

This book contains three essays in economic theory: "Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem and asymmetric auctions", "Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms", and the third essay entitled "Review of the binomial and trinomial models for option pricing and their convergence to the Black-Scholes model determined option prices". In each of these essays mathematical statistics, alongside numerical optimizations has been used to prove theorems in microeconomics.











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