning.

Cyber risk is an issue that exists at the intersection of business risk, regulation, and technology. Executive decision-makers should understand the nature and magnitude of those risks, consider them against the benefits a strategic shift would deliver and then make more informed decisions.

Accordingly, organizations must now factor cyber into their risk appetite and explicitly define the level of cyber risk that they are willing to accept in context of their overall risk appetite.

Underscoring that there are no unaffected parties when it comes to cyber security and managing cyber risk, stakeholders who need to shape policy include unexpected job titles. For example, software engineers and developers must ensure that new releases ship without errors that could be exploited. HR teams use Human Capital Management (HCM) software, often cloud-based, that contains employees' personal information such as social security numbers, home addresses, medical claims and other sensitive information. An enterprise's supply chain, distribution channel, partner network and similar third-parties that routinely have access systems and are often integrated, can inadvertently be a vector for cyber security failures.

Here is a starting point to identify cyber security and cyber risk influencers in the organization:



Cyber security and cyber risk influencers in the organization (Picture 1)

CREATING ACCESS TO COMPUTER RISK MANAGEMENT

The risks arising from computer activities, in particular the use of the Internet are relatively new and many companies have no experience and understanding of how to defend themselves. The European Commission estimates that more than one million people are victims of cyber-crime every day around the world. All types of companies are affected by cyber-attacks, not just those who offer financial services. For example, according to a study by the Ponemon Institute in 2013, the average loss ranges from \$ 1.1 million in India to \$ 5.4. Small businesses are among the most affected by cyber-attacks. Criminals are targeting less protected companies (Institute of Risk Management, 2017).

An effective framework for cyber security that each company should have starts with a clear understanding of the risk in the environment in which it operates, the availability of the resources needed for mitigation if there is a potential cyber risk.

Cybersecurity is at the top of the board room agenda today because it is well understood that cyber stakes have never been higher. The innovations and strategic advances that organizations make will continue to raise the stakes.

It is not a problem that can be solved; cyber risk cannot be completely eradicated, but it can be managed to facilitate the success of a company's drive forward.

Decisions about cyber risk appetite need to be made with the business and communicated throughout the organization. It's important to understand the culture of the company and how the key stakeholders answer the following questions:

What losses would be catastrophic?

What can we live without and for how long?


What information absolutely cannot fall into the wrong hands or be made public?

What could cause personal harm to employees, customers, partners, visitors?

Creating a common risk management taxonomy and language is essential for an organization to understand cyber risk in the context of its overall objectives.

Cyber risk management is an identification, analysis, risk assessment, and acceptance, avoidance, transfer or mitigation of risk at an acceptable level. It also refers to the costs and benefits undertaken by the company.

First of all we would like to define cyber risk as a potential factor that can cause problems or affect the IT system that could cause disruption in the performance of duties and can lead to economic loss.



IT System (Picture 2)

When it comes to cyber risks, in addition to external factors such as unauthorized access, hacking, etc., it is also important to consider internal factors such as system performance errors, which can lead to complete failure.


There are types of Computer Risk (Hino, 2018):

External Factors:

- Viruses,
- Social Engineering and
- Unauthorized access

Internal Factors:

- General systemic failure,
- Abuse and
- Operational error.



Types of Cyber Risks (Picture 3)

In order to ensure cyber risks, insurers need to be able to identify risk factors. It is necessary to establish countermeasures, to make statistical analysis, if there is a computer risk to manage it. When there are established IT standards, it enables smooth integration of the organization's operation and management, as well as easier handling of problems that arise and are related to cyber risks.

By management it is necessary to make a guide to cyber security and dealing with cyber risks.

It is also advisable to conduct simulation exercises for an IT incident for a certain period of time, to use the countermeasures that are provided, to see how the personnel handling this type of incident and so on.

The IT incident is a phenomenon that in fact results in negative results, has consequences for IT systems, including all the disadvantages involved in IT systems.

"Cyber Risk is not only external factor, but also internal factor"

IT managers need to cope and resolve the incident that has occurred in the computer system. First of all:

- Record incidents for future analysis, in order to improve the attitude towards cyber risks;
- If the cyber incident is serious and critical, in that case the IT manager is obliged to report this to the senior responsible persons in the company, in order to react promptly in order to avoid more serious consequences;
- After solving the critical cyber incident, the IT manager should proceed with an investigation and risk analysis, in order to prevent the same risk being repeated;

Management is required to organize regular trainings of the company's staff related to the operation of IT systems and cyber risks. An analysis of the report on cyber incidents should be carried out, the new trends in the area of cybercrime should be monitored, and timely risk assessment etc. should be carried out. If needed, consultation with external IT experts can also be made.

Regarding all data used in the IT system, the IT manager should properly manage them, the availability of data to be regulated in terms of who has access to all data, etc., to prevent data loss, falsification of data, not to allow them to be disclosed somewhere, etc. It is very important to pay attention to the work of the IT system, especially when it is connected to the Internet, it requires a lot of knowledge, experience and caution.

It is also necessary for the management of a company affected by a cyber-attack to include experts from forensics that will conduct investigations to determine the severity of the cyber-attack, how to cope in the future with such attacks, to do risk assessment, risk understanding program, etc.

The notion of how to show value for cyber risk investment is one that the industry struggles with because success is invisible – it's the absence of a cyber event, or the ability to show that an event had a lesser impact than it might have had. It is difficult to show return on investment for cyber risk programs. Organizations need to develop the ability to demonstrate that the investments they are making are aligned with the actual risks they face.

They have to ask if they are making the appropriate investments in security, vigilance, and resilience, and whether those decisions are based on a realistic understanding of the specific risks their organization faces – and the magnitude of impact that a cyberattack could have.

Managing cyber risk is not just a cost to the business, but a positive investment to enable the success of strategic growth and performance initiatives," contributes Deloitte Advisory Cyber Risk Services (RSA, 2016).

CONCLUSION

The threats are very pervasive and it is necessary to have a national and international interest. Every institution or company should precisely cure the risk of a cyber-attack. Cyber risk is just another kind of risk that needs to be properly addressed inside the company, as well as managing that risk. With real approach, every company can face cyber risks. Regular controls, safe use of the Internet and all the opportunities offered by information technology should be carried out.

As the world progresses digitally, the real management team needs to implement expensive security solutions in each infrastructure. In order to cope with the development of information technology and all the risks coming from it, we should first accept it and learn to live with it. Good managers need to work proactively, take steps and adapt and adjust to the computer environment that has already been evaluated, and if not, then they should be considered responsible.

Critical infrastructures are increasingly facing many challenges, including cyber-attacks. It is therefore necessary to systematically monitor, analyze risks, assess weaknesses, potential threats, and propose risk control plans to ensure continuity of work.

It is necessary to create a process for integrating advanced cyber security and practices to manage cyber risks and their evaluation.

The ability to quantify cyber risk and make informed decisions about cyber risk appetite will often be the difference between success and failure for modern enterprises. Those who do so effectively will be better positioned to enable continued growth, those who do not will expose their organization to risks with potential calamitous implications. Organizations must take a comprehensive inventory of potential cyber risks, quantify their potential impact, and prioritize them effectively. This process must involve stakeholders across the organization to gain perspective and consensus. It must be an ongoing process involving constant evaluation and re-evaluation. And, this up-to-date understanding must feed into the organizations view of operational and enterprise risk.

Everyone is a source of cyber risk. Public failures become personal. Personal failures become public. Even seemingly small lapses in judgment or policy oversight can have dire consequences. Over sharing on social media can reveal critical personal information that threat actors can use. Not logging out of a system at the end of the day is a wide open door to information thieves.

All of these messages should be taken into account and adapted to the new types of threats that the information technology brings with us in order to act timely and preventively and prevent major threats that could endanger the national security of the country.

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THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

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Abstract: Terrorism as a form of endangering security in the state that can be considered as a psychological act designed to influence the public, its purpose is to cause fear, which implies that this fear is directed at someone else, and not just to the victim.

The various forms of terrorism that are known today make the very definition of the term terrorism more difficult. It therefore approaches a more general definition, such as that it constitutes a criminal violation of any national or international legal code

Terrorism is a common practice in the ranks of rebels, but they do not have to be qualified as terrorists if they respect the rules of war and if they do not intervene in those forms of violence that identify themselves as terrorist acts. War is subject to the rules of international military law, while terrorists do not recognize rules (no person, place, object are not immune to the terrorist act).

Their unpredictability and apparent coincidence makes it difficult for the government to protect potential victims. Although there is a public legal discipline and determination, it very rarely hinders terrorists in carrying out their sacred tasks that are always justified by "higher laws".

Intelligence has an obligation to collect information, process them, analyze them, make an appropriate assessment of the occurrence, and deliver them to those who need to make a decision or take action to prevent the action of a particular threat. No other institution is so important in anti-terrorism, i.e. in the fight against terrorism, as much as the intelligence services.

The most difficult area in the fight against terrorism is the collection of the information about identity, goals, plans and, most importantly, what are the weak points of the terrorists.

The fear of terror that prevails today mainly stems from the fear of future attacks that will end as much or as many victims of the attacks on September 11 or similar attacks that have taken place over the past 20 years. Whether and how these attacks will be carried out may depend on political events that have not yet happened. However as in other areas of human activity, the prediction of the worst if it resonates in the fear of the people is much more likely than predicting the best.

Even 90% of success of intelligence can bring another major setback. Terrorists will attack successfully no matter how effective the intelligence system is.

However, this must not shake the intelligence services to fulfill their tasks, as they are the key to dealing with terrorism, and even only a more salvaged human life will justify their existence.

Key words: terrorism, intelligence, intelligence system, national security.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a form whose nature can't be accurately defined, characterized, but the essence of its existence is present throughout history, and it seems that it begins to take on a bigger swing. Terrorism is merely proof of the human thirst for power, position, way of expressing anger, rage through violence, and mistreatment of innocent people. So the objective reality gives us the right to penetrate deeper into human beings and being to actually see that it is a blow to the human race, a blow to ourselves. So terrorism acts with a monotonous correspondence man against man. From here, it can penetrate even deeper into the subjective expression of man. This subjective approach to the sentiments presented through violence forms the niche of those who accept terrorism. It is about subjects whose intellect, individuality is at such a low level of consciousness and thinking that leads to the reduction of the moral act and the sense of ethics, moral code and value. So man by doing such unforgiving feats loses valorization towards the society itself, and it points to an irrefutable fact that there is still a thirst for revenge, violence, dominance. So to eradicate this phenomenon it is necessary to consider the aspects of the human psyche. So we come to a crucial problem whose solution is probably the time. As a factor that affects the behavior of certain individuals and groups is inequality. This issue leads people to express their power through aggressive actions, murders, threats, intimidations. So in this plan there is also a decrease in cultural values and spiritual aspirations. In fact, terrorism entails distancing from the norms of living and causing a negative effect on society. The very effect of terrorism is causing adverse effects and grieving the tight principles of power, the law and the public. So terrorism is able to use every link and harm the government, as well as the sovereignty and integrity of the state. Terrorism does not choose religion, a nation, an individual, but only requires a cause and cause for action. Human ideology seeks to eliminate this mass phenomenon by choosing non-violent means, because otherwise it will become the same as the opponents.

Defining intelligence is particularly problematic given the wide range of areas of interest covered by intelligence activity.

Intelligence must fulfill tasks if it wants at least to be in step in dealing with modern terrorism, such as: gathering information, searching through received raw data, compiling information and data, drawing the right conclusions and conveying them to management.

Fulfilling these tasks, intelligence fulfills its basic function, which is to obtain quality, timely and reliable information in order to prevent terrorist attacks.

THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM

The data on the existence of terrorism begin sometime in the eleventh century when it is important to emphasize the terrorist insanity of the assassins in Persia and Assyria that spread great fear and terror through the Islamic Empire. In the period of the American Revolution, terrorism does not stop. His cruelty was primarily directed against the British and their colonial sympathizers. The use of organized terrorist groups during the US Civil War has been expanded and often overwhelmingly endorsed allowing certain groups of former soldiers and bandits on both sides to use certain tactics of terror.

Colonial slavery in a number of countries in the world in the first half of the twentieth century will trigger a large number of terrorist groups, motivated to break the chains of centuries-old colonialism. The wave of the new anticolonial revolution, which culminated in a number of anti-colonial wars, sparked new forms of intense terrorist activity. Modern terrorism appears in the second half of the 20th century, more precisely in the period from 1950 to 1970, when violence became a popular way and strategy for achieving certain planned goals and effects. The effects of these activities were aimed at raising political and social awareness, that is, the possibility of coming to a political expression of certain social groups in the society. The last decade of the 20th century is one of the most significant periods of the evolution of terrorism. So, today terrorism is a frequently used tactic of radical fundamentalist groups dedicated to the goal of destroying their political and religious opponents.

The various forms of terrorism that are known today make the very definition of the term terrorism more difficult. It therefore approaches a more general definition, such as that it constitutes a criminal violation of any national or international legal code.

The US government defines terrorism as a thoughtful, politically motivated violence committed against a non-military target by subnational organizations or secret agents, which violence is intended to influence the public (usually on the rule of law). Terrorism is a common practice in the ranks of the rebels, but they do not have to be qualified as terrorists if they respect the rules of war and if they do not intervene in those forms of violence that identify themselves as terrorist acts. War is subject to the rules of international military law, while terrorists do not recognize rules (no person, place, object are not immune to the terrorist act). Their unpredictability and apparent coincidence makes it difficult for the government to protect potential victims. Although there is a public legal discipline and determination, it very rarely hinders terrorists in carrying out their sacred tasks that are always justified by "higher laws".

BASIC REASONS AND TERMS OF TERRORISM

The question as to why and why terrorism arises is very difficult to offer a clear answer because terrorism is a complex and layered phenomenon whose causes are increasing day by day, and similarly to its dreadful consequences. On their appearance great influence have:

- **objective circumstances** - injustice and imperfection in the economic base and political upgrading of society (the failure of its institutions, insufficient education, poverty, the

isolation of individuals and social groups, bribery, corruption, revanchism, ethnic strife, the existence of a system of formal democracy, the trust in the political system, the legitimacy of state power, etc.).

- **Subjective circumstances** - which means "taking things into their own hands", that is, "taking justice in their own hands" because according to their estimates such a state can only be changed with violence, that violence is the only and last remedy, the fastest and most effective possible variant of action and realization of the set goals.

The most important factors contributing to the creation of terrorist violence to a large extent are the following:

- **Political** - non-popular, repressive and corrupt government;
- **Social** - not a middle class and total discrimination;
- **Economic** - unbearable poverty, ie total impoverishment of the population and high unemployment;
- **Ideological** - political philosophies with strongly expressed opposition;
- **Geopolitical** - the presence of a large number of residents from other countries, or the rampant border conflicts or civil and other types of conflicts in the immediate environment;
- **Religious** - religious conflicts or religious violence
- **External** - external support of the activities of influences dissidents or extreme enemy political emigration.

Every terrorist act is solidly planned and rationally determined in order to achieve something specific, unusual but quite effective. Usually his intention is to achieve one or more of the presented goals:

- obtaining a worldwide general and national recognition of their goal;
- provoke an overreaction by the government and create an atmosphere of affection for the terrorists;
- to attack and embarrass government security forces, diminishing their effectiveness;
- alienation for the purpose of obtaining money, weapons and equipment;
- destruction of tactical and symbolic goals;
- deter foreign investments and assistance programs;
- to exercise influence on the decisions of the government, the legislation or during the elections;
- Revenge
- change the outcome of the guerrilla war.

Significantly for the terrorist actions is that their effectiveness is not contained only in the terrorist act, but also in the level of reaction of the public or the government. In general, there are five main groups that are a significant target of terrorist attacks. These are: the government, the police or the military, the business, the public and the media. The reasons for this are different.

The government is often the target of such attacks due to various requests by terrorists or because of an attempt to force a change in the country's internal or foreign policy. Security forces - the police and the military are targeted for terrorist attacks for retaliation for their successful operations, due to an excessive reaction by the police or the military to show government oppression, due to the strength of the police or the military, showing the population that the security forces cannot control the situation and protect people.

INTELLIGENCE AS A RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS

The modern way of behavior and response to modern intelligence in the process of preventive action, early warning and response to the contemporary security challenges and threats that arise as a result of the emergence of global change and the consequences on the local and regional level are the more pronounced challenges and threats and mass manifestations of extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, international terrorism, organized crime, and others. The fact of the massive use of urban terrorism and heavy crime, which significantly threatened security in the larger settlements, led to religious division and distrust, disloyalty and violation of democratic processes and violation of national security.

In the past, there have been many attempts to isolate intelligence as a branch of security, but also as a phenomenon and tool in the hands of contemporary democracies to provide an appropriate response to security challenges and threats.

Intelligence theories give the concepts of defining and identifying carriers of forms of endangering internal and external security, but at the time in which we live, intelligence has become a big business, which forms a legal status with extremely important personnel, which is the reason for rejecting the past century of hiding behind the cloak and the myth of secrecy, accepting its effects.

Modern intelligence is a logical product from a large number of necessary operative-tactical and analytical-research measures, actions and methods in the path of receiving final (usable) intelligence information.

Intelligence in opposing the challenges and threats is a tool for preventive action and obstruction of the realization of the asymmetrical logic of the set goals.

The need for intelligence has become an important segment and pillar in the demands of information by state authorities, and the degree of efficient execution of the missions set depends directly on the level of information needed to determine.

Modern intelligence requires the modernization of intelligence capabilities and opportunities in modernizing models, setup, functioning, and efficiency of expected and necessary results.

Of particular importance in the sphere of intelligence is the use of standard operational procedures, which in international practice is a relatively new term, with massive use after the start of the period of asymmetric threats and global terrorism at the beginning of the 21st century, as well as with the admission of new members in NATO. Standardization in NATO member states is carried out by the "NATO Standardization Organization", whose role is to increase interoperability and contribute to the capacity of allies' forces to jointly train, practice and act in

an efficient way, cooperation with partner countries. In fact, "standards" represent the totality of accepted norms and rules that regulate the organization of work, from the simplest to the most complicated activities. They simply offer a formula (model, idea) for access to a particular area, such as the war.

The term "modern intelligence" is most often associated with the activities of state institutions, but in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, private mega companies, banking institutions, international representative offices and business groups are increasingly using it, and in some regions of the world where political security is unstable and paramilitary formations, rebel groups, criminal gangs, and so on.

The modernity of intelligence as a system is a primary necessity and a desire to provide the necessary level of information, knowledge, monitoring of certain events, phenomena and trends, opposing threats, risks, endangerment and preventive action against the occurrence of asymmetric hazards and the like.

The famous Chinese theorist Sun Tzu Wu as early as 500 BC. he wrote that intelligence can compensate the advantage of the enemy in "people, money and materials". Intelligence is a key requirement for meeting other requirements for success, such as surprise, and to achieve this, intelligence must be first-rate. In order to successfully combat any kind of terrorist campaign, a key precondition is the development of an original, high-quality intelligence activity.

There are many rare examples when security services can catch terrorists at the crime scene (a special story is with suicide bombers). Then the anti-terrorist mosaic will have to be carefully assembled with the help of careful collection, analysis of comprehensive and precise intelligence to create valid assumptions for the successful locating of terrorists and their bases. The best variant is the timely detection and prevention of their conspiracies and their bringing to justice.

The primary goal of each intelligence service is the preventive action to prevent the development of terrorist threats higher than the initial phase.

The success of the preventive function depends on the ability to act continuously and to have a solid knowledge of the terrorist forces and individuals, the exact nature of their plans and goals, their political, economic and psychological motivation and inclinations, leadership / leadership, membership, logistical and financial opportunities for their secret mixtures), their links with other domestic and international terrorist organizations, links with countries that sponsor terrorism, and the structures of international organized crime that often appear as their sponsors.

Intelligence responsibilities within national frameworks should be precisely defined in order to avoid rivalry with other security services, as well as separation with other regional police forces. Intelligence data in the field of threats from terrorist attacks constitute a product obtained through the collection, assessment, analysis, unification and interpretation of all available information pertaining to threats of terrorist attacks as a serious security threat to organizations in and outside the country, as well as the zone for carrying out operations that are potentially significant for planning attacks from terrorist organizations.

There are six basic categories of intelligence that at the same time are characteristic (with their specificities) and for successfully combating the threats from terrorist attacks:

- Power, combat facilities, combat tactics, weapons systems, explosives, the possibility of producing weapons of mass destruction, etc.
- Scientific and technical data - primarily relate to the level of scientific and technological achievement in both the civilian and the military sectors. These data are even more important if they are related to countries that actively or passively reduce the non-state actors. The focus is again on the achievements of their development in the field of research and production of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation on the black market. The possibility of equipment, capacities and potential opportunities is explored in particular.
- Sociological data - refer primarily to the sociological analysis of certain "critical" subgroups in the society that belong to the representatives of terrorist organizations, ie to potential impoverished subgroups (according to ethnic, religious and other belongings) which can represent a solid base from which could recruit future terrorists and have active support from the group they belong to.
- Economic data - that refer to all essential economic parameters that determine the economic development, the standard and all other elements needed to create a clear picture of the economic basis and economic conditions and relationships in a particular society. By analyzing certain financial flows, especially the overall economic transactions in the function of sponsoring and financing terrorist organizations. The channels, sources and models for their funding are numerous and analogous to the many methods for detecting and tracking the financing of terrorism and analyzing the structure and functioning of certain international groups.
- Data for the environment - referring to all important military geographic, orographic, climate, weather parameters, vegetation, hydrography, endemic diseases, water conditions and the possibility of survival of the terrain, the effects of gravity, the ions of natural radioactive radiation in certain areas and the like, The specificities of these elements will be particularly necessary for the zones of the more severe crisis hotspots. Knowing the characteristics of the terrain of a potential conflict between the state forces and the terrorists will largely determine the chances of success of this involved party that will be more skillful in using the strengths of these factors of crucial importance for winning in the future clash.

Specific forms of action of modern intelligence

It is necessary that the terrorist attacks are prevented in the planning phase, that is, it is imperative that it does not happen at all.

The only ones who are able to "look to the future", that is collecting information to come to the knowledge of which will prevent the execution of terrorist activities are precisely the intelligence services.

Whether and how many intelligence services will be effective in carrying out their preventive function in the fight against terrorism depends also on: the ability for continuous action and sound knowledge of terrorist groups and individuals, their plans, their political, economic and psychological motivation and habits for leadership, membership, logistical and financial opportunities, their links to countries that sponsor terrorism, and to the structures of international organized crime that often appear in the role of foreign sponsors.

Gathering information, processing and evaluating it is the essence of intelligence that is the logic of the existence and operation of the intelligence services in the world.

In this context, professional intelligence experts define strategic intelligence as a knowledge of the world around us-introduction and in presidential decisions and actions.

From this aspect, a product of intelligence is information-collected and interpreted in order to obtain a sharp picture of the political, economic and military position in the world, in the region, and most importantly in the immediate environment.

What makes intelligence different from other types of information, are the threads of secret material woven through it, the threads are invisible to ordinary "mortals".

According to the ancient Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, it is the "divine pulling of the strings", necessary for wise governance, for winning the wars and for the successful running and survival of the state. Intelligence services are now engaged in "predicting the future" of a special interest in national security, which means life or death for the state.

Also, the importance of intelligence and the successful conduct of the fight against terrorism is paramount. Intelligence is the key to conducting successful anti-terrorist operations, that is, good intelligence is the best weapon in the fight against terrorism. Especially in the fight against international terrorism. The ability of the state to detect, analyze and act against a terrorist threat depends largely on the effectiveness of the intelligence apparatus.

Daily collection of information about the identity, goals, plans and weak points of terrorists and terrorist organizations is the most difficult area in the field of intelligence. However, no other method of anti-terrorism policy is more important than the prevention, obstruction, and reaction of terrorist attacks.

Intelligence in the sphere of counterterrorism is a special discipline with its own special issue, specificity with much greater risks. Unlike strategic and military, intelligence in this sphere is much more difficult because terrorist organizations are essentially secret structures, they are hardly observed while technical sources have almost no meaning for fighting this kind of secret activity.

These difficulties primarily arise from the fact that terrorist groups are usually small, unique, disciplined, with a high level of conspiracy, a high degree of security awareness, culture and meaning.

Their plans are only known to a few by the top management of the top pyramid of the terrorist structure, while the possibility of someone outside to be familiar with their content is completely eliminated.

Their “defense mechanism”, closure and organizational setup represent a significant obstacle to gathering reliable information and in their distribution to policy analysts and policy makers.

The risk for agents and field officers is very high, and for that purpose intelligence information must be safely stored. The “leak” of intelligence reduces their value, jeopardizes sources of information, distances the services of friendly countries, prevents their co-operation and threatens the ability of their own intelligence services to collect other necessary information.

In such situations, we will be forced to work with poor, incomplete, often arbitrary, peripheral information, beyond the focus of the plan or carrying out any attack. Often, the sources of information will be unknown or unverified, thus continually causing us to be surprised and suffer defeats, which are most often paid for by the blood of innocent citizens.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism is a very complex, multidimensional political phenomenon whose object of action is so chosen to trigger strong psychological reactions among a wider circle of people in order to change the behavior that is important for achieving certain goals.

Terrorists believe that the “bad” situation in society can only change with violence. Terrorism is a threat to security in a state, starting with property, material goods and even human life.

So terrorism threatens to destroy man, the constant economic, political and technological development of society. Terrorism in the future will include an increasing level of violence. Universal and easier access to all types of weapons and explosives greatly increase the capabilities and capabilities of the terrorists. Today, terrorists have a huge arsenal of murderous weapons, including chemical and biological weapons. This complex development of terrorism should present a serious warning to modern states that inevitably need to be prepared for all the challenges that will produce this evil.

Threats are constantly changing, but one who is always the first to discover the intentions of those who want to endanger the state and the citizens are the intelligence services.

With the intelligence process it is necessary to increase the importance of successfully managing the threats from terrorist attacks and obstructing their activities, as well as their dissemination and elimination. Simply put, intelligence never sleeps.

The main purpose of intelligence is preventive action in preventing the conduct of terrorist attacks. Its closest goal is the discovery of the individual terrorist scenario, the identity of terrorist individuals and terrorist groups. The best option is to timely detect and disrupt their conspiracies and bring them to justice.

The role of intelligence will remain an activity in the future of invaluable importance for successful management of the fight against terrorism.

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THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON URBAN SECURITY AND THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE

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Abstract: The paper analyzes the impact of migration on urbanization, that is, on urban security in major cities and the quality of urban life. Urbanization itself has its own positive and negative challenges. The positive challenges are most often associated with accelerated modernization of cities and their industrialization, economic development, democratization, improved quality of services, cultural development, education, etc. According to some unwritten rule, the quality of services in urban areas increases in proportion to the increase in the population. On the other hand, the large concentration of population in a small area highlights the disadvantages that are a side segment of the urbanization and are most often related to security, i.e. to the so-called "urban security". The shortfalls are associated with the increased occurrence of negative social deviations, poverty, increased crime rate, lack of drinking water, enormous soil, water and air pollution, concentration of large populations in a small area, vulnerability to terrorism, increased noise, scarce green areas, appearance of a specific microclimate, climate change, etc. This also leads to a division of the population living in neighborhoods, which are most often formed based on the economic power of the population and security. There are also poor neighborhoods that may be hotbeds of negative social deviations and are characterized by a lack of security of the population. This, in turn, requires the city authorities and the state to invest additional resources in finding mechanisms that will remove such shortfalls and allow the population greater equity and security. Urbanization is widely accepted by a large proportion of the population, but there is also strong resistance in part of the population that opposes modernization and urbanization and is attached to the traditional way of life in the rural areas. The paper aims to emphasize some of the benefits, but also some of the challenges that are a segment of the urbanization, that is, the migration of the population and urban security and the quality of life of the population.

Key words: Urbanization, urban security, migration, poverty, population.

Introduction

Urbanization of space is as old as humanity itself. In the course of his development, man began to urbanize his space and use the advantages it offered. Urbanization also brings along migration from rural to urban areas. Urbanization and migration are intertwined and conditioned by the development of the cities that are the main driver of the overall political, democratic, economic, technological, social, educational, cultural and other types of development of the country. In the past, cities spread in certain frames, most often horizontally. However, with the development of construction and building materials, cities are beginning to “rise” even vertically by increasing the number of floors of the buildings. This limits the spread of the cities on arable land and protects the environment and nature, but also reduces the “necessary living space” of the population.

This challenge is especially relevant for the cities in Europe that have gradually developed over time. During their development, they have reached their maximum limits of spread and sustainability. Their inherited and preserved infrastructure and architecture are most often protected and declared as cultural and historical heritage. This means that all construction projects that would modify that architecture are limited. On the other hand, it challenges the upgrade and the need to receive new population. Practice has shown that the “old cities” on European soil, and especially in the Balkans, have a serious challenge with their absorption power of new population due to the limited space and old architecture and infrastructure. It is well known that cities in the Balkans, and across Europe, are quite old cities that have not been designed for rapid population growth. Their infrastructure is designed for a certain number of people in a certain area. The mere “growth” of cities with new population throws light on new challenges associated with urbanization, migration and urban security.

However, it is possible to separate several stages in the development of these cities, which were stimulated by migration and urbanization, and followed by the application of urban security mechanisms. In general, these cities experienced several waves of migration in recent history that strongly influenced their urban security, but also the quality of life.

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However, it is possible to draw a distinction between several stages in the development of these cities, which were stimulated by migration and urbanization, and accompanied with the application of urban security mechanisms. In general, these cities experienced several waves of migration in recent history that have strongly influenced their urban security, but also the quality of life.

The first wave of urbanization is associated with the accelerated industrialization in mid last century, when many of the industrial facilities were built in the immediate vicinity of major cities. Industrialization demanded new population that would work in those industrial plants. The influx of population also required the construction of new residential buildings for housing, new road, communal and other infrastructure, increased need for energy and resources, and the like. This inevitably caused the spread of cities to the outside, with the greatest damage suffered by the natural environment and biodiversity around the cities.

The next more serious wave of the expansion and urbanization of cities and the increase of their population is related to the globalization and the emergence of the Internet. This wave of expansion of the cities is heading "to the inside", usurping the urban greenery, or vertically "upward", which increases the number of floors of the existing buildings manifold. In doing so, the construction and living standards are not complied with, i.e. the expansion of the remaining accompanying communal infrastructure, as well as the necessary greenery for each building are not sufficiently taken into consideration. Hence, urbanization can seriously impair the safety of citizens and the necessary living space. This problem is especially challenging in situations of natural and other disasters, especially taking into account the danger for the population not being able to find shelter during a disaster.

Generally, urbanization causes rapid transition of the population from natural rural areas to artificially built urban infrastructure. The city environment itself requires the construction of an accompanying infrastructure that will support life in the cities. It requires greater quantities of water, energy, food, road infrastructure, communal infrastructure, causing along the way air, soil and water pollution, etc. Urbanization also destroys the greenery, which is replaced by concrete and other buildings, resulting in microscopic and mesomatic increases in temperature in urban areas compared to rural areas. Such changes result in potentially negative consequences for both local and global communities that are linked to sustainability and traditional lifestyles. The main issue is how to balance and support the growth of urban communities in a sustainable way without disturbing the existing natural balance. In other words, it is necessary to balance between the interdependence of the infrastructure used to support the growth of urban regions and its environmental, social and economic consequences for the environments of large cities (Golden, 2004).

These challenges of urbanization are most striking in the developing world, where the inner parts of the countries are depopulated at the expense of the spread of cities. The best example is China's accelerated urbanization, where space is intensively urbanized and a large mass of people migrates from rural to new urban areas. The urbanization itself has its advantages and supporters, but also challenges and opponents. Resistance and contempt for urbanization come

from the population that does not want to give up its traditional way of living. We will elaborate some of the advantages and challenges of urbanization and migration related to urban security in the text below.

Migration, economic development and concentration of population in cities

Large cities hold the primacy of concentrated economic development dynamism, predictable access to services and opportunities for the development of a democratic society. They are promoters of economic, political, cultural, educational, technological, political, financial and other power, but also provide faster access to the necessary services and better quality of life for the population. The quality of life offered by urban areas is an additional incentive for intensifying migration from small to large urban areas. Throughout mankind's history, urbanization has been a key factor in the development process (Bairoch, 1988). Arguably, the two processes are interdependent, i.e. development can not take place without urbanization and vice versa. Urbanization is not only the result, but also a cause of economic development (Gallup et al., 1999). The speed of economic development and urbanization vary from country to country and from region to region, and depend on the size of the country. The economic development and urbanization of large cities produce a series of challenges related to urban security, ecology and the environment, such as the poor quality of housing, crime, pollution and traffic overload. At the same time, urbanization provides great opportunities for economic and institutional innovation and cultural development. A city is a city that has a higher concentration of population, or is more important than a town or village (Bloom et al., 2010). "

In recent decades, many global organizations have supported the view that urbanization supports growth and development and should be encouraged. The World Bank emphasizes that no country can develop without industrialization and modernization, especially in the big cities. Large cities have the power to innovate, create wealth, improve quality of life and accommodate a large number of people in a small area, but at the same time use more resources per capita compared to rural areas (Robinson and Swilling, 2012).

The urbanization of big cities affects in many ways the economic development of the country. First, cities play an important role in the structure of the economy and society in developed and developing countries by providing opportunities to people to enjoy the benefits of education through development of new technologies, employment through job creation and better health care (Aghion and Howitt, 2009).

The concentration of people in such a small space makes it a very important factor of business (Glaeser et al., 2010) and strongly influences the reduction of production costs for certain products and services (Kumar and Kober, 2012; Fujita et al., 1999; Krugman, 1991). The concentration of the population in urban areas provides an easier access to finance, promotion of business ideas and a greater level of services and a market for starting a business. It, in turn, requires the ability to attract workers in the manufacturing sector, allocate appropriate jobs to workers, and provide opportunities for developing their skills and abilities (Bacolod et al., 2010). In this way, urbanization encourages the migration of highly skilled and talented people in large

cities not only from rural areas, but also from other countries. Migration significantly enhances the transfer of information, technologies and finance to areas where migrants have settled (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007).

Urban security is closely linked to the migration of the population that takes place within a country, the so-called internal migration or migration from village to city. Another type of migration that is currently on the rise is migrating abroad when people are leaving their native country and go to another country in search of a better life. This process is especially pronounced in this part of Europe, i.e. the Western Balkans, where the largest portion of migrants is comprised of young highly educated and most capable individuals. This process of mass migration has gained momentum in recent decades, and is further intensified with the strong influence of the social media, the Internet and globalization on the one hand, and the unstable political and economic conditions in the countries of origin, on the other.

The most important drivers of such accelerated migration are young people, especially those who get their education in the city educational institutions. Typically, renowned universities that offer more quality and prosperous opportunities and prestige are concentrated in major cities. The young population is generally on a continuous move within their educational, life and work processes. The influx of new population in cities requires new urbanization of the space, new infrastructure, a place to accommodate this population, new services, new cultural events, sports activities, etc. Urbanization is a transformative process that is synonymous with modernization and development. In most cases, as countries are urbanized, they become more advanced, more developed and more prosperous (UNICJRI, 2019).

During the fifties of the last century, about 30% of world's population lived in urban areas. Today, "54 percent of the world's population lives in urban areas and this trend is expected to continue" (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2018: 316). According to the United Nations World Population Prospects 2010 Revision (UNWPP2010R, 2011), it is estimated that by 2030, about 60% of world's population will live in cities. The challenge is further aggravated as data show that 1.3 million people migrate to major cities per week or annually that is about 67 million people. It is estimated that the migration to cities in developing countries will take place at an average annual rate of 2.4%, compared to 1.2% in developed countries. This means that by the end of 2030, some 5 billion people in the world will live in large cities (Golden, 2004). "According to the World Bank (2015), the expected number of people living in cities will rise to 6 billion by 2045, an increase of two billion urban residents. With over 80 percent of the global GDP, urbanization will contribute to a sustainable growth if the increasing productivity is well managed, thus enabling innovation and implementation of new ideas" (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2018: 316). It is estimated that the population in cities will grow at a faster pace than the total population of states and they will remain more urbanized than developing countries. This will pose a serious challenge for the remaining 40% of the world's population to provide enough food, water and energy for all (McMichael, Butler, & Ahern, 2002). Urban areas occupy only 2% of Earth's surface but they use a very large amount of resources. For example, urban areas take up about 75% of the industrial use of wood and 60% of water (O'Meara, 1999)

The influx of new population in cities also causes a continuous increase in the quality of life in the cities. The quality of life depends proportionately on the increase in the number of people in the urban area. Namely, if the population of an urban place increases by 20%, then the quality of life in this urban area will increase by the same rate. It means that the number of cultural facilities, shopping centers, production facilities, services, educational institutions and other infrastructure and services in this urban place will also increase by 20%.

Urbanization challenges and increased resource consumption

It is an undeniable fact that the world is rapidly urbanizing and urbanization is accompanied by significant socio-economic and environmental consequences. Such accelerated migration and concentration of the population in urban areas strongly influence climate change through an increased need for energy, resources and security, but also generate a range of social deviations that endanger the safety of the population.

As regions are transformed from rural agricultural to urban areas, they impact **climate change**. Urbanization brings about cutting of trees. Water and air pollution and destruction of green areas cause a rise in temperatures. Also, the construction materials used to build urban infrastructure above ground and underground change the soil and affect the rise in temperature in urban areas. Additional concern is caused by the fact that accelerated urbanization occurs at a time when the world faces the climate change phenomenon which further contributes to increasing air temperature (Golden, 2004). However, this rise in temperature in cities is directly reflected on the increase in temperatures in rural areas.

Climate change and warming undoubtedly affect the increase of the sea levels, the melting of glaciers, changes in the precipitation cycle, as well as the increased frequency of extreme weather (floods, droughts, storms, torrential rainfall). Some studies indicate that economic and demographic processes have a greater impact on water pollution than climate change (Vörösmarty, et.al. 2000). However, rising temperatures strongly affect the melting of glaciers and snow and ice reserves on the poles, which, in turn, affects not only the reduction of drinking water supplies, but also the rise of the sea level. If the sea level rises by just one meter, a large part of the world population living in the big cities along the seas and oceans will face serious challenges to the survival of their homes, that is, they will have to find new places to live.

Large cities, on the other hand, demand **increased energy consumption** that is used, inter alia, for heating the homes during the winter months, as well as for cooling during the summer months. There is also an increased need for energy for both industrial facilities and services. That energy must be provided from somewhere, i.e. produced. It is usually provided by thermal power plants, hydropower plants and nuclear power plants. Investments are also made in securing energy from renewable ecological sources. However, the extent of representation of these sources in the overall production is still small. Most of the energy is provided from fossil fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas. This causes global warming and environmental degradation.

Urbanization brings to light the challenge connected with the **supply of quality drinking water to the population**. Water quality deeply affects the security of the population (Dik et al.,

2018). Population growth in urban areas inevitably requires increased water consumption either for drinking or for technological needs. The lack of water can cause a number of diseases in the population, and even a conflict in the fight to obtain it. Water is provided from natural sources and tanks of fresh water or through desalination from seawater. Most often, artificial dual-use accumulations are built in the immediate vicinity of big cities, to provide supplies of clean drinking water, but also to prevent possible floods from torrential rains. However, consumption is high and there is a continuing need for its increase as the population grows. Following its use, the water is contaminated by a variety of contaminants. If it does not get purified then its release into natural river flows causes contamination of the rest of the water, soil, fish and animals and the environment. Major cities in developed countries, learning from the past, invest significant resources in the construction of waste water treatment plants to purify the water before returning it to nature. This minimizes the impact of environmental pollution and provides a healthier life for people. A number of developed countries have strict legal regulations dedicated to environmental standards, nature protection, the environment in which people live and their health.

However, despite strict legal solutions, we are witnessing everyday that the “urban mafia” usurps the environmental, security and urban standards to gain profit and destroys the quality of life in big cities. The greatest victims are the greenery and the citizens who suffer due to the maintenance problems and the excessive pollution of the air we breathe.

The size of the cities and population density strongly influence the health of citizens. Population diseases in cities are often associated with quality of life, insufficient nutrition and increased susceptibility to epidemics. The effects of urbanization on human health are so severe that the World Health Organization has identified urbanization as a critical challenge to public health in the 21st century.

Air pollution is a serious challenge for the fast-growing urban centers. This is a problem faced not only by developed countries, but also by developing countries. The biggest loser is the population living in those urban centers. On the other hand, the polluted air is a generator of a number of health problems of the population - problems related to respiratory tract and heart diseases. The most sensitive categories of citizens to these diseases are children up to 15 years of age, pregnant women, people with chronic respiratory and cardiac problems and people over 60 years of age. However, this does not mean that the other categories of citizens are protected from polluted air. On the contrary, their health has been gravely challenged. Accelerated migration and the high concentration of population in urban centers bring along the challenge of emerging and rapidly spreading infectious diseases and epidemics. This requires additional investment in the health care and prevention system. Timely dealing with epidemics in cities can potentially save millions of lives. We are well aware of the experiences from the past when the “black plague” epidemics on European soil wiped out a third of the population in Europe and Asia. We remember the fresh examples of Ebola epidemics, swine flu, bird flu, measles in Skopje, etc.

Urbanization challenges and urban security of cities

The impact of migration on the urban security of cities and the quality of life is multifaceted and comprehensive. Urban security and migration, on the one hand, are closely linked to the accelerated urbanization of cities, rapid development, improved quality of life of the population and greater accessibility of social goods. On the other hand, uncontrolled urbanization and migration also affect the reduction of living space, usurpation of green areas, lack of drinking water, food, poverty and increased occurrence of negative social deviations such as urban crime, violence, prostitution, panhandling, drug addictions and terrorism and other violent "isms." Addressing these phenomena requires additional investment in the construction of appropriate institutional mechanisms for the prevention and suppression of these negative deviations.

Negative social deviant occurrences are not random events. They are more frequent in the larger settlements compared to the smaller ones, that is, they are more frequent in some neighborhoods in some cities, than in others where they are reduced to isolated cases. The frequency of negative social deviant occurrences is often associated with communities living in a particular area, as well as with the population density in that area and the number of family members. An additional reason for the development of negative deviant phenomena is the high level of poverty most common in such populated areas (Felson, (2002). This, in turn, jeopardizes the safety of people living in major urban cities.

The security of people and their property implies their proper protection against negative social deviations. The positive results from the prevention of these negative social deviations are an important aspect of urban life. Public space is the foundation of the urban environment and constitutes its identity and image. That urban space is open and freely accessible to all citizens regardless of their diversity on various grounds. However, the occurrence of negative social deviations is most probable precisely in this space. This makes people feel insecure and afraid for their own safety, which results in reduced utilization of the benefits of that space. It also leads to a decline in the value of real estate, general social segregation, occurrence of crime and other negative deviations. Thorough compliance with the legal standards and urban plans at all levels can significantly contribute to increasing the degree of urban security in major cities (Danilović-Hristić, 2012).

Urbanization also brings about the challenge of poverty and violence followed by an increased need for population security. The fight against poverty is a serious challenge to urban security, not only in big cities but also across states. Poverty is considered a "fertile soil" for development of social negative deviations, such as crime, panhandling, prostitution, drug addictions, terrorism, etc. It also generates a large number of cases of violence followed by murders and suicides. In general, the number of deaths in cities is higher than in rural areas. In addition, cities with increased growth are facing the threat of a rise in murders. Most suicides occur in urban areas. There are often situations when supply is disrupted in the event of a crisis, a natural disaster, or when certain criminal groups and gangs seize control on a certain territory due to insufficient security.

The security problems that people are facing in big cities are increasingly causing great concerns and are acquiring global significance. The situation can be further complicated if there is no effective security structure in the big cities that will guarantee the safety of the citizens and their property. The criminal groups make use of such situations, as they try to establish control over certain territory at the expense of the security of the citizens who live there and their property. This challenge is highly likely to occur in developing countries that have accelerated urbanization and a large influx of population to the large cities. The great quantities of weapons (to a great extent in illegal possession) which the population owns on various grounds, whether for personal protection or for another purpose, contribute to such activities. The trauma caused to the local population by criminal groups is only one of their negative effects. Such insufficiently secure urban areas offer a safe haven for illegal economies and are characterized by high-intensity armed activity in which the management challenges and activities of non-state armed groups merge and affect the rest of the urban system through extortion rackets, robberies, burglary and unsafe public transport (Sampio, 2018). It requires the state to make additional investments in the security of cities and protect the property and lives of the population, as well as in the fight to prevent these negative social deviations. In any case, urban crime strongly influences and hampers the economic growth and well-being of citizens and considerably weakens the state institutions.

Conclusion

Urbanization and migration will continue to take place at a faster pace in the future as well. It is a notorious fact that urbanization and migration have a strong impact on the country's economic, political, cultural, educational and other social development, generating at the same time challenges to the security of the population living in those urban areas. Experience has shown that in the period 2000-2010, the migration level in most developed regions reached 3.4 million migrants annually. This figure does not include migration in developing countries. This tendency of the population from the rural areas to migrate to the cities will continue in the future. It is estimated that in the period 2040-2050, migration to developed regions will mildly drop to 1.9 million per year, of which 1.1 million will be only in North America (UNWPPR, 2011: 47).

In the past, urbanization was a process that allowed economies to harvest the gains from agglomeration economies – the positive externalities related to geographically concentrated economic activity. But today, in many developing countries, rapid urbanization is seen as a source of concern. Rapid urbanization is often accompanied by very visible manifestations of poverty in the form of substandard housing, growth of slums and pavement dwellers. Urbanization also stretches the capacity of urban areas to provide suitable infrastructure to support densely populated communities whether it be roads, water and sanitation or energy. Furthermore, congestion and pollution related costs are exacerbated by rapid urbanization. In light of these highly visible costs, many developing countries have tended to look upon urbanization as an unwelcome development that needs to be slowed down if not reversed. However, the relationship between urbanization and growth is a quadratic one. The costs of rapid urbanization

(increases urban population in a country by more than 20 per cent) tend to overwhelm the benefits of urbanization. So, the growth effect of urbanization levels off at high rates of urban growth (Kalarickal, 2009).

Food security in general, but particularly urban food security, is affected by international policies, trade practices, national government policies, and programs related to agriculture, economics, social safety nets, urban planning and migrations patterns. Cities in developing countries face problems of acute and chronic challenges with sufficient food supply that have been exacerbated by the rising cost of food. The food security programs in cities in developing countries often address the most immediate issue of starvation first (Wurwarg, 2014). This means that programs need to be developed to overcome the challenge of insufficient nutrition in the fast growing urban centers in developing countries. It will affect the reduction of poverty and starvation of the most affected population in the urban centers.

Good governance, investment and development of comprehensive programs may help overcome poverty and other challenges faced by major urban centers and the cities can provide an urban advantage for all. The challenge for the next few decades is to learn how to use the opportunities offered by urbanization because the future of humankind depends on it. The focus is on promoting urban security in the context of prevention of the challenges generated by urbanization, as they are the main impediments to the sustainable economic development of the states. The manifestation of these challenges, especially those with a criminal, violent and social outlook, weakens state institutions, undermining efforts to promote sustainable development and poverty reduction (UNICJRI, 2019).

The challenge for the next generations is related to the need to answer these questions and learn how to use the opportunities offered by urbanization while at the same time suppressing the negative consequences of urbanization. The future of humanity depends on it.

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NATIONAL SAFETY SERVICE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS - SECURITY SAFETY OR RISK

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Abstract: The state establishes systems through which it will be able to carry out its functions with appropriate organization. In addition to other systems, it builds and establishes its own so-called. national security system as an integral part of state organization.

Different models of building and functioning of national security services have been recorded worldwide. As distinctive we will single out the following models:

- National Security and Counterintelligence Service within the Ministry of Interior;
- National Security, Counterintelligence and Intelligence Service, as a separate government agency;
- National Security, Counterintelligence and Intelligence Service within the Ministry of Interior
- A national security, counterintelligence service from the Ministry of the Interior, as a separate government agency and a special Intelligence Agency under the President of the State

Within this paper will be presented the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the current security system of the Republic of North Macedonia, where the model of security and counterintelligence service within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Intelligence Agency under the authority of the President of the state as an institution was applied. A module that guarantees the safety of citizens or a threat to their fundamental values, and one of the fundamental values is respect for human rights and freedoms.

Key words: model, alert, security service, counterintelligence service

Introduction

The word system-can often be encountered in everyday communication. There are many definitions that are often differ depending on whether it is provided by an analyst, philosopher, political scientist, economist, etc. The system is the total or complexity of the elements of individual parts. He owns a structure, realizes functions and conveys information or processes them. It should be known that each system has its own structure composed of elements, functions and a network for communications and information. Seen from a semantic view, the given word has multiple meanings. He often interferes with the notion of structure, especially in sociology, as well as with the term regime in politology. The questions can then be posed: What is meant by the system? And "what is the possibility of its application in the study of the security system?" The basic task of the security system is to protect the fundamental values, above all the constitutional order, the protection of democratic institutions, but at the same time respecting the fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens. Values evolve throughout history, which means that the security system needs to be reformed and adapted to the new socio-economic and political conditions and the protection of the new actual values established by the constitution as a basic legal act.

The state establishes systems that with proper organization can perform its functions. In addition to other systems, it builds and establishes its own so-called. national security system, as an integral part of the state organization. The Benefit System is a very complex system and is organized through hierarchical structures, that is subsystems and microsystems. In this sense, it is especially important from a theoretical and practical aspect to determine the theoretical and practical bases on which the security system is created and modeled. What model will be chosen in conceiving the security system, in particular the place and role of the security, intelligence and intelligence service in the overall security system depends on several factors (Spasseki J, Nikolovski M., Gerasimovski S. 2010, 58) :

Size of the land by space and inhabitants;

- National composition;
- Historical events, warfare and other hostilities with neighboring states;
- Risks and threats from the past that have an impact on the modern functioning of the state;
- The fundamental national values (national capital) that need to be protected by the state security system;
- Assess the risks and threats to the fundamental national values in the future;
- The international position of the state with regard to the level of national security;
- The economic power of the state;
- National traditions of patriotism among the population and the relation to the fundamental values, material, moral, etc.
- The degree of cultural development of the population in the country;
- Global processes such as globalization and so on.

In continuity in all stages of development, society has been exposed to different types of hazards, because it necessarily imposes the need for security structures to focus on detecting and eliminating all negative phenomena and behaviors that lead to disruption of the security situation. The security system, with its subsystems, offers services of greatest social significance for the citizens and that is their security. One of the basic tasks of every legal state is to take care of the realization and maintenance of all segments of security. The achievement of these goals can be achieved only with admissible legal remedies, but only in a framework in which it will not bring into question the violation of the freedoms and rights of the citizens. Since security in the society is a fundamental interest, a need, but also a guarantee for the realization of all activities and the greatest social values, it is logical that the security system in its development goes through a certain evolution and adjustment. It is necessary to build a model of a security system that could best answer, to address the risks and threats that in that period represent the real and most serious threat to the fundamental values that are laid down in the constitution.

In selecting a model and conceptualizing a quality security system, it is especially important to strike a balance between the new types of risks and threats, a qualitative security system that will respond to them, but at the same time respect the basic fundamental values and above all respect for the basic human rights and freedoms of citizens, which is a characteristic of a modern democratic society.

Global processes of globalization, on the one hand, and contemporary types of transnational crime, on the other hand, can in some sense be said to have ruined the borders of national security systems and created a process of modeling modern forms of security systems. All threats to national states and threats to the world community are of international character. It has a strong reflection on which of the models will be chosen in the concept of the security system. The security system itself should be so conceptualized on the principles of international security, of course, adapting to the specifics and specifics of the risks and threats on the territory of the Republic of North Macedonia.

Relationships on which it is built (modeled) and develops the security system

Each country has its own specifics in location, historical development, social order, economic diversity, national - religious composition of the population, degree in the construction of democratic relations, etc. all this in turn has its influence in the conceptualization and construction of a security system model. Which model will be chosen depends primarily on: the type and character of social order, the value system of the state, the state of security - internal and external threats, permanent changes and the promotion of democratic relations in national and international frameworks.

Each state will establish a system of values on the basis of which it will organize the total living and perspective approaching the organization of its own - authentic security system. Regarding the overall social system, the security system appears as its subsystem. This functional as a separate whole, with relative autonomy, functions harmoniously in the whole of the macrosocial environment. It should be borne in mind that the value system is not static, nor is

the security system established as something eternal and given once and for all. Both systems are exposed to change, refinement and enrichment, which is in line with the need to promote the processes in society in the interest of the citizens and in the interest of progress

In contemporary theoretical thought, and in practice, there is an overwhelming opinion that the country, the state within its own borders, will be less able to do it alone and with its own security system to guarantee a high level of security. Such a view seems justified and conditioned the need for the organization of collective security systems. Here, it should be noted that the main and basic security system is the one that organizes the country for its own needs and for its own space because without it there is no possibility to establish any wider collective security system. It should garner national security.

Analysis of the current security system

After proclaiming its independence and sovereignty from 1991, the Republic of North Macedonia started building its own autonomous security system. The basic task of this security system is to protect the fundamental values that are established by the constitution as the highest legal act. Each country has its own specifics, which in turn have an impact in the construction of an appropriate security system that will be able to adequately respond to potential risks and threats. In the Republic of North Macedonia after the independence, no more serious changes were made in the model of building a security system. The first serious step in the reform was made in 1995 with the adoption of the Law on the Intelligence Agency and the Exit of the Intelligence Segment within the Ministry of Interior.

In the paper we would like to clarify the current position of the security system by pointing out certain shortcomings that should be annulled with the reforms under way.

The current position of the security system of the Republic of North Macedonia is shown in Table.1

Table no. 1 Structure of the security system of the Republic of North Macedonia




Table no. 1 Structure of the security system of the Republic of North Macedonia

In 1995, with the adoption of the Law on Intelligence Agency, the former SDB (State Security Service), which was an integral part of the Ministry of Interior, (as in the former SFRY) transformed into three segments:

- Administration for Security and Counterintelligence - which remains within the Ministry of Interior;
- Intelligence Agency, under the authority of the President of the State;
- Military Security and Intelligence Service, a model that is still functioning.

Based on the multi-year analysis of the operation of such a concept, certain deficiencies that negatively affect the functioning of the security system are detrimental, and in particular, they are concerned with the huge concentration of power in the Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence and Misuse on its part and to the detriment of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia.

When talking about security system reforms, it can be concluded that the Security and Intelligence Services have not undergone any significant changes since the early 1990s, with the exception of 1995 and the division of the intelligence component of the total system. This stagnation is contrary to threats and challenges to the national security of RNM, which have changed and increased to a considerable extent, especially in the last period. What needs to be

done is to reform the security services to respond adequately to new types of challenges such as cybercrime, organized crime, corruption, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, illegal migration and violent extremism and radicalization, at the same time ensure proper oversight of the security intelligence services so that security services are not misused as many times in history.

Now is the moment for complete reforms and laying the foundations of the new security service (when we say security service we mean the security, counterintelligence and intelligence service) that will effectively fulfill the legal obligations and in the same time it will be supervised, ie, there will be no violation of the basic threefold value of the state. Since its independence until today, Macedonia is struggling to establish a proper balance in this area.

One of the remarks of the international expert group, led by Priebe, was precisely in the part of the huge concentration and power of the security service of the UBK, as well as the possibilities for abuse of powers and endangering the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the citizens. A particularly serious step should be made in the reforms in the DSC in the direction of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness that would be in the function of protecting the citizens and the rule of law

In 1995, the Law on Intelligence Agency was adopted, the intelligence segment of the then State Security Service of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Northern Macedonia is products as a separate part ie. a special body of the state administration within the Intelligence Agency under the authority of the President of the State.

With the Law on Internal Affairs 95/09 the Ministry of Internal Affairs comprise the BJB - Public Security Bureau and UBK - Administration for Security and Counterintelligence, while the police law determines the rights and responsibilities of the uniformed police within the Ministry of Interior.

The members of the UBK still do not have a separate law to work on, they still work under the Law on Internal Affairs. When designing such a model, certain advantages of such a model were taken into account (UBK, within the Mol), such as: using common premises, physically securing them, using the services of the BJB to perform its tasks.

The operation of the UBK within the Mol (I must mention it as a model that is rarely applied in other states in the surrounding), it has certain constraints and disadvantages for the successful operation of the UBK.

In the next section, we would highlight certain detected shortcomings, the current model that should be kept to a minimum with the new model, so that we could talk about a more efficient security system:

- from continuing to the present, the administration has been shouting a lot of scandals, I would say some of them: such as the 1992 "Duvalo affair", "Big Ear", in 2001, the same scandals were illegally listened to by journalists, leaders of organizations civil society, etc. as well as should not be forgotten the last affair of "the local wiretapping of over 20000 citizens", for which the Special Public Prosecutor's Office was established, which already charges criminal activities,

- **The particular disadvantage of such a model is inadequate and inadequate supervision over the UBK.** A particularly painful issue is being spent for years. , if there was a quality oversight there would not have been and would not speak today of abuses and affairs such as the part and the above mentioned. On the one hand, we have a huge concentration of power, and on the other hand abuse of the UBK control mechanism. Theoretically a system of parliamentary oversight in the form of a control was established by the Parliamentary Commission for Supervision of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency, as well as the Commission for Supervision of the Application of the Special Investigation Measures for Monitoring the Communiqués by the Ministry of Interior The Ministry of Defense and other competent institutions. For illustration only, the first commission for supervision over the UBK and the AR did not meet at all, the second commission met 8 times since it was established in 2006, but it did not even perform inspections in the UBK nor did it collect statistical data and analyzed the cases of interception of communications. It is obvious that committee members did not have enough technical knowledge to collect data from UBK appliances. The same commission was composed of up to 5 members and, in continuity, one or two of the commission did not have a security certificate to access classified information such as data on wiretapping, which complicated the work of the commission. The second segment is that there is a conflict of interest, the security certificate for the members of the oversight committee passes through the filters of the UBK, which can approve or reject the request, which in an indirect way block the work of the commission for supervision of the UBK and the AR . Members of the committee of opposition political parties, in concert with their parties, boycotted the work of the commissions, thus violating the legal obligation to submit an annual committee report to parliament.
- **Inadequate coordination between UBK and other security services** and exchange and verification of information, the quality of information. Unfortunately, in the past, security institutions received or dispose of security institutions with diametrically different information on the same security events. In 2003, the exchange of information between security institutions on a weekly basis was overcome, the question of the success of that model, how much information was exchanged, with what quality and whether equally all security institutions participate in the placement and consumption of such information, or whether the exchange of information depends on the subjective factor, who and how much it will present and the findings in its possession. It has been 15 years since applying such a coordination model, but unfortunately it does not record any particular results, which means that in the phase of UBC reforms, particular attention should be paid to the coordination of information between security and intelligence services.
- **Abuse of the law for admission to the UBK without a public competition**, which, unfortunately, is not a rare practice in the past years, where the "small door" employs personnel with inadequate education that later can not adequately respond to the scenarios that are facing them. This exception becomes a rule and thus employing its close and party half-servants, disregarding the law, in which way certain positions are filled in for which are required primarily well-educated and certain qualifications that can respond to the contemporary challenges which threaten the security of the state.

- **Unprofessionalism of the staff** - Whenever the ruling political group changes and when a new political party takes power, the majority of the personnel in the key positions in the security institutions changes, redistributes to certain positions that have nothing to do with the acquired knowledge and experience in certain segments of security. Recruitment and selection of new personnel in security institutions should be organized on strict criteria of merit and integrity, taking into account the sensitivity of security intelligence and conflict of interest. Members of the security institutions need to continuously attend trainings in certain segments of their daily work, including respecting the rules of data protection, basic human rights and professional ethics and integrity
- **Politicalization** The imposition of political parties in the work of security-intelligence services, due to the political affiliation of senior officials, adversely affects the quality of the work of the security services and degrades the professionalism of the institutions. Changing the ruling headquarters also leads to changes in the personnel decisions of the key positions in the security institutions, that is, partisanship and possibility of abuse of the services for carrying out certain party tasks. In the Republic of Northern Macedonia, for the first time after many years, a director of the security-counterintelligence service has been appointed a person who is a longtime member and head of the service itself. Also, according to the new draft law for the new National Security Agency's National Security Agency, the criteria for director of the agency is envisaged to be employed in the service with a multiannual working position in managerial positions. Only with such solutions can we talk about the depoliticization and professionalization of the security services in which there will be no abuse for various private, business or political interests, but the service will be in the interest of the security and freedom of all citizens.

According to the existing Law on Internal Affairs, the UBK is a part of the ministry and works to cover more serious forms of criminal acts against the state (terrorism, higher forms of organized crime, protection of constitutional order), where penal policy sanctions are over 10 years, which in turn requires more time needed in the pre-trial procedure, applying appropriate methods and funds that are not provided for under the law on internal affairs. It is necessary with the new legal changes in the new agency to foresee larger authorizations of the members of the agency as they could work more successfully, collect timely information and prevent the execution of serious crimes against the state and the constitutional order. The same is the statutory regulation, that is, the authorizations and the instruments that are in the possession of both the members of the UBK and the criminal-political police, but the responsibilities differ in many ways. The competence of UBK is security and counterintelligence ie. protection of fundamental values of the constitutional order, democratization institutions, protection against violent extremism terrorism protection of state institutions, which in turn requires this type of threat and requires a longer period of investigation and in order to provide valid material evidence, as well as larger authorizations so that the relevant evidence of the offenses can be provided. The task of the criminal police is the deception of criminality. The question is whether it is equally weighty in providing valid material evidence of acts against the constitutional order and the crimes in the field of classic criminality, but both of them work according to the same

legal regulation, that is the Law on Internal Affairs, the Law on Criminal Procedure and the Criminal Code, I think that the functioning of the UBK in the MOI ramps faces a real problem that in the deadlines passed by the LCP and the Law on Internal Affairs are short enough to provide valid material evidence for the more serious crimes which are subject to their scope of work. If a certain statistical analysis of filed criminal charges is filed for the crimes in the jurisdiction of the UBK, how many of them are rejected, how many are qualified and how many of them are processed with effective court verdicts, and for some of those court cases and after 10-15 years they are returning to retrial and issuing acquittals for defendants and convicts for serious crimes. All these arguments are in favor of legal changes and enabling wider legal authorizations of members of the security institutions in order to talk about a more efficient instrumentation available to the security-counterintelligence and intelligence services for the successful execution of their legal competence, that is, with hard work against the state and the constitutional order.

Conclusion:

The paper analyzes the various models of conceptualization of the security system, pointing out certain shortcomings of the current model that operates in the Republic of Northern Macedonia, and it is a security-counter-intelligence service within the Ministry of Interior.

From all of the above presented in the paper, several conclusions can be drawn:

- The security-counterintelligence service should be in favor of meeting the essential standards of democratic governance, ensuring transparency of public issues
- Citizens should feel the order, the institutions and thus the security services as their own that do not endanger their rights and freedoms, but they are in favor of their protection;
- Particularly painful issue in the current model is the weak control over the operation of the security countermeasures and intelligence services, such a lack of control enabled various security impacts and their abuse for personal, business and party interests. In functional democracy, in the area of control and oversight, more engagement of the bodies is needed, such as the State Election Commission, the Directorate for Personal Data Protection, the Parliamentary Committees, the Ombudsman as an institution. The impression is that in the current model of the security system, these institutions do not have the right place as oversight bodies in the control of security institutions. These institutions should act proactively in accordance with their specific competencies and their mandate. Appropriate acts should be applied in a way that will achieve the full effect of the mission of those oversight bodies. Ex officio procedures should be perceived within the severity of what was published.

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THE ROLE OF PROTECTION AND RESCUE SYSTEM IN PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract: Protection and Rescue System (PRS), as a part of security system in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), is established to protect people and property from natural and other disasters. Critical infrastructure is assets, systems and networks of high importance for state functioning and in event of terrorist or cyber attack, natural or other disaster affect, in large scale, human lives and health, cause damage on property or environment. There is no law on critical infrastructure in BiH but PRS, as a part of security system, have to be involved and took an active role. In accordance with laws on protection and rescuing in BiH there is an obligation for physical and legal persons to provide personal and mutual protection but Civil protection (CP) is state-organised part of PRS that could fulfill the task of critical infrastructure protection (CIP). There is a need to answer on several questions: What is the structure of PRS and is it ready for CIP? What has to be done in legal framework to make and adopt law on CIP and how much it influences PRS? How to coordinate preparedness and response in CIP if it can spread across the borders and affect neighbouring countries? The answers are going to be given by using of description, analyze and comparison as methods in purpose for thesis: Critical infrastructure protection is determine with Protection and rescue system capacities and coordination. .

Key words: protection and rescue, critical infrastructure protection

Introduction

Security is one of basic terms in this paper. Security as a condition for survival and activity of individual, society, the state and international community is one the basic social functions (Tatalović, 2006b:60). In principle, term security means absence of (protection from) danger and threats (Nohlen,2001:388). Security is statement that insure physical, spiritual, social and material survival of individual and social community in relation to other individuals, other communities and nature (Abazović,2002:2-3; Grizold and other,1999:8). National security, (Lippmann,1943:32; Tatalović and other,2008:17), or security system (Grizold and other, 1999:8), is organized system by the state to protect territory, political system and its citizens from inner and outer threats (Beridan,2008:55). Protection and rescue of people and property in event of natural and other disasters is very old activity, but the scientific approach has started much afterwards. It is mul-

interdisciplinary area that involve numerous scientific areas and subdisciplines that are related to natural phenomenon or technical equipment and its use (Huseinbašić,2009:5). Civil protection (CP) as part of protection and rescue system (PRS) of people and property is very dynamic activity. Governments are organizing CP in accordance with international law standards to provide security for citizens from natural and other disasters (Huseinbašić,2007:9).

Basic meaning of term management is related to complex verb to manage, but also to administration. In contemporary context there is two meanings for term administration. First is related to use of verb administrare in meaning to manage different activities and complex jobs in any area of social activities. Second one is related to noun administratio with complex meaning to manage jobs and tasks in some specific area of social activity (Dujović,2006:24-25). Management (in this paper named top management) in national security is continuous activity of linking all phases of management in unique decision making process, policy determination and targeting tasks that security system should fulfill. In accordance to fact that basic decisions on targeting tasks for security system has been done out of this system it is important to notice that in free states, organized on democracy, it is the government that determine policy and goals but some of it in decisions making process are not compatible with decisions on upper or lower levels of decisions (Dujović,2006:26-27).

Beside top management there is mid management that is organized activity on implementation of policy, goals and tasks defined by top management (Dujović,2006:32) in security system, and PRS as its part, but also one of functions of top management. According to this mid management is activity of leaders and managerial structures to direct individuals, groups, units or security system in total to implement goals and tasks set by Government (Dujović,2006:20).


1. Protection and rescue system in Bosnia and Herzegovina

After signing of General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, december 1995., CP was still part of defence sector. Inner organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) consist of two entities- Federation of B&H and Republic of Srpska, and one district of B&H- Brčko District. According to this civil protections was part of ministries of defense, Federal ministry of Defense and Republic of Srpska ministry of Defense (Lopušina and other,2007:25). Since 1998. CP in Republic of Srpska is separated from defense sector. In Federation of B&H CP is separated from defense sector in 1999. (Huseinbašić,2007:134-136). In Brčko District CP is established in 2003. (Brčko District is established in 1999. by arbitrary decision, Cikotić,2010:99). CP become part of inner security sector and start its leading role in PRS of B&H (Huseinbašić,2009:60). Sector of civil protection is established in 2003. within Ministry of security of B&H (state level ministry, member of Council of Ministers) and renamed in Sector of Protection and Rescue in 2009. (Huseinbašić,2009:73). PRS of B&H consist of: Government sector, Legal entities and nongovernment sector (chart 1.).

Government sector consists of public institutions, Ministry of Security of B&H and other ministries (defense, judiciary, finance etc.). Legal entities are companies in energy sector and industries (electricity, water, mines, chemical and pharmacy industries, telecom etc.) half lead by

state actors and half by private investors. Nongovernmental sector consist citizen associations (Mountain Rescue Service, divers, hiking and scout associations etc.) and humanitarian organizations (Red Cross, Caritas etc.).

Chart 1. Protection and Rescue system of Bosnia and Herzegovina




Huseinbašić,2009:58

Within Government sector clear hierarchical structure is in accordance to political organization in B&H. Managing this complex system on different levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina is different and difficult (Chart 2).

On the state level Council of Ministers is coordinating activities through Ministry of security in B&H, protection and rescue sector in particular. On entities and district level managing bodies have operational activities. Organization and activities of CP on all levels is completely different. In Federation of B&H the Government is managing CP through Federal directory of CP, 10 cantonal directories of CP, municipalities CP services and, just in case, CP services in legal entities.. In Brčko District BiH the Government is managing CP through public security department and department of CP and, just in case, CP services in legal entities. In Republic of Srpska the Government is managing CP through Republic directory of CP, regional directories and municipalities CP services and, just in case, CP services in legal entities. According to this real managing on CP is lead by lower level and coordination on the state level is conditioned by political will of all members.


Chart 2. Organization of top management in protection and rescue system



Huseinbašić,2009: 74; Deronja and other,2014:26.

Framework Law on the Protection and Rescue of People and Property in event of natural or other disasters in B&H („Official gazette of B&H“, No 50/08), article 6., is about establishing of Coordination body of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Protection and Rescue. This body include 21 members (9 from Council of Ministers, 5 from Federation of B&H entity, 5 from Republic of Srpske entity and 2 from Brčko District). Mid management, or operative management, in PRS and CP as its constitutive part is functional on level of entities and district (Chart 3).

Chart 3. Coordination of mid management in protection and rescue system



Huseinbašić,2009:81; Law on protection and rescue in emergencies, article 8.

According to this facts there is an obstacles in management process because of organizational problems, especially on the state level. It is significant that cooperation is based on Agreement on cooperation in accomplishing tasks of CP („Official gazette of Federation of B&H“, No 36/01) signed by governments of Federation B&H and Republic of Srpska. In this Agreement it is defined: cooperation, crossing entities borders and preconditions for CP forces to cross borders. Very complex cooperation was detected by UN bodies. In relation to International Strategy for Disaster Reduction in 2009. UNISDR has published „UNISDR Terminologija“ (UNISDR Terminology) to align terms used in protection and rescue in B&H but also to translate them in other languages.

2. Critical infrastructure concept

Development of functional national security requires organized activities of all society within the state (Cikotić,2010:175; Cikotić and other,2018:40-41). „Critical infrastructure concept is evolving“ since 1980s (O’Rourke, 2007:22). Critical infrastructure definition in United States of America assume „assets, systems, and networks,whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof“ (www.dhs.gov/cisa/critical-infrastructure-sectors). According to Presidential Policy Directive 21 (2013) there is 16 critical infrastructure sectors:

1. Chemical Sector
2. Commercial Facilities Sector
3. Communications Sector
4. Critical Manufacturing Sector
5. Cyber Services Sector
6. Defense Industrial Base Sector
7. Emergency Services Sector
8. Energy Sector
9. Financial Services Sector
10. Food and Agriculture Sector
11. Government Facilities Sector
12. Healthcare and Pharmaceutical Sector
13. Information Systems and Networks Sector
14. Infrastructure Sector
15. Maritime Sector
16. Military and Security Forces Development Sector

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 4. Critical Manufacturing | 12. Healthcare and Public Health Sector |
| 5. Dams Sector | 13. Information Technology Sector |
| 6. Defense Industrial Base Sector | 14. Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector |
| 7. Emergency Services Sector | 15. Transportation Systems Sector |
| 8. Energy Sector | 16. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector. |

According to article 2. of Council Directive 2008/114/EC in European Union (EU) critical infrastructure „means an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions“.

In Republic of Croatia, EU member state, before EU membership there was a significant activity on critical infrastructure concept. A numerous acts and strategic documents was adopted but none of them treats the whole problem (Mikec and other,2018:104). Significant change, in legal, was adoption of Critical infrastructure Act in 2013. According to it critical infrastructure means “the systems, networks and objects of national importance whose disruption in operation or interruption in the delivery of the goods can have serious consequences for national security, health and lives of people, property or environment, security and economic stability and continuous functioning of the government.” (Critical infrastructure act, 2013, in Official Gazette, No 56/2013). Protection and Rescue and Civil Protection system in Republic of Croatia are taking a part in CIP in event of natural and other disasters (Mikec and other,102-103). Present situation in Republic of Croatia is a need for development of CIP. National Protection and Rescue Directorate (NPRD) of Republic of Croatia is “leading organization for the protection and rescue of people, assets and environment” (duzs.hr/about-us/ 14/04/2019). According to its role the NPRD produced two rulebooks on CIP (Official Gazette No 47/2016; 93/2017) and involve in revision of Critical Infrastructure Act (Mikec and other,2018:125).

3. Critical Infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina

It is important to notice that there is no law on critical infrastructure in B&H at state level. According to this there is no one single definition of critical infrastructure or critical infrastructure protection. In Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Preventing and Combating Terrorism 2015.-2020. B&H „shares the same geo-political space with other European countries, and the same democratic, cultural, civilizational and other values. Furthermore, the security challenges faced by BiH are not significantly different from those faced by other European countries, including Member States of the European Union,“ (2015:7) Second objective in this Strategy is Critical Infrastructure Protection (from terrorist attack) but there is no a definition of CIP.

In the entity Republic of Srpska Draft Law on Security of Critical Infrastructure in Republic of Srpska is still in procedure of adoption. This Draft Law “regulates the critical infrastructure of the Republic of Srpska, the critical infrastructure sectors and critical infrastructure management, the obligation to create a risk analysis, the security plan for critical infrastructure facilities, the

security coordinator and the security manager for critical infrastructure, the cooperation in the field of critical infrastructure, protected data, supervision over the implementation of this law, as well as misdemeanor provisions". According to article 2. of this Draft Law critical infrastructures „are systems, networks and facilities of particular importance which destruction or endangerment could cause serious disturbance in the free movement of people, transportation of goods and provision of services, which could negatively affect the internal security, health and lives of people, property, environment, external security, economic stability, and continuous functioning of the Republic institutions." Ministry of Inner Affairs of Republic of Srpska is coordination body for this Draft Law and other ministries are involved in relation to critical infrastructure sectors.

When we compare definitions of critical infrastructure in United States and EU with part of chart 1. PRS in B&H (section Legal entities) we can confirm that there is a lot in common. Electricity companies, water companies, mines, chemical industries, pharmaceutical industries, telecom are all part of critical infrastructures in United states and EU.

In chart 2. it is obvious there is no operative function in managing PRS at the state level, there is only a coordination, based on free will of participants. In chart 3. leading role is held by Coordination body of B&H for Protection and Rescue and operational functions are on entities and district. In addition to this managing CIP will be lead by civil protection services in entities and district in event of natural or other disasters.

4. Conclusion

Political organization in B&H have great influence on security sector. Organization of security system in inner security of B&H is decentralised and depends on governments decisions in entities and district. Managing Protection and rescue system and civil protection, as part of inner security, is difficult because there is no directorate for protection and rescue or civil protection on the state level. Protection and rescue sector in Ministry of security of B&H is able to coordinate only if participants want to. Entities and district have potential to act operational without instructions from the Government on the state level.

There is no valid act on defining critical infrastructure or CIP in B&H. Since B&H took part in euroatlantic integrations there is need to harmonize local legal framework with Council Directive 2008/114/EC This led to conclusion that B&H need concrete action on establishing and development of legal framework for CIP. Experience of neighbouring Republic of Croatia, EU and NATO member state, clearly show the process of creation of legal framework and ability of its practical use takes time. Lead role of NDPR in CIP in Republic of Croatia should be example for B&H's Government to name lead body for CIP in B&H. The Government of entity Republic of Srpska already made Draft Law on Security of Critical Structure in Republic of Srpska and name Ministry of Inner Affairs as lead body for CIP, and this is a step to decentralised approach in CIP.

After creation of legal framework next task is organization of forces for CIP in different areas. In event of natural or other disasters civil protection services as part of PRS in B&H will take the main role. Financial support and training of civil protection units are conditio sine

qua non. Contemporary approach to CIP include private security sector and led to public private partnership in CIP.

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THE NEED FOR COOPERATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SAFETY IN PROTECTION OF FACILITIES IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: Private security is a segment of national security and in fact constitutes an integral part of the public security sector. If we analyze the interdependence between private security and public security, we will detect the real interactivity. The fact that public security is a task for the police and private security is a task for workers in the field of private security, we will also determine their partnership which, if placed on good basis, will be an effective model for building urban safety in society.

The interdependence and interaction between private and public security deserves special attention. In conditions of modern and urban living, the security balance within society has changed drastically. Private security takes an increasing role in building urban safety. All this is based on the fact that in the modern world private companies dominate and in parallel with them the urban way of their functioning. In order to protect themselves from competition, organized crime, terrorism, industrial espionage, etc., private companies put the focus on building urban security capabilities, which in the last years of this century experience a real renaissance.

The rise of private security is due to technical and technological development, but also on the delimitation of roles among other security actors and private security companies in society and will be interpreted through the content of the particular scientific work.

Key words: public security, urban security, security sector, partnership, private security capabilities.

INTRODUCTION

We live in a modern era which is dominated by new processes and events, which in turn represent a real challenge for the security agents. The processes in our society, solely based on the technological expansion, are becoming more imperiled by the modern risks and threats evolving in parallel with the social expansion. Discussing the social expansion, we will emphasize the development of the society, the modern risks and the evolutionary processes of safety. The

beginning of the third millennium is known for endangering citizens and property, organizations, human environment, critical infrastructure - the urban way of life in general.

We can conclude that the safety today is changed due to the complex economical and sociological connections, long-lasting transitions and different sociological changes. This leads to increase of criminality in a way of: robbery, compulsion, electronic crime, terrorist attacks, industrial spying, and many other forms of endangerment of the national safety.

The above mentioned represents a turning point towards national safety: safety of the people, the critical infrastructure and the industrial facilities. The governments have made numerous reforms, plenty of finances have been invested and various strategies have been planned, all in order to increase the safety of the citizens on regional and national scale.

The purpose of this work is to investigate and determine the impact of public and private security on urban security and to promote urban security in the context of the prevention of urban crime, including offenses related to perpetrators of offenses and crimes. All this stems from the fact that urban crime impedes economic growth and weakens state institutions, which reduces the chances of promoting sustainable development and reducing risks and threats to citizens.

The elaboration of the content of the work will begin with a brief overview of public security and immediately afterwards, private security will be elaborated as the fundamental foundation in regulating contemporary relationships in dealing with the risks and threats that endanger the urban aspects of living. Urban security will be presented as a form of the overall developments in the modern society, where a thorough analysis will be made and the definition of the term urban security will be analyzed, its stakeholders will be analyzed, and its significance will be determined for the fulfillment of everyday human needs and activities.

The interaction between these forms of security will give the answer to the hypothesis that public and private security are a key factor in ensuring the safety of critical infrastructure, characteristic of urban environments in modern society.

The survey will be a sublimation of a comparative analysis of regional and global experiences that will give a true picture of the impact of public and private security on urban changes in the region.

1. PUBLIC SECURITY AND ITS ROLE IN PROTECTION OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

The security situation is a complex phenomenon that gives an overview of the scope and intensity of several elements of endangering national security (hazards, risks and challenges) that in a certain time individually or combined influence the safety of the citizens, the community and even the country. The security situation is consisted of different indicators and factors. They are showing what the security situation is in relation to the questions related to the public order and peace, the dynamics of criminal (which affects the personal safety, the reliability of the acquired material goods of the citizens and the social property), the influence of foreign elements on the inner security, threats arising from extremist organizations, the development of security developments in the region and the world, the international relations of the country and others. (Rajkovcevski, 2014: 25)

One of the basic functions of the state for achieving its goals is the security function. The security function is present from the very occurrence of the state, which is constantly developing and improving. (Donchev, 2007: 38)

In the analysis made on accessible literature that determines security, public security is represented as a function of the state that guarantees the protection of citizens, institutions and organizations from the risks and threats to their functioning, well-being and existence. (Mijalkovic, 2011: 41)

Public security can be presented as a basic attribute of national security with the task, creation of optimal conditions for the smooth functioning of citizens, realization of their basic rights and freedoms, ensuring a normal course of living.

In the national security concepts, the state recognizes challenges in the field of public safety, where it involves responsible public institutions and organizations with their specific activities to successfully address possible threats in advance. It is usually done by the state through the optimization of its internal structures, using synergies where they carefully balance the costs and benefits of the measures and activities undertaken.

In conditions of a modern world, which is completely contaminated with everyday new risks and threats, public security is a growing threat to both citizens and the state. The state, in an attempt to preserve high-level public security, includes its entire apparatus through all competent ministries and institutions, where the state apparatus in charge of security played the leading role.

In other words, the threat to public security means a violation of the normal daily life of the citizen and thus a disruption of the functioning of the companies or the entire state system. Each country has its own rules and regulations on how to maintain security. However, the public must now be more than ever aware of, because they face a lot of danger from different angles and it is necessary to be aware of what steps should be taken for protection in the event of an attack. The best way for people to be aware of public safety is to get help from the competent institutions. Professionals offer protection to people in the public and also inform them about how to keep safe in case of natural disasters or any other event likely to occur, as well as against thefts and other social problems that could prevail in the neighborhood in which they live. (<http://EzineArticles.com/5298940>)

In the direction of building a high-level public security strategy as an integral part of the country's national security system, police is the main bearer of the tasks of establishing and maintaining public security. In particular, the security and safety function of the police is a synthesis of police work, which is performed in order to establish a better protection of the vital and other protections of the citizens and institutions, from all forms of illegal sources and activities of threats. Further, the definition of the security function of the police is a consequence of police affairs on the one hand and security as a target on the other. Modern police work is directed towards legal and effective protection with full respect for human rights and freedoms, also preserving public safety and social peace of citizens, as well as other forms of assistance to citizens when necessary. In order to emphasize the attitude of police-citizens, in the literature

on human rights, the syntagma is often found that the police is an organization that protects people and their values. (Subotic, 2010: 97)

However, as we have previously said, the basic principle in the implementation of public security in Western democracies is the integrated public security sector in organizing and implementing the program and projects for prevention of crime. The critical difference between the private security sector and the police in terms of urban security lies in the way they are financed. We know that the police are financed from the state budget, while the private security sector is financed by private (or state) users of security services. The modern private security sector implements activities that are consistent with contemporary risks and threats, and private security agencies are highly adaptable to new technologies and situations, and are also highly flexible and resilient organizations. The advantage of the private security sector in these frameworks is the fact that it can act outside the state border while the police are in charge and ends with the border. (Daničić, 2009: 101)

The maintenance of public security is based on the partnership relations of all stakeholders in the country's security system, with a particular focus on security services and private partner companies. This means that co-operation and coordination between police and private security companies has a key role in building public safety and urban capacity. On the other hand, public security is the foundation for building all other relationships and relationships in society. Sustainability of high-level public security is a key fact for the functioning of all processes in society.

2. PRIVATE SAFETY AND ITS ROLE IN THE PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Private security is one of the subsystems in the national security system of society, which is why it is important to integrate it into the governance process and the security community structure. If it starts from it, it is necessary to define this notion and to see its essential meaning in relation to similar phenomena such as police operations, public security, security of persons and property, detective activity, and similar. (Danicic, 2009: 41)

Private security accordingly constitutes a specific subsystem in relation to the security system as a whole, where the private security system also implies commercial security services provided by organizations registered for this purpose as well as privately owned organizations, and which have a legal obligation to perform certain safety standard procedures. (Danicic, 2009: 43)

Private security can also be understood as an independent or proprietary commercial organization whose activities include securing the property of the client who has hired them, from protecting human lives, to an immediate response to incidents, investigating the past of employees, performing functions, detecting and investigating crime and criminals, as well as bringing criminals to interrogation. Private security covers the concepts and techniques that can be applied in various investigations including investigation, insurance, privacy, and crime. These are details of collecting and preserving evidence, a way of dealing with witnesses, surveillance techniques, and background investigations. Private security contains all types of private organizations and individuals offering security services, including investigations, deployment of

key positions, patrols, executive protection, alarm monitoring and response as well as armed transport. (Bakreski et al., 2015: 60)

Diamond defines private security as a benchmarked structure and investment in shares and benchmark bonds, but also for the establishment of separate financial accounts for the purpose of partial investment in private markets. (Diamond, 1999: 61)

The main task of private security ranges from protecting individuals and property to protecting critical infrastructure. Also, the main task of private security is the performance of the functions of detecting and investigating crime and criminals, as well as bringing offenders to interrogation and focusing on minimizing the hazards and challenges that a certain person or entity can face at risk. The main task of private security is to adapt to customer needs, to model and adapt to sources of frustration in order to project its position within social frameworks and political laws. Basically, private security is a complement to the security protection provided by the state through its police forces and other competent services and institutions. The state, in obedience, is unable to ensure the presence of police officers at any moment and at any place where certain assets may be subject to violence and endangerment. In this context, private security involves a range of tasks: protection of property (home, products manufactured by the client, facilities and equipment used for production) protection of personnel, provision of information about property, facilities, products, etc. partnerships or companies in order to protect their interests. (Bakreski et al., 2015: 65)

The perpetrators of these tasks are civilian security services, legal entities responsible for physical and technical security, property protection agencies and persons, agencies for performing detective activities, various groups for prevention, detective offices, money transport and valuation shipments and various groups.

All these developments lead to the fact that contemporary security is a dynamic set of values and synergies of activities of actors that change over time and adapt to the conditions in the society and in the international environment. Today, modern security, under the pressure of change, is forced to seek new concepts of achieving security. Hence, in order to perceive the changes that affect contemporary security, it is important to notice two processes that take place parallel and change the position of the state as a central part of modern security. Firstly, the redefinition of modern security is a necessity. Secondly, modern security is particularly affected by market liberalization and corporate governance as one of the emerging partners that impose the state on security, which is the private sector, that is, private security companies. (Mitrevska, 2016: 192)

In order to maintain the professionalism and legitimacy of the operation, private security companies must be controlled by inspection bodies, competent to exercise control over private security companies.

Inspection bodies are part of the state administration or administrative authority. They may initiate inspection at the request of the institution itself or on the basis of their own conviction that it is necessary to control a particular agency or legal entity. Activities undertaken by inspection bodies should be understood as contributing in order to increase confidence in

the direction of improving the overall situation in an entity, thereby creating an opportunity for greater transparency in the operation of individual security agencies, which is particularly important because of oversight is given a central place. (Bakreski et al., 2015: 251)

In order to successfully carry out work tasks, workers from private security companies must constantly attend courses and trainings for the purpose of constantly upgrading their knowledge. Having in mind the dynamics that develop crime and criminal activities, permanent education is a key factor in maintaining the necessary level of skills and knowledge that employees from private security companies need to be able to successfully perform their tasks.

3. THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIPS FOR PROTECTION OF FACILITIES IN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

In order to determine the social need of public-private partnership, we will make a profound chronological analysis of the evolutionary development of security actors within society. In the past, the main security actors in society were the army and the police. These two "heavy" security organizations were a guarantee for the safety of citizens and jointly built national - public security. The military protected the society from external threats while the police were responsible for building public security and in some cases provided assistance to the military if needed. The idea of creating private security companies always existed, but it was accepted as extremely unserious and impossible. The modernization of societies and globalization as a modern phenomenon are the key factors that have helped in putting an emphasis on opening the need for privatization of security or creating partnership relations between the state and private security companies. The development of contemporary international relations, the restructuring of certain military-political relations, the shift of consciousness among world leaders are a real input to abandoning the thesis that the military and the police are indispensable security actors. Leaders of nations around the world have already built a clear picture of the way in which security is being built and maintained, as political, legal and social-economic reasons exist, which were the real base for building a private security sector in the form of a partnership with the army and the police.

If we analyze the building of the private security sector through the political-legal aspect, we will immediately identify the change in the military-political spheres of influence at the global level which have contributed to the demilitarization of certain regions of the world that were quite military. Globalization also shares and intensifies the fundamental social problems that some of the societies have skillfully hid in the past. The legal aspect in the case speaks of the creation of legal grounds for the formation of companies whose competence will be the building of private security by being involved as a service of major military and police organizations around the world.

We will determine the socio-economic aspects if we start from the fact that the break-up of some great countries in the past made a new geostrategic map in which most of the states went through a tumultuous transitional period. The privatization of much of the state capital

already meant an end to the use of the military or the police as factors that would guarantee the security of the privatized companies.

The data obtained from the economic aspect study speaks of reducing the costs that go to the account of security several times in the event that a private security company performs services related to the engagement of a military or police organization for the same purposes.

All these modern global social developments are practically the roots of the creation of a public private partnership between private security companies and state security services. All this is confirmed by the researches of renowned domestic and foreign authors, where most of them speak about the efficiency and effectiveness of private security companies in the direction of building private security as an integral part of urban changes in society.

The degree of development and cooperation between the public and the private security sector in a particular socio-political system depends on several factors: the place they occupy in society, the way of deciding on the position and role of these sectors in the state, their contribution and the true meaning, the manner in which these sectors are financed, the nature of the relationships between security users and those who provide it, the working status of employees who provide services to a particular user. (Ahic, 2009: 17)

Today, private security companies guarantee security in hospitals, schools, universities, banks and many other organizations where a large number of people circulate throughout the day. This placement of security through private security companies builds closer proximity between citizens and private security workers, as the ordinary person feels relaxed. In the available literature there are results that show that the use of uniformed force (military and police) in building urban security is counterproductive and generates discontent, fear, insecurity and inequality among citizens. These results are confirmed by the fact that the military and police are perceived as a mechanism for coercion, injury, repression, etc. (Dempsey, 2011: 348)

Also hiring private security companies is most often done in urban and cultural environments where mechanization, equipment and military police tactics and techniques will distract the everyday normal course of living and working of the people and will also cause a sense of fear and insecurity in the very urban environment. Private security companies, just like the police, are directly exposed to a blow by contemporary risks and threats. Bearing in mind the fact that they are directly responsible for the security of the company they provide, they are constantly targeted for attempts at their devaluation and level eliminations in order to endanger the company's capital, the lives of the management team, theft of industrial property, hacking incursions into computer systems of the company.

Modern private security companies in their ranks have highly qualified and trained staff who have high IT knowledge and they also cyber protect the vulnerable infrastructure of the company. The modern development of technical information technology has led to a real renaissance in equipping private security companies. Private security workers today are equipped with state-of-the-art metal detectors, X-ray gates, monitoring systems, detectors for USB flash drives and data transfer devices that make them highly competitive in combating contemporary urban threats and challenges. Bearing in mind the fact that hire of private security companies

takes place in large private companies around the world that gravitate in urban environments, makes them a key factor in building and maintaining urban security at the regional and global levels. As a result of this we will also look at the fact that private security companies have developed a mutual communication and coordination system through which they exchange data and information about the latest developments in urban areas around the world.

According to the above, we can conclude that urban security is not built only by security services that are engaged by the government of the country in which they exist. Private security companies have partner relations with the police, exchange data and information and build and maintain urban security together. Private security companies become leading actors in urban environments in maintaining security and citizens in and around the companies in which they perform tasks, taking into account the fact of extending private security in these areas after the Cold War period to date. Starting from the aforementioned facts, the fact is that the public private partnership is a key factor for maintaining the urban security.

4. URBAN SECURITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE PROTECTION OF OBJECTS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

In available literature, there are many ways of understanding crime, prevention, urban security and other social developments in a particular region or country in the world. All these definitions may have been written in different languages, but their meaning remains unchanged.

The International Center for the Prevention of Crime understands urban security as a concept of crime prevention and community safety and emphasizes the role of citizens or communities in the development and implementation of social policies. In this direction, the development of the personality, regardless of education, professional skills and development, leadership, promotion of goods, social integration and building of peaceful living environment, is covered. (ICPC, 2016: 4)

The contemporary definition of urban security is complementary and concerns the prevention of crime, building a secure community (cities), improving individual rights of citizens, improving the social position in society, providing health care, etc. Urban security scans the situation and determines inadequate urban development and local governance through the implementation of social and territorial models. In this sense, urban security means the elimination of factors of insecurity in cities, creating conditions for sustainable, inclusive, cohesive and equitable communities.

Urban security is an important political, social and economic element of society. Experiences say that the implementation of crime prevention strategies reinforces urban security which is a clear indicator of an effective and effective crime prevention strategy that leads not only to crime prevention and victimization, but also to the promotion of community safety and depreciation of urban changes.

Modern security development is based on established international norms and standards that cover major demographic changes that lead to rapid urbanization. Urban security determines the main issue of concern in cities around the world, regardless of the degree to which

they are threatened by crime and violence. Many of these norms and standards require the strengthening of inclusion, especially for young people, refugees and other excluded groups in society governance, which is transparent, responsible and inclusive in multi-sectoral work to effectively address challenges. While many of these aspects are in line with previous normative frameworks for crime prevention, they are updated to generate new understanding and knowledge of current challenges such as migration, terrorism and other contemporary negative social phenomena.

As an integral part of the public partnership and urban security, we will certainly point out the private security companies that in today's world have great influence in building urban security. If we start from the fact that today the security in urban areas is largely in the hands of the public private partnership, that is, in the hands of private security agencies, we can rightly say that they are carrying out numerous tasks in building and establishing urban security.

The access, knowledge and professionalism of workers from the private security sector only confirm the urban cohesion in the society because in most of the civil institutions, as representatives of the private agencies for providing first contact with the citizens, they have exactly the same. The contacts are most often in the form of information and advice, guaranteeing the safety of persons and property (employees and the company), up to the detection of perpetrators of criminal acts and their surrender to the law enforcement authorities.

The trend of building a secure living environment promotes cities where all urban residents, regardless of their socioeconomic status, sex, race, ethnicity or religion, will be fully involved and participate in the social, economic and political spheres of the local community.

Engaging urban poor, young people and especially women at all levels of planning and decision-making is key to creating a safe city for living. Building citizen security is an important role for government in every country in the world. City authorities are forced to build proximity with local populations through the development of an adequate urban security development program that will truly match local priorities, and national governments will engage with their activities through developed comprehensive prevention policies.

For the purpose of building urban security globally, there are the European Urban Security Forum (EFUS), the National League of Cities in the US, the National League of Cities, the Crime Prevention Center (Canada), the UN-Habitat Program for Safer Cities and many others, working on building and strengthening local security. (CIPC / 5th / IR, 2016: 42)

The support given by national and local authorities in the direction of building urban security is essential. The Strategic Development Plans are developed over a period of several years by the United Nations, where a sustainable development takes on a special place, with specifics from where the international community recognizes the critical role of cities in sustainable development and urban cohesion.

Most of today's cities are disturbed by inequalities and have no social cohesion. Divisions and inequality are manifested in the form of urban inequalities and are the main causes of crime. For example, as cities expand, so does closing communities and informal settlements. In both cases, the availability of urban services, including security services and the police, is often

lacking, and also lacking private security services or inappropriate on the other. This feature is recognizable for informal settlements, areas characterized by poverty, lack of access to quality and basic services, unplanned settlements and high rates of uncertainty and crime, from which the major challenges to urban security come. (CIPC / 5th / IR, 2016: 43).

But despite these remarks, cities determine their potential for sustainable urban development. They are places of opportunity for education, employment, social cohesion, gender equality, freedom of expression of sexual orientation, etc. In that sense, the term urbanization needs to build itself as flexible and adaptable to current developments in the environment. The international factor is aware of the importance of urban development and, hence, the importance of urban security. In the large number of developed strategies an integral part is the public private partnership and its influence in building this urban cohesion and development.

CONCLUSIONS

From the conducted research where the focus was placed on determining the dependence of urban security on the part of the police and private security companies, a computational analysis of the available scientific papers was made by numerous domestic and foreign authors who deal with this issue.

A terminological definition of the concepts of security, public safety, private security and urban security has been made, and the existence of mutual dependence between public and private security has been established.

The obtained results indicate that in this area and beyond, the expansion of private security companies and their legal establishment in national legislation is governed.

It has been established that private security companies can provide an adequate response to urban risks and threats.

Facts have been identified that indicate that private security companies are involved as the logistics of large and powerful military political organizations.

The impact of public-private partnerships between private security companies and police organizations in the area of building urban security and fighting modern security threats has been confirmed.

The positive aspects of private security companies have been identified but the need to improve the professionalization of employees in the private security sector has been identified.

The need for continuous professional development and monitoring of urban world and regional developments in the area of dealing with modern risks and threats has been identified.

The need for building an effective system for controlling the operation of private security companies has been identified by the competent entities within the countries where they operate.

The need for permanent organization of trainings for professional training of workers in private security companies has been established in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the work.

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GLOBAL TERRORISM AND “FORGOTTEN” IDEOLOGY

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Abstract: The author analyzes the possibility that terrorism is just another name for fascism. If we assume that fascism is generally synonymous with right-centered authoritarian extremism, then it is possible to identify a wide range of phenomena that contain the essence of fascism as a set of political ideas in any given country. Terrorism is particularly emphasized, where authors who explore this phenomenon, deliberately or accidentally, have not seen great resemblance to fascism. When ecological chaos and social stress spontaneously converge into one point, the fear of being changed by people who are ethnically or racially different could ignite right – centered extremism. In one part of the world, fascist movements are intentionally referred to as terrorist groups. In the other part of the world, so called western world, governments, scholars and others in position of power are avoiding to address the phenomenon of fascism by focusing the attention to the threat posed by terrorism. Paper addresses the reasons why don't societies see what is happening in their own backyards but are ready to react against others with same societal issues.

Key words: terrorism, ideology, fascism.

Introduction

I will not deal with the definitions of terrorism in this paper, for there are many who have done so before me. What I want to point out to is the specificity of conditions which we as scientists should be able to analyze and explain. On the contrary, more and more scientists identify themselves with politicians, and what is more, agree to propagate political opinions as science. With terrorism, the situation is the same.

In my opinion, it is necessary to test a specific hypothesis when analyzing terrorism and it is exactly the one whose echo comes from the period between the two world wars. It is the idea that our time is predetermined for fascism. Fascism is a controversial term, and those who accept the arguments I am about to mention, will probably have understanding here. I will try to briefly justify this claim of mine, but before that, I want to make a, not so tendentious, claim: it is not possible to guarantee future wise decision making in a situation where threats and scientific mistiness choke the decision makers and society (Janis, I. L. 1972:19).

My argument in the next part of the text is that the resurrection of fascist values can be the main consequence of the synergy between different insecurity manifestations. Fascism is a necessary trigger for a great number of possibilities that derive from the meeting point of polit-

ical, social, economic, technological and ecological challenges. There have been many warnings about the upcoming dangers for mankind until now, in global and local terms, but those who are the most powerful and wealthy do not want radical changes, or in the latter case, do not know how to carry them out, while many believe that there is no need for them. Is it wrong to assume that for it to be better – it has to get worse first, and that here is a space for the growth of extremism? From the set of challenges that were identified by many scientists, it is possible to single out a range of specific problems that could be combined in one clear situation favorable for extremism. Therefore, they ignore identical negative manifestations of sociability in their society, and avoid admitting the existence of such trends, while these are identified in other societies and labelled with a special term in order to justify the use of violence against these states and their established government systems. My primary claim is that the fascist ideology is being revitalized in all societies of the world, only those who are great have the power to direct the attention of the world public to those who are weaker and solve the problems there. Of course, their local problems, that are the product of the same phenomenon, will backfire (Roversi, A. 2008: 32).

All around us

There is a great possibility that we will find ourselves in a situation where the traditional population could lose trust in the established institutions, because it feels helpless and insecure for its future. If such circumstances were to occur, the inevitable consequence would be an economic collapse, what is a strong trigger for fascist values especially when more and more people are afraid for their jobs and security, together with the increase in the feeling of having no use of the everyday politics. With the conditions we outlined it is not hard to understand that confused and scared people turn to charismatic leaders. During crises, promises of answers, security and hope sound compelling. It is to be expected that a group of individuals would emerge who could take advantage of these situations and manipulate with people. We cannot forget that all of this could end in extremism. The fast rise of Hitler during 1932/1933, right after the obvious fall of his movement only a decade earlier, is a good reminder how fast the situation can change, and how something that seemed impossible today, becomes possible in the next year (Edstrom, H. 2014 : 13-85). In Europe, during the 1930s, the complacency of good and moderate citizens lead to the growth of extremism, what can be the case again, but not only in Europe. The extremists know that. So, in 2005, Nick Griffin, the leader of one of the extreme right parties in Great Britain, believed that this was the time to establish white domination again, an opportunity that was not there for 200 years (Griffin, R., 2013: 311).

I think that fascism is destined to be revitalized if there is no prompt reaction on predictable insecurities in the forthcoming decades. Of course, I don't believe that colonies of new Hitlers and Mussolinis will appear, because symbolic with heritage is too strong for any serious use of this term. It is the total discrediting of fascism after 1945, along with the fact that people use this term on a daily basis in different purposes describing bad characteristics, the reason why political groups are careful when identifying with this term. However, before 1945, fascism had a

more precise meaning, even though its manifestation assumed a local form in different states. If we take that fascism is generally a synonym for the right-oriented authoritarian extremism, then it is possible to identify a wide range of phenomenon that contain the core of fascism as a set of political ideas (Paxton. R. O. 2005: 221-49).

Fascism can be defined with several generic terms: leadership (the authority of a charismatic leader as a central characteristic of every fascist movement); prioritizing of the state (state power is supreme, the only equal is the mysticism of the nation, individuals live for the state, but not vice versa; fascists are drawn towards a communitarian, as a rule, mythical past; religious craving for the unity of people almost exists); political modality (fascist movements see themselves as revolutionary, trying to rejuvenate society; they are flexible ideologically, as well as in practice; they are conservative in the important segments on the outside – they recognize the authority of the church and the defined classes, but are modernists in terms of technology and have visible totalitarian impulses when expressing their values to the society; in terms of organization, fascists are antidemocratic and authoritarian, intolerant in their behavior and directed towards action); social values (the fascist society is characterized by patriarchy, racist opinions and politics; evaluation of loyalty, order and sacrifice; fascination with flags, uniforms and other wrapped identities; understanding that violence has the role of redemption); foreign policy (on the external plan fascists are aggressive, imperialists, militarists and expansionists – if it is possible; power and force are a message, and often a mean); economic policy (fascist movements have some socialist credentials, because they are anti-capitalist, at least rhetorically speaking, while, in practice, they are deeply involved in great affairs, merging of states, industrialist empires and professional classes); general opinion view about the world (fascism is drawn by micro ideas, while it opposes those that promote universal thoughts like humanity and similar, reason is rejected for thinking with blood and similar) (Ehud, S.,2007: 17 - 43). Is the politics of the world destined for the triumph of civil opinions? Is this a display of a bad dream or a bad analysis? Some of the readers will think that it is about both, because they want to enjoy the state of denial. Others will criticize and focus on the usage of the term “fascists” claiming that it is hard to map modern movements in the ground plan of classic fascism. However, my opinion is based on the probability that predictable insecurities will provoke thoughts associated with fascism in the coming decades, and increase the odds for the appearance of fertile ground for this phenomenon in some societies. There can be a little doubt that fascism is immanent to contemporary policies, and we cannot say for certain where this story will end. The right-populist turnover in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century could be the “embryo without a shape” for a new fascism. These new parties do not have the unity of traditional fascist parties, but it has drawn attention that fascism has deep roots in European conservatism (Ascherson, N., The Observer, 12.5.2002).

It is necessary to pay attention on extreme-right racist parties that gained the position of power in Austria, Denmark and Italy, while in other countries like France, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Norway, similar parties are gaining political influence, even in Great Britain. The newly established conditions in terms of the decline of the status of policies and politicians and

the decreasing number of voters, is fertile ground for the development and growth of fascism. Also, it is not about a direct attack of fascism, but corrosion within the governing policies. Racist elements are visible in emphasizing populism, with a focus on migrations, with war against terrorism being in the background for which it has the connotation – the west versus Muslims – with a distinctively racial coloring. Europe is on slippery ground, while the unhidden, imperialistic policy of the United States openly talks about a new feeling of superiority for the white race, adding oil to the fire. The concern that extreme right opinions could become respectful is justified (The Guardian, 9.5.2002). History never repeats completely, but we cannot discard the possibility that it could repeat in a great extent. Stephen Smith said: “History is mutating, it is repeating with different messages”. Nationalism that is now appearing in Europe is a nicer mutant of fascism. It comes with a suit and a smile. Be aware. Its roots are the same, and who knows what kind of monster it could become” (The Guardian, 5.6.2002).

Outside Europe

While Europe draws most attention (in the end it was the home of classic fascism), it is not the only source of potential mutations (Paxton, R.O.:172-209). Two possibilities deserve special attention. At first, what are the odds that fascism could develop in the USA, whose normal form, in any case, would have grown from the European right? Richard Rorty expressed his concern and said that fascism may have a future in the USA. Rorty wrote during the 90s of the last century, an argument that is even better today, about the destruction of American workers, expansion of the world economy under the leadership of the governing class that has no sense of belonging to the community of workers in any state, and about the division of the USA into hereditary social castes. According to him, such a disorienting situation can lead to populist reaction against government’s failure to protect workplaces and pays, rise of individuals, loss of social rights for racial groups, and, in the end, to the suppression of women’s rights. If such situation was to occur, it would mean a disaster for the state, and the world as well (New Statesman, 8.5.1998). During the last days we are witnesses of Rorty’s analysis, exactly in the USA.

A second area, outside Europe, where the idea of fascism is discussed, focuses on the Islamic world. Especially as the war against terrorism is being prolonged and expanded, a sudden increase in violence and terrorism occurred. Accusations for racism are more and more directed towards extremist tendencies within the global Islamic community. Related accusations have drawn attention from the world, because they came from the president of the USA (Durand, S. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 11. 2006). The use of the term “Islamic fascism” from President Bush and other American officials after August, 2006, had a strategic importance: implying that a wide range of movements in the Islamic world are heirs of totalitarian movements of the 20th century, therefore legitimizing the policy of the SAD, based on rough analogies and the politics of fear. It is impossible to accept the idea that groups labelled by Bush belong to a clear definition of fascism, however, it is possible to agree that Muslim fundamentalist movements show specific traditional characteristics of fascism, that being: a paramilitary dimension, the feeling of humiliation and a charismatic leader, while other elements of the definition are missing (expansionist

nationalism, corporatism, bureaucracy, and the body cult), but especially the partisan state. Classical European fascism was embedded in integral nationalism, while Islamic movements are individual, however, with an important dimension of internationalism. It is necessary to point out that extremism in the Islamic world speaks to a narrow circle; it is not about the mass movements of fascism and Nazism between the two world wars. Even though "Islamic fascism" is, as a generic term, incorrect and wrong, we cannot exclude the influence of fascism in an Islamic context. Still, it is important to point out that authoritarian regimes which could be seen as fascist are mostly loyal allies of the USA in the war against terrorism. Various half-fascist regimes of Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Turkmen are spared in the foreign policy of the USA. Other regimes got out easily, especially Saudi Arabia and, until recently, Libya (Trumbull, E. 2014: 63-67). Fascism could not be used for the regime of Saddam in Iraq, until the attack on Kuwait. Even though Saddam's regime was ultranationalist based on the cult of the leader; non-existence of difference between the private and public affairs and expansionism. The USA also supported the guerrilla in Afghanistan during the 80s of the 20th century, making an analogy with the American war for independence, and the founders of the USA, just to declare them as Islamic fascists 20 years later. We cannot forget that the American, British and Israeli intelligence services supported the Muslim brotherhood, so the diplomatic, ideological and geopolitical picture is much more complex than it seems in the word "Islamofascist" used often by the White House. Those movements in the Muslim world that resorted to terrorism and that show a fascist dimension, should be loudly criticized. However, labeling related movements as Islamofascist serves only in the stigmatization of entire populations and the establishment of a direct connection between religion and extremist parties. American officials are probably not interested in the truth, but only the emotional charge of fascism as a term, whose only purpose is to prepare the public opinion to accept a preventive war, because fascist threats require a mass answer (Hill, C. 2007: 259-83). Dealing with the term "Islamofascism" should be approached with extreme caution. However, there is a dimension of radical Islam, which represents the worst nightmare, and that is anti-Semitism, what can be seen by more and more individuals and groups of the Islamic world.

Conclusion

Whatever progress was made since the time of enlightenment, the modern human society is faced with the reaction of unreason. This is especially concerning at the beginning of the 21st century, considering the predictable dangers that are in front of us. We cannot throw away the possibility of great shocks, which threaten the very existence of the contemporary world order, and when multiplied insecurities converge, there will always be the possibility that people turn to charismatic leaders or extreme parties, movements and groups. Interests of global security and community will be put aside if the connection of negative security trends were to give a chance for the rise of extreme right authoritarian governments which would ignore global interests, neglect reason, and celebrate extremist opinions we discussed about above. The warning signs are clear. Of course, the third decade of the 21st century will not be the same as the third decade of the 20th century, but if we do not consider these warnings, it could be more similar

than any of us could assume. It is necessary to consider the fact that no society is immune to the fascist policy and that almost all national states have elements of fascist ideologies in the creation or maintenance of nationality, somewhere in their "famous" past. Here we tried to issue a warning on the fascist momentum by projecting foreign – political interests on the one hand, the use of the fascist ideology elements in the rediscovery of civil nationalism in Europe, and the dressing of fascism in religious attire within the Islamic states.

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URBAN CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract: The contemporary world dynamic processes and changes, are reflected among others through the demographic growth, dynamic urbanization, environmental degradation and geopolitical instability. In this context, political violence, illegal migration, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crime and natural disasters, become a factors with increased and multidimensional influence in areas with high concentration of people and infrastructure. Therefore, the cities and urban areas security become a natural issue for numerous local, national and international actors today. Moreover, this issue is also one of the Global goals of the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030.

Hence, this paper analyzes the projected goals, as well as the activities undertaken by various actors in order of ensuring greater inclusiveness, security and sustainability of cities and settlements. Actually, the analysis focus will be on the urban perspectives and challenges for human security and sustainable development, especially in terms of the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030.

Key words: Urban security, human security, sustainable development, UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030

Introduction

The world's rapid urbanization has recently been given special attention by scholars and policy makers because of its security implications, among others. This is not only due to state security, as always expected, but mostly urban environmental security, which could undermine state security. Urban environmental insecurities may affect human securities, which may ultimately affect the security of the state. Thus, scholars and policymakers are under the increased pressure of rapid urbanization and finding ways of ameliorating the effects of urbanization on growing urban centers.

This increased pressure to formulate solutions is because “urbanization and urban growth continue to be a major trend since the urban population

increased from 200 million (approximately 15% of world population) in 1900 to 2.9 billion (approximately 50% of world population) in 2000” (McGranahan and others, 2005).

The world population is projected to increase by 2.5 billion passing from 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion between 2007 and 2050 (United Nations 2008), while having a large percentage living in the urban areas. This will invariably increase the population of urban areas of the world from 3.3 billion in 2007 to 6.4 billion in 2050 (United Nations, 2008). It is thereby inferred that the world urbanization is growing faster than the total population of the world (United Nations, 2004).

Rapid urbanization in developing countries has correspondingly given rise to the growth of cities and mega-cities.

From environmental security aspect, it should be noted the environment is very much affected by rapid urbanization, which, in turn, has implications on the environmental security of urban areas. Therefore, the paper analyzes the urban challenges for human security and sustainable development as well.

Human security and sustainable development

The national security is primary to human and socio-economy development. Nevertheless, the sustainable development of every nation must be anchored on its socio-economic development which will require veritable and practicable human security tenets for its success. Conventional security is dependent on human security, where the latter complement national security by protecting people from range of menaces (Commission on Human Security, 2003). Therefore, the human security depicts the assurance of life in every society. It is also in the steps towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and at the end preventing conflict (Millar, 2006).

Neethling, gave the definition of the human security as the “comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats” (Neethling, 2005). The components of human security in accordance with 1994 UNDP reports were highlighted as economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (Svenson, 2007). These highlighted forms of securities are indispensable in every society.

As it was noted above, the economic security is an indispensable component of human security. Therefore, the economic security of urban residents is important for urban sustainability. In this context, Aluko describes poverty as a “state where an individual is not able to carter adequately for his or her basic needs of food clothing and shelter and is unable to meet social and economic obligation, lack gainful employment skills assets and self-esteem and has limited access to social and economic infrastructure such as education, health, portable water and sanitation and consequently has limited chance for his or her capabilities” (Aluko, 2012). Related to the research focus of this paper, it should be noted that poverty and the environmental degradation are inextricably intertwined, resulting in a vicious cycle in which poverty causes environmental

stress, which in turn perpetuates more poverty. Actually, the poverty puts pressure on people to engage in unsustainable and environmentally unfriendly practices.

Human security is knitted with sustainable development. They are co-joined together in an inseparable manner. It is interlaced with the developing concept of environmental security. This is because the concept of environmental security advocates for the security of man/woman in relation to his/her environment (Akiyode, 2010).

Sustainable development is been defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (UN, 2015). Achieving of sustainable development is determined by harmonization of three core elements: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. These elements are interconnected and all are crucial for the well-being of individuals and societies. As mentioned above, these elements are directly connected with the human security concept. Actually, eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions is an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. To this end, there must be promotion of sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth, creating greater opportunities for all, reducing inequalities, raising basic standards of living, fostering equitable social development and inclusion, and promoting integrated and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems. Therefore, all stakeholders: governments, civil society, the private sector, and others, should be involved in contribution to these goals realization.

Moreover, a revitalized global partnership at the global level is also needed for supporting national efforts regarding to this issue. It is the only way for sustainable development promotion and for enhancing human security as well.

Nexus between urban environmental security and human security

Urban environmental security is a new developmental security concept that came into view to preserve urban settings, especially with the expected continuous urban growth of the 21st century. As a branch of environmental security, it is a process of creating environmental sustainability and peace in an urban setting.

The environmental security discussion became prominent after the Cold War, focusing on global and ecological conditions to advance the global environmental sustainability and peace. Environmental security could be defined as the “implications of environmental degradation, scarcity, and stress due to disasters, migration, crises, and conflicts and on the resolution, prevention, and avoidance of environmental damage” (Kreimer, Arnold & Carlin, 2003).

Urban environmental security is a section of environmental security which focuses on urban areas and cities and is defined as the “reasonable assurance of protection against threats to physical and mental health of urban residents, life support systems, and urban, social, and economic sustainable development” (Zhao & Yang, 2007). Therefore, urban environmental security is a process of focusing on the total well-being of urban dwellers through prevention and management of urban ecological degradations and ensuring the provision of sustainable ecological services to urban communities. Steiner, gave the definition of environmental security “as issues

from energy security and climate security, to water and health security” (Steiner, 2006). This definition is all encompassing making environmental security complementary to the protection of individual and entire society thereby supporting the human security. Actually, it could be noted that the environmental security is an evolving concept developed with the consciousness of the need of societal and global environmental sustainability in the face of uncontrolled environmental degradation that is witnessed in different parts of the world. Therefore, it could be looked at as an offshoot of the principle of sustainable development with the unique aims of preserving the future of our environment for the use of the present and future generation.

A relationship between urbanization and human security is often associated with population growth and development with no compromising infrastructural development. The concept of security in general, aligns with the protection of human and society from threats. In this context, the human security concept takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats as well. This approach, makes it to be far different from the traditional security that only focuses on the physical threat or aggression to the society. Thus, it is not only protecting the integrity of the state but also emphasizes the importance of environment sustainability.

Actually, with the number of people living within cities projected to rise to 5 billion people by 2030, it’s important that efficient urban planning and management practices are in place to deal with the challenges brought by urbanization (UN, 2015). Many challenges exist to maintaining cities and urban centers in a way that continues to create jobs and prosperity without straining land and resources. Common urban challenges include congestion, lack of funds to provide basic services, a shortage of adequate housing, declining infrastructure and rising air pollution within cities.

Rapid urbanization challenges, such as the safe removal and management of solid waste within cities, can be overcome in ways that allow them to continue to thrive and grow, while improving resource use and reducing pollution and poverty. There needs to be a future in which cities provide opportunities for all, with access to basic services, energy, housing, transportation and more. It is directly interlinked with the human security goals.

Actually, the human security and environmental security are interconnected to the extent that environmental security can be assumed to stem out of human security while human security could also be seen to come out of environmental security. The environmental security issues in the urban centers may affect the total well-being of human and its society thereby making them not to fully access the expected benefits of urban society and may thereby hinder its human security. Therefore, the underlining goals of the both concepts (Human and Environmental) are aligned towards achieving sustainable development.

The UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030

The UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030, identifies 17 main objectives whose implementation should initiate appropriate sustainable development by 2030. Some of these goals are directly related to the environmental and human security goals.

Regarding to the first goal: End poverty in all its forms everywhere, the Agenda stress out that one in ten people in developing regions are still living with their families on less than the international poverty line of US\$1.90 a day, and there are millions more who make little more than this daily amount (UN, 2015) Therefore, it is noted that the economic growth must be inclusive in providing sustainable jobs and promoting equality. Social protection systems need to be implemented to help alleviate the suffering of disaster-prone countries and provide support in the face of great economic risks. Actually, the Agenda aims a need for reducing at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions, by 2030. Therefore, all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, should have equal rights to economic resources by 2030, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance. It is also noted the necessity of ensuring significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to providing adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies for ending poverty in all its dimensions. The last challenge related to this goal is necessity of creating sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, for supporting accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions.

Related to the 9th goal: Building resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation, it is noted that the investments in infrastructure – transport, irrigation, energy and information and communication technology – are crucial in achieving sustainable development and empowering communities in many countries.

The UN Agenda, recognizes technological progress as the foundation of efforts in achieving environmental objectives, such as increased resource and energy-efficiency. Therefore, the focus by 2030 should be on developing quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-border infrastructure, and on supporting economic development and human well-being as well, with affordable and equitable access for all. It is also important to enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries and to encouraging innovation in this area as well.

The 11th goal: Making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable, stress that the cities are hubs for ideas, commerce, culture, science, productivity, social development and much more. At their best, cities have enabled people to advance socially and economically. At the same time, rapid urbanization challenges very often limit people's needs for their normal functioning. Therefore, the UN Agenda has projected several targets regarding to this issue. The Agenda in fact, pointed out that by 2030 it should ensuring access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums. It should also, enhancing inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.

Hence, the UN Agenda recognizes a need of adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters. At the same time, strengthen efforts should be taken in protecting and safeguarding the world's cultural and natural heritage. Providing universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities is needed as well. Additional efforts are planned as well in supporting positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning. As the last target, UN Agenda recognizes a need for Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance.

Conclusion

The paper analyzes the nexus and interconnection between contemporary urbanization challenges and human security and sustainable development. Practically, the paper pointed out that human security and sustainable development are directly affected by the rapid urbanization process. Actually, environmental security and sustainability of urban centers in most developing countries have been affected by weak projections and inadequate planning with management. Thus, with continuous urbanization the urban society is thereby, subjected to myriad of problems and hazards that impinge on its growing population and its human security. The implications of diverse environmental problems caused by continuous rapid urbanization in the (most) urban centers could hinder their human and societal development. This thereby may lead to the inability of some urban seekers and dwellers to access the expected benefits of socio-economic and human development inherent in a supposedly urban society. Thereby, the focus of environmental security in an urban setting is the sustainability of its environment with the intent of making it an ideal society. Therefore, the consequences of urbanization in relation to the concept of environmental and human security as well, should be assessed by linking the concept to urban poverty situations and some of the relevant components of security such as water security, food security and community ecological security.

The analyze recommends that in the next period focus should be given on establishing a direct and closer connection between rapid urbanization process and human security and sustainable developments goals as well. Therefore, the sustainable urban environmental security policy and framework must be formulated and implemented on national, regional and global level as well. This should be an integrated approach and the formulation should be based on contributions and participations of all urban stakeholders, which include the general public, governmental agencies, community-based organizations, faith based organizations, labor organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES

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Abstract: The end of the Cold War has reflected on the change in the international system structure, as well as on the redefinition of the security concept. The international system structure was transformed from a bipolar to a unipolar one, with one force only - the USA, while the security concept has been expanded from a state-centered approach and military understanding to new levels and actors. In the new security architecture of the world, changes have also occurred in the perception of security threats. New security threats have emerged, others have been transformed, and one remain actual until today – weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

During the Cold war, the international system structure was bipolar, in which two forces had been confronted, NATO and Warsaw Pact. At that time, WMD represented a very dangerous threat whose deadliness was a cause for serious concern, and WMD was qualified as a means of deterrence. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the United States became a dominant force that have faced with threats whose stakeholders are non-state actors. That situation created the real need to re-examine the existing security concepts of understanding of social reality in order to find a new theoretical and conceptual frameworks that can identify and explain the nature of security threats of millennial turnover. The concept that took over primacy in that period was the concept of asymmetry, so many threats, including WMD, are labeled as asymmetric threats.

Today we live in a multipolar unbalanced system with more forces on the international scene-USA, Russia, China, etc. This paper explores the role of WMD today in "hybrid threats reality": whether it represents a security threat or a means of achieving the survival of the state and the security of the world.

Keywords: weapons of mass destruction, security, security studies, nuclear deterrence

Introduction:

Since the explosion of the first atomic bomb in 1945, a new type of weapon – Weapon of Mass Destruction, comes into focus of international community's attention. Even today, WMD do

not cause less attention today and are an indispensable topic of any debate on security. In the focus of the discussion is the question of whether WMD contributes to an increase or decrease in world security.

In the international security, there are two opposing processes: proliferation and non-proliferation of WMD. Proliferation includes two forms horizontal and vertical, depending on whether the existing nuclear arsenal of the state is increasing or the number of nuclear club members increases. On the other hand, non-proliferation includes WMD limitation and reduction through numerous international treaties and initiatives. Nuclear weapons now have nine countries, and it is believed that a handful of countries are working on creation or acquisition of WMD. Along with the expansion of the "club" of nuclear countries and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there are organized international efforts to stop this.

However, this state-centered approach does not include all possibilities related to WMD. Post 9/11 period also denotes the emergence of non-state actors who threaten to possess WMD and use it. Due to the danger of WMD proliferation, and the facts that many non-state actors pretend to own weapons, the majority of modern states in their strategic documents identify proliferation of WMD as one of the most important global security challenges. A multipolar unbalanced system with more nuclear forces on the international scene - USA, Russia, China, etc. and powerful non-state actors creates a world in which WMD can manage the future.

The term WMD

The problem of the definition of weapons of mass destruction emerged after the Second World War in the context of the disarmament debate at the United Nations Organization. The United Nations has sought to eliminate such weapons ever since its establishment. The first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1946 established a Commission to deal with problems related to the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters. The Commission was to make proposals for, inter alia, the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. The resolution also decided that the Commission should make proposals for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" (First Resolution adopted by UN General Assembly, 1946).

In 1947, the United States submitted a draft of resolution stating atomic explosive weapons, weapons with radioactive material, deadly chemical and biological weapons and any weapons that will develop in the future with characteristics that can be compared with an atomic bomb or other previously mentioned weapons. On the other hand, the USSR voted against, because it assessed the US definition as too narrow and stated that conventional bombs and rockets were used in World War II also represented weapons of mass destruction (Vulevic, et al. 2016:270).

In its original formulation, "weapons adaptable to mass destruction," the term appears in the very first resolution passed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1946. By 1948, an alternate form, "weapons of mass destruction," became the preferred usage. Already it was so integral to discussions of disarmament that the United Nations tasked a committee to generate an authoritative definition. That committee generated the following definition: WMD are atomic

explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above (Carus, S. 2012:5).

Despite the relative clarity of definition, multiple additional definitions have appeared during the years. Carus analyzed more than 50 definitions on WMD in order to identify their constituent elements. Most of them fall into one of six categories:

1. WMD as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC);
2. WMD as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN);
3. WMD as CBRN and high explosive weapons (CBRNE);
4. WMD as CBRN weapons capable of causing mass destruction or mass casualties;
5. WMD as weapons, including some CBRN weapons but not limited to CBRN, capable of causing mass destruction or mass casualties;
6. WMD as weapons of mass effect capable of causing mass destruction or mass casualties or that cause mass disruption (Carus, S. 2012:6).

As we can see, in all mentioned classification of WMD main elements are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and differences are reflected in whether WMD is limited only to this weapon or identifies other weapons such as explosive devices, i.e. WMD does not limit only to the aforementioned weapons. Thus leaving the possibility for the inclusion of new weapons whose use would lead to significant negative consequences and destruction.

Theoretical approach to the understanding of proliferation of WMD

In international security, the role of WMD is not understood uniquely, nor the consequences of further proliferation. On the one hand, it is widely accepted that nuclear weapons was an important factor in maintaining a long peace (or “nuclear peace”) between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Proponents of this view, mostly neorealist theoretic, predict that the future proliferation of nuclear weapons will have the similar “pacification effects”, which should be moderate and directed by large nuclear forces. This attitude, therefore, expresses optimism about existence and expansion nuclear weapons (“nuclear optimism”). On the other hand, it is also widely accepted the view that continuation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, and therefore, we should work to improve the international initiatives for this prevention. This opinion, which mostly advocated by liberally oriented theoreticians, represents pessimism in relation to the existence and spread of nuclear weapons (“nuclear pessimism”) (Novicic, 2005: 516). Therefore, we will analyze the basics of two main theoretical approach, neorealist and liberals regarding the use and proliferation of WMD. Certainly, these theoretical approaches are not the only ones dealing with WMD issues.

Conclusions on “nuclear peace” neo-realists derive from the structural theory of international politics. States operate in an anarchic international system. The absence of a central authority is considered to be the main reason to justify the inherent conflict nature of the international politics. In such a chaotic system, states should endeavor to have levels of power in order to

ensure achieving national interests of their respective countries (Rajmil, 2015:394). In an anarchical international system states are conditioned to rely on self-help in order to protect their sovereignty and national security. Because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, any state that seeks to maintain its national security must balance against any rival state that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent itself. This can produce two policies. First, strong states do what they can: they can pursue a form of internal balancing by adopting the costly, but self-sufficient, policy of developing their own nuclear weapons. Second, weak states do what they must: they can join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear retaliation by that ally as a means of extended deterrence. For such states, acquiring a nuclear ally may be the only option available, but the policy inevitably raises questions about the credibility of extended deterrence guarantees, since the nuclear power would also fear retaliation if it responded to an attack on its ally (Sagan, 1996/1997:57). States, therefore, in order to protect their security need to maximizing their military strength, if possible develop nuclear weapons which helps them to maintain the status quo, stabilizes the international system and deter war.

Waltz claims that probability of war between countries that possess nuclear weapons approaches zero, because the state will be deterred from the attack if it believes that there is the possibility that the enemy will return. According to Waltz, nuclear weapons, used responsibly, makes the beginning of wars very difficult, because the state who possess nuclear weapons have a strong incentive to use it responsibly (Waltz, 1981: 30). Waltz believe that there are seven reason of why states want nuclear weapons. These are: 1) imitation among the great powers; 2) doubt that the ally will not fulfill its allied obligation; 3) adversaries possesses nuclear weapons; 4) fear of the conventional power of the enemy; 5) nuclear weapons as a cheaper and safer alternative to running economically ruinous and militarily dangerous conventional arms races; 6) countries may want nuclear weapons for offensive purposes; 7) building nuclear weapons a country may hope to enhance its international standing (Walz, 1981:8-9). This vision has contributed to the development of the theory of deterrence what will be discussed below.

Liberal theorists believe that the proliferation of WMD contributes to international destabilization, therefore, the efforts of the international community should be directed towards its control and disarmament. Also institutions should change the character of the international environment by influencing the priorities and behavior of the state. Liberalism claim states cannot live in isolation hence emphasizes cooperation among nations. Cooperation is viewed answer to contemporary security challenges including nuclear proliferation. Global community's cooperation and efforts resulted in signing of the NPT. Moreover, creation of the NSG mechanism and IAEA led safeguards system which with the passage of time has become main hurdle in halting nuclear proliferation (Asfhaq, 2017:380).

One of the variants of international regimes that prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons is a concept of the so-called virtual or latent nuclear arsenals. The first idea of this kind was promoted by Jonathan Schell who believed in a world in which no one has military capabilities greater than near-nuclear military capability. Schell argued for a nuclear arms control policy in

which all nuclear weapons were verifiably dismantled and put under state control, although in crises, nuclear weapon states were allowed to reconstruct their nuclear arsenals with a lead-time of several weeks to several months (Shell, 1984: 118). The idea of a virtual or latent nuclear arsenals was also represented by Michael Mazar, who relied on arguments similar to the Schells. He alleged three major advantages of the virtual arsenal system: they would expel nuclear weapons to the margins of international politics; they would eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons being fired accidentally or without authorization; they would strengthen efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus help the solution regional problems (Mazar, 1995:10). Proponents of the idea of virtuous nuclear arsenals actually suggest replacing of deterrence of the second-strike force with "factory deterrence" or "weaponless deterrence". Alone the ability to make nuclear weapons would serve the purpose of deterrence (Novcic, 2005:521).

One of concept that had an enormous importance at international strategic level during the Cold War and who needs to be analyzed separately is the theory of nuclear deterrence. Many authors consider that the term deterrence is a product of nuclear age, although we can find of the idea of deterrence in the writings of Machiavelli, even though he never used that term. Maybe deterrence was the closest to legal philosophers to justify the punishment as a means of deterring people from criminal behavior. Although the term deterrence can be attributed to the threat of use of conventional weapons, it came into the focus of interest only when the risk of using nuclear weapon arised. Gorge and Smoke wrote that in its most general form, deterrence is the simply persuasion of one's opponent that the cost and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefit (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:344). Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff noticed that the theory of deterrence did not emerge suddenly. During the period when the US enjoy a monopoly on atomic weapons (1945-1949) there was no systematic strategy on deterrence and it was preceded by the policy of containment. It was under the certain developments in the early 1960s that Western analysis began to sharpen and redefine the theory of nuclear deterrence: Korean War, the growing awareness on two power that possess substantial arsenal of nuclear weapon *both atomic and thermonuclear) and apprehension that the Western countries were inferior to the communist bloc in conventional force (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:346). So strategists and policymakers anticipated the arrival of a technological condition in which both the US and the Soviet Union could launch a devastating nuclear second strike even after absorbing a massive nuclear first strike. Secure, second-strike forces would render defense impossible as neither state could physically protect from an attack. Consequently, both states would have to rely on deterrence to dissuade the other from attacking it be tempted to do so (Powell, 2003:88).

Like all forms of coercion and threat, it requires two elements: the credible capability to harm and the credible intent to carry out this harm. Kaufmann noted that deterrence consists of essentially two basic components: first, the expressed intention to defend a certain interest; secondly, the demonstrated capability actually to achieve the defense of the interest in question, or to inflict such a cost on the attacker that, even if he should be able to gain his end, it would not seem worth the effort to him (Kaufmann, 1958: 2). The deterrence as the possible

threat to inflict harm include not only ability to inflict harm, but the harm must be of sufficient magnitude to overcome potential gains from taking the action that is to be deterred. Also the deterrence need to include a credible reassurance (Long, 2008:10). But, the question that arises is how can a state credibly threaten to impose a strike that, if imposed, would subsequently result in its own destruction? The risk of accidental or inadvertent escalation to nuclear war is the key in solving the credibility problem. In a condition of mutual assured destruction, states cannot credibly threaten to launch a massive nuclear attack deliberately. But they may be able to credibly make "threats that leave something to chance" (Powell, 2003:89). Even today many theorist argue that deterrence during Cold war provided secure and they try to apply this concept to a modern world.

(Non) proliferation of WMD


In the international relations there are two opposing relationships in relation to WMD: processes of proliferation, expansion or spreading of WMD and processes of non-proliferation, reduction or decreasing of WMD. When it comes to the proliferation process, eight states have confirmed possession of WMD, and for one is presumed to own it, which implies that the "nuclear club" is made by nine states. Also, several states have aspirations to own WMD, or it is suspected that they secretly working on their nuclear programs.

The concept of WMD proliferation can be discussed through of vertical and horizontal dimension. The vertical proliferation implies an increase in the nuclear arsenal of those states who already are in possession of nuclear weapons. Horizontal proliferation involves an increase in members of a "nuclear club", or a number of nuclear-weapon states. Waltz prefers the term "spread rather than proliferation" because so far nuclear weapon have proliferated only vertically as the major nuclear powers have added to their arsenals. Horizontally, they have spread slowly across countries, and the pace is not likely to change much (Waltz, 1981:1).

The proliferation of WMD began in 1945 when US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the next 20 years, four countries have tested nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union, UK, France and China. Those five countries represent a recognized owner of nuclear weapons whose nuclear status had been confirmed by international agreements. Three more countries are de facto possessors of nuclear weapons, although their nuclear status haven't been recognized (i.e. allowed) by international agreements. Those are India, Pakistan and North Korea. India execute the first nuclear test in 1974, claiming that it serves for peacefully purpose. She publicly announced the possession of nuclear weapon in 1998. at the same time when her regional rival, Pakistan has performed the first nuclear test. North Korea had signed the NPT, but withdrew from it in January 2003, also is not a part of CTBT and conducted six sophisticated nuclear test since 2006. North Korea is not a part of CWC and it is believed to possess a large chemical weapons program. Although being a state party of BTWC, there are suspicious that North Korea also may maintain biological weapon program. In July 2017, North Korea successfully tested the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and in September 2017 it conducted a test of what it claimed was a thermonuclear weapon. Israel has never admitted or deny the possession of

WMD, but it is assumed that he develop it. Even so Israeli has never conducted a public nuclear test, it is believed that the “double flash” detected on 22 September 1979, by the American Vela satellite which carried various sensors designed specifically to detect nuclear explosions, represent the proof that Israel illegally preformed nuclear test. For those reason Israel is ranked as the ninth nuclear power (Picture 1).

Picture 1: Status of World Nuclear Forces



Source: Kristensen H., Korda, M. (2019) Status of World Nuclear Forces, Washington: Federation of American Scientist (FAS).

In the possession of nuclear weapons, there were officially four other countries. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they had destroyed strategic nuclear weapons and tactically returned to Russia. South Africa in 1993 announced that until 1989 had secretly produced six nuclear devices, but then dismantled it. A special group consists of “nuclear reversal states”. Nuclear reversal states refers to the phenomenon in which states embark on a path leading to nuclear weapons acquisition, but subsequently reverse course, though not necessarily abandoning altogether their nuclear ambitions (Levite, 2002/2003:61). The list of these states is long, and some of them are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany and Yugoslavia.

Over the years, it has been suspected that some countries have tried to secretly develop nuclear weapons, including Iran, Iraq and Syria. Iraq has begun the development of a nuclear program before the First Gulf War (1991), but was forced to dismantle it under the supervision of the UN Inspector. The occupation of Iraq by the US and its allies in 2003 due to the never proven possession of weapons of mass destruction, has ended Iraq’s aspirations for nuclear weapons for now. Syria was also suspected of developing a nuclear program, and doubts were raised after 2007 and an Israeli airstrike of what was suspected to be an undeclared plutonium production reactor. IAEA attempts to investigate the country’s nuclear program have been hindered by limited Syrian cooperation and the ongoing civil war. Iran is also suspected of developing secretly

on a nuclear program. Iran shows willingness to cooperate, reflected through allowing IAEA inspections and signing agreements. Accordingly, in 2015 Iran has agreed a long term deal on its nuclear program with a group of world powers known as P5+1: the US, China, UK, France, Russia and Germany called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action-JCPA.

Proliferation of WMD as we explain, represents the spread of technologies, materials, knowledge and expertise that pay assist in the production of WMD. The opposite process is **non-proliferation**, that include a numerous of mutually reinforcing elements design to provide assurance that the use of nuclear energy, chemical and biological agents won't contribute to the proliferation of WMD. Arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament share a common origins in post-World War II efforts to control atomic energy. Arms control aims to limit the number of weapons and to regulate their use by virtue of bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements. Disarmament involves the reduction or elimination of armaments and prohibition against their future production. So, disarmament may be partial if include a specific weapon system or complete (Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:374). Along with the proliferation of nuclear weapon, at international level "the regime" of prevention of this phenomenon was created. Nonproliferation includes a network of international treats, internal legislation, bilateral, regional and multilateral verification systems, positive and negative guarantees of security, economic sanctions, control technology and nuclear-weapon-free zones (Novcic, 2005:510-511).

The first nonproliferation contract Partial Test Ban Treaty - PTBT (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water) was signed in 1963 between the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom who have agreed about the future execution of nuclear explosions just underground.

It is considered that Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has the most prominent place in the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. This treat recognize that proliferation of nuclear weapons could enhance the danger of nuclear war. Objective of this treaty is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT has become and remains an essential pillar of international peace and security, and the heart of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States-US, Russia, China, UK and France. North Korea has withdrawal from the treaty in 2003.

In addition to the three elements of which includes, non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy, the NPT establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The NPT promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use. The provisions of the NPT envisage a review of the operation of the NPT every five years. The 2015 Review

Conference of the Parties to the NPT, ended without the adoption of a consensus substantive outcome. That is a setback for the strengthened review process, and the preparatory process for the 2020 Review Conference is currently underway.


A number of bilateral, multilateral treaties have been established with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation and testing, while promoting progress in nuclear disarmament. Some of those important WMD instruments are:

1. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I - **SALT I** in 1972 (between the USA and USSR on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms);
2. Biological Weapons Convention - **BWC** in 1972 (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction);
3. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treat - **ABM** in 1972 (between the USA and USSR on Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems);
4. Threshold Test Ban Treaty - **TTBT** in 1974 (between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests);
5. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II - **SALT II** in 1978 (between the USA and USSR on the limitation of strategic offensive arms);
6. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty - **INF** in 1987 (between the USA and USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles);
7. Missile Technology Control Regime - **MTCR** in 1987 (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States with an interim agreement to control nuclear-capable ballistic missiles);
8. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty **START I** in 1991 (between the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms);
9. Chemical Weapons Convention - **CWC** in 1993 (The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction);
10. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - **START II**, in 1993 (between the USA and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms);
11. Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty - **CTBT** in 1996 (US and China are the only remaining NPT Nuclear Weapon States that have not ratified the CTBT)
12. Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty - **SORT** in 2002 (Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions)
13. Hague Code of Conduct - **HCOC** in 2002 (International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) (Newman, 2007, Novicic 2005).

The existing non-proliferation mechanisms are constantly being promoted and new contracts are formulated. The latest development is Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), opened for signature in 2017 but has yet to enter into force. As a result of all these international initiatives and interstate efforts, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined significantly since the Cold War: down from a peak of approximately 70,300 in 1986 to an estimated 13,890 in early-2019. Government officials often portray that accomplishment

as a result of current or recent arms control agreements, but the overwhelming portion of the reduction happened in the 1990s. Some also compare today's numbers with that of the 1950s, but that is like comparing apples and oranges; today's forces are vastly more capable. The pace of reduction has slowed significantly compared with the 1990s. Instead of planning for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-armed states appear to plan to retain large arsenals for the indefinite future, are adding new nuclear weapons, and are increasing the role that such weapons play in their national strategies (Kristensen, Korda, 2019) (Picture 2).

Picture 2: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945-2019



Source: Kristensen H., Korda, M. (2019) Status of World Nuclear Forces, Washington: Federation of American Scientist (FAS).

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones - The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975) defines a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as "any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

- a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined,
- b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute" (Resolution 3472B, 1975:24).
Treaties established 9 nuclear-weapon-free areas that include:
 1. Five zones: Latin America and the Caribbean (1967), South Pacific (1985), Southeast Asia (1995), African (1996) and Central Asia zone (2006) and
 2. Four nuclear-weapon-free geographical regions: Mongolia (1992), Antarctica (1959), Space (1967), Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor (1971) (UNODA, 2010).

WMD as an asymmetric threat

The terrorist attack on the US in 2001, marks a milestone in the development (actualization) of the concept of asymmetry. In the event of this attack, this new concept arose the interest of the broader scientific community, primarily because it was essential to find an explanation for this distinct constellation of forces between state and non-state actors (Ćurčić, 2018:23). Analyzing the literature on security threats we can notice which threats are dominantly labeled as asymmetric threats: terrorism, the use of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the threats that inflict information technology (cyber threats). As we mentioned previously, during the Cold War WMD represented a very serious threat, whose deadliness was a cause for serious concern. At that time, WMD was qualified as a means of deterrence, not as an asymmetric threat.

Precisely, during the Cold War, the only actors in international relations were states. Consequently, only the states could be in possession of WMD. The balance of power, as a guarantor of international stability, was established between nuclear states. Also, this period of bipolarity is considered the most stable system. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union influenced the emergence of a unipolar world that led the US as the only super power. Over time, a new actor in international relations emerged, a non-state actor. The non-state actor represents a weaker actor in conflict with powerful states. In order to achieve his goals, they resorted to the use of asymmetric means, such as terrorism. However, over time, a fear that non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, could get into possession of WMD arised. The potential consequences of such a situation have led the UN to adopt UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). In this resolution non-state actor had been defined as individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution. The Security Council decided that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes. The resolution requires all States to adopt and enforce appropriate laws to this effect as well as other effective measures to prevent the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery to non-State actors, in particular for terrorist purposes (Resolution 1540:2004).

There is a growing fear in the international community that non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, could get into possession of WMD either by developing it or by buying other states. Although it is known that non-state creators used biological and chemical weapons during the 1980s and afterwards striving to acquire nuclear power, this concern became accentuated after 9/11. In order to understand this threat in real terms, it is necessary to analyze five factors. They include collective motives (whether they are religious terrorists), their methods (whether they are prone to mass killings) access to nuclear material, money needed to purchase nuclear material and necessary expertise in the production and use of such weapons (Sidhu, 2012:470).

Nevertheless, although there is a fear of nuclear terrorism, it is more likely that attacks of by using radiological bursts (dirty bombs - a compound of conventional weapons with other

radioactive materials used for industrial or medical purposes) will occur. During the explosion, the radioactive material spills on a large surface, which is particularly dangerous in urban areas that are densely populated.

Conclusion

In the post-Cold War period we distinguish at least four groups of actors when it comes to WMD. The first group consists of the states that are signatories of the NPT and which are within the framework of the regime of non-proliferation of WMD. Although there is no doubt that these five nuclear forces have reduced their nuclear arsenals, the lack of transparency makes it impossible to assess whether these reductions are correct and irreversible. Also, there is always fear that these countries will withdraw from existing agreements and strengthen their nuclear programs. The second group consists of nuclear states that are not signatories of the agreement and therefore do not respect the provisions derived from these agreements. The unpredictability of their actions, the lack of information on their nuclear programs, create the great concern in the international community. The third group consists of countries that secretly develop nuclear projects about which other states do not have any knowledge. The fourth group consists of non-existent actors who pretend to be in possession of WMD and who are believed to really use these weapons.

All of these groups of actors pose a particular threat to international security, if we agree with liberal theorists. On the other hand, realists believe that nuclear deterrence modified in modern conditions can become a guarantee of security, but also of the stability of the international order. So the burning question remains whether the WMD represents a threat or a chance for security. It is certainly a threat if it comes into possession of an actor who does not hesitate to use it. At the same time presents a chance if it can provide a balance for the multipolar international system.

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NATIONAL PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE - A CONDITION FOR PROVIDING A COORDINATED APPROACH IN ESTABLISHING NATIONAL GOALS AND PRIORITIES FOR PROTECTING KEY RESOURCES

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Abstract: The National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure, created on the basis of specific sector support plans, will provide continuously secure basic services to the nation and the community.

Consequently, proactive and coordinated efforts through various means, networks and systems to strengthen the safe functioning, maintain and strengthen their resistance are vital to public confidence and the security, prosperity and well-being of the nation.

Critical infrastructure is diverse and complex, from organizational structures, models, distribution networks and interdependent functions of systems, both in physical space and in cyberspace, which includes respect for a variety of regulations on all fields.

Critical infrastructure must be safe and able to withstand the various effects of all hazards on national security, economic stability, public health or a combination of these and rapid recovery. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to integrate the national system for prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery in order to reduce vulnerability, minimize the consequences, identify and anticipate threats.

The aim of this paper is to determine the legal position or the gap with experience and good practice in the developed countries to offer a model of protection of the critical infrastructure in the Republic of North Macedonia.

Keywords: Critical infrastructure, National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Specific Sector Support Plans, Key Resources

Introduction

Modern trends at new techniques and technologies provide a much easier flow of information, goods, people, which increases the vulnerability to national security of the community. On the other hand, climate change, the destructive effect of man in nature, cause reduces resistance to natural and technical-technological disasters. New threats such as migration crises, cyber-crime, extreme terrorism and hybrid threats are demanding new mechanisms and models to strengthen the critical infrastructure security in order to preserve the integrity, security and social and economic stability of the community.

By analyzing the models for protecting critical infrastructure and experiences in developed countries, we will consider the benefits that can be applied in creating policies and strategies for protecting critical infrastructure in the Republic of North Macedonia.

1. Terminology, definition and infrastructure division

The term "infrastructure" was first introduced in the 19th century by Swiss military theorist Antoine-Henry Jomini, who potentiates the strategic and operational significance of the leadership of the military actions. By the middle of the 20th century, the term "infrastructure" is a military term that denotes the territorial organization of the system for maintaining and functioning of the army. Later "infrastructure" begins to be used in economic theory and in management theory. Currently, it is widely applied in the computer science, economic geography and security researc

There are many definitions of the term infrastructure. Among them are:

Infrastructure is a basic physical and organizational structure that needs of a society, environment, organization or institution to function smoothly within its frameworks.

Infrastructure is a set of interconnected structural elements that provide a framework for support for the overall functioning of one community.

In **civilian terms, infrastructure** is defined as a term for which is made partial assessment of the development of a country.

From **a functional point of view, infrastructure** facilitates the production and distribution of goods and services to consumers (roads, plumbing, electricity, etc.), as well as enabling the use of basic social services (schools, ambulances, etc.).

The infrastructure can be divided into:

Rigid (heavy, physical) infrastructure - refers to large physical networks that are need for the functioning of a country, institution, organization, etc.

The rigid infrastructure is divided into:

- transport (streets, roads, bridges, tunnels, airports, ports, canals, etc.),
- energy (electricity network, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, lines for transportation of ore, etc.),
- water supply network (sewage network, sewerage, sewage drainage, etc.) and
- communication (Internet, telephony, television, etc.).

Soft (service) infrastructure - refers to all institutions that are needed to maintain economic, health and cultural and social standards of a state. Soft infrastructure includes physical assets such as highly specialized facilities and equipment, rules and regulations that regulate various systems, the financing of these systems, and so on.

The soft infrastructure can be divided into:

- state (state institutions, judiciary, police, fire protection, etc.),
- economic (economic zones, financial and banking systems, etc.),
- social (health care, school system, social networks, etc.),
- cultural, sports and recreational (parks, museums, libraries, tourist facilities, etc.) and
- military infrastructure.

The term **military infrastructure** is used for all built and permanent installations necessary for the smooth operation and support of the military forces whether they are in the barracks, whether they are deployed in another country or perform certain operations.

The term Key Resources - refers on publicly or privately controlled resources essential for minimal business operations of the economy and the government.

2. Appearance and models for assessing the protection of critical infrastructure

At the end of the 20th century, the term critical infrastructure protection (CCI) emerged, which constitutes an essential component of the security policy of many countries, especially in the NATO and EU member states.

The protection of critical infrastructure is connected, on the one hand, with the processes of globalization, and on the other, with the fight against international terrorism.

There is a direct link between the threat of terrorism and the protection of critical infrastructure.

The immediate cause of activating the critical infrastructure protection policy is the terrorist attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001, as well as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.

The second main reason is the development and control of major infrastructure projects for the transfer of oil, gas and other strategic raw materials.

2.1. Models for assessing and protecting critical infrastructure in the US, UK and Canada

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, critical infrastructure protection is becoming a top priority. Initially, this activity is being implemented by the FBI National Infrastructure Protection Center. In 2002, the critical infrastructure protection is carried out by the **Department of Homeland Security (DHS)** and is regulated by the Homeland Security Act. Most of the obligations are implemented by the Directorate for "Information Analysis and Protection of Infrastructure" within the Ministry of Homeland Security.

The Department of Homeland Security in collaboration with other owners and operators of critical infrastructure should develop a unique methodology for identifying objects, sys-

tems and functions with criticality from the national level in order to establish the protection priorities and build a complete database of these critical objects, systems and functions.

After drawing up the list, a process of assessment of each element is carried out by teams of experts which carry out field research on individual elements. Annually in the United States estimates are made at about 300 sites of critical infrastructure.

In the UK, critical infrastructure protection activities are carried out by two organizations: **The Governmental Coordination Center for National Infrastructure Security** and **The Advisory Council on Information Security** (it is a public-private organization). United Kingdom, unlike the United States, has no full conception of the assessment and protection of critical infrastructure. This activity is implemented by the existing Ministries in their own departments with coordinated activity of the mentioned authorities.

In Canada within the Ministry of Defense in 2000 was established an expert group for the protection of critical infrastructure, carrying out a comprehensive overview of the national critical infrastructure. At the same time, Canada has a private organization, **CANCERT (Canadian Computer Emergency Response Team)**, which focuses its activities on protecting critical infrastructure information.

3. Analyzing EU normative documents and EU policy on the protection of critical infrastructure

EU policy of the protection of critical infrastructure is developing very dynamically after 2004 in the context of the fight against international terrorism. From an institutional point of view, the EU's policy of protecting critical infrastructure is coordinated by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security.

In November 2005. The European Commission accepts so-called "The Green Paper for the European Program for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure" and for the first time at Community level defines the term "critical infrastructure" as a system of facilities, services and information systems, whose braking, defect functioning or destruction would be severely negative impact on the health and safety of the population, the environment, the national economy or the efficient functioning of the state administration. Apart from the term "national critical infrastructure", the authors of the Green Paper promote the term "European critical infrastructure".

Based on the Green Paper in 2006, the EU launched the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), and in the process of developing the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information System (CIWIN).

The other key EU policy paper on critical infrastructure protection is the proposal for a Council Directive from December 2006 on the recognition and establishment of European critical infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve its protection.

The Directive establishes a new list and recommends a list of sectors of critical infrastructure. The following sectors are listed: Energy Sector; Sector black industry; Sector for Information and Communication Technologies; Water Supply Sector; Food Insurance Sector; Health Sector; Sector Finance; Transport Sector; Sector for the chemical industry; Space Capacity and

Scientific Capacity. This list of sectors is not final and subject to specification. EU regulations includes significant number of directives and provisions for activities in 5 of the critical infrastructure sectors - information technology, health, transport, chemical and nuclear sectors. These regulations provide measures for protection of the relevant sector, but there are no criteria for assessing the criticality of infrastructure facilities in the sectors. EU sectoral laws have a bearing on the development of disaster protection plans faster.

4. National Security Policy and Building Resilience to Critical Infrastructure

National Security Policy and Building Resilience to Critical Infrastructure is the first step of the community to counter the physical and cyber threats. This policy clearly defines and establishes responsibility among national, regional and local entities and “owners” of public and private critical infrastructure and operators. The policy points to a clear link between the structures mentioned above, their function, roles and responsibilities in order to enhance the security and resilience of national essential functions.

Through policy, it is necessary to analyze all threats that can affect national critical infrastructure, economic stability, public health and safety, and their combination. A great effort is being made to reduce vulnerability, minimize the consequences, identify new risks, enhance response, and recovery.

Three important strategic priorities are imperative in the policy:

- clear functional realities and links between government departments and a mutually united effort in the security and resilience of critical infrastructure;
- enabling efficient exchange of information by identifying the base data and requests for the Government; and
- conducting an integrated and analytical function in informing for planning decisions and undertaking activities related to critical infrastructure.

In order to implement this policy, it has to implement of international regulation in national legal solutions.

In principle, it is useful one agency or line ministry to play the role of a national coordinator, which includes:

- Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure, considering physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, in coordination with Agency and other national departments and agencies;
- Maintain national critical infrastructure centers that shall provide a situational awareness capability that includes integrated, actionable information about emerging trends, imminent threats, and the status of incidents that may impact critical infrastructure;
- In coordination with Agency and other national departments and agencies, provide analysis, expertise, and other technical assistance to critical infrastructure owners and operators and facilitate access to and exchange of information and intelligence necessary to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure;

- Conduct comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the Nation’s critical infrastructure in coordination with the Agency and in collaboration with regional and local entities and critical infrastructure owners and operators;
- Coordinate National Government responses to significant cyber or physical incidents affecting critical infrastructure consistent with statutory authorities;
- Support the Attorney General and law enforcement agencies with their responsibilities to investigate and prosecute threats to and attacks against critical infrastructure;
- Coordinate with and utilize the expertise of Agency and other appropriate National departments and agencies to map geospatially, image, analyze, and sort critical infrastructure by employing commercial satellite and airborne systems, as well as existing capabilities within other departments and agencies; and
- Report annually on the status of national critical infrastructure efforts as required by statute.

4.1. Sector-Specific Agencies

Each critical infrastructure sector has unique characteristics, operating models, and risk profiles that benefit from an identified Sector-Specific Agency that has institutional knowledge and specialized expertise about the sector. Recognizing existing statutory or regulatory authorities of specific National departments and agencies, and leveraging existing sector familiarity and relationships, Sector-Specific Agency shall carry out the following roles and responsibilities for their respective sectors:

1. As part of the broader national effort to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, coordinate with the National Agency/ Ministry and other relevant national departments and agencies and collaborate with critical infrastructure owners and operators, where appropriate with independent regulatory agencies, and with regional and local entities;
2. Serve as a day-to-day national interface for the dynamic prioritization and coordination of sector-specific activities;
3. Carry out incident management responsibilities consistent with statutory authority and other appropriate policies, directives, or regulations;
4. Provide, support, or facilitate technical assistance and consultations for that sector to identify vulnerabilities and help mitigate incidents, as appropriate; and
5. Support the Head / or other person from Agency/ Ministry statutorily required reporting requirements by providing on an annual basis sector-specific critical infrastructure information.

The term “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) means the Federal department or agency designated under this directive to be responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and

associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment.

5. National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection - Model of the US Department of Homeland Security

The National Plan takes into account the varying risk management perspectives of the public and private sectors, where government and private industry have aligned, but not identical, interests in securing critical infrastructure and making it more resilient. It leverages comparative advantages of both the private and public sectors to the mutual benefit of all. The National Plan is organized in the following manner:

1. Vision, Mission, and Goals – Outlines the vision, mission, and goals for the critical infrastructure community.
2. Critical Infrastructure Environment – Describes the policy, risk, and operating environments, as well as the partnership structure within which the community undertakes efforts to achieve goals aimed at strengthening security and resilience.
3. Core Tenets – Describes the principles and assumptions that underpin this National Plan.
4. Collaborating to Manage Risk – Describes a common framework for risk management activities conducted by the critical infrastructure community in the context of national preparedness.
5. Call to Action – Calls upon the critical infrastructure community (respective of authorities, responsibilities, and business environments) to take cross-cutting, proactive, and coordinated actions that support collective efforts to strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience in the coming years.

5.1. Vision, Mission, and Goals

- Vision - A Nation in which physical and cyber critical infrastructure remain secure and resilient, with vulnerabilities reduced, consequences minimized, threats identified and disrupted, and response and recovery hastened.
- Mission - Strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure, by managing physical and cyber risks through the collaborative and integrated efforts of the critical infrastructure community.
- Goals
- Access and analyze threats to, vulnerabilities of, and consequences to critical infrastructure to inform risk management activities;
- Secure critical infrastructure against human, physical, and cyber threats through sustainable efforts to reduce risk, while accounting for the costs and benefits of security investments;

- Enhance critical infrastructure resilience by minimizing the adverse consequences of incidents through advance planning and mitigation efforts, and employing effective responses to save lives and ensure the rapid recovery of essential services;
- Share actionable and relevant information across the critical infrastructure community to build awareness and enable risk informed decision making; and
- Promote learning and adaptation during and after exercises and incidents.

5.2. Critical Infrastructure Environment

5.2.1. Key Concepts

The key concepts described below provide context for this critical infrastructure environment. An understanding of these key concepts influences the state of critical infrastructure and shapes the community's approach to ensuring security and resilience.

- Critical infrastructure represents "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the community that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters."² The National Plan acknowledges that the Nation's critical infrastructure is largely owned and operated by the private sector; however, national and regional and local governments also own and operate critical infrastructure, as do foreign entities and companies.
- Security as "reducing the risk to critical infrastructure by physical means or defens[ive] cyber measures to intrusions, attacks, or the effects of natural or manmade disasters." There are several elements of securing critical infrastructure systems, including addressing threats and vulnerabilities and sharing accurate information and analysis on current and future risks. Prevention and protection activities contribute to strengthening critical infrastructure security.
- Resilience, is "the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions...[it] includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents." Having accurate information and analysis about risk is essential to achieving resilience. Resilient infrastructure assets, systems, and networks must also be robust, agile, and adaptable. Mitigation, response, and recovery activities contribute to strengthening critical infrastructure resilience.
- Security and resilience are strengthened through risk management. Risk refers to the "potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood [a function of threats and vulnerabilities] and the associated consequences;" risk management is the "process of identifying, analyzing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring, or controlling it to an acceptable level at an acceptable cost."³
- Partnerships enable more effective and efficient risk management. Within the context of this National Plan, a partnership is defined as close cooperation between parties having common interests in achieving a shared vision. For the critical infrastructure community,

leadership involvement, open communication, and trusted relationships are essential elements to partnership.

2 USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 1016(e). 3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Risk Lexicon – 2010 Edition, September 2010, <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf>

5.2.2. Risk Environment

The risk environment affecting critical infrastructure is complex and uncertain; threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences have all evolved over the last 10 years. For example, critical infrastructure that has long been subject to risks associated with physical threats and natural disasters is now increasingly exposed to cyber risks, which stems from growing integration of information and communications technologies with critical infrastructure operations and an adversary focus on exploiting potential cyber vulnerabilities.

The Strategic National Risk Assessment⁴ (SNRA) defines numerous threats and hazards to homeland security in the broad categories of adversarial/human-caused, natural, and technological/ accidental threats. Critical assets, systems, and networks face many of the threats categorized by the SNRA, including terrorists and other actors seeking to cause harm and disrupt essential services through physical and cyber attacks, severe weather events, pandemic influenza or other health crises, and the potential for accidents and failures due to infrastructure operating beyond its intended lifespan. The potential for interconnected events with unknown consequences adds uncertainty in addition to the known risks analyzed as part of the SNRA. It also identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors:

- Chemical
- Commercial Facilities
- Communications
- Critical Manufacturing
- Dams
- Defense Industrial Base
- Emergency Services
- Energy
- Financial Services
- Food and Agriculture
- Government Facilities
- Healthcare and Public Health
- Information Technology
- Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste
- Transportation Systems
- Water and Wastewater Systems

5.2.3. Policy Environment

The National Plan is aligned with the goal of National Preparedness, of “a secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.” These five mission areas are central to a comprehensive approach for enhancing national preparedness and critical infrastructure risk management activities across all five mission areas contribute to achieving the National Preparedness Goal. In addition, the National Plan is con-

sistent with the National Planning Frameworks and Interagency Operational Plans developed pursuant to National Preparedness. The scope of the National Plan is not meant to and does not alter the implementation and execution of prevention activities, as described in the Prevention Federal Interagency Operational Plan. The National Plan scope comprises activities that often support and abut prevention activities designed to avoid, prevent, or stop an imminent threat or actual attacks.

5.2.4. Operating Environment

The Nation's critical infrastructure has become much more interdependent, continuing to move from an operating environment characterized by disparate assets, systems, and networks to one in which cloud computing, mobile devices, and wireless connectivity have dramatically changed the way infrastructure is operated. Interdependencies may be operational (e.g., power required to operate a water pumping station) or physical (e.g., collocated infrastructure, such as water and electric lines running under a bridge span). Interdependencies may be limited to small urban or rural areas or span vast regions, crossing jurisdictional and national boundaries, including infrastructure that require accurate and precise positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) data. PNT services are critical to the operations of multiple critical infrastructure sectors and are vital to incident response.

5.2.5. Partnership Structure

Voluntary collaboration between private sector owners and operators (including their partner associations, vendors, and others) and their government counterparts has been and will remain the primary mechanism for advancing collective action toward national critical infrastructure security and resilience. The Federal Government must make economic calculations of risk while also considering many non-economic values, such as privacy concerns, when addressing its role in national and homeland security. As a result, government may have a lower tolerance for security risk than a commercial entity. Both perspectives are legitimate, but in a world in which reliance on critical infrastructure is shared by industry and government and where industry may be on the front lines of national defense, such as in a cyber attack, a sustainable partnership must be developed to address both perspectives.

The National Plan organizes critical infrastructure into 16 sectors and designates a Federal department or agency as the lead coordinator—Sector-Specific Agency (SSA)—for each sector (refer to Appendix B for the roles and responsibilities of SSAs). The sector and cross-sector partnership council structures described in previous NIPPs remain the foundation for this National Plan.

5.3. Core Tenets

The National Plan establishes seven core tenets, representing the values and assumptions the critical infrastructure community should consider (at the national, regional, local, and owner and operator levels) when planning for critical infrastructure security and resilience.

1. Risk should be identified and managed in a coordinated and comprehensive way across the critical infrastructure community to enable the effective allocation of security and resilience resources.
2. Understanding and addressing risks from cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies is essential to enhancing critical infrastructure security and resilience.
3. Gaining knowledge of infrastructure risk and interdependencies requires information sharing across the critical infrastructure community
4. The partnership approach to critical infrastructure security and resilience recognizes the unique perspectives and comparative advantages of the diverse critical infrastructure community.
5. Regional and local partnerships are crucial to developing shared perspectives on gaps and actions to improve critical infrastructure security and resilience.
6. Infrastructure critical to the United States transcends national boundaries, requiring cross-border collaboration, mutual assistance, and other cooperative agreements.
7. Security and resilience should be considered during the design of assets, systems, and networks.

5.4. Collaborating To Manage Risk

The national effort to strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience depends on the ability of public and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators to make risk-informed decisions on the most effective solutions available when allocating limited resources in both steady-state and crisis operations. Therefore, risk management is the cornerstone of the National Plan and is relevant at the national, regional, State, and local levels. National, regional, and local resilience depend upon creating and maintaining sustainable, trusted partnerships between the public and private sector. While individual entities are responsible for managing risk to their organization, partnerships improve understanding of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences and how to manage them through the sharing of indicators and practices and the coordination of policies, response, and recovery activities. Critical infrastructure partners manage risks based on diverse commitments to community, focus on customer welfare, and corporate governance structures. Risk tolerances will vary from organization to organization, as well as sector to sector, depending on business plans, resources, operating structure, and regulatory environments. They also differ between the private sector and the government based on underlying constraints. Different entities are likely to have different priorities with respect to security investment as well as potentially differing judgments as to what the appropriate point of risk tolerance may be. Private sector organizations generally can increase investments to meet their risk tolerances and provide for their community of stakeholders, but investments in security and resilience have legitimate limits. The government must provide for national security and public safety and operates with a different set of limits in doing so. Finding the appropriate value proposition among the partners requires understanding these differing perspectives and

how they may affect efforts to set joint priorities. Within these parameters, critical infrastructure security and resilience depend on applying risk management practices of both industry and government, coupled with available resources and incentives, to guide and sustain efforts.

Specifically, the three elements of critical infrastructure (physical, cyber, and human) are explicitly identified and should be integrated throughout the steps of the framework, as appropriate. In addition, the updated framework consolidates the number of steps or “chevrons” by including prioritization with the implementation of risk management activities. Prioritization of risk mitigation options is an integral part of the decision-making process to select the risk management activities to be implemented. Finally, a reference to the feedback loop is removed and instead, the framework now depicts the importance of information sharing throughout the entire risk management process. Information is shared through each step of the framework, to include the “measure effectiveness” step, facilitating feedback and enabling continuous improvement of critical infrastructure security and resilience efforts.




Figure 1 – Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework.

The critical infrastructure risk management framework is designed to provide flexibility for use in all sectors, across different geographic regions, and by various partners. It can be tailored to dissimilar operating environments and applies to all threats and hazards. The risk management framework is intended to complement and support completion of the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process as conducted by regional, SLTT, and urban area jurisdictions to establish capability priorities.⁸⁵

The critical infrastructure community shares information throughout the steps of the risk management framework to document and build upon best practices and lessons learned and help identify and fill gaps in security and resilience efforts. It is essential for the community to share risk information, also known as risk communication, which is defined as the exchange of information with the goal of improving risk understanding, affecting risk perception, and/or equipping people or groups to act appropriately in response to an identified risk.

Critical infrastructure risks can be assessed in terms of the following:

- Threat – natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property.

⁸⁵ Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, Second Edition cites infrastructure owners and operators as sources of threat and hazard information and as valuable partners when completing the THIRA process.

- Vulnerability – physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard.
- Consequence – effect of an event, incident, or occurrence.

Decision makers prioritize activities to manage critical infrastructure risk based on the criticality of the affected infrastructure, the costs of such activities, and the potential for risk reduction. Some risk management activities address multiple aspects of risk, while others are more targeted to address specific threats, vulnerabilities, or potential consequences. These activities can be divided into the following approaches:

- Identify, Deter, Detect, Disrupt, and Prepare for Threats and Hazards
- Reduce Vulnerabilities
- Mitigate Consequences

5.5. Call to Action: Steps to Advance The National Effort

This Call to Action guides efforts to achieve national goals aimed at enhancing national critical infrastructure security and resilience. These activities will be performed collaboratively by the critical infrastructure community. Federal departments and agencies, engaging with SLTT, regional, and private sector partners—taking into consideration the unique risk management perspectives, priorities, and resource constraints of each sector—will work together to promote continuous improvement of security and resilience efforts to accomplish the tasks below. The actions listed in this section are not intended to be exhaustive nor is it anticipated that every sector will take every action. Instead, this section is intended as a roadmap to guide national progress while allowing for differing priorities in different sectors. As such, the actions listed below provide strategic direction for national efforts in the coming years. Call-out boxes throughout this section identify linkages between the Call to Action activities and the national goals presented in section 2.

It include:

- Build upon Partnership Efforts:
- Innovate in Managing Risk:
- Focus on Outcomes:

6. Special Sector Plans

Each sector agency has developed a specific plan detailing the application of the NIPP framework to the unique characteristics and risk of their sector.

Special Sector Plans (SSPs) provide the way NIPP is implemented in all key infrastructure and key resources (CICRs) sectors as well as the national framework for each sector to respond to its unique characteristics and risk. This coordinated approach applies federal resources and resources in the most effective way to manage risk.

Sector - Specific Agency	Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Sector
Department of Agriculture Department of Health and Human Services	Agriculture and Food
Department of Defense	Defense Industrial Base
Department of Energy	Energy
Department of Health and Human Services	Public Health and Healthcare
Department of the Interior	National Monuments and Icons
Department of the Treasury	Banking and Finance
Environment Protection Agency	Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems
Department of Homeland Security Office of Infrastructure Protection	Chemical Commercial Facilities Dams Emergency Services Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
Department of Homeland Security Office of Cyber Security and Telecommunications	Information Technology Communications
Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration	Postal and Shipping
Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration United States Coast Guard	Transportation Systems
Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Protective Service	Government Facilities

Table I. Sector- Specific Agency - Critical Infrastructure/Key resources Sector

As part of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the public and private sector partners in each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors and the state, local, tribal, and territorial government community have developed a Sector-Specific Plan that focuses on the unique operating conditions and risk landscape within that sector. Developed in close collaboration with federal agencies and private sector partners, the Sector-Specific Plans are updated every four years to ensure that each sector is adjusting to the ever-evolving risk landscape.

SSPs are tailored to address the unique characteristics and risk landscapes of each sector while also providing consistency for protective programs, public and private protection investments, and resources:

- Define sector security partners, authorities, regulatory bases, roles and responsibilities, and interdependencies;
- Establish or institutionalize already existing procedures for sector interaction, information sharing, coordination, and partnership;

- Establish the goals and objectives, developed collaboratively with security partners, required to achieve the desired protective posture for the sector;
- Identify international considerations; and
- Identify the sector-specific approach or methodology that Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other security partners, will use to implement risk management framework activities consistent with the NIPP.

7. Conclusion

Republic of North Macedonia has not yet established a critical infrastructure regulation, for many reasons:

- which institution to be competent,
- does that institution have staff and facilities to bring and solve all issues,
- existing methodologies of risk assessment is not an appropriate (one from CMC, one from PRD)
- existing Plan for protection and rescue from natural and other disasters are not national in the right sense, it is more institutional,
- overlapping in regulation from different entities

We can conclude that is good opportunity to make clarify and finally to make more effort in prepare policy of critical infrastructure, new regulation, use the best practices for planning process, with clear rules and responsibilities, with unique approach on national, regional and local level with good cooperation and collaboration with private business sector and operators. It is good opportunity to separate prevention and preparedness in existing documents with amending or prepare a new. Plan for protection and rescue will be good to divide in two separate national plans, one for protection of critical infrastructure and another for preparedness, emergency response plan. In this case will be more easy to coordinate and collaborate in two deferent scopes, prevention and preparedness. This is necessary, to integrate the national system for prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery in order to reduce vulnerability, minimize the consequences, identify and anticipate threats.

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