

**МИГРАНТСКИТЕ И БЕГАЛСКИТЕ КРИЗИ ВО ГЛОБАЛИЗИРАНИОТ  
СВЕТ: ОДГОВОРНОСТИ И ОДГОВОРИ**

**MIGRANT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD:  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPONSES**

**МИГРАНТСКИТЕ И БЕГАЛСКИТЕ КРИЗИ ВО  
ГЛОБАЛИЗИРАНИОТ СВЕТ: ОДГОВОРНОСТИ И ОДГОВОРИ**

**MIGRANT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD:  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPONSES**

Скопје, 2018

МЕЃУНАРОДНА НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА

**МИГРАНТСКИТЕ И БЕГАЛСКИТЕ КРИЗИ ВО  
ГЛОБАЛИЗИРАНИОТ СВЕТ: ОДГОВОРНОСТИ И ОДГОВОРИ**



INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

**MIGRANT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD:  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPONSES**

**INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE  
MIGRANT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD:  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPONSES**

**Editors**

Biljana Vankovska, PhD  
Oliver Bakreski, PhD  
Tanja Miloshevska, PhD

**Publishers**

Faculty of Philosophy

**Scientific committee**

Biljana Vankovska, (President), Oliver Bakreski (Macedonia), Rina Kirkova-Taneska (Macedonia), Nedžad Korajlić (Bosnia & Herzegovina), Desirée Pangerc (Italy), Cvetan Cvetkov (Bulgaria), Želimir Kešetović (Serbia), Jan Oberg (Sweden), Ivan Toth (Croatia), Iztok Prezelj (Slovenia)

**Organizing committee**

Tanja Miloshevska, Vanco Kenkov, Zoran Nacev, Goran Zendelovski

**Secretary**

Sergej CVETKOVSKI

**Graphic designer**

Angela MARINKOVSKA

**Print**

MAR-SAZ Skopje

CIP - Каталогизација во публикација

Национална и универзитетска библиотека "Св. Климент Охридски", Скопје

314.15:005.44"20"(062)

314.15(497)"20"(062)

MIGRANT and refugee crisis in a globalized world :  
responsibilities and responses : conference proceedings. Vol. 1 /  
International scientific conference 05-07 September, 2018 Ohrid ;  
[editors in chief Biljana Vankovska, Oliver Bakreski and Tanja  
Miloshevska]. - Skopje : Faculty of philosophy, 2019. - 375 стр. :  
илустр. ; 25 см

Библиографија кон трудовите

ISBN 978-608-238-156-5

а) Миграции - Глобализација - 21 в. - Собири б) Мигрантска криза -  
Балкан - 21 в. - Собири

COBISS.MK-ID 109424394



## CONTENT

1. Natasha ANGELOSKA GALEVSKA - <u>Research Approaches to Migration</u> .....	11
2. Boris KRŠEV and Zdravko SKAKAVAC - <u>Migrations in the 21st Century: Demographic, Economic and Political Opportunities and Consequences for East and West</u> .....	17
3. Jovan PEJKOVSKI - <u>International Migrations and Demographic Changes</u> .....	33
4. Goran ZENDELOVSKI and Sergej CVETKOVSKI - <u>Migration as Security Issue: New Challenges and Risks for States</u> .....	45
5. Teresa Ferreira RODRIGUES, André INACIO and Sara RIBEIRO - <u>Population Dynamics, Risks and Opportunities: The Impact of Migrations on Iberian Security</u> .....	59
6. Zoran MATEVSKI and Duška MATEVSKA - <u>Religious Exclusivism and Refugee Crisis in a Globalized World</u> .....	77
7. Desirée PANGERC - <u>An Anthropological Analysis of the Evolution of the Western Balkan Route 2000-2008</u> .....	89
8. Siniša TATALOVIĆ and Dario MALNAR - <u>Migration and the National Security Strategic Documents: USA, European Union and Russia</u> .....	103
9. Jovan MANASIJEVSKI - <u>Mainstreaming Migration into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Migration Management through Securitization and Externalization</u> ....	117
10. Nenad TANESKI and Aleksandar PETROVSKI - <u>Mass Migration as Asymmetric Threat to the National Security of Democratic States</u> .....	133
11. Žarko ĆULIBRK - <u>Emergencies as a Cause and Consequence of Refugee Crises</u> .....	149
12. Nedžad KORAJLIĆ and Tarik RAHIĆ - <u>Problems of Crisis Management in Public Procurement - Example of Procurement for Hiring Executors for Acceptance, Care and Accommodation of Migrants</u> .....	161

12. Vesna STEFANOVSKA and Bogdanco GOGOV - <u>The Image of Immigrants as "Others" and Deviants</u> .....	169
13. Pere ASLIMOSKI and Saše GERASIMOSKI - <u>Models of Socio-Cultural Acceptance/Rejection and Security Consequences at Time of Migrant Crisis</u> .....	183
14. Tsvetomira PENKOVA and Martin ASENOV - <u>Europe and Migration – Changing Attitudes</u> .....	201
15. Jasmin AHIĆ - <u>Securitization of Illegal Migration in Bosnia and Herzegovina</u> .....	217
16. Mirsad BUZAR - <u>Reflection of the Migrant and Refugee Crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina</u> .....	231
17. Muhamed BUDIMLIĆ and Muamer KAVAZOVIĆ - <u>Illegal Migration: B&amp;H Point of View</u> .....	245
18. Toni STANKOVSKI - <u>The Role of Police in Management of the Mixed Migration Flow</u> .....	269
19. Toni ANGELOVSKI and Vanco KENKOV - <u>The Border Police on Republic of Macedonia in Crisis Situations: Current Situation and Future Challenges</u> .....	285
20. Ivan TRAJKOV - <u>Managing Professional Stress to Border Police during the Migrant Crisis in the Balkan Region</u> .....	301
21. Nebojša BOJANIĆ - <u>The Role of Private Security Sector in Case of Migrant Crisis</u> .....	311
22. Gjorgji ALCESKI and Tomislav TUNTEV - <u>Private Security in the Context of a Migrant Crisis: The Security of Transport Systems as a Part of Critical State Infrastructure</u> .....	323
23. Stevko STEFANOSKI and Agron BUXHAKU - <u>The Refugee and Migrant Crisis through the Prism of the Crisis Management System of the Republic of Macedonia</u> .....	339



24. Mende SOLUNČEVSKI and Maja TIMOVSKA - <u>The Role of the Protection and Rescue System during the Migrant and Refugee Crisis in the Republic of Macedonia</u> .....	351
25. Davche NASEVSKI - <u>From Security of Borders to Human Security on Borders: Refugee Crisis between the Hammer and the Anvil</u> .....	357
26. Nikolcho SPASOV and Aleksandar PAVLESKI - <u>Connection between Conflicts and Climate Change in the Context of Global Migratory Processes</u> .....	367

# Mass Migration as Asymmetric Threat to the National Security of Democratic States

Nenad TANESKI, PhD  
Military academy „General Mihailo Apostolski“- Skopje  
E-mail: [nenoreal@yahoo.com](mailto:nenoreal@yahoo.com)

Aleksandar PETROVSKI, PhD  
Military academy „General Mihailo Apostolski“- Skopje  
E-mail: [aleksandar.petrovski@ugd.edu.mk](mailto:aleksandar.petrovski@ugd.edu.mk)

**Abstract:** In the 21st century, two very important factors have special significance for national security: demographic movements and threats from militant Islamic organizations. The latter misuse the large-scale demographic movements and exploit the weakness of immigration policies and laws of the Western democracies. The management of mass migration and the refugee crisis are a serious security challenge for any state because migration flows have an impact on the spread of international terrorism and endangering the national security interests. As one might expect, migration management is a far greater security challenge for smaller, weaker countries than for developed societies. Refugees and migrants bring in their own culture, beliefs, fears, and hopes, and Western states can only assume whether they want to integrate or assimilate into their culture. Mass migration and refugee crisis directly affect criminal, terrorist and extremist activities, human trafficking, ethnic tensions, and sectarian violence. Consequently, these developments affect the state's capacities, autonomy and power. The threat is, however, not systematic but appears in certain aggravating circumstances such as an illegal migration, made up of groups of people of different ethnic belonging. In a new global security environment, countries that are able to formulate and implement migration policies will be safer. National security means, among other things, not only securing the state borders, maintaining the military power and protection of national sovereignty, but it also includes appropriate policies with regard to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. This paper tries to identify the potential threats from the migrant and refugee crisis for democratic states, the measures that could be undertaken, and the revision of existing approaches to conducting this asymmetric threat in the direction of strengthening national security.

**Keywords:** mass migration, national security, asymmetric threat, terrorism

## Introduction

In recent years, millions have migrated from their homes to other countries, some voluntarily seeking economic opportunities, and some of them forced by political turmoil, persecution or war, and have left their countries seeking asylum elsewhere. Sometimes, by the receiving country, migrants are considered a positive opportunity, but migration is often seen as a threat. Due to the continuing influx of war refugees from Syria and economic migrants from Africa, the social and political stability of Europe and the United States is endangered. In addition, migrants in the host country are trying to impose their rights and religious convictions. Some of them, instead of contributing to their new countries, use the host country as a place for recruitment, fundraising and a place to carry out terrorist attacks.

Today, national security is generally regarded as a rather complex phenomenon in many respects. The multidimensionality of the concept of "national security" requires a special approach to its study. The primary goal of the national security system is to create and maintain internal and external conditions conducive to the realization of the most important areas of national security through which sustainable economic development will be achieved. Threats to national security include the dynamic development of migration processes that cause an increase in inter-ethnic tensions. Threats from terrorism carried out by militant Islamist organizations in connection with the great mass of refugees and migrants and their limited level of integration in the US and Europe. (Moens and Collacott, 2008)

## Refugees and Migrants as a Security Threat

Over the past years, mass migration and refugee crisis have climbed high on the security agenda in Europe and the United States. The perception of this phenomenon as a security threat has developed along with the rapid increase in the number of migrants around the world: 154 million in 1990, 191 million in 2005, 214 million in 2010, 232 million in 2013, in 2017 to reach a figure of 258 million. (UN, International Migration Report, 2017)

Refugees or migrants, is the question that has plagued Europe after several thousand waves, daily "attacks" its borders.

If previously the Syrians were the most numerous among the refugees, who escaped from the cruel war with their families massively leaving family homes and flee to Europe in the recent period there was a decrease of Syrian citizens transiting through the "Balkan route". According to the analysis from the security services, it is a symbolic drop on account of individuals from Pakistan or Iran, however, these data are in favour of claims that "refugee

crisis" are trying to seize a large number of citizens of countries that are safe for living. In these mixed migrant groups generally we can identify:

- Economic migrants, who are trying to escape poverty and seek a better life, legally or illegally, temporarily or the long term. Theoretically, when they will receive protection from their government should be returned home. (Dalton, 2008)
- Refugees, who are forced to leave their country of origin due to well-founded fear from persecution because of their race, religion, nationality or because of membership in a particular social or political group or political persuasion. After they get refugee status, they have certain legal rights and protection in accordance with international law. (Zutsi et al., 2011) They are different from economic migrants because refugees are forced to leave their country, but economic migrants are leaving voluntarily for economic reasons.
- Asylum seekers, people who are fleeing their home country and seek a refuge in another country where they apply for asylum, demanding the right to be recognized as refugees. They can receive legal protection and assistance until their status is not resolved formally. (Whittaker, 2006)
- People without citizenship, persons who are not considered citizens of any state under national law.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks sparked reforms in European countries with regard to immigration policies, such as securitization for the protection of its citizens and migrants from terrorism and the opening of doors for migrant workers. (Weiner, 1992). But what security risk are refugees and migrants? It is fundamental that the threat must be thoroughly defined and characterized. The reference object of safety must be clearly identified - the object in danger and in need of protection. Also, the logic linking the threat and the reference object must be clearly stated so that the chain that connects the causes - the threat and the consequences - to the reference objects can be followed. All these concepts should be expressed within the framework of the migration analysis as a threat. In terms of discourse, the framing of an issue as a security matter occurs when a discourse takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998). In the general sense of the word, security refers to the absence of threats. The traditional approach to international security focuses primarily on military issues. From this perspective, the state is the reference facility that needs protection from military threats. However, security studies in the Cold War era have gone beyond the approach of the state-centric approach, extending the definition of security that included a number of potential threats (Lohrmann, 2000).

The concept of social security is primarily concerned with the issue of collective identity, that is, the ability of a society to remain in its essential character under varying

conditions or real threats. In the context of the refugee crisis and migration, it refers to the ways in which a country's citizens see their cultural, linguistic, religious or national identity that they may be endangered by migrants. From this perspective, the national values of the host country are reference objects that are under threat. The impending danger of migration as a social security threat to the state does not represent an objective and universal threat, but a subjective threat, which depends on the ways in which the host state is defined. While some states are proud of their cultural diversity, others feel that multiculturalism is undesirable. In this case, the migrant and refugee crisis can be seen as a social security threat, because it endangers the traditional national identity and the basic values of the state. The inability of migrants to integrate or assimilate has a negative effect on society and the stability of the government.

Mass migration and the refugee crisis also pose a threat to the national interest of the state through its impact on the economy of the host country and the country of origin. Expanding the definition of security that encompasses the economic sector has led to increased attention to the economic challenges caused by migration, and migration has, as a result, been marked as a security issue. These are economic migrants, as well as refugees and asylum seekers, who are considered to endanger the economic security of the country. Also, migrants, and in particular refugees and asylum seekers, are a threat to the social protection system and assistance to the host country. Refugees and asylum seekers are presented as a burden that illegally exploits the host country's social assistance system, unable to withstand the inflow of migrants. (Huysmans, 2006) The high number of migrants and their poverty also constitutes an economic threat to the state, which will create a shortage of housing, negative implications in education, transportation, sanitation, and communication services. All of this is followed by expressed dissatisfaction with the local community because it believes that migrants not only take over their jobs, but also social benefits. Economic adverse effects, social changes, overburdening in institutions and other sources of difficulties observed after mass migration are easily attributed to the presence of migrants and thus rise as social security problems. The rising inflow of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers is inevitably a fiscal challenge that the host country has to face, while the effects of migration on social spending vary among states and can change over time.

Social and economic security is obviously closely linked, since the view of migrants as an economic burden is caused by the perception of them because of the treatment of foreigners visibly "different" from us. In addition to social and economic security, internal security is threatened by migration. The notion of migration as a threat to internal security present at the end of the 20th century. The Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention

linked migration to border control, transnational organized crime and terrorism. (Huysmans, 2000) Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, migration has risen higher on the security agenda, countries have strengthened immigration policies by linking it with terrorist activities. As an example, we will point out the measures taken in the United States. The then-President George W. Bush approved a strategy to fight terrorism, the US Immigration Service was involved in the Homeland Security Department, institutionalizing immigration as a threat to internal security. Six weeks after 11 September, the Patriot law was passed, border controls were tightened, and surveillance over foreign citizens in the US was increased, and the government was allowed to detain, prosecute and expel foreigners suspected of terrorist activities. But, according to certain security experts, the threat of terrorism by migrants and refugees does not represent an objective reality. According to certain perceptions, the panic, and not the real terror of terror, forces the public to accuse a certain group of people, signifying them for enemies. However, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, Madrid 2004, London 2005, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers were identified as enemies. Nor can it be denied that in some countries there is a link between the increased migrant influxes of increased crime rates, that is, cities with a high crime rate have a larger number of migrant populations. While terrorism is undoubtedly a real threat to the internal security of states around the world, its link to immigration must be explored.

### **The Effects of Mass Migration on the Growth of the Muslim Population in Europe**

In recent years, Europe has experienced a record influx of asylum seekers, migrants and refugees fleeing conflicts in Syria and other predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East. This sparked a negative reaction among Europeans, a growing number of political parties advocating the cessation of migrants' flows, and groups that protested against the "Islamization" of the continent emerged. According to new projections of the American Pew Research Center, the Muslim population in Europe in the period until 2050 should be doubled and possibly triple. The projections contained in the report "The growth of the Muslim population in Europe" confirm the well-known fact: the continued decline in birth rates in European countries, followed by mass migration from the Muslim world, will quickly lead to Islamization of Europe. The research centre report offers three projections based on three different scenarios involving migration over the next three decades. The starting point for all three scenarios is the Muslim population in Europe defined in 28 countries in the European Union, plus Norway and Switzerland. It is estimated that in 2010 the number was 19.5 million

(3.8% of the total population in Europe) so that in 2016 the number of Muslims reaches 25.8 million (4.9% of the total population in Europe).

According to the first scenario, a complete suspension of the migration from now until 2050 is foreseen. This scenario will not happen but is modelled to determine how the future might look like the migration removed as a parameter. According to this scenario, the Muslim population in Europe is expected to increase by about 10 million people, from about 25.8 million in 2016 to 35.8 million in 2050. The Muslim population will grow not only because of an increase in absolute numbers but because the number of non-Muslims in Europe is expected to decrease by about 10%.

According to the second variant, which is most likely, the assumption is that from the second half of 2016, the refugee wave from the Middle East will slowly decrease, but the "regular" migration to Europe will continue. Under these conditions, the number of Muslims in Europe could reach 57.9 million or 11.2% of the European population in 2050.

The third scenario is based on the high flow of refugees in the period from 2014 to 2016, to continue indefinitely in the future with the same religious composition. In that case, the number of Muslims could reach 75.6 million, or 14 percent of the total population in Europe by 2050 - representing a nearly triple increase from the current state. According to this scenario, the Muslim population in Sweden - formerly a homogeneous Christian country - will reach almost one third (30.6%) of the total population by 2050, Australia (19.9%), Germany (19.7%), Belgium, France (18%), Norway (17%), Britain (16.7%), Denmark (16%), the Netherlands (15.2%), Finland (15%) and Italy (14.1%).

In other words, in Germany, if the flow of refugees continues, the Muslim population will increase from the current 4.950.000 (6%) to 17.490.000 (about 20%) by 2050, compared with 11% according to the second scenario and 9% without further migration according to the first scenario. In France, the Muslim population will increase from today's 5,720,000 (8.8%) to 13,210,000 (18%) by 2050 according to the third scenario, 17.4% according to the second scenario and 12.7% without further migration. In the UK, the Muslim population will increase from today's 4.130.000 (6.3%) to 13.480.000 (17.2%) according to the third scenario, 6.7% according to the second scenario and 9.7% without further migration. In Belgium, the Muslim population will increase from today's 870,000 (7.6%) to 2,580,000 (18.2%) according to the third most critical scenario, 15.1% according to the second scenario and 11.1% without further migration.

Table. 1 Top list of countries of origin for Muslim migrants to Europe (source: Pew Research Center 2017)

*Estimated counts of Muslims migrating from each country of origin, 2010-2016*

Top 10 origins of Muslim migrants		Top 10 origins of Muslim refugees		Top 10 origins of regular Muslim migrants	
Syria	650,000	Syria	610,000	Morocco	360,000
Morocco	370,000	Afghanistan	180,000	Pakistan	240,000
Pakistan	270,000	Iraq	140,000	Bangladesh	230,000
Bangladesh	230,000	Somalia	60,000	Libya	170,000
Iran	220,000	Iran	50,000	Iran	170,000
Afghanistan	180,000	Eritrea	50,000	Jordan	150,000
Libya	180,000	Pakistan	30,000	Algeria	140,000
Jordan	150,000	Sudan	10,000	Senegal	70,000
Iraq	140,000	Mali	10,000	Somalia	70,000
Algeria	140,000	Nigeria	10,000	India	70,000

However, no one can say with certainty how big the population in Europe will be in 2050 because the estimates of population numbers are definitely dependent on who or which government or non-governmental institution investigates the problem and makes calculations. For example, in Spain, according to the Pew Research Center, it is estimated that the Muslim population has a population of 1,180,000 or 2.6% of the total population. However, Spain's Union of Islamic Communities (UCIDE) estimated that the Muslim population of Spain at the end of 2016 was 1,919,141 or 4.1% of the total population.

According to the Pew Research Center, there are approximately 3.45 million Muslims in the United States in 2017, that is, Muslims make up about 1.1% of the total population. Muslims in the US are not as numerous as the number of Americans who through religion identify themselves as Jews. At the same time, projections suggest that the Muslim population in the United States will grow much faster than the Jewish population in the country. By 2040, Muslims will replace the Jews as the second largest religious group for Christians. By 2050, the American Muslim population should reach 8.1 million, or 2.1% of the total population in the country - almost twice as much today.

## Mass Migration and Terrorism

Is migration from one country to another related to terrorism? In other words, is terrorism dispersed by migration flows, that is, whether there are arguments for the claim that mass migration represents a link between states, leading to a division of policies, ideologies and,



finally, to terrorism? If so, it can very easily be concluded that migrants can be a medium that facilitates the penetration of terrorism through the refugee or migrant route.


Terrorism, migrants, and refugees have a long and painful history. Important terror groups, such as Fatah, Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), emerged from the 1948 Palestinian refugee crisis. It took them many years, in the end, frustrated and politicized refugees, who had little chance of integrating into their host countries, joined the militant groups. The Afghan refugee community in Pakistan has created the Taliban. Somalian refugees were assisted by the al-Shabaab terror group. Because most refugees come from the region where the Islamic State operates, it is consequently to assume that the jihadist group has infiltrated its fighters among refugees who will attack in European countries.

This can be confirmed by the example of the Hamburg cell, a group of radical Islamists who became operational with the Sept. 11 attacks. This terrorist cell was formed by an immigrant student community abroad. The cell was formed by Mohammed bin Nasser Belfast, an illegal migrant who had been illegally living in Germany for twenty years before being given legal status. (Sageman, 2004)

Persons like Mohammed bin Nasser Belfast, work as intermediaries between their terrorist organization and migrants, using their established social ties, for recruiting and indoctrination in their activities. Migrants coming from countries based on terrorist organizations may be linked to the emergence of terrorist movements because they, through the process of interaction and socialization in the host country, can very easily influence the creation and shaping of the social identity of the other migrants, for their commitment to a particular cause. At the moment of the influx of migrants and refugees, the terrorist cells through their experienced operatives, are making direct and group people of the same ethnicity throw the expanding of their ideology and directly implementing a phase of initial recruitment. The influx of migrants is melting into a network that has formed their ethnic diaspora that is rich in social capital. Later, migrants can easily be used as a political resource, and joining a particular terrorist cell is in a final phase.

In 2015, the EU received 1.3 million asylum applications, of which nearly half a million were from Syrian citizens, and the other half were from Iraqi, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan, areas where the most dangerous terrorist groups in the world operate. During that period, the terrorist organization Islamic State - ID, through their media supporters from Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, tried to make a propaganda campaign in which refugees and migrants portrayed them as "Infidels - unbelievers" fleeing from the Caliphate. "Infidels" who, instead of defending their Muslim allies, seek shelter in non-Islamic countries. The ability of the ID

to use refugees and migrants as "psychological weapons" has been sparked by far-right politicians across Europe who have demanded the closure of the borders. On the other hand, humanitarian organizations oppose such views, emphasizing that refugees are saved from terrorism, and not part of its network.



Graps 1. Terrorism deaths in EU 2006-2015 (source EUROPOL 2016)

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the refugee crisis affects the growth of terrorism in the EU, but the fact is that there is a huge increase in deaths caused by militant terrorists, and especially after the influx of one million refugees in 2015. This is illustrated by the graph of Europol - Terrorism deaths in EU 2006-2015.

The report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the fight against terrorism warns that perceptions linking migrants with terrorism are wrong because they can produce reckless policies or policies that violate human rights and thus create conditions favourable to terrorism. (UN Special Rapporteur, 2016) While the Europol report from 2016, the ID's work has been revised, and the radicalization of migrants and refugees in Europe is a real and immediate danger. (EUROPOL, 2016).

According to Hans-Georges Maasen, head of the German Federal Security Agency (BfV), in June 2016, at least 17 known terrorists travelled to Europe via the Balkan refugee route. (Von der Mark, 2016) In addition to these 17 cases, earlier in February 2016, the German security agency reported that more than 100 information confirmed that in Germany, militants were among refugees. In 2016, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) announced

that the official ID strategy was to infiltrate operatives among refugees travelling from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe. (Scarborough, 2017)

By analyzing a particular group of attacks that have taken place in Europe over the past few years, a clear picture of whether certain individuals are radicalized before they arrive in Western Europe or after their arrival in the host country will provide a clear picture:

- On December 31, 2017, in Germany - Berlin, a Syrian fugitive attempted to kill people who he was terrified of being "Infidels - unbelievers".
- On October 1, 2017, an illegal migrant from Tunisia knifed two women at the station of Saint-Charles in Marseille, France. Soldiers who patrol killed the assailant.
- An attack in Würzburg, on July 18, 2016: Pakistani asylum seeker, arrived in Germany in 2015.
- On 31.08.2017, in Sweden - Stockholm, a police officer was stabbed in the neck of a Muslim migrant.
- On August 25, 2017, in Belgium - Brussels, a Somali asylum seeker attacked the police with a machete, shouting Allah and carrying the Qur'an.
- On August 25, 2017, in England - London, a 26-year-old Bangladesh immigrant, chanting "Allah Akbar" with a sword attacked policemen.
- On 18.08.2017 in Finland - Turku, Moroccan asylum seeker, with a knife killed two women.
- On 28.07.2017 in Germany - Hamburg, a United Arab Emirates migrant, kills one with a knife and injures five people.
- On 17.07.2017 in Italy - Milan, a migrant with a knife pierces a policeman, shouting that he is a martyr for Allah.
- On June 3, 2017, in England - London, an attack on pedestrians on the London Bridge was carried out, eight people were killed and part of the attackers were illegal migrants.
- On 30.06.2017 in Austria - Linz, a Tunisian migrant knife kills two people in their home.
- A bombing raid in Ansbach-Germany on June 24, 2016, the attack was carried out by a Syrian asylum seeker, injuring 15 people.
- An attack on Stockholm on April 7, 2017, an executioner was an Uzbek citizen to whom the asylum application was denied.
- On 01.01.2017 in Istanbul - Turkey, an armed assailant killed 39 and wounded 70 people. The attacker was an Uzbek illegal migrant.

- The December 2011 attack in Berlin, a Tunisian citizen, came to Italy in 2011 to escape from a prison sentence in Tunisia. In July 2015, after several years in an Italian prison, he travelled to Germany. In April 2016, he applied for asylum under a false name. The request was rejected, and the German authorities tried to deport him back to Tunisia.
- On August 6, 2016, in Belgium - Charleroi, an illegal migrant from Algeria, attacked two police officers and severely injured them.
- On 21.12.2015 in Germany - Michendorf, the Syrian refugee chanting Allah with a knife attacked a man on a bus.
- On 13 November 2015, in France - Paris, three co-ordinated terrorist attacks were carried out in which 130 people were killed and 100 were wounded. A number of perpetrators are illegal migrants who used the refugee crisis to enter Europe.
- On September 29, 2015, in Denmark - Copenhagen, a Palestinian migrant sympathizer of the ID with a knife pierced a policeman.

According to the annual report and analysis of Frontex for 2016, the perpetrators of the Paris attacks in November 2015 used the migration flows to join the EU. Former French Interior Minister Bernard Kazneuu said the ID has an entire factory for making false passports and passports stolen in Iraq, Syria and Libya used to enter Europe. These statements are part of the increased securitization of migrant control and border policies. In August 2016, Europol sent an anti-terror team to Greece with the task of separating potential 60,000 migrants from the country's migratory camps.

Since 2014, it has been estimated that some 27,000 foreign fighters have joined the ID in Iraq and Syria. Of these, 6000 are from Europe, most often from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In the past period, we are witnessing a gradual degradation of the power of the ID, and some of its foreign fighters take advantage of the migration routes to re-enter Europe. In doing so, they engage in terrorist activities and thus establish the link between migration flows and terrorism. (The Soufan Group, 2015) Returners - foreign fighters who are residents of Europe and the inability of the security services for their detection increases the threat. The attacks in Belgium in January 2015, in November 2015 in France and the two attacks in March 2016 in Brussels, provide an example of the previous claim. Parts of the participants in these attacks were European citizens who fought on the fronts in Syria and Iraq, to return later to Europe and carry out the attacks. Because they were part of the persons suspected of being listed in the EU Information Exchange Database, they infiltrated the migration routes and did not come back to Europe.

Migrants coming from countries in the Middle East and Africa, who are cradling modern terrorism, have previously established strong links and connections in European countries, ties that ease the breakthrough of the militant Islamist ideology. That is, terrorist organizations abuse these connections, and the common country of origin or ethnicity is the most important condition for radicalization and mobilization of new recruits. All previously offered arguments may be considered as a confirmation of the thesis that terrorist organizations use mass transnational migration to fulfil their ideological goals and carry out terrorist attacks in Europe. It can be concluded that this is achieved by recruiting new members - migrants who join the already established terrorist networks and through returnees - experienced fighters who take advantage of the migrant - refugee route to return to Europe.

## Conclusion

Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, their activities and the current influx of refugees are a serious security threat for Europe. They easily adapt to the weaknesses and changes in their surroundings. From here we can conclude that the intersection of the threat of terrorism and the constant flow of migrants represents a new uncertain asymmetric threat.

In the past few years, in terms of combating terrorism and dealing with migration, the EU has taken steps to confirm the key role of information exchange and border management. In 2015 and 2016, several EU countries have introduced tightened border control measures and the European Counter-Terrorism Center and the European Migrant Smuggling Center have been set up. In March a partnership agreement was signed with Turkey, and at the moment when Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia closed the borders and the Balkan route was declared closed. It was followed by the temporary establishment of the EU Passenger Name Record Directive (PNR). Frontex was renamed the European Border and Coast Guard, and its mandate was extended and its facilities increased. The airlines were obliged to hand over passenger data entering or leaving the EU Member States - Passenger Name Record (PNR).

European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) was established in order to strengthen security checks and gather information for travellers coming to Europe without a visa. This way of visa-free travel for EU entry is most often practised by criminals and terrorists, therefore this system should contribute to the more efficient management of the external borders of the EU. In April 2017, new rules for controlling the external borders

of the EU began to apply. This involves systematic checks for all passengers, due to the adopted amendments to the Schengen Borders Act, according to which Schengen member states are bound to tighten control. These new rules were adopted on a proposal from the European Commission after the Paris attacks in November 2015. According to the previous practice, the border guards only routinely checked the travel documents of EU citizens. But then, the documents are checked in the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Interpol database for stolen and lost travel documents, as well as in-state bases. All passengers who are not part of the Schengen area will be thoroughly checked and compared personal data and the number of passports with the data of persons for whom a warrant has been issued.

The Schengen Information System (SIS) was promoted to SIS II. The system provides police, border control, customs, and European institutions (such as Europol and Eurojust), at any time, a database of individuals and objects of interest, such as criminals, terrorists, stolen documents, and vehicles. This system is very important because of the ability to exchange real-time information from a particular country to a central database, which can then be used for the needs of another service that needs this information. Most of Paris's attackers were registered in international databases but were not detected by the services of the EU's external borders. During the great influx of refugees in 2015, member states which are the external border of the EU have suffered from a significant lack of technological capacity and human resources needed to use these databases in the process of registering and registering migrants and asylum seekers. The reasons for the misunderstanding about joint investments in the protection of the EU's external borders are numerous and complex, yet one of the most obvious is that police and border management were held responsible for security-intelligence services responsible for national security. This is backed up by the fact that states have different methods of administration and registration, and hence the information that is transmitted in international databases is inadequate and inconsistent. Obviously, it is necessary to improve the cooperation in the information sharing of information, in order to avoid problems that arise because of the different national security system's practices, competencies and capacities and border control between EU countries. The focus of the EU in the framework of information between States and the joint capacity building of the entities responsible for internal security is to strengthen the national security of states and national border controls of member states. This return to the national framework is an attempt to maintain national security through the sovereign management of national borders.

The decisions to strengthen the national security of European states in order to better protect their national borders to the detriment of initiatives and agreements with the EU will not reduce the threat of possible terrorist activities. An effective response requires

greater joint operational, technical and administrative support at the external borders of the EU, which will provide electronic connections to the relevant Interpol and Europol databases and the efficient processing of migrants and refugees at all crossings at the external borders of the EU. But strengthening the EU's external border controls to detect prospective terrorists or returnees from the Middle East battlefields should never compromise the protection of refugees.

Terrorists in Europe are EU residents, foreign fighters who joined al-Qaeda and ID in Syria who used migration flows to return to Europe, but there are people who seek asylum in European countries on various grounds. Perhaps at first glance, the terrorist threat in Europe has no direct connection with the migrant crisis and refugees, but the analysis of the attacks in recent years confirms that detailed research is needed to what extent the radicalization of this vulnerable category of people and their potential links with terrorist organizations.

The migration crisis for the EU is an event like that of September 11, 2001, for the United States. On that day, it changed for a moment, and the United States discovered its vulnerable point. The burglary of migrants will have the same effect for Europe. History proves that neither economic nor military power fail to prevent the disappearance of civilizations. The EU is at a crossroads, where it has to decide how best to deal with the new global order, global migration, and terrorism. The large wave of uncontrolled migration from the Middle East and North Africa has to a certain extent caused the termination of political co-operation by certain EU members and a massive deviation in public opinion. According to some EU member states, the fundamentals of European civilization have been attacked by transnational criminal militant forces from the Middle East, which for the first time since the Cold War pose a growing threat to Europe's geopolitical stability. The exit should be sought "from the foot to the top," with mutual cooperation and understanding to fill the gap between the intelligence services, governments, and the public, jointly building a new European peace regional policy. But the threat of bringing terrorists into the country among refugees should be evaluated objectively as a matter of national security, not treated as an expression of conservative or liberal political views on immigration.

## References:

1. BBC News (2015) "Islamic State video campaign urges migrants to stay", accessed on <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34291726> date 12.01.2018
2. Buzan B. Wæver O. and de Wilde J. (1998). *Security. A new framework for analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner

3. Dalton D. (2008) *Economic Migrants*, Paw Prints, Heinemann Library
4. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, (2017) *International Migration Report 2017 Highlights* (ST/ESA/SER.A/404), United Nations, New York
5. EUROPOL (2016) *Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited*
6. Huysmans J. (2000) "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39(5)
7. Huysmans J. (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU*, London: Routledge
8. Lohrmann R. (2000) „Migrants, Refugees, and Insecurity: Current Threats to Peace?“ *International Migration* Vol. 38, No. 4
9. Moens A. Collacott M. (2008), „Immigration policy and the terrorist threat in Canada and the United States“, Fraser Institute, Canada,
10. Sageman M. (2004) *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press
11. Scarborough R. (2017) "Islamic State finds success infiltrating its terrorists into refugee flows to West", *The Washington Times*
12. The Soufan Group (2015) *Foreign Fighters: An updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq*, New York
13. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2016) *Refugees and terrorism: "No evidence of risk"* – New report by UN expert on counter-terrorism
14. Von der Mark F. (2016) "The risk of open borders". *Deutsche Welle*
15. Whittaker D. (2006) *Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Contemporary World*, Oxon, Routledge
16. Zutsi R., Satpute J. and Tahir S. (2011) *Refugees and the Law*, Second Edition, New Delhi, Socio-Legal Information Cent