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BETWEEN CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND NEO-ORTHODOXY – TRANSFORMATIONS, IDENTITIES AND CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL ELITES IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE

INTRODUCTION

Interest for the past, ancient symbols, and traditions, represents a remarkable feature of various civilizations and historical periods. Deferent researchers in the fields of philosophy, psychology¹ and related social sciences have argued

¹ Janet Coleman, *Ancient and medieval memories: studies in the reconstruction of the past*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992), p.600-614

in favour of a close link between this affinity and the underlying processes of human self-awareness and self-consciousness.²

The analyses of sociologists, anthropologists and historians have additionally noted that references to cultural, social and societal achievements and traditions are closely connected with the process of self-identification and the urge for legitimacy of the positions or aspirations of individuals and groups in a given society and the wider environment.³ In this regard, the conclusion of Professor Thomas W. Smith is very illustrative, unambiguous and worth mentioning. In his broader analysis of the relationship of history and international relations, Smith concludes that “people in power invariably espouse a certain view (version) of history.”⁴

This particular set of reasons and dynamics is to blame for the almost inevitable link between various forms of societal and intellectual activity, including scientific research of the past and cultures, as well as creative and artistic research, re-creations and the inspirations from them in arts and culture, with the political

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- 2 The ontological relationship between history and identity has been analyzed by many authors and in different epochs. One of the influential and notable analyses of this topic is the essay “On Use and Abuse of History for Life” by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. This essay represents important critique of historicism, which, interestingly enough, comes from a classical philologist in the epoch when historicism and influence of history on society is most thriving in Germany and Europe. Yet, besides his critique of historicism, and more importantly in this context, Nietzsche in this essay instigates philosophical analysis on the interactive relationship between history and the needs, aspirations and identity of individuals, giving suggestions and recommendations for appropriate usage of historical knowledge and traditions. However, it is not Nietzsche, but another great German philosopher that is unavoidable and still quoted in this regard. Hegel has constructed a theoretical relationship in which history is asymmetrically dominant and greatly influential over identity, self-cognition and life of the individual. Hegel’s extensive theoretical focus on this matter will lead towards important and unequivocal conclusion that: Any human society and all human activities, including science, art and philosophy are predetermined by their history. Thus, Hegel transforms history into main causal force of any human activity, arguing that every person and every culture is a product of its time. This philosophical view, known as Historicism, is also a significant field for debate in contemporary philosophy and social sciences. At the same time, this continuous interference of the past with the present and the future are of great relevance for the contemporary research in the fields of social psychology and social anthropology as well. Hofstede and Minkov, for example, elaborate extensively on the impact of symbols, heroes, rituals and traditions as part of the mental software of modern man and his understanding of himself and others. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, 1873*, translated by Ian C. Johnston, (Liberal Studies Department, Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, British Columbia, 1998), p.11
Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations – Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival*, (McGraw-Hill, NYC, NY, USA, 2010), p.4-16
- 3 History, as a scientific discipline, and historians are familiar with the practice of self-portraying of the elites through references to traditions and identities from the past. The classical antiquity provides us with the illustrious examples, such as: the reference to the tradition of Homeric Achaean heroes by the Hellenic (Athenian) elites during the conflict with Persian empire, a reference to their mythological progenitors, like Dionysus, Heracles or Orpheus by the Macedonian dynasts, the call of the Romans on their Trojan origin, the call of Eastern Mediterranean dynasties dependent or semi-dependent on Rome on the direct legacy and blood lines from the Macedonian Seleucid and Ptolemaid dynasts, or the call of the Parthian dynasties on the direct legacy of the Persian dynast Darius. The medieval and modern history of humankind has provided even more illustrious examples of these tendencies. Contemporary trends in history and various related scientific disciplines place great emphases on this relationship, both in the researches focused on the distant past and those focused on modern history. Professor Diaz-Andreu, an archaeologist, is among those prominent historians of social sciences and humanities that elaborate extensively on the diverse connections between the self-identification and the needs and aspirations of the modern elites and the development, transformations and the overall professional history of different scientific disciplines and focuses. Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.32,41-43,57-58
In terms of sociology, particularly illustrative are the observations of Friedrich Nietzsche, who directly connects the desire to explore the past with the aspirations and views on life of each individual. His analysis which elaborates on the motives for the interest for the science of history will hint the possibility that the motivations affect the view on history. In his essay on this topic the philosopher noted: “If a man who wants to create greatness uses the past, then he will empower (and portray) himself through monumental history... the man who wishes to emphasize (or preserve) the customary and traditionally valued cultivates the past as an antiquarian historian...(while a man) oppressed by a present need and who wants to cast off his load at any price (and overcome his difficulties) has a need for critical history.” The text in brackets is additional intervention by the author of these lines in order to clarify other potential contexts. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, 1873*, translated by Ian C. Johnston, (Liberal Studies Department, Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, British Columbia, 1998), p.11
- 4 Thomas W.Smith, *History and International Relations*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 1999), p.4

needs of various elites,⁵ and, even more importantly, through them with the collective identities through history.

Such socially engaged elites are often referred to or qualified under the category of “political elites.” According to political scientists and sociologists, they include “group(s) of people, corporations, political parties and/or any other kind of civil society organization who manage and organize government and all the manifestations of political power.”⁶ According to the renowned American political scientist and researcher of political elites John Higley, these groups not only promote their views of the past and the identities and symbols associated with it, but “by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to regularly and substantially affect (the) outcomes”⁷ of social debates and developments in this area.

This study analyzes, on the specific case of the modern Greek society, the undoubtedly significant “interest of the political actors for culture” and the importance of “cultural identities” in the “creation and enhancement of group cohesion, as well as maintaining of the political communication⁸,” and through them the overall development and perspectives of society. Focused on the identities and tendencies of contemporary Greek political elites, this paper locates and substantively analyzes the roots of their diversity and inconsistencies in socio-political relations developed since the establishment of the Greek kingdom. However, the analyses in this work are not restricted to the goal of making a credible portrayal of the identities of contemporary Greek elites. Their wider focus is rather directed towards identifying some of the features and qualities of these groups that are important or crucial as capacities or liabilities of Greek society and its leadership to respond to the multifaceted challenges that modern Greece, the wider region and the world face.

5 The relationship of prominent intellectuals, scholars and artists, and the process of creation of their cultural, scientific and other products and accomplishments, whose importance surpass by far their time and epoch, with the needs, political ambitions and projects of certain political and societal leaders, their close ties and patron dependency are present and well documented in different periods through history. One may just recall the illustrative examples in antiquity, such as Pericles and Phidias, Ptolemaic dynasts and Manetho, or Seleucid dynasts and Berossus, in order to comprehend to tremendous impact of such relationship for the global developments in art, culture or science. Exactly “in this context” reminds us Professor Strootman “one may also think of Berossos’ *Babyloniaca*, a history of Mesopotamia commissioned by Antiochos I, Manetho’s *Aegyptiaca*, the same for Egypt, and the translation of the Thora that Ptolemaios II ordered.” Yet, this important interconnectedness of transcendent artistic or scientific achievements and the political needs and aspirations of a concrete political elite and epoch persists through history from antiquity to modernity.

Rolf Strootman, PhD thesis, under mentorship of W.H. Gispen, *The Hellenistic Royal Courts: Court Culture, Ceremonial and Ideology in Greece, Egypt and the Near East, 336-30 BCE*, (Department of History, University of Utrecht, Netherlands, 2006/2007), p.213-215

On the later and different uses of the work of Manetho and Berossus for the identifications and clashes of the elites see:

Anthony Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2008), p.126

6 Luis Garrido Vergara, *Elites, political elites and social change in modern societies*, *Revista de Sociologia* No. 28, (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Chile, 2003), p. 33

7 Ibid.

8 Bucken-Knapp analyzing the scientific approaches to the matter refers to the arguments of the professor of political science at Stanford, David D. Laitin

Gregg Bucken-Knapp, *Elites, language, and the politics of identity: the Norwegian case in comparative perspective*, (State University of New York Press, Albany, USA, 2003), p.146-147

CASE STUDY OF MODERN GREECE

Different aspects of the “case of Greece” are almost inevitable topics of modern analyses of the interaction of archaeology and archaeological heritage with politics and identities. While most studies of postmodern science related to this case are focused on the impact of identities, perceptions and prejudices of the scientific and political elites in the development of modern science and policy, already a significant amount of papers analyze the other side of this equilibrium. The latter research focus aims to explore the impact of archaeology, as part of the wider spectrum of scientific and cultural activities and processes, on the development of the culture and identity of elites and modern societies in general.⁹

In this context, one might view the particular motives and the challenge to focus this research on the case of modern Greece. This particular modern society represents an important and illustrative case of a small country influenced by archaeology and archaeological heritage, but at the same time it possesses characteristics and creates implications much wider and significant than these obvious dynamics. Namely, one of the paradoxes of modern Greece is that while this modern society, according to many researchers, is essentially modeled by the views, visions and archaeological projects of Western non-Greek elites, at the same time it, or the ideas about, still represents a significant core of the supranational identity of Western elites in the globalizing world. At the same time, modern Greece is facing a chronic and dramatic security and economic instability and insufficiency, and the perception of it among international political elites still remains one of the most stable symbols and brands in contemporary international relations. Finally, it is particularly interesting that in many aspects of its historical and cultural development and its contemporary reality, Greece stands out from the “Western world” and yet represents its core conception, milestone and meaning.

This identity and the essential division of Greek history and modernity is particularly noticeable in recent years as the economic collapse and significant social and security challenges before the state and society, instigated by instability in the Middle East and the rapid migration processes, reveal serious issues and future dilemmas in this modern society.¹⁰

Many analysts and scientists include Greek political elites and their identity and culture among the key factors responsible for the current situation. Their specific cultural “conservatism” and the general reticence towards globalization processes, according to one of the most eminent British experts for the Balkans

9 Effie F. Athanassopoulou, *An “Ancient” Landscape: European Ideals, Archaeology, and Nation Building in Early Modern Greece*, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 20, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 2002), p.277

10 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.5-6

James Pettifer, is the first factor that contributes to the contemporary challenges of Greek society. Professor Pettifer lists the “the centrality of a few political extended families within the political elite- the parataxis of the families of both major party leaders- the strength of Marxist and quasi-Marxist ideology and political parties, (and) the political and economic influence, if not direct unmediated power, of the Greek Orthodox church” as the basic problems of Greek society, followed by the relationships with neighboring countries, the traditional problem of the fragmented Greek landmass and islands and the long-term dependence on external finance.¹¹

But the Greek political elites are not the only local and national elites that opposed, faced and were frightened by the globalizing waves.¹² At the same time, they are not the only ones trying to preserve and present their “cultural and national fable” as part of the international dialogue and the preservation of its interests in the postmodern world of “geo-perceptions.” Therefore, the specifics of this culture, the cultural identities and symbols of identification of the Greek elites, responsible for, or at least influencing, the patterns and directions of the development of this society, significantly different from the prevailing European tendencies, are increasingly drawing the attention of researchers of various social sciences.

In this context, an illustrative element of the wider corpus of issues, connected to any scientific effort to define the performance and characteristics of this society, represents the inconclusive research of its true nature. The two centuries of scientific focus on Greece have constructed two different and completely opposed fables. One created and sustained by the classical archaeology and the classical philology and another by contemporary multidisciplinary approach and socio-cultural anthropology.

Classical archaeology, which was conceived and occasionally reinvents itself precisely upon the territory, the concepts and historical phenomena associated with Greece,¹³ has transformed, through its scientific paradigms, both modern Greece and the modern world. The historical and cultural fable that classical archaeology created and, in some aspects, maintains is in diametrical opposition to the contemporary scientific approaches and understandings of the culture of Greece, and culture in general, of researchers in the fields of anthropology, political science, cultural studies and related disciplines. Yet, the long history of this scientific focus and particular approach, as well as the plethora of hypotheses, artifacts and materials created in this process, inevitable lead to the creation of two parallel stories and perceptions of Greece. At the same

11 James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.3

12 Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, (Picador, New York, USA, 1999), p.29-43

13 Anthony Snodgrass, *What is Classical Archaeology? Greek Archaeology* in the edition Susan E. Alcock, Robin G. Osborne, ed., *Classical Archaeology*, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK, 2012), p.13-29

time, this scientific development made dramatic impression on the creation of ideas, culture and identity of both Greek and international elites. Therefore, it represented and remains main ideological matrix in the construction of the contemporary Greek society and the creation of all policies designed and implemented by and related to the Greek state.

The “stereotypical notion” and perception of Greece created by classical archaeology and classical philology can be summarized in short as: the oldest European civilization;¹⁴ authentic European culture and identity with a millennial continuity, as well as a critical impact on the development and values of the “west”; a determinant of “western” geography, history and world domination.¹⁵ In contrast, the second fable and historical perception of Greece created in parallel by modern scientific trends and contemporary political experience is diametrically opposed and essentially denies the first. It can be presented in short as: Greece is very small, non-compact; a territory disconnected from and inaccessible by land; that because of this, and because of its climate and relief features does not have natural resources and is condemned to surviving on trade. Historically it is an area of the continuous mixing of different cultures and foreign influences, which are in a constant game of supremacy and continuously create the multicultural and particularistic context of this territory.¹⁶

The first “history of Greece” is the fruit of the early enthusiasm and most important projects of early classical archaeology. It is the most typical expression of prejudices and conceptions of European colonial and imperial elites, influenced by the ideas of racism and nationalism.¹⁷ In contrast, this by-product of the early development of modern scientific thought remains one of the most attractive brands, which through its distinctiveness unites as a communication code the scientific, political and social elites in Greece and the world.

The second “history of Greece” is a product of modern development of science and society. It has built in itself modern understandings, knowledge and pluralistic tendencies in the broader field of social sciences, but also a contribution to it has been given by the most modern archaeological research, made possible by the long presence of a multitude of archaeological teams, national and international archaeological institutions on the territory of Greece.¹⁸

14 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.2

15 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.284-294

16 *Ibid.*, p.299-300

17 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.1-3

Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.293-294

18 Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, *Introduction: The Cultures within Greek Culture, in the edition* Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, ed., *The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2003), p. 1-16

The “modern Greek fable” anticipates the inter-disciplinary, self-reflective and systematic approach of modern science, but at the same time, it is a result of the new open worldviews held by the intensively communicating elites of the globalizing world.¹⁹

It demystifies one of the largest and most outdated archaeological and historical myths of the Eurocentric world, thus paving the way for Greek society to move from a position of “sad relic”²⁰ of European imperialism, to contemporary society that actively and flexibly uses the symbols and past experience in line and parallel to the overall development of its capacities and infrastructure.

From here, many pose the question whether the Greek society is able to modernize and reinvent itself without having the Greek elites face the complex global transformations on social, economic, cultural and security level and their implications on Greek society and reality.

In the increasingly popular criticism of Greece, Western elites highlight the static, conservative and “thoroughly unmodern” character of the Greek society,²¹ while expecting the reform process that will bring the “Europeanization” and approximation of the society and the reality in Greece to those in other geographical regions of Europe.²² However, it seems that in their enthusiastic and often conceited desire to help Greece part of the European elites today, as two hundred years ago when they created the “old fable about Greece” remain unaware or insufficiently interested in the local reality, and the culture and aspirations of local elites in modern Greece.

In this sense, only an overview of the substantial misunderstandings between the foreign elites and the Greek elites throughout the history of modern Greece has the capacity to address some of the complex issues arising from the contemporary political, cultural and security challenges, which both Greek and European political elites will inevitably have to face.

THE IDENTITY AND CULTURAL “MISUNDERSTANDINGS” IN MODERN GREECE

One of the key episodes in modern Greek history that will predetermine the path of confrontations and contemporary cultural transformations is the

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- 19 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.94
- Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, *Introduction: The Cultures within Greek Culture, in the edition* Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, ed., *The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2003), p. 1-16
- 20 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.,2-3
- 21 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.,2-3
- 22 James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.2

intervention of the Great Powers in the early nineteenth century, which resulted in the formation of a new political entity and social reality in the territories of the southern Balkans. Among contemporary scholars in this matter, the creation of the Kingdom of Greece is considered a “complex and controversial”²³ clash of identities, cultures and societies of the East and the West. It is the result of the imposition of the big idea of European humanism, associated with identities and social relations in Western Europe²⁴ on a small rocky, poor and long-term unstable region of the Ottoman Empire. The creation of a new Christian and European Atlantis, extracted from the sea of the “mystical Orient” and its “barbaric” context²⁵, at the same time represents a distant asylum that conservative European rulers would offer to the revolutionary anti-monarchist elites of Europe in the nineteenth century.²⁶ These elites, ideas, trends and needs of the Western world, despite the serious objections of the local population, will transform this micro-territory with crypto-colonial status²⁷ on the coastal

- 23 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.205
- 24 Today in modern science the consensus rules that “Hellenism, as a cultural *topos* (“place/category”), was an intellectual product of the Renaissance, which was subsequently renovated (and modified) through intellectual trends ranging from the Enlightenment to the Romanticism” in Western Europe. The construction of Hellenism in Western Europe and its adaptation to the needs of different trends and social transformations in the West, has been elaborated by several renowned authors at the end of the twentieth century (Turner 1981; Lambropoulos 1993; Augustinos 1994; Hadas 1960; Marchand 1996; Miliori 1998), and the XXIst century has seen extensive, elaborate and numerous analyzes of all aspects of this topic from the most renowned authors and scientific centers in the US, Europe, Greece and beyond. Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.205
- 25 In The first half of the nineteenth century “there was a highly interesting utopian moment, in which Friedrich Thiersch (classicist and educator) and Ludwig I of Bavaria (as well as other European idealists) thought Greece could be ‘a cornerstone of European freedom and the protectress of Christianity in the Orient (the East).’ Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.35
- 26 For the intellectuals of the Enlightenment, like Voltaire, the (idea of) Greek liberation did not mean (was not expect to bring) the “creation of independent Greece, but the victory of reason and human rights” over the absolutism of the empires and monarchies. After all, Western “philhellenic writers like Voltaire and Hölderlin really hoped that a Greek revolution would free them” and many “philhellenes who fought in the Greek War of Independence, especially the French and Italian volunteers, had been involved in revolutionary movements in their own countries and in Spain before they landed in Greece.” David Roessel, *In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.15, 29
- 27 Contemporary authors, including several prominent Greek scientists, use for the case of the formation and development of the Greek kingdom in western protectorate(s) the terms “colony” and “colonialism,” “crypto-colonialism,” “pseudo-colonialism,” “informal-colonialism,” “protectorate” and the like, but most of these authors agree that even today we see aspects of the development of post-colonial society in Greece. (Margarita Diaz-Andreu, Michael Herzfeld, Yannis Hamilakis, Robert Holland, Diana Markides, Alexander Mirkovic, Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer) Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.99 Yannis Hamilakis, *Decolonizing Greek archaeology: indigenous archaeologies, modernist archaeology and the post-colonial critique*, in the edition Dimitris Damaskos, Dimitris Plantzos, ed. *A Singular Antiquity: Archaeology and Hellenic Identity in Twentieth-Century Greece*, (Benaki Museum, Athens, Greece, 2008), p.273-284 Robert Holland, Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006), p. 45,65 Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147-157 Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, во научниот журнал *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.3

southern end of the Balkans into the true homeland of the classical illusions of the European elites.²⁸

One of the parties, disproportionately more powerful in this “clash of civilizations” were the Western elites, led by the foreign king and administration²⁹ appointed by them, which enthusiastically created on this limited territory a reality from the most modern western European myth of the day,³⁰ “the ideal and free” ancient “Hellas.”³¹ This myth represented a valuable tool for self-identification and self-representation of the German, as well as other European elites, which felt threatened by the French imperialistic endeavours. At the same time, it suited well the interests and worldviews of the growing and strengthening merchant class all over Europe, which was deeply inspired and encouraged by the anti-monarchist ideals of the French revolution.³² This overenthusiastic European philhellenes, indoctrinated through the scientific dogmas of the classical history and early classical archaeology, elevated the myth of “classical Greece” to such heights, that they were virtually convinced that all Europeans and “their” civilization, as opposed to the “East”, could trace their roots in these rocky cliffs of the most southern corners of the Balkans. In such a state of mind, these elites perceived the liberation of Greece as a process of rediscovery of the true nature of Europe.³³

Consistent to the European colonialist mentality of the nineteenth century, the new Western rulers perceived the local population as consisting of “degenerated” or uncultivated “barbarians” that Europe was obliged to civilize.³⁴

28 In recent decades, many authors have extensively reflected on the Roman background and contribution to the creation of the “imagined” ancient identity “Greeks,” and its relation to the ancient Hellenes. These analyses connect the ancient idea and concept of “Greek” with the “transformative power of the Roman imagination,” and the self-reflective nature that this determinant had for the Romans, that connected it to the civilized world and high culture of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ronald Mellor, *Graecia Capta: The Confrontation between Greek and Roman Identity*, in the edition

Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.79-126

29 Robert Holland, Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006), p. 45,65

30 Marios Hatzopoulos will call Hellenism “the European dearest ideal of that time” (the period before and about the independence of the new kingdom), which will be useful for the desired local autonomy of the Christian population, to assert itself later on as a completely “new belief about identity.”

Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: ‘sacred’ myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-83

31 David Roessel, *In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.13-41

32 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition

Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.207

Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.79-80

33 The later Western analysts of the hellenophilia of the Western intellectuals at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, see it as a “consequence of the French Revolution,” and due to the features of the search for own ideals in the idyllic and unknown they call the philhellenism of the Western elites the “illegitimate sister of freedom.” Professor David Roessel will summarize that “philhellenism was built on the fact that the freedom in Greece was linked to the idea (desire) for some kind of transformation in the rest of the Western world.” David Roessel, *In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.30

Roderick Beaton, *Introduction*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.3-4

34 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.127-128

But unlike the other conquered territories, where the West saw significant natural resources and trade opportunities, in the new Kingdom of Greece the Western elites looked for their own “imagined” and glorified identity, represented through the illusion of the classical Hellenes.³⁵ Therefore, the local population in the new kingdom, “even though physically in Europe and (living in a space whose ancient history was) for centuries the focus of European Enlightened imagination, were treated more like colonial subjects.” At the same time, this “subaltern” people and their elites “had to live their everyday lives in the ...’imagined community’” ... of “the European Neo-Classical dream.”³⁶

The local population of this new and particularly symbolic Western “property”³⁷ - Greece played a relatively passive and unimportant role in the expensive “theatre” for self-representation of Western elites. Yet, for many liberal intellectuals, as well as for the later conservative supporters of the “Greek project” in Western governments, the identity or origin of these local people remained an important aspect in the wider maintenance of the mythological idea of restoring the ancient roots of the “ever-dominant” colonial Europe. Thus, while many European scientists, artists, statesman and travelers to the Kingdom argued that the contemporary population had nothing in common with “classical Greeks” and had descended from the “mixture” of the new demographic waves in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages³⁸, the philhellenic enthusiasts insisted on certain continuity. However, even the protagonists of the continuity among the Western scientific and layman publics were using “every occasion” to specify that the modern heirs of the classical Greeks were “degenerated” and “debased.”³⁹ Even so, this represented no obstacle to the European elites who were actively transforming this land of “savages”⁴⁰ into their imaginary “Classical Greece”.⁴¹ The expectations of the Bavarian rulers, through the words of Georg Ludwig von Maurer, were for the locals to follow the example, because “all the Greeks have

35 Andromache Gazi, *Archaeological Museums and displays in Greece 1829-1909: A First Approach*, in the scientific journal *Museological Review*, Vol.1, No.1, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK, 1994), p.52, 69

36 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147

37 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152

38 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.231, in Roderick Beaton, *Introduction*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.4-5

Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.4

39 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.37

40 Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.4

41 Professor Liakos explains that “Hellenism as a cultural construct (imagination) of Western civilization was coined by Philhellenes (the West) as resuscitation (revival) of the ancient in modern Greece.”

Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.207-208

to do in order to be what they used to be (the idealized classical Hellenes), is to mimic the Germans.”⁴²

Despite all the Western illusions and misconceptions, the population they encountered in these poorest regions⁴³ of the Ottoman Empire in Europe had pre-existing elites, identities, values, myths and aspirations. Although being in a disadvantaged position in the general process of the development of the Kingdom of Greece, the local population, with its elites, was constantly making attempts to articulate at least partly its own worldviews in regard to the construction of the society and the new state. For this local multilingual and multi-confessional population, which usually identified itself with the Romaioi identity⁴⁴ and its historical memory reached to certain symbols, figures and concepts of the Roman (Byzantine) Empire, the values brought by the Western elites and rulers were less known and often more unacceptable than those of the Ottomans. Even the mere identities “Hellene” and “Greek”, which the West triumphantly imposed in the new kingdom, were unknown in the population, whereas the elites educated in the “Romaioi” Orthodox spirit saw these “Western” names as anti-Christian and pagan tendencies which insulted the grounds of their identity.⁴⁵

As attractive location for instability and piracy, these peripheral regions, with weak and instable land communication lanes with the continental centers of the empire, were for centuries habitually affected by the wider volatility and power struggles in the Mediterranean. Led by pro-Russian elites⁴⁶ and supported by diverse Orthodox Slavic speaking, Vlach speaking and Albanian speaking elites and outlaws in the Balkans, the local chieftains, who had long been semi-independently surviving due to smuggling and piracy in the Aegean and beyond, started the insurgence, later referred to as “Greek Revolt”.⁴⁷ While many researchers relate the western intervention to the situation that the local

42 Georg Ludwig von Maurer was a member of the regency council of minor King Otto.

Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.149

43 Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, first printed 1992), p.48

44 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), pp.214,220-221

45 Not only throughout the Middle Ages, but also by the end of the eighteenth century and later, the views of many local intellectuals and leaders remain consistent. One such example is the evangelist Kosmas o Aitolós, who was spreading among the people of Epirus the “Christian language” - Greek while at the same time reminding the Epirots that: “you are not Hellenes” because “you are not unbelievers, heretics, atheists, but you are pious Orthodox Christians.”

Dimitris Livanios, *The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism, and Collective Identities in Greece, 1453-1913*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), pp. 256-258, 264

46 Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: 'sacred' myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-86

47 Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: 'sacred' myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-86

pirate elites preyed on shipping,⁴⁸ the Anglo-French pressure and facilitation and the measures of the later Bavarian led government did not stabilize the rugged coastline. In the following years, through the “Bavarocracy” and after, these local elites would cause constant instability, through mutual conflicts, armed clashes and ruthless executions, and deeply rooted mistrust and divisions along the lines of the linguistic and religious differences, but above all on the bases of the local and tribal identities. Living on the edges of the empire, they were accustomed to living in the volatile Aegean and did not easily adapt to attempts for centralization and functionality of the new Greek Kingdom.

A particularly important aspect of cultural “misunderstandings”⁴⁹ with the new Western rulers was the fact that the local majority, led by the Orthodox elites, as well as many local leaders associated their identity with the orthodox traditions in the Ottoman empire, inherited from Byzantium. Therefore, they viewed the new kingdom only as a hotbed of conflict and support to the restoration of the Orthodox Romaioi Empire.⁵⁰ The “imaginary Hellada”⁵¹ born in the conscience of the Western liberal elites⁵² as a compact state entity did not exist even in the distant “classic history”, hence it had neither state traditions nor symbols around which the local people or the elite of the wider region would create their own mystifications.

In such conditions, the history of modern Greece represents two centuries long “cultural war”. As defined by the prominent historian from the University of Athens, Professor Liakos, it was a “struggle over memories”⁵³, between the multicultural traditions of the local elites of this important crossroad of cultures in the Mediterranean and the oppressive idea of “pure”⁵⁴ and “perfect” classical culture and authentic mimesis of the imagined “ancient Hellada.”⁵⁵

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- 48 James A. Wombwell, *The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends*, (Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, 2010), p.6
- 49 Suzanne Marchand, What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective, во еднцијата Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.41
- 50 Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: 'sacred' myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.83-85
- 51 Ronald Mellor, *Graecia Capta: The Confrontation between Greek and Roman Identity*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.79-126
- 52 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.207-208
Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.33-42
- 53 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.234
- 54 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.94
- 55 Constanze Guttenke, *Placing Modern Greece: The Dynamics of Romantic Hellenism, 1770-1840*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2008), p.2-3
Dimitris Livanios, *The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism, and Collective Identities in Greece, 1453-1913*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p. 267-267

This process began and received its institutional dimensions when the “Protecting Powers’ imposed a monarchical form of government on Greece and young Otto, the second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, was appointed (by them) King of Greece.” The new kingdom was ruled by a council of foreigners, and these new rulers “showed little (or no) understanding and sensitivity for the Greek reality,” and the identities and aspirations of the local elites.⁵⁶

On the contrary, the advent of the new western king in these poor lands which were predominantly populated by Romaioi,⁵⁷ who spoke several different languages, meant complete reorganization and transformation of this geography. It was focused on creating and imposing the almost unknown classical Hellenic name, the classical identity and values in the space of the new kingdom, as well as erasing the traditions of local elites. As in the case of all colonies of the nineteenth century, these local elites were called barbaric and unworthy subjects. In this context, the words of the Bavarian state (royal) architect, who welcomed King Otto, are more than illustrative. He would salute his patron with the words: “Your majesty stepped today, after so many centuries of barbarism, on this celebrated Acropolis”, where “all the remains of barbarity will be removed.”⁵⁸

The project of Europeanization project of the new kingdom began with significant political symbolism and specific ceremonial. Abandoning the centres and traditions of the local community and the “Greek uprising,” the Bavarian administration placed the capital of its new king “Otto of Greece” in a small village in the predominantly Arvanitic speaking Attica, which was located on the site where once upon a time in the “classical eras” ancient Athens⁵⁹ was situated. One of the most eminent scholars of modern Greek history, the British historian Richard Clogg, rightly concludes that this political gesture “symbolized the extent to which cultural orientation of the new state was to be influenced and indeed distorted by the burden of (Western romantic visions of) the Greek classical past.”⁶⁰

In the following period, the Western rulers and mentors set up the “entire ideological structure of the new state as a reminder of the ancient Greek world.” This activity meant that from “Ancient Athens,” the “Hellenic” western kings broke down the traditions, culture and identities of local elites throughout the

56 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.44

57 Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, first printed 1992), p. 48

58 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152-153

59 Hamilakis associates the process also with the rebuilding of Sparta, as the “second city in the kingdom” Yannis Hamilakis, Eleana Yalouri, *Sacralising the Past – Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece*, *Archaeological Dialogues - Volume 6*, Issue 02, (1999, (Cambridge University Press, UK), p.125

60 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.45

kingdom, replacing them with their “classical illusions.” As the royal architect promised his King Otto, “all the remains of barbarity (including toponymy, architecture, language, culture, traditions and symbols of the population) will be removed ... in all Greece, and the remains of the glorious (classical) past will be brought in new light, as solid foundation for glorious present and future.”⁶¹

One of the aspects of the “de-barbarization” of the new kingdom was the extensive change of toponymy with which the new rulers and elites close to them put their hand on one of the most important aspects of pre-national identity, in order to integrate a wider territory in the image of the “restored Hellada.” This policy of “acculturation” encompassed even the “names that had acquired a commemorative value, particularly since the Revolution of 1821”, that “were often replaced by obscure, antiquated denominations (like Tripoli in place of Tropolitza, Aigion in place of Vostitsa, Kalamai in place of Kalamata, Amphissa in place of Salona, Lamia in place of Zitouni, Agrinion in place of Vlachori), etc.”⁶² The fact that in 1909 there was a proposal for one third of the villages in Greece to change their names speaks about the extensive modification of the local toponyms and culture, in order to remove all the “non-classical” names, and with them the non-classical aspects of the past in modern Greece.⁶³

Finally, many of famed topoi of the “Greek uprising” were transformed into auxiliary areas, in which local villagers lived with the dynamics of the activities of the French, English, German or American diplomats, archaeologists, tourists and enthusiasts who intensively dug out of the ground the classical cities and artifacts. The magnitude of this overwhelming transformation is shown by the fact that one of the remarkable Balkan regional leaders from Thessaly, regarded as the most significant early protagonist of the Greek state project, had to enter into the Greek national pantheon under a changed name. Thus, the Vlach speaking Riga from Velestino, because of the Slavic name of his birthplace, was inscribed in the Greek historiography according to the name of the ancient Thessalian city Pherae, and posthumously called Riga of Pherae (Feres).⁶⁴

61 Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152-153

62 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.232

63 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.106
 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p. 231-232
 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity: International Relations and Ideology*, (I.B.Tauris & Co, London, UK & New York, USA, 2008), p.10

64 This way the Vlach speaking ideologist of the Romaioi Empire in the second half of the eighteenth century, through the classical archeological site close to his birth place, will be connected to the new Hellenic identity of the Kingdom.
 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.232-233

Tourists and itinerants, already heavily influenced by classical tomography, now drew the modern Greek reality moving through the extensive network of archaeological sites that classical literary tradition had transformed into an exciting reality of modernity.⁶⁵

The creation of this imaginary “classical” nation, through the “Hellenization of Modern Greece” did not limit itself to “hellenization of the space” of the kingdom.⁶⁶ Shortly after the proclamation of the kingdom, the Romaioi language, which was the language of high culture of all Christians in the Balkans, was named “barbaric” or “barbarized”.⁶⁷ The “pure” language of the realm had to be connected to the artificial language of classical literature, familiar to classically educated Western elites and the fictional link with the ancient identity suggested tendencies of absolute mimesis,⁶⁸ which is best illustrated by the ideal of the period: “that if any ancient Greek were to rise from the dead, he would (should) recognize his language”.⁶⁹

Modern science states that “the first fifty years of the life of the Modern Greek state (1830-1880) could be described as a period of Hellenization of the Greek language” that “purged [the language] of words and expressions of Turkish, Italian, Slavic and Albanian origin.”⁷⁰ Thus, during the nineteenth century, the modern Romaic language called Romeika (Roméika),⁷¹ from spoken language, that was a “daughter” of ancient Hellenic language and the imperial Koine,⁷² was transformed into an artificial redesigned copy of ancient literature. This form was not only unrecognizable to the Vlach speaking, Slavic speaking, Albanian speaking people and residents of the kingdom, but was not near to any of those elites and groups who spoke the Romaioi language.⁷³

- 65 Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.40-41
- Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.289
- 66 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.230-234
- 67 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.220,225
- 68 Peter Mackridge, *A language in the image of the nation: Modern Greek and some parallel cases*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.181
- 69 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.222
- Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, во научниот журнал *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.12
- 70 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.224
- 71 The advocates against “Hellenization” of the modern language in Greece use the term also during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.85
- 72 Peter Mackridge, *A language in the image of the nation: Modern Greek and some parallel cases*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.180
- 73 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.222-223

These and such efforts towards acculturation and “civilizing” the inhabitants of the Kingdom according to the ideas and criteria for the “Classics” of its new rulers intensively changed the space and culture, but also met with obstacles and opposition in the aspirations, perceptions and values of the weaker side in the “cultural war” on this limited territory on the margins of the Balkans. While the new Western rulers “civilized” Greece with great commitment and enthusiasm, the local population and elites expressed their “resistance (and refused to live in) this European neo-classical dream.”⁷⁴ Opposing the new government and its policies, local and Orthodox elites articulated different and multifaceted political and ideological alternatives to the process of “Hellenization” that systematically removed their traditions, culture, symbols, identity and local social relations.⁷⁵

The misunderstanding of these representatives of the two “civilizations” and the various social groups and individuals who favoured them, created a deeply divided society. According to the scientific community, this division originated from their different love and understanding of the same country.⁷⁶ While for the ruling Europeans, “Greece was the cradle of (their) culture and valuable antiquity,” for the local elites “it was home that they spilled their blood for,” and that they aspired to independently manage and develop according to their local interests and traditions and more freely than ever.⁷⁷

The local population and many representatives of their elites gave different forms of resistance to changes in the toponyms, architecture, language, culture, traditions, symbols and identity of the population. For many representatives of the local elites, key aspects of their culture were the lineal ties and the closed patriarchal communities at the Greek banks that have been particularized for centuries. They opposed the various trends of centralization early, whereas the confrontation with the “European Hellenism”⁷⁸ took place on the issue of changing the names of places that, together with the religion, were the most important aspects of their pre-modern identity. An additional problem for the process of change was the demotic movement that for more than a century

74 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147

75 Yanna Delivoria, *The notion of nation: the emergence of a national ideal in the narratives of 'inside' and 'outside' Greeks in the nineteenth century*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King's College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.109-120

Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition

Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.220-230

76 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147

Yanna Delivoria, *The notion of nation: the emergence of a national ideal in the narratives of 'inside' and 'outside' Greeks in the nineteenth century*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King's College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.109-120

77 Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.156

78 Yannis Hamilakis, *Double Colonization – The Story of the Excavations of the Athenian Agora (1924-1931)*, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 82, No. 1, *Special Issue: Philhellenism, Philanthropy, or Political Convenience?* (American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Greece, 2013), p.161

enjoyed unparalleled local support in the resistance to the fictional “ancient” language “Katharevousa”, which was inapplicable to the modern times.⁷⁹ Part of the local elites and the Greeks of the Diaspora persistently noted that this artificial language was an obstacle to the development of education and promoted illiteracy among the general population of the kingdom.

Nevertheless, the confrontation of the western Hellenism “installed”⁸⁰ in the new kingdom with the local culture of its subjects did not have only local and personal implications. On the contrary, “the new national name, Hellenes, also constituted an obvious discontinuity with the past 1500 years (and all the traditions, culture and symbols associated with it) and created enormous tension between the Hellenism and the Romiosyni (local Christian identity), which will present itself as difficult to overcome.”⁸¹

The Romaioi identity, dominant in the tradition of local elites in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, remained a prominent political alternative to the intensively promoted Hellenic identity. This local concept of identity, associated with the terms “Romiosyni” or “Romaioi”, “dissociates modern Greek identity from the Classical past, and adopts (and advocated) a more diffused, popular and immediate feeling for identity” among the local population, linking it to the tradition of “self-nomination of Greeks (Orthodox Christians) during the Byzantine and Ottoman centuries.”⁸² The proud and long time independent elites that carried the Greek revolt found early their allies in Constantinople and continental cultural elites of the Romaioi cultural context of the Ottoman Empire. These elites who viewed the Greek kingdom as a hotbed of the liberation movement of Christians in the Ottoman Empire were reluctant to abandon their visions for a Romaioi Kingdom and Romaioi identity. At the beginning of the twentieth century (in 1909), the first integrated “History of the Romaioi” was published in Athens, sparking a lively debate in Greek society. Of course, the main opponents of such a historical view and literary undertaking were the classic archaeologists, who until that moment experienced the climax of their organization and social visibility in the kingdom of Greece.⁸³

79 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.222-223

80 Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.97

81 Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.95

82 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.214

83 Daniel Paul Payne, *The Revival of Political Hesychasm in Greek Orthodox Thought: A Study of the Hesychasm Basis in the Thought of John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras*, dissertation, Mentor Derek H. Davis (J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, USA, 2006), p.417

GREEK POLITICAL ELITES AND NEO-ORTHODOXY

A considerable number of representatives and groups of local elites in the Greek kingdom were in constant confrontation and rebellion against the new “Western” rulers since kingdom’s establishment. Through this struggle, they acquired significant aspects of their modern identity. Tying their identity to Constantinople and Asia, they produced the Greek “Great Ideal” early in the kingdom’s history. Called sometimes the “Megali Idea,” this conception, at least in theory, connected the lost “Romaioi” world of the locals, urging for its credentials as an indigenous culture of the broader Eastern Mediterranean cultural space. At the same time, this collective vision was seen by groups and members of the local elites and certain political leaders as an opportunity for this poorest⁸⁴ part of the “Greek world” to become self-sustainable and overthrow western domination.⁸⁵

These and such anti-Western overtones⁸⁶ and traditions were further strengthened by the development of leftist ideas in the world and certainly contributed to their great popularity in Greece. In this sense, the efforts and ideas of many Greek communists and anarchists can be placed in the wider corpus of the anti-colonial movement in the world in many respects.⁸⁷ In contemporary Greece, more and more, as in the Middle East, local cultural and religious traditions question the identity, symbols and culture imposed by the “Western colonialists”.⁸⁸

However the specific case of Greece has important features that make this issue more complex for the future of Europe and the wider trends in international relations. Namely, in other entities of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, which were also subjected to identity change influenced by European “classical” ideas, such as Persia, Syria, Phoenicia, Egypt, Libya, etc., the Christian elites, as in Greece, were among the most dominant in the acceptances of the western

⁸⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, first printed 1992), p.48

⁸⁵ Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008),

⁸⁶ Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p. 267-269

⁸⁷ James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.2-5
Yannis Hamilakis, *Double Colonization: The Story of the Excavations of the Athenian Agora (1924–1931)*, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 82, No. 1, Special Issue: Philhellenism, Philanthropy, or Political Convenience? *American Archaeology in Greece* (January-March 2013), pp. 153-177

⁸⁸ Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p. 143-167
Yannis Hamilakis, *Double Colonization – The Story of the Excavations of the Athenian Agora (1924-1931)*, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 82, No. 1, Special Issue: Philhellenism, Philanthropy, or Political Convenience? (*American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Greece, 2013), p.161
Michael Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the looking-glass – Critical ethnography in the margins of Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 1987), p.198

culture and identities in order to emancipate themselves from the rule of Muslim rulers.⁸⁹

In reaction to this colonial past, in these regions in recent decades we witness revival of the pre-colonial identities, culture and of social relations,⁹⁰ while Christian minorities often fall victim to this radical side-effect of the western domination.⁹¹ In Greece, however, a small territory with very limited human and natural resources, the Christian population did not emancipate from the Muslim rulers, as in other regions of the spacious “Old world.” Muslims in this region were eliminated during the “Greek uprising.” The contradiction of this development was that the new Western elites, unlike in other regions, in Greece ruled not over the predominantly Muslim religious or mixed populations but over the Orthodox Christians that the West had consistently called Greeks for centuries. Thus, in Greece the Christian, not the Muslim, elites show long-term animosity towards the West and the social and cultural phenomena associated with its influence.

Today, many researchers, analysts and concerned observers are puzzled with the picture of the united front of the far-right and far-left voices in Greek society, on the basis of their anti-western sentiments, as well as the pro-Russian sympathies and political inclinations. The roots of these recently amplified overtones and developments are deeply embedded in the political constellations in pre-War and Cold-War Greece. The ideological isolation from Western liberal trends, mastered for decades by the totalitarian right-wing regimes ruling over Greece added new aspects in the Greek misunderstanding with the West. At the same time, equally crippling were the deep mistrust and the long-term grudge towards the West of the suppressed leftist opposition. Additionally, during the Cold War era and after, prominent Greek scholars and professors, such as John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras, “articulated the neo-Orthodoxy as an alternative Greek Orthodox identity vis-à-vis the West”, thus transcending the religious misunderstandings with the West, into wider ideological and political clash.⁹²

In the new challenging and increasingly multi-polar global realities, and in the light of certain weakening and short-comings of the Western global influence, the concept of Neo-Orthodoxy⁹³ amplifies its scope and political implications.

89 Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p. 146

90 Michael Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the looking-glass – Critical ethnography in the margins of Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 1987), p.198

91 Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p.165-167

92 Daniel Paul Payne, *The Revival of Political Hesychasm in Greek Orthodox Thought: A Study of the Hesychasm Basis in the Thought of John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras*, dissertation, Mentor Derek H. Davis (J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, USA, 2006), p.442

93 Seraidari underlines the positions of the Orthodox churches in Greece, but also in the post-communist countries in the wider region that “build their influence upon the rejection of pro-European and supposedly “corrupting” values, serving thus as a medium for the fears and discontents produced by social changes.” Katerina Seraidari, *Religious Processions in the Aegean (Greece). Issues of Gender, Social Status and Politics*, *Ethnologia Balkanica, Journal for Southeast European Anthropology*, Volume 16, 2012, p. 240

These tendencies in the “Slavic-Orthodox sphere,” where Huntington’s notorious article places Greece, as well,⁹⁴ certainly find fertile soil in the pre-national identities and the traditional anti-Western sentiment of Greek society. In such a context, the unification of the radical left option SYRIZA⁹⁵ and the radical right party “Independent Greeks” in the governmental “double-populist coalition”, whose only common ground are the “pro-Russian tones in Athens”, represents an important indicator of the challenges and political dilemmas that the Greek society faces today.⁹⁶

Equally representative parameters for certain aspects of the worldview of Greek political elites are the positions of the leaders of the particularly influential Orthodox Church in Greece,⁹⁷ presented and propagated through public comments and arguments, like those of the Athenian bishop Christodoulos. He suggests, in line with the post-colonial syndrome and in the framework of the “Eastern” stereotype, that the history and culture of Greece (with a focus on “Hellenic” Byzantium) should not be analyzed under the influence or in relation to contemporary Western and non-Greek scholars. After privatizing and nationalizing the Byzantine cultural heritage and suggesting that it is not a part of the Western world, the archbishop contradicts his previous positions by claiming that it is the basis for the creation of the European identity. For the modern historians, sociologists and anthropologists in Greece and the world underline that “this attitude (and the more general line of the Greek Orthodox Church) could be compared with modern Islamic attitudes on history” and as such represents an example par excellence of the post-colonial aspects of Greek culture and identity.⁹⁸

A prominent historian of Athens University and Chairman of the Board of the International Commission for History and Theory of Historiography, professor Antonis Liakos, compares such attitudes on the part of the Greek social and spiritual leaders with those revisionist Islamic elites, who often point out that “Islamic history is influenced by Western education, (which is unable) to understand Islam, (because) the mind that will judge Islamic life must be Islamic in its essence.” Thus, according to Liakos, in these post-colonial societies there is a “move from the suppression of entire past periods, located outside the Western cultural canon, to the idealization of these same periods as distinct

94 Dimitris Tziouvas, *Beyond the Acropolis: Rethinking Neohellenism*, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p.208

95 In contrary to the expectations of a dramatic confrontation of the radical left and the conservative and overwhelmingly influential Greek Church, the trends are moderate and dissimilar to those in other societies. Andreas Karicis, doctor of philosophy and member of Central Committee of SYRIZA has elaborated this ideologically unusual symbiosis with the words: “What separates the Church and Syriza is much less important than what unites them,” adding that “in this time when (Western) neo-liberalism attacks European societies, these two forces (SYRIZA and the Church) are naturally found on the same side: that of resistance and human values.” <http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/why-syriza-leftists-play-nice-with-greek-orthodox-church>

96 *Macro Update: Greek chaos, Italian success, Russian risk*, Berenberg Macro Flesh, (Joh. Berenberg, Gossler & Co., London, UK, 2015), p.3

97 James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.3

98 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.209

cultural features (of these societies) and as (their) contributions to universal civilization.”⁹⁹

| GREEK ELITES AND CLASSICAL GREECE

The complex aspects of the contemporary Greek national and cultural narrative, implying inherent animosity towards some of the values, symbols and traditions, that the European continent and its elites consider to be the basis of their identity, are important, but not the exclusive aspect of the modern identity of the Greek elites and the Greek society. The analyses of such trends should not overestimate their overall impact, whereas their drastic forms of occurrence in modern Greek politics and society should be analyzed in terms of the wider crisis of social values and identities in Europe. These aspects of anti-colonial, anti-Western and anti-European sentiment make up only one of the layers of contemporary Greek identity. At the same time, one should bear in mind that the values and symbols brought or imposed by the Western elites in the last two centuries already represent the integral and equally influential aspect of the identity of contemporary Greece.

In this context, any analysis of the contemporary Greek society should take into account the results of the intense process of acculturation “during the nineteenth and twentieth century, (when) modern Greece was “Hellenized” and “Hellenism” acquired a modern Greek version.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, nowadays the “imagined Hellas” of the Western idealistic intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth century is being transformed into and monopolized by a real state, that places great emphasis on the identities and symbols of “Hellenism”, once imported from the West.

Moreover, certain modern scholars would underline that from today’s perspective, many Greeks cultivate the exact attitude and “sense of the past (which) was imported in Greece by Western Europe”, because “the awe in which the Western world has held the classical tradition has shaped and reshaped (thus succeeded in transforming) Greek apprehension of their own past.”¹⁰¹

Therefore, despite the findings of contemporary researchers that the creation of the modern Greek identity “was not connected (as in some other cases in the nineteenth century) with the process of ‘inventing the community’ or ‘inventing the tradition’ by the (local elites) Greeks” but with the “Germans

99 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.209
Dimitris Damaskos, *Archaeology, National Identity and the Greek Museum*, (Ann Arbor, Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, USA, 2010)

100 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.229

101 Professor Andromache Gazi cites several European authors on this subject.
Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.37

imagining Greece, or more precisely, with the Germans imagining Germany (in Greece)", further development and transformations have shown certain indigenous tendencies.¹⁰² The early process of appropriation of western identity, symbols and the mythologization of Hellenism is associated with the needs and aspirations of the "Greek Diaspora." These individuals, directly affected by the stigma and the negative perceptions of the West regarding the backward Orthodox believers, called Greeks, enthusiastically embraced the idyllic mystification of their supposed "Hellenic" origin.¹⁰³ Yet, later on, the nationalist historiography, written under the German and Western impressions, but with Greek signatures, had a wider and more significant influence, offering an important avenue for the unification of the new nation.¹⁰⁴ In this context is the statement of Professor Kaplanis from the University of Thessaloniki, that: "The only way to explain why generations of intellectuals in the nineteenth and twentieth century would try to make a case for the continuity of the Hellenes, based on 0.3 per cent of (historical sources) the evidence, while at the same time so obstinately ignoring the other 96.5 per cent (that Kaplanis proves to be pointing to the centuries long continuous Romaioi identity) is to admit the power that the national narrative exercises over its subjects."¹⁰⁵

Finally, in the twentieth century, not only the elites, but also the broader structures of the local population had the opportunity to solidify their national feeling, through education, high culture and national symbols, as well as through confrontation with other identities and national projects in the region. Throughout the twentieth century, inspired by the fables of classical history, the "barbarians" who were Hellenized under a Western-European government were transformed into fanatical protagonists of the "assimilation policy through Hellenization" of the Christian population in the north of Olympus and in Asia Minor.¹⁰⁶

As a result of this complex process, today modern Greek national and state identity, which unites significant part of Greek citizens and various groups in the Diaspora, undoubtedly rests on the narratives and symbols of classical Greece. The Hellenic language, as opposed to modern Romaioi, was considered the language of antiquity until the nineteenth century, while today it represents

¹⁰² Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.157

¹⁰³ Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.2

¹⁰⁴ Ioannis Koubourlis *European historiographical influences upon the young Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King's College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.53-64

¹⁰⁵ Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.95

¹⁰⁶ Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p.49

a term used for the language of modern Greeks.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, the liberalized use of the demotic language in Greece from 1980 by the left-wing reformers of the totalitarian society of the Greek military junta is not returning to the language of the leaders of the “Greek uprising,” but is accepting two centuries cleansed, under classical impressions, Romaioi language.¹⁰⁸ Today, the pre-national culture, religion and the reactions of Western domination are substantially balanced by Athens, the Acropolis, the produced “classic” touristic toponymy and numerous archaeological sites across the country. All of these contemporary “evidence” confirm that Hellas is not just a romantic illusion of foreign elites, but a modern nation proud of its own history and culture.

In strengthening its state and national sovereignty, especially during the twentieth century, the Greek state utilized, with high fanaticism, the installed foreign “classical myth” not only in its relations with neighbours, but also, and even more drastically, in the policies of integration and acculturation applied to its citizens.¹⁰⁹ In the attempts to create an integrated and sustainable nation, especially on the territories where there was cultural diversity and aspirations of residents towards other national and state projects, the national identity preserved by the puritan norms of the classicists was transformed into a symbol of repression and totalitarian tendencies in Greek society.¹¹⁰ In the twentieth century, the traditional instability in Greece was complemented by periods of radical dictatorships, with ideologies integrating elements of the most radical forms of nationalism, xenophobia and racism.¹¹¹ The ideal of “classical Greece”, which at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century was designed as a radical liberal movement in Western Europe,¹¹² was transformed into a “national” identity with racist connotations by the European conservative governments and their colonial mentality in the nineteenth century¹¹³ and in the twentieth century was further transformed into a radical doctrine to “protect” the identity of the unstable Greek state against the new waves of global liberal

107 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.208-210

108 John Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, (SAGE Publications, London, UK & Thousand Oaks, California, USA & New Delhi, India, 2005), p.81

109 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity: International Relations and Ideology*, (I.B.Tauris & Co, London, UK & New York, USA, 2008), p.59,77

110 Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, *On the Stage and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship*, in the edition Michael L. Galaty Charles Watkinson, *Archaeology under dictatorship*, (Springer Science+Business Media, New York, USA, 2004), p.157-158
Erik Sjöberg, PhD thesis, *Battlefields of Memory: The Macedonian Conflict and Greek Historical Culture*, (Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden, 2011), p.90-97

111 Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, *On the Stage and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship*, in the edition Michael L. Galaty Charles Watkinson, *Archaeology under dictatorship*, (Springer Science+Business Media, New York, USA, 2004), p.163

112 Modern scholars, such as Olga Augustos, extensively elaborated the goals and ideas of early Western European Hellenism, which had no national or geographical aspirations and did not advocate for “the creation of an independent Greece, but the victory of reason and human rights” over the authoritarianism of empires and monarchies in Europe and the world.

David Roessel, *In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2002), p.15, 29

Effie F. Athanassopoulou, *An “Ancient” Landscape: European Ideals, Archaeology, and Nation Building in Early Modern Greece*, in the scientific journal *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 20, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 2002), p.279-280

113 Margarita Miliori, *Europe, the classical polis, and the Greek nation: Philhellenism and Hellenism in nineteenth-century Britain*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King's College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.68

and revolutionary ideas. At the end of the sixties and early seventies of the twentieth century, as liberal ideas of pacifism and human rights spread from Woodstock to Prague and beyond, transcending national, ideological, cultural and other barriers, Greece remained isolated under an extremely repressive military dictatorship. The “value system of the (Greek) junta (in the seventies) is crystallized in the phrase: ‘Torture is necessary to protect our civilization’ that one of the dictators expressed in response to the allegations by Amnesty International in respect of breaches of human rights in Greece.”¹¹⁴

Yet, even today, for the modern Greek political elites the classical archaeology and archaeological sites and artefacts connected to it, provides certain identity alternative to Orthodoxy and the socially influential Church, with its omnipresent religious objects, rituals and events. The classic historical fable appeared as a “new religion”¹¹⁵ from the very beginnings of the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece, and the “classical archaeology” constituted and still constitutes a bridge for the Greek political and intellectual elites to the western world, society and values. In this context are the analyses of Professor Martin Millett on classical archaeology and its contemporary connection to Greek national identity. The prominent British archaeologist and academic, referring to the role of Classical Greece, underlines the new scientific and societal realities, with the words: “Although from a contemporary (scientific) perspective this clearly distorts the evidence, creating nothing more than a modern myth, it remains politically powerful, as witnessed in the manipulation of the Classical past for the opening ceremony of the Athens Olympics in 2004.”¹¹⁶

While modern trends in archaeology and social sciences in general continuously adjust the analysis, questioning the fundamental tenets of classical archaeology,¹¹⁷ the vibrant infrastructure of foreign archaeological centres and teams, originated from the classical focus, represents even today an important avenue of intellectual dialogue of the Greek elites with the world. Finally, “the secular religion of Hellenism”, built on the narratives of classical linguistics and materialized in the findings and interpretations of classical archaeology, represents even today an important aspect of the self-cognition of Greek elites and as such intertwines, complements and democratizes the growing Neo-Orthodox tendencies in Greek society.¹¹⁸

114 Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, *On the Stage and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship*, in the edition Michael L. Galaty Charles Watkinson, *Archaeology under dictatorship*, (Springer Science+Business Media, New York, USA, 2004), p. 173

115 Yannis Hamilakis, Eleana Yalouri, *Sacralising the Past – Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece*, *Archaeological Dialogues - Volume 6*, Issue 02, (1999, (Cambridge University Press, UK), p.127-130

116 Martin Millett, *What is Classical Archaeology? Roman Archaeology*, in the edition Susan E. Alcock, Robin G. Osborne, ed., *Classical Archaeology*, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK, 2012), p.34

117 Anthony Snodgrass, Martin Millett, *What is Classical Archaeology? in the edition* Susan E. Alcock, Robin G. Osborne, ed., *Classical Archaeology*, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK, 2012), p.11-50

118 Yannis Hamilakis, Eleana Yalouri, *Sacralising the Past – Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece*, *Archaeological Dialogues - Volume 6*, Issue 02, (1999, (Cambridge University Press, UK), p.127-130

| CONCLUSION

The complex development of the society and identity in modern Greece, according to the internationally prominent American historian, professor Suzanne Marchand, is a result of the artificial imposition of European values and identities on the Greek elites of the nineteenth century. This caused long-term “misunderstandings” about the values, standards and social relations between Greece and the Western world that have “until today already taken deep root.”¹¹⁹ This line of thought is also followed by the Greek classical archaeologist at the University of Ioannina, professor Dimitris Damaskos, who explains the abuses of historical symbols and narratives by modern Greek political leaders in the twenty-first century, noting that such trends “are well known in cases of states which have gained their independence after being a satellite of some larger power or which are going through the process of decolonization”¹²⁰ In this way, Damaskos portrays a complex picture of Greece in the twenty-first century, where more than one hundred and eighty years since the proclamation of the Greek kingdom of Otto, the local and “installed”¹²¹ foreign identities and cultures create tensions, instability and divisions between political elites and radical social movements that will continue to transform and change this society in the years to come and through it, the wider region located between Europe and Asia.

In this sense, the identity buried in outdated premises of classical archaeology, as well as the neo-orthodox tendencies in the society which are often presented as diametrically opposed tendencies of Greek society, represent a unity, seen in terms of the reactions of local elites before the big waves of cultural, economic, demographic and security transformations and challenges of the globalizing world.

One of the internationally prominent Greek archaeologists, professor Hamilakis, reminds in his analyses that the “integration into the European Union and the increasing number of immigrants from Balkan countries, from Asia and from Africa, may produce a society (in Greece) that is again as multi-cultural as it was before the nineteenth century”¹²², whereas the rapid global changes would, at the same time, intensively transform the main economic, political and ideological paradigms of all European societies. In this new reality, the Greek political elites are confronted with two different paths of response. They may either use their conserved ideological and social positions in order to “potentially undermine

119 Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.41

120 Dimitris Damaskos, *Archaeology, National Identity and the Greek Museum*, (lecture) (Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 2010), p.19

121 Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.97

122 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p. 300

the effectiveness of institutional reforms¹²³ or they can try to effectively “affect political outcomes”¹²⁴ that will provide answers to the challenges of the society and the citizens of “Greece (that), of course, is constantly changing”.¹²⁵

On the other hand, European and Western elites, concerned with the situation in Greece, but also in other troubled regions, through the experience of modern Greek history, are confronted with the question, if the “multi-cultural ideologies, the (self)critique of Eurocentricity, ... and the cultural and demographic changes in western societies”¹²⁶ are able to create open, modern, democratic and developed societies or will they additionally increase differences, tensions and prejudices. Even more importantly, this historical lesson should help the process of reevaluation of the contemporary practices of insistent imposing of Western ideas, values and narratives. It certainly provides arguments that some of these contemporary practices represent reminiscence of the mistakes of the nineteenth century and the ignorance for the visions and aspirations of the local elites.

Finally, for the scientific community, the example of the modern Greek society once again strongly confirms and questions the key aspects of the “relationship of the political elites and the representation: first, that “political elites have a need to manipulate cultural identities”; second, that “certain cultural identities, are fitted candidates for manipulation, and others are not given any chance”; and third and particularly important in contemporary dynamic global reality that “certain aspects of the identity become especially important at certain times and politically irrelevant in others.”¹²⁷

123 Luis Garrido Vergara, *Elites, political elites and social change in modern societies*, Revista de Sociología No. 28, (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Chile, 2003), p. 32

124 Luis Garrido Vergara, *Elites, political elites and social change in modern societies*, Revista de Sociología No. 28, (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Chile, 2003), p. 33

125 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p. 300

126 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p. 300

127 Gregg Bucken-Knapp, *Elites, language, and the politics of identity: the Norwegian case in comparative perspective*, (State University of New York Press, Albany, USA, 2003), p.146