Наслов: Балканските перспективи во средината на НАТО безбедносните предивици

Title: Balkan's Perspectives in The Middle of NATO Emerging security challenges

Authors:
1.   PhD Rose Smileski, Full Professor, *University "Goce Delcev-Stip", Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" Skopje, Associated Member,* smile@va.edu.mk
2.   PhD Metodi Hadji-Janev, Assistant Professor, *University "Goce Delcev-Stip", Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" Skopje, Associated Member,* hadzijanev@yahoo.com

Резиме

Современите безбедносни предизвици покажаа дека НАТО повеќе нема да може да се потпира единствено на военатa моќ. Растегнат помеѓу сајбер нападите и пропаднатите држави, помеѓу енергетската безбедност и „Арабската Пролет", демократската транзиција и кревката безбедност во Авганистан, па се до суровата финансика криза на лидерите во НАТО им стана јасно дека за да бидат во состојба ефективно да се справуваат со современите безбедносни предизвици, на НАТО му е потребна активна цивилна компонента. Стратешката трансфромација во изминатите неколку години од географска во функционална безбедност го тестираше легитимитетот на НАТО во неколку случаи. Почнувајќи од Босна, преку Косово и сега во Авганистан потребата од цивилна компонента која ќе биде во функција на превентивното дејствување и зајакнување на издржливоста е повеќе од евидентна.

Евроатланската интеграција до сега се покажа како клуч за стабилноста во Регионот. Сепак, отворените прашања како прашањето помеѓу „Македонија и Грција-спорот со името името", прашањето за „статусот на Косово", предизвиците со функцоналната Босанска администрација се предизвици кои се исправени пред Балаканските држави коишто допрва чекаат да впловат во „евро-атланскиот базен". Ние тврдиме дека иако билатералните проблеми спречуваат НАТО политиката на „отворена врата" да стане ефективна за целиот Балкан, новиот Стратегиски концепт на НАТО од 2012 нуди сериозни можности за Балканските држави. Смели предлози кои ќе понудат одоговри за предизвиците на НАТО и од кои ќе произлезат функционални активости кои се вклопуваат со интересите на НАТО се реална можност за ако не надминување, барем „разладување" на „жешките" билатерални прашања. Трудот детално ќе оппише како активните проекти кои се потпираат на размена и заедничка соработка ќе придонесат во ефективниот социјален инжинеринг кој потоа потенцијално би служел како платформа, или за надминување на билатералните проблеми или пак за зајакнување на регионалната стабилност

Клучни зборови: НАТО, Нов Старетгиски Концепт, Македонија и Цивилно-воени односи

Summary

Security challenges have proven that NATO cannot longer rely on sole Military Power. Ranging from Cyber attacks to failed states, from energy security to "Arab Spring's" democratic transition and from fragile security in Afghanistan to the severe financial crisis NATO have realized that in order to be able effectively to cope with security threats it needs active civilian component. Strategic shift over the past years from geographical to functional security have tasted NATO legitimacy in several occasions. Starting from Bosnia through Kosovo and now in Afghanistan the necessity of effective civilian component that could increase preventive approach and improve resilience is more than evident.

Euro-Atlantic integration has so far proven to be the key for stability in the region. However, open issues like "Macedonia-Greece name issue", "Kosovo status issue", Challenges for Bosnian functional Government, are challenges that influence remaining Balkan states to effectively flow in to the Euro-Atlantic pool. We argue that although bilateral issues prevent NATO "open door policy" to become fully effective in Balkan, the New NATO 2010 Strategic Concept offers great opportunities for Balkan states. Bold proposals that will offer solutions for NATO emerging security challenges and come out with functional actions that could nest under NATO interest would likely if not undermine "chill" the hot bilateral issues. The article will expand on how active projects relying on pulling and sharing could serve as effective social engineering that could then potentially used as a platform for either solve existing issues or improve regional stability.

Key words: NATO, New Strategic Concept, Macedonia and Civil Military relations

Introduction

Global security has changed. NATO is facing nontraditional challenges that require proactive instead of passive approach. NATO's New Strategic Concept in these regards supports the idea that to be fully effective it should include not just member states but also partners. However, Balkan states show no such interest. Macedonia should use this opportunity and with smart projects should comprehend ability to overcome current security and political issues. Thus by employing smart ideas and proactive role of civilian component Macedonia could improve its social stability, strengthened ethnic cohesion and become leader in the Region of Western Balkans with these regards. Ultimately this will create far more comfortable position for the government regarding the name issue on domestic and foreign affairs.

1. NATO and new security challenges

The end of the Cold War has dramatically changed security environment. While many applauded the end of what they saw as the stagnant era,[1] some have feared of what was about to come.[2] In fact all of them were right. On one hand globalization accompanied by technological development has promised wealth and prosperity, peace and stability.[3] On the other it has brought unimagined power to the non-state actors.[4] This new security reality had urged NATO to change.

Post-communist transition followed by bloody wars in former Yugoslavia has challenged NATO's warriors with necessity for doctrinal change. Political decisions to act proactively meant transition from geographical to a functional security on the ground. Although NATO's military superiority was out of question strategic shift required military conventional wisdom to adapt to the post-conflict peace-enforcement and peace building (also known as "Chapter VII") missions.

Lessons learned from Bosnia and arguably from Kosovo confirmed that even though NATO had dominated the major combat operations it had lacked capabilities for post-conflict operations.[5] One of the biggest challenges that was recognized and incorporated in the 1999 Strategic Concept was civil-military cooperation. Nevertheless it remained evident that civil-military cooperation was lacking serious projects for practical implementation.[6] Another shortfall that has also became evident soon after 1999 Strategic Concept was that it had reflecting approach and failed to foresee future threats. Threats from non-state actors were out of the NATO intelligence officers' and pundits' scope. In fact, 9//11 attacks has confirmed this underperformance.[7]

Although NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept recognized terrorism as a new challenge in the post-Cold War era, it was not until 11 September 2001 that the scale and scope of the threat was appreciated. Within 24 hours of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the collective-defense clause, for the first time. Since then, nearly every aspect of work at NATO has been reconsidered in the light of the terrorist threat, which has been factored into the development of policies, concepts, capabilities and partnerships.[8]

The issue with combating terrorism has proven to be even more challenging. Security environment in post-conflict Afghanistan further emphasized the shortage of effective civil-military cooperation experience. NATO forces had dominated the air and have occupied the ground. Nonetheless even after a decade NATO does not fully control the situation on the ground.[9] Thus military power alone has proven that could not solve all issues.

Originally the end-state of both missions ISAF and Enduring Freedom was to drive the Taliban from power. Today, the Taliban are considered the lesser of other evils. Mistakes in executing the post-conflict operations, i.e. insufficient experience in effective planning and execution of civil-military operations supported by other lines of operations like, information operations, psychological operations-PSYOPS etc. on the ground, have turned public opinion against the foreign troop presence. This is even present among Afghans who originally welcomed U.S.

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[1] Mead, Walter Russell, (2004), *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk* , New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p.71

[2] Merasheimer, John (August 1990), *Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War*, Atlantic Monthly,

[3] Novak, Robert, (July 21, 2005), *Public Air Wars*, Chicago Sun-Times (July 21, 2005)

[4] Peters, Ralph, (May 23, 2005), *Myths of Globalization*, USA Today

[5] Clark Wesley, (2001), *Waging a modern War*, Foreign Affairs, p. 45

[6] See broader discussion in Karabelias, Gerassimos, (1998), *Civil-military relations: a comparative analysis of the role of the military in the political transformation of post-war Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995*, Report submitted to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in June 1998

[7] Flangan, Stephen, (November 18, 2010), The *NATO Summit: Updated Strategy, Phased Transition in Afghanistan, Reset with Russia* , Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.

[8] Dagmar de Mora-Fig, *NATO's response to terrorism*, NATO Review: Combating Terrorism, Issue 2005

[9] Noll, Andreas, (2012), *Quran burnings put the heat on ISAF*, Deutche Welle, available at: http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15769895,00.html

troops and who remain ideologically against the Taliban. Taking sides in intertribal disputes is a clear example of unprepared civil-military approach toward the issues on the ground.[10] Instead, although the same could be argued for recent situation, the biggest preoccupation is dealing with groups such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba who have practically no presence whatsoever except for the South – East Afghanistan.

Recognizing these early mistakes but also recognizing that 1999 NATO strategic concept no longer fully reflected the strategic context in which the Alliance had to operate the majority of NATO members pushed by U.S. have decided to go for new strategic concept. Orchestrated by US governments' neo-idealistic approach led by Madeline Albright a group of experts have prepared and helped negotiation of the new NATO strategic concept. Several arguments and events out of the above discussed issues were considered from the experts.

Beside the fact that during the past decade, NATO's geo-strategic situation has changed fundamentally it is clear that important changes have also taken place within the Alliance itself. The number of its members has increased by one third, a process of military transformation has been initiated and the Alliance embarked on its first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.[11] Profound transformations have also affected NATO's direct proximity and its more distant perimeter. This new perimeter defines the new order designed by modern terrorism, instability caused by failed or failing states, risks attributable to climate change and energy security challenges.

On the other hand NATO still faces traditional challenges. Activities of non-NATO states, especially Russia, the issues with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other military technologies that have become more acute in the last few years further shapes the new security environment which NATO needs to address. Complexity of issues including financial crises however has opened another question.[12]

Stretched between threats from terrorism and financial crises, necessity for more proactive involvement (led by US, Canada and UK) versus conventional defense interests (like the South Wing Countries) not everyone inside the Alliance have the same views. Growing differences between the way that different NATO members perceived threats to security and desirable ways and means to respond to them had seriously challenged NATO too. The operation Iraqi Freedom and the passive ISAF involvement from the beginning in Afghanistan were first issues that sparked disagreements. Additionally missile defense project with serious reservations among some NATO members have polarized the vision about NATO in the future. All of these have arguably caused enormous controversies among the Allies and deepened the political divisions between them.[13] Considering all of the above beside the negative effects of the discussed obstacles experts succeeded to prepare and propose NATO's new strategic concept. Formalization of the process took place in Lisbon at 2010 NATO Summit.[14]

2. NATO and the New Strategic Concept

Evolving security environment since 1999 when the Alliance adopted its last Strategic Concept has been formally accepted by NATO members in Lisbon on 19 November 2010 NATO. This formal acknowledgement of the changed security environment updated understanding about the core purpose of the Atlantic Alliance. In fact with the New Strategic Concept NATO sought to bring its basic interests and strategic thinking into line with the security environment.

The Strategic Concept adopted by NATO in November 2010 is the Alliance's third post Cold War Strategic Concept. First post Cold War concept was published at the Rome Summit in November 1991. This Concept was updated and revised at Washington Summit during the Alliance's fiftieth anniversary – in April 1999. Though officially this Concept stood until the Lisbon Summit significant changes were made during 2004-2005. Namely following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and NATO's growing engagement in Afghanistan raised the question about the necessity of revision or maybe even replacement of the existing Concept.[15] Division among its members regarding the political disputes over Iraq resulted with concessional decision to upgrade only a part of the Strategic Concept that dealt with military implications. As a result during the Riga Summit in November 2006 NATO Alliance agreed to accept the so-called Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG).[16] Therefore the post Cold War track record consists of three New Strategic Concepts and one Comprehensive Political Guidance.

[10] Dorronsoro, Gilles, (2011), *The Impossible transition*, Carnegie Endowment, South Asia, p. 30
[11] Wioeniewski, Bartosz, (2010), NATO Member States and New Strategic Concept, Polish Institute of International Relation, p. 5
[12] Ringsmose, Jens and Rynning, Sten (2011), NATO's New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, Danish Institute For International Studies, p. 7-10
[13] Ivanov, D. Ivan, (2011), *Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions and Capabilities*, Lexington books, UK, p.186
[14] Maulny, Jean Pierre, (2010), *Toward A New NATO Strategic Concept*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.2
[15] SIPRI, (2007), *Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*, Oxford University Press, p.42
[16] House of Commons, (2007/2008), *The Future of NATO and European Defense*, Nine Report of Session UK, p. 128

The NATO's New Strategic Concept is different from its pre-successors. It could be argued that more or less this is a result of the dichotomy that grew among its members influenced by the financial crisis, different threat perceptions among its members and some other disagreements that we have addressed above. Hence the New Strategic Concept represents continuity and significant change.

Traditional role of the Alliance's so-called 'musketeer clause' (Article 5) was once again emphasized as a result of the evident fear by some members states, but also as a result of the internal financial problems by some of other members.[17] The sense of change could be seen in applying deterrence of both nuclear and conventional capabilities as a "core element of [NATO's] overall strategy'. Even though deterrence as a doctrine is in line with the 1999 Strategic Concept, the New Strategic Concept gives the flavor of crisis management employment to the issue. For example, one of the Alliance's Core Tasks and Principles states that "NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of… political and military tools to help manage developing crisis". Nevertheless the biggest change that New Strategic Concept brings is the proactive global role that NATO supposed to play.[18]

The question is how one could see NATO becoming more global while the text of the New Concept makes it clear that supreme task of the Alliance remains defense of NATO territory and Allied populace? Even more it could be viewed that New Strategic Concept revokes regional NATO role. These claims however will fail once one explore the activities before the Lisbon Summit and understand the comprehensive diplomacy that was in place in order to agree on the New Strategic Concept's text.

The brief history of events before the Lisbon Summit confirms that the New Strategic Concept is flexible product between three groups of NATO states. First, the so called globalists group of states led by US, UK and Canada who believed that NATO should take proactive approach in ensuring its role. Precisely they believe that NATO should be more involved in assuring international stability on a global scale as an approach that will appropriately address current security challenges in the context of defending Alliance territory.[19]

This approach was counterweighted by the so called "article 5 coalition". This coalition had modern and traditional wing. The so-called "modern wing" constituted countries who believed that NATO should have real, as opposed to a formal (declarative) approach in exercising its chief task, i.e. the ability to provide for defense of the treaty area. Therefore this group of countries (led by Turkey and Baltic states) supported the activities that will enable Alliance's capabilities in the sphere of international stabilization.[20]

On a contrary traditional wing (third group of countries member states) cheered for the traditional NATO approach. These are countries that for various reasons showed relatively little interest in both the debate on the new strategic concept itself and the actions taken by NATO, as well as the directions in which it should evolved. More than the other they were interested in limiting the costs (both material and non-material) that NATO membership entails. This attitude characterizes the countries of the Alliance's "Southern Flank" i.e., Portugal, Spain, Greece[21] or Italy.[22]

As a result NATO's New Strategic Concept has three core tasks i.e. three core missions. These are

- *Collective defense*: NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,

- *Crisis management*: NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises and

- *Cooperative security*: The Alliance is affected by, and can affect political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership.[23]

In fact, if one read narrowly New Strategic Concept is designed for NATO to cooperate not just with Alliance's member states but also with partner. This is understandable if NATO wants to achieve its goal of

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[17] Greece and NATO', www.mfa.gr; 'A New NATO, Euro-Atlantic Security, and the Greek-American Partnership', Washington, D.C., 28-29 April 2009, www.ifpa.org/pdf/ifpaGreek
Conf09.pdf (including the text of the speech given by Evangelos Meimarakis, the Greek Minister of
Defense).
[18] Ringsmose, Jens and Rynning, Sten (2011), p.7
[19] Muller, Harald, (2011), Flexible Responses, The Non Proliferation review, Vol. 18. Issue 1, p. 103-124
[20] Wioeniewski, Bartosz, (2010), p.6
[21] See for example: Efthymiopoulos, P. Marios, *Experiencing the paradox: Greece's past, current and future of co-operation at NATO*, available at: www.strategyinternational.org
[22] Carati, Andrea, (2009), Analyst with the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI),
[23] NATO, (2010), *New Strategic Concept,* Lisbon

proactive involvement in security. Thus, especially last task i.e. cooperative security gives a chance for countries like Macedonia that are willing to become NATO member states but have political obstacles.[24]

Building on a recent success that Macedonia has achieved in fulfillment of requirements for full membership and have practically proved this success on the ground in the post-conflict operations especially Afghanistan, Macedonia still has chance to benefit from NATO New Strategic Concept.

3. Cooperative security as a chance for Macedonia in the middle of Balkan's perspectives?

It is more than clear that almost all Macedonian political elites are fully devoted to Euro-Atlantic integration. This political dedication has great deal of popular support in the country. However, absurd political obstruction from Greece has prevented Macedonia to become a NATO member at Bucharest Summit like it is also real obstacle on Macedonia's way to European Union.

NATO membership is important for Macedonia for several reasons. Among the most important one is that NATO is being seen as a corner-stone for Macedonia stability. A closer view from strategic and operational perspectives will fail to confirm this thesis since all of the security analyses will confirm that there is no conventional type of threat that endangers Macedonia. However, there is common sense that in fact NATO membership will rather have more influence on psychological perception among Macedonian people than the real security dimension. In fact except with Greece Macedonia doesn't have disputes with its neighbors. On a contrary there are many projects and initiatives that foster regional cooperation and are guarantee for stability and security.

The problem with ethnic tension is still open although it is unlikely.[25] The Ohrid Framework Agreement remains as a sole mechanism in the Region that could be considered as a success. Nevertheless to heal effectively Macedonian society needs social stability that will support government's efforts toward this direction. Having this in mind it is clear that Macedonia in fact needs NATO not just for security reasons but also for economical reasons. The logic is that NATO membership will grant security and that membership will open the door for foreign investments. We could not agree less with this logic however, there is no empirical prove of it. Examples for this are Romania and Bulgaria. The question than, is how Macedonia could point out from the New Strategic Concept, while name issue with Greece remains opens?

As professor Bhagwati once argued "*when implemented intelligently globalization could be the most powerful force for social good in the world today, providing especially great opportunities for economic and social uplift in the poorest pockets of the globe…*".[26] Thus, by using intelligent projects proposal Macedonia could still benefit, improve social stability and confirm its dedication to Euro-Atlantic integration. Success in this context will also relieve political pressure to the Government, will strengthen ethnic cohesion and will further discredit Greece position of political blackmailing. There are three factors that could confirm this approach. Macedonian NATO neighbors position on NATO open door policy, recent success with military operations and lack of civil military capacities that will fully implement cooperative security. We will fully address the neighbors' position on the NATO open policy issue and its position toward NATO's New Strategic Concept.

3.1. Macedonian' NATO neighbors position and the New Strategic Concept

The analyses of Macedonian neighbors' position that are also member of NATO in the context of New Strategic Concept begins from the question of how could Macedonia employ current neighbors' position in the context of New strategic concept and benefit from it. As we saw from the above one thing NATO is missing is effective civilian component that could support functional security during post-conflict operations. One could reasonable argue that Macedonia NATO's neighbors have the same capacities to do so and that like Macedonia they are also actively involved in military operations. Additionally they are NATO members. Closer look nevertheless to their recent political activities will confirm that there is little interest for such action among their elites.

3.1.1. Albania

Albanian presence in Afghanistan as of 2009 stands at 280 soldiers.[27] This contingent doubled in size after Albania joined NATO. In this manner, by stressing its pro-active approach to participation in out-of-area missions,

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[24] Hadji-Janev, Metodi, (2010), *From the other side of tradition*, Sovremena Makedonska Odbrana

[25] International Crisis Group, (2011), Macedonia, Ten Years After the Conflict, Europe Report, No212, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/macedonia.aspx

[26] Bhagwati, Jagdish, (2004), *In Defense of Globalization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.72

[27] International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown, 1 October 2009. Available at: www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat_archive/isaf_placemat_091001.pdf .

Albania wishes to strengthen its position within the Alliance. At the same time, NATO forces have their part in increasing Albania's security. NATO airplanes patrol Albanian airspace as part of the Air Policing mission until Albania purchases its own fighters.[28] Albania supports expanding the scope of NATO tasks beyond purely military missions. In addition, it supports the Alliance's participation in the ensuring energy security.[29] However the core dedication for Albanian Government is not involvement in civilian mission but rather collaboration in combating organized crime which it views as a the major security threat. The other positive thing about Macedonia is that Albania openly supports Macedonian membership in NATO.

3.1.2. Bulgaria and its interest to take active role under the New Strategic Concept

While recognizing the increased importance of asymmetric threats, Bulgaria draws attention to the risk of the outbreak of traditional conflicts.[30] In this context, Bulgarian authorities point to the Western Balkans and the region of the Black and Caspian seas. This represents a departure from the position of the previous government, which stressed that the role of the Alliance is not only to defend its members but to contribute to peace and stability on a global scale through the development of partnerships and through peace and stabilization operations.[31] Bulgaria is interested in cyber security burt represent a little interest in furtehr NATO proactive activities. Like Albania it also supports Macedonia for NATO membership and NATO open door policy.

3.1.3. Greece and its interest to take active role under the New Strategic Concept

For Greece, NATO remains to be important as a defensive alliance. It emphasizes great importance to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for two reasons. First, due to complicated situation with Turkey. Second due to a financial crisis. The situation with enlargement is maybe the most contradictory in this context. Greece supports NATO open door policy but with conditions to fully met Alliances criteria. Financial crisis however, put out of question and any discussion of further Greece's role to play as an active player under the New Strategic Concept.

The short analysis of Macedonia neighbors clearly confirms that Macedonia could count on building project that will employ civilian component. Furthermore the analyses showed that it could play the role of the leader in the western Balkans for this since all of its members have no interest in these activities.

The last question that needs to be answer is how could Macedonia benefit and who should be involved.

3.2. Non-NATO members Serbia and Kosovo and NATO relationship

Complicated relationship between Serbia and NATO begun to move forward when Serbia became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in December 2006. Key focus of cooperation since then is on democratic, institutional and defense reforms. Serbia is currently seeking to deepen its cooperation with NATO through the development of an Individual Partnership Action Plan. However, Serbia has no official request for NATO membership. In its PfP Presentation Document submitted to NATO in September 2007, Serbia indicated its intention to become an active participant in the Partnership for Peace. NATO stands ready to further develop an ambitious and substantive relationship with Serbia, making full use of its PfP membership, while at the same time respecting Serbia's policy of military neutrality.[32] In a speech on 29 June 2011, NATO's Secretary General stated that *"Serbia's future lies in peaceful cooperation with its neighbors and with the European Union and NATO. […] We have made good progress these past few years in developing a sound basis for partnership and cooperation. It is now up to Serbia to decide if it wants to move forwards in its cooperation with NATO, and how fast."*[33]

Kosovo on the other hand is healing and improving. Throughout Kosovo, NATO and KFOR are continuing to work with the authorities and, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR is cooperating with and assisting the UN, the EU and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. Nonetheless, from all of the above it could be argued that for now there is no sign of any proactive initiative between Serbia, Kosovo and NATO in the context of our interest.

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[28] Albania grants NATO permit to patrol its airspace', Southeast European Times*, 7 May 2009, available at: www.setimes.com.
[29] Fabrizio W. Luciolli, (2009), *Albania and NATO Achievements and Perspectives,* I'Occiedentale
[30] For example President Georgi Parvanov did not mention NATO during his speech on 16 January 2009, in front of the Parliament entitled "National security in the face of new challenges", available at: www.president.bg/en/news.php?id=87
[31] Wioeniewski, Bartosz, (2010), p.16
[32] NATO from Ato Z, *NATO's relations with Serbia*, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50100.htm
[33] Ibid

4. Macedonia: potential Balkan's leader in proactive civilian involvement during future NATO global activities

From the analyses of the current deficit of NATO's capacities to address modern challenges and from the analyses of our neighbors' interests, the only thing that Government should go for is proposing serious project that will make this scenario happened. Good idea to start in such occasions is to build upon existing practice.

Development of projects that cherish corporate social responsibility might be a creative approach. This idea is based on the mutual cooperation between government and private sector. Government should support development of corporate social responsibility and on return private stakeholders should support specific government initiatives. Practice shows that over the last decade, governments have joined other stakeholders in assuming a relevant role as drivers of corporate social responsibilities.[34] This role usually focused on adopting public sector roles in strengthening corporate social responsibilities. [35]At the beginning of the century, these governmental initiatives converged with the actions of different international organizations such as the UN Global Compact and the European Commission,1 both of which began to promote and endorse this activities. Therefore we believe that Government should focus on these initiatives and build upon in order to propose specific projects that will begin to fulfill required emptiness in NATO's functional security building.

In return these projects will propose benefits for private sector and individual civilians with required social skills for effective nation building. Recent data shows that there is growing interest for Macedonian civilians with different social skills to actively participate in post-conflict involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.[36] On the other hand NATO is seeking proactive solutions for Afghanistan after 2014 when withdrawal should begin.

Government could also benefit from this. Current estimates show that there is no clear data on the number of Macedonian civilians involved in these activities.[37] We do not intent to propose that Government should control all civilians but that it could channelize their involvement and offer real partnership solution. Speaking in a greater context it could be also in compliance with NATO efforts. NATO will have greater control in centralized planning since civilians involved will follow Government coordinated approach. Success on terrain could easily expand.

Lessons learned could be thought to regional partner and thus regional initiatives will be welcomed. This will have direct and indirect benefits. Directly it will expand civilian involvement and will support NATO's initiatives. Indirectly it will influence promotion of regional cooperation and stability. Thus, cascade effects of clear net good will come true. In sum concepts like smart defense and similar initiatives are nothing else but promotion of regional cooperation where nations share and pull and provide for stability.

Conclusion

Security environment has changed. To address these challenges NATO needs has transformed from geographical security to functional security. This strategic shift has opened serious issues among other areas in NATO's civilian capabilities to deal with modern threats and new NATO role. Understanding the need for change Alliance formally has begun to work in this direction after the Lisbon Summit. However, not all of the NATO member states share the same threat perceptions and views about NATO future's role. Beside traditional collective self-defense role, globalists approach ended in developing a framework that could enable NATO to take proactive role regarding security. Corporate security beside Crisis management is one of the three core tasks for NATO.

Despite fulfillment of all criteria and requirements for NATO membership, due to the political disputes with Greece over the name issue Macedonia has not become NATO member. However, corporate security opens door for innovative solutions and participation from which both NATO and potential partners like Macedonia could benefit. Smart and innovative solutions in this context could improve Macedonian social stability and will create more secure and proper environment, not just in Macedonia but in the whole Balkan region. Ultimately this will increase regional cooperation, prosperity and stability.

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[34] Moon, Jeremy, (2004), *Government as a driver of corporate social responsibility: the UK in comparative perspective*, ICCSR Research Paper Series, 20-2004. ICCSR, University of Nottingham, pp. 1–27.

[35] Fox, Tom., Ward, Halina. and Howard, Bruce, (2002), *Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility: A Baseline Study*, Washington, DC: World Bank, p.8-11

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[37] Vecer, (March 07, 2010), Macedonian died in Afghanistan, Vecer, avaliable at: ttp://www.vecer.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=013221DBA341F8499BE032EF2F20BFB5

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