

THE I-PERSPECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S INNER WORLD REFLECTED IN EMOTIONAL VOCABULARY

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Abstract: Linguists' interest in emotional issues can be explained by the ever-growing cultural relations between people in the world. The study of the emotional evaluation of the lexis in a language system is closely related to the problem of the national consciousness, different national factors, national traditions, national culture, and thus with the national world perspective. The presence of emotional vocabulary in the language system is, to a large extent, determined by the development of emotionality (as its mental category), which in turn is determined by the specifics of the national consciousness. The knowledge about the emotional power (options) of words enables us to find a proper way to successful communication. In this paper we make an attempt to describe the linguistic units that are connected to the inner state or inner world of a person belonging to different word classes. These are the units that describe a wide range of emotional anthropocentric terms and the units which not only denote the individual by itself, but also its deeds, actions and its status, i.e. those areas which are related to the existence of a human being. We try to analyze the linguistic units (nouns, verbs, adjectives) and to describe emotional states of individuals such as anxiety, fear, lively/energetic, unhappy/grumpy, serious, violent, sensitive and many others.

Key words: emotion, inner world, I-perspective

1. INTRODUCTION

Based on the discussion in Leibniz's work regarding "multiple worlds", "infinitely many possible worlds", which was continued in logical semantics, in this paper we try to highlight a special interpretation problem: the terms and meanings are functions of the possible worlds of the specified objects - what is called "a world" can be considered as a set of different interpretations and processes. The already mentioned discussion in Leibniz's work on the "multiple worlds" or "infinitely many possible worlds" (Leibniz 1968: 101), has been promoted in logical semantics (by Frege and Carnap), in particular as "possible worlds of semantics" (Hintikka), and continued in the newer concepts and theories (Strawson, Kripke, Putnam and others) (as cited in Boboc, 2005: 1). When we talk about our world, we talk about the existing situations, i.e. facts, but when we talk about the possible worlds, we talk about the possible situations, i.e. situations that either exist or could exist if the world looked different from the way it is now (Kutschera, 1976: 24). What we call "a world" can be considered as an entity of different interpretation processes. This means that a change in interpretation is "not merely an interpretation of a basic constant, but in fact a different world" (Able, 1987: 116). According to Nietzsche's slogan "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that the existence and the world are eternally justified" (Nietzsche 1980:47), we could say that there are as many real worlds as

there are significant coherent interpretations. A systematic theory derived from the semantics of the possible worlds was first developed in the 1950s by Saul Kripke and other philosophers. Similar to the abovementioned process, the concept of possible worlds has been used to establish a semantic notion for statements of possibility and necessity: A statement in the modal logic is considered possible if it is true in at least one possible world. A statement is considered necessary if it is true in all possible worlds, and a statement is true or false, if it is at least true in our world, the actual world. Furthermore, we would like to mention the following thought by Wilhelm von Humboldt: "interpreting the language in its real essence is something constant and, at every moment, it's also uncertain" (Humboldt, 1876: 55). This is also the case with the emotional lexicon of the language. From the diachronic point of view, the emotional - evaluative words have a relative stability in their lexical - semantic vocabulary. The following fact is also a paradox: on the one hand, the man as a rational being (*homo ratio*) who has taken a giant revolutionary step in which his environment, his way of life, his professional activities, his needs, his interests, and his likes or dislikes are constantly changing, and on the other hand, the changes in the man itself as a psychological/emotional being (*homo emotion*) happen to a lesser extent. As it has been for thousands of years, he expresses his joy, pain, grief, etc. and thereby by expressing his feelings he colours the world with his own emotions. Hermann Böschenstein writes: "Something new has then ... emerged, the German *feeling culture*, besides the German philosophy and the science of history, as the most significant event in this language area, and in our opinion, has the same value as the wisdom of the world: the feeling has to be experienced and the value of the existence has to be proved on the human existence." (Böschenstein, 1954:7). Language is one of the most important means for communication; it does not only cover the rational and thinking ideas, but also the emotional – or the emotional sphere of the human activity. The man is a spiritually gifted creature and is not only equipped with the powers of the mind. He is also a creature that has his own wishes, judgments and feelings, too. There is no doubt that the spiritual relationship of the man to the world is the earliest relation that he has developed. And it is certain that the majority of people with a mentally rooted connection establish themselves far more quickly and more dominantly than the mere spiritual relationship to the world. (Tschirch, 1955: 35). Whether linguists like it or not, they have to deal with numerous problems of anthropological, sociological and psychological nature that affect the area of language (Edward Sapir, as cited in Hymes, 1979:7). We present some examples and analyze the attitude about seeing the inner world of the man according to Borissevich (2002), and the natural separation of the man from his environment by the limits of his body. This solves a corresponding structure in his world view from: Internal world, what is going on inside the man, is the inner world, and external world, what is going on outside the human body. The external world can be divided into two groups: external inaccessible world (celestial phenomena, weather conditions), and external accessible world. The inner world can be divided in areas of sensations, emotions, emotional responses, points of view, etc.

2. THE INNER WORLD AND THE LANGUAGE STRUCTURES

We take a TC (Tercium comparationis /das zum Vergleich herangezogene Dritte/ that we used for comparison of a third entity) at different levels: firstly, at the level of the reference ranges (worlds). TC could be also performed at other levels, such as the level of the semantic roles, the syntactic level, the morphological level, the lexical and the phonetic level, too. The facts about the inner world expressed in a sentence can be understood as introverted processes of mental and physical perceptions. The first division from nature (the world) is that we will be perceived as an I-object of perception and external influences. They consist of two members, such as in the sentences: *Mir graut (es davor)*. Me (in Macedonian) / Mir (in German) - first complement, individual, introverted reference, the pronoun appears in the form (mi / me in Macedonian) as a mentally affected object. *Graut* - as the second element - predication. In this way, the other set of forms in the center of the language area for inner world can be constructed. Consider the following example: *Es graut ihm*. Although the nominative "es" is the grammatical subject of the sentence, it is used as the dative object in the 3rd person singular masculine, and should be related to a person if something is really to be said. Such "content" subject which, although it does not function as the nominative object occurs in this sentence and forms the actual object of the statement, called "logical", or sometimes "psychological subject" (Elke Hentschel & Harald Weydt, 2013: 326). This statement also expresses that the person acts and is triggered not only by the form, but also, probably, by the logical relationships or the psychological interest of the affected subject. The grammatical subject plays, on the contrary, a subordinate role and it may even be omitted when the logical subject comes at the first place. *Mich friert. / Mir ist unheimlich. / Dir wird sicher kalt sein. / Mir graut vor dir*. Constructions of this type are by no means limited only to the German language, they also occur in many other languages, but they do not usually contain any element that takes the grammatical subject function. The potential use of the "es" in German in the function of a subject of such impersonal constructions is not provided with its own name in all grammars; in most of them it remains nameless. Helbig and Buscha (2011:243) in such cases speak of a "formal subject." Since the level of the global reference and the level of semantic roles are largely universal, on the syntactic level the features have much in common, but there are also differences in the two languages (Macedonian and German), and the morphological, and in particular, the lexical and phonetic level are language-specific (see Helbig, 1981). In this context, here we can write about an expansion of the subject-containing (subject-related, subject-highlighting) sentence structures, in contrary to the subjectless sentence structures and the corresponding way of seeing and analyzing them (see Weisgerber, 1957, 21ff). Thus, for example, the subjectless sentence construction *Mir ist angst* is used less frequently than the subject-containing construction *Ich habe Angst*. In German, there is a high degree of formal agreement in the meaning of subjectless structures opposite the subject-related structures:

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|-------------------------------|-----|---|
| <i>Es wurde mir schlecht.</i> | for | <i>Mir wurde schlecht. (MK: Mi se sloši)</i> |
| <i>Es ist mir kalt.</i> | for | <i>Mir ist kalt. (MK: Ladno mi e, mi studi)</i> |
| <i>Es graut mir.</i> | for | <i>Mir graut. (MK: Me obzema užas)</i> |
| <i>Es dürstet mich.</i> | for | <i>Mich dürstet (žeden sum)</i> |

Es geht ihr gut. or *Insgesamt geht es ihr gut.* There are different names in the grammars for the pronoun “es”, such as: “fixes as” (Zifonun et al 1997: 1082), “nicht-phorisches es” (ibid.), “formales Subjekt” (Helbig/Buscha, 2011: 243), “impersonal es” (Duden, 2009: 826), “es-expletives” (Eisenberg, 2006: 176). Similar agreements with subject containing constructions are used in German also with verbs denoting weather conditions (from the world domain - inaccessible external world). *Es regnet.* (es+Vb) (MK: Vrne. (Vb)). The same similarity is often seen in the English language. (ENG: It rains). The expansion of the subject-containing structures compared to the subjectless structures goes so far that, for example in English for: *Mir ist kalt.* The construction *I am cold* is used, e.g. literary **Ich bin kalt.* *Mir ist angst.* In German also: *Ich habe Angst.* A similar explanation we can give for the Macedonian example: *Sum dobar/dobar sum* (es geht mir gut), literary **Ich bin gut.*

3. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE STATE OF ANXIETY

In addition to the formal criteria, there are also semantic criteria, which are referred to as “Sachverhaltsbeteiligung”, “Perspektivierung”, “perspectivation (Engl.)” “Sachverhaltskontextualisierung” and “autonomous coding” (Elke Hentschel & Harald Weydt, 2013). By “perspectivity” an extent of an entity is implied, by which an element is suppressed as the most important part of the utterance: ‘be anxious’ perspective (p. 354) that an object that is causing the feeling of fear and a certain feeling of anxiety is caused by something and thus can be “a great concern, restlessness, vague, often groundless feeling of being threatened or understood (Wahrig, 1997: 191). *Fear* occurs in many situations of the outer and inner world, e.g. *fear* of terrorists, *fear* of unemployment, diseases, nuclear power, *fear* for the children, *fear* for the parents etc. No human being, as Herbert Henry writes, is without fear, without anger, without defense, or without disgust, without constant readiness to flee. “There is no fear-free human being, and yet, a man must live with all his fears, especially if these feelings dominate him, when they appear in his inner world, in his life and have different levels, shapes and frequencies- dread, horror, panic, paranoia, fear of life, fear of death, etc.” (Henry 1974, as cited in Bergentholz, 1980: 65). The state of fear and its psycho-physiological variants are in a ground-consequence relationship, which is reflected in the language. Substantive lexemes that denote the “Angszustand” (state of fear) emotionally will convey its numerous subtle shades/nuances. They can show up in sentences describing the actual fear, for example: a) „Er spürte eine Hitze. Einen Stau. Angst. Er hatte Angst.” (Martin Walser. *Jenseits der Liebe*). b) Im Schreck (shock, fear): „Erst jetzt spürte er den ganzen Schreck, den ihm die

leise und zähe Erscheinung des Boten bereitet hatte.“ (L. Feuchtwanger: Goya oder der arge Weg der Erkenntnis). c) im Grauen (horror): „Das Grauen saß in ihrem Gehirn fest wie ein Angelhacken.“ (St. Zweig: Novellen). d) im Schauer (thrill): „Er fühlte die Haut von den Schläfen, herab bis in die Knie überrieselt vom eiskalten Schauer“. (St. Zweig: Novellen). A special group that represents the semantic domain of the lexemes that express fear (Angslexemen) are the words that are used by the native speakers for indication of the strongest and most human fear, namely: for indicating the fear of death (Fischer, 1988) "... the greatest fear of all fears is the fear of death" (H. Hesse: Steppenwolf). Even Epicurus philosophized on this topic: "get used to the idea that death does not concern us. Because all good and all evil is based on the sensation, but the death is the loss of this sensation. For so long we are here, the death is not there, and once it is there, we are no longer here (Epicurus, as cited in Lothar, 1990: 1082).

4. CONCLUSION

Emotions as entities of the inner world of people stand in various interrelations and interactions with the process of thinking (Darwin, 1953). Wilhelm Georg Friedrich Hegel wrote: "The absolute is not to be understood, but to be felt and looked at, not its term, but its feelings and intuition are to take the word as it is pronounced (as cited in Jäger, 1988:285). Feelings, according to Hegel, may be the subject of thoughts and they can be understood only if they are analyzed properly (ibid., p. 285). According to L.S. Vygotsky the thought is not the last process. The thought itself is not born from another thought, but from that motivating sphere of consciousness, which includes our inclinations, needs, interests and drives our passions and emotions.

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