

1. WARFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY LAW

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"The student who reads history will unconsciously develop what is the highest value of history: judgment in worldly affairs. This is a permanent good, not because 'history repeats' - we can never exactly match past and present situations - but because the 'tendency of things' shows an amazing uniformity within any given civilization. As the great historian Burckhardt said of historical knowledge, it is not 'to make us more clever the next time, but wiser for all time'".

The just war theory also has a long history. Parts of the Bible hint at ethical behavior in war and concepts of just cause, typically announcing the justice of war by divine intervention; the Greeks may have paid lip service to the gods, but, as with the Romans, practical and political issues tended to overwhelm any fledgling legal conventions: that is, interests of state or *Realpolitik* (the theory known as political realism would take precedence in declaring and waging war. Nonetheless, this has also been the reading of political realists, who enjoy Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* as an example of why war is necessarily the extension of politics and hence permeated by hard-nosed state interest rather than "lofty" pretensions to moral behavior.

Although Saint Augustine provided comments on the morality of war from the Christian perspective (railing against the love of violence that war can engender) as did several Arabic commentators in the intellectual flourishing from the 9th to 12th centuries, but the most systematic exposition in the Western tradition and one that still attracts attention was outlined by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. In the *Summa Theologicae*, Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the traditional just war theory as discussed in modern universities. He discusses not only the justification of war but also the kinds of activity that are permissible (for a Christian) in war (see below). Aquinas's thoughts become the model for later Scholastics and Jurists to expand and to gradually to universalize beyond Christendom – notably, for instance, in relations with the peoples of America following European incursions into the continent. The most important of these writers are: Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767).

In the twentieth century, just war theory has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam war. The most important contemporary texts include Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill *The Ethics of War* (1979), Richard Norman *Ethics, Killing, and War* (1995), Brian Orend *War and International Justice* (2001) and Michael Walzer on *War and Justice* (2001), as well as seminal articles by Thomas Nagel "War and Massacre", Elizabeth Anscombe "War and Murder", and a host of others, commonly found in the journals *Ethics* or *The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs*.


Since the terrorist attacks on the USA on 9/11 in 2001, academics have turned their attention to just war once again with international, national, academic, and military conferences developing and consolidating the theoretical aspects of the conventions. Just war theory has become a popular topic in International Relations, Political Science, Philosophy, Ethics, and Military History courses. Conference proceedings are regularly published, offering readers a breadth of issues that the topic stirs: for example, Alexander Moseley and Richard Norman, eds. *Human Rights and Military Intervention*, Paul Robinson, ed., *Just War in a Comparative Perspective*, Aleksander Jokic, ed., *War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing*. What has been

¹ Jacques Barzun, *Begin Here: The Forgotten Conditions of Teaching and Learning*

of great interest is that in the headline wars of the past decade, the dynamic interplay of the rules and conventions of warfare not only remain intact on the battlefield but their role and hence their explication have been awarded a higher level of scrutiny and debate. In the political circles, justification of war still requires even in the most critical analysis a superficial acknowledgement of justification. On the ground, generals have extolled their troops to adhere to the rules, soldiers are taught the just war conventions in the military academies (for example, explicitly through military ethics courses or implicitly through veterans' experiences). Yet despite the emphasis on abiding by war's conventions, war crimes continue - genocidal campaigns have been waged by mutually hating peoples, leaders have waged total war on ethnic groups within or without their borders, and individual soldiers or guerilla bands have committed atrocious, murderous, or humiliating acts on their enemy. But, arguably, such acts do remain atrocities by virtue of the just war conventions that some things in war are deemed to be inexcusable, regardless of the righteousness of the cause or the noise and fog of battle.

Circle of Modern War

- Match/Mismatch between national objectives & national strategy;
- Core technologies: information technology, metallurgy, chemistry, physics, mechanics, electronics;
- Core Weapons:
 - infantry weapons, artillery, naval armament, aircraft, infantry weapons;
- Logistics as the lynchpin of modern war
- Offense vs. defense
- Revolutions in national, regional and international military affairs.



Modern warfare is warfare using the concepts, methods, and military technology that have come into use during and after World Wars I and II². The concepts and methods have assumed more complex forms of the 19th and early 20th century antecedents, largely due to the widespread use of highly advanced information technology, and combatants must modernize constantly to preserve their battle worthiness³.

² Attributed to Samuel Clemens (1835-1910)

³ Crevel, Martin Van (2000). "Technology and War I: To 1945". In Charles Townshend. The Oxford History of Modern War. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. p. 206. ISBN 0-19-285373-2.

The **law of war** is a legal term of art that refers to the aspect of public international law concerning acceptable justifications to engage in war(*jus ad bellum*) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (*jus in bello* or International humanitarian law).

Among other issues, modern laws of war address declarations of war, acceptance of surrender and the treatment of prisoners of war, military necessity, along with *distinction* and *proportionality* and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering. The *law of war* is considered distinct from other bodies of law—such as the domestic law of a particular belligerent to a conflict—that may provide additional legal limits to the conduct or justification of war⁴.

1) Distinction – “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” [Additional Protocol 1, Article 48] The only legitimate object of attack in an armed conflict is military personnel or property. This does not mean that civilians cannot be legally harmed or killed under the law only that civilians and civilian property should not be the object or the purpose of the attack. *Distinction* is a principle under international humanitarian law governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict, whereby belligerents must distinguish between and civilians⁵.

(2) Proportionality – “Loss of life and damage to property *incidental* to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.” [U.S. Army Field Manual FM27-10: Law of Land Warfare]. The key here is the word *incidental*, meaning outside of the military target. This means that when considering a target the damage to civilians and their property cannot be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained. Proportionality is not a requirement if the target is purely military. This principle brings with it an obligation to consider all options when making targeting decisions: verify the target, timing (is there a time when fewer civilians will be around?), weapons used, warnings and evacuations for civilian populations, protects Non-combatants. *Proportionality* is a principle under international humanitarian law governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict, whereby belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected by an attack on a legitimate military objective⁶.

(3) Military Necessity – “...[E]very injury done to the enemy, even though permitted by the rules, is excusable only so far as it is absolutely necessary; everything beyond that is criminal.” – Napoleon [Solis, Law of Armed Conflict p 258]. The principal of military necessity prohibits things such as wounding or permanently injuring an opponent except during the fight, torture to exact confessions and other activities simply used to inflict additional damage on the enemy that does not further the military objective. The Liber Code defines the prohibited activity as, “in general, ... any act of hostility that make the return to peace unnecessarily difficult. **Protects Combatants** *Military necessity* is governed by several constraints: an attack or action must be intended to help in the defeat of the enemy; it must be an attack on a legitimate military objective and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated⁷.

⁴ The Program for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, "IHL PRIMER SERIES | Issue1" Accessed at <http://www3.nd.edu/~cpence/eewt/IHLRI2009.pdf>

⁵ Greenberg 2011, Illegal Targeting of Civilians

⁶ Moreno-Ocampo 2006, See section. Allegations concerning War Crimes, 4-5.

⁷ Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides a widely accepted definition of military objective: "In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by

(4) Unnecessary Suffering – “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” [Additional Protocol I, Article 35.2] ****Protects Combatants****

THE LAWFUL USE OF FORCE Despite the UN Charter’s broad legal prohibitions against the use of force and other forms of intervention, specific exceptions exist to justify a State’s recourse to the use of force or armed intervention. While States have made numerous claims, using a wide variety of legal bases to justify the use of force, it is generally agreed that there are only two exceptions to the Article 2(4) ban on the threat or use of force: (1) actions authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and (2) actions that constitute a legitimate act of individual or collective selfdefense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter and/or customary international law.

Additionally, states often conduct operations within the sovereign territory of other states, with the receiving state’s consent. Consent is not a separate exception to Article 2(4). If a State is using force with the consent of a host State, then there is no violation of the host State’s territorial integrity or political independence; thus, there is no need for an exception because the rule is not being violated⁸.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, entitled “*Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*,” gives the UN Security Council authority to label as illegal threats and uses of force, and then to determine what measures should be employed to address the illegal behavior⁹. Before acting, the Security Council must first, in accordance with Article 39, determine the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Provided the Security Council makes such a determination, the UN Charter gives three courses of action to the Security Council: 1) make recommendations pursuant to Article 39; 2) mandate nonmilitary measures (i.e., diplomatic and economic sanctions) pursuant to Article 41; or 3) mandate military enforcement measures (“action by air, land, or sea forces”) pursuant to Article 42. a. Article 39, the same article through which the Security Council performs its “labeling” function, allows the Council to make non-binding recommendations to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Because Article 42 hasn’t operated as intended (see *infra*), some have grounded UN Security Council “authorizations” to use military force in Article 39 (as non-binding permissive authorizations) vice Article 42 (as binding mandates). b. Article 40 serves essentially a preliminary injunction function. The Security Council may call upon the parties to cease action or take some action with respect to the dispute, but the parties compliance with those provisions will not prejudice the claims of the state in later dispute resolution proceedings. Failure to comply with Article 40 measures may have deleterious effects for later claims. The purpose of this Article is to Legal Basis for the Use of Force 32 prevent the aggravation of the situation that is causing a threat to international peace and security. c. Article 41 lists several non-military enforcement measures designed to restore international peace and security. These include “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Article 41 measures are stated as a mandate, binding on

their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a military advantage.

⁸ As stated above, a minority of States would include humanitarian intervention as a separate exception to the rule of Article 2(4). Additionally, state’s often conduct operations within the sovereign territory of other states, with the receiving state’s consent. Consent is not a separate exception to Article 2(4) because there is no violation of the article where there is bona fide consent. If a State is using force with the consent of a host State, then there is no violation of the host State’s territorial integrity or political independence; thus, there is no need for an exception because the rule is not being violated.

⁹ LtC. Ryan Dowdy and group of authors. Law of Armed conflict, Internaional and operational law department of West point, USA, 18-20.

all UN members. Article 42 implies that Article 41 measures must be attempted (or at least considered) before the Security Council adopts any of the military measures available to it. d. Article 42 contemplated that the Security Council would be able to mandate military action by forces made available to it under special agreements with UN member States. However, because no Article 43 special agreement has ever been made, Article 42 has not operated as envisioned. This means that the Security Council is unable to mandate military enforcement action in response to illegal threats or uses of force. Consequently, military measures taken pursuant to Chapter VII are fundamentally permissive and phrased by the Security Council in the form of an authorization rather than a mandate¹⁰.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the UN Security Council passed, on the very next day, UNSCR 1368. This resolution explicitly recognized the United States' inherent right of individual or collective self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter against the terrorist actors who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. The basis for the United States' use of force in OEF is, therefore, the Article 51 right of individual or collective self-defense. United States forces involved in NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission must also, however, be aware of current UNSCRs, the most recent of which is UNSCR 2069 (dated 9 October 2012), which "[a]uthorizes the Member States participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate." The mandate of ISAF per the UNSCR is to assist the Afghan Government in improving "the security situation and build its own security capabilities." Thus, forces operating within the ISAF mission do so legally on the basis of a Security Council resolution, whereas forces operating within the OEF mission do so legally on a self-defense basis¹¹.

2. WAR AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

War is a continuation of politics by other means. War is an act of violence that theoretically could have no limits. Traditional war consists of strategic, operational and tactical levels.

State is an entity comprising territory, citizens and constitutional order/legislation. Constitutional order is a set of principles reflected in laws and describing how state is constituted, i.e. how it works, how it is governed and how much control it exerts over its population and various sectors of society and economy.

Politics/policy is a process of decision-making/purposeful flow of action for better define and effectiveness of some state important area.

Strategy is an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of political and military power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve various objectives.

Operational art is an application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces

Operation is a large-scale military action consisting of tactical engagements in support of strategic goals.

Tactics is an employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other for achieving better domination of the military operation.

¹⁰ LtC. Ryan Dowdy and group of authors. Law of Armed conflict, International and operational law department of West point, USA, 33-35.

¹¹ Michael Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2009).

Innovations	Princely state 1494-1572	Kingly state 1567-1651	Territorial state 1649-1789	State-nation 1776-1870	Nation-state 1861-1991
Constitutional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consistent finance - Permanent government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Absolutism - Sectarianism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade control - Aristocratic leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nationalism - Imperialism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nationalism - Ideology
Warfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use of mercenaries - Mobile artillery - Fortification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More firearms - Siege warfare - Standing armies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Professional armies - Limited wars 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mass conscription and mass armies - Decisive battles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nuclear weapons - Rapid computation - International communications

1. Historical development of Unconventional warfare

A collision between two armed forces using their overall power has always been a characteristic of the international environment. More recently, these conflicts are generally conceived as events between two nations. This kind of conflicts includes all instruments of state power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic.

Most of these conflicts were peaceful. Commonly, states have used military instruments of power peacefully for their defense, as a force which provides diplomatic credibility or for non-military mutual purposes. Only when other instruments of state power were used or proved inadequate, military instruments of power were used to achieve or solve international differences. Clausewitz characterizes the state military power as an act of violence in order to subordinate the enemy to fulfill his own goals. This strain has a profound impact. However, the vision of implementing national power nowadays is too limited. Sun Tzu has a more relevant statement that although the battle has to be won, winning one hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the top of the military skills. Winning the enemy without a fight is the peak of the military skills. Which means there is more than one way to defeat the enemy.

The international discovery in the 21st century brings new challenges. The conflicts in international environment are using all instruments of power. However, remain unbroken and continuous. The warring parties are concentrated on non-military instruments of power in the international relations between the states. The enemy uses the instruments of power as a weapon. Moreover, not all modern enemy forces are synonymous of a nation-state.

The international actors in the current era have awakened the potential of "unconventional" methods for enforcing the enemy to achieve their will. Using other instruments of power, especially informational, they try to apply what is known as "irregular", "asymmetric", "unlimited" warfare. Even when the violence is united, direct methods are usually avoided for classical techniques of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion and rebellion




Figure 1-1. The war according to Clausewitz¹²

The indirect methods are not unprecedented. From ancient times kingdoms and empires used psychological warfare for terrorism, demoralization and loss of their enemies. The guerrillas attacked and sabotaged where it was possible to weaken the enemy. Combined with political goals, guerrillas and political fighters tried to resist the occupiers to subsidize or remove him from power. Postcolonial and modern era has especially seen as great expansion of unconventional methods.

The instruments of military power are mostly based on intelligence and legally regulated instruments which provides feedback informations.

1.1. Defining the Unconventional war

The definition of unconventional warfare evolves over time. The initial doctrine of the United States concept for the use of unconventional warfare continues with creation of the Strategic Services Office during the Second World War. In this context, unconventional warfare was generally defined in conditions of guerrilla and secret operations on enemy territory or in influential territory. The first official military definition which covered all aspects of unconventional warfare appears in 1950 as "partisan warfare." In 1951, military unconventional assets were consolidated under psychological warfare and the Army issued the first two fields for the use of special operations.

Since 1955 for the first time in history, the Army Special Forces have been linked to unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare consists of three interrelated fields of: guerrilla warfare, escape and invasion, subversion against enemy forces and similar activities.

Decades after the Cold War, definition is expanding, volcano is changing and the thoughts conceived as part of an unconventional enterprise have been added or stripped. However, a common conceptual core remained as working out, with or on the basis of irregular surrogates in a secret and / or covert manner against opponents. It is common for the development of definitions and the Special Operations Force has clarified the definition below in order to emphasize the essentials of unconventional warfare and the elimination of non-core ones. In this era of definitions and conceptual changes the special operations forces

¹² <http://slideplayer.com/slide/3489184>

with its interagency and multinational escort must be unified with clear and precise understanding of the core of the mission of unconventional warfare.

The current definition of unconventional warfare follows: "Operations carried out by, with or through irrelevant forces in support of giving: resistance, insurrection or conventional military operations".

This definition reflects two basic criteria: Unconventional warfare must be carried out by, with or through surrogates and the surrogates must be the irregular forces. Unconventional warfare was carried out in support of two rebellions, such as Contras in the 1980s in Nicaragua and resistance to overwhelming occupying power, such as the Mujahideen in the 1980s in Afghanistan.




Figure 1-2. Indigenous mass which helps minimize strategic risk during Gray Zone

Unconventional warfare was also carried out in support of conventional military operations. For example: OSS / Jedburgh activities in France and OSS / Detachment 101 activities in the Pacific during the Second World War and more recently, the operations of special forces in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM / Afghanistan in 2001 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. Finally and in accordance with the mystery and / or the disguised nature of the historical timeline of unconventional warfare, this involved the implementation of classified surrogate operations.

The definition is based on a "Litmus test" which clearly distinguishes unconventional warfare from other activities and clearly sets out the objectives for conducting unconventional warfare. Including the idea of "from, with or through surrogates" eliminates any confusion with unilateral direct action, special reconnaissance or counterterrorism. Identifying historically proven use of irregular forces as a surrogate.

The definition eliminates any confusion with foreign internal defense or coalition activities using regular forces. The clearly stated goal of unconventional warfare supports the riots, movements of resistance and conventional military operations. Eliminate the possibility of incorrectly characterizing unconventional warfare as the only activity of irregular warfare, but articulates the importance of unconventional warfare for the Army and the joint forces with specifying support for other operations.

The Staff, should not interfere with unconventional warfare with other operations involving local personnel, such as foreign internal defense. The United States has chartered the foreign defense as an open, direct method to help and protect the government of the

people of the nation from revolt and lawlessness. The forces are conducting foreign internal defense with recognized domestic regular forces.

This forces are armed persons or groups of persons which are members of the regular armed forces, police forces or other internal security forces of that nation.

There might be persons suggested by United Nations or domestic people employed as a civilian personnels for improving operational efficiency. However, these individuals are openly recognized as an increasing force of the regular national forces. The Army and the associated Doctrine at the moment don't comprehensively define regular or irregular forces. For use in this guide, these forces are defined as the rival side of the irregular forces.

The regular are armed persons or groups of persons which are members of regular armed forces, police or other internal security forces. When state finances forces to provide internal security, that forces are taken into account as a regular force. Regardless of its appearance or the naming of convention the power is acting under the control of the government as a regular force. Irregular forces are persons or groups of persons who are not members of regular armed forces, police or other internal security forces.

They are not usually financed by the state and they aren't limited by the laws of the state. These forces may include specific paramilitary forces, performers, individuals, foreign political organizations, resistance or rebel organizations, transnational terrorist opponents, and transnational disillusioned members of terrorism.

However, the definition of unconventional warfare is not a simple list of basic criteria and principles. It is one of the most approved definition for the basic unconventional criteria and principles, explicitly and implicitly answers to the questions of the military definition "who, what, when, where and why". "Where and why" are the questions which are explicitly answered by the purpose of unconventional warfare such as quoted above and "when and where" are implied in times and spaces when the goals are achieved.




Figure 1-3. The relationship between social movements, revolution and unconventional warfare

Having in mind the current utility of unconventional warfare in the era of wars for counterterrorism and in the context of irregular warfare, it is equally important to emphasize what unconventional warfare represents. It's not a simple phrase for something that is not conventionally regular or traditional. It's not synonymous either with the new term "irregular warfare" nor with the currently influential term "asymmetric warfare," "unlimited warfare," or "fourth generation of warfare" (although there are conceptual similarities). In addition, despite widespread confusion outside the Special Forces.

Unconventional warfare is not even synonymous with "special operations" or "guerrilla warfare." Most of the unconventional operations are special operations, but not every special operations are unconventional operations.

1.2. Defining the Conventional warfare

The traditional understanding of unconventional warfare, as a distinct from conventional warfare was clarified by special forces for more than half a century ago. Commentators outside the community of special operations forces often misunderstood this term. One of the reasons for this conceptual misconception is that conventional warfare is not defined either in Joint Publication 1-02¹³.

Neither in the Ministry of Defense in the part of the Army nor in operating terms and schedules. The Joint Operational Concept of Irregular Warfare¹⁴ describes conventional or "traditional" warfare such as:

"A form of warfare between states that apply direct military confrontations to defeat enemy armed forces, to destroy or exploit enemy facilities or conquer the territory of an opponent in order to force change in government and politics structure of the enemy. The focus of conventional military operations are normally opposing armed forces in order to influence the opponent's government. Usually it is assumed that the indigenous population within the operational zone is not involved and will accept any political outcome that the government will impose, mediate or contract. The basic military goals in conventional military operations is to minimize the participation of civilians in these operations".

Unconventional warfare is a specific military operation and it's not just an invasion of conventional warfare as was defined above. Unconventional warfare can be applied against state or non-state actors. The directness or indirectness of unconventional warfare depends on the situation, level of warfare and the passage of time.

Although it's often required to destroy or weaken the possibility of making military decisions of the opponent. This effort may and may not involve direct military confrontation. When unconventional warfare includes such a confrontation, forces pay special attention to engaging only during favorable circumstances of resistance or rebel forces.

Seizure and retention is rarely achieved directly and only resolutely achieved as a result of an overall victory in a longer strategic campaign. The focus of unconventional warfare is the influence over others which are and may not, the focus of opposing armed forces. Unconventional warfare usually assumes that some part of the indigenous population (sometimes a larger proportion of the population) are either involved or support from unconventional military operations. Unconventional warfare is specifically focused on the impact of the reluctance on a part of the indigenous population to accept a status quo or "any political outcome" of the government that will impose, mediate or contract. The main military goal in unconventional warfare is the deliberate involvement and influence on the participation of the civilian population in unconventional military operations.

¹³ The *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02*, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

¹⁴ IW JOC, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007

1.3. Defining the Irregular warfare

The new concept of irregular warfare raises the confusion that is actually made with the explanation of unconventional warfare. Together with many other operations, unconventional warfare is now considered as a integral part of irregular warfare.

First of all, it is necessary to understand how irregular warfare has different approach from conventional warfare followed by an explanation as how the irregular warfare is related to unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare is a special operation, but not all special operations are a form of unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare is a specific activity of irregular warfare, but not all activities of irregular warfare are unconventional.

The terrorist attacks over the United States had increased the danger of warfare by non-state actors. By recognizing this forms of irregular events from the side of non-state actors will be dominant module during the 21st century. The National policy makers dictate that planners must analyze and prepare themselves for such irrelevant events. It is clear that previous assumptions about the terms of "conventional", "traditional" and "regular" warfare and reliance exclusively on the doctrine of "regular" or "conventional warfare" were inadequate.

Irregular warfare is a significant topic in the Quarterly Defense Review Report of NATO in 2006¹⁵. In April 2006, Pentagon made a clear roadmap for defining the irregular warfare as a growing threat outside the conventional states conflicts.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines the irregular warfare as an act of violence with the use of state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence on relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors an indirect and asymmetric approach, although it can apply the full range of military and other capacities in order to reduce opponents: power, influence and will.

The Irregular warfare is an inherent, long-lasting confrontation. Opponents will follow strategies of irreversible warfare by applying hybrids actions of irregular traditional and catastrophic abilities. Facing these challenges and fighting this approach requires the joint efforts of all instruments of national power.

The irregular war depends not only from the military power, but also from the understanding of social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences and cultural customs. Although the irregular war is a violent struggle, not all volunteer countries or irregular forces must be armed. So in this kind of constellation, the human factor or the people, before the weapons, operational methodology and advanced technology, would be the key factor for success in this kind of wars.

Successful irregular warfare, relies on building relationships and partnerships at the local level, accepting the patience, persistence and cultural understanding of the people within a joint force for carrying out an irregular war.

The pursuit of long-lasting, irregular wars depends on building a global capability and capacity. The irrelevant war won't be won by a single state alone, but through joint efforts with multinational partners of NATO.

Combined irregular wars will require joint forces for establishing a long-term sustainable presence with many countries for building partnership capabilities and capacities. This capability and capacity extend the operational achievements of NATO for the multiple forces to be more effective and available and provides increased options for winning over opponents. The constitutive activities of the irregular war are:

- Rebellion (uprising);
- Anti-rebel rebellion;

¹⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 2006.

- Unconventional warfare;
- Terrorism;
- Anti-terrorism;
- Foreign Internal Defense;
- Stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations;
- Strategic communications;
- Psychological operations;
- Civil-military operations;
- Information operations;
- Intelligence and counterintelligence activities;
- Transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking and illegal financial transactions that support or maintain irregular warfare;
- Conducting legal activities that are focused on the fight against irregular opponents.

The above list of operations and activities can be implemented with irregular warfare. However, they are nothing new and most of them also are applied to the current associated services and doctrines.

What is new is their conceptual construction in the application of irregular warfare. The list of activities considered together is also useful in characterizing how the irregular warfare differs from conventional warfare and its emphasis on the main combat operations, especially worthy of respect is that unconventional warfare (including the support of rebellions), anti-terrorism, foreign internal defense, psychological operations and civil-military operations are Army special operations forces with their basic tasks.

These forces are well-adapted to be main practitioners in irregular warfare. Working definitions of a conventional war provide an appropriate starting point from which irregular warfare will be defined. The terms "conventional", "regular" and "traditional" war are essentially synonyms. Conventional warfare focuses on direct military confrontation between nation-states in which the desired effect is to influence the opponent's government by defeating the opponent's Army. In addition, conventional warfare attempts to isolate the population from the conflict and minimize civil barriers.




Figure 1-4. Contrasting points of conventional with irregular warfare

The definition agrees with the Joint Publication-1, the Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, as a discussion of traditional warfare and also as a confrontation between nations-states or coalitions of nations-states.

The contested definitions also agreed with the military understanding of the major combat operations within the conflict and that the main combat operations are different from irregular warfare.

Irregular warfare is an integral part for conducting major military operations and military support for stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations. It is a complement for conducting intimidation operations and shaping operations. It also offers complementary and competing ideas about the ways and meanings of resources for addressing strategic and operational challenges.




Figure 1-5. Joint operating concept relationships¹⁶

The united concept of operations of irregular warfare addresses aspects of irregular warfare that other current joint operational concepts don't do:

- Theater Strategy for Irregular Warfare
- A campaign for irregular design, planning and execution
- Global scale of operations for Irregular warfare
- Long-term timeframe for Irregular warfare
- Offensive applications of Irregular warfare, especially against hostile armed groups working in unaccompanied states

The main operational attitudes of the Joint Operational Concept includes a general description of Irregular warfare which focuses on cases where Irregular warfare is an integral part of large-scale combat operations.

Irregular warfare in the Joint Operational Concept provides broad discussion in conjunction with conventional military operations and also as a part of long-standing regional or global campaign that may not include significant conventional military operations.

Stability, security, transition and reconstruction of the Joint Operational Concept focuses on the full range of military support through the peace to crisis continuum. Irregular warfare occurs primarily during a crisis or conflict. Irregular module phases in operations for:

¹⁶ http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf

stability, security, transition and reconstruction, the primary focus is to get support from the population.

Stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations are vital component in most irregular warfare operations and campaigns, but stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations also emerge beyond the scope of irregular warfare.

Also in some case studies, irregular operations can be a contrast to stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations such as support for rebels or unconventional warfare, where the goal is not to support the home government, but to undermine stability and security to reduce the control of an opponent on its territory and population.

As with the irregular warfare, many tasks in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction are best done by domestic institutions, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. However, both concepts require joint forces to carry out all the necessary tasks in order to establish a civil order when civil agencies can't do that. Much of the concept of irregular warfare offers aligns with the traditional doctrine, practice and conceptualization of the forces for special operations. What makes irregular warfare different from conventional warfare is the focus of its operations - a relevant population and strategic goal to gain and maintain control over the impact on the population and to support that population through political, psychological and economic methods.

Specialist forces experts have long understanding for the importance of unconventional warfare with focus on the population and also in campaign operation or combat operations, which might include: information, intelligence and development of tactical military capability.

The Joint Publications - 1 of the US Army, explain the irregular warfare as a struggle between the state and non-governmental actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population, which primarily involves and have indirect approach for reducing power, influence and will, which is determined by the characteristics of the opponent and is not a new or independent kind of warfare. For the Special Forces forces all of these are methods of unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare is a component and method of prosecuting irregular warfare, but both kind of warfare have special characteristics and methods. Both types of warfare focuses on the impact of relevant population.

However in irregular warfare operations with irregular forces are not necessary, unconventional warfare is always carried out by with or through irregular forces.

Unconventional warfare may be a central effort in a comprehensive military campaign of irregular warfare in which conventional military operations aren't used or they can be implemented as an element of irregular warfare in support of what is mostly a conventional military operation. The new concept of irregular warfare lends with many of the traditional concepts of special operations forces but they aren't synonymous with one to another.

2. Planning and phases of Unconventional warfare

Any use of unconventional warfare is unique or distinct, especially when is applied against non-state actors. However, unconventional efforts explained by the United Nations law regulations and chapters, generally go through the following seven phases:

- Preparation
- Initial contact
- Infiltration
- Organization
- Building
- Application
- Transition




Figure 2-1. Phases of unconventional warfare

Some of the phases may occur simultaneously or in certain situations, without a current given time. For example, a large and effective resistance movement may require only logistical support, which means skipping the organizational phase.

Phases can also occur outside a particular sequence, each obtaining a varying degree of emphasis. An example is when members of an irregular group are withdrawn and hidden to a partner nation to be trained and organized before being reinvented in the area for performing unconventional operations, with or without a special operations unit. In this case, the typical sequence of phases would be changed.

3. HYBRID WARFARE TROUGH THE PRISM OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

The history of wars as a social phenomenon continuously evolve. All this has been determinate trough the factors which directly reflects who will "*win the war*" in which the most important factors are: changes in international relations, moving the center of global power, influence of global policy and technical - technological development of weapons.

The emergence of opponents which planned and organized wars on symmetrically and asymmetrically ways, implies the need for a new definition of the war or emergence of "*hybrid warfare*", which in itself represents a combination of: conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal activities in order to "*win the war*".

One of the basic purpose of this paper is to explain the historical development of hybrid warfare with explaining its operational phases and methods.

The main hypothesis of this paper with using the historical method and comparative analysis is determining: *"Does in the Ukrainian crisis were present operational phases of hybrid warfare, from which side and in what kind of way"*.

A comparative analysis will be based on practical models that were previously used in crises in a way of operational phases of hybrid warfare and it will be compared to the culmination point of the Ukrainian crisis scenario.

Beside this we will make an individual analysis of methods of hybrid warfare that were used by Ukrainian forces supported by NATO to Russian separatists supported by Russia and conversely.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the international relations were unified with a strong hope that in the near future there will be less international conflicts and confrontations. Which actually the military history had proved as a wrong hypothesis.

However in a short time, less than a decade after the Soviet Union collapsed, new era in international relations has been opened in which the "use of force" in resolving international conflicts and wars, again reincarnated as a possible option for solving them.

Practically, what we have mentioned above have been illustrated practically in the both wars against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thereby, if we want to explain the strategic objectives of hybrid warfare, it is first necessary to make introduction of evolutionary development of this kind of warfare.

The simplest way to define hybrid warfare is to say that this kind of warfare represents a combined use of conventional and irregular forces in implementation of the military campaign. The famous military historian Professor Peter R. Mansoor, defines the hybrid warfare as a conflict which carried combined use of conventional and irregular forces (guerilla rebels and terrorists), which may be state or non-state actors.

Their common goal is to achieve common political interests. Seen from this perspective, hybrid warfare is an entirely new model of warfare. There are numerous examples which uses the modern information technology for achieving better results on a tactical, operational and strategic level, even those in the writings of Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, which described the world-renowned in the fifth century BC.

The irregular warfare in the military history always has been classified as a serious challenge to conventional military forces or to be more specific to conventional model of warfare¹⁷.

Over the time a guerrilla-style warfare experienced a very important and effective long-term impact on the impossibility of implementing effective modern military operations of NATO. NATO operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have once again confirmed the inability and difficulties to overcome irregular fighters without infringing human rights according to the resolutions of the United Nations and allegations of local population for disobeying national and international regulations for public support of NATO to conduct military campaigns¹⁸.

During 2000, the use of the term "hybrid warfare" has become a unified way to describe the modern way of warfare for simple reason that the continuing sophisticated development and progress of military technology reinforce the behavior of non-state actors and has strengthen the methods for applying a cyber warfare. All this contributed for creation or birth of this new kind of warfare, called a "hybrid warfare", which have elements

¹⁷ Peter R. Mansoor, "Hybrid War in History," in *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*, ed. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, Cambridge, 2012, 1-3

¹⁸ U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Hybrid Warfare*, GAO-10-136R, Washington, 2010.

of conventional and irregular forces and methods in the entire spectrum of the phenomenon of contemporary conflict that might lead to war¹⁹.

During 2007 the famous Professor Frank G. Hoffman, defined the "hybrid warfare" as a "Modern war", which in its base incorporates a comprehensive spectrum of different models of warfare, including: conventional capabilities and capacities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist methods of violence, discrimination, cohesion and criminal activities that are manifested and implemented by non-state actors²⁰.

The combination of conventional and irregular methods of modern warfare have been contributed to more efficient development of hybrid warfare of his previous historical forms. In the past, conventional and irregular modern military operations were applied separately in the terms of what they practically today are used in integrated way. When the military campaigns are conducting the irregular way of warfare is an additional component of conventional warfare.

During the military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah during the 2006, the hybrid mode of warfare continually has been changing and evolving his methods and warfare instruments. The militants from Hezbollah, which were fully trained and equipped by Iran, surprised the Israeli Army through the combined use of conventional and guerrilla-style of warfare, as well as through the use of advanced technology in military equipment and communication - information systems, which have been trained to use these advanced systems of the countries from which Iran bought this modern military equipment. If we reviewed the historical chronology, we will see that the hybrid warfare has been used as a combination of irregular and conventional methods of warfare²¹. During 2014, the grand military strategy of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), once again proved that sophisticated information technology or so-called information or "cyber warfare" has a dominant role in the effective implementation of modern military operations. Numerous are the official reports from NATO, which mentioned the development of components and methods of hybrid warfare, which also were mentioned in the Strategic Concept of NATO during the Lisbon summit of NATO in 2010²².

During the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and further the concept of hybrid warfare has constant development. Numerous are the Western European professors, which the word "hybrid", describes as a tools and methods of using operational and tactical elements of the Russian Federation during the annexation of Crimea and support of Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine.

The Russia achieve the dominance in Crimea with advanced military technology and with involving a combination of conventional and irregular military operations, but also the support of political protests, economic support of Russian separatists and Protestants through numerous non-governmental organizations, cyber operations and constant media propaganda campaign²³.

In an interview in July 2014, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Russian strategy of warfare in Ukraine describes as a "methods of hybrid warfare," which he defined as "a combination of military action, covert operations and aggressive media propaganda"²⁴.

¹⁹ Hoffman, Frank G. *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 51, 2009,34-39.

²⁰ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 8.

²¹ *Ibid*, 9-12.

²² Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, Department of Defense, 2010, 10.

²³ Carolina Vendill Pallin and Fredrik Westerlund, 'Russia's War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2009,401-403.

²⁴ Mark Landler and Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Chief Warns of Duplicity by Putin on Ukraine," *The New York Times*, July 2014, 8-10.

The Scientific Military journal Balance in his issue of 2015, provides a complete and comprehensive definition of "hybrid warfare", which explains the hybrid warfare as a: "use of military and non-military methods in integrated military campaign, designed to achieve surprise, increased initiative in the theater of operations and achieving psychological advantages to the opponent through diplomatic propaganda.

Basically, all this is achieved through the sophisticated use of advanced information technology, electronic and cyber operations which has been accompanied by military and intelligence components and economic pressures and sanctions.

Modern methods of asymmetric warfare, always present when the weaker opponent should achieve dominance on the powerful or stronger opponent. So far, the military strategy proved that the strategy of asymmetric warfare is a successful concept²⁵.

In the scientific discussions, the elements which has been identified in the hybrid warfare, reminiscent to the fourth generation of warfare, which has been developed their operating elements during the 1990s²⁶.

The Chinese military strategy, describes the "hybrid warfare" as a development of combat elements and methods of warfare which has been depended from the dominance of firepower of opposing parties, which often has been used the weaker side whether it is legitimate national armed forces or non-state actors. Even Chinese generals said that "hybrid warfare", represents a war without restrictive measures and rules in which, nothing is "forbidden or restricted"²⁷.

2. Analysis of the differences between the Hybrid and Unconventional warfare

There is still unofficial military doctrine of NATO, for the comprehensive definition of hybrid warfare, so the Chief of the US Military Forces, US military analysts and professors characterizes as a range of: conventional, irregular and cyber warfare²⁸. On the other hand, the unconventional warfare in accordance with the military doctrine of the US which has been generally accepted in the military doctrine of NATO was defined as: special combat operations, urban and non-urban guerrilla operations in a certain area²⁹.

Thus, we should be said, that a part of a unit from the legitimate national special forces of a state must be: trained, equipped and supported to be able for successfully dealing with the "guerrilla warfare", subversion, sabotage, illegal, intelligence activities and for assisting in other unconventional activities.

The term "unconventional warfare", which animates to the term "conventional warfare", has a completely opposite meaning. While, conventional warfare, represents a war between two or more conventional forces (war with guns, armored vehicles, tanks, etc.) or a war of legitimate powers with legitimate military means, unconventional warfare as a form of warfare in modern military history, reflected as a war with legitimate or conventional irregular forces (insurgent, terrorist, irregular, illegitimate powers) which due their lower power use irregular tactics or "guerrilla tactics" of war in order to win stronger legitimate opponent. Does the "hybrid warfare" is more contemporary warfare from "unconventional warfare" and why?

²⁵ Tim Benbow. Talking 'Bout Our Generation? Assessing the Concept of Fourth-Generation Warfare, *Comparative Strategy* 27:2, 2008, 155–161

²⁶ Donald J. Reed, Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31:8, 2008, 685–689.

²⁷ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 2-3.

²⁸ Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson. Hybrid Warfare, JSOU Report 13-4 August 2013, 3-5.

²⁹ FM 3-05.201, (S/NF) Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (U) 28 September 2007, 22-24.

First, the definition of "hybrid warfare" which we have been mentioned above, incorporates all segments of irregular warfare. The irregular warfare on the other hand includes the following types of warfare: Shared national and collective defense, Fight against terrorism, counterinsurgency operations or (COIN) operations for stabilization and unconventional warfare³⁰.

By itself, this statement that unconventional warfare represents one of the vital segments of irregular warfare and having in mind that by the definition irregular warfare is part of modern hybrid warfare it is more than clear that hybrid warfare is much more contemporary warfare of unconventional warfare.

By changing the successor of the former global terrorist organization Al Qaeda, or the emergence of ISIS during the 2004/05 year, led by its military and spiritual leader Abu Bakir Al-Baghdadi and Al-Zawahiri, has changed their matrix acting in cells. Along with the announcement of the national strategy of the US and NATO for counterterrorism, through the grand strategy of DIME with active use of (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) instruments of power³¹.

American historian and diplomat Joseph Ney, told that immediately after the Grand NATO strategy for counterterrorism, ISIS has been applied its grand strategy for attacking the so-called "soft" and "hard" targets according to military diplomacy.

According the ISIS strategy "hard targets" is explained as a territorial expansion. Soft targets are vital critical infrastructure: bridges, tunnels, airports, government buildings, shopping centers, hospitals and other facilities where the mass of people is large and where one explosion caused large effects.

So, this section of unconventional warfare obsolete in terms of hybrid warfare. In this segment the strategies for dealing with hybrid warfare or to be more precise with one of his segments the cyber threats or "cyber warfare" is to conduct a preventive and effective measures for security of the: critical equipment and devices, containing data on the nature of state secrets, protection of information systems in the banking sectors of the global economic corporations, protection of the information systems and regulating the: road, railway, water, air transportation and so on.

All this brings us to a dreadful conclusion that the main difference between the hybrid and unconventional warfare is that hybrid warfare are not always able to detect your opponent because one of the hybrid warfare components are the cyber attacks³²




Figure 1. The essence of Hybrid operations³³

³⁰ GAO analysis of DOD military concept and briefing documents (2012-2016).

³¹ NATO, 'Defense expenditures data for 2014 and estimates for 2015: financial and economic data relating to NATO defense', press release, 22 June 2015, 2.

³² Eve Hunter, Piret Pernik. The challenges of hybrid warfare, Analysis RKK and ICDS, April 2015, 17.

Furthermore, the space theater of military operations can be unlimited and unpredictable. With the development of the military technology, the hybrid warfare will receive its primacy of warfare, which will be really hard for the future NATO military operations to take certain preventive measures for protecting from cyber attacks³⁴.

Unlike, the unconventional warfare which by definition includes a combating guerrilla warfare in certain theater of hostilities actually space, hybrid warfare doesn't include a space or doesn't have the front line and will increasingly use unknown space which will be very difficult to identify the enemies³⁵.

The basic feature of "hybrid" in terms of "unconventional" warfare, is that the asymmetric actions of non-state actors or opponents will be effectively accomplished by using all the advantages provided by the military-technological progress as possible to achieve their military-political and economic interests in terms of opposing legitimate force.

The hybrid warfare as a modern form of warfare in modern military history and military theory is analyzed as a fifth generation of warfare. Unlike the unconventional warfare where over execution of combat actions can be determined the "center of gravity" of the forces in the hybrid warfare the "center of gravity" is unpredictable because the main attacks are conducted through invasion, destruction and destabilization of strategic information systems which contains information about: political, military, economic and other facilities in which the state is exposed to a hybrid war.

3. Operational phases of hybrid warfare

Analyzing the operations Russia has conducted in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine, hybrid war can be described as being composed of three main phases, each of which is composed of three sections. The first, preparatory phase concentrates on mapping out the strategic, political, economic, social and infrastructural vulnerabilities of the target country, and creating the necessary means for capitalizing on them. In the case of Ukraine, Russia has been in an excellent position to do so, thanks to the long common history, the tight economic and social ties between the two countries, as well as the strong connections between political, economic and security elites³⁶. The preparation phase includes these activities:

- Strategic preparation, exploring vulnerability points in the state administration, economy and armed forces;
- Establishing loyal NGOs and media channels in the territory of the target country.
- Establishing diplomatic and media positions in order to influence the international audience.
- Political preparation, encouraging dissatisfaction in the target country by using political, diplomatic and media tools.
- Strengthening local separatist movements and fuelling ethnic, religious, and social tensions.
- Establishing contacts with local business people; making them dependent on the attacking country via profitable contracts.
- Establishing contacts with local organized crime groups.
- Operational preparation with coordinated political pressure, mobilizing officials and local criminal groups, mobilizing the Russian armed forces under the pretext of military exercises.

³³ Aapo Cederberg and Pasi Eronen. How are Societies Defended against Hybrid Threats. Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Geneva, 6 November 2015, 20-22.

³⁴ United States Government Accountability Office: *Hybrid Warfare*, Washington, USA, 2010, 20-23.

³⁵ Huber, Thomas M.: *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002, 78-82.

³⁶ M. Galeotti, "'Hybrid War' and 'Little Green Men': How It Works and How It Doesn't", Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015, 12-14.

During the preparatory phase, no violence is openly engaged³⁷.

3.1. Offensive phase

All the weaknesses explored during the preparatory phase of hybrid warfare suddenly surface when the attacking country actually launches the full-scale hybrid offensive. From this moment on, hybrid war clearly becomes different from the traditional actions of Russian foreign and security policy described above. The key difference is that open, organized, armed violence starts to occur. The crisis erupted in a similar way in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine: unmarked units using high-tech Russian uniforms, weapons, vehicles and equipment appeared and started to set up barricades and checkpoints, blocking the gates of the Ukrainian military and police barracks. Not a single shot was fired, but it quickly became clear that Ukrainian units could not leave their bases without using force against the unmarked militants. Moscow probably employ the same denial strategy, hoping that it could prevent the activation of Article V of the Washington Treaty. This would be perfectly in line with the whole concept of 'new generation warfare' described earlier, where the aim is to break the target country's ability to resist by using predominantly non-military means.

The offensive phase of the hybrid war is divided on this activities:

- Organizing massive anti-government protests and riots in the attacked country, infiltrating special forces, local civilians, sabotage attacks, capture the first administrative buildings in the targeted regions.
- The media of the attacking country launches a strong disinformation campaign.
- Disabling the central power by capturing administrative buildings in the targeted region.
- Blocking the central power's media, establishing communication and information monopoly.
- Establishing alternative political power with declaring an alternative political centre, based on the captured administrative buildings, by referring to real or fabricated traditions of separatism.
- Replacing administrative organs of the central power with newly established political bodies.
- Media of the attacking country strengthens the legitimacy of the new political bodies.

As demonstrated both in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine, towards the end of the attacking phase the resistance potential of the target country was broken, its governance, command, control and communications capabilities were severely damaged and it lost control over one or more parts of its territory³⁸.

3.2. Consolidation phase

In order to consolidate the results achieved by the hybrid war, attacking country needs to take additional steps to further strengthen its rule. This third phase can be referred as a strategic stabilization. However, in Eastern Ukraine scenario turned out to be radically different from the Crimean. Referendums on 'independence' were organized in both regions and in both cases the results were in favor of the separatists. On the peninsula, according to the 'official' results, more than 97% of the population voted for secession from Ukraine. The consolidation phase can be described in detail in three sections as follows:

³⁷ A. Zaitsev, 'Partizanskimi metodami. Sovremennaya armiya dolzhna umet' voevat' bez linii fronta', Voenno-promishlenniy Kurier, No . 32 (550), 3 September 2014.

³⁸ P. R. Gregory, 'Putin's 'Human Rights Council' Accidentally Posts Real Crimean Election Results', Forbes, 2014, 20-23.

- Political stabilization of the outcome, organizing a 'referendum' and decision about independence with the strong diplomatic and media support of the attacking country.
- The new 'state' asks for help from the attacking country³⁹.
- Separation of the captured territory from the target country, annexes the captured territory (Crimea) or establishes open or covert military presence there.
- Lasting limitation of the strategic freedom of movement, loss of territory (economy, population, infrastructure, etc.)
- Enable full control over its territory, the attacked country is unable to join any political or military alliance.

Crucially, they have demonstrated an innate understanding of the three key target audiences and their probably behavior: the Russian speaking majority in Crimea, Ukrainian government, international community, specifically NATO and the EU. Armed with this information they knew what to do and what the outcomes will be.

Finally, it is worth to mention that comprehensive analyzes are required for the security risks and threats to a national security of the countries which in the future might be exposed to a hybrid attacks⁴⁰. The hybrid warfare could be very dangerous if especially uses his instruments of power for making a cyber attacks on the critical IT structure. All this gives a great importance and advantage of the hybrid in terms of unconventional warfare. Where "de jure", the states can't be directly exposed on open military action with an opponent, but "de facto" will be indirectly exposed to a cyber attacks which would "destabilizes" the security and peace of the countries.

4. Conclusion

The hybrid warfare didn't changed the essence of war. The methods used to achieve the dominance during the hybrid warfare has change their tactics and operatic but didn't changed the objectives of the war for achieving the victory. However, the modern military history and warfare continually evolving the modern military thought on the nature of war. So, the hybrid warfare as the most modern forms of warfare today: asymmetric, unconventional, nonlinear, irregular and a new generation of warfare in the fourth and fifth generation of warfare highlighted the needs of professors and students in the military academies and universities around the world, constantly and continuously to develop the complexity of the armed conflicts in the XXI-st century⁴¹.

So in this context the word "hybrid" is a term used practically to explain how is this kind of warfare. Considering the fact that many armed conflicts and wars are on the line between war and peace they often use different instruments of power which are not represented in the traditional mode of warfare which significantly hamper the effective implementation of modern military operations of NATO and other collective security and defense systems⁴².

Understanding the strategic significance of Russia in Ukraine, comes with the operationalisation of a new form of warfare that cannot be characterized as a military campaign in the classic sense of the term. The invisible military occupation cannot be considered an occupation by definition. Not only were the troops already on Crimean territory stationed at Russian naval bases, but they were also "officially" part of the autochthon civilian militia. The deception operations occurred inside Russian territory as

³⁹ S. Walker, 'East Ukraine goes to the polls for independence referendum', The Guardian, 11 May 2014.

⁴⁰ Thomas T. L. Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2004, 237-256.

⁴¹ Smith Rupert. The Utility of force: The Art of war in modern world, New York, 2007, 32-34.

⁴² Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, 70-74.

military exercises, including ones in Kaliningrad to increase the insecurity of the Baltic States and Poland. At the same time, the Crimean parliament officially - although not legally by the Ukrainian constitution, asked to join the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian media became inaccessible. As a result, Russian channels of communication propagating the Kremlin's version of facts were able to establish a parallel reality, legitimizing the Russian actions in the realm of idea.

This will be the main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020:

- From direct destruction to direct influence;
- Direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
- From a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;
- From a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groups;
- From the traditional (3D) battleground to cyber warfare and perceptions;
- From direct clash to contactless war;
- From a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's internal side and base;
- From war in the physical environment to a war in cyberspace;
- From symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;
- From a war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war⁴³.

All this leads them to think that modern challenges for the international security have a wide range of threats that must first identify and then to take an appropriate effective and efficient measures to prevent and eradicate them⁴⁴.

Taking into account, everything that we have said above, we spent more time for identifying the theoretical part for hybrid warfare and then according to this the suggested measures, instruments and methods for prevention and suppression from hybrid warfare.

First, which is necessary to make the creators of the national strategy to combat hybrid warfare is to identify the methods for dealing with this type of warfare.

In defining the strategy for modern types of warfare, such as hybrid warfare the most important is to elaborate the influence and involvement of modern: diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power.

This increases the complexity of identifying and proposing effective measures for preventing the security threats posed by this type of warfare⁴⁵.

All this requires a comprehensive approach of the authorities and institutions responsible for dealing with this type of warfare and threats on the national and international security which might be arising from it.

The previous recommendations of the international scientific and political public, suggested that the best guidelines for proposing effective instruments of power for preventing the modern way of warfare, first must be well coordinated and implemented on a national level in the national strategy of each country from NATO and EU. Than on the annual summits of NATO and EU, each member state could provide the best suggestion, which they have been implemented on a national level in their national strategy⁴⁶. And finally

⁴³ Peter Mattson. *The Russian Armed Forces Adapted to New Operational Concepts in a Multipolar World*, 2014, Riga, 12-15.

⁴⁴ Weir, William: *Guerrilla Warfare: Irregular Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, USA, 2008, 45-48.

⁴⁵ Jan Rood, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Minke Meijnders, *A world without order? Clingendael Monitor* 2015,3.

⁴⁶ Margriet Drent, Rob Hendriks, Dick Zandee. *New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses*, Netherlands, 2015, 22-25.

the best solutions from the NATO and EU member states can be integrated in the NATO strategy or concept for dealing with this kind of warfare.

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Questions for the Topics:

T-1: WARFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY LAW

- 1. What is the circle of modern war?**
- 2. Definition of Modern war?**
- 3. What is the law of war?**
- 4. What is Distinction according to International military law?**
- 5. What is Proportionality according to International military law?**
- 6. What is Necessity according to International military law?**
- 7. What is the Lawful use of force?**
- 8. Explain the lawful use of force article 39-41 from Chapter VII of UN Preamble with examples?**
- 9. Explain the lawful use of force article 51 from Chapter VII of UN Preamble with examples?**

T-2: WAR AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

- 1. Definition of war?**
- 2. Definition of state?**
- 3. Definition of policy and politics?**
- 4. Definition of strategy?**
- 5. Definition of Operational art?**
- 6. Definition of Operation?**
- 7. Definition for Tactics?**
- 8. Explain the process of Evolution of the states?**
- 9. Definition for Unconventional warfare?**
- 10. Historical development of Unconventional warfare?**
- 11. Definition for Conventional warfare?**
- 12. Definition for Irregular warfare?**
- 13. Which are the Constitutive activities of Irregular warfare?**
- 14. Which are the planning phases of Unconventional warfare?**

T-3: HYBRID WARFARE THROUGH THE PRISM OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

- 1. Definition of Hybrid warfare?**
- 2. Analyze the differences between Hybrid and Unconventional warfare?**
- 3. Which are the essence of Hybrid operations?**
- 4. Which are the Operational phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis?**
- 5. Which are the Offensive phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis?**
- 6. Which are the Consolidation phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis?**

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Questions for the Topics:

T-1: WARFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY LAW

1. What is the circle of modern war?

a.) Circle of Modern War represents match between national objectives & national strategy: core technologies, logistics as the lynchpin of modern war, offense vs. defense and revolutions in national, regional and international military affairs.

b.) Circle of Modern War represents match between national objectives & national strategy: core technologies, core weapons, logistics as the lynchpin of modern war, offense vs. defense and revolutions in national, regional and international military affairs.

c.) Circle of Modern War represents match between national objectives & national strategy: core Weapons, logistics as the lynchpin of modern war, offense vs. defense and revolutions in national, regional and international military affairs.

d.) Circle of Modern War represents match between national objectives & national strategy: core Weapons, logistics as the lynchpin of modern war, offense vs. defense and revolutions in international military affairs.

2. Definition of Modern war?

a.) Modern warfare is warfare using the concepts and methods that have assumed more complex forms of the 19th and early 20th century.

b.) Modern warfare is warfare which has widespread use of highly advanced information technology and combatants which are constantly modernized to preserve their battle worthiness.

c.) Modern warfare is warfare using the concepts, methods and military technology which have come into use during and after World Wars I and II and which are constantly modernized.

d.) Modern warfare is warfare using the concepts and methods that have assumed more complex forms of early 20th century till today's concepts of warfare.

3. What is the law of war?

a.) The law of war is a legal term of art which refers to the aspect of public international law concerning acceptable justifications to engage in war(*jus ad bellum*) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (*jus in Bello* or International humanitarian law).

b.) The law of war are modern laws which addresses to declarations of war, acceptance of surrender and the treatment of prisoners of war, military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering.

c.) The law of war is considered distinct from other bodies of law—such as the domestic law of a particular belligerent to a conflict—that may provide additional legal limits to the conduct or justification of war.

d.) The law of war is considered distinct from other bodies of law—such as the domestic law of a particular belligerent to a conflict—that may provide additional legal limits.

4. What is Distinction according to International military law?

a.) Distinction is a principle under International humanitarian law in order to ensure protection of the civilian population and civilian objects of the parties in the conflict.

b.) Distinction is a principle under International humanitarian law which make a certain distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.

c.) Distinction is a principle under International humanitarian law governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict, whereby belligerents must distinguish the civilians.

d.) Distinction is a principle under International humanitarian law which make a certain distinguish between the civilian population and combatants.

5. What is Proportionality according to International military law?

a.) Proportionality is a principle under international humanitarian law which analyzes the subjects about loss of life and damage to property in incidental attacks, which mustn't have be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

b.) Proportionality is a principle under international humanitarian law governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict, whereby belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected by an attack on a legitimate military objective.

c.) Proportionality is a principle under international humanitarian law which means that with considering a target the damage to civilians and their property can't be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained.

d.) Proportionality is a principle under international humanitarian law which means that with considering a target the damage to civilians and their property can't be excessive in relation to the military advantage.

6. What is Military Necessity according to International military law?

a.) Military Necessity according to International military law is principal which describes that every attack must be on a legitimate military objective and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage.

b.) Military Necessity according to International military law is principal which prohibits things such as wounding or permanently injuring an opponent except during the fight, torture to exact confessions and other activities simply used to inflict additional damage on the enemy that does not further the military objective.

c.) Military Necessity according to International military law is principal which in general defines the prohibited activity, such as any act of hostility that make the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

d.) Military Necessity according to International military law is principal which prohibits things such as wounding or permanently injuring an opponent except during the fight, torture to exact confessions and other activities simply used to inflict additional damage on the enemy.

7. What is the Lawful use of force?

a.) The Lawful use of force according to UN Charter are broad legal prohibitions against the use of force and other forms of intervention, specific exceptions exist to justify a State's recourse to the use of force or armed intervention.

b.) The Lawful use of force according to UN Charter are actions authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and actions that constitute a legitimate act of individual or collective self defense.

c.) The Lawful use of force according to UN Charter are operations conducted by states respecting the sovereign territory of other states. If a State is using force with the consent of a host State, then there is no violation of the host State's territorial integrity or political independence.

d.) The Lawful use of force according to UN Charter are operations conducted by states respecting the sovereign territory of other states. If a State is using force with the consent of a host State, then there is no violation of the host State's territorial integrity.

8. Explain the lawful use of force article 39-41 from Chapter VII of UN Preamble?

a.) The UN Charter gives three courses of action to the Security Council: 1) make recommendations pursuant to Article 39; 2) mandate nonmilitary measures (i.e., diplomatic and economic sanctions) pursuant to Article 41; Article 41 lists several non-military enforcement measures designed to restore international peace and security.

b.) The UN Charter gives three courses of action to the Security Council: 1) make recommendations pursuant to Article 39; 2) mandate nonmilitary measures (i.e., diplomatic and economic sanctions) pursuant to Article 41; or 3) mandate military enforcement measures ("action by air, land, or sea forces") pursuant to Article 42.

c.) The UN Charter gives three courses of action to the Security Council: 1) make recommendations pursuant to Article 39; 2) mandate nonmilitary measures (i.e., diplomatic and economic sanctions) pursuant to Article 41; or 3) mandate military enforcement measures

(“action by air, land, or sea forces”) pursuant to Article 42. Article 41 lists several non-military enforcement measures designed to restore international peace and security.

d.) The UN Charter gives three courses of action to the Security Council: 1) make recommendations pursuant to Article 39; 2) mandate nonmilitary measures (i.e., diplomatic and economic sanctions) pursuant to Article 41; or 3) mandate military enforcement measures (“action by air, land, or sea forces”).

9. Explain the lawful use of force article 51 from Chapter VII of UN Preamble with examples?

a.) Article 51 from UN Chapter VII defines the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against the terrorist actors who perpetrated the US attacks 9/11, according to resolution UNSCR 1368.

b.) Article 51 from UN Chapter VII defines use of force of NATO forces involved in NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.

c.) Article 51 from UN Chapter VII defines the necessary measures of NATO to fulfill its mandate in Afghanistan. The mandate of ISAF per UNSCR to assist on the Afghan Government in improving “The security situation and build its own security capabilities.”

d.) Article 51 from UN Chapter VII defines the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against the terrorist actors who perpetrated the US attacks 9/11.

T-2: WAR AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

1. Definition of war?

a.) War is a extended arm of the politics.

b.) War is a continuation of politics by other means.

c.) War is an act of violence that theoretically could have no limits.

d.) War is a extended arm of policy.

2. Definition of state?

a.) State is an entity, comprising territory, citizens and constitutional legislation.

b.) State is a set of principles reflected in laws and describing how is constituted.

c.) State represented a population and territory which works under constitutional laws.

d.) State is a set of principles reflected in laws and describing how is constituted.

3. Definition of policy and politics?

a.) Politics/policy is a process of state final decision-making.

b.) Politics/policy is a process of action for better define and effectiveness of some state important area.

c.) Politics/policy is a process of action for making better live for the citizens of that state.

d.) Politics/policy is a process of action for making better live for the citizens.

4. Definition of strategy?

- a.) Strategy is an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of political and military power in a synchronized and integrated way.
- b.) Strategy is set of ideas for employing the instruments of political and military power in a synchronized way to achieve their objectives.
- c.) Strategy is set of ideas for employing the instruments of political and military power in a synchronized and integrated way to achieve various objectives.
- d.) Strategy is set of ideas for employing the instruments of political and military power in a synchronized way.

5. Definition of Operational art?

- a.) Operational art is an application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns and major operations.
- b.) Operational art is an application for organize and employ military forces.
- c.) Operational art is an application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns and major operations and organize and employ military forces.
- d.) Operational art is an application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs to design strategies and major operations.

6. Definition of Operation?

- a.) Operation is a large-scale of military action consisting of tactical engagements in support of strategic goals.
- b.) Operation is a military action consisting of strategic engagements.
- c.) Operation is a military action of tactical engagements which support the strategic goals.
- d.) Operation is a military action of tactical engagements which fulfill the strategic goals.

7. Definition for Tactics?

- a.) Tactics is an employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other for achieving better domination of the military operation.
- b.) Tactics is ordered arrangement of forces in relation for achieving better domination of the military operation.
- c.) Tactics is an employment of forces in relation to each other for achieving better domination of the military operation.
- d.) Tactics is an employment of forces in relation to each other for achieving better domination of military actions.

8. Definition for Unconventional warfare?

- a.) Unconventional warfare was generally defined in conditions of guerrilla and secret operations of enemy territory or in influential territory.

b.) Unconventional warfare consists of three interrelated fields of: guerrilla warfare, escape and invasion, subversion against enemy forces and similar activities.

c.) Unconventional warfare follows operations carried out by, with or through irrelevant forces in support of giving: resistance, insurrection or conventional military operations.

d.) Unconventional warfare was generally defined in conditions of guerrilla operations of enemy territory or in influential territory.

9. Historical development of Unconventional warfare?

a.) The Evolution of Unconventional warfare started when other instruments of state power were used or proved inadequate, military instruments of power were used to achieve or solve international differences. Clausewitz characterizes the state military power as an act of violence in order to subordinate the enemy to fulfill his own goals.

b.) The Evolution of Unconventional warfare started when warring parties were concentrated on non-military instruments of power in the international relations between the states. The enemy uses inadequate instruments of power as a weapon.

c.) The Evolution of Unconventional warfare started when the vision of implementing national power was too limited. Sun Tzu has a more relevant statement that: "Winning the enemy without a fight is the peak of the military skills. Which means there is more than one way to defeat the enemy".

d.) The Evolution of Unconventional warfare started with non-military instruments of power in the international relations between the states. The enemy uses inadequate instruments of power.

10. Definition for Conventional warfare?

a.) Conventional warfare is a form of warfare between states that apply direct military confrontations to defeat enemy armed forces, destroy the enemy facilities or conquer territory of an opponent in order to force change in government and politics structure of the enemy.

b.) Conventional warfare is warfare between states that apply direct military confrontations to defeat enemy armed forces and to destroy or exploit enemy facilities or conquer the territory.

c.) Conventional warfare is a form of warfare between states that apply direct military confrontations to defeat enemy armed forces in order to force change in government and politics structure of the enemy.

d.) Conventional warfare is a form of warfare between states that apply direct military confrontations to defeat enemy armed forces in order to force change in political structure of the enemy.

11. Definition for Irregular warfare?

a.) Irregular warfare is an inherent, long-lasting confrontation. Opponents will follow strategies of irreversible warfare by applying hybrids actions of irregular traditional and catastrophic abilities.

b.) Irregular warfare favors an indirect and asymmetric approach, although it can apply the full range of military and other capacities in order to reduce opponents: power, influence and will.

c.) Irregular war is a violent struggle, which means that not all volunteer countries or irregular forces must be armed.

d.) Irregular warfare is an inherent, long-lasting confrontation. With applying hybrids actions of irregular traditional and catastrophic abilities.

12. Which are the Constitutive activities of Irregular warfare?

a.) Rebellion ; Unconventional warfare; Terrorism; Foreign Internal Defense; Stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations; Strategic communications; Psychological operations; Civil-military operations; Information operations; Intelligence activities; Transnational criminal activities, legal activities against irregular opponents.

b.) Anti-rebellion; Unconventional warfare; Anti-terrorism; Foreign Internal Defense; Security, transition and reconstruction operations; Psychological operations; Civil-military operations; Information operations; Counterintelligence activities; Transnational criminal activities, legal activities on fight against irregular opponents.

c.) Rebellion and Anti-rebellion; Unconventional warfare; Terrorism and Anti-terrorism; Foreign Internal Defense; Stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations; Strategic communications; Psychological operations; Civil-military operations; Information operations; Intelligence and counterintelligence activities; Transnational criminal activities, legal activities on fight against irregular opponents.

d.) Unconventional warfare; Terrorism; Foreign Internal Defense; Stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations; Strategic communications; Psychological operations; Civil-military operations; Information operations; Intelligence activities; Transnational criminal activities, legal activities against irregular opponents.

13. Which are the planning phases of Unconventional warfare?

a.) Preparation, Initial contact, Infiltration, Organization, Building, Application and Transition

b.) Preparation, Information, Infiltration, Organization, Building, Application and Transition

c.) Preparation, Information, Infiltration, Organization, Sabotage, Application and Transition

d.) Preparation, Information, Infiltration, Organization, Attack, Application and Transition

T-3: HYBRID WARFARE TROUGH THE PRISM OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

1. Definition of Hybrid warfare?

a.) Hybrid warfare represents a combination of: conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal activities in order to "win the war".

b.) Hybrid warfare is an entirely new model of warfare. Which uses the modern information technology for achieving better results on a tactical, operational and strategic level.

c.) Hybrid warfare represents use of military and non-military methods in integrated military campaign, designed to achieve surprise, increased initiative in the theater of operations and achieving psychological advantages to the opponent through diplomatic propaganda.

d.) Hybrid warfare represents use of military and non-military methods in integrated military campaign, designed to achieve surprise in the theater of operations and psychological advantages to the opponent through diplomatic instruments and methods.

2. Analyze the differences between Hybrid and Unconventional warfare?

a.) Unconventional warfare represents one of the vital segments of irregular warfare and having in mind that by the definition irregular warfare is part of modern hybrid warfare it is more than clear that hybrid warfare is much more contemporary warfare of unconventional warfare.

b.) Unlike the unconventional warfare where over execution of combat actions can be determined the "center of gravity" of the forces in the hybrid warfare the "center of gravity" is unpredictable because the main attacks are conducted through invasion, destruction and destabilization of strategic information systems which contains information about: political, military, economic and other facilities in which the state is exposed to a hybrid war.

c.) The main difference between the hybrid and unconventional warfare is that hybrid warfare aren't always able to detect your opponent because one of the hybrid warfare components are the cyber attacks.

d.) Unlike the unconventional warfare where over execution of combat actions can be determined the "center of gravity" of the forces in the hybrid warfare the "center of gravity" is unpredictable because the main attacks are conducted through destabilization of strategic information systems.

3. Which are the essence of Hybrid operations?

- a.) The essence of Hybrid operations are using soft and hard power of offence sequential to defense.
- b.) The essence of Hybrid operations are using offence of: DIME tools, Unconventional and security forces, Cyber, Private and Civil society capabilities sequential to vital functions of modern society.
- c.) The essence of Hybrid operations are using offence hard and soft power concurrent to defense power of one modern society.
- d.) The essence of Hybrid operations are using offence of: DIME tools, Unconventional and security forces, Cyber and Civil society capabilities sequential to vital functions of modern society.

4. Which are the Operational phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis?

- a.) Operational phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis includes: Strategic preparation and vulnerability points; Establishing loyal NGOs and media in target country; encouraging political dissatisfaction in the target country; strengthening local separatist movements; establishing contacts with local business people; contacts with local organized crime groups;
- b.) Operational phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis includes: Strategic preparation and vulnerability points; Establishing loyal NGOs and media in target country; encouraging political dissatisfaction in the target country; strengthening local separatist movements; contacts with local organized crime groups; coordinated political pressure;
- c.) Operational phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis includes: Strategic preparation and vulnerability points; Establishing loyal NGOs and media in target country; encouraging political dissatisfaction in the target country; strengthening local separatist movements; establishing contacts with local business people; contacts with local organized crime groups; coordinated political pressure;
- d.) Operational phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis includes: Strategic preparation and vulnerability points; encouraging political dissatisfaction in the target country; strengthening local separatist movements; contacts with local organized crime groups; coordinated political pressure;

5. Which are the Offensive phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis?

- a.) Offensive phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis was divided on this activities: massive anti-government protests, media launches a strong disinformation campaign; disabling central power by capturing administrative buildings; establishing communication monopoly; establishing alternative political power; replacing administrative organs of the central power; strengthens the legitimacy of the new political bodies.

b.) Offensive phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis was divided on this activities: massive anti-government protests, media launches a strong disinformation campaign; disabling central power by capturing administrative buildings; establishing alternative political power; replacing administrative organs of the central power; strengthens the legitimacy of the new political bodies.

c.) Offensive phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis was divided on this activities: massive anti-government protests; disabling central power by capturing administrative buildings; establishing communication monopoly; establishing alternative political power; replacing administrative organs of the central power; strengthens the legitimacy of the new political bodies.

d.) Offensive phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis was divided on this activities: massive anti-government protests, media launches a strong disinformation campaign; disabling central power by capturing administrative buildings; replacing administrative organs of the central power; strengthens the legitimacy of the new political bodies.

6. Which are the Consolidation phases of Hybrid warfare during the Ukrainian crisis?

a.) Consolidation phase can be described as follows: political stabilization of the outcome, organizing a 'referendum' and decision about independence; separation of the captured territory from the target country; limitation of the strategic freedom of movement, loss of territory; enable full control over its territory.

b.) Consolidation phase can be described as follows: political stabilization of the outcome, organizing a 'referendum' and decision about independence; separation of the captured territory from the target country; limitation of the strategic freedom of movement, loss of territory; enable full control over its territory; the attacked country is unable to join any political or military alliance.

c.) Consolidation phase can be described as follows: political stabilization of the outcome, organizing a 'referendum' and decision about independence; separation of the captured territory from the target country; limitation of the strategic freedom of movement, loss of territory; the attacked country is unable to join any political or military alliance.

d.) Consolidation phase can be described as follows: political stabilization of the outcome, organizing a 'referendum' and decision about independence; separation of the captured territory from the target country; limitation of the strategic freedom of movement; enable full control over its territory.



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