



МЕЃУНАРОДНА НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА
БЕЗБЕДНОСНИ КОНЦЕПТИ И ПОЛИТИКИ - НОВА
ГЕНЕРАЦИЈА НА РИЗИЦИ И ЗАКАНИ



INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
SECURITY CONCEPTS AND POLICIES - NEW
GENERATION OF RISKS AND THREATS

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PREFACE

The states of the contemporary world are feeling the consequences of the existence of dynamic and complex living conditions, conducive to asymmetric threats and risks, terrorism threats, transnational crime, dangers related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious radicalism and extremism, illegal migration, cyber attacks and the like.

The security assessment needs to encompass the changes in the character of the risks, threats and potential conflicts. It means that the actors that cause the risks, threats, potential conflicts and dangers are diverse, multilayered and, as certain threats, sometimes even asymmetric. Their identification is much more difficult than before, when the state was the sole actor. As risks and threats are acquiring an increasingly internal character, sub-national groups and ethnic communities have an ever more significant role. Organized crime oftentimes participates and cooperates with the involved actors, exploiting the situation, the shortage of resources, diseases, epidemics, natural disasters, the vulnerability of the social system; moreover, crime and terrorism are increasingly becoming transnational to a great extent. The above reasons have led to a change in the matter of interest of the security policy, that is, to a change in the policy approach, and to adopting a broader concept rather than exclusively following a political – military standpoint. This change and the new security concept and its policy have affected the national security to follow the same trend.

With regard to security development, the threats and risks to the state and to the social, economic and political relations, the state order, the human potential and civic concept, the objective need for organizing independent protection of the entire territory, the international position of the state and the realistic capacities of the country play the key role.

The vulnerability of national security ranks among the top problems that people face as individuals. Unlike the theories and practice in the past period, and the forms of threats and security of that period, the development of contemporary societies determines many more security threats relating to the economic, social, health and other spheres, even internal security. At the national level, the security of the Republic of Macedonia is a precondition for successful external and internal stability and comprehensive development of the social life of institutions and citizens.

As stability is a precondition for the approach of this region to the European Union, building common mechanisms for protection against risks and threats and crisis management are important assumptions for security consolidation and swift democratic transition of the SEE countries.

The expansion of the security concept involves the emergence of new and broader potential security threats, primarily targeting economic growth, environmental destruction, violation of human rights and migration movements.

Pursuant to the risks and threats, it is necessary to conduct a demographic analysis with the focus on the demographic movements in the country and the region, taking into account the shifts in the ethnic and religious structure (which appears as the most serious ground for separation and conflict), as well as the shifts in age structure, spatial distribution and living style based on ethnic and religious affiliation and the shifts in the ratio between the working and military capable population and the dependant population.

As a political concept, security is evidently a precondition for the existence of individual and social life and means an absence of threats and protection against them. Understanding security as an inherent interest of every individual and the broader human collectives – family, society, nation and state, the international system implies the need to expand the security concept to include these collectives. Hence, theory shapes concepts such as national and international security, and in recent times, individual, societal and global security, which indicates a significant extension of new security dimensions.

The expansion of the security concept in the Republic of Macedonia provides for inclusion of new and broader potential threats to security, primarily targeting economic growth, environmental destruction, violation of human rights and migration movements.

Mission

The mission of this conference is to encourage the academia and the security experts to share information based on their use of scientific research methods and to exploit practical experience so as to create a scientific – research dimension. The idea for organizing this conference coincides with the new trends in the security field, specifically, with the new generations of security risks and threats and the interdependence of the security concepts, strategies and policies in addressing these threats.

The papers submitted through an announcement offer solutions for identifying the security risks and threats, or the destabilizing factors that cause conflicts. In this context, and in correlation with the title of the Conference and the rational assumption for full application of the offered security concepts presented in the papers treating security issues in a number of security science sub-disciplines, they should contribute to confirming the current and creating new solutions within the existing security concepts, based on a holistic approach in view of efficient and timely dealing with the security risks and threats.

Hence, the mission of the conference is to encourage the scientific researchers to share scientific knowledge aiming to shed some light on the new generation of security risks and threats and, determine at the same time the security concept and policy for dealing with such risks.

Aims

The practical aim of this conference is multifaceted, primarily given the fact that scientific and expert literature is scarce in works and analyses on this particular issue, or even if there are such works, they are characterized by a partial scientific approach, which indicates imposed effects in practice. The aim of the conference is to obtain valid results and scientifically verified knowledge in view of implementing a rational and acceptable solution for sustaining security and addressing risks and threats. The well reasoned proofs and presentations of the obtained results and the insight in the overall situation will enable considering systemic and institutional solutions, that is, a new stage in the qualitative development of this segment.

The scientific and practical objective of this scientific conference is stimulated by the following assumptions:

- How do the contemporary concepts affect the maintenance of security in our country?
- What is the impact of the complexity and specificity of the approaches to security, particularly to its development and the social political situation in the country?

- How many and what type (both in terms of quality and quantity) of researches of the basic factors for successful implementation of the basic concepts in the national security system have been conducted to date and to what extent have they affected the strategic documents with respect to using the results thereof?
- Which of the basic concepts are most suitable and applicable in the security system of the Republic of Macedonia?
- Which are the critical areas in the security system of the Republic of Macedonia that need elements for change?
- How can we come to proposals and solutions for building an efficient security system in the Republic of Macedonia, i.e. for tracing directions for creating an appropriate security policy.

Tasks

The scientific conference in Ohrid 2017, by debating its scientific works, contributes to providing answers to questions that spur scientific and public social interest. One of these issues is the definition of the new generation of security risks and threats.

Security concepts and policies will be discussed at the conference through an open and well reasoned debate.

In this way, the Faculty of Security – Skopje continues its orientation towards organizing international conferences in the area of security, contributing to the development of scientific thought and helping the policy creators (political level) and the decision makers (senior level of practitioners) on the regional, national and local level to overcome practical problems more swiftly, simply and timely they are facing using the presented knowledge and research results.

To that end, the following topics are discussed at the conference:

Topics:

- ❖ Contemporary security – a state or a social problem
- ❖ Security as a public good and its transformation in the spirit of the new generation of security risks and threats
- ❖ Peace, security and technological development
- ❖ Risk society and risk dynamics
- ❖ Threat and risk theories
- ❖ Security and insecurity, realistic and subjective threats
- ❖ Sectors and levels of security and risks (military, economic, environmental, societal and political risks).
- ❖ Systemic risks, dependence of the technological and social risks.
- ❖ Risk assessment, exposure and vulnerability
- ❖ Risk management and conflict and crisis prevention
- ❖ Possible manifestations of extremist nationalism, racial and religious intolerance
- ❖ Forms and activities related to international terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, illegal drugs, human and weapons trafficking, dual use materials, and the consequences of weapons of mass destruction use
- ❖ Possession of substantial quantities of illegal weapons;
- ❖ Transition problems, such as corruption, urban terrorism, serious crime, including blackmails, racketeering, murders, attacks on citizens' property, economic crime,

tax evasion, insufficient building of democratic institutions system, judiciary problems

- ❖ Social problems and unemployment
- ❖ Activities of foreign special services aimed at deteriorating the security situation and thus slowing down the democratic and integration processes, particularly those related to NATO and the EU
- ❖ The consequences of the conflict of interests in terms of using the sources and roads of the strategic energy resources and impeding and blocking their import to the Republic of Macedonia
- ❖ Natural and other disasters, technical – technological disasters, human epidemics and animal diseases caused by domestic and/or external factors
- ❖ Computer crime, piracy and misuse of information technology, especially in the domain of personal data, business, official and state secret
- ❖ Degradation and destruction of the environment
- ❖ Security integration and risk prevention
- ❖ Deep political and social turmoil
- ❖ Crash of the global management system
- ❖ Corporate security as a new way of risk management.

With regard to the organization of the Conference, for eight consecutive years, it has acquired a highly renowned place in the scientific circles in the region and it has been constantly expanded in view of its further development.

**Chairman of the Organizational Board
of the International Scientific Conference**
Assistant Professor Marjan Gjurovski, Dr.Sc

Country	Original scientific paper	Review scientific paper	Professional paper	Negative reviews	Total work papers
Albania				1	1
Bulgaria	3				3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1			2
Croatia	2	2	1		5
France	1				1
Italy	1	1			2
Kosovo		2			2
Macedonia	7	31	14	2	53
Poland		2	1		3
Romania		6	1		7
Republic of Srpska, BiH	1	2		1	4
Slovenia		2			2
Serbia	5	11	6	1	23
Turkey		1			1
United Kingdom			1		1
Total work papers	21	62	24	5	112

HYBRID WARFARE THROUGH THE PRISM OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

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The history of wars as a social phenomenon is continuously evolving. This has been determined by the factors which directly reflect who will "win the war", the most important factors being: changes in international relations, shifting the center of global power, the influence of global policy and the technical - technological development of weapons.

The emergence of opponents who plan and organize wars in symmetric and asymmetric ways, implies the need for a new definition of war or the emergence of "hybrid warfare", which in itself represents a combination of: conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal activities all aiming to "win the war".

One of the basic purposes of this paper is to present the historical development of hybrid warfare by explaining its operational phases and methods.

The main hypothesis of this paper based on a historical method and comparative analysis attempts to determine: "Were operational phases of hybrid warfare present in the Ukrainian crisis, from which side and in what way".

The comparative analysis will be based on the practical models that were previously used in crises as operational phases of hybrid warfare and they will be compared to the culmination point of the Ukrainian crisis scenario.

In addition, we will make an individual analysis of the methods of hybrid warfare that were used by the Ukrainian forces supported by NATO against the Russian separatists supported by Russia and vice versa.

Keywords: evolution of hybrid warfare, operational phases, Ukrainian crisis, NATO, Russia

1. Introduction

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the international relations were unified with a strong hope that in the near future there will be less international conflicts and confrontations. Military history has, however, proved this to be a wrong hypothesis.

Nevertheless, in a short period of time, less than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new era in international relations was opened, in which the "use of force" in resolving international conflicts and wars reincarnated as a possible option for solving them.

Practically, what we stated above was illustrated practically in both wars against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thereby, if we want to explain the strategic objectives of hybrid warfare, it is first necessary to make an introduction of the evolutionary development of this kind of warfare.

The simplest way to define hybrid warfare is to say that this kind of warfare represents a combined use of conventional and irregular forces in the execution of the military campaign. The famous military historian Professor Peter R. Mansoor, defines hybrid warfare as a conflict which is carried out with a combined use of conventional and irregular forces (guerilla rebels and terrorists) that may be state or non-state actors.

Their common goal is to achieve common political interests. Seen from this perspective, hybrid warfare is an entirely new model of warfare. There are numerous examples of the use of modern information technology for achieving better results on tactical, operational and strategic level, even those in the writings of the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, whose world-renowned descriptions originate from the fifth century BC.

The irregular warfare in military history has always been classified as a serious challenge to the conventional military forces or, to be more specific, to the conventional model of warfare¹.

Over time, the guerrilla-style warfare created a very important and effective long-term impact on the impossibility of implementing NATO's effective modern military operations. The NATO operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have once again confirmed the inability and difficulties to overcome the irregular fighters without infringing human rights according to the United Nations resolutions and the accusations of the local population for disobeying the national and international regulations for public support of NATO to conduct military campaigns².

In 2000, the use of the term "hybrid warfare" became a unified way to describe modern warfare for the simple reason that the continued sophisticated development and progress of military technology reinforced the behavior of non-state actors and strengthened the methods of applying cyber warfare.

All this contributed to the creation or birth of this new kind of warfare, called "hybrid warfare", which has the elements of conventional and irregular forces and methods across the entire spectrum of the phenomenon of contemporary conflict that may lead to war³.

In 2007, the famous Professor Frank G. Hoffman, defined "hybrid warfare" as a "Modern war", which incorporates in its base a comprehensive spectrum of different models of warfare, including: conventional capabilities and capacities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist methods of violence, discrimination, cohesion and criminal activities that are manifested and implemented by non-state actors⁴.

The combination of conventional and irregular methods of modern warfare has contributed to more efficient development of hybrid warfare from its previous historical forms. In the past, conventional and irregular modern military operations were applied

¹ Peter R. Mansoor, "Hybrid War in History," in *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*, ed. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-3

² U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Hybrid Warfare*, GAO-10-136R, Washington, 2010.

³ Hoffman, Frank G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 51, 2009,34-39.

⁴ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 8.

separately compared to the fact that today they are practically used in an integrated manner. When the military campaigns conduct irregular warfare, it is an additional component of conventional warfare.

During the military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the course of 2006, the hybrid mode of warfare continually changed and evolved its methods and warfare instruments. The militants from Hezbollah, who were fully trained and equipped by Iran, surprised the Israeli Army by using a combination of conventional and guerrilla-style warfare, as well advanced technology in military equipment and communication - information systems; they were trained to use these advanced systems by the countries from which Iran bought this modern military equipment. If we review history chronology, we will see that hybrid warfare has been used as a combination of irregular and conventional methods of warfare⁵. In 2014, the grand military strategy of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), once again proved that sophisticated information technology or the so-called information or "cyber warfare" has a dominant role in the effective execution of modern military operations. There are numerous official reports from NATO which state the development of components and methods of hybrid warfare, also stated in the Strategic Concept of NATO during the Lisbon Summit of NATO in 2010⁶.

During the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and beyond, the concept of hybrid warfare has constant developed. There are numerous Western European professors who describe the word "hybrid" as tools and methods of using operational and tactical elements of the Russian Federation during the annexation of Crimea and in support of the Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine.

Russia achieved its dominance over Crimea with advanced military technology and by engaging in a combination of conventional and irregular military operations, but also by drawing on the support of political protests, economic support of the Russian separatists and Protestants through numerous non-governmental organizations, cyber operations and constant media propaganda campaigns⁷.

In an interview in July 2014, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, described the Russian strategy of warfare in Ukraine as "methods of hybrid warfare," which he defined as "a combination of military action, covert operations and aggressive media propaganda"⁸.

The Scientific Military Journal Balance in its issue of 2015, provides a complete and comprehensive definition of "hybrid warfare", which explains hybrid warfare as "use of military and non-military methods in an integrated military campaign, designed to achieve surprise, increased initiative in the theater of operations and achieving psychological advantages to the opponent through diplomatic propaganda".

Basically, all this is achieved through the sophisticated use of advanced information technology, electronic and cyber operations which are accompanied by military and intelligence components and economic pressures and sanctions.

⁵ Ibid, 9-12.

⁶ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, Department of Defense, 2010,8-10.

⁷ Carolina Vendill Pallin and Fredrik Westerlund, 'Russia's War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2009,401-403.

⁸ Mark Landler and Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Chief Warns of Duplicity by Putin on Ukraine," *The New York Times*, July 2014, 8-10.

Modern methods of asymmetric warfare are always present when the weaker opponent wants to achieve dominance over a more powerful or stronger opponent. To date, military strategy has proved that the strategy of asymmetric warfare is a successful concept⁹.

In scientific discussions, the elements which have been identified in hybrid warfare, resemble those from the fourth generation of warfare, which developed its operating elements during the 1990s¹⁰.

Chinese military strategy describes "hybrid warfare" as a development of combat elements and methods of warfare dependant on the dominance of firepower of the opposing parties; it has often been used by the weaker side, whether by its legitimate national armed forces or non-state actors. Even Chinese generals say that "hybrid warfare" represents a war without restrictive measures and rules in which nothing is "forbidden or restricted"¹¹.

2. Analysis of the differences between hybrid and unconventional warfare

NATO's unofficial military doctrine provides a comprehensive definition of hybrid warfare and hence the Chief of the US Military Forces, US military analysts and professors characterize it as a range of: conventional, irregular and cyber warfare¹². On the other hand, unconventional warfare, according to the US military doctrine, which has been generally accepted in NATO's military doctrine is defined as: special combat operations, urban and non-urban guerrilla operations in a certain area¹³.

Thus, we may say that some units from the legitimate national special forces of a state must be: trained, equipped and supported to be able to deal successfully with "guerrilla warfare", subversion, sabotage, illegal intelligence activities and to provide assistance in other unconventional activities.

The term "unconventional warfare", compared to the term "conventional warfare", has a completely opposite meaning. While conventional warfare represents a war between two or more conventional forces (war with guns, armored vehicles, tanks, etc.) or a war between legitimate powers with legitimate military means, unconventional warfare, as a form of warfare in modern military history, is a war with legitimate or conventional irregular forces (insurgent, terrorist, irregular, illegitimate powers), which use irregular tactics or "guerrilla tactics" of war, due to their weaker power, in order to defeat the stronger legitimate opponent.

Is "hybrid warfare" more contemporary warfare than "unconventional warfare" and why?

First, the definition of "hybrid warfare", which we stated above, incorporates all segments of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare, on the other hand, includes the following types of warfare: Shared national and collective defense, Fight against terrorism,

⁹ Tim Benbow. Talking 'Bout Our Generation? Assessing the Concept of Fourth-Generation Warfare, *Comparative Strategy* 27:2, 2008, 155-161

¹⁰ Donald J. Reed, Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31:8, 2008, 685-689.

¹¹ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 2-3.

¹² Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson. Hybrid Warfare, JSOU Report 13-4 August 2013, 3-5.

¹³ FM 3-05.201, (S/NF) Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (U) 28 September 2007, 22-24.

counterinsurgency operations or (COIN) operations for stabilization and unconventional warfare¹⁴.

By itself, this statement that unconventional warfare represents one of the vital segments of irregular warfare and having in mind that by definition irregular warfare is part of modern hybrid warfare, it is more than clear that hybrid warfare is much more contemporary warfare than unconventional warfare.

The change of the successor of the former global terrorist organization Al Qaeda, or the emergence of ISIS in 2004/05, led by its military and spiritual leader Abu Bakir Al-Baghdadi and Al-Zawahiri, changed their matrix of acting in cells. At the same time, the national strategy of the US and NATO of counterterrorism was announced, based on the grand strategy of DIME with active use of (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) instruments of power¹⁵.

American historian and diplomat Joseph Ney, stated that immediately after the Grand NATO strategy for counterterrorism, ISIS applied its grand strategy for attacking the so-called "soft" and "hard" targets according to military diplomacy.

According to the ISIS strategy, "hard targets" are explained as territorial expansion. Soft targets include the vital critical infrastructure: bridges, tunnels, airports, government buildings, shopping centers, hospitals and other facilities where the mass of people is large and where one explosion causes large effects.

Hence, this section of unconventional warfare is obsolete in comparison to hybrid warfare. In this segment, the strategy for dealing with hybrid warfare or, to be more precise, with one of its segments, cyber threats or "cyber warfare", is to conduct preventive and effective measures for security of the critical equipment and devices containing data on the nature of state secrets, protection of information systems in the banking sectors of the global economic corporations, protection of the information systems and regulating the road, railway, water, air transportation, etc.




Figure 1. *The essence of Hybrid operations*¹⁶

¹⁴ GAO analysis of DOD military concept and briefing documents (2012-2016).

¹⁵ NATO, 'Defense expenditures data for 2014 and estimates for 2015: financial and economic data relating to NATO defense', press release, 22 June 2015, 2.

¹⁶ Aapo Cederberg and Pasi Eronen. How are Societies Defended Against Hybrid Threats. Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Geneva, 6 November 2015, 20-22.

All this brings us to the dreadful conclusion that the main difference between hybrid and unconventional warfare is that hybrid warfare is not always able to detect the opponent, because one of the hybrid warfare components are the cyber attacks¹⁷.

Furthermore, the space theater of military operations can be unlimited and unpredictable. With the development of military technology, hybrid warfare will gain its primacy of warfare, which will make very difficult for the future NATO military operations to take certain preventive measures for protecting against cyber attacks¹⁸.

Unlike the unconventional warfare, which by definition includes combating guerrilla warfare in actual theaters of hostilities, hybrid warfare does not include space nor a front line and will increasingly use unknown space, in which it will be very difficult to identify the enemies¹⁹.

The basic feature of "hybrid" in terms of "unconventional" warfare is that the asymmetric actions of non-state actors or opponents will be effectively accomplished by using all the advantages provided by the military-technological progress in order to achieve their military-political and economic interests in terms of opposing the legitimate force.

Hybrid warfare as a modern form of warfare in modern military history and military theory is analyzed as a fifth generation of warfare. Unlike unconventional warfare, where the "center of gravity" of the forces can be determined by the location of execution of combat actions, in hybrid warfare, the "center of gravity" is unpredictable because the main attacks are conducted through invasion, destruction and destabilization of the strategic information systems that contain information about the political, military, economic and other facilities in which the state is exposed to a hybrid war.

3. Operational phases of hybrid warfare

Analyzing the operations that Russia has conducted in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine, hybrid war can be described as being composed of three main phases, each of them consisting of three sections. The first, preparatory phase concentrates on mapping out the strategic, political, economic, social and infrastructural vulnerabilities of the target country and creating the necessary means for capitalizing on them. In the case of Ukraine, Russia has been in an excellent position to do so, thanks to the long common history, the tight economic and social ties between the two countries, as well as the strong connections between the political, economic and security elites²⁰. The preparation phase includes these activities:

- Strategic preparation, exploring vulnerability points in state administration, economy and the armed forces.
- Establishing loyal NGOs and media channels on the territory of the target country.
- Establishing diplomatic and media positions in order to influence the international audience.
- Political preparation, encouraging dissatisfaction in the target country by using political, diplomatic and media tools.

¹⁷ Eve Hunter, Piret Pernik. The challenges of hybrid warfare, Analysis RKK and ICDS, April 2015, 17.

¹⁸ United States Government Accountability Office: *Hybrid Warfare*, Washington, USA, 2010, 20-23.

¹⁹ Huber, Thomas M.: *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002, 78-82.

²⁰ M. Galeotti, "‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works and How It Doesn’t", Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015, 12-14.

- Strengthening local separatist movements and fuelling ethnic, religious and social tensions.
 - Establishing contacts with local business people; making them dependent on the attacking country via profitable contracts.
 - Establishing contacts with local organized crime groups.
 - Operational preparation with coordinated political pressure, mobilizing officials and local criminal groups, mobilizing the Russian armed forces under the pretext of military exercises.
- During the preparatory phase, no violence is openly engaged²¹.

3.1. Offensive phase

All the weaknesses explored during the preparatory phase of hybrid warfare suddenly surface when the attacking country actually launches the full-scale hybrid offensive. From this moment on, hybrid war clearly becomes different from the traditional actions of Russian foreign and security policy described above. The key difference is that open, organized, armed violence starts to take place. The crisis erupted in a similar way in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine: unmarked units using high-tech Russian uniforms, weapons, vehicles and equipment appeared and started to set up barricades and checkpoints, blocking the gates of the Ukrainian military and police barracks. Not a single shot was fired, but it quickly became clear that the Ukrainian units could not leave their bases without using force against the unmarked militants. Moscow probably employed the same denial strategy, hoping that it could prevent the activation of Article V of the Washington Treaty. This would be perfectly in line with the whole concept of ‘new generation warfare’ described earlier, where the aim is to break the target country’s ability to resist by using predominantly non-military means.

The offensive phase of the hybrid war is divided into these activities:

- Organizing massive anti-government protests and riots in the attacked country, infiltrating special forces, local civilians, sabotage attacks, capturing the first administrative buildings in the targeted regions.
- The media of the attacking country launches a strong disinformation campaign.
- Disabling the central power by capturing administrative buildings in the targeted region.
- Blocking the central power’s media, establishing communication and information monopoly.
- Establishing alternative political power by declaring an alternative political centre based on the captured administrative buildings, by referring to real or fabricated traditions of separatism.
- Replacing the administrative bodies of the central power with newly established political bodies.
- The media of the attacking country strengthens the legitimacy of the new political bodies.

As demonstrated both in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the resistance potential of the target country was broken towards the end of the attacking phase, its governance,

²¹ A. Zaitsev, ‘Partizanskimi metodami. Sovremennaya armiya dolzhna umet’ voevat’ bez linii fronta’, *Voенно-promishlenniy Kurier*, No . 32 (550), 3 September 2014.

command, control and communications capabilities were severely damaged and it lost control over one or more parts of its territory²².

3.2. Consolidation phase

In order to consolidate the results achieved by the hybrid war, the attacking country needs to take additional steps to further strengthen its rule. This third phase can be referred as strategic stabilization. However, in Eastern Ukraine the scenario turned out to be radically different from the Crimean. Referendums on ‘independence’ were organized in both regions and in both cases the results were in favor of the separatists. On the peninsula, according to the ‘official’ results, more than 97% of the population voted for secession from Ukraine. The consolidation phase can be described in detail in three sections as follows:

- Political stabilization of the outcome, organizing a ‘referendum’ and decision about independence with the strong diplomatic and media support from the attacking country.
- The new ‘state’ asks for help from the attacking country²³.
- Separation of the captured territory from the target country, annexation of the captured territory (Crimea) or establishment of open or covert military presence there.
- Lasting limitation of the strategic freedom of movement, loss of territory (economy, population, infrastructure, etc.)
- Ensuring full control over its territory, the attacked country is unable to join any political or military alliance.

Crucially, they demonstrated an innate understanding of the three key target audiences and their probable behavior: the Russian speaking majority in Crimea, the Ukrainian government, the international community, specifically NATO and the EU. Armed with this information they knew what to do and what the outcomes would be.

Finally, it is worth noting that comprehensive analysis is required regarding the security risks and threats to the national security of the countries which may be exposed to hybrid attacks²⁴ in the future. Hybrid warfare could be very dangerous, especially if it uses its instruments of power for conducting cyber attacks on critical IT structure. All this gives great importance and advantage to hybrid warfare compared to unconventional warfare. While "*de jure*" the states cannot be directly exposed to open military action with an opponent, "*de facto*" they will be indirectly exposed to cyber attacks which would "destabilize" the security and peace of the countries.

4. Conclusion

Hybrid warfare has not changed the essence of war. The methods used to achieve dominance in hybrid warfare have changed their tactics and operation, but they have not changed the objectives of the war for gaining victory. However, modern military history and warfare are continually evolving the modern military understanding of the nature of war. Thus, hybrid warfare and the most modern forms of warfare today including asymmetric, unconventional, nonlinear, irregular and a new generation of warfare in the fourth and fifth generation of warfare, has highlighted the need of professors and students

²² P. R. Gregory, ‘Putin’s ‘Human Rights Council’ Accidentally Posts Real Crimean Election Results’, Forbes, 2014, 20-23.

²³ S. Walker, ‘East Ukraine goes to the polls for independence referendum’, The Guardian, 11 May 2014.

²⁴ Thomas T. L. Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2004, 237-256.

in the military academies and universities around the world to constantly and continuously develop the complexity of the armed conflicts in the XXI-st century²⁵.

Hence, in this context the word "hybrid" is a term used to explain practically this kind of warfare. Considering the fact that many armed conflicts and wars are on the line between war and peace, they often use different instruments of power that are not part of the traditional mode of warfare, which significantly hampers the effective execution of NATO's modern military operations and other collective security and defense systems²⁶.

Understanding the strategic significance of Russia in Ukraine, comes with the operationalization of a new form of warfare that cannot be characterized as a military campaign in the classic sense of the term. The invisible military occupation cannot be considered as occupation by definition. Not only were the troops already on Crimean territory stationed at the Russian naval bases, but they were also "officially" part of the autochthonous civilian militia. The deception operations occurred inside Russian territory as military exercises, including ones in Kaliningrad to increase the insecurity of the Baltic States and Poland. At the same time, the Crimean parliament officially - although not legally according to the Ukrainian constitution, asked to join the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian media became inaccessible. As a result, the Russian channels of communication propagating the Kremlin's version of the facts were able to establish a parallel reality, legitimizing the Russian actions in the realm of idea.

These will be the main guidelines for developing the Russian military capabilities by 2020:

- From direct destruction to direct influence;
- Direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
- From a war with weapons and technology to a cultural war;
- From a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groups;
- From the traditional (3D) battleground to cyber warfare and perceptions;
- From direct clash to contactless war;
- From a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's internal side and base;
- From war in a physical environment to a war in cyberspace;
- From symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;
- From a war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war²⁷.

All this leads them to believe that modern challenges have a wide range of threats to the international security that must be first identified and then appropriate effective and efficient measures are to taken to prevent and eradicate such challenges²⁸.

Taking into account everything that we have said above, we spent more time identifying the theoretical part of hybrid warfare and then accordingly, the suggested measures, instruments and methods for prevention and suppression of hybrid warfare.

First, what the creators of the national strategy need to do to combat hybrid warfare is to identify the methods for dealing with this type of warfare.

²⁵ Smith Rupert. *The Utility of force: The Art of war in modern world*, New York, 2007, 32-34.

²⁶ Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, 70-74.

²⁷ Peter Mattson. *The Russian Armed Forces Adapted to New Operational Concepts in a Multipolar World*, 2014, Riga, 12-15.

²⁸ Weir, William: *Guerrilla Warfare: Irregular Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, USA, 2008, 45-48.

In defining the strategy for modern types of warfare, such as hybrid warfare, the most important is to elaborate the influence and involvement of the modern diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power.

This increases the complexity of identifying and proposing effective measures for preventing the security threats posed by this type of warfare²⁹.

All this requires a comprehensive approach of the authorities and institutions responsible for dealing with this type of warfare and threats to national and international security which may arise from it.

The previous recommendations of the international scientific and political public suggested that the best guidelines for proposing effective instruments of power for preventing the modern way of warfare, must first be well coordinated and implemented on a national level in the national strategies of each NATO and EU country. Then, at the annual NATO and EU summits, each member state may provide the best suggestion, which they have implemented on a national level in their national strategy³⁰. And finally, the best solutions from the NATO and EU member states can be integrated in the NATO strategy or concept for addressing this type of warfare.

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²⁹ Jan Rood, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Minke Meijnders, *A world without order? Clingendael Monitor* 2015,3.

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