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СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

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
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CONTENTS:

THE FAILED KOSOVO NEGOTIATIONS

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Abstract: *Early 1990s of the 20ʰ century witnessed a number of conflicts as a result of the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The international community employed its crisis diplomacy and mediation in order to put an end of the armed conflicts that were devastating the country. Dayton Agreement signed in 1995 was to endorse regional balance on the territory of former Yugoslavia, thus ceasing ethnic cleansing and more bloodshed. Until 1990 Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, declaring its independence in 1991. However, international community's indifference added for the Kosovo conflict to culminate in late 1998. Thus, negotiations were undertaken in early 1999 aiming at deescalating the crisis and resolving the conflict.*

The paper looks into the context of the failed negotiations and elaborates on their failure putting a special emphasis on the structural aspects of negotiation analysis. The data presented support the belief that it requires a great expertise on the part of mediators and negotiators in order to persuade the involved parties of mutually enticing opportunity.

Keywords: *negotiations, conflict, crisis, agreement, diplomacy.*

> "The way [Ambassador] Hill's plan was drafted, the negotiations will fail."
>
> *-Kosovar negotiator at Rambouillet* [2]

Introduction

The conflicts that arose from the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were not completely resolved by the crisis diplomacy and mediation of the early and mid 1990s that culminated in the landmark Dayton Accords of 1995. The disintegration and ethnic cleansing had been stopped only temporarily. Kosovo, once an autonomous province of Serbia, had already declared its independence in 1991 after a popular referendum, but the international community's response indicated either indifference or dangerous neglect. The Kosovo conflict became critical in late 1998. Three instances of crisis negotiations were undertaken from February to March 1999

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[2] Jonathan Landay, "Inside the Kosovo peace talks," *Christian Science Monitor,* February 10, 1999, vol. 91, no. 52, p5.

in order to accomplish two ambitious goals: 1) protect the human rights of Kosovar civilians and create an autonomous status for Kosovo and, 2) do so without violating the territorial integrity of Serbia/Federal Yugoslav Republic (FRY).[3] Each of these three attempts to deescalate the crisis and resolve the conflict failed to avert further bloodshed.

An internationalized armed conflict ensued, pitting NATO air forces against Serbian ground targets. In the aftermath of the armed conflict, the Serbs were forced to withdraw their forces from Kosovo and the international community began to administer Kosovo under a limited interim arrangement that comes to a close as this manuscript goes to publication.[4] This article briefly reviews the context of the failed negotiations and then provides an analysis of their failure with a special emphasis on the structural aspects of negotiation analysis.

The data presented here tends to support Zartman's contentions (2006) that a mutually enticing opportunity (MEO) is needed to bring the parties toward agreement and that great skill on the part of mediators and negotiators is needed to persuade them of the MEO. In this case, the Contact Group and NATO's promise of inducements to the Kosovars (though less than their maximal demands) and threats of losses against the Serbs were insufficient and perhaps even counterproductive in the search for a negotiated solution.

Crisis Diplomacy Leads to an Initial Agreement to Deescalate the Conflict

Even while the war in Bosnian took center stage in the politics of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia during the first half of the 1990s, commentators and insiders occasionally warned of the potential for another wave of genocidal violence and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.[5] Until 1990, Kosovo had enjoyed constitutional status as an autonomous province of Serbia within the Yugoslav Republic. Kosovo was populated by at least three main ethnic identity groups: Albanians, Serbs and Roma, with Albanians consisting of perhaps 90% of the population. In 1995 Kosovars elected Ibrahim Rugova as the President of their self-proclaimed independent "Republic of Kosova" but Serbian manipulation, rejection and repression of Kosovo's fledgling non-violent movement for independence led to the creation of an armed insurgency, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and deepened political divisions among ethnic Albanian Kosovars.

Kosovars continued to suffer violent attacks from Serb forces and paramilitaries from 1997 onward. An international coalition known as the Balkan Contact Group,[6] originally formed to coordinate global diplomacy to end the Bosnia war, was reactivated to prevent the spread of war to Kosovo throughout 1998. Later in the year, the United Nations Security Council invoked the binding Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter in its Resolution

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[3]   The terms Serbia and Federal Yugoslav Republic (FRY) are to some extent used interchangeably in this section although at the time of the events, Slobodan Milosevic was president of the FRY while Serbia retained a separate, subordinate government as a component republic of the federation.

[4]   See press statements by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, regarding the possibilities of Kosovo independence. For example, see the press release December 21, 2005, http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/051220_Ahtisaari.doc.htm

[5]   David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 78, 304-305.

[6]   The final composition of the Balkan Contact Group was the United States, the Russian Federation, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Christoph Schwegmann, "The Contact Group and its Impact on the European Institutional Structure," *Occasional Papers* 16, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, June 2000.

1199 of September 23, 1998 (passed 14 to 0, with China abstaining) calling for the cessation of all hostilities, for humanitarian action, and the renewal of political dialogue while warning of "additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."[7] The additional measures were not spelled out.

Nevertheless the Serbs did not comply with the Security Council's warning. Far from withdrawing their forces, "three particularly shocking massacres of civilians in and near the neighbouring villages of Gornje Obrinje/Obri e Eperme (Glogovac/Gllogoc) and Donje Obrinje/Obri e Ulet (Srbica/Skenderaj)" came to light.[8] In the months preceding the Resolution 1199, the Security Council estimated 230,000 Kosovars had fled their homes due to Serbian attacks.

However, the United Nations Security Council proved a difficult forum in which to support global diplomacy with a credible threat of force against Serbia. Russia and China were disposed to use their Security Council vetoes to prevent any UN-sanctioned attack on Serbia. The other members of the Contact Group were not eager to support outright secession for Kosovo, given that it had not enjoyed (at least on paper) the status of a constituent republic of the former Yugoslavia, and due to the irredentist possibility that it would end up comprising a "greater Albania."[9]

Therefore, policymakers with an interest in changing the status quo in the Balkans turned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to provide diplomacy with a credible threat of force. The US Ambassador to Macedonia, Chris Hill in conjunction with Austrian Ambassador to Belgrade Wolfgang Petritsch engaged in shuttle diplomatic missions between the Kosovar and Serbian governments to get their comments on a draft agreement for renewed autonomy status for Kosovo. Neither side gave unequivocal acceptance of these drafts through the end of 1998, as the Kosovars consistently signaled that nothing short of secession would satisfy their aspirations, while the Serbs would only consider autonomy for Kosovo within the framework of Serbian sovereignty.[10]

In parallel to this EU/US shuttle diplomacy between the Serbs and Kosovars, US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, in the first two weeks of October 1998, negotiated a withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo with FRY President Slobodan Milosevic. Holbrooke and Solana's discussions with Milosevic took place in the shadow of an October 13, 1998 North Atlantic Council "activation order" authorizing airstrikes against the Serbs in case of continued aggression and noncompliance.

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[7]   United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), S/RES/1199 (1998), September 23, 1998 accessed at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm

[8]   *KOSOVO / KOSOVA: As Seen, As Told: An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999* (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 1999). Available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/1999/11/1620_en.pdf

[9]   As an "Autonomous Province," Kosovo enjoyed many of the same rights and responsibilities as the Republics within the Yugoslav framework: territorial integrity, borders, use of national languages, legislation, law enforcement. "The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia." Art. 1, Constitution of Yugoslavia (1974, as amended through 1987), reprinted in Hurst Hannum, ed., *Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).

[10]   Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo," *International Affairs* vol. 75, no. 2 (1999), 211-251.

Milosevic backed down, at least initially, and Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo. The FRY signed separate agreements with NATO for an aerial surveillance mission and with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE) for the deployment of an unarmed observer group to verify Serbian withdrawals and to oversee local Kosovo elections, on October 15 and October 16, 1998, respectively.[11] At that time, the FRY and the Serbian government also issued an eleven point Statement of Principles for a Political Settlement. Most importantly, international mediation was reinvigorated as a result of this episode of negotiation, but the crisis was only temporarily de-escalated.

Broken Promises, Crisis Negotiations, War

Ambassador Hill renewed his shuttle diplomacy process of circulating draft agreements between Kosovars and the FRY government until formal rejections by both sides came in December 1998. A Christmas eve offensive by Serb forces in Kosovo was justified as police enforcement against 'terrorists' but continued the pattern of Serb military and paramilitary killings, torture and expulsion of Kosovar Albanian civilians.[12]

The OSCE fielded its Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to observe and verify compliance with the ceasefire, and Serb withdrawals from Kosovo. But a series of new massacres, expulsions of Kosovo civilians by Serb forces, and the onset of further refugee movements within and outside of Kosovo created pressure for additional action to convince the Serbs to withdraw their forces and to persuade the Kosovars to pursue a negotiated solution in their quest for self-determination. When the KVM began reporting on a new massacre of Kosovars in the village of Racak in Southern Kosovo that had taken place January 15, 1999, the FRY declared the head of the KVM, Ambassador William Walker *persona non grata* and attempted to expel him. The Serbs also publicly refused access to Kosovo for the Prosecutor from the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia, who sought to investigate the massacre and had been given the authority to do so by the Security Council.[13]

After January's events, the armed conflict returned to crisis mode. The threat of NATO use of force was no longer a remote theoretical possibility, but rather an operational matter. Negotiators again scrambled to deescalate the crisis and get the parties to sign on to an interim peace agreement and political settlement. Several inter-related negotiations in early 1999 failed to achieve a replay of the 1995 Dayton Accords that had ended the Bosnia war, in spite of intense international commitment from the Contact Group, the presence of competent diplomats, and the credible threat of force against FRY by NATO.

Aftermath of the Kosovo Crisis

NATO began an aerial bombardment campaign against FRY that lasted seventy eight days, and it was this military action that finally persuaded the Milosevic government

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[11] See the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), October 24, 1998. S/RES/1203 (1998), accessed at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm
[12] Weller, "The Rambouillet conference," 220.
[13] Statement by the President of the UN Secretary General, January 19, 1999, S/PRST/1999/2

to accept the terms of the international negotiators.[14] The air campaign was suspended only after the FRY had agreed to withdraw on an eleven-day schedule. On June 20, 1999, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. Wesley Clark formally declared the Serb withdrawal complete and the aerial bombardment campaign officially closed. While the bombing campaign had succeeded in forcing the Serb withdrawal, it did not resolve the political and legal status of Kosovo.

What began as an effort to protect the Kosovar population from ethnic cleansing without creating a new independent state in the region resulted in the very ethnic cleansing campaign the diplomats had sought to prevent. After the bombing campaign, Kosovo gained an ambiguous autonomy arrangement under international protection. Tensions between the Albanian and Serbian communities in the wake of the Serbian withdrawal remained high and resulted in a wave of reprisal killings against Serbian and Roma Kosovars. The status of the territory remained highly uncertain. The legitimacy of the NATO campaign in international law aroused controversy in diplomatic and academic circles since it demonstrated the resolve of collective humanitarian action but suffered from the absence of a unified mandate from the UN Security Council (due in part to Chinese and Russian reticence for Security Council-authorized military action against the FRY).

The intensive negotiation efforts that led up to the NATO bombardment campaign are:

1. the seventeen days of talks between the Serbs and Kosovars at Chateau Rambouillet in France that took place from February 6 to February 23, 1999

2. the follow-on Paris peace talks conducted from March 15 to March 18, 1999, and

3. a final mission to Slobodan Milosevic by Richard Holbrooke from March 21 to March 23, 1999.

NATO airstrikes against Serbia began the day after Holbrooke's mission to Milosevic, March 24, 1999. Could these negotiations have been more successful in achieving both their humanitarian and political aims? Could the armed conflict have been avoided? An examination of the structural elements of these negotiations helps to shed light on the reasons for their failure.

The Talks at Chateau Rambouillet

The deteriorating humanitarian and political situation at the beginning of 1999 also made the international players look ineffective and impotent in their ability to foster international peace. On January 26, 1999, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Ivanov, met and declared their support for a renewed diplomatic initiative undertaken by the Contact Group. On January 29, the Contact Group ministers summoned the Serbs and Kosovars to a seven day peace conference in France at the Chateau Rambouillet to commence by February. On the next day, the North Atlantic

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[14] Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, June 9, 1999, which established the NATO 'international security force' (KFOR) and gave the defeated FRY and Serbian forces 11 days to withdraw completely from Kosovo. http://www.usip.org/library/pa/kosovo/kosovo_mta06091999.html. Also see the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), June 10, 1999, S/RES/1244 (1999), which noted FRY and Serbian acceptance of new terms on Kosovo, called for KLA disarmament, and authorized both an international military and civil presence to administer Kosovo.

Council issued a statement informing the international community that, in case the parties failed to resolve their political differences at Rambouillet and the FRY failed to fulfill its earlier commitments to NATO to withdraw forces from Kosovo, then the NATO Secretary General "may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY territory. ...[and] will take all appropriate measures in case of a failure by the Kosovar Albanian side to comply with the demands of the international community."[15]

The Serbs and Kosovars accepted this 'invitation' to Rambouillet and the Contact Group sent each side a one-page document of its "non-negotiable principles/basic elements," most of which were distilled from the draft agreements Ambassador Hill had been circulating among the parties.[16] Despite the threat of force from NATO, the Serbs continued to build up forces in and around Kosovo, a move that signaled to NATO that an offensive was being contemplated against both the KLA forces and the Kosovar Albanian civilians, despite the presence of the Serbs at the negotiations in France.[17]

The Serbian/FRY delegation and the Kosovar delegation each had symptoms of fragmentation and disunity. The Serb/FRY delegation included FRY nationals who purported to represent Serbs and others living in Kosovo, as well as Serbian and Yugoslav political figures. The Kosovar delegation also had fracture lines of its own; some negotiators represented the government of President Rugova and his party, the LDK, while others were close to the main opposition party, the LBD (United Democratic Movement) and the KLA forces. The delegation itself was led by Hashim Thaci, then the 29 year old head of the KLA's political wing who appeared to be taking his negotiation instructions from Adem Demaci, a top KLA leader and longtime political prisoner who would not attend Rambouillet.[18] Demaci's absence was paralleled by the absence of the Presidents of Serbia and Yugoslavia from the talks.

The Rambouillet talks commenced on February 6, 1999. The respective Serb and Kosovar delegations never met to hold any substantive talks. Rather, they were ensconced in separate conference rooms on different floors of the building, with a large number of interested third parties present as well, including delegations from the US, Russia, France, Italy, Germany, the UK (the Contact Group itself), the EU, the OSCE and others. The mediators shuttled between floors to conduct substantive discussions. The negotiations were overseen by US Ambassador to Macedonia Chris Hill, Austrian Ambassador to Belgrade Wolfgang Petrisch, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Mayorski. They in turn, delegated much of the actual discussions to Contact Group legal experts led by a representative of the US State Department. The FRY/Serb delegation, which had initially claimed it would not even attend Rambouillet if KLA members were present, arrived insisting on direct instead of proximity negotiations. It is reported that no direct talks—even in the presence of the mediators—ever occurred at Rambouillet, however.[19]

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[15] NATO Press Release 99 (12), accessible at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm.

[16] Weller, p. 225.

[17] Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999): 114-120.

[18] "Kosovo's Elusive Peace," *The Economist*, February 27, 1999; Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," p. 227.

[19] Weller, 228.

At Rambouillet, neither side appears to have taken responsibility for drafting consecutive versions of the proposed agreement. The parties worked on a series of drafts created by the Contact Group. Upon arrival, the delegations were handed a one-page set of non-negotiable principles meant to guide the negotiations and set out the parameters of discussion. This was immediately followed up by a comprehensive draft framework agreement that covered the political aspects of a settlement.

The mediators' groundrules for Rambouillet contemplated discussions based on their text of an interim agreement only. The parties were invited to submit comments on the text, with modifications possible only if both parties agreed or if the mediators themselves believed a proposed change would facilitate agreement. If the parties could not agree on a proposed change, it was not supposed to be integrated into the draft. Proposed changes were also supposed to be consistent with the non-negotiable principles. A media black-out was declared, but in practice proved quite porous. Delegates were to be completely confined to the Chateau for the duration of the talks. However, to accommodate outside experts, each delegation was permitted five rotating passes permitting egress and entry.[20]

By the end of the first week at Rambouillet, the Kosovar delegation had submitted detailed comments on the draft. The Serbs declined to make written submissions even after Rambouillet had been extended, only offering to sign the non-negotiable principles. In the absence of any substantive comments from the Serb delegation, Ambassador Hill traveled to see President Milosevic in Belgrade with a senior member of the Serb delegation. This had the effect of goading the Serbs to finally make a written submission on the draft almost two weeks after the conference had begun, much of which, according to some sources, was incompatible with the 'non-negotiable' principles.[21]

On the Kosovar side, Hashim Thaci was finally permitted to leave Rambouillet in order to consult with his superior, Mr. Demaci, who by several accounts instructed his protégé to *not* sign the Rambouillet Accords.[22]

On February 17, the Contact Group legal experts informed the Kosovar delegation that the Serbs had a reduced set of changes they now required, and that negotiations would now proceed on the basis of concessions to the Serbs. On February 18, with only two days left until the scheduled end of the conference, the Contact Group submitted to the two delegations a new draft political settlement that seemed to reflect Milosevic's preferences on the parameters of settlement. In contrast, "very few of the suggestions proposed by the Kosovo delegation had been adopted."[23] The Kosovo delegation formally protested and refused to even receive the new draft, thus hoping to communicate to the mediators "a serious warning that the fundamental change of the draft in favor of the side which had obstructed progress in the talks until the last minute jeopardized further constructive par-

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[20] Weller, 228.

[21] Weller, 229, 230.

[22] Barry Came, Guy Dinmore, "High tension in Kosovo," *Maclean's*, March 8, 1999, p. 10, accessed via Academic Search Premier; http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=1622484.

[23] Weller, p. 230.

ticipation from the Kosovo delegation."[24] In any case, the Serbs also declined to sign onto the newest version of the agreement.

But the draft agreement itself only covered the political autonomy arrangements for Kosovo. The critical annexes covering the civilian and military aspects of implementation had only just been distributed to the parties. The military aspect of implementation referred to the selection and mandate of the military forces that would be responsible for peacekeeping. The Contact Group, with the exception of Russia, had a strong preference for NATO to be the predominant military guarantor of an eventual peace. This preference was shared by the Kosovars, and strongly opposed by the Serbs, who, by some accounts, would possibly have been amenable to a multinational force under the jurisdiction of the UN or the OSCE.[25]

When noon of February 20, 1999 passed without agreement, the parties were asked to indicate their agreement with the Contact Group text as it stood. When both delegations refused, the mediation was extended until 3pm February 23. Negotiations proceeded now with greater intensity; the Contact Group legal experts shuttled back and forth with each side, mediating their respective demands so as to decrease the likelihood of rejection. A new text was then created, incorporating both the political settlement and the annexes into a unified overall document. The February 23 deadline arrived, and the Rambouillet Accords were again presented for signature to both sides.[26]

The Kosovars still refused to sign the agreement on February 23, but declared that the delegation had voted in favor of the text and would return to Kosovo for internal consultations. The Serbs pushed for further negotiations, having accepted in principle that the Kosovars could exercise a measure of self-government under Serbian sovereignty. The Serbs also appear to have finally agreed to some kind of international presence in Kosovo, although they were still holding out against NATO. Milan Milutinovic, Serbia's president, acknowledged that "the scope and character of an international presence" were on the table. This was interpreted by some observers as Serbian acceptance of a multinational force if it included significant numbers of Russian troops not under NATO command.[27]

While the Kosovars were firmly in favor of a NATO presence to implement an agreement, the annexes contemplated the KLA's demilitarization. This provision created new uncertainties for the KLA. Given their predominance in the Kosovar delegation at Rambouillet, disarmament would have made it far more difficult to sign the Interim Agreement draft in the absence of a clear final status for Kosovo. However, the future political status of Kosovo under an eventual final agreement appears to have received little attention by the Contact Group until the final night of negotiations.[28] The international community

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[24] Weller, p. 231.

[25] "Forgotten Coverage of Rambouillet Negotiations: Was A Peaceful Kosovo Solution Rejected by U.S.?, Press Release of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), May 14, 1999, accessible at http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1901.

[26] The text of the February 23, 1999 draft is available on numerous web sites, including the United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/library/pa/kosovo/kosovo_rambtoc.html.

[27] "Kosovo's elusive peace," *Economist*, February 27, 1999, p. 45-47

[28] Weller, p. 232-233.

as represented by the Contact Group, the UN and NATO had all affirmed their support for the territorial integrity of the FRY. The Rambouillet negotiations—focused as they were on gaining acceptance of an interim peace—could not reconcile this tension between Kosovar final status sovereignty and Yugoslav territorial integrity.

The parties and the mediators had met for 17 days without reaching agreement and two deadlines for NATO bombing had passed. The parties' attitudes at the deadline could be paraphrased as 'Yes, but we'll sign later' (Kosovars) and 'No, but let's keep talking' (Serbs). Under such circumstances, the mediators opted to declare a partial victory and spare the regime of Slobodan Milosevic from a NATO bombing campaign. Instead of bombing, a new round of diplomacy was scheduled by the Contact Group: The Paris Talks of March 15, 1999. For the Kosovars, Paris was framed as little more than a signing ceremony. For the Serbs, Paris was thought of as an opportunity for further bargaining sessions.

Paris Talks

The story of the Paris Talks is neither long nor complicated, but can be seen as separate from the Rambouillet talks. Some critical events affecting the Paris Talks took place in the interim period between Rambouillet and Paris: Slovenia's Prime Minister, working in cooperation with US Secretary of State Madaleine Albright, conducted secret talks with the KLA leadership. Hashim Thaci was flown to Slovenia, where he secretly met with Slovenia's Prime Minister, Dr. Janez Drnovcek and Ambassador Ernest Petric, who persuaded Thaci to assume the top leadership of the KLA, while they simultaneously persuaded Demaci to resign, all in the hopes of facilitating the Kosovars to sign onto the Rambouillet draft.[29] On March 2, Demaci announced his resignation from the KLA, ostensibly in protest at the Rambouillet negotiations, which had resulted in neither a Serbian withdrawal or ceasefire, nor Kosovar independence.[30]

On March 15, the parties and the Contact Group gathered in the International Conference Center in Paris. The Kosovar delegation immediately presented the mediators with a formal letter of acceptance of the agreement and declared that they would be "honored to sign the Agreement in your presence at a time and place of your choosing." However, the Contact Group would not open the document for signing and instead urged the Kosovars to wait while the Serbs were engaged in further talks. On the next day, the Contact Group mediators firmly declared that only technical adjustments could be proposed to the text, and even those would have to be acceptable to both principal parties.

Nevertheless, for several days, the Kosovars and the Contact Group mediators discussed economic reconstruction, civilian implementation issues, election monitoring and other issues. The Serbs tried a different approach: they presented their own entirely new version of the agreement to the mediators. However, their draft essentially sought to

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[29] Dr. Ernest Petric, current Ambassador of Slovenia to IAEA, Interview with the author, February 23, 2006. "Our purpose [in our back channel contacts with Thaci] was to avoid further violence, expulsion and escalation."

[30] "Demaci quits the KLA as Kosovars gamble on peace," *Muslimedia*, March 16-31, 1999, accessible from www.muslimedia.com//archives/world99/koso-kla.htm.

resolve the Kosovo issue on terms the Kosovars could never accept; abolition of the Kosovar presidency, constitution and autonomy. No implementation mechanisms in terms of armed peacekeepers or an international civil administration were contemplated in the Serbs' draft.[31]

Therefore, the Contact Group opened the February 23 version of the Rambouillet Accords for signature on March 18, 1999. The Kosovars duly signed it, although Ambassador Mayorski of the Russian Federation declined to witness the Kosovars' signature. The Kosovars issued a statement after the signing providing their interpretation of the Agreement: they regarded NATO peacekeeping as the *sine qua non* of their acceptance, they would hold a referendum on the political status of Kosovo at the end of the three year interim period and they would undertake to transform the KLA into a political actor.[32]

Even after the Kosovars' signature, on March 19, a final attempt was made to persuade the Serbs to sign on, but to no avail. The Contact Group issued a statement accusing the Serbs of trying to "unravel the Rambouillet Accords" and warned them not to undertake any military moves or to interfere with the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission. This too fell on deaf ears as the Serb forces in Kosovo attacked civilians, again driving up the number of displaced persons and refugees to over 200,000.[33]

The Holbrooke Mission

The Contact Group mediators, accompanied by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, traveled to Belgrade on March 22 in order to persuade Milosevic and the Serbs to end their offensive and accept the Rambouillet Accords as drafted. The seeds for this mission had been sown during Rambouillet, as some observers and participants believed that the Serb delegation was not authorized to make any commitments at Rambouillet and that Milosevic himself was keeping such authority to himself.[34]

The March 22-23 mission was fruitless, despite the credibility and status of its members, the finality of the mission and the impending use of force as a sanction. On March 23, the Yugoslav parliament voted to reject the accords, prompting Holbrooke to depart Belgrade and proceed to Brussels to brief NATO. Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary General, immediately ordered General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to commence an air war against the FRY/Serbia.

Analysis

On the face of it, the Contact Group had acted correctly: they created a fading opportunity for a political settlement that provided the Kosovars with great autonomy, without permitting them to secede from FRY/Serbia; these were the twin goals of the negotiations from the beginning, as stated above. They had controlled the negotiation process and successive drafting of the Rambouillet Accords. The parties' delegations appeared to have been

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[31] Weller, p. 235-236.
[32] Weller, p. 235.
[33] Weller, p. 236.
[34] "There is nobody there [in the Serbian delegation] who at the end of the day is going to sign up to anything," one Western diplomatic source told the *Christian Science Monitor*. Landay, "Inside the Kosovo peace talks," p.5

shaped by the Contact Group with a view toward broad representation. They had attempted to sideline or co-opt hardline Kosovar and Serbian leaders while providing a credible threat of war against the Serbs if their commitments to the Contact Group and NATO were broken. By at least some criteria of negotiation analysis, these negotiations may have been predicted to be succeed. And yet these negotiation attempts failed to accomplish their stated purposes.[35]

By examining the structural aspects of these negotiations, we begin to appreciate at least some of the reasons for this failure. The classical definition of negotiation structure, which comprehends power asymmetry, is certainly relevant here. But so are other structural aspects, particularly

    i)   the complexity of the delegations
    ii) the major issues at stake
    iii) the interests of the parties concerning these issues
    iv) the linkages between the interim arrangements and final status, and
    v) the zone of possible agreement.

These and other structural aspects are examined in the analysis here:

In terms of power asymmetry, the most relevant way to apply this concept is to look at the three-way disparities of power among the Serbs (including FRY), the Kosovars and the Contact Group mediators (including NATO), as this was really not a simple bilateral negotiation between two monolithic parties. The Serb forces clearly had superiority on the ground against the KLA, even though the latter was quickly finding ways to smuggle arms and increase its ability to inflict costs on the Serbs. And yet, Serbian military power was no match for the combined capacity of NATO air forces, which had already demonstrated their ability (mixed with reluctance) to take on Serbian forces in the past. But NATO was not yet engaging the Serbs and was not pre-positioned to attack during the negotiations. Its power was therefore limited to *the threat* of the use of force, and this had been carefully evaded by the Serbs both before and during the Rambouillet negotiations.

The weak party, the Kosovars, boosted its relative power by becoming the beneficiary of the NATO threat of force against the Serbs, and of any real action against the Serbs, even in the absence of a true alliance. The NATO declarations against the KLA were muted by comparison to their declarations against the Serbs. Thus the most powerful and the weakest parties were to some degree joined in an undefined coalition against the Serbs. This should have helped the negotiations succeed because it would tend to reduce the asymmetry, yet it did not. The reason this use of power and asymmetry reduction did not work out well may have more to do with the main issues that were being negotiated: Kosovo's political status and NATO's role in implementation.

It is not necessary to delve into the specifics of drafting the Rambouillet Accords. The broad contours of the drafts at all times concerned the degree of interim autonomy the Kosovars could enjoy and the modality of keeping peace (implementing the agreement). Despite their later willingness to entertain some Kosovar autonomy and a non-NATO presence to protect the Kosovars, the Serbs were very inclined to see autonomy as a negative; undesirable *per se*, and from their perspective, little more than a step on the way to the full secession of Kosovo from both Serbia and the FRY. In this regard, and attempting to

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[35] In fairness, the Kosovar acceptance of the Accords indicated some measure of success.

look at the issue from the Serbian perspective, the threat of force and reduction of power asymmetry most likely had the effect of presenting the Serbs with two unpalatable choices: lose Kosovo at the negotiation table (in effect, giving it away for nothing in return except a promise that NATO would not attack and sanctions might be lifted) or lose Kosovo in a 'heroic' battle against NATO, which could (and did) bring loss of life, but could also be framed by Milosevic as an act of aggression against Serbia. It is very likely that the Serbs chose the second path precisely because it was less undesirable than the first. In other words, it was the lesser of two evils from Milosevic' perspective. The use of the word 'chose' is deliberate because the negotiations, for despite procedural and structural flaws, presented the Serbs with choices.

But this structural examination also helps to explain why the Kosovars *also* did not wish to sign the Rambouillet Accords on February 23. Signing on that date would have given them a clear moral victory over the Serbs, and earned them the credibility and respect of the Contact Group, whose members' reputations were at stake. Signing would have strengthened the KLA-Contact Group coalition of convenience. And yet, they did not sign. Certainly the Kosovar approval without signature was portrayed by the Contact Groups as an 'acceptance' of Rambouillet, thus possibly gaining the Kosovars the benefit of signing without fully committing them to its terms. But here too, the issues and the power asymmetry inter-relate. To illustrate: For most Kosovars, there was no point in seeking a permanent autonomy under Serbian sovereignty. With the past as a guide, Serbia had no tolerance for Kosovar autonomy however limited, and there was always the issue of the Serbian population in Kosovo. The military offensives prior to Rambouillet had obliterated any possibility that the Kosovars would seek anything less than independence. They too felt that they must hold out for a link to a future *without any* Serbian sovereignty over them. Rambouillet did not give this to them unequivocally, although it did provide for the referendum which could be used for that purpose.

Nevertheless, what incentive did the Kosovars have to save the Serbs from themselves? Signing on February 23 could have meant extra leverage for the mediators and a possible Serbian signature or acquiescence, thus permitting the Serbs to once again escape the wrath of the international community. It may have been preferable to the Kosovars to lose some of their KLA military gains in exchange for a full NATO attack on Serbia. From the Kosovars' perspective, NATO use of force to evict Serb forces from Kosovo probably seemed preferable to their negotiated withdrawal.

The delegations of both the Serbs and Kosovars could not be said to be monolithic in any way—that is, their respective ability to commit themselves to an agreement was limited by their fractured nature. Disagreements within delegations are, in theory and practice, just as problematic as disagreements across delegations. Pluralistic parties exacerbate this problem. The Serb delegation included several people purporting to represent non-Albanian Kosovars, and only later brought in professional negotiators. The Kosovar delegation included representatives of the KLA and two major political parties, but key figures like President Rugova were missing, as were other decisionmakers from both sides. Factional lines were apparent in the delegations. The additional breadth of the delegations might have been used to build a broader coalition in favor of a peaceful settlement. Yet that very breadth seemed to work against success. Demaci's attempts to derail the Rambouil-

let process from his exile in Slovenia, and Milosevic's attempts to prevent his negotiators from committing to Rambouillet help explain this dynamic. The successful replacement of Demaci with Thaci, engineered by the Slovenians, was one part of the puzzle, and helped to cement Kosovar approval of the Accords. But Milosevic was a different kind of spoiler than Demaci, who had been the longest-serving political prisoner in the world at the time. The Serb delegation was composed of two sovereign entities' representatives; those from Serbia and those from the FRY. But both could be manipulated by Milosevic. The direct diplomatic approaches by Holbrooke and Solana to Milosevic stemmed from the latter's overarching authority over Serbian political decisionmaking on Kosovo and everything else. But his valuation of the different negotiation outcomes was seriously misinterpreted by the Contact Group, who probably thought that the threat of force alone would make him change his mind, as it had occasionally done in the past.

Similarly, the interested third parties at Rambouillet and beyond comprised a large number of parties: at least six countries (the Contact Group), the North Atlantic Council and NATO, as well as the individual members of NATO, the United Nations Security Council, the OSCE, and the European Union. Problems of coordination in peacemaking when the intervenors are themselves pluralistic are well-known. One of the main problems is the different preferences among the third parties. They may differ on their approach to the negotiations, their preferences with regards to sanctions, their willingness to use force, their skill in mediation, their ability to exercise leverage over others and many other aspect of peacemaking. In short, they too are engaged in a constant series of internal negotiations that make if more difficult to project a unified stance. Press accounts of the negotiations occasionally gave the impression that one or another country from the third parties was not in agreement with the others on the process of mediation, the use of air strikes, and other issues.

Finally, there appears to be a built-in weakness in negotiations for interim accords that rely on an indeterminate future permanent settlement. Interim accords are meant to deescalate crises, achieve confidence building measures and gain traction on operational issues that bring benefits to the conflict parties. They do not usually seek to resolve or transform the underlying conflict dynamics, but rather seek to build up enough of a relationship among the parties so that can eventually achieve a permanent settlement. If the interim measures fail to bring their promised benefits to parties, this could have the opposite of the intended effect: an erosion of confidence in a permanent settlement. And if the interim accords do not articulate the future permanent status in a way that all parties can feel comfortable with, it may make little sense to sign an interim agreement in the first place. Why sign an agreement to stop fighting if you believe you might inflict losses on your enemy and you're not sure if you'll achieve your political aims in the future? This linkage is a structural element not well-studied in negotiation literature, and that merits further empirical research.

A number of structural elements help us determine the existence and scope of a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), but it is also the preferences of the parties and their attitude toward compromise and negotiation that shape the ZOPA. Ambassador Petritsch has shed light on the preferences of the parties in this regard, and his statements give the impression that neither side was truly interested in creating or widening the ZOPA: "Both the Albanian and the Yugoslav sides did not believe in compromise… During the negotiations, we were confronted with one of the crucial political problems of the region: the lack of a culture

of political compromise. Compromise is perceived negatively in the region—it is seen to mean giving in to the oppressor. I have noticed that politicians in the former Yugoslavia are still aiming for 'win-or-lose' scenarios. They would rather be defeated than compromise. The concept of a 'win–win situation' simply does not exist."[36] But the existence of this attitude toward negotiation, in combination with the structural elements above, lead us to query whether or not the Rambouillet negotiations and their follow-on were properly analyzed in the first place. The structural problems with these negotiations appear to be quite strong, and constrained the process choices for the mediators. Their attempts to essentially impose their own draft agreement on the parties, while something of both a structure and a process issue, might have worked in the absence of the other structural problems. But it also did little to engender buy-in from the parties. The Serbs in particular seemed singularly unwilling to have the Contact Group impose their draft at Rambouillet, and at Paris, the Serbs demonstrated their contempt for the negotiation management of the Contact Group by introducing their own eleventh hour draft.

Although there is no reason to believe that the Rambouillet negotiations and their follow on negotiations were pre-destined to fail, it is apparent that their structural aspects weakened the chances of success and worked together to make failure more likely. The ability of the interested parties to successfully complete their current negotiations on the future status of Kosovo can benefit from an analytical—rather than a strictly partisan—analysis of the past negotiation failures, on the assumption that parties want in good faith to reach an agreement in 2006-2007.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IN THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract: *Ohrid Agreement as a political act of domestic nature, due to many things today changed the course of history of Macedonia after the critical 2001. It launched a new model in the political system. Even today, when almost thirteen years have passed since the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, its implementation still remains the current political agenda of every government as a condition inevitably required for post-conflict peacebuilding in Macedonia. Therefore, the implementation of the basic pillars of the Agreement led for the Ohrid Framework Agreement to be an instrument of reconciliation, democratic progress and enhancement of human rights in Macedonia. Elaboration contained herein is moving along three lines, first, an analysis is made of the major points of the Ohrid Agreement. The second line of analysis concerns the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement in the Macedonian Army from 2001 to 2013. While the third line refers to the analysis of the implementation of the Agreement in the following: education, use of languages, decentralization and special parliamentary procedures.*

Keywords: *peace, Ohrid Framework Agreement, conflict, implementation, ARM*

Introduction

Ohrid Framework Agreement as a political act of domestic nature, which due to many things changed the course of history of Macedonia after the critical 2001. It promoted a new model that in the political system prevents majority of Albanian ethnic community and implements three basic segments, including: expanding the use of language of minority ethnic communities, equitable representation of minority ethnic communities and decentralization. Today, the implementation of these three basic pillars, led for the Ohrid Framework Agreement to be an instrument of reconciliation, democratic progress and enhancement of human rights in Macedonia. Those who speak differently, promote demagogy that feeds on fear, which can be a powerful tool, effective in the short term, but in the long run it has a great price both internally and externally. Thus, for more than a decade, common effort, common perspective, often labeled as a trademark for post-conflict Macedonia, was systematized, organized, analyzed, propagated and proven with numbers the very implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Namely, its effects can be perceived in the security sector (the Army), education, use of languages, decentralization, etc. Hence with the analysis in this paper, we will try to prove that.

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Main Points and Implementation

The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA)[2] aimed to provide the main framework on how to terminate the armed conflict in the Republic of Macedonia. At the same time, the agreement posed a unique opportunity for the future cessation of hostilities.

The demands of the Albanian ethnic community, articulated through their Albanian political representatives, had been primarily elaborated in the Prizren Agreement and the same demands were then elaborated in the OFA. The main goal of the OFA was, thus, to meet the already existing demands of the Albanians in Macedonia, and to preserve the unitary character of the state.

The OFA terminated hostilities, discarded the use of violence as a means for attaining political goals, confirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Macedonia and re-established the unitary character of the state. The OFA underlined that the multi-ethnic character of Macedonian society must be preserved. In addition, the OFA supported the role of the civil society in regards to the development of decentralized power, non-discrimination and equal representation, special parliamentary procedures, as well as through educational systems. In that way, the OFA envisaged a redefinition of the Macedonia political model in order to meet the multicultural and multi-ethnic needs of the Macedonian society.

As to legitimize the process of implementation of the OFA, the Agreement is founded upon several basic principles, namely (i) absolute rejection and prohibition of the use of violence in pursuit of political aims, (ii) Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the state are inviolable and must be preserved meaning that no territorial solution to ethnic issues exist, (iii) the multi-ethnic character of the Macedonian society must be preserved and reflected in public life, (iv) a modern democratic state in its natural course of development must continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets the needs of all citizens and complies with the highest international standards, and (v) decentralization and development of local self-government, which is essential for encouraging civil society, citizens' participation in democratic life in promotion of respect for different identities of communities (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001).

In addition to these important guiding principles, several other key provisions are envisaged and defined, amongst which emphasis is put on the cessation of hostilities, development of a decentralized government, non-discrimination and equitable representation, special parliamentary procedures, education and use of languages, expression of identity, implementation of the OFA and annexes and other provisions. The three Annexes that constitute integral parts of the OFA comprise Annex A (Constitutional Amendments), Annex B (Legislative Modification) and Annex C (Implementation and Confidence-building Measures).

At this point it is very important to stress the genuine aim and role of the OFA, as well as the constitutional changes that emerged from it. Namely, as a result of non-acceptance by the Albanians in Macedonia of the Preamble to the Macedonian Constitution of 1991,[3] the proclamation that only the Macedonian people formed a constitutive nationality, while

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[2]   OFA was signed on August 13, 2001 with mediation of the international community, and ended a seven-month manifest phase of the conflict in the Macedonia, when hostilities and the use of force prevailed.

[3]   In 1991, the Republic of Macedonia passed its first Constitution as an independent and sovereign state.

all other nationalities were defined as minorities, was changed. The Republic of Macedonia was re-defined as a state comprised of Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs, Romani, Bosniaks and other.

The OFA stipulated another important provision for the decentralized government. This provision prescribed revision of the Law on Local Self-Government, aiming at reinforcing the powers of elected local official. The provision extended local governments' competencies in conformity with the Constitution and the European Charter on Local Self-Government, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001, Article 1.2 and Article 3.1).

The provision for special parliamentary procedures put forward by the OFA designated a new manner of voting for certain constitutional amendments. The Law on Local Self-Government would establish a system for amendments needing to be approved with a two-thirds majority, within which there must be a majority of votes by representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority of the Macedonian population.

Furthermore, this voting principle was to be implemented in the election process of one-third of the members of the Constitutional Court, three members of the Judicial Council and the Ombudsman. According to the OFA, this provision would also be used in the part of equitable representation, which applies to the representation of the communities in the public administration at both, the national and local level.

In this context the OFA took a hierarchically superior status in shaping the Constitution and other laws. The most important laws, which had to be amended in order to comply with the provision, were the Law on Local Self-Government, Law on Local Financing, Law on Municipality Boundaries, Laws referring to the Police residing in the Municipalities, Law on Civil Service and Public Administration, Law on Electoral Districts, Rules of the Assembly, Laws Pertinent to the Use of Language and the Law on Ombudsman.

Additionally, it was agreed for measures of confidence building to be undertaken. Special focus would be taken in regards to carrying out censuses and organizing elections, ensuring the return and rehabilitation of a decentralized government, the introduction of equitable representation in public administration, military and police services for members of communities which do not form a majority in Macedonia. In addition, special attention would be paid to role of culture and language within the media and educational systems. More precisely, in terms of use of language, Macedonian language and its Cyrillic alphabet was designated to be the official language within the country and in international relations. Furthermore, the provisions prescribed that any other language spoken by at least 20% of the population in a given region would be deemed as an official second language and would be regulated in the official proceedings and personal documents of the citizens of Macedonia.

Implementation of the OFA has proven to be a complex process, ongoing since 2001. Its implementation does not merely mean the fundamental establishment of stability of a certain state, but rather the creation and the building of a democratic, secure and prosperous country. Following the overarching aim of the OFA one argues, can it be achieved through its implementation? What exactly does the implementation of the OFA mean, supposing that it actuality presents an agreement for constitutional amendments and the political system of the state? What are the long-term effects and lessons of the OFA? Can the OFA serve as

a model for future conflict resolution in regards to addressing constitutional amendments and the political system of state?

According to contemporary theories of the nation, state and state-building, one can conclude that the OFA establishes a foundation for a specific, rather than a modern concept of nation-state, that could accommodate the diversity of the society. Contemporary theorists are right when they claim that multi-ethnic states are most frequently forced to find pragmatic solutions to ethnic conflicts in order to deescalate conflict and silence the demands of secession. (Mehmeti 2008, 1000). This may be why adjustments and accommodation of ethnic diversity is a key state issue. As Topperwein (2002, 187) rightfully elaborated "in order to be able to survive, the state will have to, in a democratic way, integrate political demands of different ethnic group. Otherwise, the state risks, sooner or later confronting internal fragmentation or secessionist movements".

Based on the aforementioned question and scepticism, key gains and deficiencies, stemming from the implementation of the OFA, will be analysed.

One of the main demands of the Albanian ethnic community representatives was the guarantee that the Albanian would find representation in public administration and other state institutions. The principles or non-discrimination and equal representation of the communities in public administraton at national and local level were based on these demands and guiding principles of the OFA. This extended to the full inclusion of marginalized groups within the army, police, public enterprises, as well as improvement of their access to public financing for development of business activities. Changes in the legislation were made for consistent implementation of the provision; reform processes in public administration were carried out and accelerated training for representatives of the communities were introduced. All of these activities and programs fell under the title 'measures of affirmative action,' aimed at ensuring rapid integration of representatives of marginalized and less represented communities in state institution and society as a whole (Cvetanova 2006, 168).

Employment in Public and State Institution

The economic and education disparities within the Republic of Macedonia initiated amendments to the Law on Civil Servants. Under such circumstances training for members of the marginalized communities was introduced, which enabled their employment in public administration and state institution.

Results from the undertaken activities and concrete measures of affirmative action in the sphere of employment were evident in less than four years. During the period of implementation the level of equitable representation of less represented communities in state institutions and public administration increased. In the period from 2006 to 2010, the number of Albanians employed in state institutions and public administration was continually increasing. In this context it is also important to note that before the implementation of the OFA, the representation of ethnic minorities within security forces (that is the uniformed structures of the army and police) was relativity small. In 2001, the percentage of Albanian civil servants in police service was 2,5 and by 2006 had risen to 16,5 %. Representation of ethnic communities in the army, especially in the uniformed and civilian structure, was significantly improved, which is evidenced by the following tables.

Table no. 1. Representation of the members of the ethnic communities in the ARM in the period from 2001 to 2012, end No.07-102/2013, data for 08.04.2013

NATIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE ARM BY YEARS

No.	Nationality	2001 No.	2001 Pct.	2002 No.	2002 Pct.	2003 No.	2003 Pct.	2004 No.	2004 Pct.	2005 No.	2005 Pct.	2006 No.	2006 Pct.	2007 No.	2007 Pct.	2008 No.	2008 Pct.	2009 No.	2009 Pct.	2010 No.	2010 Pct.	2011 No.	2011 Pct.	2012 No.	2012 Pct.
1	Macedonians	5241	91,58	7407	91,19	7479	89,09	6823	85,87	5810	81,37	5940	77,60	5912	75,06	5707	73,59	5779	73,31	5353	73,60	5321	74,08	5135	73,27
2	Albanians	116	2,03	252	3,10	483	5,75	679	8,55	871	12,20	1183	15,45	1411	17,92	1467	18,92	1418	18,79	1350	18,56	1318	18,35	1336	19,06
3	Turks	27	0,47	32	0,39	41	0,49	51	0,64	70	0,98	110	1,44	135	1,72	158	2,04	174	2,21	162	2,23	153	2,13	153	2,18
4	Roma	13	0,23	27	0,33	29	0,35	25	0,31	32	0,45	57	0,74	73	0,93	79	1,02	92	1,17	86	1,18	86	1,23	86	1,23
5	Serbs	166	2,90	238	2,93	178	2,12	186	2,34	176	2,46	178	2,33	167	2,12	165	2,13	164	2,08	145	1,99	136	1,89	131	1,87
6	Boshnjaks	5	0,09	12	0,15	22	0,26	24	0,30	42	0,59	46	0,60	45	0,57	46	0,59	45	0,57	43	0,59	42	0,57	41	0,59
7	Vlahs	14	0,24	16	0,20	23	0,27	26	0,33	45	0,63	58	0,76	58	0,74	60	0,77	63	0,80	60	0,82	58	0,81	57	0,81
8	Others	141	2,46	139	1,71	140	1,67	132	1,66	94	1,32	83	1,08	75	0,95	73	0,94	85	1,08	74	1,02	70	0,98	69	0,97
	Total:	5723	100	8123	100	8395	100	7946	100	7140	100	7655	100	7876	100	7755	100	7883	100	7273	100	7183	100	7008	100

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, General Staff of the Republic of Macedonia, file 07 no 19/4 from 19.04.2011[4]

[4] For the purposes of the paper the author submitted a request to GS of ARM no. 03-9/156 from 03.04.2014, requiring data for the percentage of representation of ethnic minorities in ARM. The answer (no.15-5/190) acquired form GS of ARM was that "data for 2013 do not differ from the ones referring to 2012".

Table no. 2.   Representation of the civilians in the ARM according to their ethnic affiliation in the period from 2001 to 2012, end No.07-102/2013, data for 08.04.2013

NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CIVILIANS BY YEARS

No.	Nationality	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
1	Macedonians	1566	89,74	1499	88,18	1381	89,21	1207	85,79	1015	83,88	923	83,61	824	79,61	772	79,51	751	79,72	545	82,83	546	83,61	454	82,10
2	Albanians	25	1,43	23	1,35	25	1,61	65	4,62	78	6,45	77	6,97	112	10,82	103	10,61	99	10,51	53	8,05	50	7,66	46	8,32
3	Turks	7	0,40	6	0,35	5	0,32	7	0,50	9	0,74	8	0,72	12	1,16	14	1,44	13	1,38	7	1,06	8	1,23	8	1,45
4	Roma	8	0,46	11	0,65	9	0,58	9	0,64	9	0,74	9	0,82	11	1,06	11	1,13	11	1,17	6	0,91	5	0,77	5	0,90
5	Serbs	97	5,56	133	7,82	78	5,04	73	5,19	62	5,12	52	4,71	44	4,25	42	4,33	39	4,14	29	4,41	27	4,13	24	4,34
6	Boshnjaks					8	0,52	7	0,50	5	0,41	5	0,45	4	0,39	4	0,41	4	0,42	2	0,30	2	0,31	2	0,36
7	Vlahs	5	0,29	5	0,29	11	0,71	9	0,64	11	0,91	10	0,91	10	0,97	7	0,72	7	0,74	5	0,76	5	0,77	4	0,72
8	Others	37	2,12	23	1,35	31	2,00	30	2,13	21	1,74	20	1,81	18	1,74	18	1,85	18	1,91	11	1,67	10	1,53	10	1,81
	Total:	1745	100	1700	100	1548	100	1407	100	1210	100	1104	100	1035	100	971	100	942	100	658	100	653	100	553	100

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, General Staff of the Republic of Macedonia, file 07 no 19/4 from 19.04.2011

Table no. 3.   Representation of the professional soldiers in the ARM according to their ethnic affiliation in the period from 2001 to 2012, end No.07-102/2013, data for 08.04.2013

NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS BY YEARS

No.	Nationality	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
1	Macedonians	1094	96,90	2771	96,28	2751	89,84	2511	89,33	2139	80,17	2684	75,82	2851	72,60	2693	70,17	2759	69,34	2633	70,01	2659	70,91	2598	70,01
2	Albanians	13	1,15	20	0,69	216	7,05	217	7,72	409	15,33	612	17,29	796	20,27	840	21,89	869	21,84	792	21,06	771	20,56	796	21,45
3	Turks	6	0,53	11	0,38	18	0,59	11	0,39	21	0,79	56	1,58	74	1,88	91	2,37	108	2,71	105	2,79	98	2,61	98	2,64
4	Roma	2	0,18	11	0,38	14	0,46	10	0,36	14	0,52	34	0,96	45	1,15	50	1,30	63	1,58	62	1,65	63	1,68	63	1,70
5	Serbs	9	0,80	42	1,46	39	1,27	42	1,49	58	2,17	79	2,23	83	2,11	81	2,11	81	2,04	74	1,97	69	1,84	67	1,81
6	Boshnjaks			7	0,24	8	0,26	6	0,21	7	0,26	20	0,56	22	0,56	23	0,60	22	0,55	22	0,58	21	0,56	21	0,57
7	Vlahs	3	0,27	4	0,14	4	0,13	3	0,11	9	0,34	29	0,82	30	0,76	34	0,89	37	0,93	36	0,96	34	0,91	34	0,92
8	Others	2	0,18	12	0,42	12	0,39	11	0,39	11	0,41	26	0,73	26	0,66	26	0,68	40	1,01	37	0,98	35	0,93	34	0,92
	Total:	1129	100	2878	100	3062	100	2811	100	2668	100	3540	100	3927	100	3838	100	3979	100	3761	100	3750	100	3711	100

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, General Staff of the Republic of Macedonia, file 07 no 19/4 from 19.04.2011

Table no. 4. Representation of the non-commissioned officers in the ARM according to their ethnic affiliation in the period from 2001 to 2012, end No.07-102/2013, data for 08.04.2013

NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS BY YEARS

No.	Nationality	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
1	Macedonians	1209	90,36	1606	86,30	1848	86,60	1687	79,16	1430	76,59	1275	71,39	1248	70,59	1283	70,88	1329	71,92	1307	72,25	1293	72,48	1285	72,64
2	Albanians	44	3,29	164	8,81	191	8,95	329	15,44	316	16,93	405	22,68	417	23,59	420	23,20	410	22,19	397	21,95	391	21,92	385	21,76
3	Turks	8	0,60	7	0,38	8	0,37	19	0,89	27	1,45	31	1,74	33	1,87	36	1,99	36	1,95	32	1,77	29	1,63	29	1,64
4	Roma	2	0,15	3	0,16	4	0,19	3	0,14	6	0,32	11	0,62	14	0,79	15	0,83	15	0,81	15	0,83	15	0,84	15	0,85
5	Serbs	25	1,87	29	1,56	31	1,45	38	1,78	32	1,71	27	1,51	23	1,30	25	1,38	27	1,46	27	1,49	26	1,46	26	1,47
6	Boshnjaks	3	0,22	3	0,16	4	0,19	9	0,42	18	0,96	13	0,73	12	0,68	11	0,61	11	0,60	11	0,61	11	0,62	11	0,62
7	Vlahs			1	0,05	2	0,09	3	0,14	7	0,37	6	0,34	6	0,34	7	0,39	7	0,38	7	0,39	7	0,39	7	0,40
8	Others	47	3,51	48	2,58	46	2,16	43	2,02	31	1,66	18	1,01	15	0,85	13	0,72	13	0,70	13	0,72	12	0,67	11	0,62
	Total:	1338	100	1861	100	2134	100	2131	100	1867	100	1786	100	1768	100	1810	100	1848	100	1809	100	1784	100	1769	100

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, General Staff of the Republic of Macedonia, file 07 no 19/4 from 19.04.2011

Table no. 5. Representation of the officers in the ARM according to their ethnic affiliation in the period from 2001 to 2012, end No.07-102/2013, data for 08.04.2013

NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICERS BY YEARS

No.	Nationality	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
1	Macedonians	1372	90,80	1531	90,91	1499	90,79	1418	88,79	1226	87,89	1058	86,37	989	86,30	959	84,42	940	84,38	868	83,06	823	83,06	798	81,94
2	Albanians	34	2,25	45	2,67	51	3,09	68	4,26	68	4,87	89	7,27	86	7,50	104	9,15	103	9,25	108	10,33	106	10,64	109	11,12
3	Turks	6	0,40	8	0,48	10	0,61	14	0,88	13	0,93	15	1,22	16	1,40	17	1,50	17	1,53	18	1,72	18	1,81	18	1,81
4	Roma	1	0,07	2	0,12	2	0,12	3	0,19	3	0,22	3	0,24	3	0,26	3	0,26	3	0,27	3	0,29	3	0,30	3	0,31
5	Serbs	35	2,32	34	2,02	30	1,82	33	2,07	24	1,72	20	1,63	17	1,48	17	1,50	17	1,53	15	1,44	14	1,41	14	1,43
6	Boshnjaks	2	0,13	2	0,12	2	0,12	2	0,13	12	0,86	8	0,65	7	0,61	8	0,70	8	0,72	8	0,77	7	0,70	7	0,71
7	Vlahs	6	0,40	6	0,36	6	0,36	11	0,69	18	1,29	13	1,06	12	1,05	12	1,06	12	1,08	12	1,15	12	1,20	12	1,22
8	Others	55	3,64	56	3,33	51	3,09	48	3,01	31	2,22	19	1,55	16	1,40	16	1,41	14	1,26	13	1,24	13	1,31	14	1,43
	Total:	1511	100	1684	100	1651	100	1597	100	1395	100	1225	100	1146	100	1136	100	1114	100	1045	100	996	100	975	100

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, General Staff of the Republic of Macedonia, file 07 no 19/4 from 19.04.2011

Based on these one can conclude that the representation of the Albanians in the public administration and state institution has a rising trend. However, during the implementation of the OFA, discrimination of representatives of Albanian decent is evident; Albanian minorities were positively discriminated at the expense of the smaller ethnic communities, such as Vlachs, Serbs, Turks, Romani, Boshnjaks etc.

After the change of power in August 2006, the new government coalition, led by VMRO-DPMNE and DUI adopted a strategy for equitable representation, whose aim was the "development and promotion of equitable representation of the members of non-majority communities" (Mehmeti 2008, 111). This decision did not differ from the policy of the previous government, led by SDSM and DPA, but it did seem that the dynamic of the process for the attainment of equitable representation was stopped.

The analysis leads to the conclusion that the time frame for realization of the measures for rapid integration in the area of employment of the less represented communities was not determined during the preparation of the OFA, nor upon its implementation. In such conditions it was possible to achieve exactly the opposite effect from the desired one. That is why the Macedonian majority and the smaller ethnic communities felt disadvantaged, in view of the favouring and rapid employment of the representatives of the Albanian community, especially in the context of high unemployment rates and unfavourable social and economic situation in the country. In other words, the need to apply the principle of appropriate and equitable representation of the communities, as well as the concrete measures of affirmative action in function of consistent implementation of this principle in multi-ethnic multicultural societies is apparent. However, the application of this principle demonstrates only a part of the overall process of social integration in society, an integral and overall approach in solving this complex yet necessary issue is needed (Cvetanova 2006,178).

Education

According to the OFA provision, the state was obliged to provide funding for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20% of the population of Macedonia. In that context, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia passed several changes and amendments to the Law on Higher Education. In accordance with the legislative amendments, a State University was established in Tetovo, and consequently the obligation for funding university level education in languages spoken by at least 20% of the population, belonging to an ethnic minority in a given municipality of Macedonia, was implemented. Furthermore, it was decided that the principle of positive discrimination be applied in the enrolment process for the state universities for candidates belonging to the communities, which do not form a majority in the population of Macedonia.

In the same period a university had already existed and functioned in Tetovo.[5] The South East European University was funded by the international community and all the teaching at the university was conducted in Macedonian, Albanian and English languages.

With the establishment of both universities, the percentage of the Albanian students for the academic year 2004/2005 increased to 15,5% out of the total number of enrolled students. The percentage of Albanians has been continually increasing.

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[5]   Tetovo is a town in western Macedonia with a predominantly Albanian population.

In addition, the right of primary and secondary education in students 'mother tongues had already been realized and in this aspect the OFA only reiterated and emphasized the already existent normative and factual situation. Instruction in the primary and secondary education in Macedonia was conducted in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and Serbian languages, as well as facultative tuition in the languages of other ethnic communities. More precisely, in 134 of the total 344 primary school in the academic year 2002/2003, the schooling was conducted exclusively in the Albanian language or in the Albanian language as one of the teaching languages. In the academic year 2008/2009, 72,570 Albanian pupils enrolled in primary school. The same year, the percentage of the Albanian population of the total number of students covered within secondary education was 18,57% (State Statistical Office 2008, 63); the same academic year, 25,857 Albanian students enrolled in high school. Of 90 high school in Macedonia, 26 conducted teaching exclusively in Albanian.

Having in mind that educational institutions represent a place where the process of socialization develops and forms, we can conclude that Macedonia still lacks heterogeneous primary education with a real multicultural format. The introduction of a multicultural education policy is a way through which pupils and students can get to know the culture and identity of the 'other' and serves as a positive step forward in overcoming the ethnic prejudices, which already represent a basic precondition for the existence of inter-ethnic tensions. Introduction of contents and program through which pupils and students could develop a sense of common belonging and loyalty to the state is necessary and serves as one of the main preconditions for living together (Cvetanova 2006, 180).

Use of Languages

The issue of language is regulated in accordance with the provision by the OFA, stipulating that "any other language spoken by at least 20% of the population (in a given municipality) is also an official language" (OFA 2001). Based on this provision a change to the Constitution of Macedonia was made. Such a provision enabled the use of multiple languages: in the work of the Parliament (including the working bodies and plenary sessions), for publication of laws, during criminal and civil court proceedings, when issuing personal documents and in communication between the citizens within local, regional and central governments.

In order to understand the tensions in the framework of education, one needs to take into consideration the 20% margin. According to the ethnic affiliation, the result from the census held in 2002, showed the following structure of population:

- Macedonians: 64,18%
- Albanians: 25,17%
- Turks: 3,85%
- Romani:2,66%
- Vlachs:0,48%
- Serbs:1,78%
- Boshnjaks: 0,84% and
- Others:1,04%

Having in mind that only the Albanian ethnic community meets the prescribed 20% of the population in Macedonia, this fact inevitably leads to the impression that the OFA provision is actually in the function of affirming the Albanian language as the only minority language that can- under certain additional conditions - be the official language. In such a way the state has become bilingual (Cvetanova 2006, 181). For this reason a number of analysts consider that in Macedonia, the bi-national model of organization has been promoted and introduced unnoticeably.

The representatives of the Albanian community think that the use of the Albanian language in accordance with the Constitution and the OFA will serve as a mechanism for overcoming language barriers, which frequently present the main reason for inter-ethnic conflict or misunderstanding. The aim of the official use of the Albanian language is to enable inter-ethnic cohesion, and to increase and solidify the sense of affiliation of the ethnic Albanian towards the state (Mehmeti 2008, 118).

Under these condition, the question of the use of languages represents one of the most sensitive topics in multi-ethnic and multicultural societies, primarily due to the language serving as the most important identity trait and as a means of communication and its related functions during the process of socialization of the individual. The issue of the use of languages most frequently acquires political attention and is perceived as political affirmation and social promotion of minority communities (Cvetanova 2006, 182).

Decentralization

Decentralization, or local self-government, represents a constitutional category according to which 'one-level decentralization' is chosen as an optimal model, which does not jeopardize the unitary character of the state (Siljanovska 200, 53).

The Republic of Macedonia started the process of decentralization in the 90s, after its independence. In 1996, Macedonia signed the European Charter on Local Self-Government and ratified it in 1997. Furthermore, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia passed the two key laws on decentralization, the Law on Local Self-Government and the Law on Territorial Organization.

However, the Albanian ethic community was not pleased with such conceptual or legal framework of local self-government. That is way the process of decentralization after the signing of the OFA acquired a completely different flow and started to be treated as a solution to the problems that had led to the signing of the OFA in the first place.

The OFA, in item 3, determines the development of decentralized government, according to which increased competencies, of municipalities, in accordance with the international standards, will relate to "the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care" (OFA 2001, item 3.1).

As part of the implementation of the OFA and in accordance with the obligations prescribed in it, the Parliament passed a revised Law on Local Self-Government (January 2002), a new Law on Territorial Organization, which redefined municipal boundaries (June

2004), and a Law on the Financing of Local Self-Government, which prescribes the allocation of authorities connected with the finding of municipalities (July 2004).

The development of a decentralized government also relates to the security sector. More precisely, according to item 3.3 of the OFA, local heads of police are to be selected by municipal council from lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of Interior.[6] One has to bear in mind that the aims of these changes is to increase the authority of local population and give more civilian control to the work of police, while building greater trust among the population and the security organs.

From the above-mentioned changes and the passing of new laws on local self-government and territorial organization is reflected the intention for the preservation of peace, which would enable a rapid implementation of the OFA. It is also evident, however, that the revision of municipal boundaries or more precisely the new Law on Territorial Organization, with which new municipal boundaries were defined, provoked serious reaction and division in the Macedonian public.

One of the key provisions of the OFA, namely the part defining the basic principles, claims there are no territorial solutions for ethic ethnic issue. However, the impression remains that the provision on ethnic criterion was the key in the tailoring of new municipally boundaries, with which the municipalities were divided into Macedonian and Albanian. The number of municipalities where the 'non-Macedonian' and 'non-Albanian' population dominates - namely the smaller ethnic communities - has drastically decreased after the implementation of the OFA (Cvetanova 2006, 183).

Contrary to this assessment, the Albanian share a different opinion. They believe that "due to the multi-ethnic character of the state, the reform of the local self-government in Macedonia has two parallel dimensions: ethnic and political-democratic one" (Mehmeti 2008, 112). Accordingly, these two dimensions should not be in collision but complementary. The main challenge of decentralization is how to manage the cooperation between the central and the local government. The majority population at the central level becomes a minority group in some municipalities, such as the ethnic Macedonians who live in the city of Tetovo. Precisely this change of position should serve as the best test for the respective communities to show what it means to be a majority and a minority in one single multi-ethnic society.

The OFA regulates the Special Parliamentary in item 5. Namely, according to this item

"Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local election, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of municipalities must receive a majority of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia" (OFA 2001, item 5.2).

Moreover, the OFA offers an additional solution, which is in the function of guaranteeing the right to veto. Namely, with this decision an inclusive Committee on Inter-Community Relation has been established, which functions in the framework of the Macedonian Assembly and is comprised of representatives of Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlahs, Romani,

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6 The selection process in the OFA item 3, Annex B.

Serbs and Boshnjaks. This Committee has the authority to bring decision and give opinion on the laws, for which the Parliament in a plenary session cannot decide whether a dual voting or the use of the Badinter principle is required.[7]

Conclusion

Ohrid Framework Agreement is the broadest basis for advancing the political, cultural, social and economic status of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. The Agreement includes several provisions and the analysis has shown a success in their implementation, including:

- The Albanian to become the second official language where it is spoken by over 20% of the population;
- From 2001 to 2012 continuously increases the number of members of ethnic communities in the Macedonian Army;
- Increased number of civilians in the Macedonian Army of members of ethnic Albanians;
- Increased number of professional soldiers in the Macedonian Army according to their ethnicity in the period from 2001 to 2013;
- Also, the number of non-commissioned officers in the Macedonian Army has increased according to their ethnicity in the period from 2001 to 2012;
- The number of officers in the Macedonian Army has increased significantly at the members of ethnic Albanians, for example in 2001 the number of officers was 34, and by 2012 that number has risen to 397. Furthermore, the analysis shows that more efforts are still required in promoting officers from ethnic communities not in the majority;
- The implementation enabled reinforcement of power of local self-government units in political decision-making.

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[7] The Badinter principle is a special procedure of voting, prescribed in the OFA, according to which for the laws relating to language, culture and identity or non-majority communities, majority of votes is necessary, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of the Republic of Macedonia. The principle is named after French lawyer Robert Badinter.

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STRATEGIC PROBLEMS AND INTEGRATION
OF THE WESTERN BALKANS

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Abstract: *In the days of turbulent changes and challenges in the international relations strategic thinking is a must. This apples to every region in the world and is mostly needed in the area where wars were fought until recently and where there are still open chances for instability. In contemporary European relations Southeast Europe or Western Balkans are still seen as a part of unfinished issue. After the wars which were ravishing former Yugoslav space, eruption of instability was permanent feature which was stopping the development in that part of the world. The paper is going to focus on concrete situation in the area of Western Balkans trying to put an accent on the role of Euro-Atlantic integration process (NATO, European Union). Two countries, Slovenia and Croatia, are now fully integrated in NATO and the European Union and are parts of a widep European integration process. On the other side, majority of Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) have some kind of institutional ties with both NATO and the European Union, but they are still far away of a full-fledged membership in those organizations. How the relations between space exclusivity and Europeanization are going to work in the future? There are so many unresolved questions (security, political, economic, ethnic, energy supply....) in the area of Western Balkan countries but as the role of international actors as NATO and the European Union were important in stabilizing the situation, immediately after the wars in that area, one should say that NATO and the European Union could contribute to bring these countries to free and democratic Europe. Integration of the Western Balkan countries into NATO and the EU is a two-way process. On one side it depends on the country aspiring for membership, and on the other side it depends when the organizations – NATO, EU – are willing and ready to open the doors to new members. So if we want to have a free and democratic Europe it is important for the rest of the Western Balkan countries to continue with the reforms of their societies and NATO and the European Union should not stop with their enlargement policy.*

Keywords*: Western Balkans, Euro-Atlantic integration, strategic thinking*

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Introduction

Syntagm *Western Balkans* has been entered into the political discourse during the European Union Summit in Zagreb in 2000 for the territories of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, plus Albania, i.e. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the then FR Yugoslavia[2], Macedonia, and Albania. The newly adopted term is primarily a political syntagm used for identifying this group of countries that were at that time on a similar level of internal development, judged by the state of their overall post-socialist transition processes, level of their integration into Euro-Atlantic and European structures (or lack of it), and by direct or indirect consequences of military and ethnic conflicts in this region.[3]

In early 90s of the 20th century, immediately after the disappearance of bi-polar relations and in the midst of a search for new structure of European and World order,[4] post-socialist countries of the Western Balkans have expressed their desire to pursue political, economic and security integration within the so called "Western way of life". And in institutional sense this also meant integration with NATO and the EU. Bloody disintegration of SFRY has slowed down the much needed transition of countries emerging after the fall apart of the former federation and at the same time it has determined their paths to integration into both NATO and the EU.[5] The only exception was Slovenia which became a NATO and EU member in 2004. Slovenia was the most advanced federal state within the former SFR Yugoslavia, it was spared from a large scale war destruction, and being a small but well organized country it managed to implement the needed reforms quickly and succesfully.[6] The rest of the former SFR Yugoslavia was not as successful. In territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the wars were raging till 1995, and in 1999 FR Yugoslavia was bombed by NATO. Presence of international forces was preventing ethnic conflicts in Macedonia. Albania, which was a part of the socialist world, but at the same time was pursuing a policy of neutrality and isolationism in relation to security and economy integrations of the socialist world (Warsaw Pact and COMECON) also managed to protect its territorial integrity after the fall of the bi-polar world, albeit with much assistance from the international community (especially the USA and NATO). Therefore it is understandable why the European Union, within a range of its regional approaches to post-socialist countries[7], groups these countries under the term Western Balkans and adopts a specific program for assisting them on their paths towards EU integration. Namely, on the

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[2] Today these are: Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.

[3] For more detail on Zagreb summit, see Z.Petak: „Zagrebački summit i politika integracije Hrvatske u Europsku uniju", *Europska unija – pravni, gospodarski i politički aspekti,* br. 28, Informator, Zagreb, November 18, 2000, pp. 2-6.

[4] More about the new structure of international community after the fall of bipolarism see in: R. N. Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff- The United States after the Cold War,* New York, 1997, John Lewis Gaddis, *The Future of American Foreign Policy,* New York, 1994, Joseph A. Camilleri & Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World,* Aldershot, 1992. May Singer & Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil,* Chatham, 1993.,G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos", *Foreign Affairs 75,* No. 3, travanj - lipanj 1996, pp.. 79-91.,F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* New York, 1992.,John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security,* 15, no. 1, summer 1990, pp. 5-56., Robert D. Kaplan, "The Corning Anarchy", *Atlantic,* february 1994, pp. 44-76., Samuel Huntington *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking ofWorld Order, New York, 1996.,*Zbigniev Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives,* New York, 1997, R. Sloan, *The U. S. Role in the New World Order: Prospects George Bush's Global Vision,* Congressional Research Service, Washington D. C, 28. March 1991.

[5] More about the new definition of security in South-Eastern Europe, after the fall of bipolar system of international relations see in: R. Vukadinović, Varnost v Jugovzhodni Europi, Ljubljana, 2002, pp.7-45.

[6] Statistical data for Slovenia see in: Miroslav Prokopijević, Evropska unija, Beograd 2005, pp.354-357.

[7] For more on EU regional approaches to South Eastern Europe see in: R.D.Vukadinović, Uvod u institucije i pravo Evropske unije, Beograd, 2010, pp.389-395.

same EU Zagreb Summit in 2000 where the term Western Balkans was launched, the Stabilization and Accession Agreement as an important mechanism for accession of these countries closer to the EU was also adopted.[8]

It must be noted that NATO, although not taking over the term Western Balkans in its official documents, also insisted on political stabilization of these countries – through its Partnership for Peace program – and only then on reforms of their defense systems. In analyzing the requested reforms one can see that the so called "first set" of these pre-conditions set forth by both NATO and the EU is almost identical.[9] It refers to political conditions – regional cooperation, full cooperation with the ICTY, return of refugees, strengthening the rule of law, fight against corruption, and democratization of all aspects of society. In other words, by applying the "stick and carrot" policy NATO and the EU were trying to guide these countries to full membership in both organizations. Today, in spite of the still present and used term Western Balkans, each of these countries has different level of institutional links with NATO and the EU, respectively.

Integration of the Western Balkans

Analyzing the enlargement process of NATO and the EC/EU it can be noticed that all "new democracies", including the post-socialist ones, have first become members of NATO and only then of the EC/EU. It was evident that Euro-Atlantic allies have maintained this principle for the countries of the Western Balkans as well. In reviewing their institutional bilateral connections it can be concluded that NATO made the first steps towards a particular country, and the EU followed.

Croatia

Military aggression in which one third of Croatia's territory was occupied, fight for physical liberation of the country, and Croatia's involvement in armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have all stopped Croatian progress towards NATO. Almost to the very end of the 20th century Croatia, along with FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, was one of the most isolated SEE countries by international community. In spite of the fact that NATO forces, as well as the EU member states and the USA, were assisting Croatian fight in various ways, due to this war that was forced upon it, Croatia was left out of any NATO institutional ties and programs designed for post-socialist countries.[10]

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[8]   For other European post-socialist countries that were aspiring to EU membership EU had a different mechanism – Accession Agreement. Naturally, due to specific problems caused by the war and other soft challenges to security that countries of the Western Balkans needed to address, the EU primarily insisted on stabilization, and only after that on accession. See more in R. Vukadinović, L. Čehulić Vukadinović, Politika europskih integracija, Zagreb, 2011, pp. 333-335.

[9]   N. Tomović, L.Čehulić Vukadinović, „Kompatibilnost kriterijuma za ulazak u evropske i evroatlantske integracije“, Zbornik škole euroatlantizma, Vol. III, no.3., Donja Gorica, 2012, pp. 81-102.

[10] During her visit to Croatia in late May 1997, the US Secretary of State Madelaine Albright insisted on the following: Croatian support to and consistent implementation of the Dayton Agreement; return of refugees and displaced persons to Croatia; cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. A year later in his article *Croatia's Roadmap to Partnership for Peace* the US Ambassador to Croatia William T. Montgomery has higlighted the principal guideliness for Croatian participation in Partnership for Peace. American ambassador recommends Croatia to invest efforts in: reconciliation process; creating conditions for free return, life and work of all refugees from Croatia; consistent implementation of the Dayton Accords; democratization of the society with special accent on freedom of media, change of electoral legislation, and free and fair elections. See in: Lidija Čehulić: „Clintonova administracija i ulazak Hrvatske u Partnerstvo za mir“, Politička misao, vol. 37, no.3, 2000, p. 277.

Croatia's progress towards NATO began after the democratic presidential and parliamentary elections in 2000, when Croatia, almost overnight, became a member of the Partnership for Peace. Soon after this Croatia starts to participate in NATO's Membership Action Plan. Along with Albania and Macedonia Washington includes Croatia into a program for adjusting to the standards of the Alliance – the so called Adriatic Charter. This all led to Croatia being recognized as a country that deserves an invitation to full NATO membership during the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008. Croatia became a NATO member in 2009 at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Cologne.[11] Since then Croatia actively participates in numerous political, humanitarian, civilian and military missions conducted under the auspices of the UN or NATO.[12] At the same time, the percentage of public support to NATO and Croatian membership in it has never exceeded 55 percent.[13]

Simultaneously with its approach to NATO, Croatia has established institutional ties with the EU.

With exception of a short period of time when it was included into the EU PHARE program, until January 2001 Croatia was actually only entitled to annual trade preferences in trade with the EU.[14] The negotiations between the EU and the Republic of Croatia on Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) have officially begun at the margins of the 2000 EU Summit in Zagreb. By signing the SAA and the Temporary Agreement, which was to be implemented until the effectiveness of the SAA, Croatia has for the first time established formal relations with the EU. This was the most important formal step within the process of Croatian accession to the EU before the official request for full membership status (in 2003) and acquiring the candidate status (in 2004).[15] Of all post-socialist countries Croatia's negotiations were the longest ones and the most substantive ones.[16] This was a result of internal political situation, certain "enlargement fatigue" that was felt within some EU member states, as well as a result of positions of some neighboring countries towards Croatia's membership in the EU (Slovenia). Finally on July 1st 2013 Croatia became the twenty-eighth member of the EU.[17]

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Country that suffered the longest and bloodiest war after the break-up of former Yugoslavia can be grateful to NATO and the US administration under President Clinton

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[11] The Head of Defense Policy Office within Croatian Ministry of Defense at the time, Mr. Pjer Šimunović, stated after the final operational meeting at which Croatian officers presented to their NATO colleagues the Report on achieved progress in adopting NATO standards by Croatian armed forces that „Croatia is entering NATO as one of the countries with highest readiness for membership ever". Vjesnik, 18 and 19 October 2008.

[12] See in: Marta Nakić-Vojnović: „Contribution of Croatia to International Peacekeeping Missions", in L. Čehulić (ed. Yearbook Šipan 2006, Zagreb, 2007, pp. 82-91.

[13] For more on public opinion in regards to NATO membership see in: Zlatko Gareljić: „Croatia and NATO", in L. Čehulić (ed.): Yearbook Šipan 2006, Zagreb, 2007, pp. 115-124.

[14] Between 1992 and 2001 the Council of Ministers was determining the content of trade preferences for Croatia at the beginning of each calendar year.

[15] A.Brnčić, P,Leppee, I, Mošnja, Hrvatska na putu u Europsku uniju: od kandidature do članstva, Zagreb, 2004.

[16] S. Tišma, V. Samardžija, K. Jurlin (ur.), Hrvatska i Europska unija. Prednosti i izazovi članstva, IMO, Zagreb,2012., Što donosi članstvo u Europskoj uniji. Pregled pregovaračkih poglavlja, Ministarstvo vanjskihi europskih poslova RH, Zagreb, 2012.

[17] Tekst Ugovora o pristupanja Hrvatske Europskoj uniji, Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova I europskih integracija RH, Zagreb, 2011.

for stopping the armed conflict. But the very same international community has also forced a protectorate status upon Bosnia and Herzegovina and a political system that very few of the citizens of this country support – the Dayton Agreement. Regardless of all advantages or disadvantages of its functioning in accordance with the Dayton model,[18] integration of this country into the European and Euro-Atlantic space is more of a symbolic character than expression of will of its citizen or realistic possibilities.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was accepted to Partnership for Peace program in 2006. It was also conditionally offered participation in the Action Plan for NATO membership in 2010 (however, the underlying issue of military property remains unsolved). Soldiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina participate in peace missions and other joint activities of the Alliance. On the other hand, through the Stabilization and Accession Agreement (2008), EU has initiated reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina but due to poor functioning of the Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unique state little has been achieved on closer accession to the EU.[19]

Emergence of a "state within the state" – the Republic of Srpska – in combination with deeply rooted national divisions prevent this country from further accession to Euro-Atlantic integrations.[20] Formal progress achieved on the path towards NATO membership is not equally well accepted in two entities, while recent Progress Report issued by the EU reveals that there is not much progress in functioning of the state. Lack of readiness by local players to invest joint efforts on solving the concrete, daily hardships and to unanimously declare their joint interest for membership in NATO, the EU respresents sufficient reasons for international community to be dissatisfied with the present situation. Global crisis and numerous problems throughout the world and in Europe are additionally decreasing the level of interest of both Europe and the international community for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In turn, this results in a situation where almost complete development within the country is left to certain political inertia.[21]

Serbia

Similar to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia is both institutionally and psychologically still far away from NATO and the European Union. Differing from Bosnia and Herzegovina where NATO was crucial in stopping the bloody war, Serbia is still viewing NATO as an enemy that attacked its sovereignty in 1999 (the action in Kosovo followed by NATO air strikes on strategically significant targets in Belgrade and Novi Sad). By applying the "stick and carrot" policy NATO and the EU are trying to get closer to Belgrade and are awarding every, even the slightest democratic progress in the country. Serbia was admitted to Partnership for Peace (Riga, 2006), but it was clear that without the democratization of the whole Serbian society and forming of a stable pro-Western government there would be no further integration of Serbia into NATO. In the post-Cold War times Serbia was defeated in all wars it led (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), and its territory shrunk with

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[18] Milan Vego, Međunarodna zajednica i Bosna i Hercegovina, Mostar 2012., pp. 101-210.
[19] S. Cenić, N.Trninić, S. Vilendečić, EU-monitoring: O ekonomskom i pravnom prilagođavanju standardima Evropske unije, Sarajevo,2012.
[20] Radomir Nešković, Nedovršena država, Sarajevo 2013. pp.122-152
[21] Paul Pasch (ed.) Bosna i Hercegovina 2025:Scenariji budućeg razvoja događaja, Sarajevo 2012.

the secession of Montenegro and Kosovo. But still, Serbia has not experienced internal social catharsis and is constantly facing dangerous remains from the recent past in various segments of its social development. Within such context all positively assessed reforms and transformations of the military forces are being offset by internal political instability and weaknesses of the society. Thesis offered by some segments of Serbian political elites that Serbia may enter the EU without NATO membership, [22]and comparisons with neutral status of Austria or Switzerland are not very realistic.

However, in spite of this stalling in institutional relations with NATO, the European Union is continuing with the "stick and carrot" strategy. Serbia has the Stabilization and Accession Agreement, and as a reward for Serbian willingness to talk with Prishtina after the incidents on Serbian-Kosovo border it even received a candidate status.

The so called Independence Declaration of 2009 was intended to point to Serbian desire to separate the Euro-Atlantic process and to stay outside of NATO - i.e. to remain neutral[23] – while still aspiring for EU membership. [24]Although the Declaration was primarily a declaratory response to court judgement on Kosovo, it was obvious that Tadić's administration did not wish to alienate itself from Europe. [25]

But, following the presidential elections and raise to power of the new coalition with President Nikolić, statements that Serbia will "never abandon its Southern province" and that "the choice between Kosovo and Europe" is not an option, are gaining on strength and frequency in Serbia. Due to its unwillingness to make a positive step towards opening negotiations with Kosovo, Serbia will probably not receive a date for opening negotiations with the EU during this year. At the same time readiness to implement the agreements reached with Kosovo during the previous administration will not be enough since Serbia was already rewarded for that by receiving an EU candidate status.

Montenegro

Besides Kosovo, Montenegro was the last country of the former SFR Yugoslavia to gain its independence in 2006, and has immediately made a solid start in implementing reforms needed for accession to NATO and the EU. Namely, as during the so called Community of Serbia and Montenegro defense and security issues were under the realm of the joint state, with its independence Montenegro had to start from the scratch in these areas. Ranging from legal regulation to establishment of operational security forces, everything that was done in this small country on these issues was done in accordance with NATO standards and principles.[26]

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[22] S.Petković, „Istraživanja javnog mnjenja prema Evropskoj uniji u Srbiji – tendencije i perspektive", Međunarodna politika, vol.LXII, no.1144, october-december 2011., pp.50-65..

[23] Andreja Savić, „Srbija na raskršću: Neutralnost ili NATO", Zbornik škole euroatlantizma, vol.II, no.2,Donja Gorica, 2011., pp. 103-116.

[24] Marija Urošević, „Pridruživanje Srbije EU u svjetlu političkih prilika uzemlji i problema u Evropskoj uniji", Međunaraodna politika, Vol.LXIV,nor.1150, April-June2013, Beograd, pp. 30-32.

[25] Jelena Milić, „Može li Zajednička bezbjednosna i obrambena politika EU biti alternativa NATO integracijama Srbije", Integracija Zapadnog Balkana u mrežu globalne bezbjednosti, (ed. Dragan R. Simić), Beograd, 2011, str.305-311.

[26] For more on development of security and defense systems in Montenegro, see Mehmedin Tahirović, „Montenegro and Partnership for Peace", Međunarodne studije, vol. 8, no. 2, 2008, pp. 53-70.

NATO recognized this and admitted Montenegro into Partnership for Peace immediately after the independence (2006). This was a clear advantage for Montenegrin armed forces, as well as for the whole society. Later Montenegro fell as collateral victim of NATO politics when due to conflicts in Georgia it was not admitted to Membership Action Plan. Montenegro had to wait until 2009 to enter this program. Again, as a collateral victim of NATO's internal crisis it was not admitted to NATO membership during the Chicago Summit and now it must wait for the fourth wave of NATO enlargement. If it continues with successful reforms and activities within the existing NATO programs there is no reason for Montenegro not to become the next NATO member from the Western Balkans region as soon as the Alliance decides on the new enlargement.

Montenegro's path towards the EU was similarly successful.[27] After signing the Stabilization and Accession Agreement (2007) Montenegro has bravely requested EU membership. The fact that it was given the candidate status, as well as the date for beginning the negotiations, additionally encourages political elites, as well as citizens of the country, to persist on Euro-Atlantic and European path.[28]

Institutional accession of Montenegro to NATO and the EU gives favorable winds to political elites who were, because of that, able to solve some dilemmas of their own, as well as dilemmas expressed by the public opinion in Montenegro. Namely, every time a slow-down in this path towards the West is being sensed Montenegro calls upon its traditional connections with Russia. Some radical advocates of this Russian-Montenegro ties attempt even to substitute European path with closer relations with Russia. Montenegro may be taken as an example by all remaining Western Balkans countries, as well as any other country aspiring to NATO and EU membership, as a positive example of modern, globally interlinked international community. And since NATO and the EU have well established relations with Russia, membership in these organizations does not have to mean automatic break-up of connections and relations with Russia.

Kosovo

Kosovo as an independent state is a project of the United States of America.[29] Although United States are the most powerful member of the Alliance, to Kosovo's regret this fact did not help in all members recognizing Kosovo's independence. In the post-Cold War times Kosovo lies within NATO's sphere of interest not only because of the first out-of-area action conducted there in 1999, but also due to extended presence of large contingent of NATO forces in that country.[30] However, in Brussels potential membership of Kosovo is not being officially mentioned for the time being, for it is waiting for all members of the Alliance to recognize the newly independent state. The same may be said for the relation

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[27] G. Đurović, Evropska unija i Crna Gora.Politika proširenja, Podgorica, 2012., pp.373-549.

[28] On reforms undertaken in Montenegro on this path, see in: Gordana Đurović (ed.) „Crna Gora u XXI stoljeću – u eri kompetitivnosti: integracija u evropske i evroatlantske strukture", Montenegro Academy of Sciences and Arts, vol. 73, no. 4, Podgorica 2010.

[29] See in Radovan Vukadinović: „Američka politika i stvaranje kosovske države", Međunarodne studije, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp.. 5-19.

[30] Besford Rreecaj: „Konačno rješenje statusa Kosova: procesi i perspektive", Međunarodne studije, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp. 20-42.

between the EU and Kosovo. As long as all member states do not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, the EU has to find a new specific way (approaches) for strengthening institutional relations with that country. Still, there are ways in which NATO and the EU members are cooperating with Kosovo, not to mention the fact that the EU, NATO and the UN forces are physically present in Kosovo. Based on this it might be said that Kosovo is in a rather specific situation, because it is simultaneously a subject, and an object of the contemporary international relations. The main question is: for how long we can have that kind of NATO-EU-Kosovo relations?

Albania

The post-Cold War Albanian desire to join NATO was a proof of the newly elected government that it will put an end to the long lasting Albanian policy of isolationism and its specific type of neutralism. Situation in the region (not only the armed conflicts in the territories of former Yugoslavia, but also continuing crisis over ethnic, religious and territorial issues in the neighborhood) has contributed to the fact that public opinion in Albania was constantly expressing the highest level of support to integration of their country to the Alliance. Even in times of stabilization in the South Eastern Europe and objective hardships that Albanian population was suffering during the transition and painful internal reforms,[31] this support was not falling below eighty percent. Albania was among the first countries that joined NATO cooperation programs, such as North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Membership Action Plan, within which it was developing various political, military and civil activities with the member states. Signing of the Adriatic Charter was in a way American recognition and reward for Albanian loyalty and cooperation with NATO, while the call to join the Alliance together with Croatia, extended on NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, was the icing on the cake of all Albanian efforts. For Albanian government this was certainly a reward, but also an obligation to start addressing Albanian internal problems (mostly connected to soft security challenges such as drug trafficking, crime, corruption) with more firmness and commitment.[32]

The European Union insists on the very same criteria. Albania signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (in 2006) but mostly due to insufficient reforms towards democracy and rule of law it did not achieve a stronger institutional integration with the European Union.

Macedonia

Macedonia was not exposed to bloody armed conflicts after the fall-apart of former Yugoslavia. However, in its post-socialist development it was not exempted from internal ethnic conflicts (including the use of armed forces) caused by dissatisfaction of Albanian population with its status in the new state. Religious and territorial problems gradually followed ethnic ones. The Ohrid Agreement has legally regulated status of unsatisfied national minorities but its implementation was facing numerous problems of objective and subjective

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[31]   Sabit Brokaj, „Civil-Military Relations in Albania:Phases of Evolution", in Plamen Pantev (ed.) Civil –Milityra relations in South-east Europe, Vienna, 2001., pp.15-30.

[32]   Dario Malnar "Accesion of the Republic of Albania and Republic of Croatia Into NATO-New Perspectives of Regional Security", Trendi Global, Vol.2.No3, Priština, 2009.,pp. 161-172.

nature. Military presence of international community is Macedonian reality for some time now. Internal instabilities that can easily spread over Macedonian borders in combination with Greek–Macedonian dispute over the name of the new state (among other) resulted in a strong orientation of Skopje towards the West, inclusive of NATO and its strongest member, the USA. Same as Albania, Macedonia was also intensifying its cooperation and partnerships through all existing NATO programs available to post-socialist countries. Together with Albania and Croatia it was contributing to international peace through activities within the Adriatic Charter. Level of public support to NATO membership in those times was never below sixty percent, while in times of intensified internal crisis it was rising up to eighty percent. Membership in the Alliance was primarily seen as a guarantee for lasting internal peace, stability and prosperity of the country. Thus the fact that Macedonia was not invited to join NATO with other two members of the Adriatic Charter in 2008 resulted with deep disappointment in Skopje. Even more so due to the fact that the first hints of such negative outcome started only at the eve of the Bucharest Summit and during the Summit itself. Greece as a full member of the Alliance used the fact that the Alliance decides with unanimous vote and by voting against effectively blocked Macedonian membership. NATO leadership expressed regret over such development and reinstated that NATO doors remain open for all potential members that fulfill the criteria. However, there will be no additional screening for Macedonia. Namely, Macedonia has met all the criteria and it will be admitted to membership as soon as it solves its bilateral disputes over the name issue with Greece. But the situation has significantly changed since these optimistic and comforting statements at the Bucharest Summit. In spite of Macedonian active cooperation with NATO within the Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan, disappointment after the Bucharest Summit resulted in slow down of implementation of necessary reforms in Macedonia. At the same time its accession to the European Union is also in a stalemate. After signing the Stabilization and Accession Agreement (2001) and acquiring the status of candidate country (2005) Skopje was warning that Macedonia is tired of waiting for **the date to begin** negotiations. In the meantime the Ohrid Agreement is not yielding expected results, ethnic differences are growing stronger, same as the numbers of Albanian population. In the long run this *status quo* that NATO and the EU are maintaining towards this country cannot be good, neither for Macedonia, nor for the Western Balkans. It will be very difficult for Macedonia to resist internal pressures without external assistance. [33]

Conclusion

　　Western Balkans is no longer a "black pit" of the Old Continent. This is a region where "unstable stability" still prevails, but challenges to security are no longer, primarily, military ones. They have been replaced by a wide array of the so called soft-security challenges (ethnic, religious, national, border issues, energy supply, drugs, prostitution and human trafficking, other types of

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[33] Stojan Slaveski, "Macedonia at Crossroads: Between NATO Membership and 'Defending the National Identity'", in L.Čehulić Vukadinović, Yearbook Šipan 2012, Zagreb, 2013., pp. 126-134.

crimes, ecological issues, economic stagnation, terrorism, and alike).[34] In early 1990s when post-bipolar structures of the international community started to emerge Western Balkans was primarily turned to the West. [35]Today, after twenty years of transition, conditions for easier penetration of other players into this area were created. Russia and Turkey together with some other Arab and Asian states are increasingly important partners on which countries of the Western Balkans may count, along with the West.[36]

The open door policy or enlargement remains as official policy of both NATO and the EU,[37] but there will be no new admissions to NATO and EU membership for quite some time. In comparing enlargement policy of the two organizations with their other internal policies it can be said that enlargement was the most successful **NATO's policy** since disappearance of the bi-polarism, while the EU in total had to face more challenges than benefits from this process. So probably the accession of Croatia to the European Union was the last round of enlargement to the Western Balkans this decade.

Western Balkans is the only part of Europe where NATO and the EU still have their forces present as guarantors of peace and stability (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo). This also represents a sort of security that both organizations will remain present in the region. But it must be said that from the point of Euro-Atlantism, and especially if viewed globally, Western Balkans is no longer a region holding top positions of the world politics due to its problems and unsolved issues. Stabilization and integration of this region will continue gradually, with insistence on stronger engagement of local players.

With the exception of Serbia, all other states in the Western Balkans aspire to membership in both – NATO and the European Union. By entering of these countries into NATO and the EU, a community of democratic states **will form an area** of security in this part of Europe in which prospects of some future bloody wars such as those in the recent past would become much less likely. Within such secure area, with NATO and EU as principal pillars, even those issues that are still being opened could be solved faster and easier (issue of borders, rights of ethnic minorities, asymmetrical security challenges). As a member of NATO and the new member of the EU by advocating for further enlargement of both organizations, the Republic of Croatia could significantly contribute to strengthening of security, stability, democracy and long term prosperity in the turbulent region of South Eastern Europe.

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[34] Eviola Prifti (ed.) The Euopean Future of the Western Balkans, Paris, 2003.

[35] G.Lenci, L.Martin (eds.), The European Security Space, Paris, 1998.

[36] Charles A. Kupchan: No One's World. The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn, Oxford, 2011. Walter Laqueur: After the Fall. The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent, London, 2011.

[37] Ronald D. Asmus, Rethinking MATO and EU Enlargement, NATO at 60.The Posto-Cold War Enlargement and the Alliance's Future, (ed. A.Bebler), Amsterdam, , 2009,pp. 177-184.,

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THE COLD WAR II: JUST ANOTHER MISNOMER?

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Abstract: *The paper explores the premise that the Ukrainian crisis could be a trigger of a chain of developments that lead towards Cold War II. The research question to be answered is if the world is truly moving to a new version of a Cold War and whether in retrospect the post-Cold War may be seen as an inter-Cold War period. The author argues that despite some apparent similarities, the paradigm of the Cold War II is just a misnomer, i.e. it is an old-fashioned way to describe and explain the reality, or better one piece of the world puzzle: the relationship between Russia and the West. The Cold War II is a too limited explanation of a far more complex situation in which the power politics is not highlighted by ideological differences any longer. If it is true that the Cold War I had merely spread an ideological fig leaf over a far older contest, the Cold War II is nothing but misnomer to hide the power politics as usual.*

Keywords: *international relations, Cold War, power politics, Russia, USA, Ukraine*

Introduction

A quarter of century after the Cold War many professors have serious problems to explain to their undergraduate students what was it all about, how the world looked like and what were the main international security threats and responses. It is already seen as something to be studied at the history classes. The situation does not differ so much in the scholars' circles: indeed, for quite some time there have been numerous research projects that focused on the Cold War as if it is something irreversibly belonging to the past. Also the political and academic debates have gradually shifted from the (neo)realistic interpretation of the international relations to the variants of a liberal one. The realists' voice was heard only occasionally: the 9/11 aftermath and more recently the chain of events in Ukraine are good examples for this. As argued (*New York Times*, 27 March 2014), "suddenly, with President Vladimir V. Putin's takeover of Crimea and the massing of Russian troops near eastern Ukraine, the Cold War lexicon has been dusted off, along with the logic that underlay it. A top NATO general speaks of Russia as an adversary. A former British commander urges reinforcements along the Rhine. Their words seemed to revive familiar imagery of the past - armor and infantry moving across the checkerboard of a divided Europe." The growing tensions over Ukraine seem to create a ground for another reconsideration of the international relations. The unipolar moment has obviously gone away so the key question that echoes in the political and academic corridors reads: does the world become multipolar or it is back to square one, i.e. is bipolarism going to be the "main game

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in the town" again? The answers differ but the conventional wisdom (once again) reads - we are witnessing 'interesting times' in the sense of the old Chinese curse. Few pay attention to the crucial issues such as: when and if the Cold war ended at all? What has changed since? Is this a use of an old rhetoric in order to describe the new reality? Or it is the other way around?

Dialectics of the Changing International Relations

The widespread euphoria and the hope that the end of the Cold War would enable a new (and more peaceful) world order have had a strong impact on the academia. Primarily, the character and the methodology of the academic discipline of International Relations (IR) have been re-defined. For a long period the scholars agreed that the foundations of this discipline were to be found in the political science i.e. the IR represents just an international dimension of the political science (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008, 571). Traditionally, there was a clear differentiation between the national (internal) and international (external), i.e. it was accustomed to speak of two separate political spheres. Consequently, the sphere of IR was merely a strategic sphere in which the sovereign states were interacting with each other, mostly through the means of power politics that differs radically from the (democratic) politics within the states. Hence, this specific academic discipline was meant to explore the international arena and seek for answers to issues related to the functioning of the international system with no ultimate sovereign authority. Put in other words, the states rest on political hierarchy, while the international system is based on anarchy and self-help. But the discourse has changed since the end of the Cold War: few academics in the field of International Relations have been prepared to defend International Relations as a political discipline. In fact, the dominant trends have been those which seek to overcome the binary division of the domestic and the international (Chandler 2004). Instead, a cross-disciplinary approach has become much more popular. It assumes that inter-national relations have been overcome, with the end of the Cold War, the rise of globalization and the development of global civil society. Also it argues that nation-states are no longer the key actors, nor national interests the key explanation for foreign policy. The general euphoria induced new concepts of overcoming the 'outer' (inter-national) sphere through establishment of post-national, post-modern world, and seeking for solutions beyond the political realm.

John J. Mearsheimer (1990) - and some other realist thinkers for the same reason - was among those who did not greet the end of the Cold War; he warned that soon we would miss the Cold War and that the world would enter a period marred by instability. Other American scholars, such as Krauthammer (1990/1991) cheered "the unipolar moment", while Huntington (1999) argued the paradigm of uni-multipolar world. At first the liberal thinkers rejoiced "the end of history". In his seminal article, Fukujama (1989) wrote: "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." In response, Huntington (1993) wrote his critique in a form of thesis of "clash of civilizations". Despite the vivid theoretical discussions and

the raise of new theoretical schools, the grand debate seems to have diminished radically. At the peak, instead of a debate, many symptoms of academic intolerance appeared, as noted by Mearsheimer (2002, 29): it was assumed that not only the realists have gone the way of dinosaurs but also that they represent degenerating paradigm (as opposed to the progressive, liberal one) but they do not deserve further funding for research and publishing. The realists believed that their worst enemy was not in the empirical reality that changed so much to diminish their postulates but in the hostile academia that insisted on the liberal wishful thinking. Throughout the post-Cold War era, however, a convergence of neo-realism and neo-liberalism has gradually become self-evident - i.e. the scholars of the two great schools, in addition to sharing a set of fundamental assumptions (on their academic discipline and scientific methodology), have ended up having the same central theme of reflection: how to assess, in a situation of anarchy, the effects that international structure have on the behaviour of states. Waever (1996, 2009) named it as "neo-neo synthesis". The critical theory, however, rests on its fundamental premise that any mainstream theory takes state power and the inter-state system for granted, without enquiring into their social bases; thus it is an expression of the ideological bias of those who are comfortable with the prevailing structures of social power and seek merely to correct problems in their operation rather than fundamentally transform them (Budd, 2007).

Back to the issue of the end of the Cold War, and its possible revival, it is edifying to take into account the significance of narrative clichés that may still dominate the academic and political discourses. One of them have been pointing out that it was precisely the fall of the Berlin wall and demise of USSR that enabled change of the traditional security agenda and the shift of the security discourse towards other, non-military problems and aspects. The newly discovered truth was based on the claim that the classical approach to security had become obsolete under the new international circumstances and that the multi-sector approach would give answers to a range of security challenges (Buzan 1991). Although Buzan's security object was still the state as such, he provided theoretical ground for various new security theories that focused on different security objects.

As it is usually the case with clichés, the one concerning the end of the Cold War is one also **contained** certain credibility. In fact, many years before its 'official' end and the formal acknowledgment by the Western academic thought, a number of scholars had been advocating similar concepts and possibilities for a different world - but they had been disregarded as leftists, radical or even dangerous. For instance, soon after the beginning of the Cold War and the build-up of the fortress of the doctrinarian realists, some scholars were elaborating theses that are nowadays widely acknowledged, such as: non-offensive defense, common security, disarmament, confidence building, etc. Johan Galtung (1969) elaborated on structural violence embedded into the international structure. Kenneth Boulding (1978) wrote about the concept of stable peace (against cold war/peace), John Burton (1972) about basic human needs, conflict resolution and world society; Richard Falk (1966-67) - on the world order. To these authors, who are seen as founders of peace studies within IR theory, one could rightly add many authors from the so-called Third World countries, whose standpoints have always been marginalized and treated as irrelevant. With regard to the Cold

War, Cynthia Enloe (1993, 3) rightly points out on the fact that there were not just one but many *endings*. In other words, what happened in Europe had and still has different meanings for different groups and peoples across the globe (say, for Koreans). In addition, the Cold War had been preserved by the Cold War itself and by the people who were thinking in that strategic frame, not that it was objectively speaking unavoidable. Ken Booth (1994, 3) believes that what was the moving force behind the classical strategic studies were the intellectuals of the Cold War, not the historical currents as such. Even the bipolar world could not give the whole story of a rather complex world. Quite a number of countries (from the so-called Third World) were united around of the idea of non-alignment movement. Even the cold peace was not so peaceful given the numerous wars/conflicts by proxy. During that era whatever conflicts and threat securitisations existed between other states (for instance, between Japan and China, or Russia and Germany) they were all subordinated to, or at least framed within the overarching construction of the grand struggle between East and West.

According to Robert Cox (1981), every theory is always for someone and for some purpose and there is no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. In other words, every analysis is biased as it reflects the researchers' political philosophy and the understanding of the social relations, or those of the institutions they work in. Hence the development of a theory is not always a result of the real changes in the sphere of international relations: it may be just a way of explaining (justifying and/or legitimizing) the reality or a result of a personal conviction that a tectonic change has taken place. The later could be illustrated exactly by the events such as "the end of the Cold War" and 9/11. Some theoretical works, such as Huntington's "Clash of civilizations" (1993) have had such a powerful political and practical impact that actually served as a platform for the government's political-making process. The bottom-line of the critical theory's position is that theory has power to create narrative that influences decision-making process.

Did the Cold War Ever Come to Its End?

In order to give an answer to the very topical question that concerns the beginning of the Cold War II, it would be very instructive to turn to a preceding question: if and when did the Cold War I truly end? Only then one can speculate on the credible proofs that the Cold War II has indeed begun with the Ukrainian crisis or even earlier.

So far there are a few answers to the first question: the conventional wisdom is that the end of the Cold War is related to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reality, however, it had been a process that lasted for quite some time. If looking at the Cold War dialectically, its bipolarism could be seen rather in transition (a motion of change) than being a static condition of two superpowers. Mikhail Gorbachev (2011) speaks clearly of this erroneous interpretation of the end of the Cold War: in his article on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the USSR breakup, he refers to the Perestroika (1985), his first Summit meeting with President Ronald Reagan (Geneva, November 1985) and the issued common statement that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". In Gorbachev's view, the Cold War ended at the Malta Summit in December 1989 when he and President Bush stated that the two nations no longer regarded

each other as enemies. In the fall of 1989 Gorbachev met Pope John Paul II, who speaking of the East and West, said that "Europe should breathe with two lungs." Also the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which was signed in 1990 by European nations, the United States and Canada - a blueprint for new security architecture of the common European home - was soon relegated to oblivion. After the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Western leaders chose a different path. The United States and its allies instead decided to expand NATO eastward, bringing that military alliance closer to Russia's borders while claiming for it the role of a pan-European or even a global policeman. This usurped the functions of the United Nations and thus weakened it.

The behavior of states and other international actors is determined by the very structure of the international system. It is a premise that few theorists of international relations would easily dismiss regardless their affiliation to a certain school of international relations. If so, then the crucial question regarding the Cold War's finale refers to the degree to which the international system has altered since late 20th century. Truly, the Warsaw pact did dissolve as well as the socialist federations (Czechoslovakia, USSR, SFRY). For quite some time Russia seemed to be on its knees in geopolitical terms during the time it was going through the shock-doctrine that caused dramatic internal (political, social, cultural, economic) changes. Equally as all newly independent (post-socialist) states it turned to its 'glorious past' as a national narrative. The vast majority of states in the world claim to be liberal democracies that rest on capitalist (open market) economy, which nowadays applies to all post-socialist states, including Russia. The real state of affairs is another cup of tea: democratization process has proved to be reversible and instable, so in many cases it is easy to notice an autocratic rule behind the democratic façade.

Internationally, the UN had never played the role it was meant to play - and the reason for that was usually found in the bipolar divide of major powers during the Cold War. In-depth analysis, however, shows that nothing dramatic has changed since the alleged conclusion of the Cold War. The First Gulf War was something like a honey-moon between the former adversaries. The nuclear threat has never been really eliminated: nuclear arsenal has not been destroyed, proliferation of various types of nuclear armament continues, so means of mass destruction still has a potential to annihilate life on Earth. In 1999 during the military intervention over Kosovo, it looked as if NATO was taking the supremacy over the UN Security Council and the international law. It was a moment when the Western powers saw a window of opportunity to define a new role of an obsolete military alliance: in the absence of an enemy they proclaimed a role of a conflict manager that defends "our values and civilization" as Tony Blair and Bill Clinton used to say often. It may look that 9/11 was a turning point in the sense that terrorism fulfilled the void and portrayed a common enemy both for international and common purposes: the West could legitimize its geopolitical ambitions while Russia got a useful ground for use of force internally (Chechnya, for instance). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union defined the West's threat environment and *vice versa*. The post-Cold War world provided the opportunity for a "new vocabulary, not necessarily superior to the one replaced, but with important implications for the contemporary world" (Kane 1991, 80).

Buzan's concept of "macro-securitization" seems quite helpful in the quest for a credible answer of how the Cold War or global war on terrorism could begin and/or end. This idea is based on the concept of securitization that was previously formulated by Ole Waever. According to him, an issue is "securitized" when it gets constructed into a threat, i.e. "something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so" (1998, 6), and something becomes securitized when it has been declared a security problem and this problem is accepted by the audience. The idea of macro-securitization (Buzan 2006) is the same idea applied on a much larger scale: macro-securitisations are aimed at, and up to a point succeeding, in framing security issues, agendas and relationships on a system-wide basis; they are based on universalist constructions of threats and/or referent objects. In his view, the Cold War and more recently the global war on terrorism are similar historical examples of macro-securitization. For instance, as he argues, Washington's campaign to persuade itself, the American people and the rest of the world that the 'global war on terrorism' will be a 'long war' could be compared to the Cold War as a similar sort of zero-sum, global-scale, generational struggle against anti-liberal ideological extremists who want to rule the world. Both have been staged as a defense of the West, or Western civilization, against those who would seek to destroy it. Buzan claims that states (the USA in particular) need securitization as a part of their day-to-day functioning and that after the Cold War there was a threat deficit that was filled by the aftermath of 9/11. He offers two possible reasons for this recent phenomenon: globalization and a belief in a universalist ideology. In other words, the post-Cold War era has witnessed desecuritization of ideology and securitization of civilizational/cultural differences.

Interestingly, despite the majority of opposite views with regard to the impact of 9/11, Kennedy-Pipe and Rengger (2006) argue that this event changed nothing fundamental in world politics. According to them the only thing that changed is *the belief that something had changed*. The same may apply to the Cold War, especially if seen through the prism of the strength and durability of a belief, and the question whether the end of the Cold War as a social fact can be used to create a new political framing for world politics. In the context of the project *Monument to Cold War Victory* some artists have offered interesting challenge and possible answer to this question. In an interview (Vartanian 2012), one of the authors of the project, Yevgeniy Fiks says that the most common misconception about the Cold War both for Americans and Russians is that the Cold War has ended and that we live in a fundamentally different epoch. According to him, for over two decades, public signifiers of the Cold War, such as the Berlin Wall, have been framed in terms of destruction and kitsch. A monument created at the moment of its own destruction, the Wall encapsulates the continuing geopolitical imagination of the conflict as linear, continuous, binary, and terminal: the culmination of a now-historicized narrative of competing empires. The impact of half a century of sustained ideological conflict still reverberates through all forms of public and private experience - from Middle Eastern geographies of containment to the narrative structures of Hollywood. The specter of the Cold war was closed in a bottle, while another one was set free.

In a more recent joint work, Buzan and Waever (2009) further develop the idea of macro-securitization. The Copenhagen school's theory has mainly focused on the middle level of world politics in which collective political units, often but not always states, construct relationships of amity or enmity with each other. The authors, however, revisit the concept and add to it the idea of macrosecuritisations as ways of getting an analytical grip on what happens above the middle level. According to them, the Cold War securitisations of East and West constituted a package that not only framed the fundamental relationships of the superpowers and great powers for over forty years, but also defined and created political space for the third world (ibid., 256).The narrative of the Cold War was founded on two types of antagonisms: the first one that concerned two different visions of society (socialist vs. capitalist) and the second one, between two cultural constructs, the East and the West. The global war on terror's narrative is quite similar: us vs. them.

Long before the Ukraine crisis and the revival of the Cold War, many scholars had to admit that the idea of possible post-modern world was but a pipe-dream (Kaldor 2003). The post-Cold War era was a period of interregnum before the beginning of another (although short-lived) defining epoch, the emergence of the US as the global hyper-power, while post-modern world is still in the sphere of impossible. Kaldor puts the blame on the US for the possible 'return' of the international rather than further development of the post-national politics. She argues that geopolitics, realism and national interest are coming back on the scene after 9/11 as key concepts of the international relations. In opposite, David Chandler believes that despite the fact that the US remain the "last sovereign state", nevertheless there are many states (mainly, the European ones) that have entered into the postmodernism where the national interests are no longer the most important. He points out the EU leaders who speak on behalf of post-national values and interests of supranational entity. The ongoing debate wavers between the assumptions of the importance of national states and their interests and those of significance of the supranational and integrative aspects of the international system. Prior to 9/11 the emergence of the US as the only super-power, according to some scholars, created a new international structure - unipolarity without hegemony (Wilkinson 2002). More recently, neoliberal Richard Haas (2008) has been arguing in favor of a new concept of nonpolarity. According to him, in the 21st century the world has entered a new era of nonpolarity, in which power becomes diffuse and there have been numerous power centers with no domination of either of them. In addition to states, Haas points out the growing role of corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist networks, etc. Leaving apart the internal contradictions and historical traumas, the Ukrainian crisis could be approached from this wider point of view in order to observe if there are new developments or return to old paradigms in the world politics.

Ukraine at the Crossroad or at the Periphery

Since its onset the Ukrainian crisis has compelled an irresistible set of analogies: Moscow's foe is Washington (and to some degree Brussels), and Washington's is Moscow. *USA Today* headline asked "A New Cold War?" A *Bloomberg* headline referenced "Cold War Ghosts." *CNN* argued "Cold War-style Conflict." A *New York Times* headline sounded

more sober: "If Not a Cold War, a Return to a Chilly Rivalry." Actually the crisis was induced by external actors with hidden agendas. The behavior and motives of the key actors in the Ukrainian crisis prove that the Cold War analogy obscures more than it clarifies. The turmoil in Ukraine has de facto marked the end of Russia's post-Soviet passivity with regard to the Western advances towards its "near abroad" where the former Soviet Union left over 25 million ethnic Russians. The failure of the European Union to be a soft power that brings democracy and peace wherever it spreads (i.e. intends to enlarge) proved that the Lisbon Treaty's great vision of the EU as a global actor is but a dream.

The revival of the old Cold War rhetoric between Moscow on one side and Brussels and Washington on the other was seen as an easy way of explanation not only of this situation but of the future of the international relations no matter quite a different international context. The rhetoric was meant for the domestic audience more than anything else. But the consequences for the international system are not to be downplayed. Among the vast majority biased voices and analysis Mearsheimer's one sounded most sober (2013). In an editorial in the *New York Times* (14 March 2013), he warned about getting Ukraine wrong: "After all, the United States, which has been unable to leave the Cold War behind, has treated Russia as a potential threat since the early 1990s and ignored its protests about NATO's expansion and its objections to America's plan to build missile defense systems in Eastern Europe." The old Realist scholar pointed out (again) that "when vital interests are at stake, countries are invariably willing to suffer great pain to ensure their security. There is no reason to think Russia, given its history, is an exception". At a glance, it really seemed as if Real-politics has made a come-back in great style. The Euromaidan, vastly supported by the EU politicians, turned into a coup d'état against non-democratic but yet legitimate rule of Yanukovich. Instead of democracy promotion, the pro-EU policy at all costs in a deeply divided society with no clear societal contract resulted in a turmoil. The Ukrainian crisis and the descent into a fragmentation and possible state failure could be seen as an empirical proof against the liberal peace thesis. Actually, one could say that the Europeanization served as a securitization tool - i.e. the EU membership became a security issue, something worthwhile unrest and coup d'état. Instead of uniting (and democratizing) tool, the EU (and NATO) membership became an apple of discord and provided a trigger for dissolution of a deeply troubled Ukrainian state and society. Did the EU engage into a power game not typical for Venus but rather for Mars? The situation in Ukraine displays not only clash of interests between the West and the East (embodied only in Russia) but also the disparity of military and political weight within the community of Western states - the EU again faces its place of a junior partner, even when the crisis takes place on its doorstep.

The tragedy of Ukraine is in the lack of societal consensus, corrupted government, impoverishment - and strategic appetites of its neighbours and allies. At glance, this crisis irresistibly reminds on Yugoslavia's dissolution with one or two key differences: first, Yugoslavia with its buffer zone position became irrelevant as soon as the Cold War came to its end, so the deep internal contradictions could explode even more freely once there was no external enemy. On the other side, Ukraine's geopolitical relevance made it perfect geopolitical theatre on which division between the West and Russia (Eurasia even) displays

clearly. Henry Kissinger (2014) rightly pointed out that Ukraine should not join NATO for its own good and should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with the EU: "far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side's outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them." Second, Yugoslavia was a federation, while Ukraine is a post-socialist country that used to be a part of another federation (USSR). With regard to the similarities between the two cases, some analysts emphasize that both states were "artificial", i.e. made up of bits and pieces of various former empires, thus getting together peoples of different ethnicities, languages, religions, etc. Some go further, claiming that the hidden agenda of the external actors played significant role in portraying conflicting parties as "good" and "bad" guys, and consequently took sides and worsened the internal conflict dynamics. It is still early to evaluate this hypothesis but there are striking similarities. Not going deeper into this analysis, for the purpose of this paper, it is important to stress that the tectonic changes in the international system have enormous impact on the states that represent buffer-zone or borderlands between the great powers.

However, neither USA not Russia are willing or capable to fight over Ukraine. It has become a battlefield of Ukrainian inhabitants themselves as it used to be the case with former Yugoslavs. Both Washington and Moscow know that there are too many issues they would need to cooperate over, but also that there are other powers to make alliances with.

Conclusion

Speaking in terms of West and East means nothing in a globalized word with universal ideology (capitalism and liberal democracy). In other words, the clash over Ukraine is very much related to self-interest of the superior global powers. The Cold War II is impossible in a world where a multipolar system is in raise. It does not mean that the world is safer. To the contrary!

Yet, the events do not prove that the Realists have been always right. The current US hegemony should be understood as the US capital's need to dominate the world rather than the state's maximization of power in the name of self-defence. The same concerns are driving force for the other economies, be it European or Russian. Realists tend to see history (and therefore the present and future, too) as mechanical repetition of patterns of behaviour with no progress and no qualitative change (a cyclical approach). Formal theory, in seeking universal validity, too often disconnects itself from the flow of time. It pays insufficient attention to how things became what they are, which usually offers the best clue as to what they will become. Clearly the US capital, even though having to respect other regions, is in a leading position and wants to remain there. Its power and political objectives are closely related to economic interests and security is often used as a cover.

Kenneth Waltz defined a great power as a state which excels in "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (1979, 131). The world has changed a lot since this definition became widely accepted. A Cold War 2.0 is not plausible at all. Nowadays, many of those who use the term "Cold War" do so casually to warn against the dangers of a widening Moscow-Washington divide. Others use the term to advocate a renewed military build-up in Europe. That is both flawed and dangerous. The Cold War

was unique in the way it was simultaneously "waged" on multiple fronts: ideological (philosophical/intellectual), universal (a vision for the future of the world), global (nuclear), international (in every continent and over every state), and strategically (between the greatest military machines in the world history). However, even that was not the whole truth about the Cold War: it was not much of a war in the North, and it was not a cold one in the South, where people were constantly being killed in proxy wars and ideological pogroms. Russia has given up its global mission to change the world although it is now able to make powerful alliances across the globe. At best, Russia tries to be a regional power. She has integrated its economy into the global capitalist economic system. Its trade with the U.S. is low but Russia's first trading partner is the EU. That is why, despite repeated warnings from Washington, European leading economies are not about to turn back the clock. The Cold War is not back. And neither Russia nor the United States can afford it anyway. It remains to be seen whether the Ukraine crisis is a game changer in Russia's relations with the West. But short of a return to the Cold War, the unfolding strategic drama between the two capitals could have a severe impact on stability in Europe and elsewhere. The Cold War ideologues are making too much noise because the peace camp is not speaking out loud enough.

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CULTURE AS NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST

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Abstract: *Our aim in this paper is to point out that the social role and importance of culture in the modern world are perfectly legitimate in as much as culture is connected with all the aspects of social life and integrated in all social phenomena and processes. Culture can also be linked to security because together they encourage thinking about the ways of responding to threats and vulnerabilities affecting an individual, a social group or society as a whole, and even the state itself.*

The most general anthropological understanding of culture, commonly accepted by scholars yet criticized at the same time, defines culture as a "way of life" or as a "socially defined way of life". However, this paper will focus on the approaches to interpreting culture that proceed from its fundamental functions, which serve to satisfy man's needs but also to set normative goals, that is, determine the standards of a tolerant and desirable existence. We have singled out survival, communication, normative, cumulative, and security and protection functions as the most significant functions of culture that promote the development and quality of life, at the same time building essentially on the concept of security culture. They will be discussed in this paper.

Keywords*: culture and security, functions of culture, security culture, national security, national interest*

Introduction

Many studies see culture as the critical factor that helped man to cross over from the natural into the social state. According to traditional views, the relationship between man's biological and cultural evolution is such that the biological preceded the cultural, meaning that man's physical being evolved through the usual mechanisms of genetic changes and natural selection until his anatomical make-up came to have more or less its present form. Only then did his cultural evolution commence.[3]

Contemporary lines of thought indicate that the evolution of *Homo sapiens* – man as we know him – from his pre-sapiens origins began four million years ago with the first hominid *Australopithecus* and culminated in the very *Homo sapiens* only one, two or three hundred thousand years ago. Since certain *Australopithecines* engaged in rudimentary forms of cultural

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[3] According to these views, some kind of marginal genetic change occurred at a certain stage of man's phylogenetic history making him capable of being the creator and exponent of culture and ever since the form of his adaptive response to environmental pressures has been almost exclusively cultural rather than genetic. For more detail, see: Kliford Gerc, *Tumačenje kultura* 1, Biblioteka „XX vek", Beograd, 1998.

activity (simple tool making, hunting, etc.), the beginnings of culture overlapped with the appearance of man as we know him today.

According to some estimates, that period may have lasted much longer than a million years. The final stages of man's phylogenetic history took place in the same long geological period – the Ice Age – as the initial stages of his cultural history. This leads to the conclusion that a man has a date of birth but man does not. Namely, according to contemporary thinking, culture assumed the main and guiding role in the evolution of man. Since culture accumulated and developed gradually, selective advantage was gained by those individuals who were the most capable of putting it to good use (the skilled hunter, the persistent gatherer, the skillful tool maker).

Owing to culture, man won himself numerous advantages, practiced and developed his faculties, broadened his horizons, his feelings became more refined – in a word, he became a sensible being, a human being. In fact, as Marcuse defines culture, "it was a process of *humanization*, characterized by the collective effort to protect human life, to pacify the struggle for existence… to stabilize a productive organization of society, to develop the intellectual faculties of man, to reduce and sublimate aggressions, violence, and misery" (Marcuse, 1977).

Theoreticians of the functionalist orientation focused on culture in terms of norms, values and way of life. The most important and well-known representative of this orientation was Bronislaw Malinowski.[4] He held that a true theory of culture must acknowledge that human society is founded on the biological fact that "human beings are an animal species". Therefore, before "man created a secondary environment" – culture, he first had to survive biologically, like every organism in nature (Malinowski, 1970). However, this secondary environment, "culture itself", which man created against the natural, primary environment, must be "constantly reproduced, maintained and guided". Every "cultural environment" creates its own cultural "standard of living" as a condition for the survival and progress of the community, with new "needs" always arising within it.

According to Malinowski, culture is "an instrumental reality, an apparatus for the satisfaction of fundamental needs, that is, organic survival, environmental adaptation, and continuity in the biological sense". Therefore, each culture must first and foremost satisfy a biological system of needs. However, the same author states that "as soon as human anatomy is supplemented with a stick or a stone, a flame or a covering wrap, the use of such artifacts, tools, and commodities not only satisfies a bodily need, but also establishes derived needs" (Malinowski, 1970: 32).

In human life, culture figures as an ambiguous phenomenon and, in order to understand and explain it successfully, one must take account of its effects, that is, the functions it performs. Culture expands man's potential within the scope predetermined by nature, at the same time developing and perfecting him. Singling out basic functions of culture, each having a corresponding basic systems of cultural activity of the social man, does not coincide with singling out concrete elements of culture, cultural complexes and institutions.[5] Regardless of how meanings and functions of certain cultural phenomena changed, no matter how functions were reassigned to different cultural institutions, certain basic functions of culture were nonetheless preserved throughout human history as we know it.

Culture as a specific phenomenon is by no means limited to its functions. In this paper we will explain and interpret those we deem particularly important for representing culture as national

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[4] Malinowski is considered to be one of the founders of functionalism in anthropology and social sciences and functionalism was one of the main forms of his approach to human behavior.

[5] Any cultural element can have different cultural functions, which are, however, subject to changes. For example, a ritual can perform a communicative function or be a form of emotional discharge or "draining" of aggressions from human behavior. Cf.: E. V. Sokolov, *Kultura i ličnost*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1976.

security interest, which is most clearly seen in its special form – security culture.[6] Through its functions culture helps to create an adequate framework for this concept, which is subject to various kinds of analyses. The final outcome of the development of the concept of security culture is the new role and definition of culture as national security interest. Just so and the analysis of the security concept can be implemented in the context of possibility of its development, firstly, as a separate human need, and then as an interest in the context of cultural needs, applying the culturological approach, shaped by the category of national security. This approach can be shown through the articulation of culture in the security concepts, as well as on the levels of reflection, which are manifested through the prism of personality, society, community or entity; and thus reflects the culture as a vital national security interest. Namely, the impact of culture on the field of security occurred through identity,[7] and the connections between these categories are made in various ways. If in these considerations one accepts the constructivist approach, culture becomes part of national identity and creates values which bear on the constitution of interests, one of the most important being the security interest. The existing value system is at its most productive when it encourages the creation of wellbeing and development and in doing so provides a solid basis for the framework of national culture that will shape the reactions and behavior of a state or some other entity in relation to a security threat in the process of promoting (national) security.

Functions of Culture

In the following section we will point out the functions of culture that have particular implications for both individual and national security – so much so that at some point culture can even be treated as national security interest. Each function of culture corresponds to a system of activity and can be characterized from various aspects. One of these aspects may involve human needs and interests but also how they determine a certain function. Furthermore, we can discuss the origin of this function, its development and historical perspectives, its role in the life of society, its relation to other functions, the concrete forms and institutions through which it is performed more efficiently, as well as the set of cultural values emerging within that function. Moreover, as E. V. Sokolov stresses, "breaking down culture to qualitatively different functional systems of activity corresponds, on the one hand, to the inner imperatives of human activity and, on the other, to the demands of preserving and developing culture". In addition, function can be said to often describe culture as an

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[6] Security culture can be presented as a factor of development of national security, including two substantive processes: the first one, as the transfer of national culture into security culture, and, secondly, as the transfer of national security into security culture. In doctoral dissertation Svetlane Stanarevic, the concept of security culture is analyzed primarily within the anthropological-humanological approach towards comprehension of the culture concept, within the manner in which the identity phenomenon have articulated itself from the realm of culture into the domain of security, then the way the security interest is constituted and the relation between national culture and national security is established. See: Svetlana Stanarević, *Koncept bezbednosne kulture i pretpostavke njegovog razvoja*, doktorska disertacija, odbranjena na Fakultetu bezbednosti, Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2012.

[7] See spread about in the following publications: Jepperson, R. L., Wendt, A., Katzenstein, P. J., „Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security", y: Katzenstein, P. J. (yp.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996; Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and The International state, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88, No. 2, 1994; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998.

integrated phenomenon, where one feature of culture is involved in survival indirectly, while another one is directly so.

Survival Function

All concepts of security have a general value and interest, which enable survival, preservation of identity and continued development of an individual, group, collective or community. This is at the same time a prerequisite for achieving and developing other values to be subsequently enjoyed. It is up to culture to determine the way in which certain values will be singled out and how their role and rightful place will be defined.

Living in his natural environment, man was originally concerned with surviving and ensuring his physical existence. And then, as he developed his sociability in all spheres of life, he focused on creating conditions for a comprehensive and unhindered development within the scope of which he would become capable of achieving, preserving and promoting his own security and the security of the human community. Once a satisfying degree of security has been achieved, man has fulfilled the condition for freedom and unimpeded development.

Culture can be perceived as a totality of humanity's answers (both successful and unsuccessful) to basic human needs in general, particularly the needs of certain human groups, individuals and communities that condition each other in various ways. All this suggests a need to understand culture as man's important means of survival. In fact, this was its original role, and this principle of life, which is reflected in man's struggle for survival, was characteristic of the earliest period of humankind's evolution. Once art began to develop as a new dimension of culture, new functions began to develop as well, superseding the function of survival.

The world, which is well into the third millennium, seems to be returning to the beginnings of its history as survival has once again become a topical issue, especially in the wake of increasing global threats that jeopardize the survival of mankind. It is the task of culture to once again motivate people to survive. It must provide people with the meaning of life at some level which will also help them survive. Without this basic driving force people would not do their job properly and, by extension, could not continue to exist, while culture itself would become extinct.

There is some disagreement in the theory of functionalism about whose needs culture should satisfy, so, for example, a representative of structural functionalism, Radcliffe Brown, claims that all cultures serve to support the social structure of a group, where the needs of the group are given precedence over the needs of the individual. Bronislaw Malinowski was more concerned with developing a psychological functionalism, stating that all types of behavior primarily support the needs of the individual. Any kind of support to the social structure increases only if certain types of behavior are advantageous to the individual (Golubović, 2007).

At any rate, culture can use different answers to satisfy the need for survival, whether of an *individual* (food, security, relationships with other people, medical needs, fear and/or stress), *society* (reproduction, which involves child socialization, production and dis-

tribution of resources, maintenance of order) or an *institution* (kinship, government, law, economy, religion).

Culture was originally understood as a process and result of man's coming face to face and into conflict with his surroundings, the so-called "primary nature", in order to create new, more favorable conditions for the life and survival of the "secondary nature", nature reshaped by man according to his needs, including changes he made to himself. However, in the new, altered circumstances it is necessary to rethink the entire process of cultural creation and assign it the function of preserving life on Earth and of preserving planet Earth in the universe, on the one hand, and the preservation of national security, social and individual security, on the other.

Communication Function

What links the function of communication to culture is the fact that each human individual is relatively isolated and yet not self-sufficient. An individual must satisfy his needs outside of himself and with the help of others, which means that he must develop a large network of communication. Culture is extremely helpful in all this.

This function corresponds to man's need to communicate with others. It is determined by biological, psychological and sociocultural conditions, which require continuous exchange of information, energy and emotions. The purpose of communication is for an individual to establish cooperation with likeminded others or with those individuals with whom he shares the same values and supports common interests.

Anthropologically speaking, it is important for the continuation of the species and the preservation of genetic integrality,[8] socially speaking, it is necessary for the functioning of social institutions and the social system, psychologically speaking, it is linked with personal satisfaction and the life of smaller informal groups, and, finally, what is also significant is its abstract meaning, which is manifested in the unity of individuals within spiritual culture, their common aspiration for truth, good and beauty. Owing to communication, man truly becomes a member of society and nurtures his inner qualities. However, communication does not always lead to agreement and mutual understanding. In order to adapt to the environment, each biological species exchanges information as its essential component and one of the more universal aspects of life. In order to secure food, avoid danger or find a mate, each living organism emits precisely determined signals at the right time and receives important information from the environment. If no communication is established and no information exchanged (assuming there is a mutual understanding of the message from the information received), what occurs is loss, injury or death.[9]

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[8] Man must constantly reproduce in a new form the integrality of his genetic and social being, which is continually disrupted. The sphere and tool of this reproduction is culture, specifically those of its elements and institutions which perform the communicative function.

[9] A plane cannot land safely on the runway without effective communication between the pilot and the control tower, catastrophic consequences of a tsunami cannot be averted if seismological centers fail to register the waves and alert proper services in time, nor can a terrorist threat or dangerous human trafficking be prevented if the security structures fail to react in a timely manner. In the animal world the hunter discovers his prey easily and vice versa – the prey, thanks to communication, easily escapes its enemy.

Signs and sign systems, i.e. symbols serve as a basis for human communication. The highest and most complex instrument of cultural communication is language, which consists of systems of meaning, which are fixed and therefore transmitted in the form of sound and written symbols. And therein lies man's unrivaled ability (created as a result of the evolution of our brain) to create ideas and notions of the world, i.e. to create the symbolic dimension of his own existence. Artificial languages in science, special languages for the blind and deaf as well as numerous code and cipher systems, characteristic primarily of the field of security and protection, are all coming close to natural language.

The functionalist approach allows us to determine the pragmatic context of a symbol and prove that in a cultural reality a verbal or some other symbolic act becomes real only through the effect it produces. The formal approach is at once the basis and confirmation of our conviction that it is possible in sociological or ethnographic fieldwork to define ideas, beliefs, and emotional crystallizations of a completely different culture with a high degree of accuracy and objectivity.

In order to establish a successful communication, it is necessary for a system of symbols to be known to all the participants, who will accept and use it to express their thoughts and ideas. In addition, participants in the process of communication must follow certain rules, again provided by culture. The process of active human interaction is not confined to the scope of objective socioeconomic forms. The more complex a society, the higher its cultural level, and the more developed a person, the greater the significance of individual communication, which is determined by personal engagement and the rules and conditions of psychological contact and exchange of information.

In order to create a spiritual connection between generations and inherit historical experience, it is necessary to develop means of cultural communication. The richer the culture and the more intense the communication between individuals and groups, the bigger the need for the means of communication to be more efficient. The second half of the 20th century witnessed a major development of technical means of mass communication and fast transport. Global communication succeeded in making creativity, culture, information and education absolutely global and accessible to all. In addition, it opened up the possibility of escaping the pressures of the local community, nationality, local politics or religion. Such communication calls for new definitions of culture,[10] cultural identity, a work of art and similar categories.

At first glance, the progress of technology has enabled man to conquer space and time, multiply the capacities of information channels, and ensure accurate reproduction of thought, the spoken word, intonation and mime. However, this technology quite often fails to aid communication leading instead to mutual misunderstanding. Changes in communication forms and techniques would have to be accompanied by appropriate reexamination of

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[10] Owing to digital culture, a more recent phenomenon, people's mentalities are becoming more exact and analytical, capable of embracing technological development, although this goes hand in hand with the dangerous oblivion of affective elements. Digital culture has produced the so-called net artists, cyber art, authors of digital artworks, digital magazines, virtual libraries and bookshops, virtual creative workshops and artistic and intellectual communities with permanent, instant communication, even virtual schools and universities. For more information, see: Inđić, Trivo, *Tehnologija i kulturni identitet*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2009.

communication goals and by the expansion of spiritual humanistic culture, based on which the ever-advancing information possibilities could then be used.

Communication can be made more efficient by supplementing scientific and technological progress with mutual understanding and the overcoming of spiritual isolation. The improvement of communication forms and means must go hand in hand with awareness of the sense and meaning it has for all the participants in that process.

When we talk about national security and culture as a vital national security interest, it is important to know how to shape the strategic communication[11] between countries when it comes to conflict and intervention in cases of damaged international relations.

Normative Function

Each individual strives to behave in society in an absolutely free and autonomous way, sometimes even to the detriment of the community. Society therefore endeavors, aided by culture or owing to culture as a system, to establish and maintain universal norms by means of which it aims to stimulate useful and purposeful behavior while preventing harmful and useless behavior. That way norms produced by culture are directed against creating chaos, disorder and the destabilization of a society.

The normative function involves excluding influences of random, purely subjective motives and factors in order to ensure security, predictability, certain standards and general comprehensibility of behavior. Its role in social life is manifold. Norms sustain the stability of tradition, various institutions and personal relationships as well as the homogeneity of social groups. They also point to more reasonable, tried-and-tested forms of activity and ways of resolving conflict, help consolidate ideals and values, coordinate and connect different aspects of cultural activity, and function as symbols of social and cultural affiliation. The content of a norm depends on the goals of the sphere of activity regulated by the norm. Different forms of activity are not equally standardized and there are also differences in terms of the content and ways of standardization across cultures.[12]

Regardless of whether the norms of social organizations and the state, as a separate social organization, are customary, moral or religious, they all have one thing in common – they represent an imperative on human behavior and have social sanctions and other common features at their disposal.

"Not only material activity and behavior are standardized, but also spiritual activity." (E. V. Sokolov, 1976:150). Oral and written speech is regulated by grammatical rules, and thought – by laws of logic. Sokolov also emphasizes that memory, imagination, percep-

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[11] See more about it: Majid Tehranian, „Global communication and international relations: changing paradigms and policies", *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, January, 1997. Volume 2, Number 1.

[12] While most cultures have rather strict norms concerning the use of alcohol and narcotics, there are a few cultures which are more tolerant of these "vices" and which standardize them in a completely different manner. All cultures standardize relationships between citizens and social institutions, rules of hygiene and elementary rules of community life, food consumption, family relationships, etc. Tradition, climate and other conditions can determine the way in which an activity or a social relationship is standardized. So, for example, the consumption of a certain type of food is not only determined by its nutritional value but above all by tradition and culture, which prescribe the type of food and its preparation. Some cultures eat snakes, dogs, frogs or cats, while others are not allowed to eat pork, beef and similar foods.

tion and other psychic processes are always more or less standardized seeing as they take place in a specific social environment. Their content, orientation and intensity are not only determined by the physiological activity of the psyche and individual inclinations but also by moral,[13] religious and political norms.

Security and Protection Function

Culture creates various means of protection in order to maintain the necessary balance between man and the environment and to keep him safe from dangers concerning the excess or shortage of specific life-preserving factors. The period following the Ice Age and the drop in temperature saw the introduction of fire and warm clothes and the building of the first settlements. As cultural potential and human activity increased, physical boundaries of social and individual life, as well as boundaries of the cognitive world, gradually expanded. Each new sphere of activity discovered by man involved new dangers. Culture's answer was to create more efficient means and mechanisms of protection.[14]

It took time for man to outgrow the primitive way of thinking and learn to tell the difference between dangers real (actual) and unreal (the world of magic and supernatural forces), so that, based on the real sources of danger, he could produce rationally chosen means of protection. The better man got to know his real and potential enemies, the more efficient his means of protection became. Means of cultural protection, be it material, social or psychological, constitute a unique system where each has its own sector of protection; however, and this is very important, they are all linked to natural forms of protection. An attempt at one form of protection can result in weakening other important mechanisms of protection.[15] However, inadequate assessment and perception of dangers, specifically risks and threats, can lead to responses, i.e. means of protection, which prove inefficient and useless when danger occurs.

The correspondence between Voltaire and Rousseau in 1756 clearly shows the fundamental change in the perception of irresponsible behavior of human societies. Namely, speaking about the most devastating earthquake in the history of mankind, which happened in Lisbon in 1755, Rousseau takes the density of population in the city and the height of the houses to indirectly account for the death toll: "Admit, for example, that nature did not construct twenty thousand houses of six to seven stories there, and that if the inhabitants of this great city had been more equally spread out and more lightly lodged, the damage would have been much less and perhaps of no account."

Rousseauistic intuition no doubt represents a turnabout in the perception of risk. It projects us into a new period because it does not look for an explanation for evil solely

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[13] Moral norms do not differ from other types of norms in content, since there is no particular moral activity distinct from work, communication and education, but rather in the fact that whether they are conformed to or not encroaches on important interests of other people or society as a whole.

[14] Space travel would be impossible without means of protection against radiation, the effect of low temperatures, lack of oxygen, increased g-force on takeoff or intense exposure to high pressures and temperatures on returning to Earth and entering its orbit.

[15] The destruction of one species of vermin leads to the disruption of the ecosystem and the loss of many useful species, which is why new problems and the need to address them immediately arise in the system of means of cultural protection.

in the human domain, but rather brings to light the interdependencies between nature and society. It is no longer God that punishes; rather, the frenzy of human activity in the world becomes counterproductive when jeopardizing the natural balance. In the ninth chapter of Rousseau's "Essay on the Origin of Language", he alludes to the role of natural disasters in forming human societies: "Human associations are in large measure the work of accidents of nature; local floods, overflowing seas, volcanic eruptions, major earthquakes, fires started by lightning and destroying forests, everything that must have frightened and dispersed the savage inhabitants of a land must afterwards have brought them back together to restore in common their common losses." Rousseau undoubtedly introduced a new line of thought about the relationship between nature and culture (Valter, 2012:108).

The role of culture's protective function becomes crucial nowadays with old dangers (famine, disease, fire and flood) acquiring new, more frightening dimensions and new ones arising at the same time, mostly through society's own fault. Polluted water springs, polluted air, soil erosion, catastrophic tsunamis, international terrorism, organized crime, and new diseases all threaten to destroy higher forms of life on Earth. Mankind is facing the question of life and death and is therefore forced to pursue a complex and intense development of social means of protection.

Organization of defense from a natural disaster or cataclysm, from animal attack or human violence, involves certain institutions such as households or local communities. Protection is very often based on anticipation and planning. Different house construction techniques, erecting walls, and selecting locations on which to build settlements to avoid the danger of tidal waves, volcanic eruptions or earthquakes or repel the attack of a potential enemy – all these forms of anticipatory or preventive protection could be linked with the biological need for security and its culture-based protection responses.[16] In other words, it includes mental images, that is, appropriate schemes of reality of a collective, social and cultural nature which strive to be effective. "In the 20th century the cultural model of the perception of danger and risk openly opposes the rational model of the economic or expert type. In the former, the emphasis is on values, personal views, and the role of individual experience, in the latter – on current priorities such as economic gain." (Valter, 2012:211).

The security function of culture "accompanies" the protective allowing us to tell the difference between what is good for us and what is not. It is this difference that generates conflict at different levels, for what is good for us is not necessarily good for others and vice versa. Through its security function culture teaches us to spot danger, identify the "enemy", uphold the chosen values and, by means of correctly steered and well-thought-out communication, make compromises and seek solutions that will be less "painful" but nonetheless ensure survival, offer protection, maintain order and lend meaning to life, even death.

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[16] It should also be pointed out that organization of protection, whether against forces of nature and animals or human beings, is always institutionalized. In other words, we should study the material environment – artefacts, the system of rules, organization of manpower, and the attitude of such organized groups to the biological need for self-preservation and to applied economic, legal, educational and political techniques. Cf.: Bronislav Malinovski, *Naučna teorija kulture*, „Vuk Karadžić", Beograd, 1970, 136–137.

Cumulative Function

Cultural continuity is founded on the accumulation and storage of the results of human activity (information, knowledge, material achievements), which have been collected throughout mankind's historical development and which will serve future generations. Transforming and conquering nature, communication, and setting rules or norms all represent a necessary albeit insufficient condition for fixing (establishing) human experience and forming "historical memory". Additional efforts must be made to incorporate the results of cognitive activity, information exchange and material achievements into a general system of knowledge and make them available to future generations. This, of course, is possible because the open character of culture means that it is continuously being shaped, with each generation making its contribution and leaving a mark on its own culture.

All the psychological, ideological, organizational and technical conditions which will enable accumulation of knowledge and information, their classification and operative retrieval require special institutions (libraries, newsmagazines, professional and scientific journals, scientific research institutions, information points and the like). Information services and institutions that are not developed and up-to-date become the "bottleneck" of economic and scientific activity, which can often result in absurd situations where it proves more costly and complicated to retrieve existing information than it would be to collect it all over again.

From primitive societies, where natural memory, direct imitation and oral speech were used as basic mechanisms of cultural continuity, to this day great advances have been made in the way cultural heritage is stored and preserved. The first major revolution is linked to literacy, when knowledge and information started being quickly accumulated, systematized, refined and restructured. The more complex and diversified social reality became and the more knowledge was being accumulated, the more often the dogmatic way of their systematization conflicted with the tasks of elaborating new knowledge.

With the maturation of certain sides of social relations and the specialization of forms of social activity came a new, scientific-rational method of arranging and synthesizing the established facts and systematizing them within well-thought-out, logical and neat systems. Specific areas of knowledge, specific values of each of these areas and specific rules of synthesizing knowledge within each of them were thus formed. The rational breaking down of information boosted the development of historical, ethical, scientific, practical-political, security-related and other types of knowledge. Important prerequisites for the classification of knowledge and information included the forming of a temporary and historical perspective, a certain time structure in social consciousness, and the separation of "historical memory" from the tasks of practical and political use of knowledge.

It is believed that culture will serve society more efficiently provided it accumulates a larger amount of information, which accurately reflects its own characteristics and the features of the outside world, and provided access to this knowledge and information is freer. If culture loses sight of a fragment of reality – natural or social relationships – or if it is unable to build an adequate system of perception or organization of a specific form of information, it will succumb to disorganized changes or unforeseen transformations in

the environment. In a class society certain irrational beliefs or "taboo" obscured a specific sector of reality which resisted the development of scientific knowledge and rational norms of behavior in a given area. The destruction of historical memory and the disruption of the course of cultural continuity were precisely characteristic of totalitarian ideologies. As it is well known, the ability of a society to remember events from its history means that it is able to maintain spiritual health and a specific way of life. A healthy society is familiar with its past and derives strength from the memories of its victories and glorious historic moments, but it does not forget the bad decisions and errors that also marked this past and history and caused many problems and negative consequences.

Everything in our culture is the sum of the knowledge and skills accumulated gradually over time. Without the cumulative characteristic of culture we would not have profound scientific knowledge, rich artistic tradition or state-of-the-art technology. This characteristic of culture is also instrumental in building the capacities of a society or a nation to develop a security culture that will, in accordance with this cultural richness and heritage, shape the knowledge, attitudes and behavior that will provide guidance and be a signpost for present-day and future generations.

All experiences, ideas and questions that arise should be considered and steered, and their contribution to the development and dissemination of security culture as a new manifestation of knowledge conducive to survival, development and wellbeing should be encouraged. This must also involve taking measures for a greater measure of fairness in providing all social strata with access to knowledge and, by extension, education (on all levels), greater educational inclusion, greater efficiency and accessibility of education, and, of course, curriculums suited to the needs of the future.

Conclusion

Owing to its many functions, particularly those connected to elementary security and those promoting security awareness, culture assumes the role of national security interest. Our starting point is the survival function, which originally helped man to survive and which today must motivate man anew to fight for the survival of not only his kind but also the entire planet Earth. The communication function is important because it enables contact, information exchange, cooperation and mutual trust, as well as lending sense and meaning to each relationship established in a process of exchanging ideas and thoughts.

Culture and its normative function help establish and develop norms and rules which are used to steer useful and purposeful behavior while preventing harmful and socially unacceptable activity. Culture creates various means of protection and its security and protection function is usually based on anticipatory and planning activities with the purpose of determining in a timely manner which means must be used and to what extent. This function stems from the decision made by society or a community to distinguish good from evil, what is good for society as a whole from what is not, and to uphold the chosen values by taking measures which ensure survival, provide protection, maintain order and peace, and lend meaning to everything produced by society and the individual.

Finally, the cumulative function is perhaps the most important one as it has enabled accumulation and storage of the results of human activity in both the material and spiritual sphere throughout the history of a group, people or nation or the whole of mankind. It is precisely this function's potential

that is vital to the development of the concept of security culture since the power and magnitude of material culture, historical memory, accumulated knowledge and spiritual richness of a people have, like accumulated energy, an almost unlimited capacity to maintain spiritual health and a way of life that boosts progress and development. Drawing on accumulated knowledge, values, and beliefs, that is, the potential which develops creativity and innovation, national culture helps determine how to protect and uphold vital values, that is, values best protected by the core of the modern concept of security – national security.

Unlike traditional theories of security, which did not include the cultural component in their analyses, contemporary interpretations and views of security and national security take special account of culture and do not hesitate to make it part of their analysis. It has been shown that conceptual basis, anthropological insight, individual and collective psychology, notions and meanings are all social factors that have fundamentally reshaped the material structure and examined more profoundly and extensively categories such as identity and its relationship to culture and security.

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COMPUTER GAMING TECHNOLOGY FOR MILITARY TRAINING – SERIOUS GAMES

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Abstract*: Information Age brings technologies that provide unparalleled opportunities for military and security force, including Army of the Republic of Macedonia, to develop and adopt new operational concepts for training and experimentation that may radically enhance their competitive edge. Serious games show to have positive impact on training results. Advantages of simulation games lay in the provision of a safe training environment, where users are able to play, test and probe without serious consequences. The purpose of this paper is to give a brief info about computer gaming and serious games, and in line with that to describe a new approach for building a firearms simulator based on a serious game and motion sensor technology. It also compares this model with the similar models that are in use in NATO allies and it describes challenges and our plans for future work. At the end, we are giving initial assessment of suitability of this kind virtual environment for military training.*

Keywords: *computer gaming, serious games, simulations, inertial sensors, education.*

Introduction

Military training had made a big progress from the time of the first war training techniques that were used in the Prussian armies (see more in Frank W. Brewster 2002). That progress is mainly driven by the advantages that are brought by the new computer, sensor and micro-processing technologies. These technologies are used like a particular replacement of the traditional training programs in the Army. Mainly for: better readiness of the military, lowering the costs for training, longer use of the real equipment and combat technique, and because they are ecofriendly.

The dawn of the Information Age brings with it concepts and technologies that provide unparalleled opportunities for the military and security force, including Army of the Republic of Macedonia, to develop and adopt new operational concepts that may radically enhance their competitive edge. According to Herz J.C. and Michael R. M., "The military is undergoing a major cultural shift in its approach to simulation. The use of entertainment technology is not a new phenomenon in the military. What is different today is the emergence of a culture that accepts computer games as powerful tools for learning, socialization, and training" (see more in Herz J.C. and Michael R. M. 2002).

In many fields, training and learning activities are cost and time intensive, and often fail to

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answer specific knowledge needs in the workplace (Cross J. 2007). In domains such as security, military and surgery, a simulation or simulation game can help to increase effectiveness of training by providing a flexible, safe and realistic environment (Macedonia M. 2002, p. 32-37; Bonk, C. J. & Dennen, V. P. 2005; Zyda M. 2005, p. 25-32). According to Gwenda F. "Such simulations or simulation games support the training of particular behavior and strategies. Learning such a behavior or strategy from a game, in oredr to adopt it to the 'real' world, makes the game for the player a meaningful experience" (see more in Gwenda, F. 2006).

There are many benefits from the use of computer gaming technology for military training. First, there is a low level of risk and low cost of using commercial off-the-shelf software. In developing a game for commercial release, the developers would no doubt have allocated a significant budget toward research and development of a robust game engine with leading edge technology. We are thus able to leverage the sophisticated game technology already in place, at a fraction of the cost, by creating custom game content to serve as proxy worlds for the exploration of warfighting concepts. Second, the game-development toolkits released by the game developers provide a layer of abstraction from the underlying code, allowing experienced mod makers to create game content with a relatively short turnaround time on the order of days to weeks. Third, The ease and responsiveness of modifying an in-game mission greatly facilitates timely probes into any interesting behaviors observed as the simulation is being run. This may be achieved by tweaking a scenario offline to introduce new or unexpected events or enemy behavior in order to elicit an adaptive response from the participants in subsequent simulation runs. At last, the Army also recognizes that games serve as effective vehicles to reach out to this technology-savvy generation of soldiers. Unlike traditional military simulators, little user training is required when games are used, as most soldiers are already familiar with the standard game controls and are very comfortable playing in networked gaming environments. We seek to leverage on the familiar medium of computer games to engage our soldiers in military experimentation by encouraging them to interact and address operational challenges within these virtual environments, free from the constraints of current doctrine or technology (see more in Gwenda, F. 2006).

Also, there are some challenges of use of computer gaming technology for military training. First, there is limited realism of games. Despite the many benefits of using games to facilitate concept exploration, several challenges need to be considered and addressed. The first of these is the lack of realism, a critique commonly levied at simulation systems. Several aspects of games commonly highlighted as not realistic are the limited ways that intangibles such as morale, camaraderie, fear, and fatigue are modeled in games, as well as the restricted peripheral vision and spatial auditory cues presented to players. We are of the opinion that some departure from realism is acceptable in a simulation that facilitates creative thinking, as long as the essence of the specific contexts being explored is distilled and modeled with sufficient fidelity. Second, tehere is variability in player proficiency. Challenge of using games is that the results of the gaming simulation largely hinge on the participants' familiarity with the game controls and their tactile dexterity. This may somewhat be mitigated by conducting familiarization runs for each batch of participants in an attempt to bring all participants to a base proficiency level, but the time-critical nature of first-person shooter games often exacerbates the performance difference between expert and novice gamers. However, this variability in player proficiency may be acceptable as a simulation of the different levels of marksmanship possessed by soldiers on the ground (see more in Paul A. R., Doug B. 2008).

Computer Gaming

When we are talking about the computer gaming we can use some of the existing definitions. "Reduced to its formal essence, a game is an activity among two or more independent decision-makers seeking to achieve their objectives in some limiting context. A more conventional definition would say that a game is a context with rules among adversaries trying to win objectives" (according to Abt, C. 1970).

In this article, we are concerned with serious games in the sense that these games have an explicit and carefully thought-out educational purpose and are not intended to be played primarily for amusement or entertainment. Serious Game can be defined as "a mental contest, played with a computer in accordance with specific rules that uses entertainment to further government or corporate training, education, health, public policy, and strategic communication objectives", (according to Zyda, M. 2005).

In game-based training, we often find an interplay between three main fields (see Figure 1 from Martens, Diener, and Malo 2008), which are learning, simulation and games. Training simulations, like for example used in the military domain, medicine or in business science, are used to teach and train facts using simulations. The simulation's role is to show the underlying system behavior – as realistic as possible (which does not necessarily include demanding graphics, but close to real-life models). Leaving out simulation aspects, i.e. combining learning and games, leads us usually to simple edutainment games, which are often used in primary school settings (e.g. learning how to spell a word in a game-based manner) (according to Dennis M., Martina W., Alke M. 2012).


Figure 1 - Learning, Simulations and Games
(Source: Martens, A., H. Diener, and S. Malo. 2008. "Game-based Learning with Computers – Learning, Simulations, and Games". Transactions on Edutainment, LNCS 5080:172–190.)

Leaving out the training aspect leads to simulation games, which sometimes come as real simulations (in the sense of experimenting with systems consisting of models, including a temporal aspect) – sometimes, they come as games with a simulation appearance, but no core simulation functionality (see for example Martens, A., H. Diener, and S. Malo 2008). Only in the area, where all three fields overlap, a game-based training simulation can be found, which covers all aspects: games, simulations and learning (according to Dennis M., Martina W., Alke M., 2012). Our approach is located at this central field.

Simulation gaming is a means, which can tackle some of the challenges described here, and at the same time provides a nearly realistic experience within an authentic training environment. It includes the advantages of being time and place independent, and, once developed, asking much less capacity of training staff. Games offer an environment where students are able to play, probe, make mistakes and learn (Gee, J.P. 2003). Serious games make use of visual, textual and auditory channels for feedback, challenges, and further components. They enable the player to enter virtual, artificial worlds, while being able to establish a strong relationship to the real world (Greitzer, F. L., Kuchar, O.A., Huston, K. 2007). With their combination of the game dimensions of challenge, phantasy and curiosity (Malone, T. W. 1981), simulation games additionally work very motivating. Motivation to play a game also improves the learning and training effect of a simulation game (Garris, R., Ahlers, R., Driskell, J. E. 2002).

Computer game technologies offer a compelling environment, multiplayer capabilities, world-class visualization, cognitive stimulation, rapid scenario customization, and extreme portability. Many of the military's initial experiments have focused on the modification of a commercial game to create trainers. However, as we master these technologies and understand how they are valuable for our missions, we will be able to create training tools that specifically meet our needs, rather than being limited to the structure of the commercial products. Though there are questions about the modeling accuracy of a commercial game, there is nothing inherent in the technology that prevents military users from inserting the most detailed and validated models available (according to Smith, R. 2006).

Using computer gaming in military training permits a player to fight hundreds of scenarios, make thousands of tactical decisions, experiment with different tactics, and learn from mistakes. We know the penalty for mistakes, for mis-reading the situation, for making decisions too late. Hundreds of simulated men can died in botched assaults, poorly laid positions, and as a result of unexpected enemy actions in order to teach these lessons. In this situation we can examined the ground, checked the line-of-sight, positioned the units, and supervised the units in contact so many times that the key tactical principles have become ingrained as second nature. The historical methods for teaching tactics, walking the ground, working through the examples in the manuals, tactical decision games, and actual field exercises, are important and must be done by all leaders. Schools and units must focus on real leaders, real units, and real ground. To augment this practical training however, leaders need to experience the chaotic challenges of combat hundreds of times. As an inexpensive and easy-to-use tool to teach a military leader the dynamics of tactics, the simulation based on computer gamming technology is matchless.

Meaning of a game can refer to its educational impact, or to actions one has to take in the game. Reality of a game refers to how realistic environment and objects in the environment of the game are designed. The play element of a game relates to game elements such as competition, challenge, rules etc. (Heide L., Theo van R., Alexander V. 2012). Fidelity defines the degree to which the game emulates the real world and includes many more dimensions than only the visual design of a game, like auditory, vestibular, olfactory, proprioceptive etc. as elements of *physical* fidelity of a game. Functional fidelity defines how the serious game acts in response to the player's actions. Psychological fidelity is related to the notion of presence in a game, and to emotions like stress evoked by the environment (see also Alexander et al. 2005).

Serious games show to have positive impact on training results. Advantages of simulation games lay in the provision of a safe training environment, where users are able to play, test and probe without serious consequences. At the same time, it is important to engage learners by providing a motivating, challenging environment, which becomes meaningful to the player when skills and knowledge acquired within the game are transferrable to real work tasks (see more in Heide L., Theo van R., Alexander V. 2012).

Concept for Using Serious Games in the Army Training

In Macedonian Army the acquisition and implementation of this new technologies, combined with the models made from our own research and capacities, will rise the quality of training and education for a different type of users, like the: cadets in the Military Academy, regular and special forces, pre-deployed training of staff, crisis and rescue personal and police forces.

Training Simulation - 3 Step "Concept"

STEP 1
Classroom training
➢ Theoretical knowledge
➢ Procedures
➢ Doctrine

STEP 2
Simulation Training
(Virtual Environment)
Prior to Live training
➢ reduce cost
➢ maintain proficiency
➢ create a realistic & stressful environment

STEP 3
Terrain – Live training

Figure 2 - Concept for military training in three steps

Firearms simulators are using the new sophisticated 3D and laser technology for training in: marksmanship skills, weapon handling, better accuracy, individual and team based shooting exercises, target acquire, judgmental shooting and sleep second decisions. Combined with live-firing training they produce soldiers that are being able to use their weapons in an adequate manner in combat situations.

The concept that we plan to use for combined training is represented in Figure 2.

Military training will be executed in three steps. First step – traditional education in classroom/laboratory, for theoretical knowledge, learning procedures and doctrinal issues. Second step – prior to execution of field training with combat techniques, there will be simulated practice of the procedures and tactics. In this way, trainees will achieve high standards in training. Third step – at the and trainees will have field training with combat techniques in real conditions. We will tailor the use rate of the steps, by our own demands, but without exclusion to one or more of these three steps.

Today there are a variety of companies producing firearms simulators and competing for law enforcement and military business. Before looking at some examples of such simulators, it is worth highlighting that there is an amazing choice of different firearms simulation systems. The major players are: Meggitt Training Systems (formerly FATS), Cubic Defense Simulation Systems Division, Thales and Laser Shot, companies such as Raydon, Fidelity Technologies, E-COM, ELI, Noptel, ZEN Technologies and AIS, and they all provide a range of equipment to both the military and law enforcement markets.

For the scope of this paper we will represent and compare only a few top rated firearms simulation systems.

a) VBS2 module – Tactical weapons simulator is a tailor-made software solution for virtual firing ranges or virtual convoy training solutions, with wide range of battlefield effects, from explosions through to wind-affected smoke and also realistic damage modeling. VBS2 allows commanders, crew, soldiers and support elements to be immersed in the VBS2 environment across multiple simulation systems in an endless number of different configurations. Also it has a realistic and configurable ballistic for the weapons used in range or convoy training. The Figure 3 is representing the workflow of VBS2-TWS (see more in VBS2 Whitepaper 2010, and VBS2 Tactical weapons simulator).

b) VirTra 100 MIL is the higher standard among single-screen small arms training simulators. Marksmanship mode supports up to 4 individual firing lanes at one time with full ballistics and qualification courseware. The optional Threat-Fire1 device safely simulates enemy return fire with an electric impulse (or vibration), reinforcing performance under pressure. The system is extremely compact and can even share space with a standard classroom or squeeze into almost any existing facility. System is represented in Figure 4 (see more in VirTra Systems Specifications).

Figure 3 - Workflow of VBS2-TWS
**(Source: VBS 2 Tactical weapons simulator, (2008), www.vbs2.com/media/docs/ITSEC_ VBS2_tact_weapons_sim.pdf)**

Figure 4 - Technical Specification of VirTra 100 MIL System
(Source: VirTra Systems Specifications, http://virtra.com/products/1/VirTra+100+MIL)

c) Meggitt Training Systems support both individual and collective training in the use of a variety of weapons types throughout the full spectrum of military operations. Individual training consists of Marksmanship and Judgmental training (see more in Meggitt Training Systems):

− Marksmanship training encompasses the fundamentals of individual marksmanship, crew served weapons training and sustainment training for both.

– Judgmental training includes target discrimination, force escalation/deescalation, and individual leadership imperatives.

– Collective training covers an expanse of exercises from branch specific through Joint Combined Arms Tactical Training.

– A single system supports five individual firing lanes and can be networked together with additional systems for up to 15 individual firing lanes.

All of the presented systems use lasers that are placed near the weapon muzzle, and they use the lasers for determination of bullet hits. The question is: Why don't we use these systems? And the answer is: Because they are too expensive, and also there is a big problem with the lasers and accuracy. And because we need our own product that will represent our science and research work in this field.

Model of Firearms Simulator based on Serious Game and Motion Sensor Technology

A) External and Internal Motion Detection

Motion detection is not a new idea. Security systems, medical systems and other systems apply a variety of ways of so called "external" detection of movement.

Until recently computers had a very restricted view of the world around them, and users had very limited ways of communicating with computers. Over the years, computers have acquired cameras and audio inputs, but these have been used mostly for unrecognized input; computers can store and play such content, but it has been very difficult to make computers understand input in these forms.

For example, when people hear a sound, they can make judgments about the distance and direction of the sound source relative to their own position. Until recently, computers had more trouble making such judgments. Audio information from a number of microphones does provide considerable information about the distance and direction of the audio source, but determining this information is difficult for programs to do. Similarly, a video picture provides an image of the environment for the computer to analyze, but a computer has to work very hard to extract information about the objects in pictures or video because an image shows a flat, two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional world.

In this model the method of external motion detection will be accomplished using Microsoft Kinect sensor that is placed in front of the soldier. The Microsoft Kinect sensor bar contains two cameras, a special infrared light source, and four microphones. It also contains a stack of signal processing hardware that is able to make sense of all the data that the cameras, infrared light, and microphones can generate. By combining the output from these sensors, a program can track and recognize objects in front of it, determine the direction of sound signals, and isolate them from background noise (see more in Learn the MIcrosoft kinect API 2012).

Today very attractive is the so called "internal" way of detecting motion. This method is accomplished by sensors placed on a rigid object, usually in the center of mass of the object of interest. They perform measurements of applied force and moments acting on that object, so with further processing of measurements, motion of the object is detected.

Inertial sensors (gyroscopes and accelerometers) are most commonly used sensors for the internal method of motion detection (see more in Titteron, D., 1997).

B) The Concept of the Model

The goal of our model of firearms simulator is to be able to do the targets aiming and the movements like as it would be in real life.

The most important part of the Model of firearms simulator is the connection with the serious game API, but knowing that almost every defense serious games has a restriction on the API, we needed to find a way to emulate the commands without using the API. Our plan is to use Microsoft Kinect, Flexible Action and Articulated Skeleton Toolkit (FAAST) keyboard emulator and Atomic Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). This plan will give as freedom of use our model with any type of first-shooter serious game.


Figure 5: Concept of the model of firearms simulator

FAAST is middleware to facilitate integration of full-body control with games and VR applications using the Microsoft Kinect for Windows skeleton tracking software. FAAST includes a custom VRPN server to stream up to four user skeletons over a network, allowing VR applications to read the skeletal joints as trackers using any VRPN client. Additionally, the toolkit can also emulate keyboard input triggered by body posture and specific gestures (see more in Evan A. S., Belinda L., Skip R., David K., and Mark B. 2011).

We are currently in tasting stage with FAAST and the results are promising with the body motion tracking and emulating the commands like: movement, stand up, lay down etc., but the tracking of the direction of aiming with kinect didn't give as good results as we planned, that's why in our future work we plan to mount the Atomic IMU on the rifle muzzle. The IMU will measure the accelerations and angular rates that occur during the movements of the rifle. This information will be sent to the computer via Bluetooth. Than we need to develop algorithms for capturing the motion of the rifle. They will be characterized by high speed and precision. The plan is to develop the algorithms throughout experiments where the movement of the rifle will be performed in all possible positions.

Then the movements of the user rifle will be shown on the screen in real time. The plan is to place contact sensors on the rifle. The sensor is going to be placed near the trigger and is going to give signal when the trigger is pressed.

Motion sensors are relatively cheap compared with the laser sensors. They have very high degree of accuracy. One of the main advantages of this model is the absence of detection camera.

In this way the loop is closed and the user will have a feeling that is a part of the simulation and scenario that is displayed. The concept of the model of firearms simulator is shown in Figure 5.

Initial Assessment of Suitability of the Proposed Model
for Military Training

Nowadays, simulation games are part of situational and weapon training of military, police and other security forces. It shows that military personnel and police officers who receive realistic training are better prepared for the real scenario, which leads to a more coordinated and appropriate response (see more in Heide L., Theo van R., Alexander V. 2012). Military has a long tradition of using simulations for strategy and combat training, because of the chance to clearly illustrate consequences of actions in a safe environment, without risk of injury or other damage (see more in Bonk, C. J. & Dennen, V. P. 2005, Muehl, W. & Novak, J. 2008).

In our case, primary focus will be on tactical training and mission rehearsal up to the combat team level. Also, to provide a generic simulation of all weapon platforms for combined arms training. Is not intended for large scale simulations, it will be designed to model a Combat Team. It can be operated in either a standalone mode using computer generated opposing forces, or distributed across a LAN or Internet. It will allows scenarios to be quickly created using the 3D mission editor (no additional editor is required for scenario generation). It will supports editing simulation characteristics of units, weapons and vehicles.

The simulation game's main objective is to raise situational awareness in a close protection mission. Situational awareness is understood as the ability to filter out certain details and highlight and extrapolate others, to better understand and control outcome (see more in Heide L., Theo van R., Alexander V. 2012). Different people bring in different experiences and expectations, which makes them having a different awareness of a given

situation. Serious games with their ability to represent a non-linear, immersive training experience can help to increase situational awareness and a shared understanding.

For this purpose, we aim to develop a game experience that is meaningful to the player, understood as the user of the simulation game developed. The initial assessment of suitability of this concept of the virtual environment for military training is:

  − Battle Drills (React to Contact, and Squad Attack);
  − Convoy training missions;
  − Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs);
  − Refinement of team drills and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs);
  − Vehicle checkpoints and area control;
  − Tactical security (rear area, etc);
  − Mission planning/mission rehearsal training;
  − Mounted and dismounted patrolling;
  − Battlefield visualization.

As a preliminary approach, we think this concept could be used for training, education and experimentation on the following areas:

  − Fratricide Prevention;
  − Convoys and checkpoints;
  − Multinational tactical interoperability in a below component level training event;
  − Tactical situational awareness;
  − Cultural awareness.

Conclusion

Our goal is to have small, highly trained, NATO compatible Army, with the limitation due to the money and staff cutting. In Macedonian Army the acquisition and implementation of the commercial computer gaming technology, combined with the models made from our own research and capacities, will rise the quality of training and education for a different type of users, like the: cadets in the Military academy, regular and special forces, pre-deployed training of staff, Crises and rescue personal and police forces.

With the proposed model we are training to enhance the ongoing process for implementing new technologies in training and education in Military academy and in Macedonian Army, so that will make a step in reaching our goals. Our model compared with other gives: high degree of accuracy, it cost less and doesn't use detection cameras.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND COMUNICATIONS TRAINING DURING CRISIS

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Abstract: *Within the system of national security and defense the Republic of Macedonia has reestablished unique authentic models of system for protection and rescuing and for crisis management. Institutions which are established and active within these systems are authorized for conducting measures and activities within their scope of work. Certainly, well trained and educated staff is essential for each of these institutions. In time of emergency, a disaster that is caused by natural or human factor, the institutions that are going to be involved with all their capacities, in disaster management and removing the consequences of the same, would expect cooperation and support from the affected region population and the country as a whole.*

Within the framework of all activities and measures planned and conducted in case of a natural disaster and crises on a particular territory, the institutions must know how to communicate with the public and the media in order to make their work easier.

A good cooperation in this area would enable unimpeded and effective work and undertaking of all the measures and activities by the country in order to handle such emergencies.

The purpose of this paper is to explore and point out the need of educated and trained staff for public relations during such conditions or to be more specific, to analyze the importance of informing the public as part of the communication process, in time of natural disasters of larger scale, catastrophes and other types of crisis situations.

Communication during the crises situation is one component of the strategy and methodology of the crisis management as a whole. These activities are necessary and require plans and exercises when the situation is normal.

This work is going to define certain terms regarding crisis management. In addition we will define the public relations, as well as the communication in case of emergencies, explaining all the stages. There is going to be a review of the activities necessary for proper communication, during preparations for crises response, communication during the response itself and when removing the consequences of the occurred situation.

Concerning the situation in the Republic of Macedonia, related to the need of trained and educated staff for this activity, we shall put a special accent on the opportunities for practical training, through exercises and simulation in preparation for public relations and communication in crisis situation. This work is going to pinpoint the qualitative changes in this respect within the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia. Namely, the Ministry of Defense since 2005 has established a Regional Training Center for public relations where these types of training have been held continuously. Therefore, in 2013 it has been transformed into a NATO - Training Center for Public Relations. This is a unique NATO- center for these types of trainings, whose

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goal is to train people with various communication skills and in public relations for different occasions. Among them, the most prominent place takes the training for public relations and communication in case of disasters and crisis caused by different factors.

As a conclusion we are going to state the recommendations that will result from this study. They are going to be a perfect indication to increase the capacities in the institutions involved in crises management. With appropriate application of the recommendations, it will improve the system readiness to respond to crisis situations and to run professionally the public communication as one of the bigger challenges during crises.

Keywords: *communication, information, public, crises management, media.*

Introduction

The accidents and disasters are unpredictable conditions. They cause numerous material damages and human loses. Every day we are witnesses of increased number of natural disasters, earthquakes, fires, floods, typhoons, tornadoes, landslides, and technological accidents, humanitarian catastrophes caused by drought, hunger, conflicts and wars. All these conditions need an organized and systematic access as to overcome them, for the consequences to be removed and the society to be normalized. Each country creates its own model of system solution to such situations. The Republic of Macedonia is not an exception with this type of accidents when it comes to the vulnerability of its territory and population. Several significant reforms and transformations within the system for national security have been made in the Republic of Macedonia from the period of its establishment until present, as to find the optimal model for systematic solution in the area of protecting and rescuing the population, material goods, as well as to manage crises. By adoption of the Law on Protection and Rescue and the Law on Crisis Management, legal framework for establishing institutions, forces and means for protection, rescue and crisis management has been established. Protection, rescuing and crisis management in the Republic of Macedonia are realized at central and local level while the structure elements of the system for protection and rescue and the system for crisis management are the Protection and Rescue Directorate and the Crisis Management Center.

Army of the Republic of Macedonia has not been left out of the systematic solutions for response to emergencies and crisis situations. Its role is regulated by the Law on Crisis Management and a few legal acts. The capacity of damages that are caused, as well as the loss of human lives and the insufficient number of basic products, equipment and means, often alert the international community to get involved in the field operations and each organization with their authority to assist during the management and to remove the consequences of the crises situations. In order to reduce and eliminate the damage and the consequences of these threats, our country realizes close collaboration and joint activities, firstly with the countries in the region and then at sub regional level, through sharing information regarding the natural disasters and through engagement of protection and rescue forces as an aid to other countries.

An important segment within these systems would be an on going observation of the conditions, preparation of adequate risks assessments of the territory by various factors and appropriate planning and conducting exercises about different aspects for possible crisis situation in the country. Adequate developments of documents, and the actual activities of the concerned subjects in case of emergencies of larger extent, such as forest fires, devastating earthquakes, floods, accidents, industrial hazards, etc.; are planned and continuously exercised both in national responsible institutions and joint on regional or higher multilateral level through respective simulation and field exercises, aimed even in real conditions to respond in most appropriate manner. The Republic of

Macedonia is continuously putting efforts for coordination and capacities development for dealing with crises at national, regional and international level. The experiences and lessons learned from the participation in the international simulation exercises are precious resource for further training, coordination, exchange of information, seeing the weaknesses and improving the national system for crisis management. During all of these activities the role of the media is obvious, as the necessity to monitor all the activities and adequately inform the public for actual situation on the field and the activities realized by all institutions involved. In the course of the 2013, Ministry of Defense and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia had more activities dedicated to the segment of crisis management and civil-military cooperation in case of emergencies of large extent such as the the following: "Joint Effort 13" exercise, held in June at the Army Training Area "Krivolak" and in the Training Center "Pepelishte".

Beside the Army of the Republic of Macedonia as host, the armies of the USA, the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia and military forces of Kosovo, as well as representatives of the Crisis Management Center, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior, the Directorate for Protection and Rescue and the Red Cross participated in this exercise. The point of the exercise was to show in which manner these professionals from different countries united in one action, coordinate and act together in order to respond to catastrophes. The exercise was based on a scenario for operations that handle emergencies of larger extent and providing humanitarian help, led by NATO/EU or UN. The purpose was to demonstrate the interoperability between the army, the civil agencies and the regional countries. Furthermore very important was the Conference "Lessons Learned from Operations Conducted by the Euro-Atlantic Center for Emergency Coordination" held in Ohrid in the period from 14-17 October organized by the Ministry of Defense and the Republic of Macedonia's Crises Management Center.

A special panel of the conference was dedicated to public relations, the role of the media in a crisis situation and communication during crisis. An expert from BBC had a special presentation on the role of social media in crisis management.

This indicates that in case of emergency the public information, public relations and media are significant and integral part of all the operations and activities during the management and coping with disasters and crises at national, regional, and international level and that is very important to have well trained and prepared staff to accomplish these activities during major accidents, disasters and crisis situations.

The Significance of the Information in Crisis Management Process

A crisis is a phenomena or event that happens suddenly, quickly or unexpectedly. It is an integral part of the human life in every segment of its existence. Crisis always cause uncertainty, panic, disappointment and stress with consequences for the people. "The crisis appears in certain system, through the following features: regression of the determinants and increased uncertainty, transition from stability to instability, overturning the add-ons of the contradictions and antagonisms, outbreak of removals that quickly turn into trends, seeking for new solutions, i.e. global processes of disintegration" (Moren,Edgard,1979,p12).

The crisis means lack of solution - a moment when an alternation causes uncertainty.

Treating the risks of accidents and disasters, whether natural or caused by humans, it assumes existence of a unique doctrinaire attitude, as a guidance and framework in which the concrete strategies, politics and legislatives are going to be traced (Лазаровски, Ѓоргон, Талески, 2010,p, 12).

The crises can be defined from different aspects and there are many definitions, but the mutual segment for most of them is that during crises caused by various factors, including the natural disasters and catastrophes caused by man, there is a condition in which the core values, interests and goals of the country are threatened.

Every country during these conditions, among other things, should have defined strategy to deal with the crisis situation and to make an assessment of the capabilities or the capacities to handle the problem, that generate crisis and to locate the level of engagement of the international community (Митревска, 2006, p 26). Furthermore, in the context of this work, it is necessary to define crisis management, and the planning of the process as well. Hence, crisis management is defined by numerous definitions, which in the essence have the necessity to undertake planned, coordinated and well managed activities in order to stabilize the crises situation caused by various factors.

Planning of crisis management, provides an efficient coordination of the activities between the participants, that have a task to react, determines the measures for prevention and early warning, monitors and assess the acute situations and potential consequences of the crises, continuous actions, during and even when the crises is over.

The plan for crises management should be carried out by the authorities, which should provide its appropriate realization. It should fulfill several necessary parameters in order to be efficient and it is mostly carried out in three phases:
- phase of creation/emergence;
- phase of changes and
- phase of reconstruction.

Important aspect for successful realization of the crisis management plan is to differentiate the most significant activities by phases. As most significant the following are mentioned: acceptance, preparation, training, resources development and informing.

Acceptance means to be aware that always and in anytime we should keep in mind the possibility for a crisis to occur even when it is not expected.

Preparation for crisis resolution involves undertaking a wide range of means and measures to prevent its occurrence, conducting preparations to respond to crisis, in case if its occurrence. Preparation has four aspects:
- preparation and prevention;
- detection and classification;
- response and reduction;
- bringing to its previous condition.

Training means development and acceptance of a program, including all the participants into resolving the crisis and conducting preparation for realizing the processes, with which the crisis would be solved.

Informing involves taking action for all subjects to be informed timely and continuously (Митревска, 2006, p. 38-39).

From these basic definitions of concepts for the management, planning or crisis management the importance of training, resources and information during all stages of dealing with the crisis could immediately be seen. Information as important part of this process is

related to the process of training, education and resources, and that means there is a need for professional, educated and trained staff to cover all the issues related to the information and public relations during crisis management.

Regarding the international legislation that treats information related to disasters and crises, it should be mentioned that almost all documents and frameworks that treat this issue pinpoint the importance of information, public relations and communication during disasters and crises. Moreover, these activities are an unavoidable part of most documents dealing with prevention and creating opportunities for reducing the risks and consequences of disasters and crises.

We shall have a brief overview of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, established by the UN General Assembly on 22 December 1999. By adopting this strategy special chief forum within the UN system responsible for developing strategies and policies for Disaster Reduction-ISDR has been formalized. Among the main priorities and objectives of the forum the most pronounced one states: "Starting from the thesis that prevention begins with awareness, ISDR should focus on raising public awareness towards understanding the risks, vulnerabilities and disaster reduction globally (Лазаровски, Ѓоргон, Талески, 2010,p, 17).

We will mention the World Conference on disaster reduction or the Action Framework by Hyogo- 2005 which primary goal in the period until 2015 has been to significantly reduce losses caused by disasters, both in human lives and in the social, economic resources and the environment of the communities and the countries. Among the strategic objectives and priorities for action we point out the Priority no. 3 "Building a culture of safety and resilience" which focuses on establishing systems and services for information exchange that enable access to information and their application. In terms of the implementation of Priority 3, among the other things, countries should improve the collection, dissemination and use of information related to the risks of disasters. [3]

Taking this into consideration we will mention that the national legislative, suggests the need for information and public relations as integral part of the strategic, doctrinal and methodological commitments of the Republic of Macedonia in terms of risks reduction and crisis management. During assessments and scenarios, special plans for preparations are developed but also plans for prevention and specific operational plans to undertake the activities and measures. Public relations are a necessary part of any operations plan. If we explore profoundly into the analysis we would notice that all necessary plans, should have their own standard operations procedures, as well as plan for informing the public, public and media relations. In addition conducting of all necessary measures and procedures for this activity, should be developed with the standard procedures and with the plan for public relations. For all of this to be really applicable, beside the necessary documents, there should be qualified, trained and certificated personnel, who can realize this in best possible manner in case of need.

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[3] Ibid,p. 35

Public Relations

There is a big number and various definitions regarding the process of public relations. Part of them are the following: „The public relations represent intended, planned and continuous activity in order to reestablish and maintain mutual understanding between the organizations and the public."; „Public relations are continuous and systematic activity through which private and public organizations want to build understanding, empathy and support of those public circles that have established or are expected to establish a contact " (Wilcox, Cameron. Ault, Agee, 2005, p34).

According to Rex Harlow, „Public relations are a special function, which contributes to the establishment and maintenance of mutual channels of communication, understanding, acceptance and cooperation between the institutions and the public. Public relations are part of management problems and the important issues. They should help the management to be informed about the public opinion and appropriately respond to its interest. They help the management to move forward accordingly with the changes and to use them successfully. They are a type of system for timely warning, etc.(Harlow,1976, p. 124).

By studying a large number of various definitions of public relations, we can draw several key provisions that are part of most definitions and refer to the determination of the characteristics of public relations (Wilcox, Cameron. Ault, Agee, 2005, p.87). Thus, public relations are intentional activity. They aim to have an impact, to have an understanding, to receive and give information. Public relations are organized and planned activity that takes place in a specific time period. They should comply with the planned requirements and policies. The public relations as humanistic activity must support the general interest of the country and their citizens. Well-established public relations always have two-way communication.The public relations are the most successful when they are an integral part of the decision making process of top management.The public relations comprise counseling and problem solving at higher levels, not only disseminating information when the decision is made.

The process of public relations is well known under the acronym RACE which for the first time was formulated by John Marston (Marston, 1963, p.54):
- (Research) What is the problem or situation?
- (Action) What can be done, regarding this situation?
- (Communication) How to act in public?
- (Evaluation) Did it reach the public and what is the effect?

The public relations should provide understanding of the problem, by using all of the information resources, and then their activity is to analyze and distribute to the management, which according the received information, makes decisions for undertaking activities.

The most significant place in public relations has communication in case of crisis. During the crisis, people who are responsible for public relations have a very responsible mission and should immediately take action. This means that they must not leave a vacuum space, but to broadcast immediately. The assigned spoke person must not give information that is not verified or familiar. The person should be prepared to express emotion when required, during the announcements of traumatic events, names of victims, wounded,

missing, etc. In every moment of their activities during the crisis this person, should know how to give a proper answer to that specific situation and not to answer with speculations or assumptions. If the person is not able to give an appropriate answer, should point out to other person or sources that are competent to answer the questions. Only well trained and educated person can handle all the challenges that occur during crises. The biggest confusions are caused by inaccurate, incomplete and unverified information, contradictions and confusion in statements etc...(Covello.1995,p.53).

What is the Meaning of Public Information in Case of Crisis

Public information is a communication process. A good system of information and public relations is crucial for the whole process of crisis management. There is a need of information from the time of occurrence of the accident or the crisis. The information in these initial moments should mitigate the impact of the crisis over the psyche of the population, to protect people from increased suffering (NATO/EAPS, 2013.p.6). Crisis management is always focused towards solving problems and crises that arise unexpectedly. The basic stages of the crisis management activities include: defining and analyzing problems; investigating the situation of internal and external public; formulation of goals and objectives, for example: presenting up-to-date and accurate information to the media; developing a strategy for action - PR program and selection and preparation of specific communication techniques - planning; realization and communication of the program and finally - evaluation of the results from the PR-program. The success of the communication of the crisis situation depends on three factors: existence of a communication plan as part of the general plan for crisis management; formation of a special team, so-called headquarters for combat crisis; utilization and assigning a person as a spokesman during the crisis situation. The crisis's headquarter should not be an improvisation during crises. It should be functional and secured with all the data and information with the actual occurrence of the crises and what is very important to be trained in advance, skilled and well-coordinated for all activities that happen, during the occurrence, development and resolution of the crisis. Regarding the information of the public, the crises headquarters is obliged to coordinate the process of informing, before crisis occurrence, during the crisis, and after and to communicate with the public. People in charge of the public communication should be objective, direct and honest in the contacts and communication with the representatives that expect relevant and precise information. The truth should be told regardless of the result, because, it is the only way to stop the speculations that have negative influence on the management of the situation.

Basic Activities of Public Relations at the Initial Stage of the Crisis

Institutions involved in crisis management must have professional PR that will inform the public and will communicate with the public and the media. Besides being well-trained and educated to accomplish the communication during crisis, these people should have developed credibility and trust with the public and media, which would enable good collaboration. It should be well-trained team to deliver all activities, which include a predefined network of collaborators of the state institutions and contacts with the media

(NATO/EAPS, 2013.p.8). These people should be appropriately trained and be familiar with all the activities, which should later implement in case of state crises. From their own domain of work, they should plan the necessary means, such as designated area and organized press center, vehicles for journalists' transportation, rooms for press conferences, accommodation for the journalists, etc.

During Crisis Situation

When a crisis occurs the media should immediately be notified. If not, the media will come up with the information in other ways. The press center for the crisis should be located at a central place, where from they would broadcast the news, where "the speculations" would be checked and where they would collect the facts and deliver briefings. There should be immediate public statement through an official spokesman, who on the same spot would deliver a briefing for reporters. Media and the public should know that the situation is under control. Information is given only about confirmed data. At any case, there should not be speculations with unconfirmed data. It is better to confess that there is a lack of information, than to give unconfirmed one. The information should be collected as quickly as possible. Inviting a government representative or other senior official to speak in front of the cameras is a very good thing. The people need to see the leader, not only the representatives for public relations. Appearance of senior officials during crises brings credibility and shows that the institution takes the situation seriously. The people responsible for public relations, must not show nervousness, anxiety or fear, but should act calmly and with dignity. The undertaken activities to solve the crises should always be stressed. Preferably, media representatives should be tasked on the spot – there should be representative from each media - news agency, newspaper, television, radio, magazines and photographers at the place of the event. They would write the report, make recordings and take photographs for their colleagues. No one is allowed to use these reports, until the material is distributed to all the media (NATO/EAPS, 2013.p.10). It is necessary to keep records of reporters who called, to write down their questions, their deadlines etc. They should always be given appropriate answer, because if not, they would look for information elsewhere. They would write the story anyway. Therefore, the control of the same should be under the public relations. One of the most significant matters that they should do is to constantly build their credibility and gain the trust of the public. The spokesman should constantly be in relation with the senior management when making decisions and observing/monitoring actions at the same time. Information should be constantly updated and the public should be informed about any further progress. In addition, citizens could be informed about the status of the situation by the constant refresh of the website with the latest information. Preferably, if situation allows, a press- conference with officials from all the institutions should be organized. Each representative should report about the activities they had taken over within their scope of work. The conference should be designed and organized by representatives of public relations, in order to avoid unpredictable events and reactions. If all parties involved in public relations have undergone appropriate training for such situations, all things will progress as planned, organized and in appropriate manner.

In the Aftermath of the Crisis

After the crisis, it is necessary to make analysis and evaluation of all activities undertaken in order to identify and correct the deficiencies and emerged problems. The professionalism of public relations during a crisis situation is compared with a captain of a ship who in case of storm successfully manages it. As a conclusion of the stated we would provide a metaphor which says: "You can teach everybody how to hold the brush, but not how to see the colors". This means that, in case of crisis, one of the basic principles for successful management within the crisis management is a well realized communication (NATO/EAPS, 2013.p.12).

Training Opportunities for Public Relations - Communication Training in Crisis in Macedonia

The activities which were previously described cannot be learnt only from a book, although there is good and appropriate literature. In the Republic of Macedonia there are educational institutions that are implementing educational programs for public relations and communication skills. Communication in Crisis is part of the curriculum of the subject Public Relations at the Faculty of Security in Skopje and the subject Communication Skills at the Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski". But besides a theoretical background, students of these schools recently have had the opportunity to practice and prepare for these activities. Teachers and associates of the mentioned faculties have already established a good cooperation with the leadership at the Ministry of Defense and the Head of the Regional Centre for Public Relations (RCPR) and the students have opportunity to practice the techniques of communication skills, by using camera, delivering briefings, proper preparation and giving a statement, organizing a press center, press conference etc. The most interesting is the simulation exercise to organize a press-conference during crisis. The courses that are held within the Center can be attended by people involved in public relations, within the institutions of the Republic of Macedonia and regionally, and since this year as part of NATO, and Partner countries, the countries from the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Initiation, as since June 2013 this Training Center is part of the network of NATO Training Centers.

First NATO Training Center for Public Relations

Within NATO, 26 partners' training centers, deployed in 23 countries are operational. Partners' centers play a key role in supporting NATO Partnership Goals. By working together they offer enhanced support for interested partners to strengthen their education and training in the field of defense, and also support the development and transformation of partner professional military educational institutions. Only in 2013 these centers have trained over 12,500 participants from allied and partner countries. The courses offered by partner centers for education and training, help participants from NATO and partner nations to work together and share experiences and knowledge in order to increase the understanding, efficiency and interoperability in various fields (Гелевски, 2014,p. 22). The Regional

Centre for Public Relations from June 2013 is officially the 26th NATO Training Center for Public Relations. The evaluation team, comprised of seven members (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Allied Command for Transformation, NATO School Oberammergau and representatives of the NATO international staff) visited the Regional Center for Public Relations in the period of 4-7 March 2013. During the visit the activities offered by the Center, work, accommodation and staff resources were evaluated in detail. The report, which was prepared by the NATO-team for evaluation after the visit, evaluated positively the capacity of the Regional Centre for Public Relations and confirmed that the Center meets the criteria for NATO partner centers for education and training, in accordance with the new NATO concept, with a recommendation that it can be recognized as NATO Partnership Education and Training Center, in accordance with the NATO concept of partnership centers.

Otherwise, the Center was established as a Regional Training Center for Communication (RTCC) since 2005 within the Department of Public Relations of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia. The main objective of the Centre was to provide Training and Coaching to persons from Ministries of Defense and Armies of the region. The support in material assets, the most modern equipment and technology was donated by Switzerland and the Kingdom of Norway. From the initial period until today more than 60 types of training courses, workshops, lectures, tutorials etc. have been realized. All these activities are carried by certified media trainers from the country and abroad. Besides the basic and advanced courses in this center and training sessions for new media trainers are realized and each year, new contents are introduced. Lately, the Regional Centre for Public Relations is focused on media training and public relations in crisis situations, which is a special area of study that is useful for a wider target audience. The role of NATO during response to crisis is no longer only in terms of the use of military units but above all in undertaking operations which will affect to prevent crisis and to protect the civilian population and critical infrastructure from the possible negative impacts by natural forces, hazards and humanitarian accidents and disasters which lead to crisis situations (Гелевски, 2014,р. 22). The enrichment of curriculum by including eminent lecturers and experts from NATO countries, NATO Office of Public Relations and experienced officers for public relations from Europe, from the U.S. and Canada, have further increased the attractiveness of the offer of the Centre in the regional context, hoping to continue in the years to come and internationally. For the purpose of further development of the capacities and activities of the Centre, an Action Plan is prepared for development, which aims to move the Center in pace with the development of the current and future needs and requirements, in national, regional and international frameworks. In the last period, since 2005 until present the Regional Training Center has successfully trained more than 600 participants from the country, the region and beyond. From the Republic of Macedonia there were 374 participants, which completed the training for public relations. Annually, the average training sessions are conducted with about 100 participants, with an increasing trend in the number of participants and the contents. Regarding the trainings for communication during crisis, the articles show that each year the number of the conducted training is increasing, and the most significant for 2014 is that there is going to be a training for the trainers with all the specifics of the crisis management

and communication skills during crisis. The individuals, who are going to complete this training, are already certificated media trainers, who in this manner will increase the level of their competences for communication training during crisis. It should be emphasized that many employees from the state administration, mostly from the Crisis Management Center and the Directorate for Protection and Rescue have undergone training in this center.

An Overview of the participants at courses from Directorate for Protection and Rescue of RM is as follows:

Year	Number of courses
2009	2
2011	2
2012	1
2013	1

As we can see from the overview, the participants from the Directorate for Protection and Rescue of the Republic of Macedonia are not so active at the training courses for public relations and they have to pay enough attention on this kind of training because they have great responsibility during crises and disasters.

An Overview of the participants at courses from the Center for Crisis Management of RM is as follows:

Year	Number of courses
2009	4
2011	7
2012	4
2013	9
2014	1

As we can see from the overview, the Crisis Management Center is frequently present with participation on relevant courses within the Regional Training Centre and their personnel is well trained for public relations, active and cooperative during crisis management.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Crisis management is a pronounced element in the new security strategies at national level, but also within the systems for collective security and defense such as NATO, the European Union, the United Nations etc. This is mostly a result of the different perception of the security threats on a global, regional and national level in the countries. The public relations, communication during a crisis situation, the appropriate information and cooperation with the media are an integral part of these strategic concepts. The system institutions must recognize the increased needs for training and education of the staff involved in operations in order to deal with the crisis, especially in relation to the segment of information and public relations.

By transforming the Regional Training Centre for Public Relations of the Ministry of Defence into NATO Partnership Center, the interest of the international partners for involving in the activities of the Center with their lecturers and experts has increased. As of this year, besides traditional supporters, the United Kingdom and France have announced their participation through expert assistance within the enrichment of the training activities and the coaching in the Center. One of the most interesting and most visited training courses within the Training Centre for Public Relations is the Media Training for Crisis Communication. The interest for visiting and training for this type of activities primarily is a result of the increased importance of the crisis management in the countries, but also within the collective security systems. The purpose of the recommendations is to promote and recognize the significance of the Training for Public Relations and in particular the Training for Crisis Communication, in order to attract more people who would become more professional.

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RISK MANAGEMENT FROM CATASTROPHIC FLOODS AND DEMOLISHING HIGH DAMS

MSc. Zoran SALTAMARSKI[1],
Dr. Elenior NIKOLOV[2]

Abstract: *This paper briefly describes the risks of floods caused by torrential rains and possible flooding of the City by demolishment of the dam "Matka". It describes the procedures and measures for the protection and safety during flooding of a specific area. The focus in this paper is given to the visualization (mapping) of possible flood by using the program Quantum GIS, as a powerful tool for managing the risks of catastrophic flooding and making quick and accurate decisions to undertake appropriate measures to prevent it. The possibilities offered by the program to display the possible flood and to analyse of all data obtained with it are given.*

Keywords: *catastrophic flood, risk, risk management, mapping (visualization), Quantum Gis*

Introduction

This paper describes vulnerability of settlements from flooding, especially those endangering the city of Skopje. At the beginning an overview of the flooding in the country is shown. There is a brief display of the river basins in the country and hydrological monitoring stations, as well the surface and groundwaters. In the third point of this paper an overview of the reservoirs in Macedonia and the dangers in case of their possible destruction are given. Then, the phases of flood hazard in the reon of Skopje and the method of protection from flood hazard are described. In the next point there is an overview and description of possible consequences on the city of Skopje from eventual collapse of the Canyon Dam "Matka". The last point displays visualization of possible flood in the canyon demolition program obtained by Quantum GIS.

Floods - Flood Hazard

Floods are natural disasters that often happen on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. They arise due to the specificities of terrain (relief, topographical, geomorphological) and the climate of the region. From previous observations and data obtained it can be concluded that almost all rivers and waterways including the River Vardar have torrentive character and thus making protecting and rescuing from floods complex and specific [1].

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In the last period in Macedonia five major floods are registered in the years 1916, 1935, 1937, 1962 and 1979 and they have caused serious consequences for people and goods. Full assessment of damages was made only after the floods in 1979 and the results show that caused damage is of about 10% of the national GDP of the country.

The average rainfall in the country amounts to 745 mm/m^2.

Figure 1. River waterheds and regions of the river waterheds in Republic of Macedonia[3]

The construction of the dam Kozjak on the riverTreska, the waters of river Vardar in Skopje area and partly in the area of Veles have controlled flaw.

Across the valleys of the rivers Vardar and Crna river, floods occur in winter because of the rapid melting of snow and rains, but they case less damage than floods in summer. Flooding in the summer period is more intensive in watersheds with obvious erosion and more typical are the watersheds of rivers Bregalnitsa and Pchinja. From overflowing of the rivers from their banks in the country, more than 100 000 ha cultivable area are affected.

The construction of several reservoirs in the country have decreased the flood waves in some areas and regions. Besides irrigation, hydro reservoirs of Kalimanci, Turija, Vodocha, Glaznja, Tikvesh, Kozjak and others are intended for the production of electricity

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[3] Национална Стратегија за води (2012-2042), Проектни тимови, Влада на Република Македонија во партнерство со Влада на Р. Словениа, мај 2012. стр 222

and water supply. These dams have amortized the flood wave from the great waters, and also protect large areas from floods and layering large drifts in the lower parts of the plains.

For monitoring of surface and underground waters in the country 225 hydrological stations, of which 110 for surface and 115 for groundwater, shown on figures 2&3[4] [1] are set.

**Figure 2. Hydrological stations for surface waters in Macedonia**

Figure 3. Hydrological stations for ground water in Macedonia

The teritory of the Republic, has so far built over 270 km drifts and walkway defense walls and a line of about 160 km of river'sbanks are regulated. With these facilities on the streams and rivers full or partial protection from floods of up to 60 000 ha of cultivable area is made.

In the Republic of Macedonia there isn't fully built system for protection and rescue from flooding (full regulation of streams and rivers, construction of defense embankments, fully regulated torrents, plans for the protection and rescue from flooding in all areas) [2].

Threats from Flooding When High Dams
Are Demolished

Hydro reservoirs in Macedonia are important in everyday life, but they also pose great danger, especially the high/tall ones, keeping in mind that in their sudden destruction major consequences for the population and material goods would have been caused.

Until now, more than 100 dams have been built out of which 23 are classified as high dams. In terms of their structure they are built by earthen layered dams with clay core. High dams are earthen embankment dams, concrete and combined, and they are dimensioned to

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[4] Национална Стратегија за води (2012-2042), Проектни тимови, Влада на Република Македонија во партнерство со Влада на Р. Словениа, мај 2012. стр.224 и 226.

thousand annual waters which means that they are providing sufficient security in relation to the occurrence of flooding[5].

Figure 4. Accumulation in Macedonia

According to the special reports made separately for each dam, with their sudden collapse severe damage and many casualties can be caused. They include:

- Flooding would be around 100 000 ha;

- lives of about 250 000 people in 30 municipalities and 80 villages would be endangered;

- over 50 major commercial buildings (factories, mines, thermal power stations and other facilities) to be busy and disabled;

- Submerged, buried, destroyed or otherwise incapacitated approximately 400 km roads with modern road and 150 km railway.

Operations plans for protection and rescue of people and property in the affected areas downstream of high dams are made by all the municipalities that are affected by the impact of the flood wave that would establish the eventual collapse or overflow of water over the crown of the dam;

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[5] Национална Стратегија за води (2012-2042), Проектни тимови, Влада на Република Македонија во партнерство со Влада на Р. Словениа, мај 2012. стр. 239.

– For all high dams in the country security elevations of water levels in the reservoirs, which should go down the road of intense discharge in case of danger of demolition of the dams or in the case of danger of war are set and

– Population is not sufficiently familiar with the alarm signals for reporting danger of the dam collapsing, and training and familiarization of population with measures and procedures for the protection and evacuation in those conditions is performed.

Considering the overall state of high dams, in order to avoid or reduce the consequences of possibly demolishing or spilling over the tops of the dams, it is necessary to undertake the following activities:

– The competent authorities of the management, within the legal regulations for safety at high dams,should consistently adhere to the regulations and measures entities that manage them need to realize in order to timely report and alert the population in case of sudden destruction of dams or overflow through the crown of high dams and

– To conducting training with people from disadvantaged areas downstream of high dams [3].

Risk Management from Flood in the City of Skopje

Activities related to the organization of the protection and rescue of flood depends on the level of the increase of water in the river's banks. From past experiences with flooding in Skopje, and based on analysis, and project elaborates constructed in the City of Skopje on this issue in the past, it is estimated that flood protection should be organized according to the phases of flood hazards that may provide as follows:

– **first phase** starts immediately when the rivers have increased flow of water in the basin of the river Vardar, and according to the weather forecasts and expectation of the water level to rise;

– **second phase** begins when the water level reaches the critical level for outpouring of water in certain areas and flood areas, while it is expected to further increase the water level, and there is a danger of spillage over the river basins;

– **third phase** starts when the water level exceeds the critical level for overflow of water or released large quantities of water from the reservoir of Power plant "Matka";

– **fourth phase** begins when flood of catastrophic waters is expected or danger is coming from demolishing the dam "Matka".

Accordint to these phases and risk management, figure 5 shows diagram of the general procedure for risk management of catastrophic flooding[6] [4].

The declaration of individual phases to prevent flooding caused by the size of the flow of the rivers Vardar, Treska and Lepenec, depends on the degree of danger, and the announcement made by the competent authority in the municipality, city or country.

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[6]   Risk Assessment and Management-Industrial Disaster Management, InWEnt, Germany and Disaster Management Institute, Bophal, India, November 2010, page 7.

The evacuation of citizens in the municipality is performed in two main points:
- evacuation from the left in the region of Vardar fortress "Kale" and evacuation from the right side of the river Vardar in the southern slopes of the municipality under mountain "Vodno".


Figure 5. General procedure for assessing the risk of catastrophic flood

Impacts from Collapse of Canyon Dam "Matka" in Case of Flooding

With the construction of dams Matka Canyon II and Kozjak, the flood waves of the waters of river Vardar in Skopje area are reduced, i.e. the area of the municipality of Gorce Petrov,Karposh and Center where the river Vardar has a controlled way.

Dam "Matka Canyon II " is built on the River "Treska" at the exit of the canyon, 14 km far from Skopje. In order to better adapt to the ground conditions at the dam, the dam is like an arch – reinforced- concrete. The height of the dam is 29.5m, and the length of the dam is 65.87m. The area of the water basin of the reservoir is 1800 km^2 and the length of the reservoir is 5900m with average width of 40m. The reservoir of the dam has a total capacity of 3.55 million m^3, and the useful volume is 2.600.000 m^3.

In case of demolishing the dam "Matka",from direct impact from the flood wave downstream a number of settlements and buildings as well as the City of Skopje suburbs, defined as areas for evacuation in the fourth stage of the flood are exposed.

The possible destruction of the dam with average speed of the vawe forehead thrown over the city of Skopje would be 33.4 km/h, which means that the distance of 3 km wave would reach about 550 sec, its height would be 6m. In the section from the dam to Skopje directly impacted of flood wave are villages Dolna Matka, Shishevo,Glumovo, Chichino and Saraj along river Treska, as well as Kondovo down the river Vardar. In this part flood wave would progress exceptionally steep head.

The consequences that could occur in the region of Gazi Baba would be: flooding about 5600 ha, endangered lives of about 35 000 people and about 10,000 apartments and houses. Flooded would be certain neighborhoods and villages such as triangle, Madzari, Trubarevo Jurumleri, Skopje field, Colony, Kadino, Mralino, PetrovacOgnjanci and other settlements. Flooded will be and parts of the industrial zone including former factory Gazela, most of MZT, Tehnometal-Vardar and other facilities around them. Flooded and disabled will be around 7 km from the railway line Skopje-Kumanovo and 20 km routes [5].

To reduce the effects of flood waves partially or complete demolishing of the Dam "Matka" it is necessary to take the following preventive measures:

1. To provide preventive warning of the local population for evacuation of endangered marked flood zone. For this purpose it is needed to build a system for monitoring the performance of the dam and the population of the endangered area of flooding caused by potential demolishing the Dam "Matka".

2. The system for monitoring and reporting consists by observation posts (people and video cameras), Center in Power plant "Matka", Warning Center of Skopje and warning stations, telecommunication network and marks for the maximum level of flood wave.

3.Reducing the water level of Lake Matka, which will reduce the reservoir, and thus the risk of flood wave size.

4.Reducing the water of the river Treska of the dam "Matka" by regulating the discharge of the dam "Kozjak".

City of Skopje and its surroundings due to its proximity to the dam "Matka" as well as the natural features of the river basin are exposed to great danger from flooding. Flooding of this section will occur in case of some extreme flow in the river Vardar and Treska ($900 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$-$1000 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$) when it floods an area of about 8500 ha according to the plan of flood defense in Skopje area and in the City of Skopje[7].

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[7]   Resource: The Directorate for Protection and Rescue in Republic of Macedonia

Figure 6. Flooded area in flood in the Skopje region

Data Visualization for Damage and Infrastructure Vulnerability from Flood by Using Quantum GIS Software

Quantum GIS

Quantum GIS (Quantum GIS) is an open source software, computing GIS application capable of displaying, editing and analysing geodata.

Displaying Informations

The information data are artificial and natural objects in a space. They are for example, infrastructure facilities, housing, sports and other buildings, hydro reservoirs, rivers, land use, elevation data for terrain, terrain geology etc. Information on the geometry of the objects can be in a form of raster and vector.

Raster–consists of rows and columns of cells which are called pixels, each of those cells has one particular, numerical value. In the image given as an example, the numerical value is the number of the color (color coded with numbers). In the case of displaying information value of the pixel it is not only a color, but a spatial data.

Presentation of the **vector** shape refers to the shape geometry (length, height, shape, form) whether it's linear or polygons units and their spatial position (position in the coordinate system).

Besides these there are GIS information and additional information, called non spatial data that can be linked with some raster or vector data. On the following diagrams are shown the basic parameters of the height of the flood wave depending on the profile of the terrain. From the dam to the village Sisevo for narrow profile of the terrain, canyon, the wave height is very big. As soon as the ground becomes flat the height of the wave decreases [6].

Height of the vawe according to the field profile

	The profile at Dam "Matka"	The profile at v. Shishevo	Directly downstream of confluence	Through city of Skopje	Directly downstream from the bridge "East"	Through the Skopje area	Entrance of the Taor Canyon
	0	3	9.25	15	19.5	26	42.5

Figure 7. The height dependance of the wave profile of the pitch (distance in km)

VAWE HEGHT AND THE TERRAIN ELEVATION FROM THE DAM „MATKA" TO TAOR

	The profile at The Dam "Matka"	The profile at the v.Shishevo	Directly downstream of the confluence	Through the city of Skopje	Directly downstream from the bridge "East"	Through the Skopje area	Entrance of the Taor Canyon

Distance [km]

Altitude

Vawe Height

Figure 8. Vertical cross-section of the wave height and altitude of the terrain from the dam "Matka" to Taor

Due to the narrow profile of the terrain the speed of the wave is greater. The rising immediately profile reduces speed.


Figure 9. Dependence of the vawe velocity according to the distance

The following diagram shows the time of the appearance of the forehead of the wave from the dam Matka to Taor.


Figure 10. The time of appearance of the head of tide

The following pictures show the terrain around the Dam "Matka"emphasized with River Treska, which is displayed on a separate plane (layers) in blue.

**Figure 11. Satellite image of the area around the dam**

Figure 12. Appearance of the program "Quantum-GIS"

Figure 13. Flooded area from eventual demolishing of the dam "Matka"

On the picture 13 time after demolishing the dam and flooded area that would be affected by flood waves are visually shown, and on the picture 14,the visual mapping is done, by using the software "Quantum-GIS", of damaged buildings in the region of the first settlement near the dam "Matka". Objects are classified by level of impairment (different color), and these data are given in Table 1 and Figure 15th

Figure 14th Visualization of damage to buildings from flood wave

Table 1. Classification by damage to buildings

classification	Color shown that the classification of a given location
damaged	yelow
destroyed	red

**Figure 15th Table of damaged buildings**

Figure 16th Tagged facilities affected by floodwaves

Conclusion

Full and organized record keeping for natural disasters and their impact and consequences give us data that are needed to create effective systems for the timely (early) warning and risk assessment, in order to reduce the impact of natural disasters. The collection of data for certain natural disasters and their analysis greatly improve prevention and preparation for disaster. The data gathered for visualization of vulnerability of infrastructure in the area down the river Treska, should largely be helpful in identifying risks and the overall vulnerability. Rivers , Vardar and Lepenec most commonly have caused the flooding that have occurred in the City of Skopje, and I think it would be necessary to complete the data from all the flooda that have occurred when these rivers have overflown.

Obviously there is still much to be done in Macedonia, to manage accidental risks, and this paper presents the methodology of visualization (mapping) of possible floods by using the program Quantum GIS, as a powerful tool for managing the risks of catastrophic floods and quickly making accurate decisions about suitable steps to protect at a local level. That can be applied in all municipalities.

Taking into account the time of appearance of the head of the wave and its maximum height, taking the necessary measures to protect the population (evacuation outside the marked zone of flooding) is possible only if the alarm is raised before the demolition of the dam. This can be ensured only by continuous monitoring of the condition of the dam and the ground portion of the reservoir. For protection of material goods and objects it is not possible to take virtually any action.

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TERRORISM AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: THE CASE OF MACEDONIA

MSc. Jordan POPOVSKI[1]

Abstract: *Modern lifestyle requires creating better living conditions, so striving towards it, there is a need for rapid development of technology, leading to large and rapid social development. Therefore, state being imposed for "racing societies" where countries are fighting for top positions on the scale of the most successful and powerful economic and technological way. Today, progress in technology enables the creation of modern infrastructure that provides fast flow of information and services. The same infrastructure gets key role in the society and state operating. More the operation of certain infrastructure is a key character, more the disruption of its functionality is critical. Due to this "critical", particular infrastructure gets critical importance.*

Threats to critical infrastructure are directly related to global security challenges, including modern terrorism. Therefore, the security concept to protect critical infrastructure is very high on the security agenda of the EU.

The Republic of Macedonia since the security situation in the country and region and aspirations for membership in the EU, it is necessary to adapt the approach to critical infrastructure protection in accordance with adopted principles in the collective security systems.

Keywords: *Critical Infrastructure, Terrorism, European Union, Republic of Macedonia*

Introduction

Dissable operation or destruction of one or more elements of critical infrastructure can cause technological accidents, or cause certain crises. Today, the struggle for achieving higher revenues with lower costs marginalizes the issue of security of critical infrastructure. Thus, critical infrastructure has become not sufficiently protected and vulnerable.

Terrorist groups, led by Al Qaeda, analyzing the vulnerability of the opponent, changed the previous modus operandi and shifted the battlefield at the home ground of their opponents. Targeting the critical infrastructure and carrying out attacks against the U.S., London and Madrid, presented the world with its new global agenda and apocalyptic emphasis, which has changed and course and magnitude of the global fight against terrorism. The global fight against terrorism and managing crises caused by terrorist attacks take new dimensions that directly involved the critical infrastructure as a matter of interest. This raised the need for the new methodology in the planning and establishment of capacity, measures and procedures for protection of the critical infrastructure, as well as adapting to crisis management in that direction.

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[1]   The author is from Ministry of Interior of RM

In order to understand the necessity of critical infrastructure protection, we should first answer few questions. What is infrastructure? What makes the infrastructure to become critical? What can happen if we don't protect the Critical Infrastructure?

Defining the Term „Infrastructure"

The term "infrastructure" was first introduced in XIX century by Swiss military theorist Henry Antuan-Zhomini that highlights the strategic and operational importance to the leadership of the military actions. By the middle of the XX century, the term "infrastructure" is a military term that means the territorial organization of the system for maintenance and operation of the Army. Later, the term "infrastructure" is starting to be used in economic theory and the theory of management.[2]

There are several definitions of the term infrastructure. According to Moteff *"Infrastructure is the basic physical and organizational structure that is needed for the society, environment, organization or institution to function smoothly within itself."* He said that *infrastructure is a set of interconnected structural elements that provide related support of overall functioning of the environment.*[3]

The infrastructure can be divided into:

• hard (physical) infrastructure, refers to large physical networks necessary for the functioning of a country, institution, organization, etc.

Hard infrastructure is divided into:

– Transportation (streets, roads, bridges, tunnels, airports, harbors, channels, etc.);
– Energy (electrically grid, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, lines to transport ore, etc.);
– Water (water supply, sewerage, drainage systems, drainage channels, etc.), and
– Communications (internet, telephone, television, etc.).

• Soft (service) infrastructure applies to all institutions that are required to maintain the economic, health and cultural and social standards of a country. The soft infrastructure includes physical assets such as highly specialized equipment and facilities, rules and regulations governing the various systems, financing of these systems, etc. [4]

Good infrastructure is the basis for rapid economic growth and development, improved competitiveness of the economy, faster flow of people, goods and passengers. Due to the fact that Macedonia is the main east - west corridors (corridor VIII) and north - south (Corridor X), it is necessary to have a good infrastructure that will contribute to increase the competivity of the national economy, higher economic growth and balanced regional development. This will lead to intensification of the integration of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU standards and reduce the infrastructure gap.

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[2] Idzorek, T. (2009), *Infrastructure and Strategic Asset Allocation: Is Infrastructure an Asset Class?*, Ibbotson a Morningstor Company, p. 17

[3] Moteff J. and Parfomak P. (2004), *Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets:Definition and Identification*, Congresional Research Service - The Library of Congress, p. 5

[4] See more: Policy Research Working Paper 5261, Hard and soft Infrastructure, April 2010

Defining the Term „Critical Infrastructure"

In the last decades of the XX century, the world political scene needed to precisely define the terms „infrastructure" and „critical infrastructure" in order to distinguish them.

Because critical infrastructure includes resources that are necessary for the functioning of society, such as those might be defined the following:
- – Energy facilities and networks;
- – Communication and Information Technology;
- – Finance;
- – Health;
- – Food;
- – Water;
- – Transportation;
- – Production, storage and transportation of dangerous goods, and
- – Government facilities. [5]

According to the above mentioned, we can conclude that the term critical infrastructure means „a system of facilities, services and information systems, which termination defects in the operation or destruction, would have a serious negative impact on the health and safety of the public, the environment, national economy or on the efficient functioning of the state population and management in general".

Threats to Critical Infrastructure

New challenges in the 21st century, modern terrorism and natural disasters pose faster and more effective responses. Everyday challenges and threats to our lives, whether it be man-made or natural origin, provide that our values, our environment and our existence as a whole, must be protected. It is an instinctive ability for people to open up all the operation needs to continuously enhance the environment and protect. In the past, the protection of vital infrastructure is implemented by force because there was no technology. Today, it is not enough to protect a specific area of infrastructure, it is crucial to protect their attended technology.

Critical infrastructure expand in many sectors like economy (banking and finance) transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply, communications, and key government services. Some critical elements in these sectors are not strictly "infrastructure", but actually, network or supply chain services that are essential to the delivery of products or services. For example, water supplies and food to the larger urban areas are dependent on a complex network of producers, processors, distributors, etc.

There are several factors that threaten various elements of the infrastructure and the effects of these affect the status of the security. They are threatening factors and they can be divided into the following groups and subgroups:

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[5]   Commision of the EU Communities, (2004), *Critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism*, Brusseles, p.4

• Organized actions with harmful intentions:
- Terrorism;
- Report on political or economic benefit;
- Promoting armed conflicts (eg civil war), and
- Actions with social background (eg riots and protests)
• events of natural origin:
- Floods;
- Extreme weather conditions (eg, extensive rainfall);
- Tectonic disturbances (earthquakes, land degradation), and
- Fires of natural origin
• Threats of technological nature (caused by human error or technical involvement):
- Problems caused by programming errors;
- Accidents;
- Severe industrial accidents;
- Nuclear threats and
- The release of biological agents that cause massive infections.[6]

The above list of factors is certainly not complete. It is always a possibility of unexpected situations (and a combination of the above) that will cause a danger to critical infrastructure.

At the end of XX century appears the term "critical infrastructure protection (CPI)" which represents an essential component of the security policy in many countries, especially in the countries - members of NATO and the EU.[7] Protecting critical infrastructure is directly related to terrorism posing a potential target. Besides terrorism, and natural disasters, human error or technical factors may cause significant error, which would adversely affect critical infrastructure. That's why it is crucial each state to have a systematic approach to existing infrastructure, as well as identifying and prioritizing the critical infrastructure.

The EU Approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection

European Security Strategy recognizes five security threats, including: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized crime and decay of states. European Union in order to deal with terrorism as a global threat that endangers the protection level of freedom and security of the member states, requires member states to have effective criminal laws in the fight against terrorism. In this context, security concept, dealing with security challenges and crisis management are very high on the security agenda of the EU, based on the principles adopted in the collective security system, allowing reduction of risks to the security of critical infrastructure.

It is obvious that threats to critical infrastructure are part of the agenda of terrorist organizations. Changing the modus operandi of Al Qaeda and the presence of sleeping

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[6]   B. Bognar, (2009), *The process of critical infrastructure protection*, AARMS, Budapest, p.500
[7]   Center for Security Studies, *Crisis and Risk Network Critical Infrastructure Protection*, Center for Security Studies (CSS). 2009.ETH Zürich

cells on European soil, increases the possibility of terrorist attacks on European critical infrastructure. Therefore, the perception of threats beyond existing boundaries should be supplemented with analysis of risks from inside.

Speaking of critical infrastructure and aspiration of Macedonia for EU membership, it is necessary the appropriate steps to be taken in terms of prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure, which would be consistent with the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Since the declaration of the EU, that the damage or loss of part of the critical infrastructure of a Member State would cause a negative impact on other Member States and the European economy, it is the Republic of Macedonia to take steps for coherent implementation of measures to improve the protection of critical infrastructure and defining the obligations and responsibilities of all stakeholders in the country concerned with this issue.

European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection – EPCIP

EU policy for the protection of critical infrastructure is developing very dynamically since 2004 in the context of the fight against international terrorism. From an institutional point of view the EU's policy on the protection of critical infrastructure are coordinated by the General Directory "Justice, freedom and security" of the European Commission. In order to strengthens European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure, European Commission on 20 October 2004 adopted a "Communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism".

In November 2005, the Commission adopted a "Green Paper" for European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. That was the basis for the establishment of a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Beside all, The Green Paper for the first time at the European Community, gives a definition of the term "critical infrastructure" and recommended a list of sectors of critical infrastructure. According to "The Green Paper", a *critical infrastructure system is the facilities, services and information systems, whose braking operation malfunction or destruction would have a serious negative impact on the health and safety of the public, the environment, national economy or the effective functioning of state management.*[8]

The need for developing a program for critical infrastructure protection is sought in the fact that there are a big number of critical infrastructures within the European Union that if they are disabled or destroyed, would adversely affect member states. Such critical infrastructure, with transnational dimensions, would be identified and defined as European critical infrastructure.

Regarding to the transnational dimension, extensive integrated EU approach would be complemented by the establishment of a common list of critical infrastructure sectors, which would be necessary in order to facilitate the implementation of sectoral and subsectoral measures for critical infrastructure protection.

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[8] https://www.uic.org/spip.php?article2834#documents_joints

Effective protection requires communication, coordination and cooperation at the national level and at EU level involving all relevant stakeholders. Full involvement of the private sector is necessary because most critical infrastructures are either privately owned or beneficiary is a private entity. The domain of the states for providing a security to the companies, and the critical infrastructure as well, transfer to the private security agencies, which led to some controversy about their quality.

The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection is divided in 11 Articles. In terms of identified necesity for appropriate strategy for protecting critical infrastructure, I will briefly explain all 11 Articles, which could be used as an example for the preparation of such Act. Article 1 represented subject to the Directive. The Directive establishes a common procedure for the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures, or those infrastructures whose destruction or disruption would affect two or more member states. The Directive also introduces a common approach to the assessment of the needs, in order to improve the protection of European critical infrastructure. This assessment is very helpful in order to prepare specific protection measures in the different sectors of critical infrastructure.

Article 2 presented a list of basic definitions relevant to the Directive, while Article 3 presents the procedure for identifying European Critical Infrastructure. According to Article 3, *European critical infrastructure is that infrastructure whose disruption or destruction would have a serious impact on two or more Member States or one Member State if the critical infrastructure located in another Member State.*

The procedure for the determination of European critical infrastructure is defined in Article 4, in which, after laying down the procedure under Article 3, the Commission drafts a list of European critical infrastructure. The draft list is based on information received from Member States and other relevant information by the Commission.

Article 5 regulates the security plans of users (operators). Specifically, Article 5 stipulates that all owners or users of critical infrastructure designated as European Critical Infrastructure need to establish security plans that identify the assets of the owners or users of European critical infrastructure and to establish relevant security solutions for their protection as well.

In terms of better communication, Article 6 regulates determining the point of contact for security issues. Article 6 requires all owners or operators of CI designated as European to designate a contact person for security issues. The contact person will make contact for security issues between CI and the relevant European authorities in the Member States on the protection of CI. In addition, the contact person will receive all relevant information about the protection of CI authorities of the Member State and will be responsible for providing relevant information to the States.

Article 7 introduces a series of measures for reporting. Namely, each Member State is required to conduct a risk assessment and threat on the European Critical Infrastructure. This information will provide a basis for dialogue between Member States relating to security issues (supervision), as stated in Article 5. As in Article 5 requires owners or operators of European Critical Infrastructure to establish security plans and operators to submit to

the authorities of the Member States, each Member State is required to elaborate a generic overview of the types of vulnerabilities, threats and risks encountered in every sector of the CI, and to provide this information to the Commission.

A Commission support for European critical infrastructure is regulated by Article 8. There is explained that the committee will support the owners and operators of European critical infrastructure by providing access to the best available practices and methodologies related to the protection of critical infrastructure.

In order to ensure cooperation and coordination on issues related to CI, each Member State is required to designate a contact person. The contact, which is provided for in Article 9, would coordinate on issues related to the protection of CI within the Member State, other Member States and the Commission. Confidentiality of information exchange for protection of CI is crucial and sensitive element in dealing with the protection of CI.

Consequently, under Article 10, the Directive requires the Commission and the Member States to take appropriate measures to protect the information. Any staff working with classified information related to the protection of CI should have the necessary security checks, provided by the authorities of the Member State.

Certain elements of the Directive are implemented through comitology, and within the committee, which is covered by Article 11. The advisory procedure is used for the purposes of Article 5 in order for the exclusion of certain sectors of the obligation to establish security plans.

The Republic of Macedonia Approach
to the Critical Infrastructure Protection

Following the example of the EU, that the descriptive analysis of the above statutory legislation has shown, that the Republic of Macedonia in order to achieve full membership in the EU and within the global fight against terrorism, it is necessary to work towards strengthening the European Prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure. Initially, it is to accept or adapt the European definition of critical infrastructure, then, accordingly, identifying the critical infrastructure within the state. Consequently, in order to unify the implementation of sectoral and subsectoral approach to critical infrastructure protection, there is a need to establish a common list of sectors that will enable coherent implementation of measures and procedures for the protection of critical infrastructure. The development strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure should be aimed at adapting to the private sector and its role in the protection of critical infrastructure, the objectives of the European Union and the budget.

The protection of critical infrastructure is a segment of crisis management. The main objective of the establishment of crisis management system in the Republic of Macedonia is the need to ensure a constant level of communication and consultation between all relevant stakeholders, decision -makers at the highest level, maximum coordination, reaction time, efficient and appropriate use of available resources and capabilities in the event of the occurrence of a crisis or a crisis situation in the state.

In regard to standardize the procedures of entities from the crisis management sistem in declared crisis situation, in February 2012 the Government adopted "Standard operating procedures for communication, coordination and cooperation between the entities of the crisis management system in the declared crisis situation" which encompasses the crisis caused by the terrorist attack as well.

The standard operational procedures (SOP) defines the method of declaring a crisis situation, the functions and tasks of the institutions in the system of crisis management, principles to analyze the situation, the decision-making procedures for handling (response and support), Risk/hazards associated occurrences/incidents and receipt, allocation and distribution of international aid.

In terms of the situation and the measures taken, following standard operational procedures in declared crisis situation after tip-offs, decisions and conclusions, the entities of the system for crisis management take appropriate action. In this direction, it is performing a permanent supply of data and information on the handling with the crisis by all available means of communication, monitoring the measures and activities as well as the engagement of their resources and produce reports on the situation. Pursuant to Article 24 paragraph 1 of the Crisis Management[9] (Official Gazette no. 29/05), Headquarter for Crisis Management System, makes decisions on engagement of an additional resources, as well as manner of their engagement.With the decision it is defined the engaged resources (human, material - technical and financial), as well as the putting into operation of the same, according to the time and purpose, as follows:

- Operating activities immediately after the genesis of the crisis (in the event of a terrorist attack;
- Providing aid to people directly affected;
- Dealing with the consequences of a terrorist attack;
- Help for the people directly affected by the terrorist attack, and
- Logistics Support.

At the moment of the terrorist attack, with the operational and the profesional role, the Headquarter is managing with activities for prevention and management of crisis situation, and it will be set up at the Centre for Crisis Management with the representatives of the entities of the system for crisis management.

"Standard operating procedures for communication, coordination and cooperation between the entities of the system for crisis management in declared crisis situation," is the only document that covered the activities of the entities of the system for crisis management handling (response and support) terrorist activities. As mentioned before at the beginning of this analysis of taken measures and procedures, the specific critical infrastructures and the effects of its destructions or disabling, will be different for each type of critical

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[9] The Center for crisis management set up headquarter, as operational expert body which manages activities for prevention and management of crisis situations. Headquarters is composed of representatives of the ministries of Article 13 paragraph 2 of this law. Other Staff members are the head of emergency care in Skopje, Director of the Directorate for Protection and Rescue, as well as representatives of the Army Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Security of Classified Information and the Red Cross of the Republic of Macedonia. The composition of the HQ in the Centre for crisis management, reflect equitable representation of communities. Director of the Center for crisis management manages the Headquarter.

infrastructure. Specifically, the type of critical infrastructure and infrastructure sector (eg. commercial buildings, communications and informatics, transport systems, dams, etc.) and the consequences of their destruction or disabling will vary in economic effects, effects on population, environmental effects, political and psychological effects, public health implications and so on. Therefore, for the effective protection of critical infrastructure in the country, it is necessary to prepare a list of critical infrastructure sectors and infrastructure facilities, and to develop standard operating procedures for dealing with terrorist activities for each specific sector or facility.

Conclusion

The concept of crisis management is discussed in detail within the European Union. It involves complex and effective procedures for preventing and dealing with crises caused as a result of destruction or disabling of critical infrastructure. By analyzing the law for crisis management in the Republic of Macedonia findes that there is present and established crisis management with defined participants, as well as planned engagement of appropriate available resources to effectively and efficiently dealing with the crisis, but there is a lack of the concept of a critical infrastructure protection. Speaking again about " Standard Operating Procedures for communication, coordination and cooperation between the entities of the system for crisis management in declared crisis situation", it can be concluded that standard operating procedures are effectively and efficiently analized towards engaging the subjects of crisis management system and resources used for dealing with terrorist attacks, but it is necessary to predict and SOP when it comes to the crisis caused by the terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure.

For full functionality of the system for crisis management , as well as identifying deficiencies, frequent practicing on given scenarios is necessary, because full training and proficiency of human resources for dealing with crisis caused by terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure is crucial. However, efficiency in managing the crisis, despite the training has always been associated with the resources used, and therefore requires a high level of equipment with sophisticated and appropriate equipment to deal with crises and their management.

In terms of prevention, there is a need for constantly update of the existing legislation and the development of appropriate models of early warning that correspond with the needs of the country and will enable the development of standard operating procedures for engaging participants and their available resources in crisis management caused by terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure. Successful prevention contributes to the reduction of risks, which directly affects the increase of security of critical infrastructure.

Speaking of the responsible parties to coordinate the activities of participants in systems for crisis management are the Crisis management center and the Directorate for Protection and Rescue, it is crucial to avoid overlapping of responsibilities between the responsible parties, or the practice of centralized way of decision -making and their decentralized execution. Centralized way of decision -making provides standardization of measures and standard operating procedures for the protection of critical infrastructure, whether it is state operated and manned or it is the responsibility of the private sector.

The risks of terrorism as a modern threat to critical infrastructure is reality in the Republic of Macedonia and their impact is already being felt daily in all segments of the life. From past experience, despite the long history of inter-ethnic intolerance, political disputes and divisions, as

elements that can certainly lead to risks of terrorism, there is still no solid stance on the protection of critical infrastructure. There is a necessity for a serious approach to the fact that the destruction or partial disability of critical infrastructure or part of it, is a serious threat that will exacerbate existing conditions and tensions. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt an effective strategy to protect critical infrastructure that could cope with modern threats.

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Standard operating procedures for communication, coordination and cooperation between the entities of the system for crisis management in the designated crisis situation

https://www.uic.org/spip.php?article2834#documents_joints

REVIEW ON THE BOOK
"METHODOLOGY OF SECURITY
SCIENCES-ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES
BOOK III"
(Prof. Cane Mojanoski, PhD)

Marjan GJUROVSKI, MA

The book *Methodology of Security Sciences – Analytical Procedures* **by prof. Cane Mojanoski, PhD** is conceptualized as a logical continuation and advancement of the knowledge from previous editions and is primarily intended for students from the III cycle of University studies, but also for those interested in broadening their knowledge in research methodology, particularly in application of analytical, above all quantitative procedures and research of security phenomena. The contents of this book is presented in nine chapters.

The **first chapter,** titled *Analytical Procedure* deals with the similarity of the concepts of method and procedure, and concludes that in the methodological literature the term *method* has the connotation of something more general, conceptually superior, whereas *procedure* of something particular, conceptually inferior. Furthermore, it deals with the way of constructing an instrument; through examples the drafting of the questionnaire is presented, the types of questions, the format of responses, formulation of questions, drafting of the ciphering of responses, necessary tools for data preparation for further processing. This part of the book deals with the further processing and assessing of data, removing errors, variables and their intersection, as well as the choice of scales and measures. An integral part of the discourse are the forms of graphical display of series and other procedures regarding collected data.

The second chapter of the book is dedicated to the choice of analytical procedure. The analysis is directed at the statistical series, especially the indicators of the crime level and the dynamic relations. In this course of thought, the procedures for calculation of average values are analyzed (arithmetic and harmonic average value), then positional average values (frequency and median average value). This chapter makes an overview of the features of measures of the central tendency, their interrelations of the statistical average sizes, as well as the measures of dispersion. The discourse continues through the analysis

of indicator of the form and distribution of frequencies. The way of choosing analytical procedure is also discussed, with a particular processing of nonparametric and parametric evaluation. The discourse ends with the presentation of a sum overview of the features of basic statistical techniques.

The third chapter is titled *Theory of Probability*. It begins with the basic categories of the theory of probability, especially the basic rules of probability, the basics and distributions of probability. The subject of analysis is the "Student's" t-distribution and χ^2 - distribution. The application of knowledge from the theory of probability, and combined research are more and more applied in the research of security phenomena, above all, in the formation of models and calculation of probable samples of the studied phenomenon.

A distinct part of the discourse in this part of the book is the normal distribution curve, especially the standardized normal distribution, and in this context the defining of the area under the normal curve, the security interval, i.e. central limit theorem. The author of the book pays appropriate attention to the probability in open intervals, differences of arithmetic means, the t-test, calculation of the difference of arithmetic means for independent samples, particularly the Kolmogor-Smirnov test and the standard error of arithmetic means.

The **fourth chapter** deals with the sample as an analytical tool used in data analysis. Upon defining the meaning and concept of the sample, it deals with the evaluation and definition of the sample size, types of samples, evaluation of the parameters of basic mass based on the sample, as well as the estimates of arithmetic means of basic mass and the proportion of basic mass. Apart from pointing out the choice of sample, integral part of the argument in this part of the book are the errors as well. This part of the book deals with testing and application of statistical hypothesis.

The **fifth chapter** deals with correlations. It is usually defined as connection of two or more variables. To be more precise, it usually determines the intensity between two statistical series and defines direction. The statistical analysis of the relations between the phenomena does not include the two procedures. Moreover, the analysis is conditioned by the nature of phenomena which the research relates to, by the goals of research, by sources of data, number of phenomena the dependence of which is explored, form of the model of dependence and by other factors. This part particularly analyzes the types of correlations, especially the partial and multiple correlations.

The **sixth chapter** deals with the regressive analysis and analytical procedures applied in it. The book dedicates special attention to the concept and forms of multi-variant analysis. The discourse ends with the Logistic regression.

The **seventh chapter** is titled *Analysis of Variance*. It determines the concept of *variance analysis* and concludes that it is a technique utilized in the analysis of the relation between two variables, but also in the cases when the dependent variable by nature is uninterrupted and evenly distributed in the population, whereas the independent variable is categorical with *three or more independent groups or categories – variance.* The method which provides analysis in this case is known as **analysis of variance or ANOVA.** It is pointed out that this statistical procedure provides simultaneous research of the influence

of a big number of factors in a big number of participants, i.e. the analysis of variance is a criterion indicating whether the differences between the groups are accidentally bigger than those within the group. Furthermore, the author gives arguments when it should be used, what it measures, etc.

The eighth chapter analyzes and applies factor analysis. Factor analysis is valued as a methodological foundation of research in various fields of social science, including asfaliology and other security sciences, and is also applied in the research in the field of natural sciences. Factor analysis is determined as a sum of statistical-mathematical procedures adequate for analysis of data from the observed phenomenon, and especially their interrelation. *The analysis of the book develops through the description of* the types of factor analysis, in the search of the answer to the question as to how decision is made regarding the number of factors for extraction, as well as regarding the procedure for application of factor analysis. Parallel analysis is also an integral part for determining the number of factors. This part also provides elementary information related to Meta analysis; however due to its complexity as well as volume, it is presented with contents of elementary and informative character.

The ninth chapter is dedicated to *Interpretation and Conclusion.* It deals with the proving and verification of the hypothesis, the types of proofs and the errors that might occur. The attention is dedicated to the disproving, verifiability of value judgments, standards, norms or criteria for determining the truth. The cognition characteristics of the statistical method are an integral part of the paper, and it is concluded that it has certain shortcomings and difficulties which the author treats accordingly. The forms of announcing the results from the research are also an integral part of the book, and the features of a high-quality scientific work are described, types of scientific works, especially emphasizing doctoral theses and magazines as scientific works, and the manner of evaluation of the scientists is explained as well. The book ends with bibliography, index of authors and index of terms.

The book "Methodology of Security Sciences – Analytical Procedures. Book III" by prof. Mojanoski, follows the two previous conceptually and introductory-methodological studies, published two years ago.

The book itself is extensive, with over six hundred pages of text, containing a bibliography of over 200 sources and appropriate scientific apparatus in the material. It has a complex structure: 9 chapters containing from five to ten subchapters. The text includes over two hundred and fifty tables, graphs, charts and overviews, which considerably facilitates understanding of the material and its practical application in research. All formulas and software examples are developed for application of analytical procedures, usually including complex mathematical examples, tests, etc. The quantitative methodology has never been strength of our science and this particular contribution fills a major vacuum in our research methodology. Thus, among all approaches in the scientifically-methodological elaboration of analytical procedures, this textbook by prof. Mojanski is a rare if not the sole of its kind in our country and beyond.

The text itself and the analysis by the author, Prof. Mojanski, are clear, terminologically and conceptually immaculate, quite solidly illustrated and documented with examples, proofs and conclusions i.e. recommendations. In its entirety it corresponds to the criteria and high standards of a university textbook in our country and in the world.

The book "Methodology of Security Sciences – Analytical Procedures. Book III" by prof. C. Mojanoski deserves very high scientific, expert and professional assessment. It is a genuine contribution to our security sciences and beyond – social sciences, science book reviewers Dimitar Mirchev[1] and Professor Pere Aslimoski[2] conclude.

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REVIEW ON THE BOOK:
"FOR THE IDENTITY OF THE CONTEMPORARY
MACEDONIAN NATION:
ETHNIC OR CIVIC CONCEPT?"
(Dr. Stojan Slaveski, EUROM, Skopje)

Biljana POPOVSKA, MA

Confusion still reigns in the Republic of Macedonia when discussing the terms people and nation and it is present in every sphere of the society even in the state constitution which creates some problems. This has been the motive which encouraged the author of this book to deal with the study of this problem. The book is a result of many years of interest of the author on the question about the identity of societies, management of conflicts that arise as a result of different perceptions of national and ethnic issues and the perspectives of the concept of nation as we know it today.

In the Western world that we strive to integrate into, the notion of nation and people has different meaning from what we have been used to during the communist past. The original Latin word nation means the same as the Greek word ethnos or the Macedonian word people: community characterized by a particular language, culture, common history and other. With the development of scientific disciplines that deal with such communities, as an addition they have received the word ethno (so we speak about Ethnology, Ethno-psychology, Ethno-linguistics, etc.). Also, when we talk about the uniqueness of such communities we say ethnic communities, ethnic groups, ethnicity and similar. While talking about inter-relational links we say inter ethnic relations, multiethnic societies and other. So the word "ethnos" means ethnic or linguistic, cultural and other characteristics of the community.

On the other hand the word nation has a different evolutional dimension, although originally it has denoted the same as the word ethnos. Under the influence of the French Revolution (which by special decree declared the French nation, banned all ethnic associations and their media and declared the French language as the only one in the country)

the emphasis is on the universal human rights, regardless of his/her ethnic identity. Hence the population of the state has been declared as a nation and thus the term "nation" has got political dimension from ethnic. Given the large role of France, this territorial concept of the term "nation" was accepted not only by individual countries but also by the international law. So, today, the term "nation" according to the international law and by the general use of most countries, does not indicate ethnic but territorial community with its own sovereign government which controls the territory of the country. Hence, the term "nationality" does not indicate membership to a particular ethnic group, as in the former Yugoslav federation, for example, but it means belonging to a particular state or "citizenship". Although it should be noted that in Europe, there are still countries, such as Germany and the Slavic countries, where "nation" extends beyond the state borders meaning that the term contains ethnic elements. Then we talk about the concept of "ethno-nation" or "ethno-cultural nation". Yet, the French concept of nation prevails because it is believed that it has been more democratic and creates opportunity for development of the civil society.

The Balkans "ethnic" is often considered to be identical with the "national". Hence the state policy represents the nation as a single ethnic group. The term "nation" in the Republic of Macedonia is getting more frequently used, but it is still, by those who use it, associated with ethnicity. Media, academia and political elite contribute to that. It is a kind of a mental pattern that is difficult to change. Contrary to this view, in the Western democracies and especially multicultural societies such as the American, Canadian and British, the words "ethnic" and "national" have different connotations.

This book uses the "Western model" when considering the politics of identity of the Macedonian nation. When discussing the nation it means territorial community. The author of the book wants to talk about the contemporary Macedonian nation not only as a simple extension of the old debates on the issue, but in terms of contemporary understanding of identity and nation. When using this model, the book talks about multiculturalism as a convenient way to incorporate other ethnic identities in the state in the contemporary Macedonian nation. Thus, ethnicity is separated from belonging to the state or nation. Although this model is quite criticized, on a global basis through the adoption of international standards of individual and collective rights, it becomes part of the international practice.

This book is divided into three separate parts in which on one hand from a different theoretical perspective (the concept of societal security, theories for regulation of ethnic conflict and theoretical concepts for the development of the nation) and on the other at different times (past, present and future) the question of identity and nation has been considered. Although the parts are somewhat interrelated and overlapped they can also survive as independent entities. The focus of the author's interests are the problems the contemporary Macedonian nation is facing in the 21st century in an attempt to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream and resolve the identity disputes with the neighbours.

The first part of this book is based on the theory that first, explains the nature of ethnic identity and securitization/desecuritization of the minority/majority rights. The results of these theoretical studies are used to explain the effects of societal insecurity of the groups

and their reconciliation with the example of the Republic of Macedonia. As a result of non violent conflict, the ethnic communities are generally highly securitized in terms of their ethnic identity. This book uses a constructivist analytical approach in the effort to investigate the fluidity of identity and multidimensionality of the identity of the societies (ethnic/religious groups). It discusses some of the definitions of societal security to explain the concept of "societal security dilemma" as the most productive way to explain the eruption of ethnic conflicts. Through the concept of societal (identity) security dilemma, it explains the threats to the national security of the Republic of Macedonia. Many phenomena and events in the country since its independence to the present can be explained by this theoretical concept. That is why it is used in this work so as to capture the essence of the problems contemporary Macedonian state is facing. While in resolving the "security problems", the concept does not give adequate answers so other theories and concepts which according to author's suggest some other possible solutions have been used. Subsequently the book suggests some possible answers from the liberal point of view about resolving the identity security dilemma the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are facing.

The second part of the book has used the theory to explain the most commonly used methods for resolving ethnic conflicts. This research starts from the premise that the method of "power sharing" which is applied in Macedonia is not adequate to address the fundamental question of minority rights in the post-ethnic conflict environment. This book suggests that provisions for power sharing set forth in the Agreement are primarily means to change the asymmetric power relations between Macedonians and Albanians, and that little attention is paid to the interests of other ethnic communities in Macedonia. The author considers that there are several flaws in the Framework Agreement which taken together constitute a serious obstacle to establish a multi-ethnic society in Macedonia. These defects are associated with problems of the kind the Macedonian state promotes. The book cited arguments that the provisions for "power sharing" listed in the Agreement rather push Macedonia into the creation of the Macedonian-Albanian bi-national state than to promote a multiethnic state. This book also discusses the issue of political decentralization that reduces the state capacity and authority and thus makes the prospects for sustainable development of civil society in Macedonia very uncertain. Thus, the implementation of the Agreement effectively leads to the creation of a de facto bi-national state in which Macedonians and Albanians comprise both ethno political elites, while other ethnic groups are mainly transferred to the periphery of the political life. In a critical analysis of the Framework Agreement, particular attention has been paid to the perspective of promoting peace and ethnic inclusive pluralistic democracy that Macedonia wants to achieve.

In the final, third part of the book it is argued that in the way which is most commonly used, the differentiation between civic and ethnic identity is not suitable to locate and explain the changes in the definition of national identity. Based on the standard distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" conception of national, in this part of the book a new approach oriented towards the process in the construction of national identity has been applied. Using this theoretical approach an analysis of various aspects of the development of national identity

observed through the analytical framework of the mentioned process-oriented approach has been conducted. Furthermore, the book discusses the question of national identity and its role in establishing the identity of the European political community. The analysis states that political integration in the European Union requires normative and conceptual reassessment of the concept of national identity. "Europeanization" in the context of this book suggests that the integration of national groups within and between the states of the Union is a project that marks the future of the political union. Consequently, national identity, which primarily is based on history, has reached a stage where its validity expires. In this sense, the integration of Macedonia into the European Union will require re-definition of the question of its national identity - concludes the author at the end of this book.

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