



**THE NAME ISSUE**

# Greece and Macedonia

# **NAME DISPUTE BETWEEN GREECE AND MACEDONIA**

(STUDENT PROJECT)

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*I had the chance to see works of Macedonian art,  
beautiful icons and ceramics from Ohrid and other places.  
I am especially touched by the survival of Macedonia,  
which has been surrounded by stronger neighbors  
for centuries...*

***Martin Bernal***

*April 2009*



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## P R E F A C E

This project came as a result of a proposal made by the second year law students from the Faculty of law “Justinianus Primus” in Skopje. They put forward the idea during the lectures on *Political system* held in March 2002. Almost simultaneously, the fourth year students, who were attending the courses in *Constitutional law – applied programme* and *Comparative Constitutional law*, accepted the idea spontaneously and enthusiastically.

During the lectures, the students told me: “*Professor, we would like to know something more about the core of the dispute between Greece and Macedonia related to the name of our country. As students we cannot be indifferent to any essential issue for our country, especially not when it comes to this dispute which has been such a burden to the public and to our conscience for over a decade. Therefore, we would like to get more insight into the reasons for this dispute and the ways of overcoming it, without insulting the Republic of Greece or humiliating the Republic of Macedonia*”.

The idea was accepted and methodology was determined which was supposed to shed more light on the dispute and to enable the students to create their own opinion about this issue. The classroom busted with impatience and enthusiasm to embark on such a task which was voluntarily suggested.

This provided the students with the possibility to feel part of something very important and to consider themselves as factors that bear responsibility for the future of their country. They immediately realized that they would need several independent sources in order to be able to reveal the truth. The truth was more attractive to them than false patriotism (*Amicus patria, sed magis amica veritas*).

The first thing to be analyzed was the *International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 122*, of 10 December 2001, especially the title: “*The Macedonian name: why is the dispute important and how to resolve it?*” Being the first that organized a public debate on the Ohrid Framework Agreement in September 2001, the Democratic Union encouraged the same type of debate in the Republic of Macedonia related to this document at the beginning of 2002. Bearing that in mind, the students wanted to voice their opinions and attitudes related to various historical and current issues contained in the copious ICG document.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> ICT Balkans Report No. 122; December, 10 2001

After getting familiar with the ICG Report, the students decided to talk with Edward Joseph, who is the ICG representative for Macedonia. They had a lot of questions for him and they wanted to present him their standpoints and opinions about the proposals made in the Report, as well as to know something more about the authors of the document. What made Edward Joseph even more appealing to the students was the statement he made in public: "*I am the ICG for Macedonia!*"<sup>2</sup>

The students were interested in the question: *Are the proposals contained in the Report made by the ICG or they come from individuals who are not ICG members?* That was the first question they had. It explains the reasons why they wanted to meet the Representative of this Report for the country. At that time, people in Macedonia were ignorant of the fact that Edward Joseph used to be a senior manager of the Stenkovec - 1 refugee camp situated in the proximity of Skopje during the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia or that he had previously been in Bosnia as a NATO soldier either.<sup>3</sup>

The meeting with Mr. Joseph took place on 21 March 2002, at the premises of the Faculty of law "Iustinianus Primus" in Skopje; the atmosphere was rather academic and it abounded with curiosity and tolerance in regards to the opposing views. After the introduction that Mr. Joseph made, the students put forward their remarks concerning the Report, and then asked him to express his opinion on large number of issues related to the document. That is how this project started. A decision was made to include several interlocutors, to read several different sources and also to include Greek attitudes as well as the attitudes of other foreign authors who research Macedonia both from historical and contemporary aspect.

Three years later, when the mediator Mathew Nimitz brought forward the first proposal in November 2005, the second group of students, who attended the lectures on *Political System, Constitutional law – applied programme* and *Comparative Constitutional law* in the academic 2005/06, got involved in the project. These students were much more familiar with the nature of the dispute and due to that reason they were able to present some critical remarks in relation to the first proposals made by Nimitz.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Edward Joseph, "*I am the ICG for Macedonia!*"; ZUM, 8 March, 2002, p. 13

<sup>3</sup> "Vreme leci rane" (Time is a great healer), Politika, 5 May, 2007, p. 11

<sup>4</sup> "*The official proposal about the name*" by the mediator Mathew Nimitz, 9 November, 2005

Some of these students participated in the analysis of the second proposal made by Nimitz on 19 February 2008. In comparison to the proposal made in 2005, this one complicates further the Macedonian identity and the future of Macedonia as a state. Moreover, this proposal requires adoption of a special resolution by the UN Security Council on changing the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*, which is something very similar to the *Framework Agreement* of 2001.<sup>5</sup>

The same group of students also participated in the analysis of the third proposal made by Nimitz on 26 March 2008. The public as well as the Prime Minister and the President of the country were much more in favor of this proposal and that was the attitude they had before the Macedonian delegation went to Bucharest.<sup>6</sup>

This group of students worked with huge interest and enthusiasm on the selection of texts dedicated to the Greek veto which prevented Macedonia from joining NATO due to the unsolved name dispute. With a view to illuminating the dispute, we published the NATO Declaration from the Bucharest Summit that took place on 3 April 2008, which you will find contained in this book.<sup>7</sup>

The text of the book is voluminous and it is composed of a preface, introduction, three parts, epilogue and an index of personal names. The *Preface* outlines how the project was born, the conditions under which it was carried out as well as the objectives it is aimed at. The *Introduction* is preceded by a *List of participants* in the project, the *Contents* of the book, as well as the *List of acronyms* that appear in the text. The *Introduction* shows the attractiveness of the name “Macedonia” to the students and their wish to help their country.

The *First part* contains historical, cultural, political, commercial and legal aspects of the subject of the dispute.

The *Second part* outlines analysis of the proposals related to the name as well as analysis of the issues related to the war that Macedonia was faced with in 2001.

The *Third part* gives documents that are relevant to the dispute over the name and the Greek veto imposed at the Bucharest Summit on 3 April 2008.

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<sup>5</sup> “*The document containing the proposals made by Nimitz*”, 22 February, 2008, p. 3

<sup>6</sup> “*The proposal made by Nimitz*”, from 26 March, 2008; Utrinski Vesnik, 29 March 2008

<sup>7</sup> *Bucharest Summit Declaration*; <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>

The *Epilogue* contains the conclusions drawn by the students in relation to the project. It has been approved of by all the participants following a debate that was organized; during the debate all the participants were given the opportunity to make specific remarks and comments. The *Index* contains approximately 560 names of people who appear in the text.

The First and the Second part are divided into several sections. Each section contains source texts, student essays and talks (interviews). The *texts* elucidate the aspects of the dispute, the *essays* outline students' views, while the *interviews* explain certain issues better through vivid conversation, description of the interlocutor and his/her attitude towards the topic and the students. The *documents* contained in the third part have been chronologically arranged ranging from 1913 to 2008 (from Bucharest to Bucharest?!).

The titles and the headings have been formulated collectively by the editors of this book according to the topic and the contents of the project. The copyrights of the texts are fully protected by giving the names and surnames of the authors as well as the time and the place of their creation.

The project was conceived of during the lectures, through paper works (essays) and through the lively debate in which more than 60 students participated. In their spare time, the students were getting familiar with the source literature, they visited a great number of institutions and other places where they had conversations with many people and translated lots of texts and documents from English and Greek into Macedonian. They paid the notaries who authenticated those translations and proved their correctness. They hired a professional who edited the text for they wanted it to be understandable, accessible to the Macedonian public and suitable for other Macedonian students who would like to participate in the project in future.

The biggest part of the work related to the project was done by the second year students Elizabeta Spirovska and Biljana Sekulovska; they were part of the first group of students who have already finished their studies in law. From the second group, the students from the fourth year Dimche Apasiev and Vladimir Patchev have been especially active and dedicated to the project. They are also members of the editorial board of this project. The contribution made by excellent fourth year students Zorica Velkovska and Ana Shajnoska are also worth mentioning. The commitment and the determination of Borche Razmoski, who already works as a lawyer in Vevchani, has also been of great importance.

This topic is a huge challenge. This type of research demands great dedication and moral strength, a lot of time and persistence to enter places that are not accessible to everyone. Some ICG members, public figures and university professors refused to talk with the students, while some of them accepted after a lot of insistence.

The participants in this project will be happy if the reader finds a stimulus in this book for further research into this topic and for a possible solution to the problem which will be favorable for both sides. The Republic of Macedonia and Greece should find strength to settle their differences, to embrace the common future they have and to try to build together even a more famous and brighter history than the one they had in the Antiquity.

This project has neither started nor put an end to the research related to the name dispute. The fact that the students demonstrate interest in this topic and that they try to find a way out from the deadlock is a very positive signal; no one else is more indicated than them for achieving this because they have time and they are young. They have a deeper sense for morality and justice because they act freely and straightforwardly, without fake patriotism and pressure from the outside.

The publication of this book in Greek and in Albanian ensures that the debate over Macedonia is experienced in other milieus, especially in the universities in Greece and in Europe. That is the reason why the Teachers' Council of the Faculty of law "Iustinianus Primus" in Skopje approved of the printing of this book.

I cordially thank all the interlocutors who took part in the project as well as the authors whose texts, selected by the students, have been published in this book. I would also like to thank the Public Enterprise Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia which, without any hesitation, was willing to publish this book at the right time.

Macedonia should continue to develop as a prosperous and democratic state with its own identity within the European Union. The European Union is a union of identities not of states! This is the most important message sent by the students and addressed to all the factors involved in the process of finding solution to the dispute over the name of our country.

Skopje, May 2008

Professor Svetomir Shkaric

PRAZNA

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **ATTRACTIVENESS OF MACEDONIA TO STUDENT SPIRIT**

PRAZNA

# MACEDONIA<sup>1</sup>

## About the name

Ancient sages considered that the name determined and proved existence. There is no such a thing in the world that does not have a name nor is there a name without significance! If that is true, then Macedonia, the country that has continuously borne this name for 2 500 years, has existed for two millennia and a half:

- in spite of the centuries and epochs that have passed;
- in spite of the innumerable peoples that marched through it or settled there;
- in spite of the various languages in which its name was uttered with difficulty;
- in spite of the great empires that spread over its territory and tore it into pieces, but also in the same time ennobled it.

Today, Macedonians still believe, perhaps more than any other people in the world, in the power of name.

## About the country

If the Balkans is thought to be the crossroads of the world, then Macedonia is considered the crossroads of the Balkans – the place where the Good and the Evil meet – great armies, wise thinkers and enlightened apostles.

Macedonia is not a suitable place for those who are seeking peaceful and prosperous life, ever – lasting wellbeing, or a place where law and order are a must. This is a country for those who know how to love no matter if they are frightened, hungry or oppressed. This is a country for those who sacrifice their bread and wealth for Truth, for sincere Gratitude, for a good Word or a Song coming from someone with generous heart and good intentions.

---

<sup>1</sup>The author of this text is Dr. Nikos Chaushidis. He works as a professor at the Institute of Art History and Archaeology at the Faculty of Philosophy, St. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje. He teaches *museology and conservation, archaeology and history of Macedonian culture*. He was born in Tashkent, former Soviet Union. He is the author of several works: "Mythical Pictures of The South Slavs" (*Mit ski sliki na Ju`nite Sloveni*) (1994), "Macedonia Cultural Heritage" (*Makedonija - kul t urno nasledst vo*) (1995), "Dual Pictures - The Bogomil Movement Expressed through Pictures" (*Dual isti -ki sliki - Bogomil st vot o vo medi umot na sl i kat a*). The text has been taken from the Preface to the multimedia CD "Macedonian Values" (*Makedonski vrednost i*), Skopje 1999.

Macedonian soil is not fertile for those who are vain and egotistic and who admire the things that they, as individuals or as part of the community, achieved – magnificent palaces, formidable fortresses or vaults full of gold. Throughout the centuries, Macedonia ironically and by fighting ridiculous wars reminds us of the insignificance of the wealth that we inherit from previous generations, the evanescent power and beauty. Macedonia mercilessly destroys everything that its people have obtained and achieved, pushing them towards a new beginning – a beginning which will prevent them from thinking, in all their fascination for the glitters of power and richness, that they are gods and heroes instead of being ordinary people and its children.

The history has shown that Macedonia is too important and too precious to belong to someone or to be part of something. Actually, the whole of its historical destiny has been founded on that very concept – it has constantly been a target for many peoples and warriors but none of them managed to get and retain possession of it. That is why today, just like throughout the centuries, several countries share the territory of Macedonia, but it belongs only to those who love it, who feel they are piece of it and who call themselves after it.

### **About the sacrifice**

Macedonia is one of those places in the World to which identity is intrinsic. Since it has always existed as such or longer than anything around us, no one has the right to take permanent possession of it. Only those who identify themselves with it and thus become part of it can have it. Over the centuries that passed, Macedonia saw many people travelling across it or settling there: mighty tribes, invincible kingdoms whose names today echo throughout the world history:

- Persia, Rome, Byzantine Empire, Turkey....
- Celts, Sarmatians, Huns, Goths, Slavs....
- Avars, Bulgarians, Serbs, Normans.....

Regardless of their power and tradition, they were all faced with two possibilities:

- to remain what they are but to renounce Macedonia or
- to take possession of it by becoming part of it and sacrificing their own name in return. The majority of them opted for their own name. That is why they either only passed through it or ruled over it for a short time as strangers. Those who, on the other hand, decided to seize Macedonia had to give their own name as a pledge, simply merged with what they conquered.

### **About the people**

Which is the most essential thread of people's identity? Is it the Name, the Language, the Blood, the Genes, the Faith, the Land? Certainly it is the blend of all these.

Living at the crossroads of the world and history, the Macedonian people look like a picturesque mosaic composed of innumerable cubes of different kinds, color and origin. That diversity sustained Macedonian identity through space and time.

- According to their name Macedonians are descendants of the glorious ancient Macedonians, for the first time mentioned on the Balkans some 2700 years ago.

- According to their language, their ancestors are the Slavs, who came to the Balkans from Central and Eastern Europe 1500 ago.

- They are Orthodox Christians, one of the first in Europe with their eyes always turned to Constantinople and the Holy land of Israel; they are thought of as both native people living on the Balkans and Slavic settlers of this part of the world.

### **About the symbol**

Many have tried to immortalize Macedonia with lasting symbols but each time they wanted to do that they faced resistance. The reason is rather simple – people who feel part of Macedonia subconsciously perceive it first and foremost as a symbol of its own and then as anything else. And symbols, as we all know, cannot be symbolized by other symbols. The Macedonian, like anyone elsewhere in the world, calls its motherland ***Mother Macedonia*** and in this case the symbolic relationship implies even additional power – the power stemming either from the sound of the first two syllables or from the fact that Macedonia held in its warm embrace many different peoples, giving them home, education and shelter.

### **About the history**

Being Macedonian or living in Macedonia means that history is an inseparable part of one's life. This connection does not mean scientific relationship or a relationship proven by the existence of museums or ancient monuments popularized through travel booklets or brochures. It is rather a matter of 'vibrant history' which all Macedonian experience. For example, a Macedonian peasant turns his field into a museum of ancient stone artifacts by discovering those artifacts while cultivat-

ing the soil. He spontaneously identifies the characters these ancient monuments display as saints and includes them in his calendar rituals. Even today “clairvoyant people” in this country can find ancient temples in places they that have seen in their dreams. Then, they pray and light candles in the ruins they found as if they were in a church. Superstitious women in Macedonia very often offer gifts to the nature for happiness and fertility in the family. They usually place their gifts either near springs or caves, next to other things their fellow countrywomen left a thousand or two thousand years ago. In Macedonian villages, it is completely normal to keep the corn in huge roman jars dug out by our ancestors many years ago.

For a Macedonian – either an ordinary person or a researcher – the past, the history, the ancient buildings and artifacts are not just scientific exhibits but they are also part of his everyday life, existence and truth.

**PART ONE**

**DISPUTE OVER THE NAME *MACEDONIA*  
WITH GREECE**

PRAZNA

# 1

## HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF THE DISPUTE

### MACEDONIAN IDENTITY

### PARTITIONING OF MACEDONIA (1913)

“I am Macedonian and 2.5 million Greeks feel they are Macedonians; that is the reason why this issue cannot be considered unilaterally”

**Kostas Karamanlis**, January 2007

## ETHNIC IDENTITY OF MACEDONIANS<sup>2</sup>

### Ancient Macedonia – a region of archaeological research

The last couple of decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century represent a new era of research in Ancient Macedonia. Before that, researches had been conducted predominantly in Athens, Knossos, Mycenae, Corinth and Delphi.

Up to the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Ancient Macedonia was regarded as a supplementary part of Greek history and scientific circles did not show much interest in it. Science was mostly focused on its military commanders Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon as well as on the role they played in the diffusion of the *Hellenistic culture* within their intercontinental empire. The mission of these Macedonian military commanders aimed at civilizing other nations and was more closely studied by German scientists in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. *“The ‘mission’ was the notion prevalent in German scholarship that it was Philip and Alexander’s destiny to propagate Hellenic unity and to spread the higher culture of the Greeks among the more backward peoples of the world. It was a civilizing mission. It had little to do with Macedon or Macedonian history except insofar as that northern race had produced two men whose historical impact was undeniable.”*<sup>3</sup>

A turning point in researches into the archaeological heritage of Ancient Macedonia was heralded when the royal tomb in Aigai (Kutlesh/Vergina) was found in 1977 – 78 by the Greek archaeologist Manolis Andronikos, as well as with the discovery of archaeological findings in Dion, Naoussa, Pella and Sind in the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: *“The obscurity of Macedonia has ended. There has been revealed a culture more sophisticated in the later periods than we had heretofore suspected”*.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The co – authors of this texts are PhD Svetomir Shakric and PhD Gjogje Ivanov. It has been taken from the book “Political Theories - The Antiquity” (*Политички теорији - Антиќа*), a political science coursebook used at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus”, St. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Eugene N. Borza, “In the Shadow of Olympus - The Emergence of Macedon” (*Во сенќајќа на Олимп - Појавата на Македон*); Patria, Skopje, 2004, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

The interest in exploring Ancient Macedonia significantly grew after the emergence of the dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia over the name of the latter in the period following the disintegration of Former Yugoslavian Federation in 1991. Contemporary politics made Ancient Macedonia more attractive than ever, which was something that neither archaeology nor history managed to achieve: “*What was required for a deeper understanding of Macedon and its kings were serious source studies and archaeology, but archaeological interest remained dormant for decades because twentieth – century interest in Macedonia sprang from modern politics rather than from the study of antiquity*”.<sup>5</sup>

Something that also stirred up the study of Ancient Macedonia was the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. That process provided for better conditions for more thorough and more objective study of both Ancient Macedonia and the ethnic identity of the ancient Macedonians, hence the vehement denial of the name of the Republic of Macedonia by the Greeks.

A similar parallel was drawn between the Germans and the Slavs at the beginning of the Middle Ages. For a very long time, the Germans did not allow the Slavs to write their own history because they were afraid that the truth might surface and that is history as a science: “*Only full national and political independence of the Slavic peoples can make their history part of the science and raise their awareness about their ethnic distinctiveness*”.<sup>6</sup>

### **Ethnic Identity of the Ancient Macedonians**

The ethnic identity of the ancient Macedonians has been a contentious issue in scientific circles. There are two opposing standpoints related to this: the first one assumes that the ancient Macedonians are of Greek origin, while according to the second they are separate people – different from the ancient Greeks and from other peoples who lived on the Balkans.

1) Those who are in favor of the view that the Macedonians are of Greek origin are predominantly recent Greek historians. According to the Greek position, there are archaeological findings which prove

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 9

<sup>6</sup> Nikolai Alekseevich Osokin, “History of the Middle Ages” (*История средних веков*), Ast, Moscow, Harvest, Minsk – 2005; p. 298

that the ancient Macedonians spoke Greek language. Macedonian kings regarded themselves as descendants of the Greek king Argus (from Peloponnese), they took part in pan-Hellenic events, the royal court was Hellenized to a large degree, there was a significant Greek influence on art and customs, as well as on personal names and toponyms.<sup>7</sup>

The Greek archaeologist Manolis Andronikos holds a similar view. On the basis of the epigraphic evidence from Aigai, Andronikos claims that the Macedonians are a Greek tribe: *“In the most unambivalent way this evidence conforms the opinion of those historians who maintain that the Macedonians were a Greek tribe, like all the others who lived on Greek territory, and shows that the theory that they were of Illyrian or Thracian descent and were Hellenized by Philip and Alexander rests on no objective criteria.”*<sup>8</sup>

The contemporary Greek politics fully agrees with Andronikos’s attitude. It is believed that Ancient Macedonia is an integral part of Greece and that the Macedonians are Greeks because their names were Greek. That is the message that Andronikos addresses to the visitors of the museum in Aigai (Vergina).

2) Among those who supported the opinion that the ancient Macedonians were a distinct people were Herodotus and Thucydides; nowadays the same attitude is held by a larger group of contemporary historians from numerous countries. The most ardent defender of this attitude is Eugene Borza: *“They made their mark not as a tribe of Greeks or other Balkan peoples, but as Macedonians. This was understood by foreign protagonists from the time of Darius and Xerxes to the age of Roman generals.”*<sup>9</sup>

The customs and the language of the ancient Macedonians most clearly indicate their ethnic identity. The evidences which show that the Macedonians had their own language, distinct from other languages originate from the time of Alexander III of Macedon; in those evidences Macedonian is mentioned as a separate language. The distinctiveness of the customs has also been proved by several archaeological researches in Aigai, Pella and Sind. These findings confirm that the Macedonian language was different from ancient Greek which was used at the

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<sup>7</sup> Eugene N. Borza, “In the Shadow of Olympus - The Emergence of Macedon” (*Во сенката на Олимп - Појавата на Македон*); Patria, Skopje, 2004, p. 101.

<sup>8</sup> Manolis Andronikos, *Vergina*; Athens, 1984, p. 73.

<sup>9</sup> Eugene N. Borza, “In the Shadow of Olympus - The Emergence of Macedon” (*Во сенката на Олимп - Појавата на Македон*); Patria, Skopje, 2004, pp.107, 108.

Macedonian royal court and as a language of diplomacy. The total number of 100 to 200 authentic Macedonian words which do not exist in Greek proves the above mentioned: “*In this respect Macedonian seems closer to Illyrian and Thracian than to the Greek dialects*”.<sup>10</sup>

Herodotus claims that the language of Krestons – a Macedonian tribe – differs from the language of all other tribes who lived in their vicinity. According to him, it was a language he could not understand, which is why he classified it as a foreign or barbarian language.<sup>11</sup>

Nowadays, there is even greater number of evidence in favor of the distinctiveness and separateness of the Macedonian language: “*The fact that Macedonian is different from the language of the Hellenes was proved during the trial of Philotas in 330 BC, when he decided to speak Greek so that those who are not Macedonians could understand him; During the feast in Marcanda in 328 BC, Alexander and Keytos had a fight and Alexander called upon his physical guard in Macedonian; Furthermore, Pseudo – Callisthenes wrote that Macedonian soldiers used to say farewell to Alexander in Macedonian – that his soldiers used to salute him in Macedonian as well as the military commander Eumenes, who was of Hellenic origin. When he was supposed to send a representative to the Macedonian called Neoptolemus in 321 BC, Eumenes assigned that task to a certain Xennias, whose mother tongue was Macedonian*”.<sup>12</sup>

Presently, the Macedonian Academy for Arts and Sciences is trying to decipher the text written on black granite stone (“*The Rosetta stone*”) found in Egypt in 1799 during Napoleon’s conquests. Today, this artifact is being kept in the British Museum, as one of the most precious evidences proving and describing the character of the Macedonian alphabet and the distinctiveness of the language of ancient Macedonians. The Rosetta stone dates back to 196 BC, the time when the Macedonian dynasty of Ptolemy ruled with Egypt. This dynasty originates from Ptolemy Soter, who was a general in the army of Alexander III of Macedon. The text found on the Rosetta stone is written in three scripts: hieroglyphic, demotic and ancient Greek. The hieroglyphic script has already been deciphered by the French scientist Champollion in 1822. It is assumed that the demotic script is actually the script of the

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 103

<sup>11</sup> Herodotus; “The History of Herodotus” (*Херодотова историја*); ZUM, Skopje, 1998; p. 57.

<sup>12</sup> Nade Proeva, “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадите*), Grafotisk, Skopje, 2004; p. 54.

ancient Macedonians: “We assume that the script that they had used is the one in which the text from the central part of the Rosetta stone is written. Nowadays, according to scientific circles that script is known as demotic script”.<sup>13</sup> The text is written from right to left, without spaces between words and sentences. It is a syllabary script (consonant – vowel pattern). Symbols for 25 consonants and 8 vowels have been identified as well as more than 160 words, the meaning of which can be found today in certain dialects of the contemporary Macedonian language.<sup>14</sup>

Archaeology provides more evidence for the customs than for the language. The most representative example of the material culture that has so far been discovered is the existence of some 70 tombs dating back to the 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. These evidences show that Macedonian customs were completely different from those typical of Greek city states (polises): “The architectural form, decoration, and burial goods of these tombs, which now number between 60 and 70, are unlike what is found in the Greek south, or even in the neighboring independent Greek cities of the north Aegean littoral (excepting Amphipolis). Macedonian burial habits suggest a different view of the after-life from the Greeks even while many of the same gods were worshiped.”<sup>15</sup>

The exhibits in the Museum of Vergina clearly depict Macedonian burial habits like burning of the dead, purification of their bones with water from silver dishes, wrapping the bones in fine cloth and putting them in a silver box placed in golden sarcophagus etc. The purification of the dead has also been indicated by the presence of golden wreaths in the shape of oak leaves as symbols of longevity of the deceased. Yellow leaves and stars with 8, 12 or 16 rays are also some of the ornaments typical of the Macedonian tradition.

There is a whole set of autochthon Macedonian customs that are unrelated to the Greek tradition. Some of them are perhaps taken from Asian or Balkans traditions which influenced the Macedonian way of life; other may be a reflection of the monarchical structure of Ancient Macedonian state, a system of ruling that Greeks abandoned many years

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<sup>13</sup> Tome Bashevski and Aristotel Tentov, “Tracing the Alphabet of the Ancient Macedonians” (*По истражување на писмојето на јазикот на античкиите Македонци*) (Appendices), XXVI2, The Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Skopje, 2005; p. 54.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 51.

<sup>15</sup> Eugene N. Borza, “In the Shadow of Olympus - The Emergence of Macedon” (*Во сенката на Олимп - Појавата на Македон*); Patria, Skopje, 2004, pp. 105, 106.

before: “*In brief, one must conclude that the similarity between some Macedonian and Greek customs and objects are not of themselves proof that the Macedonians were a Greek tribe, even though it is undeniable that on certain levels Greek cultural influences eventually became pervasive*”.<sup>16</sup>

### **Antagonism between the Macedonians and the Greeks**

Despite of the efforts that Philip and Alexander III of Macedon made to bridge the gap between the two cultures, Greeks and Macedonians remained steadfastly antipathetic toward one another with dislike of a different quality than the mutual long – term hostility shared by some Greek city – states until well into the Hellenistic period.<sup>17</sup> This antagonism can be put down to their different cultures and interests. They thought of each other as strangers using different strategies and occupying different territories: “*Both Herodotus and Thucydides describe the Macedonians as foreigners, a distinct people living outside the frontiers of the Greek city – states*”.<sup>18</sup>

During the Antiquity, Greeks considered Macedonians as non – Greek people. That is an incontestable fact! Nor can it be denied that Greeks despised Macedonians and regarded them as an inferior people. Hence, Macedonians for them were barbarians and foreigners: “*It should be emphasized that for the Hellenes all those who did not speak Greek were barbarians, a notorious fact which has very often been neglected and not taken into account. The word barbaros is actually of onomatopoeic origin: it designates a person who gabbles i.e. who speaks in a strange, unintelligible language*”.<sup>19</sup>

The Macedonians did not consider themselves to be Greeks, nor did Greeks feel that Macedonians belonged to the Greek people. Therefore, it is more difficult to prove the Hellenic identity of Macedonians than their own distinct identity.<sup>20</sup>

However, regardless of the differences, there were some similarities between the Macedonians and the Greeks due to the mutual cooperation that existed between these two peoples.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.106.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 106.

<sup>19</sup> Nade Proeva, “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадиите*), Grafo-tisok, Skopje, 2004; p. 69.

<sup>20</sup> Hammond, N.G.L.; *A History of Greece*, Oxford, 1986; pp.534, 535

The willingness of the Macedonians to accept other people and cultures is not a flaw or sign of inferiority. On the contrary, that characteristic of Macedonians is an advantage, especially if we bear in mind the vastness of Ancient Macedonia and its diversified population. It was an intercontinental and a multiethnic empire.

Pella (Postol) – the capital of Ancient Macedonia and the birth place of  
Krste Petkov Misirkov (1874 – 1926)

## MACEDONIANS AND THE BIBLE<sup>21</sup>

“And in a vision by night,  
there appeared to Paul a certain man of Macedonia,  
standing before his face, beseeching him and saying:  
‘Come over into Macedonia and save us!’”  
**Acts of the Apostles, 16, 9**

### Let us return to our roots

Many years ago, when I was a child and I used to rummage through my father’s drawers. Once I found a small Bible there. It was a Macedonian translation of the New Testament. I opened it with childlike curiosity and the first thing I noticed were the words of the Macedonian addressed to Paul the Apostle: “*Come over into Macedonia and save us!*” My knowledge of the Bible was rather modest but still sufficient to understand that that was an old book and I asked myself: “*Who is this Macedonian?*” Since I did not recall any of my elder distant relatives at that moment, the first person who came to my mind was my grandfather. Later, when I became more knowledgeable of the Bible, I found out that in the Bible I could find many ‘grandfathers’. I remember that someone told me: “*After the Jews, the Macedonians are one of the most frequently mentioned people in the Bible!*” That is why this text has been dedicated to those brave and proud people to whom we are deeply indebted for their honesty and loyalty. We are not the only ones who cherish these feelings for them; the same feels the whole world because they taught us how to preserve the moral, the character and above all the dignity.

A lot has been written about Macedonia and Macedonians. This text will not go into details related to history; instead we will rely on it only if need arises. The text reveals information contained in the Bible with regards to Macedonia and Macedonians, which will help us get a clearer picture of the issue.

### The Bible as a source

Since the Bible<sup>22</sup> provides a basis for our research, we will say something more about it. Living in a post – communist society, the

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<sup>21</sup> The author of this text is Mr. Denis Tanev – an academic painter and a postgraduate student of Antique archaeology. D. Apasiev made contact with him and invited him to take part in this student project.

perceptions that many people have of the Bible are often false and distorted since they think that it is a book full of myths. This belief dates back to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the so called 'high critique' appeared in European scientific circles. New scientific breakthroughs and information opened up new possibilities for research. All the classics (like Herodotus, Josephus Flavius, Xenophanes and others) were closely examined by the newly discovered scientific methods. The Bible, as a source of greater number of information related to Christian Europe, made no exception<sup>23</sup>. The characters, the customs, the people and the events mentioned in it were all subject of research; many historians questioned its historic authenticity, considering that there was insufficient historical and archaeological evidence of the information it contained. They thought that it had been composed of myths and that the customs that were mentioned there did not coincide with the time of the events described. For example, the existence of Adam was fiercely contested, in whom almost the whole world believes<sup>24</sup>, and the existence of Hittites (till that time the Bible had been the only book in which they were mentioned) was also denied etc. The authority of the Bible was seriously undermined.

Logically, the Jews and the Christians regarded this as an attack on their religion. However, regardless of their intentions and purposes, literary critics actually did them a favor. "*A literary historian also has to be a critic if he wants to be a true historian*" because "*a critic who would ignore the history would make wrong judgments*"<sup>25</sup>. In other words, critique can do no harm to truth, which was proved shortly after that.

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<sup>22</sup> The Bible or The Holy Scripture (which was being created for 1600 years, from 1500BC to 100AD) is considered to be the spiritual and historic heritage of the Jews and the Christians. "*All scripture is given by inspiration of God*" says Paul the Apostle (2 Timothy 3:16). The idea that the *Bible* was given by God does not imply that the man got The Holy Scripture as a final product. Theologians agree that it has both divine and human characteristics i.e. ....*but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost* (2 Peter 1:21).

<sup>23</sup> The biblical critique aimed at examining the text of the Bible according to rational scientific criteria. Some of the most remarkable thinkers and scientific workers are: P. Holbach, E. Renan, D.F. Strauss, B. Bauer, K. Kautski and of course Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. *General Encyclopedia*, Zagreb, book 1; p. 519

<sup>24</sup> More than 3 billion people. Two billion are Christians, 1200000000 are Muslims, and approximately 1500000 are Jews. Tad Szulc, *Abraham – Journey of Faith*, *National Geographic*, December 2001; p. 96.

<sup>25</sup> René Wellek and Austin Warren, "Theory of Literature" (*Теорија на книжевноста*); p. 68.

Following the ‘high critique’, archaeology appeared, especially the so-called ‘biblical archaeology’<sup>26</sup>. With the aid of its scientific methods and discoveries it provided the scientists with an answer to all their questions and critiques. Excavations and findings in the Bible countries were numerous, and a large number of expeditions discovered new information about the ancient past.

Some of those discoveries are worth mentioning. In 1799, Napoleon’s soldiers found the Rosetta stone (named after the place in which it had been discovered). This stone, which dates back to 196 BC, contains a text written in three different scripts by the Egyptian pharaoh Ptolemy V of the Macedonian dynasty, mentioned later on in this study. One of the scripts was written or carved out with Egyptian hieroglyphs, the second was the Egyptian demotic script and the third was the Alexandrian koine script, which was, in the centuries that followed, incorrectly referred to as Greek. The latter will be mentioned later in the study.

This was the key discovery in archaeology because it provided the scientists with a possibility to compare the already known koine with the hieroglyphs which in those times had not been deciphered yet. Eventually, after long and painstaking scientific research, brilliant Champollion finally managed to decipher the hieroglyphs. The discovery of the inscription of king Darius I of Persia in the languages carved out in a high rock near Baghdad is also one of the key moments in archaeology. Thanks to the two other scripts that had already been known, this inscription facilitated the decipherment of the Assyrian cuneiform which took place 22 years later. The numerous inscriptions, of which people were ignorant till then, suddenly came to light revealing the ancient past as never before. The great number of hieroglyphic inscriptions and tablets with cuneiform discovered different events, people and even customs that were till then mentioned only in the Bible.

In addition, the archaeologist Abraham L. Woolles shed light on the personality of Abraham. In the period between 1922 and 1932 he had been excavating the town of Ur mentioned in the Bible as a town of Abraham and a place where he received a message from God urging

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<sup>26</sup> William F. Albright is considered to be the father of the biblical archaeology. At the beginning of its career he did not hold a positive attitude towards *the Bible*, but as he became fascinated by the archaeological discoveries he turned into a defender of *the Bible* as an authoritative book. Zhejko Gregor; “Prehistory and Archaeology of the Bible” (*Prapovjest i Biblijska areologija*); p. 18.

him to populate the land of Canaan (The First Book of Moses – 11, 31).<sup>27</sup> This town had never before been mentioned in historiography or in any archaeological document whatsoever and that is why it was wrongly thought that it did not exist and that Abraham was an invented character. The discoveries that Woolles had made showed that even in 2000 BC the town of Ur was a prosperous and developed metropolis<sup>28</sup> right in the time of Abraham.<sup>29</sup>

It is also interesting that a plate has been found with the name of Abraham<sup>30</sup> on it. Furthermore, the existence of Hittites, which had been contested for a long time, has been proved near Bogazkoy (present - day Turkey) with the discovery of their civilization there.

That is how innumerable archaeological artifacts came to light like for example: the clay tablets from Nuzi and Amarna, the Code of Hammurabi containing descriptions of customs identical to those mentioned in the Bible, then the Pharaoh Merneptah Stele which mentions the land of Israel, the Mesha Stele as well as the Cyrus Cylinder etc. All of them attest some events mentioned in the Bible. We should not forget one of the major discoveries – the Qumran Scrolls, which fully restored the authority of the Bible as a book containing the oldest manuscripts in the world which are as valuable as modern translations are today.

Nowadays, there are also some very important discoveries like for example Jacob's coffin discovered in Jerusalem (Jacob was Christ's brother). Speaking of other discoveries, we should mention: the remnants of Egyptian carriages found in the depths of the Red Sea which are still being examined. Therefore, we can say that for the purpose of this research we are using a book with recognized historic value. Every one of us is free to reject, if they want, the spiritual values and morals contained in the Bible, but it is absolutely impossible to deny its his-

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<sup>27</sup> The quotations from the Bible have been taken from the *Holly Script (the Bible)* published by The Macedonian Orthodox Church.

<sup>28</sup> The town had wide boulevards and luxuriant two – story houses. Inside the houses, there were baths with an excellent sanitary system. There were also classrooms with preserved lessons in arithmetic and grammar. The town was ruled by written laws and well organized judiciary and had exquisite architecture, art and various crafts; Verner Keler, "The Bible is Right After All" (*Biblija je u pravo*); p. 30 – 31.

<sup>29</sup> According to the Bible chronology, Abraham was born approximately in 2170 BC; Gregor, p. 67 – 68.

<sup>30</sup> This does not mean that it was Abraham's tablet because the time when it was found follows the time of Abraham, but it still offers evidence that that was a common name in those times.

toric authenticity and significance. Moreover, if we accept its spiritual value i.e. its divine origin, the insights that we will get will be of prime importance.

### **Macedonians and the Bible**

The history of the Jewish (or Israeli) people, described in the Bible, was related to histories of other people as well. Jewish history inevitably contains information about other peoples who were either directly or indirectly involved in it. Those who are familiar with the Bible know that the Jews lost protection from God because they did not observe his laws and rules; they were defeated in 606 BC by the Babylonian Empire and then enslaved. It was after Babylon had been overwhelmed by Persia that the Jews could finally see the light at the end of the tunnel. Namely, in 457 BC King Cyrus of Persia gave an order with which all the previously enslaved people were allowed to return to their motherlands (*The Book of Ezra*, Chapter 1). The number of Jews who returned to Jerusalem and restored it (*The Book of Nehemiah*, Chapters 1 – 6), re – established the temple and re – introduced the religious service there was huge (*Ezra*, Chapters 3 – 5). However, not all of them returned; some of them remained scattered throughout the Persian Empire.

It was during the rule of the Persian king Artaxerxes when the book of Esther was created. Esther was a young Jewish girl who, according to the word of God, became the queen of Persia (*Esther* – 2, 17). The book describes the unusual turning point for the Jews in the time when they were unfairly accused of foiling a plot against the king. The accusation resulted with a decree issued by the king according to which all the Jews in the empire were supposed to be executed. The main character in the book Mordecai, Esther’s uncle, managed to make the king revoke the decree by using the influence that Esther had on her husband and saved his people from unjust execution.

There are several interesting moments in the Book of Esther which are relevant to our research. Haman, the man who brought the accusation against the Jews, is in our (Macedonian) translation known as Vugeecot Aman Amadatov (Haman the son of Hammedatha the Agagite) (*Esther* 3, 1). According to Pop – Atanasov<sup>31</sup>, the Jewish ethnonym **אגגי** (**Agagi**) has been transcribed incorrectly. According to those who

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<sup>31</sup> Pop – Atanasov, “The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians” (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонциите*); p. 52 – 53.

know the Jewish language, this expression means a **person who lives in Aege**, hence the translation Egeecot Aman Amadatov should be considered as more appropriate and precise. Aege was a Macedonian town founded around 700 BC by the Macedonian king Perdica and had been the capital of the Macedonian dynasty for a long time. The translation of Septuagint where the אגגי (**Agagi**) is also translated with μακεδων (**Macedon**) also proves that Haman was from Aege!

There is an interesting indirect connection between Macedonia and the events from the Book of Esther, Chapter 1. According to the book, the king Artaxerxes prepared a sumptuous feast for all the princes and dukes from his empire. But, according to the verses 9 – 11: “.....*the queen Vashti also made a feast for their wives in king Artaxerxes’ castle*”.

After they had been drinking and eating for several days the king ordered the queen to be brought to the feast: “.....*to show her beauty to the princes and to the people for she was amazingly beautiful. But, she did not want to obey her husband’s order.....*” There is no need to explain what would have happened to her if she had appeared before the crowd of all those men who were obviously drunk. This infuriated the king and, after he had been advised by the wise men who “.....*knew the times....*” (line 13), he decided that she would no longer be his queen (her place was later taken by Esther).

There is an interesting event related to the Macedonian kings Amynta I (495 – 452 BC) and his son Alexander I (452 – 413 BC) written down by Herodotus<sup>32</sup>. At that time, Persia had still been at war with Athens and Macedonian diplomacy played a crucial role in favor of Macedonian interests by shrewdly balancing Athens and Persia. On one occasion, Persia sent the seven most reputable dignitaries to the Macedonian royal house. At that time king Amynta ruled Macedonia. He prepared a feast for the Persians and, according to Herodotus, after they got drunk they addressed the king with the following words: “.....*Our friend from Macedonia, we have a custom to bring our wives and mistresses with us to feasts*”. Amynta replied: “*People from Persia, that is not what we do, here women are separated from men when there is a feast, but since you are our guests and your wish is our command, we will bring them to you*”. Shortly after, the guests from

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<sup>32</sup> Quoted by A. Shkokljev – S. Katin; “Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization” (*Придонесој на Македонија во светската цивилизација*), p. 72 – 74.

Persia were accompanied by women and, logically, they treated them improperly and disrespectfully. Amynta's son Alexander did not approve of such a behavior and after he persuaded his father to leave the feast he said to the Persians: "Dear guests, these women came here to keep you company.....but let them wash themselves and they will return after that". The Persians consented, Alexander saw the women off. He made several young men dress like women and hide knives in their armpits. When he showed those young men in, he addressed to the Persians: "*I think that we gave you a warm welcome and that you have been treated like kings; we even offer you our mothers and sisters in order to show that we respect you in the way you deserve*". When the Persians started caressing the young men dressed up in female clothes, the latter took the hidden knives and killed them all. The Persian royal court started an investigation, but Alexander managed to hush up the event by giving Bubares, the person who was in charge of the investigation, a huge sum of money **and his sister Gygea to be his wife.**

This event coincides with the events described in the *Book of Esther* and hence the question: "If Herodotus tells us that the Persians used to bring their wives and mistresses to celebrations and feasts and that that was not something Macedonians were accustomed to, then why did queen Vashti decide to hold a separate celebration for women if that was not a Persian custom? Why did she oppose to the vulgar order from her husband to come and show her beauty to drunken guests if that was their tradition? The answer is simple. Alexander's sister Gygea, who came to the Persian royal house as Bubares's wife, seems to have influenced other women, even the queen herself. As a result, the queen understood how humiliating this custom had been for women and decided to defy her husband. Perhaps at the beginning the king did not take this seriously and did not openly oppose to it, but with time the new custom started provoking conflicts, the culmination of which were the events described in (Chapter 1). That is why wise men who "***knew the times***" were called upon to solve the problem by referring to Persian laws. Young Gygea from Macedonia, who was far away from home, must have been extremely brave when she dared raise her voice against this shameful and humiliating custom.

### **Prophecies about Alexander III of Macedon**

The most popular Macedonian from the Bible is Alexander III of Macedon (Alexander the Great). A lot has been written about him during the Antiquity, and he also attracts the attention of contemporary

authors. There are a lot of legends about him; people tend to have different attitudes regarding his expeditions. According to U. Wilhelm and his book “*Alexander of Macedon*”, his personality and name still spark different reactions. However, it cannot be denied that his dominant personality moved the world by connecting the East with the West and his dream about converting the world into a single state with one king seems to be an ideological vision of equality and tolerance of other cultures and religions.

In the Bible, Alexander has been mentioned in some prophecies written in the *Book of the Prophet Daniel*. Daniel was a Jew who, after the devastation of Jerusalem in 538 BC<sup>33</sup> was taken to Babylon as a slave with many other people. Very soon, the king noticed his spiritual endowment. On one occasion<sup>34</sup>, Daniel was supposed to interpret a dream that king Nebuchadnezzar had. In the dream the king saw a very huge person with a golden head, silver hands and chest, copper hips, iron legs and its feet were made of mixture of iron and clay. While the king was looking at this unusual person, a rock fell from the mountain, hit its feet and the person was completely destroyed. Then the rock turned into a huge mountain. King Nebuchadnezzar, who was very excited by what he saw, wanted his dream to be interpreted. According to Daniel the dream meant that God from the Heaven wanted to tell the king what the future of the world was going to be like. The strange person he had seen represented the different kingdoms that would rule after him all over the world. The golden head represented the Babylonian Empire, silver hands and chest were Medo – Persia, the copper hips symbolized Macedonia and the iron feet were the Roman Empire. It is interesting that it was in the period designated by the feet<sup>35</sup> that the rock broke off the mountain and destroyed the person seen in the dream.

Theologians agree that this stone symbolizes the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, about which we are going to talk later in the part dedicated to Macedonians in the *New Testament*.

On another occasion (Chapter 7), the prophet Daniel had a vision of four unusual beasts: “..... *and four strange beasts emerged from the sea, all of them different from each other....*” The first beast looked

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<sup>33</sup> The city of Jerusalem was destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar, the king of Babylon.

<sup>34</sup> This event has been described in the *Book of The Prophet Daniel*, Chapter 2.

<sup>35</sup> According to some interpretations of the Bible, the feet of clay and iron symbolize modern Europe with remnants of the Roman Empire (iron), other European nations (clay) and their unification.

like a lion with wings of an eagle, the second one looked like a bear and the third like a leopard (or a **lynx** in other translations) with **four wings**. The last and the most terrifying one was a creature with ten horns. After all these beasts came the vision of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ.

After the vision, God sent him a message explaining what the vision was been about. Again the same kingdoms were mentioned like in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, but this time the emphasis was laid on the last beast (the Roman Empire) and the events following the period it designated till the end of the world.

It is worth mentioning that in this vision the Macedonian kingdom, of which Alexander was ruler, was represented as a **lynx** with four wings.

Daniel had a third vision (Chapter 8). In front of him there stood a ram with two big horns and suddenly there appeared a **goat** "*.....who came from the west over the face of the whole earth, and touched not the ground and had a notable horn between his eyes*". This goat, according to the prophecy "*..... came to the ram..... and ran upon him in the fury of his power.....and there was no power in the ram to stand before him.....And the goat magnified himself exceedingly and when he was strong, the great horn was broken; and instead of it there came up four notable horns toward the four winds of heaven*".

Daniel very soon got an interpretation of this prophecy which he had written down: "*The ram which thou saw that had the two horns, they are the Kings of Media and Persia<sup>36</sup>. And the rough goat is the King of Greece; the great horn that is between his eyes is its first king. And as for that which was broken, in the place whereof four stood up, four kingdoms shall stand up out of the nation, but not with his power*".

The quotations stated above are taken from the Macedonian translation of the Bible. This text will certainly confuse many people since they will read "*the king of Greece*". In order to illuminate the whole situation we should consult those who know the Jewish language in which the *Old Testament* was written<sup>37</sup>. In the original<sup>38</sup>, there stands **מֶלֶךְ יָוָן** (**meleh Javan**)<sup>39</sup> which means "*king Javan*".

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<sup>36</sup> It is well known in history that the kingdom which defeated the Babylonian Empire was actually composed of two kingdoms and peoples – the Medians and the Persians at it is very often referred to as Medo – Persian kingdom.

<sup>37</sup> The Jews also call it *The Law and The Prophets*. *The Old Testament of the Holy Script* contains books written in the period from 1500 BC up to 400 BC. The books from the

When it comes to the Bible, those who are experts will immediately know who this person actually is. Still, if we want to explain it we must refer back to the biblical history, more precisely to the time of the flood mentioned in the *First Book of Moses* (Chapters 6 to 9). In this book, we read about Noah who was given a task from God to create a vessel (Noah's ark) which was supposed to be a shelter for all those who wanted to protect themselves against the flood. Unfortunately, only Noah and his family responded to the God's message, including his three sons Shem, Ham and Japheth and their wives. The Noah's ark sheltered animals as well (a pair from each of them).<sup>40</sup>

After the flood had subsided<sup>41</sup>, Noah's ark stopped near the Mountain Ararat. Chapter 10 says: "*Now these are the generations of the sons of Noah, Shem, Ham, and Japheth: and unto them were sons born after the flood*"<sup>42</sup>.

"*The sons of Japheth*<sup>43</sup> *are Gomer, and Magog, and Madai, and Javan, and Tubal, and Meshech, and Tiras*".

### **The Macedonians and the Hellenes**

This genealogical chart of peoples reveals who Javan from the Daniel's prophecy was. But, logically, we will ask ourselves: Why does our translation, as well as many other translations, say "*The King of Greece*? Although the answer is simple, we will have to proceed step

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*Old Testament* describe world history in relation to the creation of the world and the Israeli people, then *holly anthems (Psalms)*, wise sayings, poetry and prophecies written down by prophets who lived and worked in different periods of the history of Israel. Certain parts of the Bible were written in Aramaic, a language very close to Jewish.

<sup>38</sup> The Jewish version of the Old Testament can be found in the *Biblical Association* in Skopje.

<sup>39</sup> The Jewish script is read from right to left!

<sup>40</sup> Apart from the Bible there is a lot of evidence, both written and oral, which prove that the flood really happened like for example the old – Assyrian *Epic of Gilgamesh* etc.

<sup>41</sup> The latest geological researches indicate that a catastrophic flood really happened long time ago and that the whole world had been affected by it. That is proved by the existence of various fossils of sea animals found in the canyons and other places where there is no water at all.

<sup>42</sup> According to the experts, the genealogical chart from Chapter 10 of the *First Book of Moses* actually gives us the names of the people that existed then and Moses knew about. Shem – Assyrians, Arameans, Phoenicians and some Arabic tribes; Ham – Ethiopians, Egyptians and others; Japheth - Northern Aryans and Indo – European peoples. Gjorgji Pop – Atanasov, "The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians" (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*), p. 25; The Times, "Bible Atlas" (*Biblijski atlas*); p. 92 – 93.

<sup>43</sup> Japheth means white (bright, beautiful)!

by step because of the well – know antagonism that exists between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece.

Firstly, we should bear in mind that the word Greeks (note: in Latin Greacus) is a relatively new and modern one. In the Antiquity they were called Hellenes (note: Achaeans/Danaans) and they lived on a territory of Achaea (the southern part of present - day Greece). It is beyond any doubt that the Macedonians were a separate people from the **Hellenes**. This has been confirmed by relevant historians<sup>44</sup>, but we are also going to state some more facts related to this issue:

1. The Macedonians worshiped different deities from the Hellenes;<sup>45</sup>
2. The Macedonia had a unique, independent mythological system;<sup>46</sup>
3. The Macedonians had different language from the Hellenes.

There is an interesting fact given by Quintius Curtius Rufus<sup>47</sup> who, during the rule of Emperor Claudius, created his work about *Alexander III of Macedon*. Describing the life of Alexander, he mentions a trial of a Macedonian called Philotas accused of conspiracy. When Alexander asked him to speak in his mother tongue, Philotas replied that it would be better if he spoke Greek so that everyone could understand him since there had been a certain number of Hellenes among those who were present. In addition, Demosthenes, the famous orator from Athens, in one of his philippics (speeches against Philip II of Macedon) refers to the Macedonians as to “Barbarians”<sup>48</sup> who speak a language that the Hellenes cannot understand. This shows that the Hellenes and the ancient Macedonians had different languages<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>44</sup> For a more thorough research into this topic consult the following books: Nade Proeva: “Studies of the Ancient Macedonians” (*Студији за Античкиите Македонци*) and “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадите*) and A. Shkokljev - Doncho and S. Nikolovski – Katin: “Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization” (*Придонесот на Македонија во светската цивилизација*).

<sup>45</sup> Nade Proeva; “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадите*); p. 98 – 138.

<sup>46</sup> Shkokljev - Katin; p.15.

<sup>47</sup> Quoted work, Pop – Atanasov: “The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians” (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*); p. 48 – 49.

<sup>48</sup> Dr. Proeva points out “the well - known fact, which is very often forgotten, saying that for the Hellenes all peoples who did not speak Greek were Barbarians. The word Barbaros is of onomatopoeic origin: it means to gabble i.e. to speak a strange, unintelligible language”. N. Proeva, “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадите*), p. 69.

<sup>49</sup> Other similar examples can be found in the work of Nade Proeva: “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадите*); p. 76 – 78.

4. The Macedonians lived on a separate territory from Greeks and had their own state and political system<sup>50</sup>. While the Hellenes used to have city – states, Macedonia, unified by Philip II of Macedon, was a unitary state with distinct monetary system in which similar tribes and peoples lived. The Hellenes, after having abandoned the concept of monarchy in the 8<sup>th</sup> century BC, established either a system of democracy or oligarchy. They were not much interested in colonizing the Macedonian state and its territory (except for the coastline).

5. After the battle of Cheronea in 338 BC Philip II defeated the Hellenes<sup>51</sup>, and as a result two tendencies emerged in Athens: one anti – Macedonian (the supporter of which was Demosthenes), the other pro – Macedonian. Demosthenes regarded those who cooperated with the Macedonians as *traitors*<sup>52</sup>.

However, we have to be objective and impartial. Namely:

1. The Hellenes who supported the pro – Macedonian tendency accepted Philip II as their ruler (or the hegemon)<sup>53</sup> as well as Alexander; it explains why they were part of his army and participated in his conquests.

2. After they had been defeated, the Hellenes who were in favor of the pro – Macedonian tendency considered Macedonia to be their country and consequently the contact between Macedonians and Hellenes was intensified;<sup>54</sup> Alexander's conquests were regarded as part of the common strategy of both Macedonians and Hellenes<sup>55</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup> Nade Proeva, "Studies of the Ancient Macedonians" (*Студији за Античкиите Македонци*), p. 28.

<sup>51</sup> What is surprising is the fact that in no other case has the winner (Macedonia) been studied as part of the defeated (the Hellenes).....; Nade Proeva, "Studies of the Ancient Macedonians" (*Студији за Античкиите Македонци*), p. 18.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* p. 31.

<sup>53</sup> The League of Corinth 338 BC. The Hellenes accepted their dependence on Macedonia; Nade Proeva, "The History of the Argeads" (*Историја на Аргеадите*); p. 240 – 245.

<sup>54</sup> However, this did not weaken the Macedonian national awareness. Namely, Plutarchus writes about an event in which Alexander's reaction caused by Greek arrogance was described. He said: "*Don't you think that the Hellenes consider themselves as half – gods among the animals?*", a quotation from Pop – Atanasov's work "The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians" (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*), p. 50.

<sup>55</sup> It is though well – known that Alexander was not very confident of them, which proved to be a correct attitude. Namely, immediately after his death in 323 BC, an anti – Macedonian tendency appeared in Athens and shortly afterwards even a rebellion broke out; A. Shkokljev – S. Katin, "Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization" (*Придонесот на Македонија во светската цивилизација*), p. 183. In addition, Plutarchus claims that the Hellenes regarded Macedonian rule as something strange and imposed on them; Nade Proeva; "The History of the Argeads" (*Историја на Аргеадите*), p. 67.

It is very probable that other peoples shared the same feeling, especially the Jews since the seventy Jewish translators who worked on the *Septuagint*<sup>56</sup> translated the noun יָוָן (Javan) with the word Ἑλλήνων (Hellenon). That is understandable if we take into consideration the fact that the Jews considered all people who did not identify themselves with Jewish culture and ethnicity as Hellenes. They even regarded their compatriots from the Diaspora as Hellenes because they adopted the Hellenic culture, which is not surprising at all since the Hellenes themselves used this expression rather as a cultural marker than as an ethnic indicator. That is why the Jewish translators of the *Septuagint* adopted this attitude. In fact, the translation itself was aimed at those Jews from the Diaspora who did not speak their mother tongue – Jewish. If we take into account the hard line Jews (for example the Maccabees/Maccabees) who were not willing to accept anything that was not part of their culture, especially something related to the Hellenes, then we will easily understand why the translation contains the word Hellenon instead of Javan. Consequently, the science wrongly accepted the attitude that the Macedonians are Hellenes<sup>57</sup>, which is completely unfounded. This brings us back to the Macedonian translation of the Bible, in which the phrase יָוָן מֶלֶךְ (meleh Javan) was wrongly<sup>58</sup> translated as “*The King of Greece*”.

However, the question why Alexander is confused with Javan is inevitable. Surely, it is not Javan, Japheth’s descendant. In the time when *The Book of the Prophet Daniel* was written (around 540 BC), the Jews were not familiar with all the kingdoms originating from Javan (here including the Macedonian kingdom as well), and that is the reason why Daniel simplified the whole situation by telling that that king would be Javan’s descendant.

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<sup>56</sup> Ptolemy II Philadelphus commissioned the translation of the *Bible* (The Old Testament) from Jewish into ‘koine’ language for the needs of the Jews from the Diaspora who did not speak their mother tongue. Seventy Jews worked on the translation and hence its name “*Septuagint*”.

<sup>57</sup> For the first time the term *Hellenism* was introduced by the German historian Droysen (1877 – 1878). A. Shkokljev – S. Katin; “Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization” (*Придонесој на Македонија во светската цивилизација*), p. 81.

<sup>58</sup> The mistake is probably due to the political circumstances of the time which categorically rejected the continuous existence of the ancient Macedonians to the present (an attitude which is, however, totally wrong and untenable).

### **Kittim – the root of the Macedonians**

Having in mind everything that we said so far, we can refer back to *the Book of the Prophet Daniel* and the genealogical chart from the *First Book of Moses* (10, 1-5). The vision of the goat which fiercely attacks the ram symbolizing the Medo – Persian kingdom also proves that Daniel’s prophecy (Chapter 8) that was mentioned above refers to Alexander III of Macedon i.e. the descendant of the Argead dynasty<sup>59</sup>. We are familiar with *the battle on the Granik River* and the glorious victory of Alexander’s army over the Persian soldiers who were greater in number, which proves that the prophecy was fulfilled. Speaking of the goat, it is well known that the white goat was symbol of the Argead dynasty<sup>60</sup>.

It is interesting what Jospheus Flavius reveals: during his conquests, when Alexander came close to Jerusalem, he met some Jewish priests there who told him about these prophecies, and that is why this town enjoyed a privileged status within the Macedonian Empire.

The conquests and the territorial gains achieved by the Macedonian army led by Alexander and his generals, was an unprecedented event of which history took notice; this event confirmed the prophecy: “.....came..... over the face of the whole earth, and touched not the ground”, which symbolically depicts how rapid and far – reaching the conquests of the Macedonian army were.

As for the genealogical chart, we read: “*And the sons of Javan are; Elishah, and Tarshish, Kittim, and Dodanim*” and then further on: “.....By these were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands; every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations”.

In one of the apocryphal books<sup>61</sup>, *The First Book of Maccabees* (1, 1) it is written: “*Alexander son of Philip, the Macedonian, came out of the land of Chettiim and had smitten Darius....*” Again we notice a mistranslation of the word *Chettim*. Instead of *the land of Chettim* it should be *the land of Kittim!*<sup>62</sup> Even though the author of the *First*

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<sup>59</sup> One of the Macedonian tribes; The Argeads were the ancestors of Alexander III of Macedon (Alexander the Great).

<sup>60</sup> A. Shkokljev – S. Katin; “Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization” (*Придонесој на Македонија во светската цивилизација*), p.71.

<sup>61</sup> Apocrypha means ‘secret’. Those were books of uncertain and suspicious authenticity. The Jews did not include them in the Bible, but they were used as sources of historical data.

<sup>62</sup> Pop – Atanasov; “The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians” (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*), p. 31 – 45.

*Book of Maccabees* is unknown, he reveals that Alexander should be brought in relation to Kittim, one of the Javan's sons. It is worth mentioning that Kittim is wrongly associated with Crete because of a town with a similar name, **Kyltion**, located on Crete. There was a town named **Kition** (Kittim) in Macedonia close to the town of Aege<sup>63</sup>, which means that it is possible that some settlers from Macedonia had founded the town of Kyltion on Crete.

According to this, Macedonia is the country of the ancestor Kittim who settled that area and from whom kindred Macedonian tribes originated including the Argeads and their royal dynasty.

Another interesting fact is that according to Pop – Atanasov Kittim should be read as *Skittim* and this name should be brought in relation to the **Scythians** who had later been related to the Slaves by certain authors<sup>64</sup>.

### **Prophecies about the victory over the town of Tyre**

We should also mention some other prophecies from the Bible indirectly related to Alexander III of Macedon. In the *Book of the prophet Ezekiel* (26, 12 – 14) there is an interesting text which foresees the devastation of the Phoenician town of Tyre. The text says: “.....*And they shall make a spoil of thy riches, and they shall break down thy walls, and destroy thy pleasant houses, and they shall lay thy stones and thy timber and thy dust in the midst of the water*”. Although at the beginning it was thought that the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar<sup>65</sup> (*Ezekiel*, 26, 7) was supposed to destroy the town, the prophecy was finally fulfilled with the siege and the defeat of Tyre by Macedonian soldiers.

It seemed as if Tyre had been an invincible town. Namely, one part of the town was situated along the Phoenician coast, while the other was on the near – by island. When invading armies would attack the city, its citizens used to take shelter on the island, while the invaders were hopelessly trying to seize the invincible town. That was because the soldiers, if they wanted to reach the island, had to use vessels that they either did not have or, if they had any, they were an easy target

<sup>63</sup> Alfred De la Coulonche; “The Cradle of Macedonian State hood” (*Лулкаџа на македонската државност*), p. 60.

<sup>64</sup> A. Shkokljev – S. Katin; “Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization” (*Придонесот на Македонија во светската цивилизација*).

<sup>65</sup> He had kept the town of Tyre under siege for 13 years, but he never managed to conquer it.

for the defenders of Tyre. The Macedonian army had the same problem. However, Alexander and his generals came up with a brilliant idea: they threw the stones which they found on the coastline in the water in order to create a stone passage to the island. Alexander issued an order to his soldiers to **“lay the stones and the timber and the dust in the midst of the water”**. Thus, he connected the island to the coast and shortly after Alexander’s soldiers conquered the city. The fourth and the fifth verse of the same Chapter of the *Book of the Prophet Ezekiel* say: **“And they shall destroy the walls of Tyre,..... I will also scrape her dust from her, and make her like the top of a rock. It shall be a place for the spreading of nets in the midst of the sea; for I have spoken it, said the Lord God....”**

Today, if you go the place where Tyre once was, there you will encounter a small fishing settlement with fishing nets spread all over the place, although there are ideal conditions that settlement to grow into a big city; and if you look carefully at the sea you will notice the stone remnants of the ancient town of Tyre which Macedonian soldiers threw into the water in order to ease their access to the part of the town situated on the island. You will also see the peninsula, which had once been an island, conquered by Alexander III of Macedon.

### **The pride of the Goat**

Let us now return to the prophecy about the goat from the *Book of the Prophet Daniel* (Chapter 8). After the foreseen victory and the outstanding success, we read: **“And the goat magnified himself exceedingly and when he was strong, the great horn was broken; and instead of it there came up four notable horns toward the four winds of heaven”**. The Bible always depicted the characters realistically as they really were without idealizing them, even when portraying key figures like David, the most famous and glorious Jewish king. Even though he is described as a loyal and brave king who firmly believed in God, his mistakes were explicitly mentioned in the Bible<sup>66</sup> and just like Paul the Apostle said: **“..... it is useful for teaching”**<sup>67</sup>.

The same can be said of Alexander – the Bible says that he became arrogant. What kind of arrogance was that and how was it manifested?

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<sup>66</sup> See “Kingdoms” *Царствѹа* 11 – 12 and *Psalms* 50.

<sup>67</sup> The *second Epistle to Timothy*, 3, 16.

According to historiography<sup>68</sup>, several answers to this question are possible. It is well known that when Alexander conquered Persia, he dressed like a Persian king in order to establish a closer relationship with the Persian people<sup>69</sup>. He also allowed them, in accordance with Persian laws, to worship him as a *divine king*; that caused bitterness among Macedonian soldiers and officials who accompanied him. Eventually, a compromise was reached by which the Macedonians were not expected to respect him in such a manner.

In addition, we know that when Alexander came to Babylon he got so impressed by the city that he wanted it to become the capital of his Empire. There is a prophecy about Babylon in *The Book of Jeremiah* (51, 37 – 39): “*Babylon shall become heaps,..... without inhabitants*”; those inhabitants: “*will sleep a perpetual sleep, and not wake*”. In another prophecy written in *the Book of Isaiah* (13, 19 – 21) we read: “*And Babylon, the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldees’ excellency, shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah*” and the text continues: “*.....It shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation;..... but wild beasts of the desert shall lie there; and their houses shall be full of doleful creatures; and owls shall dwell there, and satyrs shall dance there.....and her time is near to come, and her days shall not be prolonged*”.

This prophecy had not yet been fulfilled in the time when Alexander came to Babylon. We can only speculate on whether he knew about these prophecies. However, there is a strong possibility that he was familiar with them because, like we already said, he had contact with the Jews. However, the idea that Babylon should become the capital of the newly crated kingdom was part of the above mentioned prophecies which later on came true. Today, if we go to the place where the old city of Babylon was, the only thing we will see will be its ruins with owls nesting there.

### **Macedonia after Alexander**

Shortly afterwards, like it was said in the prophecy: “*the great horn was broken; and instead of it there came up four notable horns toward the four winds of heaven*”.<sup>70</sup> Alexander unexpectedly died in

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<sup>68</sup> According to Quintius Curtius Rufus and Theophrastus the glory and the power spoil him and he became a tyrant. Nade Proeva: “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадите*), pp. 37 and 41.

<sup>69</sup> Fanula Papazoglu, “Hellenic History” (*Историја на Хеленистичкиот период*), p. 163.

<sup>70</sup> *Daniel*, 8, 8

Babylon at the age of 33 under mysterious circumstances. His kingdom was divided among his four generals (the Diadochi), who split the conquered territory into four parts. Cassander ruled in Macedon and Achaia (Greece) which was liberated from Macedonian domination only after the wars between the Macedonians and the Romans; the Romans conditioned the Macedonians not to interfere with the domestic affairs of the Achaeans. In addition, Lysimachus ruled in Asia Minor, Seleucus in Syria where he laid the foundations of the Seleucid dynasty and Ptolemy ruled in Egypt where he founded the Ptolemaic dynasty.

This proves that the already mentioned prophecy was completely fulfilled: “*And as for that which was broken, in the place whereof four stood up, four kingdoms shall stand up out of the nation, **but not with his power***”. This last part of the quotation describes the difference between the rule of Alexander and his successors. Unlike Alexander, whose dream was to unify the world by creating a single culture and better living conditions for every person in the world, they disunited it and were often at war with each other. Some of these rulers proved to be tyrants by imposing their culture and religion on other peoples. A typical example of such a ruler was Antiochus Epiphanes of the Seleucid dynasty who forcefully imposed his culture on the territories he conquered including Israel. He once entered a temple in Jerusalem by force, killed all the priests and offered a pig as a sacrifice. This behavior of Antiochus infuriated the Jews, who were constantly rising up in rebellions against his rule. Eventually, the Jews, led and assisted by the Maccabees, managed to win independence from Antiochus Epiphanes, but later when the Romans came they lost their freedom for the second time.

There are some interesting facts about Ptolemy and his dynasty. He ruled in Egypt, the capital being the city of Alexandria.<sup>71</sup> Under his rule, Alexandria became the intellectual and cultural capital of the world. The Library of Alexandria is famous worldwide (unfortunately it was later destroyed in a fire) where books from all over the world had been stored. A tendency of this type certainly exerted an influence on the humanity.

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<sup>71</sup> Alexander III of Macedon founded 32 cities named *Alexandria*. A. Shkokljev – S. Katin; p. 146.

## The language of the Macedonians

Before we research into the topic related to Macedonians in the Christian era, it is important to pay attention to the language and the alphabet which were used during the rule of Alexander and afterwards. That language was called ‘koine’ and it was widely spoken, which eased the spread of Christianity throughout the whole world. A lot of opinions have been expressed on this language but the one which prevails is that it is a Hellenic language (Greek).<sup>72</sup> This is considered to be one of the most convincing arguments in favor of the theory that the Macedonians were actually Hellenes and that Alexander spoke the ‘koine’ language. However, we should also recall the previously mentioned historical facts suggesting that for the Hellenes the ancient Macedonian language was unintelligible. The issue about the ‘*koine*’ language (koine means ‘common’) and its alphabet has been closely examined in the work of A. Shkokljev and S. Katin “*Придонесојќи на Македонија во свейќската цивилизација*” (2004) which promotes the idea that this language and script had been ‘exported’ from Macedonia to Achaea and even further<sup>73</sup> and that it was not the other way around as most people believe.

However, I would like once again to consider the theory of the alleged Hellenic origin of ancient Macedonians by referring to the usage of the “Hellenic” language and its alphabet. In so doing, we should try to provide answers to these questions:

- *Does use of a certain language and alphabet always determine the ethnic origin of a certain people?* Of course not, because that would mean that all the peoples who used Latin should have been called Romans.

- *Provided we have adopted a certain culture, does that mean that we have adopted the ethnicity that comes with that culture as well?*<sup>74</sup> Of course not, because that means that half of the world should be Americans since they wear jeans.

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<sup>72</sup> However, this language was used by other peoples even before Alexander’s conquests; Nade Proeva; “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадите*), p.78.

<sup>73</sup> The same theory is suggested by Zheljko Stanojevic, “On the Language of Serbs and Jews” (*O jeziku Srba I Jevreja*), p.32.

<sup>74</sup> Throughout history, we have seen a lot of examples of people adopting cultures from other people. For example, when the Persians defeated Babylon they did not impose their alphabet on the defeated people; instead they adopted the Babylonian script.

The use of alphabet has not been suggested in the Bible, unlike the use of language which was mentioned in *the First Book of Moses* (11, 1 – 9) where it is written: “*And the whole earth was of one language and of one speech....*” After the great Flood, people shared the same language and speech.<sup>75</sup> Their intention to create a city and a tower so high that it would have “*its top in the heavens*” deeply affected the humanity throughout the centuries and it is evident even today. Namely, according to the Bible the Babylonian<sup>76</sup> teaching presupposes that we should individually and in our own way “*reach the heavens*”(the salvation, the spiritual life) contrary to the Promise of God according to which we will reach the “*heavens*” (the spiritual achievement) only as a gift from God.<sup>77</sup>

When God found out about the intentions of those people, he foiled their plans by confounding their language and that is how many different languages came into existence. If we go refer back to the genealogical chart given in the *First Book of Moses* (Chapter 10) we will encounter the following words: “*By these were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands; every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations*”.

From all this we can draw a logical conclusion that during the time that followed this event, peoples had to find a common means of communication since they could not understand each other by using languages that were all different. That is how written communication was invented. In addition, people needed written communication for keeping a record of data and events. There are no substantial evidence concerning who invented writing, but it has been widely accepted that the Phoenicians<sup>78</sup> are the ones who diffused the concept of written communication.

The Phoenicians were maritime trading people and they maintained permanent relationships with neighboring maritime people as well as with their neighbors from other countries like for example the Jews. It is thought that they had communication with Africa, where

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<sup>75</sup> The latest scientific studies (Savalli – Sforza, 1991) indicate that all the languages in the world stem from a single language and speech, that language being the ancestor of all languages spoken nowadays...; A. Shkokljev – S. Katin, p.110.

<sup>76</sup> The word can mean “*confusion, mess, mixing*” (babal, babilu) but it can also designate “*the gate of God*” (Babel); P. Zlateski and S. Katin; “*Bible Dictionary*” (*Библиска речник*), p. 28.

<sup>77</sup> See “*The Epistle to the Romans*”.

<sup>78</sup> The Times, “*The Bible Atlas*” (*Библијски атлас*), p. 94 – 95.

they founded the city of Cartagena, with Spain and of course with the Hellenes who also had their own colonies and traded with neighboring peoples here including the Phoenicians themselves; they traded especially with the city of Biblos, from which they bought papyrus, hence the word *biblion* which means *book*. The Phoenicians spread the use of the alphabet to other peoples with whom they had contact. It is possible that that facilitated the communication and the recording of commercial transactions they made. Both ‘koine’ and Hebrew alphabets<sup>79</sup> confirm this theory. Let us now compare some of the letters of the Phoenician/Hebrew alphabet to the ‘koine’ (the so called Greek) letters:

<b>Alef</b> – <i>alfa</i>	<b>Jod</b> – <i>jota</i>
<b>Bet</b> – <i>beta</i>	<b>Kaf</b> – <i>kapa</i>
<b>Gimel</b> – <i>gama</i>	<b>Lamed</b> – <i>lambda</i>
<b>Dalet</b> – <i>delta</i>	<b>Mem</b> – <i>mi</i>
<b>Zajin</b> – <i>zeta</i>	<b>Nun</b> – <i>ni</i>
<b>Het</b> – <i>eta</i>	<b>Pe</b> – <i>pi</i>
<b>Tet</b> – <i>teta</i>	<b>Reš</b> – <i>ro</i> .
<b>Tav</b> – <i>tau</i>	

This proves that peoples mutually influence each other.<sup>80</sup> This leads us to the conclusion that no matter who “lent” the alphabet to whom, Alexander throughout his conquests used a **civilisation achievement** and not something that was a **national product** of certain people. Considering the insights which show that his intention was to create a single state for all people we can say that the idea of a single language perfectly fitted the concept he had. Consequently, if nowadays I use a SONY Notebook computer that does not mean that I am Japanese nor does it mean that I am Frenchman if I have Peugeot!

By saying this I certainly do not intend to widen the gap between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. On the contrary, I would like to point out to something which is completely ridiculous – two nations, both of which claim that they are descendents of Alexander, the biggest **cosmopolitan** in history. What is even more, we share the same

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<sup>79</sup> The Jewish alphabet is very similar to the Phoenician.

<sup>80</sup> At the very beginning, the Hellenic alphabet was also based only on consonants and it was written from left to right like the Hebrew alphabet; Zheljko Stanojevic, “On the Language of Serbs and Jews” (*O jeziku Srba i Jevreja*), p. 32

Christian religion which aims at unifying people within Christ<sup>81</sup> instead of separating them.

### **The Macedonians and the Christianity**

According to the prophecy, after the rule of the Diadochi with the Macedonian Empire, the Roman Empire emerged and fulfilled the above mentioned prophecy (the kingdom represented by iron feet) from *the Book of the Prophet Daniel*: “*There shall be a fourth kingdom, strong as iron; it shall break in pieces and subdue all these others, just as iron breaks in pieces and crushes everything else*”. We are all familiar with the ‘iron’ discipline and the cruelty of the Roman Empire, which after three wars with Macedonians finally defeated them; in order to reduce the power of Macedonia the Romans divided it into four provinces. Rome conquered all the territories that Macedonia previously ruled including Israel where Christianity was born at the beginning of the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD.

At that time, Macedonia did not have a ruler; in other words it was completely unprotected against Roman tyranny especially when it came to the Roman taxes. The Romans were exempted from paying taxes because the state collected more than enough money from other people who were under Roman dominance. The bigger the appetite of Rome for conquests, the higher the taxes; those taxes were a heavy burden to the locals, not only to the Macedonians but to all people who lived within the frontiers of the Roman Empire. As a result, the number of poor people increased and many who were driven to destitute resorted to selling themselves and their children as slaves.

Those were the conditions under which Christianity emerged, a teaching that promoted equality for all people before God because “*Christ suffered for all of us*”. The teaching about an incarnated God (Christ) who, driven by love for his descendants, took all their sins and suffered on the cross<sup>82</sup> and promised them the Heaven was widely accepted by the poor and dispossessed that were deprived of their rights. Of course, there were some rich and educated people as well as considerable number of priests who willingly embraced the new religion. Apart

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<sup>81</sup> “...*There is no distinction of the Jew and the Greek: for the same is Lord over all.....*”, *The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans* (10, 12).

<sup>82</sup> The cross was a Roman death penalty. It is considered that crucifixion (Latin *crucificatio*) was one of the most painful and most humiliating punishments in those times.

from Judea (Israel) and Asia Minor, Macedonia was among the first countries in which Christianity had been preached and accepted.

In the *Acts of the Apostles* (Chapter 16) we read: “*And in a vision by night, there appeared to Paul<sup>83</sup> a certain man of Macedonia, standing before his face, beseeching him and saying: ‘Come over into Macedonia and save us!’*” At that time St. Paul was in Troas and he immediately responded to the appeal from the vision he had: “*Therefore loosing from Troas, we came with a straight course to Samothracia, and the next day to Neapolis; And from thence to Philippi, which is the chief city of that part of Macedonia, and a colony*”. In ancient times the town of Philippi was called Krinides (which means ‘a small spring’, or ‘a town of springs’) because of the numerous springs that existed in the vicinity of the town. Later, in 358 BC Phillip II converted it into his capital and it was after him that the town was called Philippi. After the Romans had defeated the Macedonians in 168 BC, Philippi was accorded a special status: “*The colony of Augustus Julius*” (Colonia Augusta Julia Fillipensis)<sup>84</sup>. Philippi is the first city in Europe to which St. Paul spread Christianity (around 50 AD); he arrived to Philippi: “*And on the sabbath we went out of the city by a river side, where prayer was wont to be made; and we sat down, and spake unto the women which resorted thither*”.

Who were these women? Considering the fact that they were gathered together on Saturday, some think that they were Macedonian Proselytes.<sup>85</sup> In every town to which he went, Paul the Apostle used to preach on Saturdays in Jewish synagogues. Since in Philippi there was no synagogue, it seems unlikely that these women were really Proselytes who gathered at the river because they had nowhere else to do that. On the other hand, it is well – known that the Macedonians worshiped rivers<sup>86</sup>, which was an exclusively Macedonian tradition; hence

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<sup>83</sup> Paul the Apostle (formerly Saul) was a very educated orthodox Jew who, at the beginning, was one of the fiercest opponents of the Christian ‘sect’ as it was called by the priests. There was an exile of Christians to Damascus (Syria) during which Paul had experienced a vision of the resurrected Jesus who asked him: “*Saul, why do you persecute me?*” Since then, the Jew Saul (later Paul the Apostle) had become the most enthusiastic supporter and preacher of Christianity and is the author of numerous epistles from the *New Testament* of the Bible (The Holly Script); *The Acts of the Apostles* 9, 1- 22.

<sup>84</sup> Pavle Borovic, “A Guide through the Bible” (*Biblijski priručnik II*), p 371.

<sup>85</sup> The Proselytes were people who were not Jews but who eventually converted to Judaism.

<sup>86</sup> Nade Proeva; “The History of the Argeads” (*Историја на Аргеадиџе*), p. 127 – 128.

we can conclude that those women really were Macedonians who performed their ancient rituals on the river near Philippi. The text itself, which says “*where prayer was wont to be made*”, leads us to the conclusion that it really was a **custom** people to pray outside the town, on the river.

Further on the text says: “*And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us: whose heart the Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul*”. What is interesting is that all women listened, but only Lydia paid attention to St. Paul’s words, which left a profound impression on her and that is why: “*when she was baptized<sup>87</sup>, and her household, she besought us, saying, If ye have judged me to be faithful to the Lord, come into my house, and abide there. And she **constrained us***”. Lydia was a merchant woman. No one has ever contested her Macedonian origin since she was from Thyatira, a town in Asia Minor predominantly populated by Macedonians<sup>88</sup>. The famous Macedonian hospitality existed even then and it is clearly shown by the sentence “*And she constrained us*”. The stress is on the mentality of “forcing” the guest to eat and drink, which is even today very typical of Macedonians!

The Apostles proceeded with their preaching and they were even faced with difficulties like false accusations and persecution. The text continues: “*.....they caught Paul and Silas, and drew them into the marketplace unto the rulers and brought them to the magistrates*”. The accusation was: “*These men, being Jews, do exceedingly trouble our city and teach customs, which are not lawful for us to receive, neither to observe, being **Romans***”. This accusation prompted revolt<sup>89</sup> among the people who were present at the event and then: “*..... the magis-*

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<sup>87</sup> Baptizing adults was a Christian custom which had been upheld in Macedonia for a long time, the proof of which are baptismal fonts found in Stobi, Heraclea and Plaoshnik etc.

<sup>88</sup> The town was founded by Seleucus I Nicator of the Seleucid dynasty. It was populated by Macedonians and served as a fortification to the Macedonian army. It is well – known that Thyatira was famous for the production of purple fabric which was kept as a secret. The archaeologist Hezej discovered a piece of white marble on which there was an inscription in two languages testifying the existence of the colonies Philippi and Thyatira. P. Borovic; “A Guide through the Bible” (*Biblijski priručnik II*), p. 215 and 374.

<sup>89</sup> It is completely understandable why revolt was provoked if we bear in mind that only a year before this event, Claudius, due to a certain insurgency that broke out, banished all the Jews from Rome. Only the mention of the words *These men, being Jews* would infuriate the people immediately; *The Acts* (18, 2).

*trates rent off their clothes, and commanded to beat them”* and eventually put them in prison. Unfortunately, in every nation there are biased people who, driven by personal prejudices, are ready to condemn falsely before even listening to the person being accused.

What is interesting for us is the word **Romans** from the quotation above. The use of this word is understandable since Macedonia was under Roman rule. Those who accused the apostles brought the accusation before Roman governors who, because of the status that the town had, were accountable to the Caesar himself, which explains why the word *Romans* was appropriate. This shows that certain territories, apart from having their usual name and the name of the people living there, got other political or administrative names when occupied by other people, which later caused confusion among the historians. Some even unfairly used those confusions for achieving their own political goals.

While being imprisoned in Philippi, the Apostles behaved just as they preached. They did not respond with malice or resentment to the injustice they had been experiencing; instead: “..... at midnight Paul and Silas prayed, and sang praises unto God: and the prisoners heard them.....” And then: “suddenly there was a great earthquake, so that the foundations of the prison were shaken: and immediately all the doors were opened, and every one’s bands were loosed”. When he saw what happened, the keeper of the prison: “drew out his sword, and would have killed himself, supposing that the prisoners had been fled”. But, Paul the Apostle dissuaded him from doing that by convincing him that no one had escaped.

The keeper’s reaction was very interesting. Event though he was the one who initially: “.....thrust them into the inner prison, and made their feet fast in the stocks.....” after this singular experience: “.....he came trembling, and fell down before Paul and Silas, and brought them out, and said: Sirs, what must I do to be saved?” The question corresponded to the attitudes and religious beliefs that people then held, led by the thought that salvation should be deserved by having done something good. Probably, this man was surprised at the words: “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house!” “Only that?” – he maybe asked himself, without even knowing that the surprises were still to come: “And they spake unto him the word of the Lord, and to all that were in his house.....” Once being heard, the word of God changes the soul and the personality of a person, by imbuing him with **joy** and tranquility.

For the first time in his life this Macedonian experienced happiness as being Christian: “.....*And he took them the same hour of the night, and washed their stripes; and was baptized, he and all his, straightway. And when he had brought them into his house, he set meat before them, and rejoiced, believing in God with all his house*”. The joy was the first gift he received in return for having converted to Christianity and for having embraced the faith of Christ.

The following day, the Apostles were released, and they immediately went to Lydia’s house<sup>90</sup> to console the believers and then left for Thessalonica. Before we proceed with St. Paul’s journeys, it is worth mentioning that the Apostle felt a deep affection for the believers from Philippi. He visited the church of Philippi several times and ten years later he addressed them in the *Epistle* with the following words: “*For God is my witness how I long after you all in the bowels of Jesus Christ*” (The Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians 1, 8). St. John Chrysostom (4<sup>th</sup> century BC) described the relationship between St. Paul and the Philippians by saying: “*Oh, what longing had he toward Macedonia*”.<sup>91</sup>

It is also very well – known that St. Paul was held in great affection by the Philippians themselves. They were immortalized in the Bible and remembered for their generosity: “*And you also know, O Philippians, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no church communicated with me as concerning giving and receiving, but you only; for unto Thessalonica also you sent once and again for my use*” (The Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians, 4 – 15, 16). The Philippians knew that St. Paul needed help, and they entrusted Epaphroditus with helping him. About Epaphroditus St. Paul said: “*Epaphroditus, my brother and fellow labourer and fellow soldier, but your apostle: and he that hath ministered to my want*” (The Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians, 2, 25). According to the tradition, Epaphroditus was later appointed bishop of the church in Philippi.

When in the Epistle St. Paul addresses the Philippians, he says: “.....*to all the saints in Christ Jesus who are at Philippi, with the*

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<sup>90</sup> In the beginning, Christians used large chambers of their homes (domus ecclesie) for the purpose of their services. MANU, “Late Christian Archaeology in Macedonia” (*Стиарохристијанска археологија во Македонија*), p. 5.

<sup>91</sup> St. Polycarp of Smyrna also gives evidence of the fact that: “*Philippi and Thessalonica are towns of the same people and the same land*”. This means that until the 4th century AD Macedonia existed as an ethnic territory. Pop – Atanasov; “The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians” (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*), p. 113.

*bishops and deacons*". This Epistle was written some ten years after St. Paul's first visit to Philippi. It is evident that the church had expanded considerably for such a short time and that it needed more bishops (supervisors, superiors). That certainly is the merit of the Philippians themselves, like for example Lydia, the first Christian woman in Europe who, thanks to her trade relations, spread Christianity among her fellow citizens. Nowadays, when Christian Europe is our greatest pride, we should not forget all these devoted and committed people, Macedonians from Philippi, who made an invaluable contribution to the dissemination of Christianity.

St. Paul arrived to Thessalonica<sup>92</sup>, the most important cultural, trade and administrative centre at that time. There was a Jewish synagogue and: ".....*Paul, as his manner was, went in unto them, and three sabbath days reasoned with them out of the scriptures*"....., revealing to those who were present in the synagogue that Jesus from Nazareth was the promised Messiah. St. Paul's preachers and speeches provoked different reactions. On one hand: "..... *some of them believed*", among whom: "..... *the devout Greeks a great multitude, and of the chief women not a few*". On the other hand: "..... *the Jews which believed not, moved with envy, took unto them certain lewd fellows of the baser sort.....*", and after they had caused dissatisfaction and revolt among the people, the Apostles were cast out of the city.

Speaking of this, let us recall that the word *Hellenes* (Greeks) indicates the cultural and religious difference between the Jews and non – Jews (the Hellenes). This is very similar to the word "*kauri*" used by Muslims to designate those who did not belong to their religion!

Let us refer back to the *Acts of the Apostles* (Chapter 2), more precisely to the part when the apostles got from the Holy Spirit a special gift. That gift was the ability to speak other languages which was necessary because: "..... *there were dwelling at Jerusalem Jews, devout men, out of every nation under heaven*". The Croatian translation<sup>93</sup> of this segment: "*Tada su boravili u Jerusalimu pop `ni @idovi koji su doš li od svih naroda pod nebom*" more clearly indicates that Jews from the whole Diaspora went to Jerusalem to celebrate together

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<sup>92</sup> Thessalonica (which means "victory over Thessaly"), was previously called Therme (meaning "hot springs"); P. Borovic, "A Guide through the Bible" (*Biblijski priru~nik II*), p. 380.

<sup>93</sup> Croatian translation of the Bible, published by "Stavrnost".

the Passover. While gathered in the temple, the Jews listened to the apostles who preached in their languages.<sup>94</sup> That struck them as unusual and the text says: “*We - Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judaea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene,....., Cretes and Arabians, we do hear them speak in our tongues the wonderful works of God*”. The Apostle Paul spoke at the end of the preacher and: “.....*when they heard this, they were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and to the rest of the apostles, Men and brethren, what shall we do?*” The Apostle expressly called them to repent: “.....*and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand souls*”. Among all these people gathered around the apostles there were Jews from Jerusalem and Judea, but also Jews from the countries mentioned above and those were actually the ‘Hellenes’ who protested; their dissatisfaction showed that the church, which was expanding rapidly, needed better organization; consequently, the apostles immediately appointed deacons<sup>95</sup> as a solution to the problem.

All this shows that according to the Bible, the term *Hellenes* does not have ethnic connotation at all, but, as we already made clear, it designates people who belonged to a culture different from the Jewish. Hence, the Hellenic women from Thessalonica and later from Berea were actually non – Jews who accepted Judaism and later, through the preachers of Paul the Apostle, they accepted Christianity as well.<sup>96</sup> This does not imply that there were no ethnic Hellenes in Thessalonica; our only intention is to point out to the fact that this term has often been manipulated with due to various reasons, which is completely opposite to the principles of Christianity!

In spite of the fact that in Thessalonica the apostles once again faced banishment, this town grew into one of the most significant centers of the Christian religion on the Balkans. Synods used to be convened there during which important decisions were made. The bishop of Thessalonica was the spiritual leader of the Macedonian church. The bishop Alexander of Thessalonica also participated in the *First*

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<sup>94</sup> It is well – known that the Jews from the Diaspora did not speak their mother tongue; instead they spoke the languages of the countries they came from.

<sup>95</sup> Attendants

<sup>96</sup> For more similar examples, see *The Acts of The Apostles* (19, 10) according to which the people from Asia could also be either Jews or Hellenes.

*ecumenical council* in 325, and he was supposed to inform the Macedonian Christians on all decisions made during the councils.<sup>97</sup> Even at the time of St. Paul, the people from Thessalonica proved to be very pious and devoted to their religion and, as a result, some of them were even mentioned in the Bible: “.....*Gaius and Aristarchus, men of Macedonia, Paul’s companions in travel.....*” (*The Acts of the Apostles*, 19, 29). It has once again been proved that Aristarchus and Gaius were St. Paul’s companions together with the believers from Macedonia and elsewhere: “.....*Sopater of Berea; and of the Thessalonians, Aristarchus and Secundus; and Gaius of Derbe, and Timotheus; and of Asia, Tychicus and Trophimus*” (*The Acts of the Apostles*, 20, 4). Aristarchus from Thessalonica accompanied St. Paul till the very end, even in the most difficult moments of suffering: “.....*Aristarchus, a Macedonian of Thessalonica, being with us*” (*The Acts of the Apostles*, 27, 2). According to some archaeological findings, it has been proved that the names Thessalonica and Macedonia were common in those times.<sup>98</sup>

After they had been cast out from Thessalonica, Paul and Silas went to Berea (Veria). There they again headed to the Jewish synagogue, where they were received more cordially. The inhabitants of Berea are described in *The Acts of the Apostles* (Chapter 17, 11) with the following words: “*These were nobler than those in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the scriptures daily, whether those things were so*”. Neither the authority of the apostles nor their well – prepared speeches formed the basis of the Christian teaching; its foundation was the *Script* which has been: “*given from God*”. Paul himself will later write to the Romans: “*and faith then comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God*” (*The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans*, 10, 17). The already mentioned companion of St. Paul, Sopater, was from Berea.

The Jews from Thessalonica were alert and when they found out that Paul was in Berea they again expelled him from there. He was forced to leave to Athens. There, he was accepted a completely different way. He came to Athens and the text says: “*Therefore disputed he in the synagogue with the Jews, and with the devout persons, and in the market daily with them that met with him. Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoics, encountered him. And some said, what will this babbler say?*” (*The Acts of the Apostles*, 17, 18).

<sup>97</sup> Pop – Atanasov; “The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians” (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*), p. 121

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120

The Apostle was very determined and did not give up, he stood on Aeropagus Hill in Athens (note: in the square) and he started preaching about Jesus Christ and those who listened: “..... *when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some **mocked**: and others said, We will hear thee **again** of this matter*” (*The Acts of the Apostles*, 17, 32). Again?! Someone said: “*Again means never!*” What a difference from the people from Philippi, Thessalonica and Berea “.....*For all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing*” (*The Acts of the Apostles*, 17, 21).

Knowing this, Paul wrote to the believers from Thessalonica: “*And you became followers of us, and of the Lord; receiving the word in much tribulation, with joy of the Holy Ghost: So that you **were made a pattern** to all that believe in Macedonia and in Achaia. For **from you was spread abroad the word of the Lord**, not only in Macedonia, and in Achaia, but also in every place, your faith which is towards God, is gone forth.....*” (*The First Epistle of St. Paul to the Thessalonians*, 1, 6 – 8).

Macedonia had for a long time been the centre of Christianity in this region, just as Antioch was for Asia Minor, which once again confirms the contribution of all these faithful and devout people from Macedonia to the development and spread of Christianity on the Balkans and elsewhere.

It was during his last missionary journey that St. Paul visited Macedonia. While he was in Ephesus he said goodbye to his companions and: “*took his leave, and set forward to go into Macedonia. And when he had gone over those parts, and had exhorted them with many words, he came into Greece (note: Achaea)*”. This confirms the territorial distinctiveness of Macedonia, which, according to how it is described in the Bible, perfectly corresponds to the descriptions made by antique authors like Herodotus, Scymnus, Strabo, Lucian of Samosata and others.<sup>99</sup>

Since the beginning of their ethnogenesis<sup>100</sup> and throughout the rule of Macedonian kings to the time of the Roman conquest, the Macedonians preserved their national awareness. Historiography<sup>101</sup> and

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<sup>99</sup> Поп – Atanasov; “The Bible about Macedonia and the Macedonians” (*Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*), p. 112 – 123.

<sup>100</sup> The end of the 8th century BC; Nade Proeva; “Studies of the Ancient Macedonians” (*Студији за Античкиите Македонци*), p. 39.

<sup>101</sup> A. Shkoljev – S. Katin; “Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization” (*Придонесот на Македонија во светската цивилизација*); p. 177 – 186.

epigraphy provide evidence that the word *Macedonian* was a frequent adjective to the names; it was also part of the names of the kings who: “*were really proud of being called Macedonians*”<sup>102</sup>, as well as of names of other people of repute from Macedonia. St. Paul addressed the believers from Thessalonica by saying: “*But as touching the charity of brotherhood, we have no need to write to you: **for yourselves have learned of God** to love one another. For indeed you do it towards all the brethren in all Macedonia. But we entreat you, brethren, that you abound more*” (*The First Epistle of St. Paul to the Thessalonians* 4, 9 – 10).

The Macedonians respected the concept of brotherhood very much. Namely, throughout history, they experienced a lot of sufferings and pains and that brought them together. *Brotherhood* is the same as *patriotism*, they stem from the same root. John the Apostle says: “*He that loveth his brother abideth in the light.....*” (*The First Epistle of St. John the Apostle* 2, 10), but than in Chapter 4 he adds: “*If any man say: I love God, and hateth his brother; he is a liar. For he that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God whom he seeth not?*” In other words, as the example of the Macedonians from Thessalonica shows, how can you love someone of the same religion if you do not love your compatriots and fellow citizens? If you do not feel love for your motherland, how can you love the motherland of God, the Heaven? If you do not appreciate the valuable things that you possess, then how can you possibly appreciate the far more valuable thing that you will be given in future? If you do not hesitate to betray your own people, are you not capable of betraying the most sacred Christian ideals in order to accomplish your own purpose? (See *Revelation*, 13, 16 – 18).

This attitude which is based on principles of Christianity a priori rejects the concept of quasi – love: to “love” only those who belong to our “group”, a feeling motivated by self – interest; we have had enough of that “love” and fake patriotism and therefore they are not worth commenting.

### **The Macedonian Christians later**

All those who are familiar with the Christian religion know that it takes a long time to become a true Christian. Paul also knew that very

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<sup>102</sup> Pausania, quoted by Nade Proeva; “Studies of the Ancient Macedonians” (*Студиум за Античкиите Македонци*), p. 29.

well and that is why he addressed not only the churches in Macedonia but also in Corinth, Rome, Ephesus, Galatia etc. He used to write them epistles which offered consolation, support and knowledge. Of the same sort are the two epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, in which he laid emphasis on two fundamental concepts in Christianity: The Resurrection and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ on Earth. He wrote: *“For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again: even so them who have slept through Jesus, will God bring with him. For this we say unto you in the word of the Lord that we who are alive, who remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept. For the Lord himself shall come down from heaven with commandment and with the voice of an archangel and with the trumpet of God: and the dead who are in Christ shall rise first. Then we who are alive, who are left, shall be taken up together with them in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air: and so shall we be always with the Lord....”* (The First Epistle of St. Paul to the Thessalonians 4, 13 – 17).

In Heraclea near Bitola, two epigraphic monuments<sup>103</sup> in the form of tablets have been found (the 5<sup>th</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> centuries AD) which confirm that Macedonian Christians had the same religion until the 6<sup>th</sup> century. There is an inscription on one of the tablets which is kept at the Museum of Bitola saying:

The one bearing the name of Theophany  
(Epiphanes or Theophan)  
the Presbyterian - -  
while still on earth was decorated with a honorary wreath  
and he abandoned this life to wait (together) with all others  
The Resurrection.

The inscription on the other tablet, which was kept in the High School in Bitola but has unfortunately been lost, says:

Here lies the tender – hearted memory of Vassily  
Who was a deacon and an archivist  
He deceased on 11 August  
Indiction 9,  
to wait with the all others  
**the (Second) Coming. Amen**

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<sup>103</sup> Vesna Kalpakovska, Anitca Gjeorjgievska – “The Life in Heraclea Lyncestis through epigraphs” (*Животојџ во Heraclea Lyncestis преку епиграфскиите ѕјоменици*), p. 89 – 93.

Macedonian Christians have left an indelible mark on history that is well – remembered even today. We should not be confused by the arrival of the Slavs on the Balkans (the precise date of their arrival is still controversial in scientific circles) because it cannot be denied that their coming had the same influence on all the people who lived on the territory of the Balkans (it is well – known that even Peloponnese was reported to have Slavic settlements, the proof of which are about 300 words of Slavic origin that still exist in the modern Greek language!)<sup>104</sup>

Certainly no one would believe that the Slaves supposedly “killed off” all the Macedonians and then stole their name and national awareness. In that case, the same would have happened to other people living on the Balkan so the so called “Slavo – Albanians”, “Slavo – Greeks”, “Slavo – Bulgarians” and “Slavo – Serbs” should not reproach us for feeling that we are Macedonians. The genetic material of the Hellenes (Greeks), Illyrians (Albanians), Thracians (Bulgarians) is still presents here on the Balkans. That is an incontestable fact that has never been questioned. Then why is the presence of Macedonian genetic material the **only one** which has been disputed throughout history and even today without arguments and proof?!

Now, when Macedonia aspires towards Europe, I would like to refer back to the prophecy of Daniel (Chapter 2) and to try to recall the vision about the kingdoms of the world (The Second Coming). In the prophecy there is an explanation about the kingdom that would succeed the Macedonian Empire: “*And whereas thou sawest the feet and toes, part of potters’ clay, and part of iron, the kingdom shall be divided.....*”. About the clay and the iron the texts says that: “*.....they shall mingle themselves with the seed of men: but they shall not cleave one to another, even as iron is not mixed with clay*”.

It is obvious that that kingdom is the Roman Empire. The prophecy of Daniel was completely fulfilled after it had been divided into eastern and western halves (the two legs of the creature from the vision). As for the feet of iron and clay, I relate them to the “United Europe” (forgive me if I am wrong) which, judging by the recent events, is far from being “unified”. That has also been proved by the fact that Europe is the only cultural and territorial heir to the Roman Empire. I admit that I am not indifferent to the standard that Macedonia will have

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<sup>104</sup> A. Shkokljev – S. Katin; “Contribution of Macedonia to World Civilization” (*Приносот на Македонија во светската цивилизација*), p. 225.

as an EU member, but is it worth fighting for something which has a priori been deemed failure?

While the Americans proudly sing their anthem: “*God Bless America*” I keep asking myself if we, Macedonians, should sing a similar song? I do not think that is necessary since **God has already blessed Macedonia!** The only thing we should do is to use it appropriately! Can we?

## THE PARTITIONING OF MACEDONIA IN BUCHAREST (1913)<sup>105</sup>

The first Balkan war broke out as a result of the disagreements between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia related to the partition of Macedonia: they could not decide how much of its territory each of them should take. Later analyses showed that there was a high possibility Bulgaria to take the largest part if it had not been for Romania who, encouraged by France and Great Britain, declared war on Sofia and ruined its plans. In northern Bulgaria there were almost no military deployments; Romania encountered no resistance from the Bulgarians and at the beginning of July its soldiers were only several kilometers from Sofia. The Ottoman Empire also took advantage of this situation and declared war on Bulgaria. The defeat of Bulgaria was inevitable and it called for a ceasefire and negotiations.

On 14 July 1913, Sunday, Greek, Serbian and Montenegrin delegations arrived together in Turnu Severin by Serbian boat with fluttering flags of each of their countries and of Romania as well. They were welcomed by Trenea Grecheanu, the head of the Romanian royal protocol. From there, they left for Bucharest by boat. In Bucharest, during his talk with a correspondent working for a Romanian newspaper, the president of the Serbian government and the head of the Serbian delegation Nikola Pashic stated: *“We completely agree on the issue of Gevgelija with the Greeks. Provided Bulgaria is willing to cooperate and if we all reach an agreement, the negotiations will finish very soon”*. The Greek delegate Dimitar Panas added: *“Between the Serbs and us there are no conflicts whatsoever, so Gevgelija will not be a problem”*.

In the meantime, the Bulgarian delegation, led by the minister of finances and president of the Liberal Party Dimitar Tinchev, was also on its way to Bucharest.

### 17 July 1913

The negotiations started on 17 July 1913 at 16:00 at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a meeting of delegates represent-

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<sup>105</sup> The text has been taken from the weekly *Fokus* No.666 of 4 April 2008. The author of the text is Mr. Darko Janevski. The full text of the *Treaty of Bucharest* (without the secret annexes) is included in *Part Three* of this book.

ing the warring countries. The first who arrived were the Serbs and the Montenegrins, followed by the Bulgarians and the Greeks. The delegates from Romania came in the end. Titu Maiorescu, the president of the Romanian government, presided over the conference. During the first day of the negotiations, the delegates met each other, talked to each other but they were also getting familiar with the mandates each of them had. Everybody except the representatives from Montenegro, had unlimited authority to negotiate and conclude peace treaties. The first signals showed that Romania and Bulgaria and Bulgaria and Serbia would very easily reach an agreement. On the other hand, there were some indications that there might be a problem between Bulgaria and Greece over the port of Kavala.

In spite of the possibility of a successful outcome, even before the beginning of negotiations between Serbia and Bulgaria the relationships between these two counties worsened further because Bulgarians demanded from Romania to protect the inhabitants of the city of Vidin. According to the Bulgarians, that was necessary in order to prevent the massacre that would happen there if the Serbs, who were only three kilometers from Vidin, captured the city. The Serbs understood this as a provocation and a diplomatic attempt of the Bulgarian delegation aimed at deteriorating the harmonious relationships between Romania and Serbia. It was later found out that it was actually Italy who advised Bulgaria to take such a step. Namely, Italy was not well – disposed to Serbia due to its interests in Albania and on the Aegean Islands that it was trying to protect.

During the same conference, the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who was the leader of the Greek delegation, proposed a ceasefire at the battlefields. The proposal was accepted and the ceasefire was supposed to come into effect on 18 July at 17:00. A permanent truce was supposed to be established within five days i.e. on 23 July at the latest. If by that date an agreement was not reached or if there was not any guarantee whatsoever that it would be reached under terms acceptable for all parties, the hostilities would continue.

### **18 July 1913**

18 July 1913 was the second day of the negotiations, which started at 16:00. The meeting lasted for half an hour and it was decided that the opposing parties should mutually solve contentious issues during separate meetings. At the conference, they would only discuss those issues upon which an agreement had not been reached. Later, in the evening,

separate negotiations were held between the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pashic and the leader of the Bulgarian delegation Tonchev. Afterwards, Tonchev and Venizelos met during another meeting. The previous day Venizelos declared that the Greeks must keep possession of Kavala and once again confirmed that there would be no problems over Gevgelija and that most probably that town would be given to Serbia.

Simultaneously, careful attention was paid to the messages sent by the great powers Great Britain, France, Russia and Austria – Hungary. It was believed that no one of them would object if Serbia got the Macedonian territories extending from the area on the left and on the right side of the river Vardar to Gevgelija. However, there were some upsetting articles published in certain Austrian newspaper saying that the powers on the Balkans should be equally balanced and for that reason Serbia should only get the territory on the right side of the river Vardar while Bulgaria would take the area on the left of the Vardar and the port of Kavala.

On 18 July it was announced that the Bulgarians would have the possibility to raise the issue of Macedonian autonomy as a last resort against the aspirations of Serbia and Greece. The correspondents of certain Balkan newspapers in Paris immediately reacted and they announced that for France that issue had already been solved; they also reminded that during the negotiations in London after the end of the First Balkan war Turkey put forward the same proposal. It was Bulgaria who replied that Turkey seemed to be unaware of the outcome of the war and that the proposal about autonomous Macedonia was unacceptable. The message was clear: if Bulgaria raised the same question in Bucharest that would mean that it would behave in the same way as Turkey did during the meeting in London ignoring the fact of being defeated in the war. Moreover, Bulgaria would get the same answer as the one it gave to the Turkish representative in London. At that time, Serbia and Greece enjoyed strong support from France and Great Britain, who regarded these two countries as a shield against Austrian and Russian influence on the Balkans.

### **19 July 1913**

The negotiations had been in progress since 10:00 between the Greek, Serbian and Montenegrin delegations on one side and the Bulgarian delegation on the other. During the talks, Bulgaria was informed on the requests made by the allies. Previously, the Bulgarian and the Romanian delegations concluded an agreement by which Bulgaria ceded

Dobrudja to Romania. The agreement was reached very easily and quickly and the Bulgarians hoped that that would help them succeed in further negotiations and that Romania would act as a neutral party since its interests had already been met.

The official conference presided over by Maiorescu started at 16:00 but it was interrupted after it had been discovered that no agreement had been reached between the allies and Bulgaria.

It was evident that everyone was irritated and dissatisfied at the Turkish conquest of Edirne and the behavior of the local residents who got out of their homes and celebrated the Turkish victory for which they were grateful to the Sultan. Therefore, the Russian ambassador to Bucharest advised Serbia and Greece to reach an agreement with Bulgaria as soon as possible in order to avoid conflicts and Russia to be able to guarantee Bulgarian possession of Edirne. Two days later, it was clear why Russia was upset: right on 19 July the Turkish authorities blocked the passage of Bosphorus for cargo ships for several hours. Later, the passage was reopened, but the message was strong enough to cause widespread panic in Russia i.e. in St. Petersburg. Turkey was able to block Russia any time and the only solution for Russians was to try to gain another access to sea with the aid of Bulgarians. Otherwise, they ran the risk of facing difficult and disgraceful situations. Therefore, Russia would indirectly support Bulgaria to take possession of Kavala port, which was one of the **key issues** for the negotiators.

### 20 July 1913

The day started with the statement given by the Bulgarian prime Minister Radosavov for the newspaper the Zeit saying: *“Now we can safely assume that agreement for peace has been reached”* and that *“as regards to the partitioning of Macedonia, there will be no obstacles that could not be overcome since the great powers retained the right to have the last word on the issue”*. The statement indicates that the Bulgarians had been trying to take as much of the territory of Macedonia as possible by using diplomatic strategies. They hoped that they would receive support from Russia and Austria – Hungary even if the outcome of the negotiations was unfavorable for them. After the indirect message received from France, the issue of Macedonian autonomy had never again been mentioned.

During the day, Serbian and Greek diplomats were already included in the process of finding solution to the problem of Turkish expansion to Edirne. It was made clear that that issue which Russia was

trying to impose was not related to the negotiations taking place in Bucharest. The common attitude of the Greek and the Serbian delegations was that If Bulgaria had problems with Turkey it should turn to the great powers for help.

On 20 July the conditions set by the allies two days before were revealed. Bulgaria was expected to draw up a border along the river Struma continuing to the Aegean Sea, to renounce all the claims related to the Aegean islands, to pay reparations, to guarantee the freedom of the local residents in Thrace and to establish schools and churches in Greek municipalities in that region. The attitude of the great powers related to the port of Kavala became crystal clear. According to the newspapers, the idea that Bulgaria should receive the port was supported not only by Russia but also by Austria – Hungary, while France, Great Britain and Germany thought that it should be given to Greece. A signal was being expected from Bulgaria indicating whether the truce, which was to expire on 23 July, could hold further.

There was a very strong propaganda during the negotiations. On 21 July Serbian and Greek newspapers abounded in articles about massacres carried out by Bulgarian soldiers in Seres. The Belgrade *Politika* even published a letter written by an association of Greek women saying that in a village near Seres the Bulgarians forced Greek women to wear bells around their necks and to dance nude around the fire in which their children were burnt alive. Later, the Carnegie Endowment investigated all the allegations of crimes committed in Seres (and not only there) and discovered that most of the cases were invented by Greeks and Serbs and that the allegations were totally unfounded. It was discovered that after the Greek soldiers attacked Seres, the Bulgarians military units withdrew in panic and several prisoners were killed in the prison. However, the Carnegie Endowment ascertained that it was the guards who decided to do that on their own and no one coerced them into killing the prisoners. One of the Greek prisoners, who did not have money to bribe the guard, was literally hammered to the floor with bayonets. Apart from this case, the Carnegie Endowment noted that most of the allegations of crimes committed by Bulgarians were false and were supposed to serve as propaganda. For example, there was a Greek report in which it was alleged that the manager of the Ottoman Bank in Seres had been killed, but fortunately the members of the Carnegie Endowment had the opportunity to meet him and talk to him. He was absolutely safe and sound!

On the other hand, the Carnegie Endowment also discovered that the Greek army had systematically committed crimes against non –

Greek population living in Seres. The majority of the murders were committed on 1 July when a regular Bulgarian unit managed to defeat Greek militia outside the town of Seres and at noon entered the town. According to the Carnegie Endowment, at least 60 or 70 prisoners were still alive when the Bulgarians came to the town, but the guards who were Greek decided to kill them. Two of the prisoners (Angelov and Limonov) managed to escape, while others, who were too emaciated and weak to run, were caught and tied. Then, in groups of four or five, they waited to be slaughtered but the execution was not carried out properly so few managed to survive. The Carnegie Endowment noted that: *“their wounds were so appalling that they looked like those of sheep being slaughtered by a butcher”*.

However, we have to admit that the *Report of the Carnegie Endowment* was made after all these things happened; during the negotiations which took place in Bucharest, the propaganda of those who were victorious in the war distorted the reality about what really happened.

### **21 July 1913**

Throughout the whole day the Bulgarian delegation had been making serious attempts to buy more time hoping that the great powers would allow them to take the Macedonian territory extending from the left side of the river Vardar to Gevgelija. Serbia made uncompromising claims of Kriva Palanka, Kratovo, Shtip, Radovish, Kochani, Strumitsa and Gevgelija. All the delegations, except the Romanian, had separate meetings with each other in relation to the issue of Kavala, but no agreement had been reached because Bulgaria still hoped that it was possible to gain control over the port. On the other hand, the attitude of France, Great Britain and Germany was that the access to the Aegean Sea that Bulgaria had eastwards of Kavala sufficed. The last proposal that the Bulgarians made was that the issue of Kavala should be discussed further and that they withdrew from all the negotiations related to the Serbian claims on the territory stretching on the left of the river Vardar, but they wanted to keep Kochani and Shtip in return. If they got Kavala, they made clear that they were ready to renounce both towns. The attitude of the Serbian delegation was that having in mind the circumstances and the situation, Bulgaria would have to make certain concessions in regards to this claim.

The situation was tense and it was obvious that all the delegations were under pressure. Confident of their superiority, Serbia and Greece started spreading rumors that there was a possibility all parties

to withdraw from the negotiations which meant that the war would resume since the truce was to expire on 23 July at 17:00. The Romanian newspaper *Vitoril* had already announced that Greek and Serbian armies planned a new joint military action against Bulgaria. Contrary to this diplomatic message and in the context of the media propaganda, the Austrian newspaper *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, referring to diplomatic resources, announced that *Serbian and Bulgarian claims were exaggerated and that the opinion of the great powers had not been taken into account.*

### **22 July 1913**

The separate negotiations between delegations did not continue on 21 July 1913 as recess was called. On the other hand, a plenary session was convened with a view to extending the truce. That goal was achieved and it was decided that the ceasefire would continue in the next three days. In spite of the break, the delegations however discussed the important issues; consequently the Bulgarians put forward a new proposal: they were willing to renounce Shtip and Kochani, but made it quite clear that Strumitsa and Radovish were the towns which they could not cede on any account. During the informal session of the talks, it was noticed that the Bulgarians were still keeping alive the hope that, regardless of the content of the treaty that was to be signed, Austria, Russia and Italy would eventually revise it to their advantage. Greece reaffirmed that it had no intention whatsoever of ceding Kavala to Bulgaria! The Romanian representatives used the opportunity to reveal that they had already concluded the negotiations with Bulgaria, but that they would consider the decision about the border between the two countries to be final even after all the delegations reached agreement on all issues. Tonchev and his delegation were shocked by the Romanian announcement because they assumed that they had already succeeded in weakening the relationships of Romania with Serbia and Greece. Moreover, they interpreted Maiorescu's words as an explicit military threat against Bulgaria in case it kept rejecting the claims of Serbia and Greece.

### **23 July 1913**

The conference started at 16:00. After the minutes of the previous meeting had been approved, the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was given the floor; he pointed out that he had received a letter from King Konstantin in which he informed him on the latest events from

the battlefield. Namely, according to the letter the Greek military units deployed near the demarcation line between Bulgaria and Greece were told by a Bulgarian representative that the hostilities would continue that very same day. The leader of the Bulgarian delegation Tonchev as well as Ivan Fichev, the Chief of the Headquarters, objected and explained that they knew nothing about such a thing and that the royal telegram was probably a mistake or a misunderstanding. After the negotiations had begun, Bulgaria said that they intended to renounce their territorial claims over Vardar Macedonia, but they insisted on obtaining Kavala and the gulf of Orfanos. Venizelos explicitly replied that such a step would spark off the anger of the Greek people, who would immediately rise in rebellion!

Throughout the whole day, there were lots of news about the diplomatic pressure of Italy and Germany exerted on Greece concerning the Kavala issue. The game was played by Great Britain and France on one side and Austria, Russia and later Italy on the other. On 22 July *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote that, no matter what Bulgaria would sign in relation not only to Kavala but to any other issue, the treaty would be considered as final only after the revision by the great powers. The very same day, *Royters* announced that eventually Bulgaria would yield and accept all the claims of Serbia and Greece and that Turkey had already agreed to withdraw from Edirne but sought financial concessions from Europe in return as well as guarantees that their army would be able to leave the town with dignity.

The Romanian minister of finances Margoloman started organizing dinners in honor of each delegation, the first dinner being organized for the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pashic.

### **24 July 1913**

All the parties managed to reach an agreement. Serbia got Shtip, Kochani, Radovish and Gevgelija, while Greece took possession of Kavala. Bulgaria lost the battle as well as Russia and Austria, who supported it indirectly. However, Bulgaria retained possession of Strumitsa and Xanthi (although Bulgaria will eventually lose Strumitsa to Serbia and Xanthi to Greece). The conference lasted from 16:00 to 20:00 and the following day the delegates were supposed to start drawing up the final version of the peace treaty and eventually to sign it. The Serbian delegation recalled the Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 when Russia had to fight Napoleon and had to withdraw all its forces from the Balkans as a consequence. In a situation like that, Serbia was unpro-

tected and The Ottoman Empire restored their rule over Belgrade. This time the Serbs were satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations considering that the injustice committed 100 years ago was finally corrected.

### **25 July 1913**

The meeting started at 17:15. The parties signed a *protocol* from the previous meeting during which agreement was reached by all negotiating parties. A commission was set up in order to draw up the peace treaty. The truce was extended indefinitely, and demobilization negotiations were initiated. The allies were upset and alarmed by the possibility Russia and Austria to revise the treaty that all delegations agreed on.

The Greek Prime Minister Venizelos presented a letter expressing regret for the misunderstanding related to the notification received on 23 July about the alleged continuation of hostilities. Then, Matanovic, the representative of Montenegro took the floor and presented a *memorandum* outlining the claims of his country. In the *memorandum*, he underlined that when Montenegro had gone to war it had not known that Serbia and Bulgaria had had an agreement on partitioning of territories (dating back to February 1912). Bearing in mind that during the war Montenegro lost 17 000 people, which is an extremely heavy toll on a country with a population of no more than 300 000, Matanovic stated that Montenegro as well claimed territories which would ensure rapid and sustainable development of the country in future.

Afterwards, the Romanian chairman Maiorescu read out an official note from Austria – Hungary and Russia whereby both countries announced their intention to revise the treaty. As a consequence, there was an immediate reaction from France who emphasized that Paris had not been informed on any possible revisions of the treaty and that it would in any event oppose to such a procedure.

### **26 July 1913**

The text of the peace treaty was drawn up and the signing was scheduled for 28 July, Monday. The *Treaty* did not include the possibility of revision, so much desired by Bulgaria. The Treaty determined the borders of Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Edirne issue was not resolved and it was decided that the great powers should decide upon it in future, which was accepted by Bulgaria who hoped that Russia and Austria would eventually intervene in the process and re-

wise the whole treaty. It was established that no additional clauses or provisions were to be included in the treaty. In the meantime, the former Prime Minister of Bulgaria Geshov had already left for St. Petersburg with a view to persuading Russia to revise the treaty. The Russian position on Kavala issue was made known through Romanian press; it implied that the location of the ports providing Bulgaria with access to the Aegean Sea was unsuitable and that the only port that met the needs of Russia was Kavala. On the other hand, for Great Britain the *Treaty of Bucharest* was impossible to amend.

Greece had already started the celebration ceremony. King Konstantin ordered 101 cannon balls to be fired from all fortresses from Janina to the Dardanelles. The newspapers wrote about Greek cities being decorated and illuminated until late in the night, especially Athens where every home celebrated the Treaty of Bucharest.

### **27 July 1913**

It was Sunday. The delegates spent the time in anticipation of the following day when they were supposed to put their signatures to the *Treaty*.

### **28 July 1913**

The *Treaty of Bucharest* was signed. Before it was signed, the Greek representative Nikolaos Politis, who was an international law professor at the University of Paris, made a proposal for the text of Article 1 of the Treaty which should read: "... .. *in order to establish peace and harmony among the contractual parties.....*"; the Bulgarian representative Simeon Radev did not like the word *harmony* to be included in the text of the Treaty, so it was removed and then the Treaty was signed. The Bulgarian reaction sparked off fierce debate among the delegates and some of them even regarded it as a bad sign.

The Treaty of Bucharest put an end to the Second Balkan War. The territory of Macedonia was partitioned. Later, some changes were introduced like for example: Strumitsa was annexed to Serbia, while Bulgaria completely lost its access to the Aegean Sea. However, all amendments that had been made to the Treaty were in compliance with the principles laid down in Bucharest. The twelve – day negotiations in Bucharest ended with the conclusion of the *Treaty of Bucharest*. The Macedonians regard this treaty as one of the key moments in their recent history.

## AEGEAN MACEDONIA<sup>106</sup>

### **The Balkan Wars and the Partitioning of Macedonia**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Macedonia was a province of the Ottoman Empire, occupied primarily by Macedonians, thought there were also Albanians, Turks, Romani (Gypsies), Vlachs, Jews and Greeks. Until the Balkan wars, Macedonia had been a compact and coherent geographic, economic, and historic entity, but after the Balkan wars Macedonia was divided.

Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria looked back to the past when their peoples, or those with whom they felt some historical association, had held great empires, and all hoped to resurrect a former glory. The great European powers had prevented Macedonian liberation before this time, sometimes even going so far as to send their own forces to assist the Turks against the Macedonians. Often the larger powers, like Russia, Austria, Britain and France were pulling strings behind the scenes, protecting their own interests and usually, with one or two notable exceptions, holding little regard for the Macedonians. Thus Macedonia remained helpless, was frequently devastated under the Turks, and became an easy victim for these other Balkan states.

Before the outbreak of war, Macedonia was under pressure from Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs, who were preparing their case for their territorial expansion. All claimed that they were simply occupying lands inhabited by their own peoples – thus, in the view of Macedonian nationalists, creating Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs where none had ever existed before. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, armed gangs working on behalf of the Greek and Bulgarian churches (remark: called phanariots and exarchists respectively) struggled with each other, and intimidated Macedonians, in their efforts to achieve control. Through the construction of churches and schools and the assignment of priests and teachers, each state was conducting an intense propaganda campaign within Macedonia, aimed at shaping the sense of national

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<sup>106</sup> The author of this text, which is an extract from the book *Македонија и Грција - битка за дефинирање нова балканска нација* published in Macedonia by "Makavej" (2002) is John Shea; the title of the original is: *Macedonia and Greece – the Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation*, John Shea – McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina and London – 1997. The choice and the elaboration of topics from this work included in this student project were made by Dimitar Apasiev.

identity of the Orthodox Christians of Macedonia towards their particular direction.<sup>107</sup>

Harilaos Trikoupis, Greek prime minister from 1882 to 1895, said: “*When the great war comes, Macedonia will become Greek or Bulgarian according to who wins. If it is taken by the Bulgarians they will make the population Slavs. If we take it, we will make them all Greeks*”.<sup>108</sup>

In 1897 Serbia, with the support of Russian diplomacy, obtained the right to have its own church in Macedonia, and then its own schools as well. Since that time there was a three - way struggle for the hearts, minds, and bodies of the Macedonians, all against a background of continuing Turkish occupation. The Turks were able to turn this divided struggle to their own purposes, as always acting on the principle of “*divide and rule (divide et impera!)*”. They willingly cooperated in the “*cultural and spiritual partition of this one people into three sections, finding in this the guarantees for its peace and power*”<sup>109</sup>. Meanwhile, agents of the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians plotted against the Macedonian nationalists as much as against the Turks, often betraying them to the Turkish authorities. “*The most characteristic feature of the history of cultural life in Macedonia proves to be the circumstance that the greatest enemy to its autonomy was not the barbaric Turks, but its brothers of the same stock and the same faith, who tried to dispossess and assimilate it with the help of the very culture the Macedonians themselves created*”.<sup>110</sup>

The Macedonian struggle reached a climax in the Balkan wars (1912 – 1913). Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria formed a series of alliances to “liberate” Macedonia from the Turks. This objective was accomplished by their victorious armies in the first Balkan war, a brief struggle from October to December 1912. In the second Balkan war, sometimes called the *Inter – Allied War*, the other allies fought Bulgaria over the spoils between June and July 1913.

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<sup>107</sup> Loring M. Danfort, “*Competing Claims to Macedonian Identity: The Macedonian Question and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*”, *Anthropology Today* 9, No. 4 (August 1993); pp. 3 – 10.

<sup>108</sup> Harilaos Trikoupis, “*History of the Greek People*” vol. 14 (Athens Publishing); p.18.

<sup>109</sup> Dimitrija Chupovski, “*Macedonia and the Macedonian*”, *Makedonskij Golos*, 1913

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

Macedonians participated with enthusiasm in the Balkan wars, hoping that the battle against the Turks would give them the independence they had so desperately sought in the Ilinden uprising (1903) just a few years before. It is significant that their co – religionists in the neighboring Balkan states had offered no help to the Macedonian revolutionaries. An independent Macedonia was not on their agenda. In 1912 – 13 Macedonian émigré groups, and others organizing within the country, formed armed detachments which participated in the Balkan wars, sometimes as conventional troops, sometimes as guerrillas, or “terrorist bands”, for example the mobile detachments of Sandanski. Macedonians of the time claimed that “*more than 100 000 Macedonians participated in this war, not considering the help that the whole population offered to the allies for the liberation....under the slogan “Macedonia to the Macedonians”*”.<sup>111</sup>

Before the end of 1912, Turkey had concluded an armistice with all Balkan allies except Greece, but a treaty was finally signed between all antagonists in May 1913. The Serbs had previously captured northern Macedonia (the Vardar basin, with Uskub/Skopje as the centre) and Monastir. The Bulgarians had taken Thrace as far as the Chataldja line close to Constantinople. The Greeks took Salonica and Preveza in the west, and in February 1913 they had captured Janina, completing their control over Epiros. However, an independent Albania was established by the great powers.<sup>112</sup>

A dispute arose between Bulgaria and its allies over Macedonia, and war erupted again. Bulgaria had tried to take over Serbia’s portion, the southwestern districts and Salonica, as well as Thrace. The Serbs and Greeks united against the Bulgarians, defeating them in their own theatre of war. The Romanians took advantage of the Bulgarian difficulties, declared war on them and took territory in the north while the Turks took back eastern Thrace. *The Treaty of Bucharest* on August 10, 1913, divided Macedonia between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. In 1919 a small part of Macedonia was given to Albania by *the Treaty of London*. With minor adjustments, these borders have remained in force ever since.

That the Greek presence in Macedonia was considered by the Greeks of the time to be an occupation seems confirmed by the *Decree*

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> A. W. Gomme, *Greece* (London: Oxford University Press); p. 43.

of *Occupation* by the Greek king Georgios I, of October 31, 1912. The decree does not speak of territories which the Greek army had liberated or regained – which would have implied that Greece considered them Greek lands – but clearly speaks of “*Macedonian territories occupied by the Greek army*”.<sup>113</sup>

It is instructive to see how more recent Greek publications speak of the partitioning of Macedonia. *Macedonia, History and Politics* explains that “Macedonia was divided up according to the following proportion: *Greek Macedonia: 34 603 square kilometers or 51.57%; Yugoslavian Macedonia: 25 714 square kilometers or 38.32%; Bulgarian Macedonia: 6 789 square kilometers or 10.11%* (p. 17). Two small parts of Western Macedonia, the ones around Lake Ohrid and Prespa and the other just south of Debar, were given to Albania a few years later.

The consequences of partition brought despair to Macedonian nationalists: “*A thousand Greek and Serbian publicists began to fill the world with their shouting about the essentially Greek and Serbian character of the populations of their different spheres. The Serbs gave the unhappy Macedonians twenty four hours to renounce their nationality and proclaim themselves Serbs, and the Greeks did the same. Refusal meant murder or expulsion. Greek and Serbian colonists were poured into the occupied territory..... The Greek newspapers began to talk about a Macedonia peopled entirely with Greeks – and they explained the fact that no one spoke Greek by calling the people “Bulgarophone” Greeks..... The Greek army entered villages where no one spoke their language. “What do you mean by speaking Bulgarian?” cried the officers. “This is Greece and you must speak Greek*”.<sup>114</sup>

The report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the Balkan Wars, initiated after “*amazing charges of Bulgarian outrages attributed to the King of Greece*”, indicated that 161 Macedonian villages were burned down and more than 16 000 houses were destroyed in the Aegean part of Macedonia.<sup>115</sup>

The Greek writer of *Macedonia – History and Politics* also argues that the portion of Macedonia given over to Greece was approximately equal in extent with the “historical” Macedonia of the classical

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<sup>113</sup> Interview with Kole Mangov, *Fokus – Skopje* (Sept. 22, 1995).

<sup>114</sup> John Reed, *The war in Eastern Europe*, 1916.

<sup>115</sup> *The other Balkans Wars* (The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; reprinted by the Brookings Institute, Washington, 1994).

period, thus providing a justification for the expansion of Greek territory. There are good reasons to doubt this argument. Examination of the descriptions of Macedonia provided by ancient writers as well as modern historians shows that virtually all of what is now the Republic of Macedonia was included in ancient Macedonia at the time of Philip II of Macedon.

It would appear that some Greek politicians would like to return to what they see as the good old days. *“Prominent members of the Greek parliament expressed nostalgia for the simple old times when E. Venizelos of Greece (former prime minister) and N. Pashic of Serbia, after the Balkan wars in 1913, agreed on the Greek – Serbian frontier so that to the north there would be only Serbs and to the south only Greeks, and no “Macedonians” on either side”*.<sup>116</sup>

### **Repopulating Aegean Macedonia**

At the beginning of this book, we note Greek claims that Northern Greece, or Aegean Macedonia, is *“more than 98.5% ethnically pure”*. This purity is held to be Greek. However, this statement is not accepted by reputable opinion outside of Greece. For instance, the 1987 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* indicated that there were still 180 000 Macedonian (Slav) speakers in this area, indicating a much greater percentage than 1.5%. If Macedonian activists from these areas are correct, there may be as many as 1 000 000 people from Macedonian – speaking backgrounds in Aegean Macedonia. Perhaps even more interesting is the origin of many of the Greeks who inhabit Aegean Macedonia. There is no doubt that there is now a high proportion of Greeks, but many, perhaps a majority, have forebears who were relative newcomers to the area.

John Geipel explains that after the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire, of which Greece was a part for nearly four hundred years until 1832, *“thousands of Greeks from Asia Minor were resettled in Hellas.....Fresh genetic material must also have been introduced from Asia Minor when over a million Greeks from Turkey were resettled in their own country during the 1920’s”*.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Stoyan Pribichevic, *“Macedonia, Its People and History”* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982).

<sup>117</sup> John Geipel, *The Europeans: An Ethno – Historical Survey* (London and Harlow: Longmans, Green, 1969), p. 218.

From 1920 to 1922 Greece fought a war against Turkey, attempting to add territories in Asia Minor, many of which had large Greek – speaking populations, to the Greek nation. Greece was defeated in this war and was forced into a population exchange that required the assimilation of 1.3 million Greeks from Asia Minor. Around half of these refugees were settled in Aegean Macedonia, where there was more habitable space than in other parts of Greek – controlled territory.

The largest numbers of new inhabitants came to Aegean Macedonia after the fall of Smyrna in August 1922. A large majority of these people were women and children and old people, since the man of military age had either been killed or imprisoned.<sup>118</sup>

In 1923 an agreement was signed with Turkey (formalized as the *Treaty of Lausanne*) for exchange of populations. Some 350 000 Moslem and “Bulgarians” left Greece<sup>119</sup>, and more than 550 000 of the Asian Minor refugees came to Aegean Macedonia between 1920 and the census of 1928. The overall population of the area increased by 33 percent, to 1 400 000.

A. W. Gomme gives the population of Aegean Macedonia in 1920 as 1 070 000. If 350 000 people were removed, as he says, that leaves us with 720 000, of whom a small minority seems to have been of Greek – speaking background. It is quite clear that many more Greeks were brought in from Turkey than were there already. Other refugee settlers came to Aegean Macedonia from Yugoslavia, Romania, and Russia.<sup>120</sup> Thus the population of Aegean Macedonia was changed by the introduction of Greek speakers from other lands, people who had no historical connection with the land of Macedonia.

While the biggest influx of Greek speakers to Aegean Macedonia came as a result of the Greek – Turkish wars, a major exodus of Slavic – speaking Christians occurs as a result of fighting in the later period of the Balkan wars between Greece and Bulgaria. Bulgaria had attempted to take the lion’s share of the spoils after the Turks had been forced out of Macedonia, and was successfully resisted by the Serbians and Greeks. Between 1913 and 1920, on the basis of voluntary and mandatory population exchanges between Bulgaria and Greece and Greece and Tur-

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<sup>118</sup> A. W. Gomme, *Greece* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945); p. 30.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 82 – 86.

<sup>120</sup> *Macedonia: History and Politics* (Athens: George Christopoulos, John Bastias, printed by Ekdotike Athenon S.A. for the Centre for Macedonians Abroad and the Society for Macedonian Studies, 1991); p.42.

key, 130 000 Slavic – speaking Christians were driven from the Aegean part of Macedonia;<sup>121</sup> around 86 000 Macedonians were forcibly sent to Bulgaria, and among the Moslems sent to Turkey were more than 40 000 Macedonian Moslems who were Macedonian speakers.

Even Greek resources concede that during the years from 1913 to 1928 the enormous movements of population which took place in Greek Macedonia changed the ethnological composition of the area.<sup>122</sup> *Macedonia, History and Politics* acknowledges that perhaps 100 000 Slavic speakers left (i.e. were forced to leave), 77 000 of these in 1926 alone. These figures may well be an underestimate (by comparison with Gomme’s estimates, for example) but this material does add weight to the idea that huge numbers of Slavs left and that even greater numbers of Greeks came in. The extent of the population movement out of Aegean Macedonia is emphasized in a report of March 30, 1927, in the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis*, which stated that 500 000 Slavic speakers were resettled to Bulgaria.

Thus the majority of the Greek – speaking population of Aegean Macedonia is descended from relatively recent Greek refugees from Turkey and other places. Thus being the case, Greece might be considered to have questionable claim on the name Macedonia. Remember, too, that the name Macedonia was not applied to the province by Greece until 1988. Thus much of the current population has lived at most some 70 years in a land that has been called “Macedonia” for less than a decade. Clearly they do not have the kind of historical claim to the land and to the name Macedonia as the Macedonian Slavs, Vlachs and Albanians whose ancestors have been there for 1 500 hundred years or more.

### **Forced Assimilation**

After the occupation of Aegean Macedonia by the Greeks in 1912 and the formal partition of 1913, the experiences of the Slavic – speaking inhabitants of Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, Greek (Aegean) Macedonia and Yugoslav (Vardar) Macedonia varied considerably. In the beginning, however, “*it was now the common lot of all the Macedonians to have their language forbidden in public life (schools, the press, etc.)*”

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<sup>121</sup> Macedonian P.E.N. Centre, *The Status of the Macedonian Language in the Aegean Part of Macedonia in Greece* (1986); cited in Slave Nikolovski “A Document on the Macedonian Language”, Macedonia, No. 402 (1986).

<sup>122</sup> *Macedonia: History and Politics*, p. 19.

– *In each part of the country the official language of the partitioning state, and it alone, was imposed as the cultural vehicle for the Macedonian population*".<sup>123</sup> Each of the states – Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Albania – that occupied a part of Macedonia denied the existence of any national minority within its borders. The experience is described with considerable emotion by a modern – day Macedonian, the former president of the new Republic: "*The participants in this partitioning claimed right to parts of Macedonia, declaring Macedonians to be Southern Serbs, Bulgarians and Slavophonic Greeks. They changed their new subjects' names and surnames. They forbade the Macedonian language, forced Macedonians to learn in foreign languages and imposed their own interpretations of history. They forced them to go to their churches. In short, they turned them into second – rate citizens, subjected to systematic re – settling and permanent exile. The common denominator of such politics was denationalization of the Macedonian people, erasing them from the Balkan's map of peoples, usurping its history, identity and desire for its own state. They forced upon us the fate of disappearing through assimilation*".<sup>124</sup>

For most of the past eighty years, the Greek government has consistently denied the existence of both a Macedonian nation and a Macedonian minority in northern Greece and has adopted a policy of forced assimilation toward the Slavic – speaking inhabitants of Greek Macedonia. The degree to which this policy has affected the human rights of Macedonians who are Greek citizens has been a concern for various human rights agencies and the United States State Department for many years. As we shall see later, international concern was first expressed effectively through the *League of Nations* in the early 1920s, and is still being expressed just as vigorously today. In the 1920s, Greece was seen as having breached its human rights obligations under the international conventions to which it was a signatory. A similar situation holds today.

Part of the detail for the argument that follows comes, with little modification, from a Macedonian source, and for that reason might be expected to present a biased position. However, there are good reasons

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<sup>123</sup> Blaze Koneski, *Macedonian – The Slavic Literary Languages*", ed. By A. M. Schenker and E. Stankiewich (New Haven: 1980); p. 62.

<sup>124</sup> *Macedonian Information and Liaison Service (MILS) News*, Skopje; August 3, 1994.

for considering it very seriously. Many of its conclusions are consistent with its observations of human rights organizations and the United States State Department in their recent criticisms of Greece's human rights record, and they were accepted without amendment by the international meeting of P.E.N. (the international society of writers) in 1986 and in subsequent years.

Population changes in Aegean Macedonia had an effect on the status of the languages in common use in those territories. Up until the period of the great population exchanges, the Macedonian (Slavic) tongue was the most commonly used language. "*Out of the total population of 1 052 227 inhabitants ..... 805 000 persons knew and used the Macedonian language in business and the market – place in everyday life.*"<sup>125</sup> Greek was a minority language<sup>126</sup> or family language, used daily by some 220 000 speakers. The situation reversed after the population exchanges.

Out of a total of 1 412 477 persons living in Aegean Macedonia after the great population exchanges, more than a million people used or tried to use the Greek tongue. Thus Greek became the common as well as the official language. The Macedonian suddenly found themselves a national minority within their own land. Some have estimated that about 370 000 "Slav Macedonians"<sup>127</sup> were living in northern Greece after the partitioning, many in the Western part of Aegean Macedonia in the Kostur, Lerin, and Voden areas. These latter areas are still predominantly Macedonian – speaking today, though the people are often reluctant to admit this.

After the Greeks occupied Aegean Macedonia, they closed the Slavic language schools and churches and expelled the priests. The Macedonian language and name were forbidden, and the Macedonians were referred to as Bulgarians, Serbians or natives. By a law promulgated on November 21, 1926,<sup>128</sup> all place – names (toponymia) were Hellenised; that is the names of cities, villages, rivers and mountains were discarded and Greek names put in their place. At the same time the Macedonians were forced to change their first names and surnames;

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<sup>125</sup> Macedonian P.E.N. Centre, *The Status of the Macedonian Language*.

<sup>126</sup> Underlined by D. A

<sup>127</sup> Stojan Ristevski, "The Creation of the Macedonian Literary Language" (*Создавањето на современиот македонски литературен јазик*), Studentski zbor, Skopje, 1988; p. 90.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.* p. 96

every Macedonian surname had to end in “os”, “es” or “poulos”. The news of these acts and the new, official Greek names were published in the Greek government daily *Efimeris tis Kiverniseos* no. 322 and 324 of November 21 and 23, 1926. The requirement to use these Greek names is officially binding to this day.

All evidence of the Macedonian language was compulsorily removed from churches, monuments, archaeological finds and cemeteries. Slavonic church or secular literature was seized and burned.<sup>129</sup> The use of the Macedonian language was strictly forbidden also in personal communication between parents and children, among villagers, at weddings and work parties, and in burial rituals.

Despite the general policy, there were times when arms of the Greek government, in the face of international pressure, took quite a different position to the Macedonian language. However, it is now the position of the Greek government that the Macedonian language does not exist and never has existed.

### **The Macedonian Primer of 1925 Produced by Greece (ABCEDAR)**

After the *Treaty of Versailles* at the end of World War I, several treaties were supposed to be implemented (under the auspices of the League of Nations) requiring the Greek government to guard the rights of Macedonian Slavs in northern Greece (Aegean Macedonia).<sup>130</sup>

For example, in Article 46 of the *Treaty of Neuilly* the Kingdom of Greece committed itself to defend the right of national minorities within its borders.

By the *Treaty of Sevres*, which was signed in Paris on August 10, 1920, the countries of Britain, France, Italy and Japan concluded an agreement with Greece on the protection of “*non – Greek nations*”. Greece pledged full protection of the Macedonian national minority (and other minorities), its language and culture, and undertook to open Macedonian schools. In section 2, Greece pledged to extend full care over the life and freedom of all citizens irrespective of their origin, nationality, language, and faith. Article 7 of this treaty states: “*No restrictions may be sanctioned which restrict the free use by each citizen*

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<sup>129</sup> Peter Hill, *Language Standardization in the South Slavonic Area*, Sociolinguistica 6 (June 1992); p. 108.

<sup>130</sup> Hristo Andonovski, *The First Macedonian Primer Between the Two World Wars – The ABCEDAR*, in *The 1986 Almanac for Overseas Macedonians* (Skopje, 1986).

of Greece of any language”. Article 8 says: “The citizens of Greece who belong to national, religious or linguistic minorities must be granted the right to equal treatment as citizens of Greece...for example, equal rights to open, manage and control institutions, schools and other educational institutions in which they are free to use their own language and confess their own religion”.

The Bulgarians claimed that the Macedonians in Greece were Bulgarian, and the Greeks for their part wanted to look after the interests of Greeks in Bulgaria, so these two countries signed the *Kalfov – Politis Protocol* in 1924, agreeing to minority rights. One very good reason for Greece to give at least the appearance of meeting its international obligations was the financial aid that was tied to such cooperation. Greece needed loans approved by the League of Nations to resettle refugees from Asia Minor. On September 4, 1925, the office of High Commissioner for National Minorities was established at Salonica, for the observance of the international agreements concerning national minorities. For a time, Greece seemed ready to go along with the treaties it had signed. It explicitly reassured the League of Nations of its willingness to fulfill the terms of articles 7 to 9 of the treaty in 1925 by submitting two copies of a primer published under the auspices of the Greek Ministry of Education for use in Slavonic – language schools. This primer, the *ABCEDAR*, was written in a central Macedonian dialect.<sup>131</sup>

Greece’s ambassador at the League of Nations explained that the *ABCEDAR* was written in a form of Latin script “similar to that used by the Croats, Czechs, and Slovenes”. Given the common use of Cyrillic script in Aegean Macedonia, as in Vardar Macedonia, up until this time, the deliberate use of the Latin script suggests that this primer was intended to counteract Bulgarian influences among the Slavic Macedonian minority in Greece. Since the use of the local dialect in Vardar Macedonia had been banned by the Serbian authorities for official and educational use, the adoption of such forms suggests that the primer might also have been intended to encourage separatist feeling among the “South Serbs”, as these Macedonians were called at the time.

Although it was presented to the League of Nations, the *ABCEDAR* never reached Macedonian children. Most copies were immedi-

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<sup>131</sup> Ristevski, “The Creation” *Создавањеѝо*, pp. 91 – 95; Peter Hill, *Different Codifications of a Language in Slavistische Linguistik*, ed. By Wg. Grike (Munich, 1981); pp. 48 – 63.

ately destroyed. Locally the ABCEDAR often arrived at the required towns but was destroyed by local police chiefs or met other (sometimes Bulgarian – inspired) misadventures. There have been recent reprints to show us what the Greek authorities achieved. The production of this little book, and the attitudes that surrounded it, indicate that at least some important Greek academics and politicians of the time recognized that Macedonian Slavs in Aegean Macedonia were a group of significant size, and a people distinct by culture and language from the Serbians and the Bulgarians.<sup>132</sup>

The ABCEDAR, the first and the only Macedonian primer officially prepared in Greece despite the Greece’s international obligations to do much more, gained much favorable comment in the Greek press of the time. Nikolaos Zarifis, writing in *Elefteron Vima*,<sup>133</sup> said: “*The Primer was printed in the Latin script, and compiled in the “Macedonian dialect”*. Zarifis went to say: “*The compilers rejected the Bulgarian and Serbian Cyrillic alphabet, and followed the Macedonian speech of the Lerin – Bitola region*”. These comments make it clear that informed people of the time recognized both the language and the territory (“Macedonia”) from which it originated.

The principles of the *Treaties of Neuilly and Sevres* were honestly supported by the Greek minister of foreign affairs, Rusos; an expert in international law, Nikolaos Politis; and the left – wing liberal leaders, Yoanis Sefianopoulos and Papanastasiu, among others.<sup>134</sup> Nonetheless, the Greek government failed to distribute the book or to implement plans to open Macedonian schools.

A Greek writer, Dimitrios Vogazlis,<sup>135</sup> said that the failure of the ABCEDAR project was caused by the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments. He said the Greek government did not follow the lead given by the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments, labeling the Macedonians Bulgarians or Serbs, since “*it held to the opinion that they constituted a separate nation regardless of the names they were given*”. This attitude seems to have provoked the Yugoslav government into action. *The London Times* of March 12, 1925 also suggests that the Yugoslav government caused Greece to back away from fulfilling its treaty obligations towards the Macedonian minority. The Yugoslav government

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<sup>132</sup> Andonovski, *The First Macedonian Primer*.

<sup>133</sup> Nikolaos Zafiris, *The Minorities in Greece, Elefteron Vima*, Oct.19, 1925.

<sup>134</sup> Andonovski, *The First Macedonian Primer*.

<sup>135</sup> Dimitrios Vogazlis, *National and Religious Minorities in Greece and Bulgaria* (1954).

(The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), angered that the Slavs south of the Yugoslav – Greek border might be called “Macedonians”, threatened to cancel the *Treaty of alliance with Greece* and discussed with the Bulgarians a division of Greek Macedonia into spheres of influence.

Despite those few Greek voices of support for fair dealings with the Macedonian Slav minority in Aegean Macedonia, the ABCEDAR never reached any of the schools for which it was intended. The suppression was so complete; there must surely have been a highly coordinated campaign to make sure that the book was never used. Nevertheless, analysis of the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the book shows that in the 1920s the Greek government, perhaps reluctantly, recognized the Macedonian Slavs to be a separate ethnic group with their own “Macedonian” language. However, despite this acknowledgement, in the 1920s Macedonian schools were closed, not opened. Kindergartens were established in Macedonian localities so that children could be inculcated in a Greek spirit. This was despite a November 11, 1930 press conference in Athens at which Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos said: “*The problem of a Macedonian national minority will be solved and I will be the first one to commit myself to the opening of Macedonian schools if the nation so wishes*”.<sup>136</sup>

### **The Metaxas Dictatorship (1936 – 1940)**

The dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936 – 1940) was especially brutal in its treatment of the Slavic speakers of Aegean Macedonia, who by this time had increasingly begun to identify themselves as Macedonians. On December 18, 1936, the Metaxas dictatorship issued a legal act concerning “*Activity against State Security*”. This law punished claims of minority rights. On the basis of this act, thousands of Macedonians were arrested, imprisoned, or expelled from Greece.

On September 7, 1938, the legal act 2366 was issued. This banned the use of the Macedonian language even in the domestic sphere. All Macedonian localities were flooded with posters that read “*Speak Greek*”. Evening schools were opened in which adult Macedonians were taught Greek. No Macedonian schools of any kind were permitted. Any public manifestation of Macedonian national feeling and its

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<sup>136</sup> The Aegean Macedonian Human rights Association of Australia, *Submission to the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry into Human Rights* (1994).

outward expression through language, song, or dance was forbidden and severely punished by the Metaxas regime. People who spoke Macedonian were beaten, fined, and imprisoned. Punishments in some areas included piercing of the tongue with a needle and cutting off a part of the ear for every Macedonian word spoken. Almost 5 000 Macedonians were sent to jails and prison camps for violating this prohibition against the use of the Macedonian language. The trauma of persecution has left deep scar on the consciousness of the Macedonians in Greece, many of whom are even today convinced that their language “cannot” be committed to writing.<sup>137</sup>

Writing in 1938, Australian author Bert Birtles in his book *Exiles in the Aegean* said: “*If Greece has no Jewish problem, she has the Macedonians. In the name of “Hellenization” these people are being persecuted continually and arrested for the most fantastic reasons. Metaxas’s way of inculcating the proper nationalist spirit among them has been to change all the native place – names into Greek and to forbid the use of the native language. For displaying the slightest resistance to this edict – for this too is a danger to the security of the State – peasants and villagers have been exiled without trial*”.

### **The Greek Civil War (1946 – 1949)<sup>138</sup>**

With the ending of the Nazi occupation in Greece, the Stalinist leadership of the Greek popular liberation army acknowledged control of the new Greek government in 1945. The new government embarked on a “white terror” campaign against the recently organized Macedonians. There were widespread massacres of Macedonians, 7 000 of whom fled to Yugoslavia. A Macedonian resistance group, the successor of the SNOF, the National Liberation Front (NOF), was set up,

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<sup>137</sup> Hill, *Language Standardization*; p. 108.

<sup>138</sup> Note: According to Arben Ljalja, the only Albanian historian who deals with the issue of the exodus of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, “*the Greek authorities expelled the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia taking advantage of the Greek civil war led between the right wing (IDEA), supported by the Great Britain and USA and the left wing (The Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) backed up by Yugoslavia, Albania and few other “communist” countries. The Anglo – Americans provided a military assistance of 353, 6 million dollars (light weapons + 4 130 minethrowers). During the war, 41 970 DSE soldiers were killed, 22 950 were captured, while 24 300 soldiers surrendered. More than 70 000 fled from the country - mostly, women, children and elderly*” (*Forum*, No. 174 of January 2009, p. 21).

On the other hand, according to Noam Chomsky 160 000 people lost their lives during the Greek civil war! (for more details see “What Uncle Sam Really Wants” (*Sta to u stavri Amerika hoce?*); Institute of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 1995; p.21).

strongly supported by Aegean Macedonian émigrés returning from Vardar Macedonia. The aim of the NOF was to defend “*the national rights of the Macedonian people within a democratic Greece*”.<sup>139</sup> From 1946 to 1949, it fought on the side of the Communist party against both the white terror regime of the Greek right, and Bulgarian nationalist groups in the region. By 1949, Macedonians made up 14 000 of the 40 000 troops led by the Communists against the Greek government.

Greek sources concede that members of the NOF believed that they were fighting “*a national liberation struggle for the Macedonians of the Aegean*”.<sup>140</sup> In passing, it might be noted that in order to file a force of 14 000 fighting men, from a community that was not universally convinced of the advantages of fighting a civil war, it would be necessary to have a population base of at least 100 000 to 150 000 people, but probably there would have been double this number. During the civil war in Greece, in the period from 1947 to 1949, in the Aegean part of Macedonia, 87 schools were opened with 10 000 students, and Macedonian literature and culture flourished.<sup>141</sup> Macedonian territories controlled by Greek government forces did not fare so well. The headquarters of the Democratic Greek Army (the Alliance of Greek Communists and Macedonians) reported that from mid – 1945 to May 20, 1947, in western Macedonia alone, 13 529 Macedonians were tortured, 3 215 were imprisoned, and 268 were executed without trial. In addition, 1 891 houses were burnt down and looted, and 13 808 Macedonians were resettled by force. During the war, Greek – run prison camps where Macedonians were imprisoned, tortured, and killed included the island of Ikaria near Turkey, the island of Makronis near Athens, the jail Averov near Athens, the jail at Larisa near the Volos Peninsula, and the jail at Thessalonica. Aegean Macedonian expatriates claim that there were mass killings on Vincho, Gramos, Kaymakchalan, and at Mala Prespa in Albania.<sup>142</sup>

In 1947, during the Greek civil war, the legal *Act L – 2* was issued. This meant that all who left Greece without the consent of the Greek government were stripped of Greek citizenship and banned from returning to the country. The law applied to Greeks and Macedonians,

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<sup>139</sup> Karadjis, *Green Left*; April 1, 1992.

<sup>140</sup> Macedonia: *History and Politics*; p. 28.

<sup>141</sup> Macedonian P.E.N. Centre, *The Status of the Macedonian Language*.

<sup>142</sup> The Aegean Macedonian Human rights Association of Australia, *Submission to the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry into Human Rights* (1993).

but in its modernized version the act is binding only on Macedonians. It prevents Macedonians, but not former Communist Greeks who fought against the winning side from returning to Greece and reclaiming property.

On January 20, 1948, the legal *Act M* was issued. This allowed the Greek government to confiscate the property of those who were stripped of their citizenship. The law was updated in 1985 to exclude Greeks, but it is still binding on Macedonians.

Among the refugees of the Greek civil war were 28 000 Macedonian children between the ages of 2 and 14. These were mostly the children of the Macedonian independence fighters whose parents were fearful for their safety after the war. The children were evacuated to the Eastern Bloc countries. Although the children of Greek fighters were officially pardoned in the 1960s and allowed back into Greece, this human right has not been extended to the Macedonians. On November 27, 1948, the United Nations issued Resolution 193C (III), which called for the repatriation of all child refugees back to Greece. However, Greek laws still prevent the free return of these and other Macedonian refugees.

While they received support from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the partisans and Communists were able to resist Greek government forces, at times staging some remarkable victories. However, after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 and massive British and United States intervention, the Greek Communist deserted the Macedonian partisans, and Yugoslav support for the Macedonians was withdrawn. After the Greek Communists surrendered, Greek government forces quickly overcame Macedonian resistance.

After the defeat of the Communist and Macedonian revolutionaries, a reign of terror ruled over Aegean Macedonia. Many thousands more Macedonians fled Greece, seeking asylum in Yugoslavia and other countries in Eastern Europe under extremely difficult circumstances.<sup>143</sup> Unlike Greek Communist refugees who have since returned, the Macedonians are barred from returning, even visiting relatives, and have not been permitted to reclaim family land and property.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia* (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1946); p. 186.

<sup>144</sup> Karadjis, *Green Left*; April 1, 1992.

### **Official policies toward Macedonians in Greece and Bulgaria**

Some villages in Aegean Macedonia were depopulated in the post – civil war period, but the bulk of the Slavic population stayed in their homes “*looking after their fields, their gardens, their families and their homes – and submitting to a barrage of official propaganda that being Slavonic meant being a communist, a traitor – and a barbarian. And who would admit to that in public?*”<sup>145</sup>

In the decades following the Greek civil war, conservative Greek government continued a vigorous policy of assimilation of the Macedonian Slavs and other minorities. On August 23, 1953, the legal *Act 2536* was issued. This law allowed that all those who left Greece and who did not return within three years’ time could be deprived of their property. This permitted the confiscation of Macedonian property. Around the same time, a decision was taken to resettle Macedonians out of Aegean Macedonia. A wide – ranging media campaign was launched to induce the Macedonians to leave their native areas voluntarily and to settle in the south of Greece and on the island. The Greek intention was to separate Macedonians living in Greece from their kin living in the Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia, and to create a 60 – kilometer – wide belt along the border with then Yugoslavia where “*the faithful sons of the Greek nation*” could be settled. A firm reaction from Yugoslavia led to the eventual cancellation of the plan.

In 1959 the legal *Act 3958* was issued. This allowed for the confiscation of the land of those people not “Greek by birth” who left Greece and did not return within five years’ time. The law was amended in 1985, but it is still binding on Macedonians.

In 1962 the legal *Act 4234* was issued. Persons who were stripped of their Greek citizenship were banned from returning to Greece. A ban on crossing the Greek border also extended to spouses and children. The law is still in force for Macedonians, including those who left Greece as children (note: refugee children).

In its June 1991 edition the *Atlantic Monthly* magazine ran an extensive story detailing many of the atrocities committed in Macedonia during the Balkan wars and following the partition of Macedonia. The author, Robert Kaplan, also said: “*Greece, for its part, according to a Greek consular official whom I visited in Skopje, does not permit any-*

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<sup>145</sup> Hill, *Language Standardization*; p. 108.

*one with a “Slavic” name who was born in northern Greece and now lives in Yugoslav Macedonia to visit Greece, even if he or she has relatives there. This means that too many families have been separated for decades”.*

In 1969 a legal act was issued to allow settlement by ethnic Greeks on Macedonian farms left behind. This has facilitated the recent relocation to Aegean Macedonia of over 100 000 immigrants of Greek origin, called Pontiac Greeks, from the former Soviet Union.

On December 29, 1982, the legal *Act 106841* was issued by the government of Andreas Papandreou. This allowed those who were recognized as ethnic Greeks who left Greece during the civil war to return to Greece and reclaim their Greek citizenship. Macedonians born in Greece and their families were excluded and remained in exile. Heads of various state administration departments received the right to use property left in Greece by Macedonian refugees.

On April 10, 1985, legal *Act 1540/85* was issued. This amended the previously issued acts regulating property relations, making it impossible for Macedonians to return. This act limits the definition of political refugees to ethnic Greeks and permits the recovery of illegally seized property to such ethnic Greeks. The Macedonian refugees from Greece are denied the same right.

In June 1989, the prime minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou, said at the pre – election meeting in the Macedonian locality of Florina that if he won the election he would build a factory in which only the locals (i.e. Macedonians) would be employed. He also said that he would abolish *Law 1540* that he had been responsible for some years before. That promise has not been kept.

In 1987, Macedonian parents in Aegean Macedonia were forced to send their 2 - and 3 – year – old children to “*integrated kindergartens*” to prevent them from learning the Macedonian language and culture. The ruling was not implemented elsewhere in Greece.

On August 30, 1989, a *legal act rehabilitating the participants in the Greek civil war* of 1946 – 49 was issued. The act granted damages and disability pensions for fighters in the civil war who now have Greek citizenship. By this measure Macedonian fighter living in exile – who earlier had been stripped of their citizenship – were rendered ineligible.

In 1990 the High Court of Florina under *decision 19/33/3/1990* refused to register a Centre for Macedonian Culture. An appeal on August 9 the same year against the decision was also refused. In May

1991, a second appeal was refused by the High Court of Appeals in Thessalonica. This refusal to permit a cultural centre has drawn the criticism of several international human rights groups.

The Greek government has undertaken a range of measures to suppress the idea that there are minority ethnic groups in the country. Since 1961, no Greek census has carried details of minorities. The Greek position has come under harsh criticism from commentators outside the country, in part because as the *London Times* noted in August 1993 “*the historical refusal to acknowledge ethnic or cultural plurality has transmogrified into a refusal to accept political dissent in relation to these ethnic or cultural questions*”.

The present public stance of the Greek government is that there is no minority group of Macedonians. There is acknowledgement that some people who live in areas bordering the Republic of Macedonia can speak another language apart from Greek, but the description of these people as “bilinguals” always implies that the use of the “Slavic idiom” is simply a matter of neighborly convenience rather than an ethnic identification. Greeks insist that these people are Greek by ethnicity.

The Greek argument about Greek nationality goes something like this: all the people in Greece, except the Muslim minority that was defined in a 1920s *Treaty* with the Turks, are Greeks. Therefore, apart from these Moslems, there is no minority population within the country. There can be no issue about the human rights of non – existent groups. As we have seen, this was not the position held by the Greeks in the years following the Balkan wars when Aegean Macedonia was first taken over by Greek forces. Now, contrary to the earlier Greek position, it is Greek government policy to deny the existence of a language called Macedonian.

This denial of the Macedonian language is a problem from the international perspective since linguistics authorities generally recognize the language and the United Nations accepted the Macedonian language several decades ago, soon after the language was standardized. While Macedonia was a part of Yugoslavia, of course, Serbia accepted the existence of the Macedonian language. They only countries that do not accept the Macedonian language are Bulgaria and Greece. (Bulgaria continues to insist simply that the Macedonian language is Bulgarian; thus Bulgarians regard Slavic peoples in Aegean Macedonia as a Bulgarian – speaking minority. In 1994 the European Union recog-

nized Macedonian as one of the languages spoken by minorities living within Union boundaries, that is in Aegean Macedonia<sup>146</sup> (at that time Macedonia itself was not a part of the EU). One might expect that this general acceptance of the Slavic language spoken by many Aegean Macedonian people would be a difficult stumbling block for the Greek government. However, Greece simply denies that the Macedonian language is internationally accepted. Thus the Greeks can argue that since there is no nation called Macedonia, and no language called Macedonian, there can be no national minority within Greece that is Macedonian or that speaks Macedonian or any other recognized language.

The United Nations, the United States State Department, Amnesty International, and various chapters of Helsinki Watch throughout the world disagree with the Greeks, in particular, about the presence of Macedonians (and other minorities) in Greece and have pressured them in recent times to change their behavior toward their Macedonian – speaking minority. There have also been significant condemnations of Bulgaria. Both the Greek and Bulgarian positions have remained unchanged in the face of increasing criticism. (Meanwhile, the Serbians may be reconsidering their previous recognition of their Macedonian – speaking population; in 1989, Serbian and Greek leaders discussed the issue of “assimilating” Macedonia). (.....)

### **How Many Macedonians?**

Macedonian writers claim that there are as many as one million Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia. The 1987 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* put the number of Slavic – speakers in Aegean Macedonia at 180 000. The London Newspaper *the Independent* suggests that there are anywhere from 50 000 to 300 000.<sup>147</sup> Recent observations by the United States State Department suggests smaller (though significant) numbers, perhaps between 20 000 and 50 000 Slavic – speakers in northern Greece, many of whom live in the area along the border between Greece and the former Yugoslavia.<sup>148</sup> The department says that although a majority of these people have a Greek national identity (they identify themselves as Greeks and as Macedonians, or as Greek –

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<sup>146</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Oct. 25, 1994.

<sup>147</sup> *Macedonian – Greek Relations in British Media*; *MILS News*, Skopje; May 13, 1924.

<sup>148</sup> US Department of State, *Sounry Reports on Human Rights Practicies* for 1990, p. 1172.

Macedonians), a significant number of them have a Macedonian national identity (they identify themselves as Macedonians but not as Greeks).<sup>149</sup>

The truth about the number of Macedonian speakers in Aegean Macedonia is difficult to determine. The Greek government says none; Macedonian activists claim more than a million. If Greece responds to international pressure to allow human rights and freedoms to its Macedonian speakers, we may gain a more accurate idea in the future about the number of people in Aegean Macedonia who consider themselves Greek – Macedonian or Macedonians. As we have seen, great pressure has been put on Aegean Macedonians to deny their language and culture. According to international commentators and others with obvious sympathy for the Aegean Macedonians, the resulting climate of fear makes any accurate analysis impossible.

It is also worthy of note that there may be close to a quarter of a million Aegean Macedonians living outside Greece. For instance: *“The Aegean Macedonian Human Rights Association of Australia claims it represents the interests of an estimated 90 000 Macedonians in Australia who originate from the part of Macedonia which is now incorporated into Greece”*.<sup>150</sup>

Similar numbers are claimed for Canada and the United States. Many of these people see themselves as refugees, and they maintain a strong interest in their native land. At the very least, they would like to visit their birthplace and their relatives again, and many would even resettle there if their human rights were recognized. *“We emphasize, however, that our ethnic origin is Macedonian, not Greek: we speak Macedonian, identify as Macedonian, and have a separate, wholly Macedonian culture. The Aegean Macedonian Community is ethnically related to the Macedonian immigrants from the Republic of Macedonia, which was formerly part of Yugoslavia. Many of the members of the Aegean Macedonian Association of Australia are political refugees from Greece, others are economic refugees due to the Greek policy of not developing Macedonian areas, and the majority still have family members in Greece”*.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Danforth; *Competing Claims* and the breakup of Yugoslavia, *Anthropology Today*, Vol. IX, No.4, Aug. 1993; p. 3 – 30.

<sup>150</sup> Aegean Macedonian Human rights Association of Australia, *Submission* (1994).

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

Anastasia Karakasidou is an academic of Greek extraction who was herself surprised to find a suppressed but surviving Macedonian culture in Aegean Macedonia. In the process she has learned about the lengths to which Greek government officials have gone to hide this group of people and to force them to assimilate with mainstream Greek culture. She has also been the target of threats from various Greek interest groups, including some of the United States, and of harassment from the Greek government security services. In an academic analysis of the situation in the Aegean Macedonia, she discussed Greek efforts at nation building aimed at turning the peoples of its expanding territory into the citizens of a nation – state. She observes that: “*since the incorporation of Macedonia into the expanding Greek state in 1913, Greek authorities have attempted to wrest control of enculturation away from the private domain of the family and to place it under the control of state institutions. In the process, Slavic speakers of the area have found themselves forbidden to use their Slavic language or to engage in songs, dances and other public cultural activities. Some have resisted, protesting that such restrictions destroy their distinct local culture*”. Karakasidou investigates these charges, examining Macedonian claims to a distinct ethnic heritage and minority status, and reactions and counterclaims by Greek authorities.<sup>152</sup> She argues “*that the politicization of culture in Greek Macedonia has directly contributed to the denial of ethnic identity among Slavic – speaking inhabitants there*”.

When Karakasidou first began to explore such issues, she travelled to the western part of Aegean Macedonia with her husband to search for Slavic speakers. She visited Florina (Lerin) and travelled off the beaten path in the country around Edessa (Voden). For the first time, she met people who identified themselves as Slavic speakers. They told her that the men of their village had first learned Greek in 1912. The women of their village were the last to learn Greek, and some of the older people, most of whom had died, never learned it at all. They told her that under the Metaxas regime, anyone caught speaking the local language was forced to drink retsinolado (castor oil) and some were tortured. Youths were beaten for speaking the language at school. In the evenings, spies listened for anyone speaking the language in the privacy of their homes. While talking to her, these Slavic speakers be-

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<sup>152</sup> Anastasia Karakasidou; *Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia*, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 11, No. 1 (May 1993).

came nervous and suspicious and wondered why she was asking so many questions. Fortunately, Karakasidou was able to calm their fears and begin the accumulation of wealth of information about the Aegean Macedonians. She studied the present population, the history, and nature of the territory that she was investigating.

Karakasidou concludes that Greece has confused ethnicity with nationality. In order to make sure that its citizens are loyal to the Greek state, she observes, the state has insisted that all its residents are ethnic Greeks. She says: *“In redefining ethnicity as nationality, the Greek state created the contradictions that form the basis of the minority problem in northern Greece today.... While assimilation and amalgamation in Central Greek Macedonia, where the process had its impetus a generation earlier, is now essentially complete, in the Florina region some local communities continue to display ethnic consciousness despite their national Greek identity..... What most seek is simply recognition of their status as an ethnic minority within the greater nation – state, and thus the right to gain equitable access to jobs, to practice their own Orthodox religion, to speak their own language, and to educate their children in the folklore and stories of their ancestors”*.

Karakasidou notes with concern that the Greek authorities have been implacable in antagonism to these “Slavo – Macedonians”, having little regard for the loyalty of their own citizens in their concern for the principle of Panhellenism. She describes the takeover of Greek families by the Greek state, which uses them as an instrument for the building of the Greek nationhood. She describes the arguments of Greek nationalist intellectuals, who attempt to build a Greek national consciousness based on a rewriting of history. She focuses on the “common blood” metaphor used by nationalists, identifying it as racism, a kind of social Darwinism and “pseudo – biology”. She points out that such arguments have long been discredited in the social science, though they are still *“the dominant ethnological, historical and political position of the overwhelming majority of Greek scholars who identify ethnicity with nationality”*. She argues that the so – called historical perspectives of Greek academics such as Kyriakidis and Vakalopoulos fell into the trap of anachronism, imposing the categories of the present on very different situations that existed in the past. This ideological meddling with the raw material of history, she suggests, cannot be given serious intellectual weight in modern times. She tells us that: *“The efforts of Greek intellectuals and politicians to construct a tradition of Greek heritage in Macedonia have led to a protracted campaign to*

*denigrate or even deny the existence of a Slavo – Macedonian ethnic minority in northern Greece*". She suggests that the issue is more than just and "academic" debate, since it has very real, and usual unpleasant consequences for the lives of the people in question as well as for the political stability of the Greek nation – state.

Karakasidou outlines the language struggle between the Slavic – speaking peoples and Greek authorities from the end of the nineteenth century. She describes with near disbelief what she calls *bizarre attempts of Greek scholars to discredit the Macedonian language by saying it has no syntax or grammar*. She feels that such indefensible ideas only discredit Greek scholarship. She writes: "*The extremist and militant tone of most articles is alarming. It is striking that that much of the rhetoric coming out of Greece on the issue has progressed markedly little beyond the simplistic and reductionist notions that inflamed the Balkan Crisis at the turn of the century*". In particular, she says there has been confusion between ideas about "nationality" and ideas about culture and ethnicity. She says that Greek scholars have frequently argued from historical premises that are fundamentally misinformed. Some have claimed that "*since there is no country called "Macedonia", there can be no "Macedonians"*". Such simplistic notions are compounded when Greek scholars fail to recognize that ethnicity and nationality are constructed, she says.

As is noted elsewhere in this book, to anthropologists, national identities are constructed through complex historical processes. They are categories people use to classify themselves and others, categories subject to negotiation and change over time<sup>153</sup>. Belonging to a particular ethnic group or national minority is a matter of individual choice which, signatories to *United Nations conventions on human rights* have agreed, must be freely exercised. Karakasidou's argument suggests that neither the Greek government nor Greek academics are willing to consider such distinction.

Karakasidou's work has been received with great hostility by extremist Greek nationalists. Leonard Doyle writes that in order to avoid necessary controversy over the Macedonian debate in Greece, she decides not to publish her dissertation, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Shrubs, Agrarian Development and Nation Building in Northern Greece*. However, Greek newspapers somehow obtained copies of the manuscript,

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<sup>153</sup> Loring Danforth; *The Age*, Melbourne, March 5, 1994.

and since that time “Ms. Karakasidou, the mother of two young children, has been mercilessly hounded by sections of the Greek media and by the Greek – American community in the United States.<sup>154</sup> She received veiled death threats from a Greek – American newspaper in February 1994, in the form of an article it published describing a possible scenario for her death. The article described an attack by a group of men, one of whom drove a pointed stake, wrapped in the colors of the Greek flag, into her heart, killing her as a traitor”. Leonard Doyle says: “*It is thought that the veiled death threats were designed to frighten her away from academic research*”. The threats against Ms. Karakasidou, 38, escalated early in May 1994 when *Stohos*, an extreme right – wing Greek newspaper, published her address in Salonica. The newspaper also provided details of the car she uses. Karakasidou does not believe that the government is behind the death threats but feels they are the work of national extremists.

### **Climate of Fear**

Of considerable relevance to questions about the number of Macedonian speakers in Aegean Macedonia is Karakasidou’s description of the terror of many Slavic speakers when asked if they know the language. After several generations of persecution, she says, they are hesitant to share their knowledge with outsiders, explaining that even today when inhabitants of some village sing in their mother tongue, the “local” Greek policeman comes over and compels them to stop.

Other commentators see the prosecution of Macedonian human rights activist as part of a process aimed at continuing the climate of fear. “*By denying the existence of any minority group, except the Turkish community in Western Thrace, the government apparently hopes to extinguish any nationalist feeling among its ethnic Macedonian population*”.<sup>155</sup>

The *Spectator* magazine published an article on the same theme on August 15, 1992. The article, by Noel Malcolm, was titled “*The New Bully of the Balkans*”. The article discusses the plight of the main ethnic minorities in Greece, including the Macedonians, the Vlachs, and the Turks. On the Macedonians, Mr. Malcolm noted: “*How many of these Slavs still live in Greece is not known. The 1940 census regis-*

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<sup>154</sup> Leonard Doyle; *The Independent*, May 11, 1994.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

*tered 85 000 “Slav - speakers”. The 1951 census (the last to record any figures for speakers of other language) put it at 41 000; many who had fought on the losing side in the civil war had fled, but other evidence shows that all the censuses heavily underestimate the Slavs’ numbers. The lack of a question on the census – form is not, however, the only reason for their obscurity”. (....)*

## STUDENT ESSAYS

### IN THE SHADOW OF OLYMPUS – THE EMERGENCE OF MACEDON<sup>156</sup>

Nowadays, the history of Macedonia arouses great interest not only because of the events that have recently taken place in Southeastern Europe (fall of communism, disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosovo crisis, infamous agreement recognizing the independence of Taiwan, war in the Republic of Macedonia, unexpected death of the President of the Republic of Macedonia Boris Trajkovski as well as other more or less important events) but, first and foremost, because of the important personalities who have been the contribution of this country to the overall human civilization. Let us remind ourselves of some of them: the famous and glorious king Alexander the Great of Macedon (the son of Philip II of Macedon) who expanded the territory of Macedonia on three continents and whose ultimate goal was to create a universal empire in which there would be huge diversity of cultures and where all people would live in brotherhood; then the celebrated Egyptian queen Cleopatra VII who had Macedonian blood and genes and was an ethnic Macedonian; she was a distant grand – daughter of one of the Alexander's generals Ptolemy, who after the downfall of the Macedonian Empire ruled in Egypt. Let us not forget either that Macedonia was the first country in Europe in which Christianity was spread; Macedonia is the birthplace of the renowned Byzantine emperor Justinian I. It is the land of brothers Sts. Cyril and Methodius who even today have the reputation of “*great protectors of the European continent*” and who are credited with devising the first alphabet of all Slavic people. St. Clement of Ohrid also originates from Macedonia; he is considered to be the creator of the Cyrillic alphabet. There is a great number of other important personalities coming from Macedonia. Unfortunately, our neighbors are desperately trying to prove and to make others believe that some of them were Serbs, Bulgarians or Greeks; in so doing they, by being greater in number and in power than us, fiercely deny the existence of separate Macedonian nation with unique identity.

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<sup>156</sup> The authors of this text, which represents elaboration of the work *In the Shadows of Olympus – the Emergence of Macedon* from PhD Eugene Borza, are Borche Razmoski and Ana Shajnoska.

Ever since the independence of Macedonia in 1991, Greece has been denying and challenging the name of our country. Of course, each of the countries has its own side of the story about who enjoys the exclusive right over the glorious name *Macedonia* and which one of them can identify itself with the outstanding hero Alexander III of Macedon! The name Macedonia has always been related to the territory of present - day Republic of Macedonia (or the territory of ethnic Macedonia) and it is logical to conclude that this name is also related to it and that it belongs to it. Nevertheless, these are only subjective and untenable attitudes which can be very often encountered in the works of both Macedonian and Greek authors, as well as in other sources.

Historical data as well as the common sense clearly point out to the fact that the culture and the blood of the modern Macedonian nation are closely related to the ancient Macedonians. They left us that as a legacy. We all know that ancient peoples and civilizations do not simply disappear without a trace (unless there is evidence for mass exodus from a certain land).

Ethnicities that are newcomers to a certain territory in most cases inherit the culture and the blood of ancient people who had lived there before them. Presently, almost all historiographies, including those from the Balkan countries, agree on this point. For example: according to the contemporary Albanian historiography, modern Albanians are descendants of the Illyrians i.e. an ancient people who lived on the territory of present - day Albania; the Bulgarian sources legitimately consider the Thracians as an integral ethnic and cultural segment of the modern Bulgarian nation. Greek historiography regards Greeks as direct descendants of the ancient Hellenes. Consequently, it is clear that ancient Macedonians are different from ancient Greeks, which means that Greek claims of ancient Macedonians being one of the many ancient Greek tribes are completely unfounded.

The purpose of this paper, which is actually an analysis of the book *In the Shadow of Olympus – the Emergence of Macedon*<sup>157</sup>, is to try to prove that modern Macedonians are certainly not Greeks i.e. that ancient Macedonians cannot possibly be considered as Hellenes, as some, encouraged by current political events, claim nowadays. Not only does this book deny the Greek origin of ancient Macedonians by pro-

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<sup>157</sup> Eugene N. Borza, "In the Shadow of Olympus - The Emergence of Macedon" (*Vo senkat a na O li mp, pojavat a na Makedon*); Patria, Skopje, 2004.

viding compelling arguments, it also proves that the ancient Macedonians had separate culture, tradition, rituals and customs and even, as some sources indicate, a distinct language! While reading this book, the first thing that attracts the reader's attention is the small geographical map of the Balkan peninsula that outlines the borders of Ancient Macedonia in 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. If we take a closer look at the map, we will notice that those borders coincide with the ones of present – day Macedonia within its ethnic borders. This means that today on the territory of Ancient Macedonia there are people who call themselves Macedonians (for example: in Pirin, Vardar and Aegean Macedonia). If not taken into serious consideration, this information may seem meaningless but it however indicates that there is a certain relationship between Ancient Macedonia and present – day Republic of Macedonia; it should encourage us to go further and discover more, to get deep insight into the Macedonian roots and prove the origin of ancient Macedonians and possibly their relationship with modern Macedonian nation.

In this book, Borza does not focus on proving whether present day Macedonians are descendents of the well – known and celebrated ancient Macedonian kings; instead, he simply attempts to show that, regardless of some similarities with the ancient Greeks, the ancient Macedonians were a separate people with unique and distinctive characteristics.

In addition, Borza does not get into arguments and debates about the name of the Republic of Macedonia. In present – day context, he regards the name Macedonia as something that applies to a territory comprising several modern states (therefore he uses the terms: Yugoslavian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia etc.) In his book, Borza does not provide evidence; he simply points out certain findings and traces. His aim is not propaganda but simply to bring readers' attention to certain facts, which is why his book is worth reading and given so much credit.

The book consists of 12 chapters, each of which tackles different problems.

At the very beginning we are going to present the territory on which Ancient Macedonia was located. This description is contained in Chapter 2 of the book entitled *The Land of Macedonia*. As regards the geography of Ancient Macedonia, Borza remains faithful to the concept of Macedonia being divided into three regions introduced by Herodotus:

1. Western (Upper Macedonia) – the mainly mountainous area west and southwest of the Emathian plain, stretching to the Pindus (the

region corresponding to the middle and upper Haliacmon River – Bistritsa);

2. Central (Lower) Macedonia – the region of the great central plain, Almopia, the Pierian piedmont, as well as the lower Axios (Vardar) up to the highlands above Salonica;

3. Eastern Macedonia – the area is bordered by the Rhodopi Mountains on the north and the Aegean on the south.<sup>158</sup>

Dr. Borza explains that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century German scholars, driven by their own interests, one of which was the unification of Germany, started promoting Hellenism as a feature of the ancient Macedonians. They needed an ancient hero, a “unifier” on whom their political leaders of the time would model themselves. They found such a “unifier” in the person of Phillip II of Macedon, who allegedly “unified” the Greek people. However, Dr. Borza emphasizes that it was exactly this perfect image of Phillip II represented as a “*unifier of the Greeks*” which proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for German scholars of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Namely, they could not in any way explain the speeches of the famous Greek (Athenian) orator Demosthenes in which he vehemently attacked Macedonians by calling them occupiers (rather than “unifiers”) of the Greek city – states. For him, they were “barbarians” and “tyrants”. However, with the course of time, the number of researchers who presented evidence that the ancient Macedonians were NOT Greeks grew. Nowadays, all leading researchers in the field of Ancient Macedonia are aware of this fact. Dr. Borza himself wrote: “*Most of ancient Macedonia was incorporated into the modern Greek state only in 1913 and it has been a politically sensitive region ever since, in its relationships both with the Athens – dominated government in the south and with its non – Hellenic neighbors to the north*”.<sup>159</sup>

The truth about the ethnic distinctiveness of ancient Macedonians has been questioned and challenged even today due to various objective and subjective factors. Namely, speaking of the ancient Macedonians and their alleged relationship with the Hellenes, which some quasi – scientists are trying to prove, we inevitably face the issue of the *ancient Macedonian language*. In Chapter 4, Borza elaborates the issue of ethnic identity of the Macedonians. If we assume that ethnic identity is best reflected through language, then according to Borza “*Macedonian*

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p.33

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, p.6 – 7.

*seems closer to Illyrian and Thracian than to the Greek dialects*"<sup>160</sup>. In relation to this fact Borza wrote: "*The main evidence for Macedonian existing as a separate language comes from a handful of late resources describing events in the train of Alexander the Great, where the Macedonian tongue is mentioned specifically*"<sup>161</sup>

As regards this document, Dr. Borza explains that some pro – Greek authors (like for example Liddell, Skott and Jones in "*A Greek – English Lexicon*") tried to translate this term as "*a man who speaks in a Macedonian way*" or style of speaking (something similar to the "Lakonian" way of speaking etc.). However, Dr. Borza rightly criticizes their attitude and gives a very precise translation for this word: "*The context of the scene described in the papyrus fragment however leads one to suspect that more than a style of speaking is meant: the Macedonian – speaking Xennias was dispatched by Eumenes to negotiate with a commander of Macedonian troops. Such a mission required fluency that apparently an ordinary Greek – speaker did not have. Eumenes, secretary to Philip and Alexander, would have been in a position to know these things*".<sup>162</sup>

However, we should all agree that in a certain moment of time the rulers of Ancient Macedonia adopted the Greek standard language. Nevertheless, this should not lead one to the conclusion that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks. Contemporary Greek historians and propagandists use this fact for their own purposes and interests assuming that this "proof" confirms the Greek origin of the Macedonians.

Commenting this, Borza wrote: "*The deficiency of an organized assembly of the epigraphic evidence, however, is being corrected by a long – term project jointly sponsored by the Greek Ministry of Culture and the National Hellenic Research Foundation. The result will be a series of publications presenting the Ancient inscriptions of Macedonia*".<sup>163</sup>

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, p. 103.

<sup>161</sup> This is a scrap of papyrus (PSI XII. 1284) which is thought to be a fragment of Arrian's lost History of the Successor. This fragment is about Eumenes who "...dispatched there a man called Xennias, who spoke Macedonian in order to negotiate with the soldiers"; see Bosworth, *Eumenes* (Bosworth considers that this fragment proves that Macedonian was a separate language, similar to Greek.

<sup>162</sup> Borza, N. Eugene, "In the Shadow of Olympus - The Emergence of Macedon" *Vó senkat a na OI imp, pojavat a na Makedon*; Patria, Skopje, 2004, p. 102 – 103.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. 104 – 105.

The perspective that Greek historians have on the issue cannot by any means prove that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks. First and foremost, lots of other people spoke standard Greek language of the time. In order to support this thesis we will try to draw a parallel between that situation and the one that we have today. Nowadays, great majority of people subconsciously regard the standard language as a proof of ethnic belonging of individuals in the past (just like Greek historians do). We should ask ourselves why they hold such an opinion. The answer is very simple. Nowadays (almost in every part of the civilized world) the level of literacy is very low. Furthermore, almost all peoples (at least in Europe) write and speak their own standard languages. Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and Macedonians - they all have their own languages respectively. Therefore, the majority of our contemporaries subconsciously think that if today all people have their own languages that must have been the case in the past as well. For them it is regarded as a “rule”.

However, if we think better and if we analyze the past more thoroughly, we shall see that the “rule” mentioned above never really existed! At that time, only few standard languages existed in the world. So anyone who wished to write something had to try hard to learn one of those languages. This means that then there were hardly any literate people in the world. For example, at certain point of the Antiquity the Greeks, Macedonians, Thracians, Jews, Illyrians and even the Romans spoke and wrote ancient Greek, but it does not mean that they were Greeks. In order to understand this better, we will mention the example of Nigeria (which applies to other African countries as well). Namely, in this country there is a great variety of different peoples and each of them has its own distinct language and does not understand the language of the other. Among the most numerous people are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. None of these people has its own standard language; instead all people living in Nigeria write English nowadays. Consequently, someone belonging to the Hausa people speaks his own mother tongue at home, but when he wants to write something or to communicate with his fellow – citizen who belongs to the Yoruba people, he will then either write or speak English.

Let us imagine that a global catastrophe happens and that after several thousands of years written documents are discovered on the territory of present – day Nigeria being the only written documents from this country. What will future archaeologists and researchers find? Every one of those Nigerian documents will be written in English! Will

that mean that in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century Nigeria used to be populated by English people just because this language was then the official language of the country? Certainly not, although there might be similar conclusions! The situation with the Greek language being used in the Antiquity i.e. written documents in Greek being studied by contemporary scientists is exactly the same.

The Thracians are also considered to be people who used the Greek standard language in the Antiquity. In 1986, 165 Thracian silver vessels were found in northwestern Bulgaria dating back to the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC. The inscriptions on some of them were written in Greek. In relation to this example, Dr. Borza wrote: “*Archaeology has provided a useful Balkan parallel: in early 1986 a village vegetable plot in northwestern Bulgaria yielded a buried hoard of 165 Thracian silver vessels from the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Sixteen of the vessels were inscribed with Thracian personal and places names in Greek. The Thracians were, as far as we know, a non – Greek people whose language – which continued to exist well into Roman times – never achieved written form. We may recall, moreover, the long – known coin issues of Thracian tribes from the early fifth century BC on which the names of the tribes, their kings and their titles are inscribed in Greek. The lesson is clear: the use of the Greek language as a form of written expression does not by itself identify the ethnicity of a culture*”.<sup>164</sup>

Several questions arise in relation to what was mentioned above: why do Greek historiography and propaganda claim that of all other peoples only the Macedonians were Greeks? Why do they not consider the Illyrians, Thracians, Bulgarians, Romans as well as other peoples who at certain point in history used the Greek standard language as Greeks? Why has Macedonia always been considered as a country with Greek culture if it is well – known that no written documents in Greek have ever been found there; unlike in Macedonia, in present – day Greece a lot of these kinds of evidences have been discovered. Is it possible Macedonia to be a “Greek country” if we all know that the ancient Macedonians did not speak Greek? This is something Greeks historians cannot explain to the Macedonian public.

Another issue that we are facing is the one related to the religion and the customs of ancient Macedonians. In Chapter 11, when speaking about the material culture of this people from the time of Phillip and

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid., p.106 (cursive, B. R.)

Alexander, Borza raises the issue of the religion, tradition and customs of ancient Macedonians.

The language is not the only indicator of ethnic identity of a population; the customs are also a strong argument in favor of the existence of a separate, autonomous entity. Thus, the most typical and the best example of Macedonian material culture are the tombs dating back to the 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. Their architectural form, the ornaments and the burial goods, the number of which amounts to 60 or 70 approximately, are different from what has been found in Greek tombs in the South, even from the tombs discovered in the neighboring independent Greek city states alongside North Aegean coast.

After presenting an overview of the differences between the Macedonians and the Greeks, Dr. Borza concludes: "*The main body of written evidence on the Macedonian pantheon comes from the age of Philip II and Alexander, and makes it appear that Macedonians shared the Greek gods. Yet many of the public expressions of worship may have been different. For example, there is an absence of major public religious monuments from Macedonian sites before the end of the fourth century*".<sup>165</sup> It appears that there is much in Macedonian society that was assimilated from Greece. But there is also a great deal that seems to be indigenous and non – Hellenic. Some of the differences may result from strong Asian and Balkan influences on Macedonian life and others from the stage of monarchical development that characterized the Macedonians, a form of political and social organization that nearly all Greeks had abandoned very early on. In brief, one must conclude that the similarity between some Macedonian and Greek customs and objects are not of themselves proof that the Macedonians were a Greek tribe.

The ancient Macedonians had their own folk customs and rituals. Many ancient historians like Herodotus, Aristotle, Plutarchus, Quintus Curtius Rufus and many others wrote about these rituals precisely defining them as Macedonian. Some of the most authentic ancient Macedonian customs are: breaking the bread during wedding ceremonies, man and women sitting separately during celebrations and festivities, cutting the hair when bereaved, unique and specific procedures for appointing kings, specific trial and funeral procedures etc.

Nevertheless, the most compelling evidence of the differences between the ancient Macedonians and the ancient Greeks is the differ-

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid, p. 72.

ent ethnogenesis of these two peoples. We know that ethnogenesis is a rather definite and precise parameter for determining the ethnic origin of a certain ethnicity. Until quite recently, many historians believed that the Dorians were one of the key ethnicities of the Macedonian ethnogenesis.

In his book, Dr. Borza precisely explains that the theory on Dorian migration to Macedonia should not be taken into account by scientists and scholars. In relation to this he wrote: *“Few subjects in the early history of Greece have been so energetically debated in recent years as the “Dorian invasions”. The theory of the “Dorian invasions” (based on Herodotus 9.26, followed by Thucydides 1.12) is largely an invention of nineteenth – century historiography, and is otherwise unsupported either archaeological or linguistic evidence”*.<sup>166</sup>

In addition, he explains: *“The Dorians are archaeologically invisible. Northern Greece has yet to produce a single artifact that can be related to the Dorians”. “.....No evidence of this so – called Dorian migration exists in central and western Macedonia and northern Thessaly. There is no archaeological record of the Dorian movements, and the mythic arguments are largely conjectural, based on folk traditions about the Dorian home originally having been in northwest Greece. Even if the latter were true, the connection between the original home of the Dorians and the well – know Dorian dialect of later times is not clear. Surely, all “Dorian Greeks” of the Classical period cannot have descended from the scattered tribes of the northwest Greek mountains. That they were later called Dorians is no more evidence of Dorian descent in any ethnic sense than was the habit of nineteenth – century Greeks to call themselves Romaioi, and the country Rumeli, evidence of their Roma heritage, despite their Greek language and Slavic admixture”*.

Doctor Borza considers: *“This is not to say that the Macedonians are of Doric origin. It is to suggest rather that the ancestors of Macedonians lived near Pindus and Haliacmon in the Bronze Age”*.<sup>167</sup>

There are other facts on the basis of which Borza thinks that the Macedonians are not Greeks; namely, Herodotus and Thucydides described the Macedonians as foreigners, as a separate people who lived outside the borders of the Greek city – states. According to him, Macedo-

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid, p.72.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid, p.74 – 79.

nia can even be regarded as the first nation state in Europe. The Macedonians belong to an ethnic group having originated from their ancestors – the Macedonians who defined themselves through their service to the king. In this context, they were people (or ethnos) who were loyal and who have contributed to the common historical experience.

However, in spite of these strong evidences showing the differences between the Macedonians and the Greeks, Greek historians are still trying to defend the attitudes of the nineteenth – century German propaganda about the alleged “Greek” origin of the ancient Macedonians. In his book Dr. Borza fiercely criticizes some Greek historians for their attitudes related to the origin of the ancient Macedonians; a great deal of those theories is unsupported by the objective scientific circles. In relation to this, Borza wrote: “*The fullest statement of the “Greek” position and also the most detailed study of the Macedonian language is by Kalleris (Les anciens Macédoniens), especially 2:488 – 531, in which alleged Greek elements in the Macedonian language are examined exhaustively. A more chauvinistic (and less persuasive) point of view can be found in Daskalakis (Hellenism), especially pts. 2 and 3. The most blatant account is that of Martis (The Falsification of Macedonian History). This book, written by a former minister for Northern Greece is a polemical anti – Yugoslav tract so full of historical errors and distortions that the prize awarded it by the Academy of Athens serves only to reduce confidence in the scientific judgment of that venerable society of scholars*”,<sup>168</sup>

These severe critiques of their works seem to be even more serious and for they are given by the most eminent scientist in this field – Dr. Eugene Borza, a PhD at Pennsylvania State University, who is not afraid of criticizing even the Greek Academy of Sciences and Arts. This outstanding scholar, being deeply cynical about the Greek positions concludes: “*.....fifth – century Macedonians were less certain about their Hellenic origin than are some modern writers*”.<sup>169</sup>

Nevertheless, the lack of a system of institutions clearly shows that although the Macedonians were a nation, their dependence upon the monarchy, whose character was rather simple and personal, prevented them from reaching statehood. The Macedonian nation served as a buffer zone that protected the Greeks against the intrusions of non

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid, p. 101.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid, p.93.

– Hellenic Balkan peoples, which was a key factor for the growth and the development of the Greek civilization.

If these arguments are insufficient to prove that the Macedonians are people different from the Greeks, then we can only conclude that no matter how much their identity is being denied, the Macedonians left a deep mark on the history not as a Greek tribe or a tribe of any other Balkan people, but as Macedonians!

According to Borza, the territory of present – day Republic of Macedonia abounds in artifacts and evidences of material culture which have not yet been discovered since in that region there has been only few archaeological excavations. This shows that we, as being Macedonians, do not pay sufficient attention to proving our origin and discovering our past. However, it is never late to start these researches, which have to be funded by the state itself and carried out by Macedonian scholars!

Borza's book has been most useful for our country because in times of great battles for proving our national identity we really do need such facts and data presented by one of the world's leading scientists and scholars in the field of ancient history; those data inevitably confirm the uniqueness of the Macedonian identity!

In our opinion, the purpose of this book, however, is to show that the issue of the Macedonians and their antique origin is so much politicized and abused by various types of propaganda that we should try to "leave it aside" for some time!

This is very true because no matter how important the past is, the present and the future always take precedence! Therefore, our attitude towards the dispute over the name Macedonia with Greece should not be based on mere search for "evidence" which would prove the antique origin of the present – day Macedonians; those evidence we may never even find; instead, we should focus ourselves on economic growth and maximum exploitation of natural resources and climate, which have been favorable to us since ancient times!

The sounder the economy is, the stronger the state will become and once we achieve that there will be hardly anyone who will care if Greece denies our constitutional name! Furthermore, we should dedicate ourselves to resolving the name issue in the most diplomatic and civilized manner, for the latest events (for example the group of Greek intellectuals who have admitted that the dispute over the name is "ridiculous and unfounded") indicate that with time this dispute will become just an issue from the past that almost no one will remember!

Ultimately, national identity cannot be proved, it can only be felt! If we feel and identify ourselves as Macedonians no recognition can make that feeling stronger or make us more confident of our relationship with Alexander III of Macedon!

In the end, however, it should be emphasized that these issues that are related to our name and national identity should come as a result of a friendly and sincere cooperation with our Greek neighbors since the current trends which aim at close economic relationships between Greece and Macedonia (the statistics shows that Greece is the major investor in our country) inevitably raise the question: *“Do people really need only “bread and games to be happy and if there is insufficient bread is it possible “national” games to compensate for the lack that they feel”?*

The fact that we cherish such close economic relationships with a country which is a member – state of the European Union, gives us hope that with time all disagreements and misunderstandings will fade away and eventually we will all be happy and proud of our “European citizenship”!

## THE MACEDONIAN KNOT<sup>170</sup>

### Ancient Macedonians

Ancient Macedonians are believed to be one of the oldest populations of southeast Europe. Ancient Greeks called them barbarians because they didn't speak Greek. However, later, in 476 BC they allowed Ancient Macedonians to participate at the Olympic Games.<sup>171</sup> During the rule of Philip II of Macedonia, Greeks became more dependent on Macedonia. After defeating the Greeks in Heronia in 338 BC, King Philip II of Macedonia established Macedonian domination over the State of Corinth. Macedonian influence grew stronger when Alexander III the Great, King of Macedonia destroyed Thebes. In 323 BC Greeks tried to liberate from Macedonian domination but their attempts ended when Macedonian troops took over Athens during the Lamian War. In those times Macedonia was influenced by Hellenism due to Macedonian domination of Greece. However, even entire Europe was submitted to the flow of Hellenism spread by the Roman Empire (where colonialism and slavery existed just like in Greece).

When Alexander died, Alexandria became the cultural center of the Hellenistic Era under the leadership of the Macedonian Ptolemies until 30 BC. Then, after the death of Cleopatra VII, the last Hellenistic State - Egypt was annexed by Rome following the three wars between Rome and Macedonia in the period from 215 to 168 BC. In the Battle of Pydna, the Macedonian state was destroyed (Macedonia became Roman province and therefore Greece became part of the Macedonian Province).<sup>172</sup>

During the rule of the Roman Emperor Diocletian, Macedonia was divided in two regions: Macedonia Prima and Macedonia Secunda. After the division of the Empire in 395 and the settlement of Slaves, Macedonia became part of the Eastern Roman Empire, later called Empire of the Romans i.e. Byzantine Empire.

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<sup>170</sup> Monika Kostic and Vladimir Naumoski, the authors of this essay elaborate on the book "*Macedonian Knot*" by Hans Lothar Schteppan – former ambassador of Germany in the Republic of Macedonia.

<sup>171</sup> Hans Lothar Schteppan, *The Macedonian Knot*, p. 35.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3.

### Early Middle Ages

In the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> centuries Slavic tribes permanently settled in the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula. During this settlement, names of states disappeared because Slaves named the inhabited regions after the names of their tribes. Later, Bulgaria got a name that wasn't Slavic but Turkish-Tatar. Only in the case of Greece and Macedonia, Slavic immigrants preserved the old names of the regions they inhabited and accepted the names of the original populations who managed to survive.<sup>173</sup>

### Samuel's state

In 976, the first Slavic Macedonian state was established, that is Samuel's state, located on the territory that bordered by Sava and Danube to the north, Peloponnesus and Aegean Sea to the south, Adriatic Sea and Zadar to the west and Black Sea to the east. There were two periods in the state development, the first one from 976 to 996 which was period of territorial expansion in the above mentioned territories and a second period from 996 to 1018 which, despite a handful of achievements, led to decline of this state.

When Samuel was defeated at the Belasica Mountain, the Byzantine emperor Basil II (from the so called Macedonian dynasty) let Macedonians maintain substantial independence and allowed the Ohrid Archdiocese a status of autocephaly. The autocephaly was maintained until 1767 when Sultan Mustafa was convinced by the representatives of the Greek orthodoxy to abolish the Ohrid Archdiocese.

The Government of the Hellenic Republic calls upon this very old event in an attempt to dispose of the unwanted name Republic of Macedonia. Athens would recognize the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church under the condition that the Greek proposal for modification of the name *Macedonian Church* into the old name *Ohrid Archdiocese* is accepted. It could be supposed that the next step would be to change the name Republic of Macedonia into the name of the Archdiocese. Then the name Macedonia, which has been an indicator of the identity of Macedonians for almost one and a half millennium, would become unimportant and would be lost forever. This would be very convenient for Greece considering that in 1912/13 Greece annexed the

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

southern part of Macedonia and called it Northern Greece until 1985, in order to convince the world that Ancient Macedonians were Greeks.<sup>174</sup>

### **Macedonia under Ottoman Rule**

The Ottoman state was established by the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, when one Beylik in the Ottoman state, which covered most of Anatolia, gained independence in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. Under the leadership of Osman, during the following centuries, an empire was created spanning Europe and Anatolia, Arabia and North Africa. Macedonia came under Ottoman rule in 1371 and the legal system of this state was established on Macedonian territory. The Balkan was included in the so called Rumelia, divided in five districts, one of which carried the name Macedonia. At this stage the Macedonian dissatisfaction of the Ottoman rule climaxed with the Karposh's Uprising in 1689. When this uprising was suppressed and due to the terror over the Macedonian people by the Ottomans, Macedonians sought protection with the Austrian ruler Leopold.<sup>175</sup>

On May 19, 1876 the Razlovci Uprising broke out, led by Dimitar Pop Gjorgiev – Berovski, who sought assistance from Saint Petersburg as many of his predecessors but was not even received!

Therefore, it may be concluded that even at that time, Russia obviously handed over Macedonia to one of its protected countries such as Greece or Bulgaria. It was very unusual for Russian leadership to reject orthodox Slavic people that tried to liberate and become independent from Ottoman rule, such as other Balkan countries which were generously helped by Russia. This halted the political development of Macedonia. Jutta de Yong had the following opinion about the Russian mysterious conduct: *“As a protector of the Bulgarian aspirations to Macedonia, Russia could have lost access to the Mediterranean Sea if Macedonia became autonomous unlike if it was a province within the borders of the (at the time) very obedient Bulgarian state.”*<sup>176</sup>

The denial of Russian assistance is also due to the Greek-Russian Agreement which manifested the imperialistic politics at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It did not only concern the great powers but also the leaders of Balkan states who were seduced by the visions for great

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid p. 39 and 40.

<sup>175</sup> Biljana Popovska, “National and Legal History of Macedonia” (*Dr`avno-pravna ist ori ja na Makedoni ja*); p. 103 and 104.

<sup>176</sup> H.L.Schteppan, *The Macedonian Knot*, p. 41.

power. The political leadership and the church in Greece dreamed of Great Greece (Megali idea).<sup>177</sup> Greece tried to eradicate the expressed endeavors of Macedonians to get autonomy so that it would not lose chances to lay its hands on Macedonia, Thrace and North Epirus. Russian assistance was the simplest way to do this.

After the last war against the Ottoman Empire in 1878, which ended with the Congress of Berlin, Russia selected Bulgaria for its protégé and stepping stone. Russian troops arrived at the suburbs of San Stefano where Russia concluded the Treaty of San Stefano under which Serbia, Romania and Montenegro got independence and territorial expansion. The Treaty also established the Bulgarian autonomous tributary principality. Nearly all of Macedonia was supposed to be comprised in this principality, except Thessalonica and the parts that were going to belong to Serbia and Albania. It was then that Macedonian question was raised, especially due to the expression “other parts”. Athens publicly expressed its territorial claims to these parts.<sup>178</sup>

On July 18, 1878 the Treaty of Berlin was made between Germany, Austro-Hungary, France, England, Italy, Russia and Turkey. According to this Treaty, the autonomous principality Bulgaria was established while Thrace and Eastern Rumelia remained within the Ottoman Empire and received autonomy and Christian prefect. Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as independent states and gained some territorial expansion. Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied by Austro-Hungary. Reforms were also foreseen for the remaining European parts of the Ottoman Empire. Articles 23 and 62 of the Treaty referred to Macedonia.<sup>179</sup> Due to pressures of England and Austria, Macedonia and Thrace were returned to the Ottoman Empire.

### Modern Era

The treatment Dimitar Pop Gjorgjiev – Berovski received in Saint Petersburg and the unfavorable decisions for Macedonia adopted at the *Congress of Berlin*<sup>180</sup> delayed Macedonian development until the Ilinden Uprising (1903) and the Balkan Wars (1912/1913), and even later, un-

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid p. 42.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid p. 43.

<sup>179</sup> Biljana Popovska, “National and Legal History of Macedonia” (*Dr`avno-pravna istorija na Makedonija*); p. 188 and 189.

<sup>180</sup> The Kresna Uprising broke out due to the dissatisfaction from the Congress of Berlin (1878)

til it received status of equal republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and full independence in 1991.<sup>181</sup>

Macedonia was fairly free for three and a half months at least from the Ottoman Empire at the time when the Congress of Berlin was held and when the Treaty of San Stefano was annulled. This was the period when the Macedonian national liberation movement activated and subsequently, the Secret Macedonian Odrin Revolutionary Organization was established.

The next short period of freedom was the establishment of the Krushevo Republic at the times of the Ilinden Uprising (August 2, 1903). However, this Uprising was suppressed in only ten days. The states united in the Balkan Union comprised of Montenegro, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece that declared war to Turkey in order to share Turkish occupied land on the Balkan. According to the Mürzsteg Agreement (made between the great powers and the Ottoman Empire in October 1903), in the period from 1903 to 1909, administrative, financial and political reforms were implemented in Macedonia by the great powers, such as Austro-Hungary, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, France and Germany. By some means, Macedonian territory was under international rule of the great powers. In 1908, as a result of the Young Turkish Revolution, constitutional system was established in the Ottoman Empire which comprised Macedonia too.

Heralds of the Balkan Wars (1912/13) were the instantaneous military alliance agreements between Serbia and Bulgaria in October 1911. In March 1912, they concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance which contained an undisclosed annex in which the parties stated their plans for the Macedonian future. The Annex foresaw establishment of mutual authority of the two states over Macedonia after the liberation from Ottoman occupation. In case of a dispute between Serbia and Bulgaria, arbitration by the Russian tsar was foreseen.<sup>182</sup>

When Balkan Wars ended, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, the Ottoman Empire and Romania as winners and Bulgaria as defeated party concluded the Treaty of Bucharest on August 10, 1913. Under this Treaty, the territory of Macedonia was divided between Greece, which

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<sup>181</sup> H.L.Scheppean, *The Macedonian Knot*, p. 45.

<sup>182</sup> Biljana Popovska, "National and Legal History of Macedonia" (*Dr`avno-pravna ist`orija na Makedonija*); p. 329 and 330.

took over the Aegean part, Serbia, which took over the Vardar part, and Bulgaria which got Pirin Macedonia.<sup>183</sup>

The division of Macedonia was confirmed when the World War I ended (1914-1918), with the Treaty of Versailles concluded at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) which sanctioned the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest regarding Macedonia. On November 24, 1919, Bulgaria and Greece concluded the Treaty of Neuilly about minorities' emigration. It was concluded according to the Committee on New States at the Paris Peace Conference. According to this Treaty and according to the data from the Greek-Bulgarian Emigration Committee and the Bulgarian Main Directorate on Refugee Settlement, 86 752 persons moved from Aegean Macedonia to Bulgaria in 1928.<sup>184</sup>

In 1926, as a result of the criticism made by the League of Nations that the minority provisions from the Treaty of Sevres were not met, the Greek Government issued an order for publication of the primer ABECEDAR for Macedonian students in Aegean Macedonia. It was written in the dialects spoken in Lerin and Bitola and printed in Latin alphabet. This primer, however, was never implemented in schools.

In December, 1935, at the 6<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Greek Communist Party, Greece replaced the slogan for united and independent Macedonia with a requirement for total equality of minorities. It explained that this change was due to the changed ethnic composition of Aegean Macedonia.<sup>185</sup>

Encouraged by the Balkan Communist Federation, the Macedonian revolutionary Dimitar Vlahov started negotiations with Petar Chaulev, Todor Aleksandrov and Aleksandar Protogerov. As a result of these negotiations on May 15, 1924, the May Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was issued. The political platform of the May Manifesto foresaw unification of the revolutionary movement in the three parts of Macedonia in order to establish Macedonia as an independent political entity within the Balkan Federation. In a while, influenced by the Bulgarian Government, Aleksandrov and Protogerov resigned from signing the Manifesto. In October 1925, when the Ilinden Organization, the former Macedonian Federal organization and the Emigrant Communist Union

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid, p. 330.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid, p. 364.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid, p. 424.

united, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (United) was established in order to expand the national liberation movement in the three parts of Macedonia. Between the two World Wars several wings of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (United) were established in the three parts of Macedonia. However, due to the processes in Yugoslavia in 1928-1929, Bulgaria in 1936-1937 and the Metaxas Dictatorship from 1936 to 1941 in Greece, this organization gradually disappeared from the political scene.<sup>186</sup>

In the beginning of the World War II, in April 1941, Germany attacked Greece and the German military units managed to invade north Greece through Yugoslav territory. Even though the Greek army was not defeated, it surrendered on April 24, 1941 and the king and the Government left the country. Most of Macedonia, parts of Serbia and one part of Kosovo, as well as parts of Aegean Macedonia, Thrace, and Greece were under Bulgarian occupation. West Macedonia, including the towns Tetovo, Gostivar, Kichevo, Debar, Struga, Kostur and most of the villages in the Prespa region, were under Italian occupation.

In the following years, the National Liberation War gained new features. It undertook measures to strengthen the National Liberation Front and the Partisan forces as well as to instigate the armed battle.

The first plenary session of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for Macedonian National Liberation (ASNOM) was held on August 2, 1944 at the St. Prohor Pchinski Monastery. It sanctioned the preceding struggles for creation of a Macedonian state during the National Liberation War and it adopted the basic acts for establishment of the new state.

When the World War II was brought to a conclusion, on May 2, 1945 in Rotterdam, a Conference was held to institute the territorial changes. However, the Macedonian question was never raised and the decisions from the Treaty of Versailles from 1919 remained in power. Therefore, the people from Aegean Macedonia vainly tried to realize their right to self-determination as expressed in their letters addressed to the Central Committee of the Greek National Liberation Front (EAM) and to the Headquarters of the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), which treated intolerably the Macedonian people in Aegean Macedonia.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid, p. 388.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, p. 591.

### **Confirmation of Macedonian Identity**

In the post war period, numerous politicians, scientists, analysts and journalists dealt with the Macedonian issue and the nationality of the Macedonian people. In order to determine the ethnic and national composition of the Macedonian people, a team of French experts elaborated a study on the events in Aegean Macedonia. They arrived at a conclusion that this population is not Serbian, Bulgarian nor Greek but a separate Slavic population with its own language and culture. British and Italian researchers arrived at similar results.<sup>188</sup>

However, this did not stop the Hellenic Republic to lie the entire world public when Macedonia gained independence in 1991 and claim that a subordinated minority of 300 000 Greeks lived in Macedonia. Athens later used the excuse that this number referred to the (Macedonian) refugees and emigrants (during the Balkan Wars and the Greek Civil War) who previously lived in North Greece!<sup>189</sup>

Macedonia appears twice on the map, as Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Republic) and Macedonia (the region). The maps show that there can be a confusion and ambiguity because the geographical term Macedonia may be used with two different meanings about two different ethnicities: the new independent Republic of Macedonia, on one hand and the Greek region Macedonia, on the other hand. This shows that there can be two separate groups of Macedonian people, such as: Macedonians (in terms of nationality) who are not Greek and Macedonians (in terms of a regional affiliation) who are Greek.<sup>190</sup>

In 1992 the Greek Foreign Minister Papakonstantinou in an official briefing tried to convince the member-states of the European Community that in 1944 Tito acted by his own free will and against the law when he named as Macedonia the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Papakonstantinou did not use any specific information, such as historical, ethnic, religious or political argument. Greece has maintained these fictions without the disruption of EU, NATO, UN, OSCE and CoE until today.<sup>191</sup>

Since 1992, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) has been used as a name for Republic of Macedonia. In the eyes of the

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<sup>188</sup> H.L.Scheppean, *The Macedonian Knot*, page 391.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid*, p. 201.

<sup>190</sup> Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict*, page 275.

<sup>191</sup> H.L.Scheppean, *The Macedonian Knot*, page 47.

world, the Republic of Macedonia and its state integrity are degraded to the level of a provisional or temporary entity. Unlike Bulgaria and Serbia, Greece may act carefree in EU and NATO since it is already a member-state and does not fear from pressure or exclusion, in the worst case it could be reprimanded. Therefore the Macedonian people must live with the fact that since achieving freedom and independence, it depends largely on the will of its neighbor, especially when it comes to NATO and EU membership.

### **The Names for Macedonians**

Macedonians appear under different names in the world: local Macedonians, Greek Macedonians, Aegean Macedonians, Greeks and Macedonians, as well as greekophiles and skopians. However, greekophiles and skopians did not appear just from transcription. The people from Lerin/Florina who identify themselves as Greeks are not greekophiles, they are Greeks. Similarly, the people from Lerin/Florina who identify themselves as Macedonians are not skopians, they are Macedonians.

The Greek Macedonian dispute about who has the right to be called Macedonian is a dispute about two ideologies for national identity, a dispute where each of the two nations tries to gain copyright of something they believe to be theirs. However, anthropologically we can see that there are two national identities and two cultures. If there are two Macedonias in regional and national terms, there will be two Macedonias, one Greek, the region of North Greece and one independent country in the Central Balkan. This solution contests the existence of Macedonian nation and Macedonian minority in Greece, and therefore it is an expression of ethnic nationalism.

Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia give the following definition of greekophiles: *“Greekophile is a fake Greek who is in fact a Macedonian wanting to be called Greek and who refuses to acknowledge his true Macedonian national origin. These people are ashamed of their past, the language they speak and they are ashamed to call themselves Macedonians. Greekophiles are transvestites, people who claim to be something they are not!”*<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict*, pages 367 and 368.

## The Power of Names

*“The biggest problem is the name... What happened to the name was a theft, forgery and distortion of history. With the name Macedonia, the Skopje state was created. The power to name is one of the most elementary forms of political power because it involves the power to resuscitate the named object”* (Pierre Bourdieu, Neos Kosmos, November 09, 1992).

In the summer of 1994, during the campaign for international recognition of Republic of Macedonia different names were suggested. The Greek Government refused persistently every name that contained the name Macedonia in any form. The Government tried to wipe out the symbolic associations that relate the Republic of Macedonia and its people with everything Macedonian. Therefore, in 1992 the President of the Republic of Macedonia gave the following statement: *“We have been carrying this name (Macedonians) for centuries, it originates from this region and we are the citizens of this region. That is how people can distinguish us from the neighboring populations, such as the Serbians and Bulgarians. Our country’s name is Republic of Macedonia and this is only a part of the territory that now belongs to Greece and Bulgaria”*.

Other names proposed by the Greek Government, such as Central Balkan Republic, South Slavia, and South Serbia are metonyms that negate the existence of the Republic of Macedonia. They distance it from Macedonia and associate it with larger geographic and cultural groups, such as the Balkan, Slavs and Serbians. The Greek usually refer to us by our capital Skopje with names such as Republic of Skopje or Skopian Macedonia, which are also metonyms.

Finally, FYROM is also a provisional name, not a permanent solution to the problem between the two governments. It negates the existence of the Republic of Macedonia, in terms of time and location. This means that the Republic of Macedonia does not benefit from independent existence nowadays since it is a former republic. In addition, this name rhetorically relates the Republic of Macedonia to former Yugoslavia, a multinational country that enclosed the Republic of Macedonia but no longer exists. Regarding this, President Gligorov stated: *“We are no longer former and no longer Yugoslavian”*.

The broad use of FYROM as acronym also distances the Republic of Macedonia from the name Macedonia and all it represents. A more extreme process and distancing is the provisional use by Greek

resources of the terms “Fyromians/Bairomians (from the Macedonian translation of FYROM)/Skopians” to refer to Macedonians.

There is also a concept for a “dual name”. It proposes that Hellenic Republic should use any name it wants for the Republic of Macedonia while the international community should use its constitutional name. The true power at this stage of the struggle for Macedonian identity lies in the hands of international organizations and powerful countries that are in position to determine the official name that the Republic of Macedonia will be able to use in the world of international affairs.

### **Consequences**

The Greek blockage to the Republic of Macedonia was detrimental to the Macedonian economy which had previously been diminished by the UN embargo over Serbia. When Macedonian access to the Greek port in Thessalonica was obstructed, the Greek blockage dramatically decreased Macedonian profit from export and seriously harmed food, oil and other vital products import. The Greek Prime Minister Papandreou was only partially right when he said that “*the survival of Skopje depends on the port in Thessalonica and not the number of its ambassadors*” (Macedonian Information Agency, December 17, 1993).

### **Conclusion**

The Hellenic Republic does not have the right to forbid the Republic of Macedonia to use its constitutional name. Therefore the members of the family of nations, headed by the EU, NATO, Council of Europe and OSCE member-states should resign from using the name FYROM that has been created against international laws. Of course, Greece may not be forced to use the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia and considering the current policy of the Greek “moderate governments”, it seems it will not face any obstacles. Therefore Greece would be in power again to play the European role that is expected from it, considering its status of ...*cradle of the European culture*. Athens, the representative of Ancient Greece, may dignifiedly undertake this task.

## HUMAN ORDER – DECLINE AND RESURGENCE:

### MACEDONIA AND THE NAME<sup>193</sup>

“*Dialogue among Civilizations*”, a conference that was devoted to the problems of modern human living took place on the isle of Rhodes, from October 05 until October 09, 2005. Among other, the debate offered many proposals.

Mr. Kapur<sup>194</sup> contributed to the debate with his speech *Human order – decline and resurgence*<sup>195</sup> where he included his positions and opinions on endurance of super powers (USA and USSR), the beginning and the end of the Cold War, the development of present society and the role of religion and its philosophy in societies.

Mr. Kapur started from several basic points: the war-torn economy of USSR, the market constantly developing towards a military-consumerist oriented progression led by the USA and USSR, the growth of science and technology, unfortunately in a military direction, and the expansion of fundamentalist forces that were derived from the numerous religions traditions.

In the end, he offers solutions that are clearly influenced from Hindu and Buddhist philosophies. He does not claim they are the best ones, only presents them as a point of reference for his vision about the future path of human kind.

The sense of humanism and cosmopolitanism are the most intriguing of what this author is trying to impose. The approach that Mr. Kapur chose and that is to see the reality for what it is but also to accept the mental struggle to find the truth about yourself in times when the general lie is constantly and pretentiously imposed, made us look deeper into the problem that concerns the Republic of Macedonia.

The fact is that the Republic of Macedonia faced problems regarding its name for long but it is also important that the parties in-

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<sup>193</sup> This essay was written by Vladimir Patchev.

<sup>194</sup> JC Kapur is an Indian futurist, solar energy scientist, creator and president of the Kapur Syria foundation and Kapur Solar farms. He is the publisher and editor-in-chief of *World Affairs Journal*. He has written the following books: *India in the year 2000, Uncommitted Society, The Future of Man: East and West Perspectives; The Human Condition Today* as well as over 50 essays on topics related to the future of man. His most recent book *Our Future: Consumerism or Humanism* is a bestseller.

<sup>195</sup> [www.bagchee.com/BookDisplay.aspx?Bkid=b34894](http://www.bagchee.com/BookDisplay.aspx?Bkid=b34894).

volved in this problem are in some way victims of themselves and not to some imaginary creation. One party is the Republic of Macedonia, consciously trying to prove the other countries that it is worth more than they believe. The other party, the Hellenic Republic is stubbornly pushing the Sisyphus rock that it imposed on itself and also the Western world that constantly tangles its hands in its Gordian knot by playing a dual policy.

In the further text we will try to make a correlation between Mr. Kapur's work and the problem of the Republic of Macedonia regarding its constitutional name.

### **The Rise and Fall of Superpowers**

Superpowers were created at the end of the World War II. On one hand, this was a period of economic renewal of the world after the World War II. On the other hand, this was period of political tensions between two ideologies – democracy and communism. One was led by the USA and the western countries, the other by the USSR.

Zinovyev said: *“Westernism and communism were antidotes but also competitive alternatives of human evolution. They were both headed to the same evolutionary direction, and were very much alike and therefore numerous western theoreticians stated concepts for their approximation. Each of them contained some elements and potentials of the other. However, considering that they were in opposition, they foremost developed opposite features”*.<sup>196</sup>

However, in these conditions, before the dissolution of USSR and the fall of the Berlin wall, there was a third group of countries, the so called Non-Aligned Movement. Primarily, it was established by Yugoslavia, India and Egypt (Tito, Nasser and Nehru) and it aimed at connecting the third world countries in a wider trade union. It kept more or less a balance between USA and USSR. However, after the dissolution of USSR, the fall of the Berlin wall and the Warsaw pact, the role and the presence of the Non-Aligned Movement vanished over night. Furthermore, when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia painfully died and was dissolved, the influence it had in the world and over the Non-Aligned Movement gradually started to fade away.

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<sup>196</sup> Alexandre Zinoviev, “The Grand Rupture” (*La grand rupture*), 1999, L'Age d'Homme, p. 27.

Obviously, the Western world successfully influenced the third world countries and the USSR satellite states. The fact is “Democracy Won!”

On one hand, the West won in a technological sense. The way capitalism in these countries, led by the States, consumed resources in a massive race for armament and prestige was unstoppable and un-reachable to USSR and their planned economy. On the other hand, the methods of the Cold War (espionage, counterespionage, purges and eliminations, as well as dangers from war threats) made many scientists from the Eastern block and from the Non-Aligned Movement run away and find greater security in the West.

This weakened socialist economies and led to interventions in Chinese and Indian economic systems aimed at establishment of mixed economies. In that context the structural program of the World Bank and the IMF was created in order to adjust poor countries to western economies, which became part of the process of westernization.

Regarding this, Mr. Kapur says: “*All these instruments have been employed in the service of an Imperial future; A twenty-first century evolution of a new imperial reincarnation of the late and lamented colonies, to serve the overly elastic definition of their national interests.*”<sup>197</sup> Therefore we can surely conclude that the Western world, led by the USA, plays a crucial role in the world but not in order to contribute to the well being and equality between the countries. They play the role of a policeman that controls and dictates their steps on a path that has already been traced. This road is paved by the national interests of USA and the West and not the interests of the countries that follow them blindly. In this context, the interests of these countries are identified with American and Western interests (we want whatever the West wants) and inevitably they become pawns in the game that has been started long ago. In this way the West and USA make sure there is no opposition to their idea because that would mean competitiveness, something they surely do not want.

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<sup>197</sup> *Dialogue of Civilizations* – Rodhes, Greece, 5-9 October 2005; „*Human order – Decline and resurgence*“, J. C. Kapur p. 2 (the text was sent by e-mail from Mr. Kapur's secretary, Ms. Chandrika Viavan)

### **About the Name Macedonia**

Some would say the name issue of the Republic of Macedonia has originated from ancient times. However, it has always been and will be topical on the Balkan.

We would not like to give too many historical details because everybody is familiar with them. We hope that many of us know about the philippics by Demosthenes and Prlichev's critics on the Greek culture and history from the Macedonian period of rebirth.

As a member-state of the former Yugoslav Federation and most importantly, as an independent country, Macedonia is one of the countries that endeavor to become part of the so called "global village". "Global village" is a group of states that seek to create a safer, more equal and more democratic society by means of the process of globalization. Let's assume that this society is a composition of numerous cultures, customs, religions and histories that are intertwined. As such, they create history, culture, customs and religion on Earth. But this does not refer only to culture or history, it also refers to economy and the equitable economic development in the world, as the tendency goes. Numerous languages, cultures and histories intertwine in the EU. Some of these cultures are thousands of years old and many of them remain on extinct cultures which existed thousands of years before. We may also mention the language which is not only a means of communication but also an indicator for tradition, customs, culture and even history. As regards history, we may conclude immediately that the history of, say a Portuguese, is also history of Europe and the world, not only Portugal history. Vasco De Gama traveled around the Earth with his ship crew and proved the world that the Earth is not flat but round. This indicates that this man is not only a Portuguese but also a citizen of the world. He is the citizen of Earth!

The same concept applies to Macedonia. This name does not belong exclusively to the Republic of Macedonia. It belongs to the whole world because Macedonian history, culture and tradition are equally valuable and unique as the Portuguese customs. Therefore, the name Macedonia may be Macedonian or it may belong to the world but it could never be Portuguese, French or Greek.

We are facing something illogical here. If the name Macedonia is part of the history of the country Macedonia and the world, why is this name subject to so many polemics and discussions over the one that has the right to it? More specifically, who is entitled to the name

Macedonia - the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Macedonia or the world?

This is all a contradiction in itself. Firstly, the name of a country is part of the history of people who live on that territory. It is part of the culture and the customs of these people. History reveals of cases when in times of migrations certain populations were assimilated with the culture of others. That is how ethnic groups or customs and cultures mix together, but the historical progression remains. Sometimes nations totally disappear from a certain region and only written documents for their existence remain, for instance, the Assyrian-Babylonians, Etruscans or the Latin people from the Roman period.

In other cases a population is a minority and is suppressed by a larger population that had colonized it. That is the case in Mexico. Over there, there are still descendants of the Maya and the Aztecs but they do not have the right to call it Mexico, Mayapan or Aztlan because they were destroyed and it is historically impossible.

Hereby, I will present an excerpt from the book "The Navel of the World" written by Dushan Miklja. This book speaks about the ethnic arrangement of New York, USA in the 80s: *"It is no wonder that certain TV channels on New York televisions broadcast programs in Spanish and Chinese as well as over ten provisional programs in other languages. Contrary to popular belief that language dialects of immigrants melt like wax in the New York melting pot, the fact is they have stubbornly and steadily remained in the ethnic ghettos. For instance, in Queens there are many Italians and Greeks, in Brooklyn there are Russians, in lower Manhattan – Ukrainians and other Slavic people, and in upper Manhattan, around the 80<sup>th</sup> street there are Germans and Scandinavians. In Bronx there are mostly African Americans and Spaniards. One entire district is inhabited by new Albanian immigrants. In Ridgewood, Queens, you can buy pork crisps in the butcher's shops of some ethnic communities. Older women with black scarves look much alike their peers of any village from the Banat district."*<sup>198</sup>

Obviously, the culture and the customs of these groups of people have remained unchanged and have only been incorporated in the American society. These cultures become part of it. Ethnic communities that live there have kept their originating ethnicity even though first

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<sup>198</sup> Dushan Miklja, "The Navel of the World" (*Trbuh svet a*); Prosveta, Belgrade, 1989; "Bites of the Big Apple" (*Ogrisci veli ke jabuke*), p. 20.

and foremost they are Americans. It is so because of their choice between poverty and misery and the “American” future for better tomorrow.

Something similar happens in our country. Republic of Macedonia is a multinational state. Its population is composed of Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbians, Roma and Bosniaks. They have kept their customs and traditions like in the previous example. Then, who has the right to the name Macedonia?

All this raises the following questions: Who can answer to the question of identity of the Assyrian-Babylonians, Etruscans, Latin people, Aztecs, Maya and American immigrants? Do the states that exist on the territory of these populations make part of the history of these people? Who has the legitimate right to the names of these states, and generally to the names of Maya, Aztecs, Etruscans, Latin people, Assyrian-Babylonians and the American immigrants? Many questions, not enough answers...

This means that the name Macedonia is subject to manipulation due to somebody’s interests and not the genesis, origin and affiliation of the name. In this case both the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic lose because just as the Republic of Macedonia, the Hellenic Republic is part of this political plot that involves the entire Balkan region. Historically, the Hellenic Republic is not entitled to the name Macedonia. It has part of the Macedonian territory which does not give to it a right to the name. If that is so, then Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro also have parts of the geographical territory of Macedonia. Does that make them equal shareholders to the right to adopt the name Macedonia? No, not at all.

As a result of this, the Macedonian endeavor to become part of the “global village” in a historical, cultural, economic and political sense is worthless. A culture’s value may be perceived from how deep its historical stories are rooted. It is a home to all people and states equally. If people want to neglect this fact, then they are victims to their blindness and greed caused by their own material aspirations. Actually, that is the goal of the present globalization led by the USA: to subject the rest of the world under the unique economic control and dependence of the Western world and the USA. In this materialistic state of mind we lose the essence of globalization.

If the name of a state is one of the prices it has to pay in order to participate in the family of prestigious, then this consumerist system of globalization is doomed to fail. It is consumerist because it constantly

places information regardless of whether they are good or not, useful or not, listened or not. The important thing is to place them. The result is unimportant.

Macedonia is not the only victim here but also the rest of the world because similar things happen to other nations, Greece, for instance. In this context Mr. Kapur says: *“Therefore, as a first step, the endless media projection of consumerist life styles and their support structures must be reexamined. This means that media is not only projecting economies of consumerism, but are trying to connect the aspirations, interests and the needs of the young people, even children, to this promotion and disconnecting them from their own cultural mores. In other words, violence, materialism and unilateralism must be replaced by a new world order based on principles of peace, cooperation and inter-dependence.”*<sup>199</sup>

### **Where do we go from here?**

In this context Mr. Kapur goes back to a model suggested in Panchsheel concluded between the two most populated countries – China and India. *“This model comprises the following principles:*

- *Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.*
- *Mutual non-aggression.*
- *Mutual non-interference in each other’s the internal affaires.*
- *Equality and mutual benefit.*
- *Peaceful coexistence.*<sup>200</sup>

Therefore, some steps should be undertaken to put the interest of the community before individual interests. Since progress depends on individual contribution, it must be determined when individual and when social interests should prevail. Then, we can perceive the objective differences between the states and only then we can overcome them. Objectively, not every country can be like the USA or Germany. But the artificially created situation in the Third world countries distances them even more from themselves.

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<sup>199</sup> *Dialogue of Civilizations* – Rhodes, Greece, 5-9 October 2005; „*Human order - Decline and Resurgence*“, J. C. Kapur, page 5 (the text was sent by e-mail from Mr. Kapur’s secretary, Ms. Chandrika Viavan)

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid*, p. 5.

This also refers to our problem. If we perceive the essence of the game behind the name dispute, then it would help us but also it would help the Hellenic Republic.

However, there is hope. Recent statements made by eminent intellectuals from the Hellenic Republic express support for recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name. On one hand, this will break the illusion that has been maintained for Greek citizens for years that Macedonia belongs to them exclusively. On the other hand, this should show the world that dialogue, coexistence and solidarity know no boundaries. As such, they should show to the great western powers that globalization is achieved with agreement and not monopolization of thought and democracy. Democracy should know no boundaries, it should move freely and without restraints, because it belongs to and derives from the citizens of the world and not to a group that wants to create a dependence on it.

To conclude, Mr. Kapur says: *“Orderliness based on social justice and an ethical order based on values higher than human in the human consciousness catalyze balances within a community, a nation or any social organism. Such a balance can only be created if there is a wide diversity—bio-diversity, theo-diversity, and freely expressed diversity of ideas. All these diversities arrive at a common centre and add to the expansion of physical, mental and spiritual life on our planet and connects it to the orderliness of the cosmos. So long as there is an evolution of the human species from the physical to the mental, supra-mental and spiritual, societies advance and imbalance within the system get continuously reflected and corrected. But if the corrective or innovative capacities of the citizens of a society are stifled, systems become imbalanced and a state of disorderliness begins to creep in. Such a unidirectional movement in the world system often leads to diseased bodies, minds, conflicts, wars and terrorism.”*<sup>201</sup>

### Conclusion

In the beginning, we used Mr. Kapur’s text as a basis and now, to conclude, we will use the history of his native country – India.

In the 40s India was the biggest British colony. At the same time it was one of the biggest British sources of profit. The cheap labor was the main force in the profit-oriented system.

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid, p. 8 and 9.

About sixty years ago in India there was a struggle for independence against the British Empire. The world has never seen such a struggle. “*It was characterized by non-violent methods of action (love and compassion), as well as refusing to participate in all that represents disruption of truth.*”<sup>202</sup> This method was led by Mahatma Gandhi.

Gandhi walked along his path with a thought faithful to the truth and with his identification with the poor and miserable Indian people. He managed to chase the British out of his country without a punch or a bad word. He proved that the strongest is not always strong enough to master forever.

India is much more populated than Britain. But in the time of Gandhi the British perceived it as a small and unimportant country. It only represented a resource for production and import of precious items that made the British Empire richer. Gandhi was traveling from South Africa to India. He perceived the injustices not only of a social, but also of national, religious, historical and cultural character. India was not different from Great Britain. It had its heroes that it celebrated for centuries. It had millennia old customs and traditions. It had philosophers and artists just like Great Britain. The only difference was that India was a British colony.

Therefore, it has never actually been perceived as meaningless by Britain. If it were insignificant, the British would have never occupied it. Its historical value is just as important as the British.

In those days Britain had Winston Churchill and India had Mahatma Gandhi. The first one chose to respond with violence to the violence. The second one chose to use non-violent methods. Hence, the difference is in the choice we make.

In that context, Macedonia does not appear meaningless and unimportant before Greece or the international community. That is actually its greatness. The name that the Republic of Macedonia carries is not only an agreement between two countries that expires, signed on a piece of paper, so that in future they could ease their conscience because they achieved something. It is a potential factor for influential world changes. It is capable to change many things only by following the path of non-violence, the search for truth, empathy for the weaker and love for the one that causes hatred, evil and injustice.

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<sup>202</sup> John Collier, *Oriental Philosophies*, Zoompress 1996, Chapter X “*Lasting tradition – Gandhi*”, p. 97.

Sometimes even the small and meaningless may achieve a lot. They only have to show strong will and wisdom. The goal is never as far as we sometimes think is. The goal is here, before our eyes. We just have to look in order to reach it.

## INTERVIEWS

### ETHNOGENESIS OF ANCIENT MACEDONIANS<sup>203</sup>

- *Professor Proeva, at the outset, could you tell us something more about the ethnogenesis of Ancient Macedonians and their links with the Slavs?*

**Proeva:** Even now, little is known about the links between Ancient Macedonians and Slavs. This research should be a mutual work of those who research the antique period and the Middle Ages, even more of the latter. There are some old theories that Ancient Macedonians were firstly Hellenized than Romanized and when the Slavs arrived, nothing was left from them as Macedonians. This view is incorrect. Firstly, Hellenization and Romanization did not represent denationalization or a complete loss of identity. They implied accepting certain fashion, a lifestyle. For instance, today we all wear jeans and that does not mean we are Americanized. We are talking about accepting a certain way of dressing, just like they accepted the Latin language. Latin was then widely used by all those who wanted to have a carrier and those who worked in the administration. All censuses and documents were written in Latin. For long, people believed that when Macedonians accepted the Roman religion they were assimilated. After the World War II, people believed that in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, when the Roman Empire started to grow weaker, there was a reaction and return to the autochthon religion. But this is also incorrect. There is an inscription, a tomb of a two-month baby from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. The inscription says that the baby had a “Macedonian voice” i.e. language. Of course, a two-month baby speaks neither Macedonian nor Greek, it just makes baby sounds. The only possibility is that this was a mark of the origin i.e. the ethnic affiliation of the baby. Therefore, if the Ancient Macedonians

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<sup>203</sup> We made this interview with Professor Nade Proeva, PhD on April 23, 2002 in her office at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. She teaches *Ancient Macedonian History* and *Ancient History*. She is a respected expert on Ancient Macedonia. She has written the following works: “Studies of the Ancient Macedonians” (*St udi i za Ant i -ki t e Makedonci*) and “The History of the Argeads” (*I st ori ja na Argeadi t e*). Her position on the issue of Macedonian identity was very important to us. Her kindness and readiness to speak openly about this problem helped us go deeper into the world of ancient history. For a moment, we reached the truth that has been denied by many and we found little hope that facts are on our side. They should be our unique weapon in the struggle for preserving and acknowledgement of our identity. Her assistant Voislav Sarakinski as well as Dalibor Jovanovski, MA in Balkan Populations History (Modern Era) participated in the discussion.

were lost or disappeared, when the Slaves arrived, they could not possibly exterminate anything or anybody with their weapons, especially not an entire population. We have witnessed this as well - an entire population could not be exterminated not even with current modern means. For instance, Jewish were killed by the fascist yet they were not destroyed. In reality, this may lead to migration, forceful emigration, and territorial acquisition but not to destruction of a population. Whether we liked it or not, at some point the two populations blend, they help each other, they do business etc. There are many elements in our culture that are close to Ancient Macedonia. Unfortunately, we do not have professionals to research this. I am the first and the only PhD that is dealing with these issues.

**Sarakinski:** The facts stated by the Professor are confirmed by Byzantine resources too, which say that when the Slavs settled, Macedonians retreated to the canyons.

**Proeva:** Yes, during the first wave of settlement they retreated to higher and safer places. That is why some Vlachs now claim that they are direct successors to Ancient Macedonians. Please, there are no direct successors to Ancient Macedonians. Greeks too, are not their direct successors. Ancient Macedonians were ancient people and they no longer exist in the way they were then. At last, Vlach language indicates that their ancestors spoke some of the many dialects of the Vulgar Latin. If they were Macedonians, their language would have surely been different.

*- The Greek "historian" Evangelos Kofos claims that Josip Broz – Tito created Macedonian identity, including the state, language, church and history. What is your position about this statement?*

**Proeva:** (*wondering if Kofos is a historian or politician*): First of all, one thing is very important – there is no artificial nation. Nations may disappear; they may be assimilated or suffer from genocide but there are no artificial nations. Have you ever heard of a nation established under state decree? Such a thing does not exist. Tito and the Yugoslavian Communist Party recognized the Macedonian nation but they did not create it. That is impossible.

**Sarakinski:** Kofos takes the advantage that Macedonian language was standardized fairly late. But does that mean it was invented? For example, today Hebrew is spoken in Israel but at the dawns of the contemporary Israeli state, the immigrants spoke Yiddish, Sephardic, Ladino as well as numerous other local European Jewish dialects that were mutually incomprehensible. According to a state program, the

Hebrew language from the Old Testament was restored. So, the Hebrew was not invented just like that. Does that mean that Jewish people were invented in the forties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century?

**Proeva:** Regarding our language, the problem of course, is that it had not been standardized before we had a state. However, it did exist. As a counterargument I will tell you that just until the Civil War in Greece, the only Greek party that recognized Macedonians in the Greek part of Macedonia was the Communist Party and that is before Tito and before the World War II. The Greek Communist Party recognized Macedonians within its country (*revolted and with criticism*). Did Tito invent Macedonians over there too?! The truth is that ever since Greece got the territories populated by Macedonians under the Treaty of Bucharest, the League of Nations, as predecessor to UN, obliged it to respect minority rights. In that period the primer “Abecedar” was made for Macedonian schools. From political reasons Greece published it in Latin alphabet and never put it into use. This problem is tackled by Voislav Kushevski so you can refer to his scientific work.

- *Kofos says that Greeks are entitled to a cultural heritage from the Republic of Macedonia. What is your position on this?*

**Proeva (raising her tone):** That is incorrect! Greeks are not entitled to our cultural heritage. I already stated this in my article in the newspaper “Forum”. In the International Crisis Group report they are talking about Greek tradition and Greek heritage. However, tradition and heritage are two different things. The report says – let’s keep the Greek tradition! But there is no Greek tradition here. Our grandmothers did not read the Iliad or the Odyssey story when they put us to sleep or the songs for Greek andarts. Are we supposed to learn Greek at this point? As regards the Greek cultural heritage, they refer to the issue of the ethnic affiliation of Ancient Macedonians that according to the science and according to some people has still not been discovered. Here is the problem. Until the World War II there were very few resources that scientists could denote so that is why it was believed that Ancient Macedonians were Greeks. Well, before that there were theories that they were Illyrians. However, when Greece strengthened its position and due to numerous other unscientific factors, the position that Ancient Macedonians were Greek was established. After the World War II when the number of resources dramatically increased, the opinion that Ancient Macedonians were not Greek appeared.

**Sarakinski:** Yes, but we should always bear in mind the political relations. Every stated position of a scientist contains certain amount of

politics. So, even the scientists who claimed that Ancient Macedonians were not Greek after the World War II did not do this loudly and openly.

**Proeva:** Yes, there was a lot of tactfulness. If some scientists openly support the thesis that Ancient Macedonians were not Greek, then they will never set foot on Greek soil! Have you ever thought what it means for a historian that researches ancient history never to be able to set foot on Greek soil and make a research? For example, Claude Rove is an eminent expert on ancient bronze. He participated in the discovery of the necropolis in Sindos at Thessalonica where they found an archaeological culture same to the graves in the village Trebenishta, near Ohrid. To clarify, the graves in Trebenishta were found during the World War I by Bulgarian soldiers who were digging trenches. The golden masks they found were taken to Sofia. Later when this territory came under Serbian rule, two additional masks that were found were taken to Belgrade. Something else is also important: when the necropolis in Trebenishta was found, such a thing was not discovered for Greeks, Thracians or Macedonians. Since this finding was close to the border between Ancient Macedonia and Illyria, scientists claimed that the necropolis was Illyrian. However, after the excavations in Sindos, Claude Rove pointed out that the discovered objects had different features from Greek objects. So, what was the response of the Hellenic Republic? It responded by not giving him permission to conduct research. Greece simply plots the theory that Ancient Macedonians were Greeks and they are its advocates. Albanians too, call upon the old theses that they are direct successors to Illyrians. But this statement is absolutely incorrect, just as the one that West Macedonia belonged to the Illyrians and that we (and by we they mean the Slaves) have won it in the 6<sup>th</sup> century. I was the first scientist to prove that in the western part of current Macedonia lived the Macedonian tribe Desarets. No one has disputed that so far. Another thing is that material and cultural evidence are much more relevant and important. Since there is such evidence in the core of Ancient Macedonia and at the Macedonian border (these border areas were sometimes under Illyrian and other times under Macedonian rule) their origin is clear.

**Sarakinski:** The perverted treatment of ancient cultural heritage is disturbing, especially because this treatment is carried out by Greece. This problem may be observed on two levels. Firstly, according to them, wherever a Doric or Ionic column has been or will be discovered it is Helladic...

**Proeva:** What about the Greek colonies in Sicily, south Italy? What about Massalia, nowadays Marseilles that used to be Greek colony

too? How come the question of Greek cultural heritage is not raised there?

**Sarakinski:** ....and secondly, what is located on the territory of current Greece is a Greek problem. In other words, Greece has the power to decide if the world is going to research this science or not. They could issue or deny visas or permissions for research and if they do not like the interpretation, then there may not be research at all. Another question is if the domestic Greek researchers could equally replace European or American. But the visas and permissions regimes are obviously significant even when it comes to science. That is really a tragedy.

**Proeva (determined):** Eventually, this is not a Greek heritage. It is the heritage of Ancient Macedonians and that is not the same. But is that really the main problem? Even in times of Yugoslavia our country had good law on protection of cultural and historical heritage and we are still working on their protection. We keep cultural monuments because they are part of human civilization, they belong to entire humanity. Cultural heritage belongs to entire humanity regardless of who created it. Greece may not arrogate it, because ancient cultural heritage does not have an owner. Regarding this issue you can call upon an entire article from the "Zoom" magazine. Culture does not have an owner, neither does the past. We preserve monuments because they belong to humanity. It is our obligation to keep what was found on our territory regardless of who created it in the past. But this problem should be researched by scientists and not politicians!

- *In your book "Studies on Ancient Macedonians" you explained the origin of the name Macedonia and the borders of the Ancient Macedonian state. Could you tell us something about this?*

**Proeva (narrative tone):** The first written Greek name about Macedonia was Ematia which means "sand country". The name is logical considering that sailors used it when they saw the sand ground from afar. But when they set foot on the mainland and made contact with the inhabitants, they realized that these people called themselves "Macedonians" and their country – "Macedonia". Therefore, the name is Macedonian and not Hellenic! When it comes to the term *Hellenes*, from the cultural point of view this word is sometimes used not only for Ancient Macedonians but for other ancient populations. In the first thousand years from our era, the most widespread language for communication was the Greek language. In the Middle Ages that was the Latin

language, until the World War II that was French and today that is the English language. The fact that the Hellenic language was used for external communication is nothing exceptional. Macedonian language existed and according to all historical resources, the Hellenistic population did not understand it. From the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC all the populations that did not speak Hellenic language and spoke some incomprehensible language, were called barbarians by the Hellenes. Macedonians were called barbarians too! From cultural perspective, the situation is somewhat different. In order to understand this, I will quote Socrates who said: “*Our city (Athens) has so much surpassed other men in thought and speech, that its students have become the teachers of others and it has made the name of Hellenes seem not as a name of a population, but as a cultural mark. So a Hellen is no longer one of common descent but one who shares our education and culture*”. So in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC *Hellen* was follower of the Hellenic culture, the most widespread and the most developed ancient culture. Therefore, when they mentioned that Macedonians were Hellenes, they meant that in a cultural and not ethnical sense. The nation is a 19<sup>th</sup> century conception, a product of the contemporary age. Greece may not look for nations in the past or a Hellenic heritage in the Republic of Macedonia. The problem is that the notions of “state” and “nation” are confused: there are no new or old nations, nations either exist or they don’t. On the other hand, there are new and old states. We established an independent country among the last ones. Anyone would have faced the same thing in our place. We have a crucial position and everybody needs us.

- *The International Crisis Group report says that Macedonians have irredentist position towards the Hellenic Republic. Could we talk about irredentism considering that the Macedonian Constitution from 1991 says that the Republic of Macedonia shall not have territorial claims to its neighboring countries?! Do you think that there is irredentism of some kind on our behalf?*

**Proeva (revoluted):** The International Crisis Group calls upon the geographic maps that encompass Aegean Macedonia. When I prepared my graduation paper on Ancient Macedonia I used all kinds of maps. In order to conduct better analysis, I needed to see in which areas were the towns located. So I remember well that this map was done before the dissolution of the former Yugoslav Federation. Actually, this map was a simple provocation used by some politicians that wanted to win

the fondness of the people with the idea that they will hold a congress in Thessalonica (*cynicism that refers to Ljubcho Georgievski*). Also the draft-coins with the White Tower of Thessalonica were a provocation. That is how Greece found “proof” that we have some irredentist intentions. The truth is that the Republic of Macedonia had never intentions of that kind towards Greece or any other state. Our politicians make these mistakes because they do not know enough about this issue but they don’t even ask and they don’t want to learn to help our country. So our politicians are the problem here. Unlike them, Macedonia has a lot of gifted, qualified and capable scientists.

- *How do you think the name issue is supposed to be resolved?*

**Proeva** (*determined*): The biggest compromise that we could make is to allow the Greeks call us however they want. But they cannot ask us or anybody else to change our constitutional name!

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Dalibor Jovanovski, Master in History of Balkan People (Modern Era) also took part in the discussion to explain us when Greece started to deny Macedonian identity.

**Jovanovski:** It is not a question of denying, it is a question of not recognizing our identity. Our identity has never been recognized by Greece and therefore it was not denied. The only relevant political entity that recognized Macedonian identity is the Greek Communist Party. Today, there is a younger generation of Greek historians that call us Slav Macedonians which is insulting. Our language is really of Slavic origin but this is a linguistic, not an anthropological group.

The Greek state was established in 1830. It started to operate in 1832 and in December 1834 the Greeks appointed a consul in Thessalonica. In a French document, the Greek consul stated: “*They appointed me a consul in Macedonia*”. Greeks did that from practical reasons. In the southern part of Macedonia, by the coast, there was Greek population. We cannot deny that. But in the past, 50-60% of the population in Thessalonica was Jewish. Thessalonica was never Greek; it was inhabited by different populations. However, its background was Slavic. Another important thing is the presence of the Vlach population, especially in Ber/Veria, Grevena, Cagliari etc. The Vlachs were greekophiles until the Roman propaganda, later they were oriented in favor or against Greece. This trend exists even now in Bitola. So when they appointed the consul, he performed his activities in the south Macedonia, by the coast. Later they appointed consuls on all strategic spots such as Serres, Kavala and Bitola. In this period, Macedonians were not recognized.

Bulgarian propaganda was also influential. Even though it was Pan-Slavic, that was to our loss. At the time, Pan-Slavism was seeking Bulgarians in Macedonia so that the Russians could overtake Constantinople. When Bulgarians directed towards Macedonia, they made it easier for Russians to access Constantinople. The presence of the patriarchate was also notable. Until 1870 it was the only orthodox clerical institution and it operated in Greek language. The education in the parochial schools of that time was performed in Greek. That is how the denationalization of Macedonians was made easier. There were also seminary schools where non-standardized Macedonian was taught. In every area they taught in the local dialect. The situation changed in 1870 when the Exarchy (Bulgarian church) was recognized because Macedonians found it easier to study in Bulgarian than in Greek.

The conditions worsened when Serbian influence appeared even though Serbians were in the weakest position because their church was still not recognized. In this period they started to negotiate with Greece in order to divide their Macedonian areas of interest. We need to mention that the Greek state was asking to possess the territory to the Sava and Danube rivers. But later its appetites settled and it asked the territory to Shar Planina. During the *Eastern Crisis* (1875-1881), upon the order of the Greek Prime Minister Harilaos Trikoupis, the consuls in Bitola, Thessalonica and Plovdiv elaborated a draft-program about the Greek aspirations. This was included in a memorandum of the Greek Government from 1880 about division of Macedonia in two vilayets, one Greek and another non-Greek. The border between them was supposed to be established at Ohrid, Bitola, Prilep, Demir Kapija, Strumica and Radovish to the border of Pirin Macedonia in Bulgaria. Since then this area was constantly pressured by Greece. Firstly, they pressured by political means. When that didn't succeed, especially after the establishment of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and the Ilinden Uprising (1903), they decided to form Greek troops. Greek troops constantly invaded our area. They were led by Greek army officers and the soldiers were Cretans who were good fighters because they constantly waged wars against the Ottomans to defend their island.

In the beginning they were not successful. However, when the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement weakened, they started to make purges in the west of Aegean Macedonia. When they did this, they got the occasion to impose greater influence over Macedonians instead to seek for territory (Greece wanted to have good relations with the Ottoman state because they were weaker than the Bulgarians and Serbians.

The Bulgarian army was one of the best armies at the time. That was not due to weapons or discipline but because it was the only one that could deal with the Ottomans.). Greece negotiated with the other Balkan states but it could not determine a border. From 1860 to 1868, Greece and Serbia negotiated the Union Agreement in 1867 but the border was not determined. In 1890 there were also negotiations that ended without success. The border was the same as the above mentioned. In 1892-1893 the Serbian ambassador in Athens Vlado Gjorgjevic raises this issue again. But the aspirations are the same and they still did not manage to determine the border. Actually, the border was trouble because of the population. Serbians claimed that this population was Serbian, and the Greeks that it was Greek. In 1899 there were other negotiations that ended with an unsigned Agreement. In 1912 finally a Union Agreement was concluded but it did not specify a border. What happened then? Greece had a navy so one part of the army unloaded in Halkidiki because the population over there was Greek and went towards Thessalonica. The other part of the army went to Lerin/Florina and Janina, but since Thessalonica was a strategically important city, the army from Lerin/Florina was directed towards Thessalonica. When the Greek army arrived in Thessalonica, Bulgarians and the Macedonian troops of Jane Sandanski were also there. When the Ottomans realized that they lost the rule over the city, they handed over the keys to the city to the French consul. He decided that it was better for the Greeks to enter. Greeks entered two hours before the Bulgarian army. They let Bulgarian army and Macedonian troops enter, but just out of courtesy. In the end, Thessalonica remained in Greek possession.

During the Balkan War II (1913), the Greeks arrived to the city of Kavala. Before that, during the Balkan War I (1912), among other cities, they won Voden/Edessa, Ber/Veria and Solun/Thessalonica. Besides Kavala, they won Serres and Kukush/Kilkis that were under Greek rule. Kilkis was leveled to the ground and cleansed from its population. This is the only genocide Greeks admit but as a genocide to the Bulgarian and not the Macedonian population. Then, the Greek rule started. According to the Agreement made between Greece and Turkey in 1923, Kemal Ataturk allowed migration of the orthodox population from Asia Minor to Aegean Macedonia. In that period, about 1925-1926, another very important agreement was concluded. That was the Kalfov-Politis Agreement for exchange of population between Bulgaria and Greece. Then the Greeks inhabited by the Black Sea emigrated and Macedonians were sent to Bulgaria as Bulgarians.

In this context, it is important to mention the issue about the possessions of Macedonians that were chased from Aegean Macedonia. Greece actually fears that when they will recognize Macedonian minority in Aegean Macedonia, Macedonians will return to ask for their possessions. Of course this is unfavorable for the Greeks who have always been good businessmen.

PRAZNA

2

**CULTURAL AND POLITICAL  
DIMENSION OF THE DISPUTE**

MINORITY RIGHTS IN GREECE  
THE MACEDONIAN PRIMER

*Being concerned with your historical past is a quality of a civilized world. It  
is the basis of identity. We should enter Europe as Macedonians, not  
otherwise.*

*Nikola Gruevski, May 2008*

## MACEDONIANS IN GREECE AND HUMAN RIGHTS<sup>204</sup>

### Topic: “Democratic Institutions; Democracy on National, Regional and Local Levels”

October 9, 2006

**Presentation of Rainbow** – *organization for Macedonian national minority in Greece*

Thank you Mr. Moderator. As we all know, one of the most basic tenants of democracy is dialogue. Dialogue between citizens and the state, dialogue between NGOs and the state are most fundamental in this regard.

Today I would like to talk about Greece’s exclusion of the European Free Alliance - Rainbow, the political party of the ethnic Macedonian minority of Greece. I shall now just briefly outline some specific cases. In May 2004, EFA Rainbow wrote to the Greek Ministry of In-

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<sup>204</sup> In the following text we provide transcripts from the speakers that participated at the five working sessions (Sessions 10-14) on different topics at the conference organized by OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (formerly CSCE) in Warsaw, the capital of Poland from October 9 until October 11, 2006 entitled *Human Dimension Implementation Meeting*. The speeches and replies were chosen by D. Apasiev. Source: [www.florina.org](http://www.florina.org).

It was notable that on October 23, 2006, just a few days after the OSCE conference, the Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) gave the following statement for the press: *The Greek State News Agency and the Greek media distort the USA State Department position on Macedonian language and ethnicity: GHM denounces a new example of dictated journalism in the service of “national interests” by the Greek state Athens News Agency (ANA) that was willingly disseminated by some Greek media without checking the story despite its obviously irrational content*. A State Department spokesperson answer to a Greek journalist, on 19 October, stating that the USA recognize states (including Macedonia with its constitutional name) and not languages or sub-national groups within states was distorted by ANA so as to make it seem like the *U.S. State Department says it does not recognize ‘a Macedonian language’ or ethnicity*. Such a position would obviously be irrational a few days after the US State Department-headed delegation to the OSCE referred to a Macedonian minority in Greece. The State Department statement is available at the web page: <http://www.osce.org/item/21661.html>. Nevertheless, the story was disseminated with utmost satisfaction by Greek media like the Athens-based information radio stations SKAI and FLASH as well as the national daily *Eleftherotipia*. GHM appends to the ANA story the transcript of the related excerpt of the State Department briefing, and the related release of the Greek Member State Committee of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages.

ternal Affairs requesting a meeting regarding the return of Macedonian political refugees to Greece who are prevented from reclaiming their Greek citizenship by the discriminatory laws enacted by Greece. There was no response to Rainbow's letter.

In the same year, the Macedonian political party wrote to the Greek Ministry of Education requesting a meeting to discuss the introduction of the Macedonian language to the Greek education system. Again, there was no reply to this letter.

In 2005, Rainbow wrote to the Ministry of Communications and to Greek state television and radio requesting a meeting to discuss the introduction of broadcasts in Macedonian language on Greek state television and radio. Once again, there was no reply to Rainbow's letter.

This pattern continued this year on two occasions when EFA-Rainbow sought the assistance of its European partner organizations, namely FUEN, the Federal Union of European Nationalities and the European Free Alliance – European Political Party that both requested meetings with the Greek government. The Greek government agreed to meet with them but indicated that at the same meetings, members of EFA Rainbow would not be accepted. Full written documentation of these incidents exists.

Therefore, I ask, since we are talking about democracy here today, how is it democratic for a legally registered political party to be refused meetings with the central government? Fortunately today at this OSCE meeting, we are able to at least to sit at the same table with representatives of our government.

Mr. Moderator I know that what I am about to do now, is not common in this meeting, but this is the only place that we are able to have a dialogue with our government, the Greek government. Let me once again personally invite the Greek government to begin a dialogue (*in that moment the representative of ESA Rainbow approached the Greek delegation to hand an invitation for dialogue*). Thank you for your attention.

**Statement by the Greek delegation**

*(in exercise of the right of Reply)*

Permit me to say a few things, as a reply to statements made by previous speakers.

1. As to a statement on the Muslim Minority in Greece, I would like to stress that the principles of the State policy towards the Muslim Minority are those of equality before the Law and equal protection of the Law, without any discrimination.

The rights of the members of the Muslim Minority in Thrace are fully guaranteed and effectively protected in a society where the rule of Law prevails. Our Muslim co-citizens participate actively in the public life of the country and many are members of political parties and local governments. In particular, around three hundred Muslims hold seats in the prefectural and town councils of Xanthi and Komotini.

Concerning the comment of a speaker on reactions to the candidacy of Ms Karachasan, a young Muslim lawyer, for the office of the prefect, let me point out that this candidacy is viewed by the whole spectrum of the Greek political parties as a natural consequence of the full integration of the Muslim community in public life.'

2. As to the statement of another speaker, on behalf of the organization "Rainbow coalition", who claimed that he represented what he called "Macedonian minority", I want to stress that such a minority does not exist in Greece. What exists is almost 2.5 million Greek Macedonians, proud of their heritage and traditions which date back thousands of years. This organization participated absolutely freely in recent elections of all kinds, and has seen that its constituency is non-existent. For example in the parliamentary election it did not receive more than 0.02% of the vote, even though it participated in the elections in coalition with other marginal groups.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that in my country all parties and organizations enjoy, both in law and in practice, full participation in the economic, social, cultural and political life.

**Statement made by Mr. Zoran Todorov, member of the Delegation of the Republic of Macedonia**

*(delivered in exercising the right of reply)*

Mr. Moderator, allow me, on behalf of the Delegation of the Republic of Macedonia, to refer to the statements just been made by the distinguished representatives of Greece and Bulgaria.

The answer to the question to belong (or not) to a national minority is not a sovereign right of the countries and saying that I refer to paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen Document: *To belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice.*

Similar provision is foreseen in the Framework Convention on National Minorities of the Council of Europe. The existence of a population which affiliates itself as Macedonian, in an ethnic sense, in these countries, is a fact recognized by several proficient, competent and

widely accepted and known international forums and their bodies, holders of internationally accepted monitoring mechanisms. Let me list just two of them: the European Commission against racism and Intolerance of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. Their findings, recommendations and judgments are obligatory for the members of the Council of Europe and should be respected by Greece and Bulgaria as recognized democratic countries, members of all main international organizations as well as actual (Greece), or future (Bulgaria) members of the European Union, whose standards in this respect should serve as an example for other countries. Thank you Mr. Moderator.

### **“Citizenship and Political Rights”**

#### **Presentation of the representative of the Home of Macedonian Culture:**

Thank you Mr. Moderator. Since we are talking about citizenship today, I would like to bring to your attention discrimination which exists in Greece today with respect to citizenship.

During the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949, thousands of Greek citizens fled Greece. Following the end of the war, all those who left Greece during this period were stripped of their Greek citizenship and property. In 1982 the Greek government passed an amnesty law (Law 106841) which declared that political exiles who fled during the Civil War and were stripped of their citizenship are allowed to return, providing they are “Greeks by genus”.

In 1985, Law 1540 was passed in which political exiles who fled during Civil War were allowed to reclaim confiscated property, provided they are “Greeks by genus”. The term “Greeks by genus” is a reference used by the Greek government for all those who identify themselves as being ethnic Greek. Hence, ethnic Macedonians who are also political refugees and have had their Greek citizenship rescinded and/or properties confiscated are excluded from enjoying the rights granted under these laws, therefore severely questioning the very standing of the laws based on grounds of equity and fairness.

Moreover, the construction of the wording as relating to these laws is not benign, it has clear intent to discriminate against all those who belong to the category of people classified as political refugees and who are not “Greeks by genus”. Given that ethnic Macedonians predominantly make-up this category of people, it is indisputable that they have been the ones targeted by this exclusivist definition and the ones to have suffered the most.

The individuals excluded by these two laws mostly reside in the Republic of Macedonia, Australia and Canada. We believe that the term *Greeks by genus* in these two laws, which are still in force today, are in breach of the fundamental principle of non-discrimination and paragraph 31 of the Copenhagen document which states that: *Persons belonging to national minorities have the right to exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.*

In light of this, the Greek government must amend this law and end the discrimination against the political refugees from the Greek civil war who are not Greek by ethnicity.

In closing I ask for the assistance of the OSCE to assist in this matter and ensure that Greece is fulfilling its commitments to not discriminate against members of ethnic minorities. I thank you for your attention.

#### **“Fundamental Rights – Freedom of Movement”**

October 9, 2006

**Presentation of Rainbow** – *Organization of the Macedonian minority of Greece*

Thank you Mr Moderator. This morning I would like to talk about Greece’s denial of the Freedom of Movement to individuals born within its borders.

Although Article 9.5 of the Copenhagen document states that States will respect the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country Greece has and continues to ignore this OSCE commitment.

Over the last few decades Greek authorities have on many occasions denied people born in Greece entry in the country. This is the case with Macedonian political refugees who left Greece during the civil war 60 years ago. Such people are denied entry into Greece because they express a Macedonian ethnic identity in the countries in which they now reside. The Greek state has placed these people on a black list for the purpose of refusing their entrance into the country.

Some examples. Last year, Gjorgji Plukovski, a Canadian citizen of Macedonian descent, born in Harala/Pozdivista, Kastoria/Kostur, Greece was denied entry into Greece when attempting to enter from the Republic of Macedonia. He was given a document by border officials stating that he “*is considered to be a threat to public order, internal*

*security, public health or the international relations of one or more of the Member States of the European Union”.*

More recently, Done Dimov, an ethnic Macedonian born in Statitsa/Melas, Kostur/Kastoria area of Greece but now residing in Australia attempted to enter Greece two months ago but was refused entry by Greek border authorities.

In another case which occurred just ten days ago, Mr Georgi Saragil, a Canadian citizen, also born in Greece and of ethnic Macedonian background, landed in Thessaloniki/Solun airport but was denied entry. Mr Saragil was then deported.

In a different set of example, the Greek government continues to denaturalize members of its Macedonian minority who as economic immigrants reside mainly in transoceanic countries. This discriminatory practice has been taking place for the last several decades.

Greek Authorities selectively implement article 20 par. 1G of the Greek Citizenship Law when they target ethnic Macedonians economic immigrants who are active as members of Macedonian associations abroad and who express their Macedonian cultural, linguistic and national identity. Ethnic Macedonians from Greece are informed about their denaturalization only when they try to enter Greece temporarily or for repatriation. Denaturalized individuals are at the same time declared undesirable in Greece (*persona non grata*) and no entrance to the country of their birth is allowed, even for humanitarian reasons. Last year, Mr. George Mishalis tried to enter Greece in order to attend his father’s funeral in his native village Meliti/Voshtarani) in Florina/Lerin. For the last several years, Mr Mishalis has been living and working in Melbourne, Australia.

This practice is appalling, racist and inhumane and must cease immediately. I call upon Greece to implement paragraph 9.5 of the Copenhagen document and call upon all OSCE member states to ensure that this occurs. I thank you for your attention.

#### **“Fundamental Freedoms I – Freedom of Association”**

October 10, 2006

##### **Statement of the Home of Macedonian Culture**

Thank you Mr. Moderator. Today I would like to bring everyone’s attention to a case concerning Greece’s refusal to respect the right of freedom of association. In fact, the case concerns our organization, the Home of Macedonian Culture, which remains unregistered due to reasons which I shall briefly outline.

In 1990, a group of Greek citizens decided to form a non-profit making organization called the “Home of Macedonian Culture.” The group proceeded to register this association with the local court in the town of Florina/Lerin. The court rejected the application asserting that the objective of the association was to promote the idea that, and I quote, “...there is a Macedonian minority in Greece, which is contrary to the national interest and subsequently contrary to the law”. An appeal to the Thessaloniki/Solun court also failed. In 1994 the highest court in Greece upheld these decisions. The applicants then appealed the case to the European Court of Human Rights. In 1998 the court found that there was a violation of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Following the Strasbourg ruling, the applicants tried once again to register the association. However for the next few years, there was no lawyer in the Florina/Lerin area who would take up the case. Following the intervention of the Greek Ombudsperson, the Florina/Lerin Bar Association appointed a lawyer and a new application was submitted to the court.

But if only the matter was that simple. On December 12, 2003, the local court in Florina/Lerin again refused to register the association, thus ignoring the Strasbourg ruling. The case was then appealed to the regional court which only a few months ago upheld the decision of the Florina court, again ignoring the Strasbourg ruling. So deplorably, eight years after the Strasbourg judgment and 16 years after the initial application, our organization, the Home of Macedonian Culture, remains unregistered.

This raises some serious questions to which the Greek delegation should respond. Following the Strasbourg judgment, why has the Greek government not taken any measures to implement the decision and ensure the registration of the Home of Macedonian Culture? The Greek government may claim that this is a matter for the courts, however when national courts refuse to implement judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, the state has the obligation to take measures to ensure the execution of the judgment. Why has the Greek government not done so? Does Greece consider the execution of judgments to be optional?

Also what about Greece’s OSCE commitments and the case of the non-registration of the Home of Macedonian Culture? The right to association is guaranteed in paragraph 10.3 of the Copenhagen Document. Furthermore, the right of a minority, which of course includes

the right of the members of the Macedonian minority of Greece, to form cultural associations is also guaranteed in paragraph 32.6 of the same document. Does Greece also consider the implementation of OSCE standards to be optional? I thank you for your attention.

**Statement by a representative of the Greek delegation**  
*(delivered in exercising the right of reply)*

Mr. Moderator, we heard this morning four statements with regard to the situation in my country. My delegation is of course happy to respond to all allegations made by NGOs. But I believe that our discussions, as a whole, would greatly benefit if human rights issues were raised in a more balanced, proportionate and, especially, non-repetitive manner, reflecting the wide diversity of challenges facing all participant states. Mr. Moderator, freedom of movement is fully respected in Greece. Every state has the right to control the entry of foreign citizens in its territory, in accordance with international standards and applicable national regulations. Greece strictly applies all relevant EU (Schengen) regulations on issuing entry visas to foreign nationals. As we have repeatedly stressed, the Muslim minority in Thrace consists of three distinct groups whose members are of Turkish, Pomak and Roma origin. They share, however, a common religion, which is the basic reason for the denomination of the minority in its entirety as “Muslim” in the *Lausanne Treaty* of 1923. Every member of this minority is free to speak his or her language, exercise his or her religion, customs and traditions and declare his or her origin. There is no denial of the existence of such minority, but only of the attempt to identify the entire Muslim minority of Thrace as “Turkish”. Mr. Moderator, freedom of association is fully protected in our legal order. According to the case-law of our Supreme Court, any restriction on the exercise of this freedom has to be carefully scrutinized by national courts under a strict proportionality standard. There is no general prohibition to use certain words in the denomination of an association. Each case is examined on its own merits, in order to achieve a fair balance between the individual right to freedom of association and the need to preserve public safety, public order and the rights and freedoms of others, as provided for in international human rights law.

As our Supreme Court, sitting in plenary, has recently held, the refusal of the denomination of an association which includes the word

“Turkish” is closely linked to the particular association’s aims, which have been found contrary to public order. With regard to allegations made by another NGO, referring to an association wishing to use the denomination “Macedonian”, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has already found, in its final Resolution that Greece had complied with the relevant European Court’s judgment. The case is now pending before domestic courts. It is to be noted that we have hundreds of scientific, business, professional and sports associations which bear the Macedonian name. The use of this word for the denomination of an association founded by a small number of individuals who attach to it a different meaning, in terms of culture or origin, would inevitably create great confusion as to what they actually mean or pursue by using this word.

The relevant case-law of the Greek courts is in line with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as with European and universal standards on permissible restrictions to the exercise of human rights in general and freedom of association in particular. Thank you, Mr. Moderator.

**“Fundamental Freedoms II - Freedom of thought,  
conscience, religion or belief”**

October 10, 2006

**Representation of Rainbow** – *Organization of the national Macedonian minority in Greece*

Mr. Moderator, ladies and gentlemen, before I begin with my presentation, allow me to reassure the Greek delegation that I will not speak about the problems of the Macedonian minority in Greece because I noticed that the Greek ambassador felt a little “uncomfortable” during his reply in the morning session...

Imagine a country where Church and State have not been institutionally separated. One of them is Greece. According to Article 3 of the Preamble of the Greek Constitution: *the dominant religion in Greece is the religion of the Eastern Greek Orthodox Church of Jesus Christ*. The expression *dominant religion* is not simply a declarative statement. It dominates in practice. A few examples:

a) The dogma of the Greek orthodox religion is involved in the educational system as an obligatory subject in public elementary and secondary schools. Moreover, every single day, students must begin the day at school with an obligatory eastern orthodox prayer. This oc-

curs all over Greece, even in schools with children of immigrants who are of a non- Greek orthodox religion.

b) Another example of the Greek Church's interference in the education system is the frequent visits of the Greek orthodox priests to public schools. During these visits, which by the way are legally permitted, children are strongly encouraged to confess their sins to the priest during school hours. We find this practice to be unacceptable and we strongly support the recent initiative of the Greek Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs to ban this practice. Furthermore we call upon the government to reform this Ministry and not to include religious affairs within its competence.

c) Reform is also needed to other areas of public life. In the judicial system, court judges at their swearing in ceremony, are obliged to give an oath before the Greek orthodox Archbishop. An example of this occurred recently with the swearing in of new judges to the Appeal Court. So the question here is, in such a situation how can a citizen of a different religion or having no religion for that matter, feel equal before the law knowing that the judge has taken an oath before an official representative of another religion. This practice must also end.

To conclude, in the current debate to revise the Greek constitution, despite the fact that they have been many expert opinions on the need to separate Church and State the Greek government has indicated that there will be no change in the current status. Therefore the Greek Church will continue to play a dominant role in all spheres of public life. Thank you for your attention.

**“Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination,  
National Minorities”**

October 11, 2006

**Representation of Rainbow** – *Organization of the national Macedonian minority in Greece*

Thank you Mr Moderator. My statement today shall focus on the linguistic rights of national minorities. Specifically, I shall speak about the Macedonian speaking community in Greece.

Although various human rights bodies have strongly recommended the Greek state to take measures for recognition and protection of linguistic rights of the Macedonian-speaking population in Greece, the Greek government continues to ignore such advice. For example, in 2003 the European Commission for Racism and Intoler-

ance recommended that Greece sign the *European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages*, as well as ratify the *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*.

I would like to mention here that it is a common practice of Greek representatives in various international forums, as it was the case last year with the Greek representative in the Council of Europe, Mr. Ayfantis, to claim that *there is a small number of people speaking a Slavic dialect or idiom in Northern Greece* referring to the Macedonian-speaking community. So the question must be asked: why has the Greek government not taken any measures to protect and promote the so-called "dialect"? I should mention that the so-called dialect or idiom that the Greek government refers to actually belongs to a language. This language is the Macedonian language.

Another strange approach of the Greek government as we heard on Monday from the Greek Ambassador is to equate the size of the Macedonian minority with the political affiliation of the citizens as expressed in the elections. Mr. Ambassador, you should be aware that Macedonian speakers vote for many parties and not just exclusively for EFA-Rainbow. The most democratic and accurate way to measure the number of persons belonging to a linguistic or national minority is not through elections but through the national census. Unfortunately the right to express one's linguistic or ethnic identity is not possible through the Greek census. We strongly encourage the Greek government to make this possible at the next census in 2011.

But even if the results of a future census were to show that the Macedonian minority is less than 1% as the distinguished Greek Ambassador claimed on Monday's session referring to the votes of EFA-Rainbow, are they not entitled to cultural rights? Of a total population of 70,000,000 people in Turkey, the Greek orthodox minority numbers less than 2,500 people which accounts for only 0.002% of the population. Of course this minority is no less deserving of basic linguistic rights, which by the way they already enjoy.

Rainbow believes that in a situation where a minority is small in numbers the state policy towards this minority should be even more progressive in the protection of their identity. We as members of the Macedonian minority in Greece have taken the first step towards achieving this, by printing a primer of the Macedonian language. We hope this initiative will finally convince the Ministry of Education in our country to take the necessary measures to introduce the Macedonian language to the Greek educational system. In this regard Mr. Ambassa-

dor I would like you to be the first representative of the Greek government to officially receive this publication. I thank you for your attention. [Rainbow representative hands the Greek ambassador, Mr Manesis, a copy of the Macedonian language primer “Abecedar”]

*Statement by the Greek delegation  
(in exercise of its Right of Reply)*

1. My delegation requested to exercise its “right of reply” to a statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States of America, who mentioned the existence of “Albanian, Macedonian and Turkish” minorities in Greece. The views contained therein are erroneous, misleading and suggest an unwarranted severity of the situation in my country. After all, many of the terms used by the distinguished representative for describing the above situation, come into stark contrast with those (terms) used on many occasions, in written and oral form, by prominent representatives of the U.S. Administration.

2. With respect to the Muslim minority in Thrace, one should note that the 1923 Lausanne Treaty provides solely for a Muslim minority in Greece. The members of the Muslim minority are free to declare their ethnic origin (Turkish, Pomak or Roma), speak their language, exercise their religion and observe their particular customs and traditions. The principle of individual self-identification is fully protected in Greece. What is not acceptable to the Greek State is the attempt to establish a single ethnic identity for the entire Muslim minority in Thrace, so as to subsume Pomak and Roma persons under a single identity.

The members of the Muslim minority enjoy a wide range of educational rights. Today, there are 210 primary minority schools in Thrace. Courses are taught in the Greek and Turkish languages. Around 400 Muslim teachers are employed in these schools. The vast majority of them are graduates from the Special Pedagogical Academy of Thessaloniki. Two minority secondary education schools operate in the cities of Xanthi and Komotini. The schools are housed in buildings provided by the Greek State. Two Koranic schools operate in Komotini and Echinus, which are recognized as equivalent to the Religious Lyceums of the country. In order to improve the skills of the pupils in the Greek language, additional educational programs are applied, producing positive results. Furthermore, in the beginning of the current year, the teaching of the Turkish language was introduced, on an optional basis, in a

number of non-minority public schools in Thrace. As far as tertiary education is concerned, Greek Law provides for a special quota of 0,5% for the admission of students from the minority to Greek higher education institutions. When this law entered into force in 1996, 70 students were admitted in Universities. This year, 315 minority students were admitted in tertiary education institutions.

The rights of the members of the Muslim minority in Thrace are fully guaranteed and effectively protected in a democratic society, where the rule of law prevails. Greek legislation provides for special measures in favor of the Muslim minority and is in line with the European Convention of Human Rights, the values of the European Union, as well as OSCE commitments.

In conclusion: Greece, indeed, continues to cite the Lausanne Treaty as the basis for the definition, recognition and protection of the minorities envisaged in this binding text of International Law. This is the reason why the Muslim Minority in Greece (of Turkish, Pomak and Roma ethnic origin) is well, “alive” and thriving, while another minority, Greek-Orthodox this time, in a neighboring country, also mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty, is practically on its deathbed, without the distinguished representative of the USA having spent one single word in his statement, on its dismal fate.

3. International law does not oblige States to recognize migrant communities as “minorities”. There is no “customary international law” to that effect. Members of these communities are fully protected by the general human rights instruments. Legislation and practice of most European countries, as reflected in national laws, declarations or national reports under relevant international instruments, follow the same approach.

4. The use of the term “Albanian minority group” in the distinguished representative’s statement is unfortunate. There is, indeed, a sizable community of Albanian citizens, who reside and work in my country in order to achieve a better future for themselves, their families and the economy of their country. Greece spares no effort to improve the standard of living of all its economic immigrants and has, to that effect, enacted a series of appropriate laws. These immigrants are effectively integrated into Greek society. Marginalization and ghettos have been avoided.

On a more general level, a law was adopted in 2005 (transposing relevant EU directives), which aims at implementing the principle of equal treatment regardless of, inter alia, racial or ethnic origin, reli-

gious or other convictions, and covers a wide variety of fields. Furthermore, it designates or establishes bodies for the promotion of equal treatment.

5. Let me underline that almost two and a half million Greek Macedonians really loathe to be downgraded to the status of a “minority” in a region, Macedonia, they have inhabited for thousands of years. If by the term “Macedonian minority” the distinguished representative implies the existence of a handful of Greek citizens, who wish to identify themselves with the Slav-Macedonians of our northern neighbor, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, then let me inform him that the members of this group are full-fledged citizens of my country, enjoying equal rights, being free and able to express their views, form political parties and associations.

The fact that a small number of persons who live in Northern Greece use, without restrictions, in addition to the Greek language, Slavic oral idioms, confined to family or colloquial use, does not indicate the existence of a minority, since the persons using these idioms have never considered themselves other than Greek and vehemently reject any attempt by some circles to define them as members of a different national, ethnic or linguistic group.

International law does not place upon States the obligation to officially recognize a group of persons as a “minority”, solely on the basis that a small number of their citizens occasionally make use also of other, local idioms.

Finally, in order to place the whole issue in its real perspective, let me add that the above Slav-oriented group of Greek citizens in Macedonia have been freely participating with their own political party in parliamentary elections in Greece, each time showing a downward trend to the already insignificant number of votes they were able to win, covering not more than 0.02% of the electoral vote. It is indicative that the above Slav-oriented group cannot attract the attention even of the people whose interests they claim to promote and protect.

### **Presentation of the Home of Macedonian Culture**

Thank you Mr. Moderator. Today I would like to talk about the use of traditional place names, the rights of minorities to use their first name and surname in their own language and the current policy of the Greek state to prohibit such names.

As a bit of background information, in the period between I World War and II World War, Greece enacted a number of laws which re-

placed all non-Greek names of towns, villages, rivers and mountains with Greek names. These traditional toponymes, which still exist in unofficial use among the population are not been given official recognition by the Greek state. This is in violation of Recommendation number 3 of the High Commissioner's Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities.

Also during the inter-war period, during the 1930s the personal names of the Macedonian speaking population were also forcibly changed. Macedonian personal names were replaced with Greek ones. One of those was the Filipov family whose name was changed to Voskopoulos. In April 2005, Pavlos Voskopoulos, a member of this family, made an application to the local Prefect in his home town to change his surname to his traditional Macedonian family name *Filipov*. According to Greek law, the Prefect has two options when presented with such an application. He or she may approve or reject the application. In doing so, the Prefect may choose to consult with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In this case the Prefect decided to consult with the Ministry. In March of this year, the Ministry issued a written opinion on the matter and suggested that the Prefect reject the application based on the following grounds, and I quote:

*The change of the applicant's surname from a Greek to a "foreign" name should be rejected because to allow such an act might result in confusion as to the nationality of the applicant and thus might result in difficulties in matters and contacts between the applicant and Greek authorities.*

A foreign name? Confusion in nationality? Difficulties in contacts with Greek authorities? I would like to invite the Greek delegation to explain to us all what its Ministry of Internal Affairs means by all of this? Paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen document states that *To belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice.* Therefore the opinion of the Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs seems to be in violation of this paragraph.

Based on the Ministry's advice the Prefect rejected the application of Mr. Voskopoulos. The matter was appealed to the General Secretary of the Region who upheld the decision. Therefore in rejecting the application of Mr. Voskopoulos to use his family's traditional name, Greece has demonstrated that it not fulfilling its OSCE commitments in this field. The practice is a violation of Recommendation 1 of the High Commissioner's Oslo Recommendations and should therefore be ceased immediately. I thank you for your attention.



*Gjorgji Ganzovski, born in the area of Kostur/Kastoria (1924), fighter at the Aegean brigade of the Democratic Army of Greece (1943-1949) and professor at the Faculty of Law.*

**ABECEDAR:  
MACEDONIAN PRIMER FOR AEGEAN  
MACEDONIANS<sup>205</sup>**

Today, only one sample remains of the original edition of the first primer for Macedonian children “Abecedar”, published 83 years ago in Greece. This book is preserved in a special depot at the Macedonian Archives and probably, it is one of the three samples left from the time when the entire edition was destroyed in 1925.

This schoolbook was preserved owing to Vangel Ajanovski – Oche, famous Macedonian revolutionary from Aegean Macedonia, who donated the schoolbook to the Archive about 30 years ago. Ajanovski received the book at the end of the World War II (1945) from a Macedonian teacher from Aegean Macedonia who managed to save it. At the end of the seventies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, he decided to donate his entire personal archives, kept by his family and himself for more than four decades, to the state institution. Ajanovski established the Macedonian Anti-Fascist Organization (MAO) and the Secret Liberation Macedonian Organization (SLMO) in region around Edessa (Voden), during the World War II (1939-1945).

According to our information, the other two samples of the primer remain in the Vienna City Library (Austria) and the National Library in Athens (Greece). Macedonians from Greece used the original sample from Athens to make a copy of the primer that was recently promoted in the capital of Greece.

This primer, intended to educate Macedonian children, is now one the most significant proofs for the presence of Macedonians in Greece, which has been persistently denied by Greek authorities. The book was printed in Athens in 1925 as a result of the request by the League of Nations to provide protection of Macedonian minority in Greece. On August 10, 1920 Greece signed an agreement before the League of Nations for providing civil rights to Greek citizens that are not of Greek ethnic origin. The agreement signed in Sevres, France stipulated that different nationalities live in Greece and that the Greek Government shall provide them the basic national rights.

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<sup>205</sup> These readings were compiled and selected by D. Apasiev from different resources for the requirements of this project.

The story of the primer ended tragically – the entire printed edition was incinerated and destroyed in a staged attack of the train that transported it to the places populated by Macedonians in Greece. Georgi Ajanovski, famous Macedonian journalist, points out that his father Vangel got the primer by chance: “*It had happened in 1944 or 1945, when he met one of the teachers that worked in Macedonian schools. My father told me that the teacher had wanted the primer to be used for education of the youngest Macedonian generations in other parts of Macedonia. Then, there was no such schoolbook that could be used for the children’s education.*” – Ajanovski says. He adds that this sample of the primer was probably saved by people who first approached the fired train where the entire edition was placed.

Today, this sample is well protected. Petar Zajkovski, head of the Archives Protection Department at the State Archives of the Republic of Macedonia, says that the primer is preserved in special conditions: “*The primer is in good state owing to the conditions provided at the Archives. The bookbinding is protected with special paper resistant to external influences*” – Zajkovski says.

This primer, entitled *Abecedar*, was first issued in Athens in 1925 due to the Macedonian ethnic minority recognition in Greece after the World War I. The primer that never actually got to the Macedonian kids in Greece was recently reissued in Thessalonica after 83 years.

The primer from 1925 was written in Aegean Macedonian dialect and printed in Latin alphabet because the Greek authorities wanted to create a difference between Macedonian, Serbian and Bulgarian.

In 1920, the League of Nations initiated numerous agreements that referred to minority protection in different European states. They stipulated the obligations of states to provide civil and political equality of minorities. On August 10, 1920 the Great Powers and Greece signed an Agreement for protection of non-Greek ethnic minorities in Greece. This Agreement was named as the Treaty of Sevres and it guaranteed the right of minorities in Greece the free use of their mother tongue in private and official communication.

The *Abecedar* was promoted in Athens, in Thessalonica and other cities populated by Macedonians. Large and visible police security was present at each of these events in order to prevent possible clash with Greek chauvinist manifestants.

Athanasios Parisi, President of the Greek Committee at the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages stated for the Macedonian daily newspaper *Dnevnik* that the reissue of the *Abecedar* is a genuine proof that Greece failed at denying the existence of Macedonians.

The reissue of the *Abecedar* was supported by European and Greek Bureau for Lesser Used Languages and the “Rainbow” party, established by Macedonians in Greece and member of the European Free Alliance.

The new edition of the primer is comprised of two parts:

1. The first part is an identical copy of the *Abecedar* from 1925 that was targeted at the Macedonian population in North Greece. In that time, the European states from the League of Nations pressured Greece to issue a Macedonian primer. Unfortunately the *Abecedar* never got to Macedonian kids and was confiscated and destroyed by Greek authorities immediately after the printing.

The book comprises the history of the primer from 1925, the opening speeches of the presidents of European Bureau for Lesser Used languages and the Greek Committee of EBLUS, the certificate of gratitude of the Rainbow members to the Greek Government for its contribution to this project. Namely, part of the finances that Rainbow received from the lawsuit at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg that was resolved in favor of Rainbow (for the exposure of the bilingual board in Florina/Lerin in 1995) were used to print this book. The articles in the primer are written in three languages: Greek, Macedonian and English.

2. The second part of this issue contains a modern primer of the contemporary Macedonian language, as it is studied all around the world. The primer has already been distributed in Greece. The promotion is planned to be in November, in Athens, Thessalonica and all larger Greek cities populated by Macedonians.

On behalf of the European Free Alliance, Bernat Joan Mari and the co-director of EFA – Gunther Dauwen, on September 13, 2006 on the press-conference in Florina/Lerin concluded that “...*history is tough burden for the peace life among the people who speak Greek and Macedonian*”. EFA held several official and unofficial meetings with national, regional and local representatives of the Greek Government and with members from Rainbow, party that represents Macedonian minority in Greece.

During the visit to Greece, Macedonia and Bulgaria the delegation was focused on the linguistic rights of Macedonian speaking populations outside the Republic of Macedonia. The delegation realized that issue is sensitive because the meeting with the state official representatives was filled with historical positions and discussions about the number of the Macedonian speaking population.

According to the official Greek representatives, Macedonian language, Macedonians, and Macedonian alphabet do not exist in Greece. The Muslim is the only minority living in Greece. The representatives from Rainbow, the party that represents Macedonians in Greece, were not allowed to participate at this meeting.

The local representatives of the municipalities in the Lerin area, the prefect of Lerin and the MPs from this region accepted to meet with EFA and Rainbow delegations. However, they only copied the directives from Athens and limited their comments to denying of Macedonian existence in Greece.

Berat Joan Mari, Member of the European Parliament and sociolinguist, made the following comment: *“It is unacceptable and counterproductive to deny the existence of Macedonian people and their language. We call upon the Greek authorities to make census and allow all the citizens to freely declare their relationship with their language and culture. After the census, the Government should do as much as possible to meet the linguistic rights of all Greek citizens speaking Macedonian language”*.


Gunther Dauwen, co-director of EFA stated: *“EFA supports Rainbow’s plans to reissue the primer written in Macedonian language and alphabet that the Greek state officially issued in 1925. This official book could help the establishment of a bilingual education in Northern Greek regions, where Macedonian language is spoken.”*

EFA encourages the Greek Government to recognize the real differences and meet minority rights according to the European values.

Mr. Haralambos G. Manesis, Greek Ambassador to the OSCE was the first representative of the Greek state that received a copy of the Macedonian primer during the annual OSCE Conference entitled Human Dimension Implementation meeting that was held in Warsaw. This initiative of EFA – Rainbow, which was welcomed by other delegations, was a reply to recent statements made by the Greek Government that there is no Macedonian primer yet.

In the presence of fifty member-states and numerous non-governmental delegations, the EFA – Rainbow representative, stated the following: *“As members of the Macedonian minority in Greece, we have taken the first step towards recognition of Macedonian language in our country by issuing this primer. Even though we believe that the Greek state should have taken this initiative, which represents standard international practice, we will continue to stimulate the Government to finally introduce Macedonian language in the public education system.”*

The Delegations of EFA Rainbow and the Home of Macedonian Culture pointed out at the working session for ethnic minorities at the OSCE conference that Greece still implements unacceptable politics regarding ethnic and linguistic differences. EFA – Rainbow would like to hope that this symbolic gesture and the reissue of the Macedonian primer will make the Greek state question its politics and at least adopt international democratic experiences about human and minority rights protection.



*New edition of the ABECEDAR from 2006, printed by Rainbow in Thessalonica with the finances received from the Greek Government due to the lawsuit at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (France).*

## THE GREEK CHURCH AND THE NAME DISPUTE<sup>206</sup>

At the end of 2006, when the Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski visited Vatican, one of the topics discussed between the Prime Minister and the Pope Benedict XVI was our name issue and the imprisonment of the defrocked bishop Jovan. The interest of the Holy See about the name issue was surprising. Our name issue is not supposed to be a problem for the good bilateral relations between Skopje and Vatican. But the problem was made by the Greek Church that refers to Vatican and other states and international organizations with letters in order to remind them of the “*name dispute with FYROM*”.

The interference of the Holy Synod of the Greek Church in political issues with our state is old news despite that it writes in its letters, reports and statements that “*the interference of the state authorities in exclusively clerical issues or vice versa, the interference of the church in state political issues is unacceptable*”. However, when the Greek Church estimates that “*their beloved motherland Greece is going through critical national events*” it becomes a fervent defender of national interests.

### Untruths

Since the Republic of Macedonia has been established as an independent country, the Greek Church has actively participated in the state politics that was aimed at forbidding the use of the name Macedonia for the northern neighbor. The Greek Church actively participated in the Greek protests against the Republic of Macedonia from 1992 to 1995. The culminating protest was organized by the Thessalonica Metropolitan Panteleimon on February 15, 1994 due to the alleged recent recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by USA. The protest was filled with nationalistic outflows, and their slogan was “*Let’s get the guns and overtake Skopje!*” The next day the Government of Papan-

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<sup>206</sup> This article was written by Dimitar Ljorovski Vamvakovski – MA at the National History Institute at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. This article, originally entitled “Neighbors that distort Macedonian history” (*Sosedni koji ja izopa-uvaat ist orijat a na Makedonija*) and first published in the weekly magazine *Makedonsko sonce*, No. 657 on February 2, 2007 was used for the requirements for this student project. The selection and redaction was made by D. Apasiev.

dreou imposed an 18-month embargo on the Republic of Macedonia. The nationalistic outburst were due to the wrongly interpreted new situation after the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia by the “*patrons of the holy Greek nation*”, including the Greek Church.

All kinds of untruths were told: that the north neighbor usurps someone else’s names, histories and has territorial claims to North Greece, declares its own (Macedonian) minority in the “most homogenous” state in Europe (Greece) etc. These untruths were necessary to keep the fake myth that was invented by those “patrons” who told them to their people in order to keep the “national ideals”.

The role of the Greek Church in the protests against our country’s name during the 90s is best indicated in the Statement of the Greek Church Holy Synod on June 5, 1992 published on its official web page ([www.ecclesia.com](http://www.ecclesia.com)). At the extraordinary session held on June 02, 1992, the Holy Synod decided to: “...*unanimously send appeal to the whole honored Greek population for national urgency, unison and combativeness*”. In the further text, different theories, viewpoints, historical misinterpretations are suggested to the Greek people, as well as insults to Macedonian nation and state in order to fanaticize Greek citizens to the degree of ethnocentrism and nationalism: “*As we know, our Macedonia used to be victim of barbarian attacks while today it lives under the threat of our insatiable neighbors that want to usurp its name and thus negate its Greek possession. But the Greek affiliation of Macedonia, as familiar, has been indisputably and closely related to the history of Greece for 4000 years and even today. Our neighbors that distort Macedonian history and change the historical truth are new historical designers. But, Greek blood in times of hardship, during the Macedonian history, and the honest Greek sweat in times of peace and well being watered Greek Macedonia for a millennium. On the other hand, for centuries the Greek nation has created great works here which captured its sensitive spirit. The honored philosophical lectures have spread from here in the whole world. In this area, more specifically in Thessalonica, were born the Ss. Cyril and Methdius. Suddenly, a little state from different genus, that was created in the Tito’s atheistic system, uses the general movements in this sensitive region of the Balkans and wants what does not belong to it i.e. the Greek name of Macedonia and so it offsets the Greek dignity and the historical reality. Therefore, as the centuries old famous history is proven, the Greek people know how to fight and strongly and effectively protect its right and the honor of its nation. On the other hand, during the whole history of Greece, the*

*ancient history, the middle ages and the new history pillar of the determining “no” was positioned before all threatening attacks from outside....The church has always been inseparable of the Greek nation and leads the struggles together with it....”*

The only thing we may note from this message of the Greek Church Holy Synod is that it does not speak of clerical issues, such as the spiritual convergence to God and peace and unity among people, regardless of their nationality. Unfortunately, this message resembles to some dark ideologies from the past centuries.

In the following period, the Greek Church continued to lead the same policy for the name dispute with the Republic of Macedonia. The Greek Church Holy Synod and the Metropolitan, especially their Church superior, the archbishop Christodoulos became more aggressive and more nationalistic – oriented in their statements every time they felt like they were losing the battle for the name of our state. For example, regarding the proposal of Matthew Nimitz from 2005, on the double use of our name, Artemis, the Metropolitan from Thessalonica stated: *“If the result from this situation is to the detriment of our motherland, I am sure that the political authorities and the entire nation will be ready to defend their country”*. Furthermore, Metropolitan Artemis states that the reason for his outburst of “patriotism” is due to the Macedonian party, which allegedly wanted to make changes in history and overtake the name, so in the end he concludes: *“We are not aggressive, but we want to make sure that our country enjoys its rights.”*

A year earlier, on November 04, 2004, the day when USA recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name, in the official magazine of the Greek Church Holy Synod entitles *Ecclesia*<sup>207</sup>, the author with initials K.H. noted the following: *“The recognition of the state of Skopje under the name Republic of Macedonia caused great sadness and disturbance of Hellenism everywhere! It had great effect because the Government of the transatlantic super power USA forgot the statement of the US Secretary of State, Stettinius, who stated in 1944 that the technical creation of the Macedonian nation in Tito’s Yugoslavia is actually a movement opposed to the Greek interests and that is why it was condemned by the Greek leadership. Also, this action has important effect because such a powerful country as the USA awards a country that causes disorders on the Balkans. Even though, the state*

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<sup>207</sup> November 2004, no. 10.

*of Skopje is weaker in terms of economy and population, it constantly causes problems to all neighboring countries. It asks the name, the history and culture of Macedonia from Greece and one undignified minority – “Macedonian minority”. With Serbia it is in constant tense relations about church and border problems. With Bulgaria it disagrees over national identity of the Slavic populations. The language and certain national heroes are required by both states. This state is in constant collision with the Ecumenical Patriarchate because it supports a nationalistic schismatic quasi-church and defrocks the canonical metropolitan from Veles, Ionnis (Jovan) that was recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Serbian Church, the Greek Church etc. From the first moment our church reacted to this challenge with the words from our spokesperson of the Holy Synod, Dorotheus II, who emphasized that the original and repeated position remains ‘we will not donate the name Macedonia to anyone’, the state of Skopje should find another name and should try to improve relations with Greece and other orthodox churches in the world. We wish peace on the Balkans and all around the world, but we do not want to delete our national consciousness and cede our historical past and our national dignity to forgers”. Commentary to such a statement is unnecessary!*

### **The “FYROM” Issue**

The recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name by the USA preoccupied the Greek Church Holy Synod. Despite occasional statements and articles by official persons from the Greek Church, it undertook another step. The archbishop from Athens - Christodoulos, realized that the battle for the name Macedonia in USA is de facto lost with the recognition of our country under its constitutional name and then decided to send a letter to EU leaders and European Christian churches to familiarize them with the “FYROM’s name issue”. The Holy Synod of the Greek Church acted rapidly. Only in two weeks after the Macedonian recognition by the USA, on November 17, 2004, it sent the above mentioned letter, which contains numerous “proofs” witnessing that the name Macedonia belongs to Greece and to the Greek nation from historical, geographic and national aspects. The letter states the following:

*“Please allow me to bring to your attention a matter of the utmost importance not only for my country and for Hellenism all around the world but also for the stability and pacification of the tormented region of Southeastern Europe: it is about the name of the state of*

*Skopje. The problem of the naming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter FYROM) became topical again after the recent decision of the Administration of the United States of America to proceed to the recognition of this state under its constitutional name: "Republic of Macedonia". The use of the term "Macedonia" by Skopje is something more than a mere instance of cultural usurpation. This is so because, in our region, the boundaries between culture, on the one hand, and politics and expansionism, on the other, are not always absolutely clear. Besides, the cultural aspect of the so-called Macedonian Issue constantly caused passions to be rekindled, given that the suspicion of territorial claims, which resurface when conditions allow so, always lurks behind it...*

*As regards FYROM, expansionism appears in two facets – Slav and Albanian - and that is why it is considered even more explosive than one tends to think. May I remind you that the population of this country is totally heterogeneous, as it is made up of a dominant Slav element, a significant ethnic Albanian minority and a medley of other ethnic groups. Albanians have an intense national consciousness and claim their descentance from ancient Illyrians. Within this framework, the Slav majority, instead of fostering spirit of unity, which would embrace the entire panorama of the country, proceeded to the construction of a 'Macedonian national consciousness' which has alienated the constituent elements of that state even further. Persistence in the name 'Macedonia' not as a geographical term but with a national significance aggravates the already acute felling of alienation between the numerous racial groups within this country and spreads irredentist ideals, which keep tension in the wider region unabated. That is why we as Greeks consider that the recognition of this neighboring state of Greece under the national designation 'Macedonia' would not render service to any Balkan state, since it heats up the thermometer of tension and suspiciousness in the area....*

*With a deep sense of awareness of the necessity of establishing a climate of stability and peace in the wider area of Southeastern Europe, my country embraced FYROM from the first moment of its inception. Besides, Greece has fervently supported the preservation of the territorial integrity of that vulnerable state, and this is why it encouraged every kind of relation and contact with FYROM to such an extent that today, for instance, the economic partnership between the two countries is regarded by Skopje itself as one of the most important partnerships for its economic survival. However, these excellent relations are*

*overshadowed by the unwillingness of the state and political Slavonian leadership of Skopje to contribute to finding a jointly acceptable name. Even so, the objections and perplexities both of myself and of all Greeks as regards the naming 'Macedonia' are not founded upon emotional exaggerations and uncritical phobias but upon realistic arguments. If the monopoly of the name 'Macedonia' by Skopje were to be established, this would cause immense confusion both in Greece and in other countries at the expense of Greek Macedonians, who are more numerous than Slav Macedonians and who use the term in its geographical sense. Both Greek Macedonians and Hellenism as a whole, we firmly believe that the name 'Macedonia constitute a principal element of our cultural heritage and an integral constituent part of our national personality. This belief is not arbitrary given that consanguinity and identity of language between Macedonians and the rest of the Greeks are confirmed in a crystalline way in the extant works of many and most authoritative classical Greek and Roman authors, particularly the invaluable testimonies of the father of History, Herodotus, while the impressive archaeological findings in Verghina and other areas of Greek Macedonia, such as Aniani, Dion, Sindos, have sealed the Greek origins of Macedonia in the most authentic manner.*

*Establishing the name 'Macedonia' in the newly formed state of FYROM would not only annul any historical truth but would reinforce the process of 'Macedonian-isation' of that part of former Yugoslavia which was known before the war as 'Southern Serbia' or 'Vardarska Banovina'; a process served by revisionist historians of Skopje, who carried out orders from centers outside Skopje for the furtherance of political goals. Collaborating with this arbitrary act would therefore send erroneous messages as to the quality and the kind of the world we are building for the generations to come."*

Such provocative letters by the Greek Church are not taken very seriously and do not interfere with the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and other European countries. The Greek Church does not get a reply to most of its letters to Governments of EU countries or from unknown reasons it does not publish them in its official magazine. So far, as far as replies are concerned, two have been published, one from Estonia and another from Vatican:

a) The Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia – Juhan Parts, sent his letter to the Archbishop of Athens and Greece – Christodopoulos on December 20, 2004, which shows that the letter from the Greek Archbishop did not have any influence over the Government in Tallinn.

*“Republic of Estonia recognized Macedonia at the UN under the name FYROM, and therefore Estonia uses the either the whole name of the acronym or the acronym FYROM when it refers to the abovementioned state in international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE and NATO) while in bilateral relations, we simply use the term ‘Macedonia’”* – says the letter published in the magazine *Ecclesia*<sup>208</sup>.

b) In the letter from Vatican, dated December 23, 2004, signed by cardinal Sodano *“the disturbance from the last decision of the US Government to recognize FYROM under the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’”* is expressed, but further it wishes that both courtiers *“will find one just solution that will contribute to peace between the countries in the entire region”*. We may conclude that as regards the struggle for the name “Macedonia”, the Greek Church will never accept it for our country and it has never stopped waging war for it. In certain periods, its struggle was more intensified i.e. when it believed that Greek national interests were endangered but also in those moments when its influence over the daily life of the Greek people and the creation of the Greek politics was less intense.

We may end by saying that the struggle for the name continues even today, mostly through the defrocked metropolitan Jovan and his Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric. Regarding this, the above mentioned author initialled K.H. wrote the following in *Ecclesia*: *“Obviously, one of the facts that is disturbing for this system is that a canonical clerical order is being established entitled Ohrid Archbishopric, which does not contain the term Macedonia.”*

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<sup>208</sup> January, 2005; no. 1.

## HEXAGON OF CONFLICT SETTLEMENT AND THE GREEK-MACEDONIAN NAME DISPUTE<sup>209</sup>

For politicians it is certain: Europeanization promotes stabilization and conflict settlement! However, the scientific proof of such a context is not really convincing up to now.<sup>210</sup>

In the first part we will elaborate the analytic *Hexagon on conflict settlement* in order to perform empirical verification of this theory.

Our second step will be to use this analytical approach for the Greek – Macedonian name dispute. Our central interest will be how much the related parties handle the existing conflict within the framework of European norms, values, procedures and institutions.

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<sup>209</sup> This article was first issued in the magazine dealing with social and political issues “Political Thoughts” (*Politi~ka misla*) (no. 16, page 67, from December 2006, Skopje), which is published by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Democracy, Solidarity and Civil Society Institute. It was written by the following authors:

a) Heinz-Jürgen Axt, born in 1946. Since 1995, he has been professor of political science, more specifically *European Politics* and *European Integration* at the University of Duisburg – Essen. Since 1998, he has been heading the Jean Monnet Department for European Legislation and he is the vice-president of the German Südosteuropa Gesellschaft. Since 1995, he has been heading the research project “*Conflict settlement through Europeanization - Greece and its Neighbors Macedonia and Turkey*”. He has written many works on European integration, EU enlargement, Greek-Turkish relations, Cyprus membership in EU, European regional and structural cooperation etc.;


b) Oliver Schwarz – Sociology Graduate, born in 1976. He has studied political science, European legislation and psychology at the University of Duisburg – Essen. Since 2004, he has been research assistant of the Institute of Political Science at this University. In 2005 he participated at the research project “*Conflict settlement through Europeanization - Greece and its Neighbors Macedonia and Turkey*”. Currently, he is preparing his Ph.D. dissertation entitled: “*Enlargement as more than an instrument? Towards Europeanization of the Western Balkans*”.

c) Simon Wiegand is a Sociology Graduate, born in 1977. He has studied sociology, political science and geography at the University of Duisburg – Essen. Since 2005, he has been research assistant of the Institute of Political Science at this University. In 2006 he participated at the research project “*Conflict settlement through Europeanization - Greece and its Neighbors Macedonia and Turkey*”. The choice, selection and editing of this article for the requirements of this project were done by Dimitar Apasiev.

<sup>210</sup> Proving this is the aim of the research project: “*Conflict settlement through Europeanization - Greece and its Neighbors Macedonia and Turkey*” (for more detailed information see <http://www.europeanization.de>). Authors would like to thank Volkswagen for its generous support.

### Hexagon of Conflict Settlement

The Hexagon of conflict settlement serves to answer the main question: *to what extent can Europeanization help settle conflicts by peaceful means?* First, we must clarify the meaning of *conflict*, *conflict settlement*, and *Europeanization*.



Picture 1: *Hexagon of Conflict Settlement*

a) We define *conflict* as „... *the clashing of interests (positional differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases...*”<sup>211</sup>

b) The term *conflict settlement* contains all the strategies of conflict handling which try to bring violence to an end and to establish a win-win constellation between the conflict sides. That is why these strategies are outcome oriented and are derived from the logic of the Rational-choice method.<sup>212</sup>

c) Radelli tried to make a definition of the term *Europeanization*, which has often been quoted: “*Europeanization consist of process of*

<sup>211</sup> HIIK, Conflictbarometer 2005. *Crisis, Wars, Coups d’Etat, Negotiations, Mediations, Conflict Settlements* (Heidelberg: 2005); [http://konfliktbarometer.de/en/barometer2005/Conflict Barometer2005.pdf](http://konfliktbarometer.de/en/barometer2005/Conflict%20Barometer2005.pdf) (access: 13 November 2006).

<sup>212</sup> Reimann, Cardula, *Assessing the state-of-the-art in conflict transformation* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005); 8-9; [http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/reimann\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/reimann_handbook.pdf) (access: 17 November 2006).

*a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms - which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies.*"<sup>213</sup>

Therefore, we understand conflict settlement through Europeanization to be the handling of conflicts within the framework of European norms, values, procedures, and institutions. But it is important to distinguish between Europeanization in a more narrow sense and Europeanization more generally. Although the EU creates (and lives by) its own norms and values and incorporates them in the *Acquis Communautaire* for its own use and the use of its institutions, it incorporates norms and values from other organizations, e.g., the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

As mentioned above, we will determine how to settle a conflict through Europeanization by referring to the conceptual framework of the ***Hexagon of Conflict Settlement***. This Hexagon consists of six variables (picture 1). The so called "level of Europeanization" is the *determining variable*. The other five variables are *modifying variables*. The determining variable specifically concerns the probability that this settlement of conflict occurs through Europeanization. The modifying variables may inhibit or induce the process of conflict settlement but the level of Europeanization is crucial for the perspective of the conflict settlement.

The level of Europeanization determines the profoundness of the Europeanization influence on the relevant conflict party. The level of Europeanization may be explained with the A-E index (picture 2).

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<sup>213</sup> Radaelli, Claudio M., „*Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?*“ – *European Integration On-line Papers* 8, No. 16 (2004), 3; <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf> (access: 21 November 2006).

Index	Europeanization	Level
A	Non-existent	/
B	Superficial	Governmental policy
C	/	Political actors
D	/	Media
E	Profound	Civil society

Picture 2: *Level of Europeanization of one conflict party*

To avoid misunderstandings: the level of Europeanization has nothing in common with the grade of readiness of a country to enter the EU (such as meeting the Copenhagen criteria and the like). It only concerns a conflict party's ability and will to settle a conflict by Europeanization. We will clarify this in the following part.

**Level of Europeanization:** The discussion concerning the mechanisms of action in the context of Europeanization reflects the paradigmatic discourse between the realistic and the institutionalistic/constructivistic philosophy in international relations.<sup>214</sup> Hence, Europeanization could be subject to the logic of consequences on the one hand and to the logic of appropriateness on the other.<sup>215</sup> The first results from a cost-benefit calculation, the second is affected by processes of learning and socialization. In addition to these different logics of Europeanization, the level of actors must be defined. According to Diez, Agnantopoulos, and Kaliber, these actor levels are classified as follows:

- *Government policy*, where the contents of policies of particular national governments come to the foreground;
  - *Political actors*, including especially patterns of thought and action of particular national parliaments and relevant pressure groups;
  - *Media*, understood as an indicator for the national discourses;
- and

<sup>214</sup> Axt, Heinz-Jürgen, Antonio Milososki und Oliver Schwarz, „Europäisierung – ein weites Feld. Literaturbericht und Forschungsfragen“ – *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (i. E.).

<sup>215</sup> Schimmelfenning, Frank und Ulrich Sedelmeier, „Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe“ in *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Hrsg. dies. (Ithaca und London: Cornell University Press, 2005); 1-25.

• *Civil society*, recorded through surveys whose contents are common constructions of values and norms and mutual corporative perceptions.<sup>216</sup>

Conflict Party	A	B	C	D	E
A	None	None	None	None	None
B	None	Inconsiderable	Inconsiderable	Inconsiderable	Inconsiderable
C	None	Inconsiderable	Medium	Medium	Medium
D	None	Inconsiderable	Medium	Probable	Probable
E	None	Inconsiderable	Medium	Probable	High

Picture 3: *Level of Conflict Europeanization*

These four levels are understood as dimensions of the profoundness of Europeanization that could be explained by one index from A to E. The basic thesis is: Profound level of Europeanization (index A-E) of both conflict parties *ceteris paribus* maximizes the chances of peaceful conflict settlement.

Regarding the four modifying variables, we make difference between inducing and inhibiting factors.

**Conflict perception:** The first modifying variable describes how conflict parties perceive the conflict item. Obviously, there can be many issues, on which the conflicting parties may adopt different positions. Possible conflict items are e.g. borders, territories, minorities, ethnicities, power, or resources.<sup>217</sup>

We assume that conflict settlement is brought about if both conflict parties agree on the perception of the conflict item. Disagreeing on this point obstructs conflict settlement.

**Conflict intensity:** The intensity of a conflict is also important to conflict settlement. According to Pfetsch's studies, we distinguish between *latent and apparent conflicts, crisis, heavy crisis, and war*<sup>218</sup>. The main difference between these conflict intensities is that the first

<sup>216</sup> Diez, Thomas, Apostolos Agnantopoulos und Aiper Kaliber; „Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society – Introduction“; *South European Society & Politics* 10, Nr. 1 (2005); 1-15.

<sup>217</sup> Axt, Heinz-Jürgen, Antonio Miloshoski und Oliver Schwarz; Conflict – a literature review (Duisburg, 23 Februar 2006); [http://europeanization.de/downloads/conflict\\_review\\_fin.pdf](http://europeanization.de/downloads/conflict_review_fin.pdf) (access: 11 November 2006).

<sup>218</sup> Pfetsch, Frank R.; *Internationale Politik* (Berlin, Köln und Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1994).

two are non-violent while the other two contain a threat of and/or the use of violence.

We can divide conflicts into two main categories: (a) non-violent conflicts, wherein no party uses or threatens violence and conflict, and (b) second category, wherein at least one party uses or threatens violence. We assume that the first category facilitates conflict settlement while the second obstructs it.

	<b>Obstructive effect</b>	<b>Beneficial effect</b>
<b>Perception of conflict</b>	Non-accordance in the perception of conflict	Accordance in the perception of conflict
<b>Intensity of conflict</b>	Threat of violence	No threat of violence
<b>EU actor</b>	Passive role	Active role
<b>External actors</b>	No convincing offers; not complementary to EU	Convincing offers; complementary to EU
<b>Connections</b>	Existent	Non-existent

*Picture 4: Modifying variables*

**EU actor:** This variable researches the active role of the EU actor (trigger function). Diez, Stetter and Albert denoted EU active role as perturbator of conflict and defined numerous influences.<sup>219</sup>

We should mention the possibility of compulsory impact by the EU which directly affects the political elites of the related conflict parties via carrots and sticks strategy. If EU activities in this field are increased then we consider this as beneficial to the conflict settlement. If EU acts passively to the conflict handling, then this may reflect inhibiting on the conflict settlement.

**External actors:** This variable means that in no conflict the EU is the only actor. We also have to bear in mind a number of other regional and international organizations as well as nation states.

Their strategies for settling conflicts are beneficial if they are complementary to the EU's strategy. But if they are not they will obstruct ambitions to settle a conflict through Europeanization.

<sup>219</sup> Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter und Mathias Albert – „*The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts*“. Theorizing the Impact of Integration and Association (Birmingham, January 2004); <http://euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publicationis/files/WP1Conceptual-work.pdf> (access: 2 November 2006).

**Conflict connection:** The last variable deals with the possible connection with new conflicts. If there is close connection with other conflict then this will obstruct the conflict settlement while if there is additional complexity, then this is considered as beneficial to its settlement.

### Greek – Macedonian name dispute

In the following part we will analyze the Greek – Macedonian name dispute by means of the hexagon of conflict settlement. The work was still in progress when we announced the results. Regarding the current condition, we may conduct the arguments analysis, of the way of thinking and acting on the level of governmental policy and political actors. At this moment, there is no complete estimate of the relevant media and opinion polls.

**Conflict perception:** According to Diez, Stetter and Albert, the Greek – Macedonian name dispute may be defined as *conflict of identity*<sup>220</sup>. On 23 January 1991, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia separated from Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and announced its independence.

The Greek focus on identity became clear in the letter of the Greek Foreign Minister Samaras: "...they (*the Macedonians*) obviously intend to dispute the legitimate right of the Greek people to a major part of their cultural identity."<sup>221</sup> For Skopje too, the constitutional name represents the essence of its national identity and it has so far been perceived as non-negotiable. We still agree with the following part of the International Crisis Group conclusion: "...*The most acute identity issue – and the one that if resolved would have most positive impact – is the long-running name dispute with Greece.*"<sup>222</sup>

Therefore, regarding the first modifying variable, the fact that both sides perceive the conflict item in the same way, has beneficial effect over the conflict settlement.

**Conflict intensity:** According to the *Interim Accord* of September 13, 1995, Greece recognized Macedonia as "the former Yugoslav

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>221</sup> Letter that Greece's Foreign Minister Antonias Samaras sent to his EPC counterparts on 17 January 1992 in Greece, *European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question*; Hrsg. Aristotle Tziampiris (Ashgate: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000); p. 209.

<sup>222</sup> ICG; *Macedonia's name: Why the dispute matters and how to resolve it* (Skopje und Brüssel, 10 December 2001); [http://www.crisisweb.org/library/documents/raport\\_archive/A400507\\_10122001-.pdf](http://www.crisisweb.org/library/documents/raport_archive/A400507_10122001-.pdf) (access: 11 November 2006).

Republic of Macedonia” and both parties agreed to establish full diplomatic relations. However, in spite of this, there was no final settlement to the name issue. Therefore, the relations between Macedonia and Greece are distinguished as latent conflict. Latent conflict may be defined as: “A *positional difference over definable values of national meaning is considered to be a latent conflict if respective demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such.*”<sup>223</sup>

Threats of violence or the use of forceful economic measures are no longer instruments of bilateral relations.<sup>224</sup> Diplomatic tensions have additionally heightened due to the Macedonian progress towards the EU. Recently, the Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, emphasized that “...*the Greek Parliament will not ratify the accession of your country in NATO and EU until the resolution of the Greek-Macedonian issue*”<sup>225</sup>

Regardless of this fact, the second modifying variable should state: Since the Greek - Macedonian dispute is structured as non-violent conflict, this has beneficial effect over the conflict settlement.

**EU actor:** Generally, we may identify two essential attempts by the EU at adopting an agreeable final resolution to the Greek – Macedonia name issue. On February 17, 1992 the European Community started an initiative and appointed the Portugal Foreign Minister Pinheiro as representative of the Council for the name dispute resolution. After that, at the meeting of foreign ministers at the European Community, on May 2, 1992, the Panheiro Package was adopted which related the name dispute settlement with adaptations made by both parties.

Also, the mediation efforts of Ambassador O’Neil from the British Presidency that followed may be determined as genuine European attempt for settlement.<sup>226</sup>

However, as part of the Macedonia accession to the EU, so far, the conditionality instrument has not been used. It is true that the aim of

<sup>223</sup> HIK, a.a.O., ii.

<sup>224</sup> Nikas Christos: *The Effects of the Interim Accord on the Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995-2002)*, èçä. Evangelos Kofos und Vlas Vlasidis (Athen: Papazisis Publishers, 2003), 89-123; [http://www.macedonianheritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim\\_Nikas.-pdf](http://www.macedonianheritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Nikas.-pdf) (access: 19 October 2006).

<sup>225</sup> „Interview with Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis“ (United Macedonian Diaspora, 28 October 2006); [http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=150&Itemid=76](http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=150&Itemid=76) (access: 11 November 2006).

<sup>226</sup> O’Neill, Robin; *The Macedonian Question. A Diplomatic Initiative in the 1990’s* (London, 30 January 1998); <http://www.wpct.co.uk/lectures/1997.htm> (access: 26 October 2006).

the *Stabilization and Association Agreement*, made on March 26, 2001 between EU and Macedonia was to improve Macedonian foreign relations with its neighbors. However, relations with Greece are explicitly excluded from this document.<sup>227</sup>

In the past progress reports, EU points out that the dispute must be settled under the auspices of the UN. Therefore, we may only speak conditionally of EU's active role. The influence of the third modifying variable may be determined as obstructive to the process of conflict settlement.

**External actors:** An important external actor in the Greek – Macedonian dispute is the UN. Concurrently with EU attempts for mediation, in New York, the former Foreign Ministers of USA and Great Britain – Vance and Owen negotiated separately with representatives of both states and arrived at a draft-solution on 14 May 1992. This draft solution proposed mutual border recognition, adopting measures to strengthen the trust between both parties, and the name “New Macedonia”.

The next draft-solution was awaited for years. On April 13, 2005, the UN Special Envoy Nimitz announced new draft-proposal. He supported the use of the name “Republika Makedonija – Skopje”. In October the same year, Nimitz suggested another variation, which proposed bilateral solution. According to this proposal, Macedonia may keep the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” but it has to use other name in relations with Greece.<sup>228</sup>

Hence, we may not identify complementary strategy of the external actors and the EU in the conflict settlement. Therefore the influence of the fifth variable over the conflict resolution through Europeanization should be categorized as obstructive!

**Connection with conflicts:** The question of Albanian minority in Greece and Macedonia as well as the future status of Kosovo touch upon the Greek-Macedonian relations.<sup>229</sup> Thus far, the design of ethnic

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<sup>227</sup> Commission of the European Communities; *Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the Other Part* (Brüssel, 26 März 2001); [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fyrom/pdf/saa03\\_01.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fyrom/pdf/saa03_01.pdf) (access: 23 April 2006).

<sup>228</sup> Nimitz *Proposals Concerning the 'Name' issue* (Macedonian Heritage); <http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/OfficialDocuments/Nimitz.html> (access: 23 September 2006).

<sup>229</sup> CG; *Kosovî : Toward Final Status* (Skopje und Brüssel, 24 Januar 2005); [http://www.isg.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161\\_kosovo\\_toward\\_final\\_st?tus.prf](http://www.isg.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_st?tus.prf) (access: 2 November 2006).

“Greater Albania”, which implies uniting Kosovo, West Macedonia, South Montenegro and some border areas of Greece, is not seriously propagated by influential politicians or the Albanian population. Therefore we may not speak of any emphasized connection between conflicts. Consequently, the influence of the sixth variable has beneficial effect over the conflict resolution!

**Level of Europeanization:** Firstly, we will analyze the level of Europeanization of the Greek party. The European orientation, supported by the Greek Prime Minister Simitis regarding Macedonia was continued also by the Karamanlis administration.<sup>230</sup> Greece insists on Macedonian approximation to the EU, which is completely opposite to its politics of a decade ago. However, the possibility of imposing veto on the Macedonian accession in NATO and EU shows that there are great differences between the political actors.

Also, regarding this conflict, media may not be distinguished as especially Europeanized. Here, any cession to Skopje would surely resonate negatively. As to the profoundness of population Europeanization, we may conclude that the public opinion on the name dispute may not be mobilized in the way that it could be in the 90s.<sup>231</sup> In spite of that, the name dispute is still an exceptionally sensitive issue, especially in North Greece. This does not exclude the possibility that Greek politics could switch from engagement to containment politics regarding Macedonia.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, regarding Greece we may speak of superficial level of Europeanization (index A) while in Macedonia, we established predominance of the perception that time works for Skopje?!

It is true that Macedonia is interested to negotiate under the auspices of the United Nations. However, at the same time it points out that keeping the constitutional name is the most important postulate of the Macedonian negotiations strategy.<sup>233</sup> This position is shared by all Macedonian parties.

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<sup>230</sup> Simitis, Costas. *Politiki gia mia dimiourgiki Ellada 1996-2004* (Athen: *Ellinika Grammata*, 2005).

<sup>231</sup> Varvaroussis, Paris. *Analysis of the Greek-Macedonian Relation (From a Greek Perspective)*, in preparation.

<sup>232</sup> Iffantis, Kostas. „Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas: There and Back Again“, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 5, Nr. 3 (2005); [http://www.ekem.gr/archives/2006/01/greeces\\_-turkish.html](http://www.ekem.gr/archives/2006/01/greeces_-turkish.html) (access: 21 October 2006).

<sup>233</sup> *Interview with Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki* (United Macedonian Diaspora, 12 September 2006); [http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=136&Itemid=76](http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=136&Itemid=76) (pri stap: 15 septemvri 2006 godi na); Gruevski, Nikola. „Adress in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia“ (1 September 2006); <http://www.vmro-dpmne.org.mk/englisg/Vesti/vest.asp?id=148> (access: 15 September 2006).

The same applies to the media.<sup>234</sup> Even though it seems that Macedonian population is more interested in the problems of unemployment, poverty and corruption which overshadowed the constitutional name issue, still, resigning the constitutional name may cause great protest.<sup>235</sup> Regarding the level of Europeanization of Macedonian actors, we may establish the level of index A.

### Conclusion

The analysis of the Greek – Macedonian name dispute in the light of the hexagon of conflict settlement produces the following image: three modifying variables may be identified as beneficial to the conflict settlement while the remaining two are obstructive to this process. The consent of both parties in their perception of the conflict subject affects positively. That is why both parties refrain from using violence, threat of violence or forceful economic measures. There are no connections to other conflicts that could be denoted.

What affects negatively is that the EU may not be assigned any active strategic role within this conflict. Furthermore, external actors do not complement their strategies for the conflict settlement. The level of Europeanization of external actors is, of course, crucial. When combined, it results in index B-A level of Europeanization. Therefore, the Greek – Macedonian name dispute currently may not be resolved through Europeanization! Of course, this does not imply that it is impossible to settle the conflict per se.

According to the current image, the most probable conflict settlement would be by bilateral means, with the current scheme of the UN mediation. However, during the Macedonian accession process to the EU there may be change of the framework conditions for Europeanization of the name dispute.<sup>236</sup> It will require change of politics by the Greek, Macedonian and European party.

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<sup>234</sup> Taleski, Dane; *Analysis of the Relations between Macedonia and Greece in the Media in the Republic of Macedonia* – in process of preparation.

<sup>235</sup> UNDP; *Early Warning Report. Macedonia* (Skopje, Juni 2006); [http://www.ewr.org.mk/reports/06%20EWR\\_ANGL2.pdf](http://www.ewr.org.mk/reports/06%20EWR_ANGL2.pdf) (access: 22 october 2006).

<sup>236</sup> Compare Axt, Heinz-Jürgen und Oliver Schwartz: „*Denn nur der Name ist mein Feind*“ – *Alternative Szenarien zur Lösung der griechisch-mazedonischen Namensfrage*“. Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen (i.E.).

## INTERVIEWS

### NEW APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL QUESTION OF MACEDONIANS IN GREECE<sup>237</sup>

- *Mr. Voskopoulos*<sup>238</sup>, until recently Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia feared to tell the world they were Macedonians and that they should enjoy all minority rights, according to international rules and conventions. Now things are progressing in their favor. Do you believe that Macedonian question in Aegean Macedonia, which was a taboo for long, has taken an upturn?

**Voskopoulos:** When it comes to the conduct and freedom of expression of Macedonian identity by the Macedonian minority in Greece, surely things have greatly improved compared to previous decades but the situation is still not as it should be. Namely, we are talking about a limited expression of Macedonian identity through folklore and oral language use. Still, even in these areas expression of identity is limited. This is due to the past but also the current politics of the Greek Government to Macedonian minority in Greece. The aggressive and cruel assimilative and discriminative measures against Macedonians in Greece in the past gave some results. Older Macedonians still live with the memories of Greek gendarmeries, punishments and persecutions due to expression of identity whereas young people are victims of the as-

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<sup>237</sup> This mega-interview with Mr. Pavle Voskopoulos (*in Macedonian*: Pavle Filipov) – member of the Rainbow collective leadership, was published in the weekly newspaper “*Makedonsko sonce*”, no. 602 on January 13, 2006. The interview was conducted by the journalist Zjaklina Mitevaska. The selection and processing were performed by D. Apasiev for the requirements of this project.

<sup>238</sup> Pavle Filipov Voskopoulos was born in Lerin (Florina) on November 25, 1964. He finished primary and secondary school in his birth city, except for one year secondary education in Melbourne, Australia. He graduated at the Faculty of Architecture in Belgrade in 1988. After that, he went back and remained in Lerin. He is a member of the collective leadership of *Rainbow*, Political Party of Macedonian Minority in Greece, member of the European Free Alliance – European Political Party EFA-EPP and of the Federal Union of European Nationalities - FUEN (Rainbow address: Stephanou Dragoumi 11, 53100 Florina / Lerin, Greece; Tel/Fax: ++30/23850 46548; website: [www.florina.org](http://www.florina.org); e-mail: [rainbow@florina.org](mailto:rainbow@florina.org)).

When we were finishing this project (April 2008), Mr. Voskopoulos was hospitalized due to a suspicious brain stroke and his condition was still critical. Some Greek newspapers announced that he was given poisoned drink at his work place?!

simulation politics of the Greek state that insists to Hellenize everything that is not Greek in the modern Hellenic Republic. Of course, there is some upturn, especially in recent years, but only regarding the activities of Macedonian minority and not an initiative by the state authorities. Not only has the state done absolutely nothing in favor of Macedonian minority recognition but also occasionally it openly undertakes discriminating measures against it, such as the judicial proceedings against Rainbow in the previous years.

- *The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg convicted Greece for preventing Rainbow activists from placing an inscription in Macedonian language on the building where their headquarters were located. Was there any effect from this judgement?*

**Voskopoulos:** You can understand the situation of Macedonian minority rights in Greece by facing the fact that, from what I know, this is the only public board used for writing in Macedonian language in Greece. In 1995 four members of the Rainbow leadership were accused of putting a bilingual board in front of the party headquarters in Lerin (Florina). The police executed the warrant by the prosecutor to remove the board. The prosecutor's decision stated that the board was "causing hatred among citizens" and the four members of Rainbow were accused of this action. It was not until 1998 that we were released from these charges and that was only because of the severe reactions by the international institutions and organizations. In order to describe Greek politics better, I will tell you more about the decision for our release in 1998. Namely, the court released us not because we had the right to express our language identity by putting that board but because Rainbow members, as the decision stated, were not smart enough to understand that this act (placing the board) will cause reactions by the population. The decision from 1998 also stated that the Synod of Lerin rightfully had reacted against us, that the mayor had rightfully condemned us and that the citizens had rightfully demonstrated before our office which led to unpleasant incidents (the office was fired)?! I am saying all this just to present the stereotypes but also the principles guiding the Greek state organs in these kinds of conditions, but also those of most of the Greek society. After our acquittal due to, in other words, the "stupidity" of Rainbow members, we placed the board in front of our headquarters and it has remained there. In 1995, when our office was demolished and fired, we filed lawsuits not only against the felons who caused the fire but also against the Synod of Lerin, the mayor and other persons for moral support of the felons. They urged

the people to attack us by making announcements in the newspapers and electronic media. Greek courts did not undertake any initiative, they even threw out the lawsuits. Then we had to appeal at the European Court of Human Rights and after four years, the recent decision was made, which represents moral and political success for our organization.

- *Your delegation attended the recent meeting about Macedonian minority rights that was held at the European Parliament. What happened there?*

**Voskopoulos:** This is not the first time we travel to Brussels, the capital of EU institutions. In the previous years we have persistently used the international factor in our political activities. It was a meeting with relevant persons and Members of the European Parliament but also our chance to lobby at the European Parliament for our current activities. To be more specific, a while ago we filed a petition at the European Parliament Committee on Petitions. The document was filed in cooperation with the Australian Human Rights Commission which has been our good collaborator. The topic was the violation of the European Convention on Human Rights by Greece in the case "*Macedonian political refugees from the Greek Civil War*". The Greek *Repatriation Law* contains racist expressions because it speaks about "Greeks by genus" who are entitled to return. These expressions are against certain articles of the Convention which is also signed by Greece. Recently, we received a positive answer from the President of the Committee on Petitions that our petition was accepted. The next procedure consists of transferring the case in the European Commission which will conduct the investigation. Our goal would be adoption of a resolution at the European Parliament. It is not easy to achieve this because all petitions do not reach such high level, but it is worth trying. If we succeed, of course, this act will have important political meaning. But even the result is different, the fact that this case will be discussed on a high level of a European Institution is significant enough. Also the European Parliament gives us hope that finally the Greek state will adopt different approach and it will bring back Macedonian political refugees, as it did with Greek refugees.

Also, we were talking about organizing an event at the European Parliament in order to emphasize the issue of Macedonian political refugees. The event will include an exhibition of photographs, public discussion, documentary etc. and it will be organized by Rainbow in cooperation with Macedonian refuge organizations from all around the

world and with the support of our European party – the European Free Alliance. We also made different meetings about other activities which we will discuss in due time.

*-It is a fact that things have started to improve for you. Also it is a fact that Greece uses all methods to persist its struggle for negation of everything Macedonian, not only on its territory but also in other areas where the Greek lobby is operating, which is counterproductive and detrimental to the neighboring relations...*

**Voskopoulos:** Things have improved for us at the international scene only because we have the chance to contact international institutions and organizations. On the other hand, the Greek politics to Macedonian minority has not changed at all. The only positive thing is that we feel kind of protected in our political struggle because of the relationships with European institutions. On another occasion I said that our situation is similar to the famous Disney cartoon, with the black cat (Sylvester) chasing the little yellow bird (Tweety). The moment the cat gets ready to eat the bird, the big white dog appears to save the bird. That is our situation. Tweety is the Macedonian minority, Sylvester is the Greek state and the big dog represents the European institutions!

*- For a decade and a half our southern neighbor attacks the millennia old name Macedonia that we are unquestionably entitled to, from every aspect. The efforts to change our name were intensified when they started to give our name to anything theirs...*

**Voskopoulos:** Macedonians in Greece and Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia have the right to carry and use the name Macedonia not because this is a millennia old name but also due to historical and other reasons related to history and tradition. According to the right of self-determination, every person or group has the right to determine its linguistic, cultural, national and other identity. The fact is that after the Balkan Wars, especially after the World War II, Greece started using this name more often in relation to North Greece and Macedonia. An example is the Ministry of North Greece that changed its name in 1982 into Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace. This became obvious after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Macedonian independence. Even the Thessaloniki airport changed the name from Airport “*Mikra*” into Airport “*Macedonia*”. The funny thing is that the road signs in the surroundings of Thessaloniki were changed too so sometimes foreign truck drivers got confused when they read the name Macedonia and they followed the road to the airport while they wanted to drive towards the Republic of Macedonia.

*- History clearly confirms that on a significant part of the Balkans, Macedonian roots appear before Greeks. What is their usurpation of historical facts based upon?*

**Voskopoulos:** I disagree with the approach regarding who came first or did not arrive on this territory and generally with the terminology related to the roots. Such approaches may be potentially dangerous and may lead to intolerant ideologies. It will be a tragedy if Macedonian nationalism becomes a caricature of Greek nationalism! Nations and national ideologies are a contemporary phenomenon in Europe and appeared almost two centuries ago, after the collapse of feudalism and the need for creation of new collectivities due to the changed approach of Europeans towards the production processes in Europe. This phenomenon becomes even more aggressive during the industrial revolution and it results in the establishment of the so called nation states or collectivities. It is true that national ideologies of European populations, especially during the first years when national consciousness was still shaping, were flirting with the past and history as basis for establishment of national unity. Generally, national ideologies were based on the ethnocentric concept (Germany is a typical example) and the civil concept (such as in France) in order to achieve homogenization of the state. This happened on the Balkans when “Balkan nationalisms” were established. Nowadays, we may talk about post-national collectivities. Globalization, technological evolution, science, electronic revolution – all these processes show the new world. Macedonian identity should find its place there and it should overcome the familiar approaches to the “national question”. There is a need for contemporary Macedonian approach that will go even further than the typical civil concept because this concept faced certain problems such as those experienced by the French model which lost the civil concept after the first romantic stage. The Greek persistence to some historical data and argumentations is totally unacceptable nowadays. From a scientific point of view it is even comical and I would call it a politically fossilized concept. History and time may not be stopped according to our free will by making arguments about our national right. These rivers do not stop flowing and only unconfident environments and states may seek famous and old roots for their identity at this point. This is especially relevant for undeveloped and immature societies.

*- For long, Greece has presented itself as the “cradle of democracy” but what happens with minorities living on its territory proves the opposite. Except for some things related to religion, its Constitution does not foresee any minority rights.*

**Voskopoulos:** If I could please ask who called Greece “cradle of civilization”? If this refers to Ancient Greece, this may be argued because on some inconsistencies. It is true that Ancient Greece was governed by democratic system, but it did not apply to everyone. There had been thousands of slaves for which democracy did not apply but this fact is often disregarded and the conditions are often idealized. Imagine, Aristotle, such a philosophical giant, was inclined to slavery. We should observe things from a different perspective, or at least try because that was a different social situation. The principles, habits and people of that time compared to modern Greece have nothing in common. Today, Greece has nothing in common with Ancient Greece! Their only connection is geographical. As to the minorities, Greece is at the bottom of European states as it has been reported by international organizations, such as the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, the Minority Rights Group International and others.

- *Even though this state does not recognize Macedonians and their language, documents show that Macedonian language was reported in a Greek census (the official Greek document from the Census of December 19, 1920, page 182, states linguistic categories and reports on mother tongues – Greek, Spanish, Roma, Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian and Macedonian which was declared by 37 persons). Besides that, the Abecedar is another proof... In spite of this fact, you are still forced to prove things...*

**Voskopoulos:** Yes, that is true. After the World War I (1914-1918), European states became more aware of minorities. The predecessor of the United Nations – the League of Nations was established then. Unfortunately, it did not help much and in a few years, the World War II started (1939-1945). So, in the twenties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there was a census with a questionnaire that contained information about the linguistic variety of the population in Greece. Unfortunately, information about North Greece was never published, but the fact that Macedonian language was stated on the official questionnaire of the Greek state, separately from other Balkan languages, speaks something, right? The same thing happened to the *Abecedar* that never arrived in Northern Greek schools. It was confiscated i.e. seized from the printing house even though Greece was forced to print it by international institutions.

- *You carry out the official struggle for the Macedonian spiritual and national cause by means of the Rainbow political party. How else do you nurture Macedonianess?*

**Voskopoulos:** “Macedonianess”, as you put it, is a questionable term because the question that follows might be how to determine

*macedonianess* in modern times? In any case it should not be nurtured by means of political organizations such as ours. We insist to improve the minority rights for the Macedonian minority, but also for other minorities in Greece. In the end, this is a struggle for more democratic society in Greece. Cultural should be nourished in cultural associations which are mostly active in the folklore domain. Also, I do not quite agree with the use of the term “national cause”, which imposes some limitations. We should think more openly. Any nation may have “national cause” which is obviously opposed to other national causes, right?! And then what? Tension, conflicts, war. Today, we must think differently, because these terminologies are overcome!

- *What will you undertake if Greece continues the discriminatory policy to Macedonian population in Aegean part of Macedonia?*

**Voskopoulos:** We will continue to act in the same manner. At home, we try to convince not only Macedonians, but Greeks also, that improving the position of Macedonian minority and recognition of minority rights of Macedonian and other minorities in Greece will contribute to a further democratization of the Greek society. Internationally, we insist on using all lobbying possibilities to emphasize minorities' position in Greece, including the Macedonian minority.

- *The first congress of Rainbow was held in 2004 without any incidents, despite threats from Greek chauvinists, which was a great success. When do you plan to hold a next congress?*

**Voskopoulos:** I believe that this was the first time after a whole century Macedonian organization to hold congress in Thessaloniki. We chose Thessaloniki because it represents the heart of the Greek nationalism! We used our position as members of the European Free Alliance and we managed to organize the Congress under the protection of 2000 members of the special forces who protected the location from the nationalist groups that protested outside of it. What happened speaks enough about the degree of democracy and tolerance of the modern Greek society. That is the current Greek problem: the political authority reflects on the society and vice versa. We plan to hold the next congress four years after the first one, unless extraordinary circumstances occur.

- *Where would you position the Macedonian government in this neighboring minority problem in Greece, especially the foreign minister?*

**Voskopoulos:** Macedonian organizations in Balkan states should find a way on their own to cooperate with democratic citizens and move-

ments in the countries where they live! This is our motto and the basic principle of our political actions. Neither will Macedonian governments solve the problems of Macedonian minorities in Balkan countries, nor should minorities expect that Macedonia will solve their problems. A continuous struggle is required in order to strengthen the relations with all democrats in the state where they reside as well as the use the international factor i.e. European and global institutions related to minority rights. Maybe this path is tougher and longer and it may seem like sailing across a raging sea but we strongly believe that it leads to real, democratic ports.

## NAME DISPUTE AND MACEDONIAN MINORITY IN GREECE<sup>239</sup>

- *Mr. Ioannou, what is the position of the Macedonian minority in Greece and how does the name dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic reflect on Macedonian minority?*

**Ioannou:** The present name dispute with Greece undoubtedly concerns the Macedonian minority in the Hellenic Republic. Actually, the problem of Macedonian minority in the Hellenic Republic is latently present in the Macedonian name dispute. The resolution of the name dispute is essential to the Macedonian minority in Greece. The acceptance of another name would indirectly mean renouncing the Macedonian minority. It would create chaos in the minority terminology! If the Republic of Macedonia is named “Upper Macedonia” or similar, the minority will be called Upper Macedonian minority or...?!

- *What were the activities of the Greek authorities regarding the Macedonian minority, bearing in mind the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities adopted by the Council of Europe?*

**Ioannou:** When the *Convention for Protection of National Minorities* was adopted by the Council of Europe, the Macedonian minority was recognized de jure. However, since it was not ratified by the Greek Parliament and not implemented de facto, the recognition of the Macedonian minority was prolonged. Rainbow participates at the European parliament and it is member of the European Freedom Alliance and that is how Macedonian language was for the first time used at the European Parliament. Articles 11, 17 and 18 from the Convention are especially interesting because they contain provisions on the use of toponyms, cross-border relations and cooperation between states regarding minority protection.

- *What measures did the Hellenic Republic take to persistently preserve this dispute?*

**Ioannou:** The problems with the Macedonian minority in Greece are problems of the Hellenic Republic and they should be resolved by

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<sup>239</sup> This is an interview with Dimitris Ioannou, member of the youth of Rainbow. From 1991 to 1994, Rainbow was a Non-Governmental Organization, the successor of MA.KI.VE. – Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity. In 1994 it was transformed into a party under the auspices of the Macedonian Party Coalition – Rainbow that existed within the European Parliament. Today, this coalition is called European Free Alliance.

the Hellenic Republic! The economic position of Macedonian minority in Greece has improved which results in hushing the need for basic human rights.

The contents of the Greek position in the dispute refer to the following:

1. The hidden propaganda which dates as far as the Bucharest Agreement on all levels: education, upbringing, workplace pressures, revoking Greek citizenship etc.; elements with similar content may be recognized in the disputes between the Hellenic Republic with Albania and Turkey;

2. The economic power of the Hellenic Republic: a public secret is that the famous publishing house *Larousse* stated in one issue of its globally most eminent encyclopedias a fact about the history of Ancient Macedonians different from what the Hellenic Republic preferred. Greece protested but *Larousse* explained that this solution was in conformity with their publishing policy which avoids biasness and pretends objectivity. Shortly after this event, *Larousse* was bought by a certain purchaser that is believed to be related to the Hellenic Republic. Then, its name was changed into *Larousse-Papirus* and so did their publishing policy?!

3. The economic power and influence of the Hellenic Republic in the Republic of Macedonia: there are indications of subsidizing politics of the Hellenic Republic in the investments in the Republic of Macedonia which results in greater presence of Greek capital in the Republic of Macedonia.





*First congress of Rainbow members – Lerin/Florina, Greece*

### 3

## ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE DISPUTE

### GREEK EMBARGO COMMERCIAL VALUE OF THE NAME



*You should fight for yourselves and your interests. In your struggle you should demand that ethics and principles start functioning in EU. If you can't, don't know or don't want to win this battle, then no one will help you...*

***European politics is a chaos today, it is based on pressure!***  
***Hans Lothar Schteppan – first ambassador of Federal Republic of Germany in the Republic of Macedonia***

## THE COURSE AND MEANING OF THE GREEK EMBARGO AGAINST MACEDONIA<sup>240</sup>

In November 1993, the Greek foreign minister, Mr. Papoulias, wrote to the United Nations secretary general, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, informing him about his new government's attitude toward talks between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece. The following is an extract from the letter:

*"...I would like to point out that the premature recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not preceded by previous overcoming of ethnic problems, led to civil war and brought foreign countries into the crisis. I fear that this example given in Bosnia could be repeated in the case of Skopje. You know very well that two ethnic groups in this region are antagonistic one towards the other, and that there is always a possibility of a worsening of their relations. Skopje emerged as a result of certain geopolitical speculations in the past, ideas that could still destabilize the region... Peace in the region is threatened not only by the name of this new state, but also by a series of actions, resulting from the usurpation of the name Macedonia, and with an aim of creating a new, historically non-existent country, with territorial pretensions as its fundamental policy, especially towards Macedonia, a northern region in Greece... We emphasize that the new government in Skopje adopted and continues with enemy propaganda against Greece ... we call your attention to the fact that the primary goal of the strongest political party in the Skopje Parliament is "uniting Macedonia," i.e. inclusion of neighboring territories in its own ... Mr. Gligorov's Government, with the agreement of his Parliament, accepted a national flag with symbols from the history of Greece. The Greek Government will no longer tolerate the disinformation that the Macedonian Government releases in international circles, because Macedonia has clearly shown that it has no genuine desire for a peaceful solution of the differences, defined by the Security Council. I believe that it is my duty to*

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<sup>240</sup> This is an excerpt from the book *Macedonia and Greece – The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation* by John Shea which was issued in Macedonia by the publishing house "Makavej" in 2002. The selection of topics from this book, which are presented in this project was made by Dimitar Apasiev.

*emphasize again and clearly state that the Greek Government and the Greek people will never recognize a state whose name has Macedonia in it, nor any other words generated from that name.*"<sup>241</sup>

Teodoros Pangalos, Greek deputy foreign minister, said, "We live in a dangerous neighborhood... Their flag is a provocation. Claiming you are descendants of ancient Greeks is very flattering for us, but please find something from your own territory."<sup>242</sup> Pangalos said that if the flag issue were settled the rest would fall into place. "What we ask is not much: they have to abandon the dream of uniting Macedonia under their leadership."

Nearly eighteen months later, in the first interview that the new Greek president, Kostas Stefanopoulos, gave for the TV station Euro-news, he said very similar things: "Greece is not the reason for any kind of problems in the region, but others are creating problems for her."<sup>243</sup> Asked about the Republic of Macedonia, he said that there had been several wars in the twentieth century centered in this area and that Greece is sensitive about the region because so much blood was shed there. He noted that there had also been, in Greek Macedonia, "an autonomist movement, which claimed that Macedonia was a wider region, that it encompassed not only Greek Macedonia, but also today's territory of Skopje, a part of Bulgaria and therefore, a new autonomous state had to be formed, which would engulf that entire region. This is the explanation for the appearance of some kind of nation called Macedonia, "which no historian found until a couple of years ago. He said this began with Tito from 1945, when he formed one of the republics of federal Yugoslavia under the name Macedonia. Stefanopoulos said that "...today Skopje is continuing with this tactic by insisting on the name, which has an expansionist character, and by using symbols which are purely Greek. By using such symbols they confirm their intentions for expansion to "all of Macedonia." In addition, the constitution expresses the obligation of the Skopje state to take care of that so-called Macedonian population. He said that what really concerned him was the claim that a part of that Macedonian population exists in Greece. Skopje continued with propaganda against Greece, and therefore Greece was forced to defend itself. When many other nations recognized the Skopje state

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<sup>241</sup> *Macedonian Information and Liaison Service (MILS) News*, Skopje, Nov. 8, 1993.

<sup>242</sup> *The Financial Times*, London; Dec. 22, 1993.

<sup>243</sup> *Macedonian Information Center (MIC)*, Skopje; May 8, 1995.

under the name Macedonia, “*Greece was forced to impose an embargo in order to turn the world’s attention to the question that is destabilizing the Balkans.*” Stefanopoulos said that Greece was the only Balkan country that made no claims on the territory of Skopje, that wanted it to exist as an independent country, but not with such aggressive dispositions towards Greece.

In the winter of 1993, Greece blocked Macedonia’s petrol supply through the port of Thessaloniki, holding a tanker with enough Macedonian petrol to last three full months. This created political destabilization in Macedonia, which was forced to obtain its petrol supplies from Bulgaria and Turkey. This was but one of many occasions on which Greece had blocked trade with Macedonia. During 1992 and 1993, Greece frequently closed its border to goods being transported from Macedonia to Greece and vice versa, and threatened a full blockade.<sup>244</sup>

Just after Christmas in 1993, at a meeting held in Kozani at the Macedonian-Greek border, the city mayors from northern Greece requested the direct closing of the border with Macedonia, the revoking of the consular representation from Skopje, the cancelling of all sorts of trade and economic concessions given to the Republic of Macedonia, and the full blocking of the Aegean part of Macedonia and Thrace.<sup>245</sup> Soon after this, trade unionists at the Esko refinery in Salonika decided to suspend the delivery of oil to the refinery in Skopje, as a protest against the establishing of diplomatic relations between Macedonia and several European Union countries.<sup>246</sup> These developments suggest that the Greek community had become well informed about the nature of the Greek argument with Macedonia, and agreed with the government position.

Some public statements by Greek leaders suggested they would follow a moderate path. Deputy foreign minister Pangalos told Reuters, “*Greece can survive without the direct settling of the question of the name of the neighboring Republic... We asked them to change the symbol on their flag, the Constitution and to proclaim that the borders are definitive.*” Pangalos said that these are elementary matters that do not require any great sacrifice. He suggested there was no sense in Greece continuing to insist that the name “Macedonia” be excluded from the

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<sup>244</sup> MIC, Skopje; Feb. 16, 1994.

<sup>245</sup> MIC, Skopje; Dec. 30, 1993.

<sup>246</sup> Fabian Schmidt, *RFE/RL report No. 8*; Jan. 13, 1994.

name of the “neighboring Republic.” Greece could live without the direct resolution of the name issue.<sup>247</sup>

The London newspaper the *Economist* speculated that Greece was inching towards a compromise in the dispute with Macedonia because they could not win and had become thoroughly unpopular with their allies. A “*certain bending*” had already taken place, the paper noted, “*since Greece now accepted the title ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,’ under which it had sponsored Macedonia’s admission to the United Nations in 1993.*”<sup>248</sup>

However, on January 24 a majority of the Greek Parliament supported the view that Athens should continue to exert pressure on the Republic of Macedonia in order to safeguard vital national interests. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu demanded that before negotiations on a normalization of bilateral relations could begin, Macedonia must remove what Greece regards as a traditional Hellenic symbol from its flag, amend its constitution to make it unequivocally clear to Athens that no territorial designs were intended, and end “hostile propaganda” directed against Greece. Both Papandreu and Adonis Samaras, leader of the Political Spring party, reiterated the position that Greece would never recognize a state called Macedonia.

Miltiadis Evert, chairman of the conservative New Democracy party, while echoing that demand, warned that if the new state were to collapse Greece could be facing a Greater Albania and a Greater Bulgaria on its northern border. Evert said Macedonia was not only crucial to stability in the southern Balkans but, due to its geostrategic position, may one day hold the key to Greece’s relations with Western Europe.<sup>249</sup>

### **Explanations for the Greek Attitude**

After the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Washington and Skopje in September 1995, special envoy of the United States President Matthew Nimitz gave a press conference at the International Press Center in New York. His response to a journalist from the *Christian Science Monitor* makes an interesting point about the way that other nations have been able to maintain comfortable working relation-

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<sup>247</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Jan. 20, 1994.

<sup>248</sup> *The Economist*, London; Jan. 29, 1994.

<sup>249</sup> Kjell Engelbrekt, *RFE/RL report*, No. 16; Jan. 25, 1994.

ships despite having disagreements of a similar nature to that between Greece and Macedonia.<sup>250</sup> He noted that the Irish do not accept the name “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” and that the British do not accept the Irish-language name “Eire,” which refers to all of Ireland including the North. Each country has stood by its own usage since the 1920s, yet the countries are able to cooperate without formal agreement on names.

Analysts Ianasz Bugajski and David Augustyn argued that the Greek government could reap domestic political advantage from nationalistic fervor. “*The real reason, they said, for the Greek attitude toward Macedonia was the strategic advantage that this antagonism gave Greece and its major ally, rump Yugoslavia.*”<sup>251</sup> They said that Greece, on the threshold of a more crucial role in the Balkans as a strong local power, could become either a pillar of stability or an agent of escalating strife in the area. They concluded, early in 1994, that Greece was taking the latter course. Instead of drawing the “*fragile and non threatening*” Macedonians into a close alliance, the conservative Mitsotakis government had provoked nationalist feeling by aggravating fears over alleged “Macedonian expansionism.” In turn this stimulated nationalist feelings and ethnic divisions in Macedonia itself. The Mitsotakis government had been pushed in this direction after Adonis Samaras was dismissed as foreign minister in April 1992. Samaras had taken a very hard line with virtually no possibility of compromise. After he was sacked, he left the ruling New Democracy (ND) party and established an extremist rival faction, Political Spring. Political Spring gained support by taking advantage of nationalist feeling, so the government needed to appear tougher with Macedonia. When the government lost its majority in Parliament after two ND deputies defected to the Samaras party in September 1993, it was forced to resign. With Greek nationalism determining foreign policy, Athens was in no position to moderate its stance. Nationalism gained ground as a result of these events, “manipulated by ambitious politicians from across the political spectrum who may seek to distract attention from more immediate economic problems.”

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<sup>250</sup> *Pub*, Skopje; Sept. 22, 1995.

<sup>251</sup> Ianasz Bugajski and David Augustyn, „*Greek Nationalism Gains Ground*“, *Greece: New Power in the Balkans*, in *The World* 6-1 (Washington DC: *Washington Times*, Jan. 1994).

Bugajski and Augustyn noted that Macedonia explicitly renounced any territorial pretensions to northern Greece and in any case was not in any position to threaten Greece. Despite this move, Athens continued to insist that the new country change its name, claiming, “contrary to the historical record” that the name Macedonia had an exclusively Hellenic heritage. Bugajski and Augustyn concluded that “such spurious justifications have led to suspicions that the name issue is merely a smoke screen for strengthening the Belgrade–Athens axis and repressing demands for the recognition of the sizable Slav minority in Greece itself.

The Greek dispute with Macedonia suited Belgrade since it kept Skopje off balance and encouraged suspicions that Athens wanted to take a part of the country for itself. While cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia had been limited in the early Cold War years because of Yugoslav assistance for Communist forces during the Greek civil war in the 1940s and Belgrade’s support of a distinct Macedonian nationality, things improved after Tito’s death in 1980 and the success of the Panhellenic Social Movement (PASOK) government. Relations improved so much that during the war in Croatia and Bosnia, Greece, while nominally adhering to the United Nations-imposed sanctions, maintained cordial and often supportive relations with Belgrade.

William Dunn, another American analyst, also took the view that Greek policies toward Macedonia were understandable in light of the politics of cultural purity which dominated the country.<sup>252</sup> He said the three major Greek parties were driven by policies based on a myth of continuity with classical antiquity and a notion of exclusive entitlement to symbols, conquerors, kingdoms, and territories of the ancient world. Dunn pointed out that while it was true that ancient Greece was the cradle of Western democratic civilization, it was equally true that Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander the Great, did not consider themselves Greeks, that Alexander conquered Athens, and that today’s Macedonia was never a part of Greece. Dunn also noted that Greece did not refer to any part of its current territory as Macedonia until 1988, when Papandreou’s government officially adopted the name Macedonia to replace that of Northern Greece. This point added weight to the notion that the dispute with Macedonia was a manufactured one.

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<sup>252</sup> William N. Dunn, „*Macedonia: Europe’s Finger in the Dike*“, *The Christian Science Monitor*; May 9, 1994; p. 19.

The grip of nationalist fervor seemed to reach out widely in Greece. A research study financed by the European Union, and published late in 1994 in the daily Greek newspaper *Avgi*, concluded that most Greeks were xenophobes, racists and anti-Semites. According to the study, Greeks expressed the most aversion to Turks, then Albanians, Jews and Gypsies. Sixty-two percent of Greeks did not like the Greek Muslims of Turkish origin who lived in Thrace, and 52 percent wanted them to go back to Turkey. Sixty-six percent of Greeks in this study said that they would never marry a Muslim, while 64 percent said the same for the Gypsies. Eighty-four percent of Greeks disapproved of having foreign workers (mostly Albanian) in Greece, and 90 percent of them believed that these workers took jobs from Greeks.<sup>253</sup>

Some American analysts believed that the Greeks were concerned about the influence Skopje might have on Macedonians living in northern Greece, encouraging their political aspirations and human rights demands.<sup>254</sup>

According to Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, much of the Greek concern in the dispute centered on the possibility of land claims by Slav Macedonians who left Greece, or were expelled, in the Greek civil war. Thousands of exiles would like to reclaim their land and homes, which they had to abandon. Some houses were torn down, others confiscated. Gligorov said, "*This has weight in Greece because of the enormous number of people who left or were expelled, who are not able to receive their property or compensation.*"<sup>255</sup>

In an earlier speech before the French Institute for International Relations on the subject "Macedonia and the New Europe" at the end of October 1993, President Gligorov said that a people's right to a name is a natural and an inalienable one. He said the Macedonian people had a Slavic origin. They had their own authentic culture, language and history. It was on this territory that the first Slavic letters and literature were born, and it was also here that the Slavs were converted to Christianity for the first time in history, he said. That is why "*we do not have to identify ourselves with the culture and civilization of other peoples, nor with their contemporary achievements.*" He said it was of great interest for Macedonia to overcome the dispute with Greece, and that is

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<sup>253</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Dec. 12, 1994.

<sup>254</sup> *Strategic Forum*, No. 9 (Oct. 1994).

<sup>255</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Dec. 30, 1993.

why Macedonia agreed to direct talks with Greece in the United Nations. Gligorov observed that Macedonia is the road to Europe for the Greeks, and Greece is Macedonia's exit to the sea. Greece is also a member of the European Community. Gligorov expressed the hope that realism would shape the talks with the new Greek government.<sup>256</sup>

Gligorov said he thought a realization that an independent Macedonia had advantages for Greece would spread more widely, adding, "*We have much more reason to cooperate fully, as good neighbors, than to create a new region of anxiety in the Balkans. With the independence of our country, Greece's security perimeter is extended to over 200 km to the north.*" He said that "no force" could now deprive Macedonia of its hard-won independence and that the Republic of Macedonia is a constitutional reality.<sup>257</sup>

The willingness of Macedonia to participate in discussion on the dispute is indicated in comments by foreign minister Stevo Crvenkovski. For instance, in an interview given to the Belgian newspaper *Free Belgium*, Crvenkovski noted that the future of talks was uncertain only because there had been no response from the Greek side. He stated that the new Greek position was unclear, and that continuation of the dialogue was the only possible way to solve the conflict. "*We are neighbors and have to go on living together. The dispute over the name is irrational, because up to 1988 the north of Greece was called Northern Greece, and not Macedonia, as it is now. The Macedonian Constitution clearly states that we have no territorial pretensions. We have insisted on talks since the very beginning, because it is the only way out of the situation.*"<sup>258</sup>

The previous round of talks involving Macedonia and Greece had ended in June 1993 with no agreement on the central issues. It is possible that the Macedonians felt constrained in their negotiations by the fact that a two-thirds majority in Parliament is needed to change either flag or constitution, and following the 1992 elections, VMRO, Macedonia's most strongly nationalist party, which even today remains adamantly opposed to any compromise, had enough deputies and parliamentary allies to prevent any change.

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<sup>256</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 16, 1994.

<sup>257</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Dec. 30, 1993.

<sup>258</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Nov. 8, 1993.

### The Embargo Begins

On February 16, 1994, after a specially convened session of the Greek government, the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou announced that Greece was canceling all trade links with Macedonia and was closing its consulate in Skopje. Mr. Papandreou stated that “*Greece is forced to take this step due to the consistent adamant stance of Skopje.*” Analysts in Macedonia believed that this Greek step was synchronized with a visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Belgrade.<sup>259</sup>

The trade blockade of Macedonia seems to have been applied in response to the American offer of diplomatic recognition of Macedonia. One week after the United States recognized the country under the name “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” and one day before the announcement of the embargo, tens of thousands of protesters filled the streets of Thessaloniki, waving banners proclaiming, ‘Macedonia is Greek,’ along with Greek flags and stars of Vergina (the same symbol that was on the Macedonian flag).<sup>260</sup>

The prominent Greek newspaper *Katimerini* described “*great anti-American demonstrations*” in the streets of Thessaloniki on the afternoon of February 15, “*exactly three years since the great rally at the Aristotle Square in Athens, now called Agea Sofia.*” The protest was organized by the church, but explicitly supported by the nationalist right-wing party Political Spring, as well as by PASOK and New Democracy. Thessaloniki metropolitan Panteleimon led the 20,000 demonstrators, mostly students (there was no school that afternoon), who rallied in front of the United States General Consulate. Alongside the familiar signs reading, “*Macedonia is Greek,*” there were others showing the words “*Axes and fire for the Skopje dogs.*” The door of the consulate was not opened, though “*the angry metropolitan constantly banged at the door ... with his scepter.*”<sup>261</sup>

President Clinton of the United States was denounced as a traitor, and protesters attacked the United States consulate with eggs, coins and other objects. The metropolitan Panteleimon II read a letter of protest addressed to President Clinton. The Greek government later stated that any expression of feelings by citizens is their personal matter, pro-

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<sup>259</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 16, 1994.

<sup>260</sup> Lou Panov, „*Greece Shuts Door on Trade, Travel to Punish Macedonia*“, *Macedonian Tribune*; March 1994.

<sup>261</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 16, 1994.

vided it is within constitutional limits. Government ministers were also present at the protest, in a private capacity. The Greek Communist party criticized the protest for spreading nationalism.<sup>262</sup>

In an interview published in *Balkan News* on February 20, Greek deputy foreign minister Teodoros Pangalos, while not backing down from Greek demands, made apologies for the government's behavior. Among other things, he said that the government should stop letting the issue dominate its concerns, instead placing it "*within the context of the country's wider Balkan policies, which in turn should be put in the context of our global policies... We have an underdeveloped approach to international relations, proved by the fact that we have let the FYROM issue dominate public opinion, replacing all other issues of concern... Greece has suffered a fall in international esteem over the issue... We could not convince people abroad, as our position was not strong enough, and we ended up giving the impression that we were ultra-nationalists and fanatics... We have to look at the whole issue again, see what is actually the truth of the matter, not have false hopes, not be demagogic, and not fool around.*"

In Strasbourg, however, about two weeks later, Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias stated that "*the Greek embargo against the neighboring country has been implemented due to its aggressiveness and uncompromising stance. It is a political measure of self-defense. Our vital interests were endangered by the uncompromising attitude of Skopje and its refusal to give up its imperialistic demands!*"<sup>263</sup> Papoulias stressed that his government would resist international pressure aimed at having Greece lift the embargo and emphasized that Macedonia had to make concessions, which include changing its name, before Athens would be willing to negotiate.

A month after this, Prime Minister Papandreou, in a statement for the *New York Times*, stressed that his country had been forced into such action because Greece's national security was endangered. He said "*this is a real threat to our national security, because Skopje's aim is to gain an exit to the Aegean Sea. We closed the border after 6 EU countries recognized Skopje... We had to remind the world there is a problem concerning stability and security in the region.*"<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Feb. 16, 1994.

<sup>263</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; March 10, 1994.

<sup>264</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; April 8, 1994.

### Macedonian Responses

A week after the Greek embargo was announced, Mr. Gligorov wrote to the Greek prime minister offering explicit assurances concerning Macedonia's borders, and inviting dialogue over all issues in the dispute between the two states. He stated that Macedonia was ready to *"sign an agreement ... which would guarantee the permanency of the borders between the two countries."* Though he warned that continuation of the embargo would *"create unwanted consequences regarding peace and stability in this part of the Balkans, which unavoidably leads to the need for us to address the Security Council,"* he added that he was *"deeply convinced that, taking into account the seriousness of these questions and the responsibility we carry, a quick resolution will be found, on a principled and lasting basis, and in the interest of the two countries and peoples."*<sup>265</sup>

After the imposition of the embargo, Macedonian premier Branko Crvenkovski said, *"Greece is responsible for every deterioration in relations between the two countries. The Greek government wants to exert economic and political pressure. The one-sided and unacceptable measures from Greece are very worrying."*<sup>266</sup>

Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski said his government was not prepared to enter direct talks while being threatened in this manner.<sup>267</sup>

On February 28, Kiro Gligorov said the Greek blockade was having *"very serious effects"* on Macedonia's economy, in particular its energy supply. He asked the European Union to pressure Greece to stop *'an act unknown except in war.'* Gligorov said, *"I believe that the ancient Macedonians were a special ethnic entity, which does not necessarily mean they were Greek. As to the Greek historical heritage, we do not wish to steal it. We settled this region in the 6th and 7th centuries A.D. Unlike other tribes, we took the name of the territory we settled, Macedonia, and that does not mean we have any pretensions to the history of ancient Macedonia. We have our own history and our own heritage."*<sup>268</sup>

Speaking to the New York-based (nongovernment) Council for International Relations, a group comprised mainly of leading journal-

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<sup>265</sup> MIC, Skopje; Feb. 24, 1994.

<sup>266</sup> Panov, „Greece Shuts Door“, *Macedonian Tribune*; March, 1994.

<sup>267</sup> Kjell Engelbrekt, *RFE/RL report, No. 37*; Feb. 23, 1994.

<sup>268</sup> *Macedonian Tribune*; April, 1994.

ists in the field of foreign politics, Gligorov said it was good that Prime Minister Papandreou would be meeting with United States president Clinton soon. He said the United States had kept a balanced position regarding this question and was showing interest in maintaining peace and security in the Balkans. He expressed the hope that the same position would be presented in these talks. He said American efforts to help find a just solution for both sides were important in encouraging an emphasis on good will by both sides, rather than the use of embargoes and threats, "*because reasonable people sit down and talk.*" Concerning the Greek reservations over part of the Macedonian constitution, Gligorov said that "*before the Badinter Commission came out in favor of the recognition of Macedonia, we changed the Constitution and put it in writing that we have no territorial pretensions and that we will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.*" He noted that in Article 108 of its constitution, Greece also had maintained that the Greek state would take care of all Hellenes, regardless of where they lived in the world, though they had criticized such an item in the Macedonian constitution. President Gligorov added, "*Besides this, we proposed an agreement to Greece for a permanent settlement in regard to the border, that would be guaranteed by the EU and the UN.*"<sup>269</sup>

Shortly after this very diplomatic statement, Gligorov was quoted as saying rather tougher things about the dispute with the Greeks. In an interview for the Dutch newspaper *Algemein Dagblad*, he said Macedonia would not accept any of the conditions set by the Greek side, and accused the Greek leaders of nationalism. He also said that Macedonia would now agree to negotiate only on an agreement securing integrity of its borders, and that Greek demands to change the name would never be accepted. He explained the Greece antagonism as related to the fact that Greece denies the existence of the Macedonian minority that lives in its territory. As for the Vergina Star flag symbol, Mr. Gligorov pointed out it that can be seen in many Macedonian churches.<sup>270</sup>

Macedonian Prime Minister Crvenkovski said, "*We cannot establish a dialogue on an equal basis with Greece as long as a rope is tied around our neck.*"<sup>271</sup>

In an address to the Economic Forum in Switzerland, Mr. Crvenkovski urged "*more energetic steps by the international community,*"

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<sup>269</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; April 15, 1994.

<sup>270</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; April 21, 1994.

<sup>271</sup> Jolyon Naegele, *Voice of America*, No. 516 799; April 27, 1994.

adding that the most serious blow to the Macedonian economy “*is given by a country member of the EU, at a time when it presides over the Union. The losses to the Macedonian economy due to the Greek embargo in just the first month reached 60 million dollars, with an additional 40 million every month after that. The result is a suddenly worsened economic situation and 25,000 people out of work.*” Stressing that Macedonia is inferior to Greece in its territory, population and economy, Crvenkovski said it seemed amusing “*to repeat that Macedonia does not intend to conquer Greece.*” He went on to warn that a “*coordinated Serbian-Greek political strategy towards Macedonia*” could lead to a Balkan war and to urge the European Union to “*take timely action.*”<sup>272</sup>

A number of Macedonian politicians were interviewed by Macedonian Radio after announcement of the European Union decision to take Greece to Court for its embargo.<sup>273</sup>

Dosta Dimovska, vice-president of VMRO-DPMNE, said, “*The European Commission’s decision is first of all a moral and political condemnation, but it is also controversial, because, besides condemning Greece, it requests that Macedonia make retreats on exactly those issues that led to the introduction of the embargo. This party considers the demands for changes in the constitution and flag unacceptable.*”

Blagoja Handziski, a leading figure in SDSM, said, “*We are ready to negotiate. The controversial issues can be resolved under UN mediation, but it is absolutely unacceptable to go into negotiations while the embargo is in effect. Our readiness to negotiate does not mean all Greek proposals are acceptable for us, especially not the one suggesting Macedonia should change its name.*”

Petar Gosev, leader of the Democratic Party, said, “*The decision appears to be positive, but we should pause before we get too excited about the solution. This is a hesitant decision, and the part justifying the Greek demands is very concerning, as it implies we should give up the name, flag and parts of the constitution. I personally expect Macedonian diplomacy will face a hard battle.*”

President Gligorov held talks in Geneva in November 1994 with UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali and mediator Cyrus Vance. Public announcements explained that no progress was made at the talks.

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<sup>272</sup> MILS News, Skopje; June 20, 1994.

<sup>273</sup> MILS News, Skopje; April 8, 1994.

However, for the first time in an official statement, Gligorov mentioned “*the right of our people to promote its constitutional name at an international level and thus resolve the matter.*” He said, “*Everything else is negotiable.*” This is of some interest because the United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 specifies negotiations on the name.<sup>274</sup> At about the same time, American analysts were saying that “*Skopje is unlikely to drop the word Macedonia from its country’s name.*”

It was suggested that after the 1994 elections, President Gligorov might agree to a name change like the “Republic of Macedonia, Skopje” or “Vardar Macedonia,” but not the removal of the name “Macedonia.” It was suggested he might also agree to modify the flag, since that seemed to be a lesser issue.<sup>275</sup>

Three months later, in an interview for the newspaper Figaro, Gligorov said that it was “*the right moment for France, as chairman of the EU, to put forward an initiative to settle the Macedonian-Greek dispute.*” He reiterated that his government was ready to compromise over all other questions, if Athens accepted the name Republic of Macedonia.<sup>276</sup>

### European Responses

The European nations were already irritated with Greece before the embargo against Macedonia. Criticizing the statement by deputy foreign minister Pangalos that Germany, one of the European Union’s most powerful member states, was “*a bestial giant with a child’s brain,*” the Financial Times had suggested that a Greek presidency of the European Union was “*widely seen as a loose cannon on the deck of a European ship.*” Greece was seen as obstinate in its opposition to Macedonia, and suspicious because of its close ties with Serbia. However, these factors only partly explained European irritation with Greece. Having also blocked aid to Turkey, Greece had hampered the European Union effort to put into effect a more coherent Mediterranean policy, important now because of Turkey’s new role on the borders of former states of the USSR in central Asia.

In a widely reported statement revealing Greek animosity towards the Turks, Pangalos had described the Turkish government as ‘*muggers*’ who were “*dragging bloody boots across the carpets of Europe.*”<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Nov. 9, 1994.

<sup>275</sup> *Strategic Forum*, No. 9; Oct. 1994.

<sup>276</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Jan. 31, 1995.

A common assessment of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis' repeated demand that the European Union oppose recognition of Macedonia was that it lost Greece much European sympathy. Six European Union states showed their attitudes by opening diplomatic relations with Macedonia by the end of 1993. The name issue was by then seen as a lost cause. It had caused bad feeling among Greece's European partners and prevented Greece from being a force for stability in the Balkans.

Some Greeks shared this analysis. Robert Marquand, writing in the *Christian Science Monitor*, cited examples.<sup>278</sup> One Greek diplomatic source said, "*We were once the English of the Balkans, but we have wasted our positive role on Macedonia, whose actual threat to us isn't just a shadow, but a shadow of a shadow.*" Marquand concluded that the explanation for the Greek intransigence was the state of domestic politics.

A young Athens lawyer acknowledged that the name issue was absurd, but pointed out that no one could say this publicly because it had become a test of patriotism. An Athens correspondent made the point that for Greeks, "*some issues are more important than truth.*"

Just days after Greece announced its economic blockade of Macedonia, six of Greece's partners in the European Union — Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Germany and Denmark — requested that Athens bring the blockade to an immediate end. The new European Union president, Jacques Delor, sent an official note to the Greek prime minister stressing the Union's concern and the seriousness with which the European Commission was examining the latest Greek measures. The Union wished to determine whether grounds existed for bringing legal charges against Greece at the European Court in Luxembourg. The prime minister was asked for a justification of his position. In response to this request, the Greek minister of law and order, Stelios Papatemelis, stated that the blockade would remain in power until Macedonia gave in to the Greek demands.<sup>279</sup>

The commissioner for foreign policy of the European Union, Hans Van den Broek, had a series of meetings in Skopje and Athens concerning the embargo. Calling the situation "*very difficult and very ur-*

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<sup>277</sup> *The Financial Times*, London; Dec. 22, 1993.

<sup>278</sup> Robert Marquand, „*Gree'-r Wants to Be European*“, *The Christian Science Monitor*; Feb. 9, 1994.

<sup>279</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 21, 1994.

gent,” he said that Greece should lift the embargo so that the negotiations between the two states could go on.<sup>280</sup> He concluded that the border is closed not only for Macedonian oil, but also for humanitarian aid.

On February 28, European Union parliamentarians told Greece that its action could lead to more fighting in the Balkans. The assembly’s presidential committee backed Union attempts to mediate in the crisis and welcomed Italian, Albanian and Bulgarian efforts to help Macedonia economically.<sup>281</sup>

The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly on March 1 criticized Greece for imposing the economic blockade on the Republic of Macedonia. In a strongly worded statement, the assembly said that the embargo could have “*a destabilizing effect in a region particularly vulnerable at this time.*”<sup>282</sup>

British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd traveled to Athens a few days later with a stern message from Greece’s eleven European Union partners. “*We understand the anxieties and concerns of Greece ... They do not, in our opinion, justify the Greek measures which harm the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in our view are illegal and certainly harm the reputation and the authority of Greece,*” Mr. Hurd said.<sup>283</sup>

On April 6, Hans Van den Broek announced that the European Commission had decided to take Greece to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg over the embargo against Macedonia. The commission appealed to Macedonia to review its position over the controversial issues, but the arguments of Greece, based on Article 224 of the Maastricht Agreement, were dismissed by the commission. The commission determined that Greece was threatened neither by war nor by destabilization, hence the measures it was undertaking against Macedonia could not be justified.<sup>284</sup>

Greece threatened that it might walk out of the European Union if the European Court endangered the Greek national interests. Deputy Foreign Minister Pangalos, speaking at the Congress of the ruling socialist party, PASOK, said that “*if the European Court brings a deci-*

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<sup>280</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 28, 1994.

<sup>281</sup> *Macedonian Tribune*; April, 1994.

<sup>282</sup> *RFL/RE report No. 42*; March 2, 1994.

<sup>283</sup> William D. Montalbano, *Los Angeles Times*; March 4, 1994.

<sup>284</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; April 7, 1994.

sion which could bring the Greek nation to the brink of disintegration, we would prefer to walk alone.”<sup>285</sup>

The European Union opposition continued throughout the time of the embargo. In the summer of 1995, French president Jacques Chirac, using his position as host of the half-year European Union summit, said Greece was alone in its refusal to lift the embargo on Macedonia, and opposed the opinions of 14 other members. “*Fourteen countries have approved my stance,*” he said, but “*we did not manage to convince the Greeks to lift the embargo.*”<sup>286</sup> Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou characterized the proposal of the French president to lift the embargo as a provocation directed against him personally, as well as Greece.<sup>287</sup>

The European Commission initiated proceedings on April 22, 1994. An interim judgment ordering the lifting of the embargo was not granted, since the court decided that the injury suffered by the FYROM could not be taken into consideration because the commission’s responsibility is the protection of the community’s interests, not those of a third country. However, the court considered that the unilateral measures taken by Greece were in contradiction with community rules on the free movement of goods and the common competition policy. The court continued to consider the issue of the legality of Greece’s actions.<sup>288</sup>

Accusing Commissioner Van den Broek of using “*immoral methods*” in bringing the European Union court action, Teodoros Pangalos demanded that he resign, although Van den Broek was immediately supported by the rest of the 17-member commission.<sup>289</sup>

At the end of June 1994, in an emergency debate, the parliamentary assembly of the European Council in Strasbourg (a pan-European organization responsible for promoting human rights) discussed the Greek embargo on Macedonia. Except for the Greek speakers, almost all of the 28 deputies who took the stand, both liberal and conservative, denounced the blockade.

The discussion itself began with the introduction by Briton David Atkinson, who presented a short summary of the embargo, reminding

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<sup>285</sup> MIC, Skopje; April 18, 1994.

<sup>286</sup> MIC, Skopje; June 29, 1995.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> *Agence Europe*, Luxembourg; June 29, 1994.

<sup>289</sup> Christopher Lockwood, „*EC Banks Off as Macedonia Feels Squeeze*“, *The Sunday Telegraph*, London; July 3, 1994.

the Parliament that in spite of the amendments that Macedonia had made to its constitution, Greece was still not backing down from its position, which placed it in violation of European Union rules. He said, "*The young Macedonian Republic is seized in a vice between Serbia and Greece. This can only spark internal tensions. In addition, various incidents make us fear that Macedonia could in future become the target of Serbian territorial ambitions.*" At the conclusion of his comments he proposed that the next meeting of the Commission of the European Council be held not in Thessaloniki, as planned, but in Macedonia, providing Greece had not lifted the embargo by that time.

British liberal-democrat Russel Johnston said Macedonia's military capacity was nil (a sentiment echoed by many of the speakers) and added: "*People mustn't give an exaggerated importance to symbols.*"

Jean Seitlinger of France's center-right Union for French Democracy (UDF) called on the European Union to punish Greece for misconduct. He asserted that the Greek embargo was in violation of Article 113 of the agreement from Rome, and that therefore Greece violated the sovereignty of the European Union in an economic plan.

In his address, the deputy in the Macedonian Parliament, Lambe Arnaudov, explained Macedonia's difficult economic position caused by the Greek embargo.

The representative from Finland reminded the Parliament that Macedonia, as a special guest at the Council of Europe, fulfilled all conditions for admission to this organization.

Danish liberal Hanne Severisen accused Greek politicians of "*throwing oil on the fire for domestic political reasons.*"<sup>290</sup>

Mr. Demirel from Turkey emphasized that Macedonia deserved to become a full member of the international community, while Mr. Panov from Bulgaria noted that regardless of some misunderstandings, Bulgaria was still able to have good neighborly relations with Macedonia, and asked Greece to follow that example.

At the end, the Swiss representative, Mr. Rufi, remarked that there could be no monopoly regarding names, and urged Greece to return to the negotiating table.<sup>291</sup>

European ministers discussed the embargo in Brussels at the end of June. The issue was raised by the current European Union chairman,

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<sup>290</sup> *Reuters*; June 30, 1994.

<sup>291</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; June 30, 1994.

German minister Klaus Kinkel. He stressed it was high time to do something about it, as the economic situation in Macedonia was increasingly worsening and could destabilize the region. Kinkel's initiative was supported by the head of the British Foreign Office, Douglas Hurd, and the French minister for European affairs, Allain Lamassour.<sup>292</sup>

On June 30, the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform parties issued a press release stressing that whatever the strictly legal position, the action by the Greek government on a frontier of the European Union endangered both the political and economic stability of a small democracy which threatens nobody, and risked extending conflict to parts of the Balkans which have so far been spared the horrors of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Western European nations individually often made very strident criticisms of Greece while offering support for Macedonia.

The British deputy foreign secretary, Douglas Hogg, summoned Greek ambassador Alijas Gounaris to the Foreign Office to convey to him the government protest in relation to the recent Greek actions toward the Republic of Macedonia. Hogg told the Greek ambassador that the embargo presented a threat to the stability of Macedonia, which Britain regarded as very important, as well as a great risk of an outburst of conflict in the already tense region. Hogg also called upon Greece to resume negotiations, without setting prerequisites.<sup>293</sup> A few months later, Britain reaffirmed its interest in finding a quick solution to the conflict.<sup>294</sup>

France had officially established diplomatic relations with Macedonia on December 27, 1993, by sending an envoy to Skopje. By that time, Slovenia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Britain had also set up diplomatic missions in Skopje.<sup>295</sup> France formally summoned the Greek ambassador, Dimitris Makris, and delivered a note of protest after introduction of the Greek economic sanctions against Macedonia.<sup>296</sup> French foreign minister Alain Juppe appealed for a reasonable behavior by Greece, stressing that a solution must be reached through dialogue, and not through confrontation.

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<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>293</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 23, 1994.

<sup>294</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; May 13, 1994.

<sup>295</sup> *RFE/RL* report No. 247; Dec. 28, 1993.

<sup>296</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Feb. 24, 1994.

The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, said that the Greek embargo was “*contrary to acceptable behavior among civilized European countries.*”<sup>297</sup> Later he said, “*I expect Greece to immediately withdraw its decision,*” and added that Bonn would not allow a destabilization of Macedonia.<sup>298</sup> Following an August meeting and talks with the Macedonian president, Mr. Kinkel said, “*Macedonian-German relations are developing exceptionally well ... In our opinion, the Republic of Macedonia is extremely important for the Union and what is essential at the moment is to help it overcome its economic difficulties... Although the (European) Court has rejected the European Commission’s accusations, it still does not mean the embargo is legal and politically justified. We believe in the urgent need to resolve this dispute and to have the blockade lifted... Macedonia is successfully proving it can function as a multiethnic and democratic state, even in these extremely hard conditions, and that is why we believe it deserves our full support.*”<sup>299</sup>

The Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, said that the Greek embargo against Macedonia was irrational and that, as a man who puts the economy to the forefront, he simply could not accept this as a form of communication with another country. Italy offered financial aid and participated in the East-West project, which includes sub-projects, such as the gas line and a highway.<sup>300</sup>

A Danish parliamentary delegation, led by the president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Peter Doetoft, visited Macedonia soon after the embargo was applied. In talks with President Gligorov, the Danish deputies voiced their concern and condemnation regarding the embargo. On a separate occasion, in New York, Danish foreign minister Helveg Petersen called the embargo “*seriously alarming.*” He promised to raise the issue at a European Union meeting, saying, “*I must suggest the Greek government regain its composure and withdraw its decisions regarding Macedonia — especially the one about economic measures.*”<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> Boris Jhonson and Paul Anast, *The Daily Telegraph*, London; Feb. 19, 1994.

<sup>298</sup> *The Macedonian Tribune*; April 1994.

<sup>299</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Aug. 15, 1994.

<sup>300</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; May 27, 1994.

<sup>301</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; March 11, 1994.

## The Council of Europe

The Greek dispute with Macedonia led also to Greece blocking Macedonia's efforts to join the Council of Europe. Through 1994 and 1995, Macedonia made repeated efforts to meet the criteria for admission to the council, but did not advance past observer status.

In May 1995, a delegation of the Council of Europe visited Macedonia and met with President Gligorov and other government ministers. It was agreed that Macedonia's admission to the Council of Europe was of key importance for the further development and international affirmation of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as for stability in the region at large.<sup>302</sup>

Discussions were held regarding concrete issues connected to the legislative system of Macedonia and its compliance with European standards. The delegation expressed great satisfaction with advances made, and at a news conference emphasized that "*Macedonia is a democratic country. Perfect democracies are rare even in the Council of Europe.*" They gave a positive evaluation on the internal situation in Macedonia, noting ethnic disputes, including the case of the Albanian-language university, but said after discussions with minority groups that they did not see a substantial obstacle to Macedonia's admission to the Council of Europe.

Recognizing Greece's opposition in this matter, they also said that the council as a whole wanted to overcome this problem. This view was confirmed during a visit to Macedonia by Miguel Martinez, president of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly.<sup>303</sup> The admission of Macedonia to the council should be a unifying factor for all political subjects in the country, Martinez said. All that remained was for the Macedonian government and Parliament to ratify the Declaration for Local Self-government and the Conventions for Human and National Minority Rights. Asked why he had insisted on Macedonia signing the Convention when a number of council members — including Macedonia's neighbors — have not signed it, Martinez said the Convention is a good initiative, adding that all other member countries are pressed to sign it and that the Parliamentary Assembly would be completely satisfied to see a greater participation of ethnic Albanians, as well as women, at all levels of governing within the country.

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<sup>302</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; May 22, 1995.

<sup>303</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; June 9, 1995.

### Other Nations' Responses

Support for Macedonia, and criticism of Greece, has also come from the United Nations. In his 1994 report on Macedonia, the special envoy on human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, demanded from the Security Council that the Greek embargo against Macedonia should immediately be lifted, and that Macedonia be given compensation for its losses due to the United Nations sanctions against Serbia and the current Greek embargo.<sup>304</sup>

*"The authorities in Macedonia want peace and complete stability in the Balkan region,"* secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated during a visit to Australia. Speaking of the positive and preventive role of the United Nations forces there, he referred to Macedonia by its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>305</sup>

In an interview for the Greek TV station "Mega," American secretary of state Warren Christopher said Greece's economic blockade was an exaggerated and unjustified action.<sup>306</sup> He added that Macedonia was in a critical economic position and its having been recognized by the United States and the European Union did not justify the Greek behavior.<sup>307</sup>

While the United States continued to verbally deplore the Greek embargo, its actions to support Macedonia were often more subtle. Nevertheless, efforts at persuasion continued through to the time the first agreement was reached in September 1995. For instance, during a congress concerning economic cooperation on the Balkans, held in Salonika in February 1995, new American-British pressure was exerted on Greece. The United States ambassador, Thomas Niles, and the ambassador of Great Britain, Oliver Miles, warned that the Greek embargo against Macedonia, as well as the crisis in the relations with Albania and Turkey, presented obstacles to investment activities of their countries through Greece and therefore should be resolved as soon as possible.<sup>308</sup>

In talks with the leader of the opposition, Miltiadis Evert, at the end of February 1994, the Russian ambassador to Greece repeated an

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<sup>304</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Aug. 5, 1994.

<sup>305</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; May 22, 1994.

<sup>306</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 15, 1995.

<sup>307</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Feb. 23, 1994.

<sup>308</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 15, 1995.

offer for Russia to act as a mediator in the Greek-Macedonian dispute.<sup>309</sup> A spokesman from the Russian Foreign Ministry stated in Moscow that the economic blockade was not acceptable in international relations, adding that Russia wanted to maintain friendly relations with both Macedonia and Greece, but that it had no intention of interfering in the settling of the “*historic problems*.”<sup>310</sup> Russia’s interest in Macedonia and the Russian attitude toward the use of the name were indicated in the enthusiastic congratulatory telegram from the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltzin, sent on the occasion of Gligorov’s reelection as president of Macedonia. “*Receive my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your election as President of the Republic of Macedonia. By supporting you again, the Macedonian people voted for strengthening peace and stability not only in the Republic, but also in the Balkans. I take this opportunity to express the conviction that friendly relations and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Macedonia will develop successfully in the interest of the people of both our countries.*”<sup>311</sup>

In the Balkans, Bulgarian president Zelu Zelev, in an interview for the TV show “Panorama,” pointed out that the latest Greek blockade against Macedonia was “not contributing to relieving of the tensions in the region.” At the same time, Bulgaria offered Macedonia the use of its port of Burgas on the Black Sea, as it had done during the previous blockade.<sup>312</sup>

Albanian president Berisha placed all services of the port of Duresse at Macedonia’s disposal.

Turkish president Suleiman Demirel offered Macedonia the use of Turkish ports and promised Turkish assistance. During the previous year’s Greek blockade of Macedonia, Ankara had supplied Macedonia with fuel, including an entire tanker of petrol. Meanwhile, Turkey urged Athens to rethink its extreme position, calling Greece’s actions unfair to the 2 million people of Macedonia.<sup>313</sup>

The twentieth meeting of the seven most developed countries in the world ended in Naples early in July 1994 with the adoption of an economic and political declaration. The official Japanese delegation

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<sup>309</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Feb. 23, 1994.

<sup>310</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 24, 1994.

<sup>311</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Nov. 10, 1994.

<sup>312</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 21, 1994.

<sup>313</sup> *The Macedonian Tribune*; April 1994.

presented the New Countries' Government program, which included a section on relations with Macedonia. The program stated Japan's readiness to aid Macedonia economically and included preparation of a project for economic cooperation between the two states.<sup>314</sup>

China established diplomatic relations with Macedonia soon after the Greek embargo, recognizing Macedonia under the name of the Republic of Macedonia. By September 1994, a new Chinese embassy had been established in Skopje.<sup>315</sup>

One international commentator who fully supported the Greek side of the dispute was Mikhail Gorbachev, former president of the USSR. Gorbachev said that no Macedonian question exists and that the Greek stand is firmly founded in history. Some Macedonians were skeptical about the value of this contribution, pointing out that Mr. Gorbachev could have a similar stand on the Lithuanian question, the Estonian question and the Latvian question, but might have been more willing to voice his opinion in the case of Greece because the Greeks paid for his cruise among the Greek islands and appointed him honorary professor at the Athens and Salonika universities.<sup>316</sup>

### **Press Reactions to the Trade Blockade**

Reactions of the non-Greek press to the dispute between Greece and Macedonia have been less cautious than those of the international diplomats. Many commentators have been extremely critical of the Greek embargo and the case that the Greeks have tried to make against the Macedonians.

The London Times wrote a lengthy and detailed editorial argument (February 21, 1994), claiming that the Greek action "*was in violation of the Treaty of Rome, the Maastricht treaty, the United Nations Charter, resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and the basic norms of morality which govern civilized international relations.*" The Times pointed out that at the Edinburgh Summit of the European Council in December 1992, Greece had made a commitment to ensure that Macedonia received a "*regular and properly monitored supply of oil.*" The embargo was in obvious violation of this commitment. The Times pointed out that Macedonia had

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<sup>314</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; July 11, 1994.

<sup>315</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Sept. 20, 1994.

<sup>316</sup> Ivan A. Lebamoff, editorial. *The Macedonian Tribune*; Sept.-Oct., 1993.

not acted unlawfully in any way and concluded that no “legitimate interest” of Greece was at issue in the dispute. Greece’s “obsession” with the name issue and the question of the flag could not be regarded as “legitimate” by any legal, moral or political measure. The Times insisted that the Greeks should end their blockade of Macedonia.

In another editorial (April 8, 1994), the Times called on Greece to give up its residency of the European Union in order to prevent even greater damage to Europe than it had already caused. It said Greece had placed its own interests above those of the Union by introducing the embargo against Macedonia, thus abusing its position and damaging the Union’s reputation. The Times said that bringing Greece to the European Court was not a suitable response since Macedonia needed help immediately. Concluding that Mr. Papandreou aimed to cause damage to a Balkan country that already faced great economic difficulties, and to increase tensions around it, the Times took the embargo as evidence that the Greek prime minister was more concerned with domestic political interests than with the need to prevent a wider regional conflict.

Other British newspapers took a similar stand against Greece. The Spectator said that the Greek government’s actions to “further its vendetta” against tiny Macedonia represented “*a curious mixture of farce, tragedy, the theater of cruelty and the theater of the absurd.*”<sup>317</sup> Greece had become more extreme in the face of European complaints, as though the European presidency had made it invulnerable to criticism, the Spectator said. Its behavior towards Macedonia was a first step towards destroying the country’s stability, which could lead to internal violence and war. The Spectator concluded that this destabilization was the long-term aim of Greek policy, and that the greatest causes of instability in the Balkans were Serbia and Greece, acting more or less as allies. The paper argued that Greece was a “*geopolitical liability*” to Europe and should have its membership in the European Union withdrawn.

The Daily Telegraph (Feb. 19, 1994) said Greece’s presidency of the European Community was degenerating into “*an unseemly and dangerous farce.*” The trade embargo against Macedonia typified Greek truculence and insecurity. The Greek government seemed intent on pursuing “*a narrowly nationalistic agenda,*” which compromised Eu-

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<sup>317</sup> *The Spectator*, London; April 9, 1994.

ropean Community institutions and treaties and threatened stability in the Balkans. In a later editorial (September 12, 1994) focused on Greek antagonism to Albania, the Daily Telegraph said that with both Macedonia and Albania “*Athens has revealed itself as a vindictive, short-sighted bully of poorer and weaker neighbors,*” and argued that the European Community should intervene because of the instability in the Balkans that Greece had created.

The Economist wrote that the blockade violated Greece’s treaty obligations and was imposed simply to protect Prime Minister Papan-dreou from domestic criticism after the United States recognized Macedonia.<sup>318</sup>

The Guardian said the Greek action against Macedonia “*would be suitable material for a diplomatic farce if it were not so disturbing,*” and was critical of Greek claims to exclusive use of the name, of the issue concerning the constitution that Macedonia had already addressed, and of Greece’s avoidance of the issue of minority rights of Slav-Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia. The Guardian concluded that because of the disparity in the size of populations and armies in Greece and Macedonia, and Macedonia’s landlocked vulnerability to blockade, the idea of expansionist actions from Macedonia is absurd.<sup>319</sup>

William D. Montalbano, writing in the Los Angeles Times (March 4, 1994), said, “*Even Greece’s best friends say the embargo is improvident, incendiary for the powder keg Balkans and embarrassing for the Athens government.*”

An editorial in the New York Times a few days later said, “*Greece is fueling tensions in another former Yugoslav republic, Macedonia, by imposing a strangling economic blockade. Greece’s Western allies understand that Athens has had serious problems with Macedonia in the past. But they are losing patience with Greece’s bullying tactics against a much weaker neighbor already suffering ethnic tensions.*”<sup>320</sup> A few weeks later, on the issue of recognition of Macedonia, the New York Times wrote, “*Greece, the country that introduced Europe to comedy and tragedy, now leads its European Community partners into a shameful diplomatic farce.*”<sup>321</sup> The editorial went on to say Alexander the Great had no qualms about the spreading of the Macedonian name,

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<sup>318</sup> *The Economist*, London; Feb. 26, 1994.

<sup>319</sup> *The Guardian*, London; April 10, 1994.

<sup>320</sup> *The New York Times*; March 8, 1994

<sup>321</sup> *The New York Times*; April 5, 1994.

since he left behind at least 10 Alexandrias in various parts of the ancient world. The article rejected the notion that Greece faced any military threat from “*this mini-state with no army*” and concluded that “*Washington has given its ally’s temper tantrum more deference than it deserves. It ought to recognize independent Macedonia without further delay.*”

The Christian Science Monitor (April 15, 1994) said that Greece had made something of a laughingstock of itself in the international community for two years by demanding that its “enfeebled” northern neighbor not use the name of Macedonia. The Monitor added that the manner in which the blockade had stoked nationalist feelings in Greece was no laughing matter, being a significant factor aggravating the overall Balkan crisis. The Monitor noted that many in’ both of Greece’s leading parties recognized that the “name issue” was blown out of proportion by the Mitsotakis government, and suggested that a way must be found for Athens to escape the corner it had painted itself into, but added that the United States administration ought not be a mere agent of the Greek lobby in Congress.<sup>322</sup>

The Chicago Tribune was particularly scathing in its attack on the Greek claims. It asked, “*Would Mexico threaten a trade embargo against the United States to force New Mexico to change its name? Would the British huff and puff in the high courts of world opinion because a section of our Atlantic seaboard chose to call itself New England?*” It concluded that there was little logic to Greece’s argument and that furthermore, Greece’s claim that full recognition of Macedonia would lead to Balkan instability could not be taken seriously while Greece continued to ignore United Nations sanctions against Serbia. The paper expressed distrust of Greek and Serbian urgings that the world not recognize the independence of Macedonia, and asked, “*Why in the world is the world listening?*”<sup>323</sup>

Like other United States analysts, William Dunn rejected the Greek claim that Macedonia is a military threat.<sup>324</sup> He pointed out also that the Macedonian constitution had been amended in 1992 to conform to recommendations of the Badinter Commission, which had then concluded that Macedonia fulfilled all conditions for recognition. He cited Article 3 of the constitution as explicitly excluding territorial

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<sup>322</sup> *The Christian Science Monitor*; April 15, 1994.

<sup>323</sup> *The Chicago Tribune*; April 14, 1995.

<sup>324</sup> Dunn, „*Macedonia: Europe’s Finger in the Dike*“.

ambitions, and explained that while the constitution expresses a concern for the status and rights of Macedonians in neighboring countries, in Article 49 it affirms explicitly the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. He adds that portions of Article 49 are virtually identical to Article 108 of the Greek constitution, which likewise seeks to support Greeks living outside Greece. Dunn noted that the relatively favorable United States State Department report on human rights in Macedonia contrasted with the unfavorable reports on Greece.

The *Globe and Mail* of Toronto had expressed concern about Greece's attitude to Macedonia before the embargo. In an editorial on October 25, 1993, the paper said that while it recognized Greek anxiety about the possibility of a war in its area of the Balkans, Greece in its fear was "*succumbing to the same virus that caused that turmoil in the first place: unreasoning ethnic nationalism.*" Three months later *The Globe and Mail* (January 10, 1994) was again critical of the Greek position, noting that Greece's European allies had lost patience with its behavior and its claims. The paper said the European Community rightly believed that recognition of Macedonia and its stability were tied together. It also noted the paradox of the situation for Canada, since troops were sent as part of a United Nations contingent to defend the territorial integrity of a state whose existence Canada did not recognize.

An editorial in *The Toronto Star* (March 12, 1994) said, "*Greece is giving its 3,000-year-old democracy a bad name with its continued bullying of Macedonia, its tiny neighbor to the north.*" The paper said that since losing its diplomatic war against international recognition of Macedonia, Greece had broadened its attack with the trade blockade, which the paper described as a crude attempt to starve the impoverished republic into submission. The *Star* said it was irrational of Athens to continue to lay sole claim to the Macedonian name, history and culture which have existed on both sides of the Greek-Yugoslav border for much of this century. The paper saw Greece as the malicious party in the crisis.

The Australian national newspaper, *The Australian*, approved of its government's decision to recognize Macedonia and noted that Greece's "*punishing trade embargo*" had been condemned by every other European Union government.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> *Ôà Australian*; March 28, 1994.

In an editorial titled, “*On Recognizing Macedonia*,” the Sydney Morning Herald (March 7, 1994) said, “*Greece’s demand that Macedonia should delete a [constitutional] clause regarding the rights of Macedonians outside the country is ridiculous, since Article 108 of the Greek Constitution says much the same.*”

On its front page, the Torino newspaper *La Stampa* published an editorial entitled “*The Vampires from 1914 Are Returning to the Balkans.*” According to this newspaper, Greece was the one to break off all relations and then light up another fuse, similar to that in Bosnia. The newspaper asked, but could not answer, the question, “*Why are the Greeks so much against Macedonia?*”<sup>326</sup>

The German press also criticized the Greek move. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* said: “*This young country, which achieved its independence with great hardship, is weak economically and politically, and cannot present any danger to Athens.*” *Brausweirgere Zeitung*, in an article entitled “*Athens Provocation*,” wrote that Greece has a tendency to blame others for its own economic and political crises.<sup>327</sup> The German press was unanimous in the assessment that Greece had taken the aggressive lead. German newspapers wrote that the Greek policy toward Macedonia had “*nothing in common with the policy of responsibility*”; that it violated the “*unity of the EU*” and spread paranoia in the Balkans; that “*Papandreou’s demagoguery [did] not comply with the international policy of peace*,” and that Greece was “*playing with fire.*”<sup>328</sup>

After the European Commission’s decision to bring Greece to the Court of Justice, the Paris newspaper *Liberation* concluded that the European Union seemed unable to cope with problems in the former Yugoslavia. The paper stressed that the Greek embargo endangered the Union trade policy, but even more seriously endangered the foreign politics of the EU, especially its concern for common security for its members.

Another French newspaper, *Quotidien*, underlined the fact Greece was the first member country brought before the court since the Rome Treaty to establish the European Community was signed.

Even the conservative Paris daily *Figaro* agreed that the Greek embargo was illegal.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Cited by *The Macedonian Tribune*; April 1994.

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>328</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Feb. 23, 1994.

<sup>329</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; April 8, 1994.

### Changes in Greek Public Attitudes

From time to time Greek voices have expressed disagreement with the policies of their government, and more and more of these have been heard as time passed. In January 1994, the president of Cyprus, Mr. Kleridis, disassociated himself from the politics of Athens towards Macedonia, emphasizing that the essential issue was inviolability of borders, not the name dispute. He said the name issue was primarily an emotional matter, and recognized that a Macedonian state had existed for a number of years as a part of Yugoslavia.<sup>330</sup>

In March, about two weeks after the imposition of the embargo, a group of 21 prominent Greek intellectuals, including university professors, former ambassadors, economists, journalists and students, sent an open letter to the media in Greece, harshly condemning the Greek measures, calling them a “revengeful act” aimed at covering up the weakness of the government by turning against countries that recognized Macedonia. The writers pointed out that never in its history had Greece been so isolated or disliked, and reminded readers of Greece’s international obligations.<sup>331</sup>

Sissy Volu, a member of the Forum of Left-Oriented Feminists in Greece, visited Skopje in May 1994 as a guest of the Civilian Forum for Dialogue Between Greece and Macedonia. Volu, who comes from Athens, was making efforts to bring representatives of the Greek Organization of Women to an international conference of women in Skopje. She described herself as an active member of the anti-war and anti-nationalist movement in Greece, which had made attempts to organize demonstrations in Salonika, with the goal of “*putting an embargo against nationalism, and not against Macedonia.*” She said, “*Ever since the very beginning of the Greek campaign against Macedonia, we firmly took the view that the Republic of Macedonia must be recognized under its constitutional name.*” She said many of her group had been arrested without any legal grounds, but they had tried to keep in contact with several like-minded intellectuals from Macedonia.<sup>332</sup> The same group that organized Volu’s visit to Macedonia organized a visit from a group of 80 Greeks in June 1994, financed by the Soros foundation’s “*Open Society*” group.<sup>333</sup>

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<sup>330</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Jan. 21, 1994.

<sup>331</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; March 4, 1994.

<sup>332</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; May 13, 1994.

<sup>333</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; June 15, 1994.

By April, Prime Minister Papandreou had moderated his public demands, saying that Greece would lift the trade embargo against Macedonia if it would stop using the disputed symbol on the flag and if it would change its Constitution. Papandreou's proposition does not include the dispute regarding the name of the country. He stated that he would retain "*the question with the name, which is hard to solve,*" as a topic for further negotiations. United States president Bill Clinton stated, "*It is very important for Greece and Europe, as well as for the world community, that the dispute between the two states is solved and I think that can be achieved.*" He added, "*I think that the easiest way to achieve this is to soften the rhetoric, to consider minority rights and not to allow the war that is raging in Bosnia to spread to neighboring regions in which the situation is equally tense.*"<sup>334</sup>

Three and a half months after the introduction of the embargo, doubts about its effectiveness were growing throughout Greece. The assistant foreign minister, Yorgos Papandreou, stated that "*the blockade has no effects.*" Some of the Athens press blamed the United States, especially after the decision of that nation's Congress to hold back 25 percent of the military help intended for Greece because of the embargo, and after the announcement of the forming of an American-inspired "customs corridor" to connect Macedonia with western Europe through Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.<sup>335</sup>

A leading member of London's Greek community, Costas Carras, said Athens' existing rigid policy towards Macedonia must be modified, not to suit FYROM, but to preserve other priorities of Greek foreign policy. He believed Athens had lost influence in Europe by remaining inflexible on the issue.<sup>336</sup>

In August the Greek newspaper *To Vima* (July 29, 1994) published a lengthy argument titled "*Eight Truths We Refuse to Accept,*" in favor of a more pragmatic approach to Macedonia.<sup>337</sup> Eight points were listed in the article:

(1) Macedonia was partitioned amongst Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria —which received the smallest portion — after the First World War.

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<sup>334</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; April 25, 1994.

<sup>335</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; May 27, 1994.

<sup>336</sup> Peter Ellingsen, *Greece: Greece Weighing the Cost of a Tough Line on the Republic*, BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe and Balkans; June 28, 1994.

<sup>337</sup> Translated by *MILS News*, Skopje; Aug. 5, 1994.

(2) Following that partitioning, at least as early as 1919, the names “Vardar Macedonia” and “Pirin Macedonia” were in virtually universal use by diplomats, historians, and other writers including those living in Greece.

(3) Since the population exchanges of the 1920s, Slavic Macedonian minorities in Greek Macedonia had been “*insignificantly small.*”

(4) Territory annexed to Serbia in 1919 kept the name Macedonia as a republic of Socialist Yugoslavia, and people in that area had “*been living with the idea of being Macedonians*” ever since.

(5) Refusal to allow Skopje the use of any form of the name “Republic of Macedonia,” began with former foreign minister Adonis Samaras and spread to the two main parties through his influence.

(6) Greece’s request that Skopje not be recognized under any form of the name Macedonia flew in the face of “basic democratic rules” of self-determination.

(7) Even if Greece or an ally managed to persuade the Macedonian president to accept a ban on the use of the name Macedonia, Gligorov’s own parliament would never vote in favor of such a proposal.

(8) The Greek claim that “*Macedonia is Greek*” or that “*there is only one Macedonia*” only fueled suspicions that Greece planned to annex the two parts of Macedonia lying outside Greek borders.

The paper went on to say that whatever the behavior of Skopje, Greece should not stoop to irrational behavior in response, nor should it “*support views unbecoming of a country with such a cultural tradition.*” And, the paper added, “*above all, there can be no reason whatsoever to hide basic information ... from the Greek people. Such systematic misinforming does not only underestimate the Greek people’s reasoning power, but is also based on undemocratic and regressive ideas. What is more, it prevents us from an objective evaluation of our present situation.*”

In conclusion, said To Vima, only two strategies were possible for Greece.-’ Continued insistence on Greece’s sole ownership of the name Macedonia, or acceptance of some derivative form of the name, combined with an offer of economic aid dependent on changes in the constitution and flag as well as a halt to “*irredentist propaganda.*”

The results of the first would be continued isolation and loss of diplomatic opportunities for Greece, and increased international sympathy for and recognition of Skopje as the “Republic of Macedonia,” particularly by Turkey, whose influence in the area would increase. With the second strategy, “*Greece would be able to demand and would*

*easily be granted guarantees for its present borders.*” The paper called for an end to “*self-destructive politics*” and to politicians placing “*their own interests and status above national interests.*”

There were some opportunities for the Greek and Macedonian governments to cooperate on humanitarian issues during the blockade. For instance, in August 1994, the Macedonian government appealed to Athens for help in fighting an enormous forest fire in the area of Jasen. The Greek government placed special planes at Macedonia’s disposal, and the planes arrived at the scene as soon as the following day, though by then the fires had already come under control. The Macedonian Foreign Ministry sent a note of gratitude expressing its desire for and confidence in the further improvement of such neighborly relations. The largest Greek opposition party, “New Democracy,” reacted bitterly to this news.<sup>338</sup>

In November 1994, Greek government spokesman Mr. Venizelos said that Greece expected to resume talks on the dispute with FYROM now that the elections in that country were completed. He believed greater flexibility might now be possible for the FYROM side. The media were speculating about possible terms of an agreement that would include the removal of the embargo by Greece, support for FYROM to join the CSCE, and the dropping of the flag and changing of the constitution by FYROM. The name issue would be left for some future negotiations.<sup>339</sup>

Soon after this, in an interview for the paper *Mesimevrini*, the leader of the largest opposition party in Greece, Miltiadis Evert, stated that he had never agreed with the embargo on Macedonia. He noted that the blockade against Macedonia had proved unsuccessful. He explained that the New Democracy party was left no choice in public discussion of the issue, and could have changed nothing by saying it would be a wrong move.<sup>340</sup>

Some of the Greek press, and even well-known personalities, began to express opinions completely opposite to those of the government on the embargo, following a statement by Teodoros Pangalos that it had been a total fiasco. In December 1994, even the opposition paper *Elefteros tipos*, known for presenting a hard line toward Macedonia,

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<sup>338</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Aug. 20, 1994.

<sup>339</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Nov. 3, 1994.

<sup>340</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Nov. 16, 1994.

said that dock workers in Salonika were feeling the consequences of the Greek embargo on their pockets and backs even more than the Macedonian population.<sup>341</sup>

The first Greek politician to visit Macedonia since the embargo was imposed, the head of the left-wing coalition, Nikos Konstandopoulos, said, "*All the questions between the two countries have to be placed on the table, without any prerequisites. This initiative of Greek left wing forces is aimed at showing how ... a different approach is necessary. The ice has been broken in relations between the two countries.*"<sup>342</sup>

In January 1995, Constandinos Pilarinos, a deputy of the New Democracy party, claimed that Macedonian citizens could now freely enter Greece with passports bearing only a seal that reads "Macedonia," instead of "FYROM." He also said that foreign embassies in Athens confirmed that Greek customs officials no longer insisted on changing of the "MKD" seal in the passports of international travelers. He pointed to examples of violations of the Greek embargo as proof of the absurdity of the blockade for Greece itself.<sup>343</sup>

Former Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis said in Athens that the dispute with Macedonia was at a dead end, and he recommended that Greece accept the proposals of mediator Cyrus Vance for a "*complex name for Macedonia.*" He said that he had not had the opportunity of imposing a solution to the problem with Macedonia in April 1992 because the rest of the leadership, including President Konstantinos Karamanlis, though privately believing that the problem with the name was not the main issue, nevertheless refused to support the policy for a direct resolution of the problem with the "*Pinneiro package.*" Mitsotakis also said that he had found himself alone in facing attacks by Andonis Samaras and his group, who threatened to create divisions within the party leading to early elections — which is exactly what happened. Mitsotakis added that his biggest mistake was failing to remove Samaras from the party at that time.<sup>344</sup>

According to the Greek Foreign Ministry's White Book on 1995, Greece had no fears of military incursions from the north, although it might get militarily involved if wider alliances were formed in the re-

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<sup>341</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Dec. 14, 1994.

<sup>342</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Dec. 20, 1994.

<sup>343</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Jan. 9, 1995.

<sup>344</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Jan. 19, 1995.

gion that could threaten the country's integrity. At the promotion of this book on Greece's Foreign Policy, former foreign minister Mikhalis Papaconstantinou condemned the view that "*all sides have some plans against Greece.*" Briefly mentioning the Macedonian issue, Papaconstantinou said, "*The name is a sovereign right of every country.*" He disagreed with the Greek official policy on minorities, saying the government is so afraid of the issue that it prohibits any research on it to the point of never mentioning national groups such as Vlachs. He spoke of a misunderstanding regarding the "*Slavophone Greeks,*" explaining that "*only the misinformed deny their Greek nationality. Language is not a necessary element for defining national affiliation.*" Papaconstantinou insisted on a solution for problems with Macedonia, which, he said, is populated by Slavonic people different from both Serbs and Bulgarians.<sup>345</sup>

There was discussion in the Greek press late in January 1995 about the possibility that Greece might lift the embargo if the European Commission withdrew its charges. This would enable Macedonia to give up its unyielding stance. The president of the left-wing Coalition of Progress, Nikos Konstandopoulos, wanted the embargo against Macedonia to be lifted immediately, as a sign of "good will." "Anyway," he said, "*it's just the same as if it doesn't exist at all, because Macedonia has neither changed its stance, nor does it have any particular difficulties in securing supplies.*"<sup>346</sup> At the same time Thessaloniki businessmen were saying that the blockade greatly damaged them, especially the general northern Greek market and the port of Thessaloniki.

Further public discussion of such issues occurred throughout the next few months, with periods when an agreement seemed imminent, and other periods of apparent withdrawal by both sides. In March there were reports of a draft agreement being signed, though without direct dialogue.<sup>347</sup> In April there were reports that agreement had been reached on terms that had been floating about in the media since November, though a Macedonian government spokesman said this was all speculation.<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Jan. 23, 1995.

<sup>346</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Jan. 24, 1995.

<sup>347</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; March 20, 1995.

<sup>348</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; April 21, 1995.

### **A Softening of Greek Behavior at the Borders**

When the dispute was at its peak, the treatment of people of various nationalities who attempted to cross from Macedonia into Greece was complicated by the fact that they had markings in their documents that the Greek government did not accept. Ethnic Macedonians from either Greece or Macedonia were often beaten by border guards, and Macedonians generally were denied entry to Greece.

For example, in the summer of 1994, a number of Australian citizens, many of whom were ethnic Macedonians, were barred from crossing the Greek-Macedonian border, and in some cases passengers were physically abused, according to reports from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The ABC reported criticisms of Greece for not respecting international conventions at border crossing. One radio correspondent, not an ethnic Macedonian, described having had an unpleasant experience himself, and called on the Australian government to examine such cases since Australia and Greece have an agreement for non-visa entry.<sup>349</sup> The Australian minister for foreign affairs, Gareth Evans, made representations to his Greek counterpart over the issue. Soon after this event, CSCE officials from Great Britain and Canada were barred from entry to Greece at the Dojrani crossing, on the grounds that they had car insurance papers mentioning the name "Republic of Macedonia."<sup>350</sup>

By January 1995, however, Greek customs police were showing more tolerance to the Macedonian seal in international documents. Passengers who were not citizens of Macedonia were allowed through despite the fact that their traveling documents contain the Republic of Macedonia seal. Exceptions to this rule were certain members of Macedonian official or sports delegations, and on such occasions, the Greek visa was generally issued on a piece of paper.<sup>351</sup>

### **The End of the Embargo**

In the first week of September 1995, the United States assistant secretary of state, Richard Holbrooke, stated that an agreement to put an end to the dispute between Macedonia and Greece had been formulated in which both countries had agreed to reach a compromise in the

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<sup>349</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; July 11, 1994.

<sup>350</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Aug. 3, 1994.

<sup>351</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Jan. 10, 1995.

name of peace in the Balkans. He added that both sides wanted the United States to safeguard the agreement.

At the same time, Cyrus Vance said that all elements of an agreement to end the dispute between Greece and Macedonia had been settled except for the name. He said it was a comprehensive agreement with every detail arranged. As a consequence of this development, the special envoy for the United States president, Matthew Nimitz, said in a statement for Macedonian radio, *"I hope to be soon establishing diplomatic relations between our countries. The standing of your country is firm and good."* He expected a formal arrangement the following week. He noted that United Nations secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and other members of the United Nations wanted the problem to be solved as soon as possible.<sup>352</sup>

An opinion poll published in the newspaper Etnos, in Athens, a few days later indicated that more than 60 percent of Greeks were against the signing of an agreement which would lift the economic embargo against Macedonia. Thirty-two percent out of 600 people sampled said the agreement would unavoidably lead to the recognition of Macedonia under that name, while 28 percent accused the Greek government of "selling itself" to the United States if it negotiated any kind of deal. Only 18.5 percent of those polled said the name issue had no significance and should be forgotten.

At about the same time, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou stated that during the talks to be held the following week in New York, Greece would not discuss the name issue. *"This time we will talk about the small package,"* he stressed, adding that the name issue demanded more effort and time. He indicated that his government would not recognize *"the neighboring country"* under the name Republic of Macedonia or any other name that would include the word Macedonia.

The leader of the New Democracy Party, Miltiadis Evert, strongly attacked the government for its actions. *"After endless irresponsibility and recklessness, the Government begins a direct dialogue with Skopje for solving the issue, without confronting the issue of the name which is the major aspect of this great problem,"* he said. The Greek Committee for Dialogue between Citizens in the Balkans and the Macedonian Civil Committee for Greek-Macedonian Dialogue and Understanding had already adopted a joint statement in which they expressed their satis-

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<sup>352</sup> MILS News, Skopje; Sept. 7, 1995.

faction about the determination of the two governments to reach an agreement.<sup>353</sup>

### **The Interim Accord**

On September 13, 1995, an Interim Accord was signed between the representatives of Greece and Macedonia. Minister Karolos Papoulias, representing Greece, described in the agreement as “*the Party of the First Part,*” and Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, representing Macedonia, described as “*the Party of the Second Part,*” agreed that Greece would recognize Macedonia as an independent and sovereign state, to establish diplomatic relations at an agreed level with the ultimate goal of relations at an ambassadorial level at the earliest possible date. The two sides confirmed their common existing frontiers as an enduring and inviolable international border, and each undertook to respect the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the other party. They agreed that they would not support the action of a third party directed against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other party. They agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force, including the threat or use of force designed to violate their existing frontiers, and they agreed that neither party would assert or support claims to any part of the territory of the other, or claims for a change of their existing frontier.

As well the two sides agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices of the secretary general of the United Nations with a view to reaching agreement on the issue of the name of Macedonia. Despite their differences on the issue each agreed to cooperate with a view to facilitating their mutual relations in various practical ways, including normal trade and commerce.

Macedonia affirmed that nothing in its constitution, and in particular in the preamble, would ever constitute the basis for any claim to any part of Greek territory, or for interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Macedonia agreed to stop using the Star of Vergina on its national flag.

Both sides agreed to prohibit hostile activities or propaganda by state-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other, and to remove restrictions on the movement of people or goods between their territories.

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<sup>353</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Sept. 11, 1995.

On the questions of cultural and human rights, both sides agreed to be guided by various existing international charters, and to encourage contacts between their peoples at all appropriate levels in accordance with international law and custom.

Greece agreed not to object to any application by Macedonia to join international organizations so long as Macedonia used the name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," and agreed that Macedonia's economic development should be assisted by developing a close relationship with the European Economic Area and the European Union.

With respect to treaty relations, the two sides agreed to follow provisions of earlier bilateral agreements between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Greece in the areas of legal relations, judicial decision, and hydro-economic questions, and to establish new agreements similar to these and in other areas of mutual interest.

Greece agreed to abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with respect to Macedonia's status as a landlocked state.

Both sides agreed to encourage the development of friendly and good-neighborly relations between them, particularly with regard to road, rail, maritime and air transport and communication links, and to strengthen their economic relations in all fields including scientific and technical cooperation, as well as cooperation in the field of education. There was even agreement to take steps to cooperate in eliminating all forms of pollution in border areas and more generally to protect the environment.

Both sides agreed to improve and promote business and tourist travel, to accelerate customs and border formalities, to modernize existing border crossings or construct new border crossings and to cooperate in the fight against crime, terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting.

Finally, both sides agreed to abide by United Nations procedures in settling disputes.

The Interim Accord was to remain in force for seven years, until superseded by a definitive agreement, after which either party could withdraw by giving 12 months' notice in writing.

On the occasion of the signing of the Greek-Macedonian accord, Cyrus Vance said: "*I can confirm that the accord, according to the new conditions, cancels the measures imposed by Greece on February 16, 1994, and replaces these measures with open and cooperative eco-*

*conomic relations.*” Vance also explained that the document would come into force 30 days after its signing.

Kiro Gligorov said, *“I particularly greet the realistic attitude that neighboring Greece has shown in the signing of the agreement... It is especially important now, in the implementation of the agreement, to show good will, readiness and fairness in realizing of the agreement which is in the interest of both sides. I’m deeply convinced that this act can become a turning point for the future of the Balkans.”*

Greek and Macedonian leaders offered one another their congratulations.<sup>354</sup>

The occasion of the signing of the agreement was also the occasion for the establishment of diplomatic relations at embassy level between the United States and the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>355</sup> In an interview for the private TV station “A1,” Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski said, *“The establishment of full diplomatic relations with the U.S.A., at ambassadorial level, is an event of exceptional, I’d say historic, significance for the Republic of Macedonia. It’s something we have been anticipating for a long time, aware that this would contribute, to a great extent, to the strengthening of Macedonia’s position not only on a bilateral basis in relations with the U.S., but overall in the international community, as well.”*

### **World Reactions**

In the United States, President Clinton welcomed the agreement between Greece and Macedonia, stressing that it was of great importance for both countries and would significantly enhance international stability.

U.S. negotiator Matthew Nimitz said, *“I’m always an optimist but regarding the name issue, it will not be easy. We should do all that we can. The beginning of the negotiations for the name issue is expected to start in the second half of October, but the negotiations will not be easy. The Greek Prime Minister got everything he asked for. That is not only concerning the embargo but the very agreement which gives possibilities for full economic and cultural relations and cooperation in the region. FYROM will now be included in the NATO program. It is good for Greece to have such a friendly neighbor.”*

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<sup>354</sup> MIC, Skopje; Sept. 4, 1995.

<sup>355</sup> MIC, Skopje; Sept. 15, 1995.

A little more than a week after the signing of the accord, a delegation from the United States Defense Department came for a one-day visit to the Republic of Macedonia. The military delegation, including the commandant of the United States Army for Europe, was received by President Gligorov, who welcomed the current development of the cooperation between the two countries in the defense field. The United States secretary of the army repeated the readiness of the United States to promote cooperation between the two armies and said the United States would stand by Macedonia in this field at an international level.<sup>356</sup>

The chief of staff of the United States Army, John Shalikashvili, visited Skopje early in October, saying, *"I'm glad to be again in the country in which our soldiers are so warmly welcomed."* Both countries expressed their mutual satisfaction with the developments in the military cooperation, through the program *"Bridge to America"* and other educational programs of Macedonian officers in the United States. The mutual conclusion was that the mission of UNPREDEP should remain as it is in Macedonia.<sup>357</sup>

Embassies and foreign ministries of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia issued statements expressing their enthusiasm for the Interim Accord.

Reactions in Athens, however, were divided. The pro-government newspapers spoke of "a new chapter" in relations between Greece and the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," while the right-wing newspapers, including *Adesmaftos*, described the accord as "treason," a "humiliating compromise" in which *"Greece is giving up its only weapon—the economic embargo."* Evangelos Venizelos said, *"The Greek government is absolutely satisfied. Positions which it formulated from the outset, positions which it firmly stuck to, were accepted."* Stressing that Greece would not back down from its position on the name, Venizelos noted that the interim agreement would not be annulled if the two sides failed to reach agreement on the name. *"Commitments have been taken,"* Mr. Venizelos said, adding that liaison offices would be opened in both Athens and Skopje.

Karolos Papoulias said, *"This is a very important agreement and a step forward after long and hard negotiations and the Greek govern-*

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<sup>356</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Sept. 21, 1995.

<sup>357</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Oct. 13, 1995.

ment welcomes it... There is only the name issue left. I predict extremely difficult negotiations for the name issue, which are to begin right after the termination of the thirty day term set forth in the agreement. The embargo will be lifted on the same day that FYROM changes the flag and gives a reassurance concerning the Constitution.” He said there would be no change of the Greek attitude regarding the name issue.

Miltiades Evert, leader of the largest opposition party in Greece, predicted an “*endless discussion*” would begin on the question of the name “*which will in the end lead nowhere.*” He disapproved of the terminology of the agreement which avoided naming the two countries.

In the last week of October, the Greek extremist leader Adonis Samaras called for division and cantonization of Macedonia, using Bosnia as an example.

A former official of the Greek government, Evangelos Kofos, stated that the agreement should have covered the name issue, and should have acknowledged the Macedonian minority in Greece and the matter of allowing the return of Aegean Macedonian refugees. He observed that in the last 40 or 50 years a nation had been formed and it was evident that the people in it did not feel like Bulgarians, Serbians or Albanians. He said the problem was that this nation had taken the name of the native land, which has often happened elsewhere, and the geographical name is a name that can be used by any inhabitant in that region. But Greece did not allow these differences to be understood by the Greek people.<sup>358</sup>

Mayors of cities of northern Greece asked Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou not to make any compromises concerning the name Macedonia. Should their demand be rejected or should they leave the meeting with Papandreou dissatisfied, they threatened to organize mass demonstrations, this time against Athens instead of against Skopje.<sup>359</sup>

The All-Greek Association of Northern Macedonia (“Makedonomasi”) appealed to the citizens of Thessaloniki and Greek Macedonia, and the associations of Macedonians living in Greece, to join the “*third greatest meeting in preserving Greek holy rights.*” The proclamation, published in the magazine Eleftheros Tipos, called for united opposition to the “*planned sale of Macedonia to Skopje’s Slavs who came in this*

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<sup>358</sup> MILS News, Skopje; Sept. 18, 1995.

<sup>359</sup> MILS News, Skopje; Sept. 20, 1995.

region 1000 years after Alexander the Great and Aristotle.” The association accused Skopje of already announcing its intention to expel the Greeks from Macedonia.<sup>360</sup>

Opinions of Macedonians were similarly divided. A survey conducted by the NIP Agency “Nova Makedonija-Data Press” with 1,200 citizens indicated that a change of the name of the republic was unacceptable for 79.33 percent of the citizens of Macedonia. In contrast, some 56.33 percent stated that a change of the flag was acceptable.<sup>361</sup>

At a press conference of the Democratic Party, its leader, Petar Gosev, warned that signing of the agreement would produce catastrophic consequences for the future of the state, would be a total fiasco for Macedonian diplomacy and was an agreement of a national shame. He stressed that the agreement denies the existence of Aegean Macedonians.

At the Universal Hall in Skopje, there was a meeting of representatives of VMRO-DPMNE, the World Macedonian Congress, the MA-AK-Conservative party, the Association “Dignity,” the Labor Party, and the Union of Independent Syndicates to express protest and disagreement about the accord. In the presence of some 100 people, the leaders of these parties expressed their discontent with, as they put it, “*the signing of the disgraceful document against Macedonian national dignity, on which the opposition was not even consulted.*” A declaration was read in which the government was accused of excluding the Macedonian public from the negotiations. The meeting announced a major protest in front of the Macedonian Parliament for the day when the Parliament was to ratify the document.<sup>362</sup>

Ljupcho Georgievski, leader of VMRO-DPMNE, said, “*I assure you the Greeks will start with blockades against Macedonia again, and our delegation doesn’t even know what it’s signing. What’s happening is a shameful defeat of Macedonian foreign policy.*”

The leader of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in Macedonia, Father Mihail, also expressed disapproval of the Accord.

City Hall of Prilep, at a special session, said that it did not agree with the Macedonian leadership and Kiro Gligorov as its leader about “*accepting of the Greek ultimatum*” for the change of the flag, constitution and name of Republic of Macedonia. It demanded that the gov-

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<sup>360</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Sept. 26, 1995.

<sup>361</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Oct. 5, 1995.

<sup>362</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Sept. 14, 1995.

ernment, Parliament and president of the republic urgently and energetically seek to terminate the negotiations in New York.<sup>363</sup>

Outside Macedonia, the Rainbow party of the Macedonian ethnic community in Greece welcomed the accord and asked for a similar dialogue between the Greek government and ethnic Macedonians in Greece.

However, a delegation of the Organization of United Macedonians and the Macedonian Community of North America came to Skopje to voice their concern about the accord. On behalf of the organization, President Vlado Grozdanovski explained, that they viewed any kind of concession as a defeat for Macedonian foreign policy. It requested that the flag not be changed and stated that the demand for a change of the constitution was an insult and interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. Also, losing the right of the home state to care for the rights of Macedonians from the occupied parts of Macedonia would be a national insult and an act of treachery to the nation's own people.

At the same time, in New York, in front of the United Nations building, a small group of Macedonians held a peaceful protest, waving the Macedonian flag. Disagreement about the signing was expressed also by Macedonian church communities and the Organization of United Macedonians of Toronto, Canada, the Australian-Macedonian Committee for Human Rights, and the Council of Macedonia of West Australia.

At the twenty-seventh session of the Macedonian Parliament, on October 5, 110 parliamentarians voted in favor of a proposal for a new flag for Macedonia, featuring a red base and a gold sun with eight sunrays. Only one delegate voted against this proposal, while four abstained. The flag became official immediately after publication of the decision in the Government Gazette.

Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou voiced his satisfaction at the decision as an integral part of the efforts for normalization of relations between the two countries.<sup>364</sup>

VMRO-DPMNE released a statement criticizing the move and declared it unacceptable.<sup>365</sup>

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<sup>363</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Sept. 13, 1995.

<sup>364</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Oct. 6, 1995.

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.*

With 102 votes “for,” 1 “against” and 2 “abstentions”, the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia adopted the law on the ratification of the accord between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece on October 9.<sup>366</sup> In his address, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski emphasized that with the accord, the Republic of Greece recognized the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia. Crvenkovski assessed the adoption of the law on the flag as the expression of an honest desire on behalf of Macedonia to implement the accord, and to restore normal neighborly relations. According to Crvenkovski, the document paved the way for a full normalization of relations with Serbia.

Macedonia was admitted as a member in the OSCE by a decision of the Standing Committee of the Organization held in Vienna on October 12.<sup>367</sup>

Towards the end of October, talks began with Greece and United Nations negotiators about the name of Macedonia, and after Greece offered the European Union verbal assurances about lifting the embargo, the Union decided to withdraw legal charges against Greece.

The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Skopje informed the Macedonian Foreign Ministry that the Republic of Macedonia had been accepted as a full member of the Black Sea Convention for cooperation in the field of culture, education, science and information, alongside the governments of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia.<sup>368</sup>

A month after the signing of the accord, some movement began at the Macedonian-Greek border points, though there were some problems. At one stage the Greek border authorities started charging border insurance of 160 Deutsche marks for cars (25,000 drachmas), and 500 DEM (80,000 drachmas) for cargo vehicles, though this was soon abandoned.<sup>369</sup>

People from the Republic of Macedonia originating from the Aegean part of Macedonia (northern Greece) were at first not being issued visas on the Macedonian-Greek border. It later emerged that the major issue was the writing of the Greek birthplace in the Macedonian script and following the Macedonian nomenclature.

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<sup>366</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Oct. 10, 1995.

<sup>367</sup> *MILS News*; Skopje, Oct. 13, 1995.

<sup>368</sup> *MIC*, Skopje; Oct. 26, 1995.

<sup>369</sup> *MILS News*, Skopje; Oct. 30, 1995.

Within days of the formal parliamentary approval of the new Macedonian flag, it was hanging in front of the United Nations building in New York. The Macedonian delegation, led by the Macedonian Parliament president, Stojan Andov, was present at the ceremony of the first raising. The ceremony was opened by the Secretary General, who stressed: *“There are not so many images that express such a collective strength as the flags near the U.N. building... The act of hanging up the Macedonian flag symbolizes the truth and understanding, the friendship in the region and in the international community because its colors are among those of other flags.”* In conclusion, Mr. Boutros-Ghali wished for Macedonia *“to live in peace as a full member of the family of nations.”*

## INTERVIEWS

### THE COMMERCIAL ASPECT OF THE “DISPUTE”<sup>370</sup>

- *Professor Kikerkova, in many instances the International Crisis Group Report states that if the Republic of Macedonia is recognized under its “constitutional name”, it will use its position to cause economic impairment to Greece. We are interested in this commercial utilization. What does it consist of and what are the possible consequences?*

**Kikerkova:** The “commercial impairment” that the Republic of Macedonia could possibly cause to the Hellenic Republic refers to the use of the name “Macedonia” for many Greek products. Most of the products involving the name “Macedonia” are aimed to be exported by Greece and therefore it fears of economic loss caused by the Republic of Macedonia. According to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), when a geographical name or indication is used, the country they belong to should receive certain share of the sales in the form of royalty, or else penalties shall be paid. So this is one of the problems for the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name and the accession in WTO under this name. Since the Republic of Macedonia is not a member of WTO<sup>371</sup>, it could not raise a dispute

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<sup>370</sup> This Interview with Prof. Irena Kikerkova was conducted on April 11, 2002 in her office at the Faculty of Economics at the SS. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje when she was still an associate professor. The motive for this conversation was to provide an analysis of the economic relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic, more specifically about what was stated as one of the obstacles for faster resolution of the name dispute in the International Crisis Group Report – the question of the Macedonian economic dependence from Greece. In the beginning, the Professor told us that she does not have information to fully illustrate the problem of the increasing dependence of Macedonian economy from the Greek economy, except for the official data on the foreign trade and foreign direct investments originating from Greece. “*I would gladly provide some statistical data and numbers on all the products involving the name ‘Macedonia’ that Greece exports on the foreign market but this kind of analysis has not been done in our country, not even as an estimate*” professor Kikerkova says.

Professor Irena Kikerkova Ph.D. teaches Foreign Trade and International Economy at the Faculty of Economics. She wrote the book “Foreign Direct Investments in Transitional Countries - including a special review of the conditions in the Republic of Macedonia” (*St ranski di rekt ni invest i ci i vo zemji t e vo t ranzi ci ja - so poseben osvrt na sost ojb i t e vo Republ i ka Makedoni ja*) (Skopje - 1998), as well as the textbook for the Foreign Trade subject (2000). She has also written several professional works from this area which were published in domestic and foreign magazines.

<sup>371</sup> Today the Republic of Macedonia is a fully fledged member of this organization.

against the use of the indications “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” for Greek products by the Hellenic Republic. If the Republic of Macedonia is recognized under its constitutional name and becomes a WTO member under this name, then it will have real chances to protect its interests by means of international arbitrage. That is the reason why the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the WTO is prolonged even though our finance minister<sup>372</sup> is too optimistic when stating that our country will become a WTO member by the end of this year<sup>373</sup>. However, it is more than certain that regarding our WTO membership, the resolution of the name dispute of the Republic of Macedonia and the results from it are very significant.

*- Bearing in mind the economic condition of the Republic of Macedonia ever since its independence and the Greek investments in our country, could you explain the economic dependence between Macedonia and Greece?*

**Kikerkova:** Greece is one of the biggest investors in the Republic of Macedonia. More specifically, it is on the second place on the list of foreign direct investors which indicates economic dependence from this “partner”. This is also obvious from the fact that Greece possesses the biggest Macedonian companies, such as Okta, Zito Luks, OTE etc., which bring large profit and put us in a position of dependence because this relationship with one foreign partner, in this case Greece, establishes not only significant economic but also political dependence. Obviously, Greek investors have previously devised adept and knowledgeable strategy. In this area, the strategy of our Government proved to be by far less successful and full of inconsistencies, especially in the persistence to privatize loss making companies by means of foreign direct investments. However, I must say that despite all these actions undertaken by our Government, selling Okta proved to be the best move. The biggest advantage that Macedonia will take from the sell of Otko is the oil pipeline that should be built on its territory. However, the total realization is delayed due to the expropriation problems on the Greek territory where the oil pipeline is supposed to be built. Of course, this problem may be used as an artificial postponement of the project real-

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<sup>372</sup> At the time of the interview, Mr. Nikola Gruevski, from the right-wing political party Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity was finance minister. At the moment of publishing of this book, he is the Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia.

<sup>373</sup> The year in question is 2002.

ization even though the Greek party claims that it requires sustainable legal solution to this problem. As to the selling of Okta, I would like to point to the astonishing move of the Greek investors that pressured our Government to accept and approve this sale without being worried that the Republic of Macedonia at the time received a wave of Kosovo refugees and our north neighbor was air bombed by the NATO alliance. This changes the nature of this process, because this action of the Greek Government, which invested so much in a risky area such the Republic of Macedonia at that time, is totally incomprehensive and astonishing.

- *Does the prolongation of the name dispute is an advantage of the Republic of Macedonia or in this case Greece would be the winner?*

**Kikerkova:** I would say that the Republic of Macedonia would lose everything! This is due to what I previously mentioned, the dependence from Greece, which invested over 400 million dollars and it is on the second place of foreign investors. Investing such an amount of money in one place is not a minor thing. For example, in the Republic of Slovenia, which is far more developed than the Republic of Macedonia, one of the major investors is Germany. So, every time that the Slovenians are talking about this dependence, they use words such as “*every time the Germans sneeze, we cough*”. If that is what Slovenians say about their dependence from Germany, than I would say that if things continue to develop with this tempo, then, as regards our dependence from Greece, we would say “*If Greece sneezes, we will get pneumonia*”. This is due to the fact that considering the current economic situation, it is more than clear that the biggest profit from the companies where Greek companies have made investments, is drawn by the Republic of Greece, which is investing little in new equipment (except for Okta). On the other hand, Macedonian companies have come to this stage because they find it difficult to place products on the European market unless they are not supported by a more developed foreign company. So this economic position may put the Republic of Macedonia in less favorable situation than the embargo in 1994. If we add the disaster that happened in Macedonia due to the last year’s conflict (2001) then we may conclude that the possible prolongation of the dispute will cause great losses to the Republic of Macedonia. But this does not mean that our country or our politicians should accept any proposed solution by foreign experts that would make Macedonia give up its constitutional name and repeat the mistake that we did in 1995 when due to external pressures and the embargo we signed the *Interim Accord* with Greece

and we gave up the Vergina Sun. Another important problem is the unjust appropriation of the banished Aegean Macedonians' possessions. If a dispute is raised before the European institutions for protection of human rights they would surely rule in favor of the deprived Macedonians. As to the loss of Greece if forced to pay compensation for using the name "Macedonia" for its products (if, say, we become members of WTO), I could not give a precise answer because, as I said in the beginning of this conversation, data on the number and type of these products are not available in our country.

-In the end I would like to ask you about something different from what we discussed so far, that is a question related to the crisis of the Republic of Macedonia after the war in Kosovo. How much did Macedonia lose from this war and what can be expected in the economic area, considering that we went through another conflict last year in 2001?

**Kikerkova:** The war in Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia had catastrophic consequences for Macedonia. During the war Macedonia suffered enormous economic loss because many gardening plants that were supposed to be exported in Yugoslavia remained on the border. Due to the war, Macedonia could not export products on the single market which accounted for the largest part of its income. The war closed the borders and all of the products that were supposed to be exported remained here. But Macedonia suffered the most from the refugees that massed on its territory and worsened the economic situation even more. I believe that this crisis was the Yugoslavian reaction to the Republic of Macedonia for allowing its territory to be used for overtaking air raids. However, I think that the consequences of this war are yet to come.

PRAZNA

**LEGAL DIMENSION OF THE DISPUTE**

**ACCESSION OF MACEDONIA TO UN  
SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE THE ICJ**



*Macedonia's name change  
law – ICG, December 2006*

## UN AND THE GREEK-MACEDONIAN NAME DISPUTE<sup>374</sup>

1. One of the key steps in the process of international recognition of RM was the country's accession to UN (8 April, 1993). For this purpose, RM had to meet the conditions provided in Article 4 (1) of the UN Charter<sup>375</sup> - that is to be a state, to be a peace-loving state, to accept the obligations arising from the UN Charter and to be able and willing to carry out these obligations. On the basis of such defined membership presumptions, the International Court of Justice lays down the principles upon which the accession of every country to UN is based.<sup>376</sup> Namely, Article 4 (1) includes extensive, but not exempli causa list of membership conditions which can be arbitrarily shortened or extended depending on the state in question; the conditions are clear and unambiguous, once they are met they represent acquisition of inalienable and unconditional membership right in the Organization, which must be exercised without any additional arbitrariness; the defined conditions must be met prior to submitting the membership application, argumentum a contrario, it is a breach of right to lay down additional conditions to be fulfilled post factum, and last but not least from practical point of view, the accession to the Organization is undisputed fact of collective recognition of newly established state. In the case of RM accession to UN, under the influence of Greek-Macedonian name dispute, all but the last legal principle were violated. Additional membership conditions were laid down – provisional reference “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” of RM for UN purposes and start of negotiations for “*overcoming the differences regarding the country's*

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<sup>374</sup> The author of this text is Professor Tatjana Petrushevska, PhD. In fact, this is a (the first) part of a larger paper analysing Nimetz's proposal from 2005 under the title: *Kakva e ulogat a na ON vo ref avawet o na gr-ko-makedonski ot spor? (What is the role of the UN in the resolution of the Greek-Macedonian dispute?)*

<sup>375</sup> Article 4 (1) of the UN Charter states: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” United Nations – *Basic documents...*, quote, page 12

<sup>376</sup> The Court did this according to the advisory opinion requested by the UN General Assembly in virtue of arbitrary interpretation of the article in question. Namely, USSR conditioned the accession of Cisjordania, Italy, Finland, Portugal and Ireland to UN in 1948 by the accession of other group of states (Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4), Advisory Opinion, 1948, ICH Rep. 57, 61 (May, 28). More on the principles in Janev I., „*Legal aspects of the use of a provisional name for Macedonia in the United Nations system*“, AJIL, vol. 93, 1999; pp. 157 and from there on.

*name*<sup>377</sup>, the latter to be carried out in interim, undefined time period after the accession of RM in UN.

2. RM did not take its chances before the International Court of Justice<sup>378</sup> to initiate proceedings for resolution of the name dispute with

<sup>377</sup> SC Res. 817, UN SCOR 48th Sess. Res. Dec. S/INF/49 (1993); GA Res 47/225, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 2 at 6, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1993).

<sup>378</sup> The constitutive act of the Organization – the Charter, among other articles, determines the International Court of Justice as one of the main bodies in Article 7 (1). Apart from this article in which one part provides interpretation of the nature of the bodies referred therein, Article 92 has specific purpose to define, among other matters, the reference of the Court to the Organization. It takes explicit position that “*The International Court is the principal judicial body of the UN*”. The provisions defined in this way are sufficient ground to draw the conclusion that the International Court of Justice can not stand without UN. Indeed, the constitutive document of the Court – the Statute (see UN publication – *Basic documents...*, quote, page 45 and from there on) – is multilateral interstate agreement. As such it is annexed to the UN Charter, of which it forms an integral part. Consequently, all UN member states are automatically parties to the Statute of the Court. Furthermore, in case a non-member state of the UN wishes to become a party to the Statute, the conditions that the state needs to meet in order to achieve its wish can only be defined by the UN bodies – the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. These two bodies also have the key role in the process of selecting the Court’s composition. And last but not least, the Security Council as a UN body, which at the same time holds the first instance responsibility for keeping the international peace and security, under certain conditions ensures the enforcement of the Court’s decision in case a certain party in the dispute refuses to comply. However, a far more delicate approach is required to determine the character of the Court. It is inevitable that the approach must start from more substantial dimension of the body in question. Surely, this dimension is expressed mainly through the name of the body. The term “international” implies an institution in which only subjects of international law can take part. In fact, only states that hold original subjectivity, regardless whether they are UN member-states (*ratione personae* jurisdiction). Why would the states “stand before” this Court? Because they hold the contentious capacity of the proceedings, in which interstate disputes are resolved on the basis of international law. Physical entities, corporations or other entities are not eligible to become contentious parties to the court proceedings. In fact, proceedings involving disputes between such subjects, or between such subjects and a certain state, can not be initiated. Finally, interstate disputes are resolved not by the states, but by a third party defined as objective and unbiased – having judicial function based on application of international law, that is to say based on sub-summarization of the specific dispute under the relevant provision or provisions of international law. In addition, the Court does not serve as a body for implementation of the Organization’s political will, but as a body for reviving the positive universal legal order. The Court acts as a body of contemporary “international community”, not just of the UN, although UN consists of all relevant members of the contemporary international community. In comparison to the judicial bodies which function within the individual internal legal systems of the existing countries, the International Court is a specific institution for applying the law. Regarding the fact that the international community is a particular social community basically different from the national communities, it is logical its legal institution to be *sui generis*. If the contemporary international community continues to act as Westphalian type of community, which means classically decentralized/dispersed community in which the states as power holders do not recognize a priori arbitration, then it is natural the Court to be a specific judicial body in terms of the dominance in the process of reaching an agreement between states – its parties in the key aspects of its function. The consensual nature of the Court is expressed through the possibility of the states to participate individually in the composition of the Court (*ad hoc* judges) and thus influence the legal source to be applied in the actual case (for example, when they allow the Court to reach a fair decision on the actual case – *ex aequo et bono*), and through the right to determine the jurisdiction of the Court.

RG. Understandably, since the jurisdiction of the Court in international disputes can not be in any case enforced, in personal sense, unless the states in question explicitly manifested their own will to be parties in the proceedings within this Court. The states have exclusive right, according to their own will, to draw Court's attention that certain dispute or certain kinds of disputes have to be resolved by the Court itself. More precisely, the consent provided by the states in this matter constitutes de iure the actual jurisdiction of the International Court. Therefore, the Court's jurisdiction within the procedure of judgment includes contractual character par excellence. Consequently, when the Court determines its own jurisdiction in the actual case (the competence to decide upon its own jurisdiction), it only establishes whether the concerned states have the will to settle the dispute before this Court.

3. The stated will can be manifested in one of the following ways:<sup>379</sup>

- when the parties in an existing dispute reach an agreement which allows the International Court of Justice to resolve the matter. In other words, the parties in the dispute conclude an agreement (compromise)<sup>380</sup> in which they define in concreto the substantive jurisdiction of the Court;<sup>381</sup>

- when a party initiates court proceedings against a state that has not recognized the jurisdiction of the Court up to the present moment, but did so during the proceedings (forum prorogatum), not through official announcement but through a concludent action;<sup>382</sup>

- when the jurisdiction of the Court is officially introduced in bilateral and multilateral agreements which involve legal consequences. Technically, this is done either with special provisions inserted in the agreement (compromise provisions) as part of the final provisions or with special agreement which is annexed to the general agreement in

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<sup>379</sup> In general, they are provided in Article 36 (1) (2) of the Statute.

<sup>380</sup> Examples of such special agreements (compromises) are available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM>, pp. 3.

<sup>381</sup> The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice until 1996 (up until the information is available on the internet) was determined in this way in 13 and 11 cases respectively (see each case of the International Court at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.-HTM>, pp. 2).

<sup>382</sup> Examples of Court's jurisprudence in this matter can be found in Avramov S. – Kreka M., "International Public Law" (*Međunarodno javno pravo*), Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1990, page 489 and at <http://-www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM>, pp. 2.

the form of protocol or annex. In terms of the content, the provisions or the special agreement may “insist” on various ways of peaceful resolving of disputes, such as the legal ways (arbitration or in the International Court), which take place in chronological order after all other have failed to provide results (read - contingency alternative); or they can determine the Court to be the only method for resolving the potential disputes resulting from the enforcement of the actual agreement;<sup>383</sup>

- when unilateral declarations are deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN, who transmits the declarations thereof to states parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court, in which certain states become part of the system provided with the compulsory clause defined in Article 36 (2): “*The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a) the interpretation of a treaty; b) any question of international law; c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation*”.

4. The declarations for recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court to settle disputes are unilateral legal acts.<sup>384</sup> They include legal consequences only for the states which also have recognized the jurisdiction of the Court in the form of unilateral legal acts. Conditionally speaking, in terms of the constituent states of the above-mentioned system, the International Court of Justice has the judicial function of internal law<sup>385</sup>, however only to the extent that declarations match their content. Namely, declarations are deposited conditionally or unconditionally, under defined reservation:

- *ratione personae*, meaning that some states which recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court do not include disputes with certain states (i.e. states with which they do not have established diplo-

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<sup>383</sup> Examples of such multilateral agreements can be found at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM>, p. 4-5.

<sup>384</sup> See the list of states which have filed unilateral declarations up until 1996 to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court through “an optional clause” at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM>; p. 8.

<sup>385</sup> As an example, in 1925 so much as 23 states out of 38 states parties to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice were part of the system of accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, in contrast to only 59 out of 187 states parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice in 1995 (<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM> p. 6).

matic relations; states which are neither members of UN nor parties to the Statute of the Court – negative clause; or states which are members of specific entity, such as the member states of the Commonwealth of Nations in the declaration of Great Britain – positive clause),<sup>386</sup>

- *ratione materiae*, which means exemption of certain types of disputes, i.e. disputes involving matters related especially to the internal jurisdiction of the states in accordance with the international law or the internal law of the state in question; disputes for which other peaceful resolution techniques are anticipated; disputes which originate in time of hostility; disputes related to multilateral agreements; disputes which are associated to some aspect of the Law of the Sea, etc.,<sup>387</sup>

- *ratione temporis*, which means exemption of certain types of disputes which originated before or after a legally relevant date, most commonly disputes which take place in time when the state in question has not recognized the jurisdiction of the Court.<sup>388</sup>

5. In this specific case, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Karolos Papoulias, signed the unilateral Declaration on 20 December, 1993. Thus, RG recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court “*ipso facto and without special agreement in all legal disputes referred to in Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court*”.<sup>389</sup> However, the Declaration contains a couple of reservations: *ratione personae* and *ratione materiae*. The first condition exempts any potential dispute from the jurisdiction of the Court arising between states which have not deposited declarations that match the content of the one submitted by RG (condition of reciprocity), while the second exempts from the actual jurisdiction of the Court “*any dispute relating to defensive military action ... for reasons of national defense*”.<sup>390</sup>

It is evident that RG did not include any reservation in terms of the Macedonian-Greek name dispute in the declaration for recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, although the declaration was deposited in time when RG was extremely interested in the existence of an entity at its northern border which in any way or manner would

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<sup>386</sup> Avramov S. – Kresa M., *ibid.*, page 489; <http://www.icjci.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/-ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM>; p. 6-7.

<sup>387</sup> See at <http://www.icjci.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM>, p. 7.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>389</sup> See the text of the *Declaration* at <http://157.150.195.3/LibertyX::D7EjQgPZaNEEtM14NIBQLATY>.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*

use the term “Macedonia” as part of its name. The aforementioned reservation, even when interpreted most extensively, can not still “cover” the Macedonian-Greek name dispute since the term “military action” has a precisely limited meaning. The declaration is explicitly determined with duration of five years. This formulation does not exclude ipso facto the legal consequences of the declaration after the period of duration; instead, it should be interpreted in the direction that the legal consequences shall apply for at least five years. After the period of duration, however, the declaration “*shall remain in force until the announcement of the termination of the legal effect*”.<sup>391</sup> Such announcement of termination of the legal effect of the declaration has not been addressed yet.<sup>392</sup>

6. On the contrary, RM does not belong to the group of states which conditionally or unconditionally recognized the substantive jurisdiction of the Court.<sup>393</sup>

The absence of declaration for recognising the jurisdiction of the Court by either party in the dispute is legally relevant fact that inhibits the initiation of contentious procedure before the International Court. In addition, *the Interim Accord for normalization of the relations between the Hellenic Republic and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (13 September, 1995) contains standard compromise clause – Article 21 – as part of the final provisions which states: “*1. The Parties shall settle any disputes exclusively by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; 2. Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.*”<sup>394</sup>

Article 5 (1) states: “*The Parties agree to continue negotiations - (for the differences with respect to the name, author’s note) - under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993)*”.<sup>395</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> Ibid.

<sup>392</sup> See the list of declarations at [.../fastweb.exe?state\\_id=1037127083&view+ treaties&-docrank +124&numhitsfound+12739&01.11.02.](#)

<sup>393</sup> Ibid.

<sup>394</sup> See Article 21 of the Interim Accord for normalization of the relations between the Hellenic Republic and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, “Official Gazette of Republic of Macedonia” No. 48, 12.10.1995, page I-IV.

<sup>395</sup> See Article 5 (1) of the Interim Accord.

Apparently both contracting parties reached an agreement to bring before the International Court of Justice any dispute which might arise from the Interim Accord. This provision constitutes the substantive jurisdiction of the Court. However, this agreement is reached under the reservation of the name dispute which is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court. RM, as well as RG, is liable to respect the Accord entirely (the principle *Pacta sunt servanda* is absolutely obligatory legal rule), that is to say, to implement it in good faith (*bona fide*). This obligation is effective to the point when the Accord no longer has legal consequences.

The termination of the Interim Accord is provided for in Article 23 (2): “*This Interim Accord shall remain in force until superseded by a definitive agreement, provided that after seven years either Party may withdraw from this Interim Accord by a written notice, which shall take effect 12 months after its delivery to the other Party*”. In this way, seven years after the Accord took effect (13 October, 1995) either party can withdraw from the agreement by delivering a *written notice* to the other party. However, the notice takes effect one year after its official delivery to the other party. After the period of seven years neither party has cancelled the *Accord*.

7. If RM eventually decides to initiate a contentious procedure before the Court, first it must withdraw from the *Interim Accord* (the entire agreement along with all its provisions, not just the ones related to the name dispute). After that, it must submit a declaration for recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court that matches the content of the declaration submitted by RG. *The declaration* must be signed by the present Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Government of Republic of Macedonia and deposited subsequently with the Secretary-General of the UN, who transmits the declaration thereof to states parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. There is also a legal and technical possibility which allows RG to avoid the court proceedings for settlement of the dispute in spite of the steps undertaken by RM. For that reason, the cancellation period of one year is not meaningless. Namely, assuming that RM withdraws from the *Interim Accord*, this period is sufficient enough for RG to terminate the effect of the declaration without having to submit new declaration, or to terminate the existing declaration and formulate a new declaration including the reservation which would exclude *ratione materiae* the name dispute from the jurisdiction of the Court.

8. Nevertheless, RM has never shown political will to initiate proceedings before the International Court of Justice. Not just contentious, but no proceedings whatsoever which might lead to the fact that the accession of RM to UN would involve *ultra vires* acts enforced by the competent bodies of the UN (the Security Council and the General Assembly) in view of the rights of the Organisation through violation of several absolutely obligatory legal principles of the common international law, such as “self-determination of nations”, “essential domestic jurisdiction of states”, “sovereign equality of states”, that is “prohibition of any kind of discrimination of states”.<sup>396</sup> This fact, on its merits, is a legally relevant solid basis for issuing advisory procedure before the Court, which is particularly different from the so-called contentious procedure:

- **firstly**, the subjects/entities can initiate proceedings before the Court. A procedure for requesting advisory opinion can not be commenced by a state, but only by the following bodies or institutions:

\* The General Assembly or the United Nations Security Council, in virtue of the authorization based directly on the content of the *Charter*.<sup>397</sup> This denotes a general authorization (*mandatum generale*) for the reason that these bodies can request for advisory opinions on any legal question without any restriction;

\* other bodies of the UN, on the basis of special authorization (*mandatum speciale*) by the General Assembly, may request for advisory opinions on any legal questions arising within the scope of their activities,<sup>398</sup>

\* specialized agencies of the UN may also request for advisory opinions upon the prior special authorization by the General Assembly.<sup>399</sup>

Naturally, representatives of the member states “seat” in all the bodies and organizations mentioned previously. In ultima linea, the states, which consider their own interests, have the final word concerning the decision for exercising the right for commencement of procedure for request of advisory opinion. However, the final decision is not

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<sup>396</sup> In addition, from a legal point of view, it is irrelevant which institution in RM gave consent to the act of violation of international law, since the potential consent to the illicit act does not have the capacity to eliminate its unlawfulness!

<sup>397</sup> See Article 96 (1) of the Charter.

<sup>398</sup> The possibility of the General Assembly to give authorization at any given moment is provided for in Article 96 (2) of the Charter.

<sup>399</sup> See Article 96 (2) of the Charter. More at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneration/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM>, *Advisory opinions*; p. 1-2.

a simple summarization of the will of the member states of a given body/organization, but a new quality which takes into account the broader legal interests. Therefore, the opinion is requested on behalf of a certain body or organization. No state has the right to inhibit the request for advisory opinion;

- **secondly**, the obligation of the Court to conduct certain procedure. Namely, after careful consideration of the formulation of the Statute which regulates its substantive jurisdiction – “*The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which...*”<sup>400</sup> – the Court, as a competent body, has no other alternative but to conduct contentious procedure (obligatory action) if any state issues proceedings before the Court. Contrary to this, the formulation “*The Court may give an advisory opinion*”<sup>401</sup>, allows the Court to decide whether the provision of advisory opinion on a legal question is appropriate or not (optional action);

- **thirdly**, the decisions adopted in a contentious procedure are legally mandatory acts. In contrast, the advisory opinions are not legally binding, not even for the requesting parties. Nevertheless, this is more practice rather than law, having in mind the enormous authority of the Court in view of the people “seating” in it, the bodies and the organizations refrain from a behavior which might be basically noted as contrary to the UN Charter or any other international act.

9. In formal law, the procedure can be initiated either by the Security Council or the General Assembly. In practice, since the establishment of UN, the Security Council has addressed only one request for advisory opinion.<sup>402</sup> For that reason, in reality it is best that the legal matter, for which an advisory opinion has been requested, is formulated by the body which has been doing this most frequently – the General Assembly. On this occasion, I would disregard the enormous work related to the preparation of the process of formal voting on the decision which involves painstaking, exhausting “bargaining” combined with intense lobbying among the representatives of the member states in order to: firstly, get familiar with the issue, and secondly, understand its long-range implications. This part of the work is done through diplomacy and professional lobbying. If completed successfully, stricto

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<sup>400</sup> See Article 36 (1) of the Statute.

<sup>401</sup> See Article 65 (1) of the Statute.

<sup>402</sup> See at: [http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM,Advisory opinions](http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbookchapter3.HTM,Advisory%20opinions); pp. 1-2.

sensu, the procedure within the plenary body would have to start with placing the matter on the agenda. The decision for request of advisory opinion does not fall among the important issues that demand two-thirds majority.<sup>403</sup> It is made by a majority of the members present and voting.<sup>404</sup> The resulting act from the voting shall be formulated in the form of resolution or decision. Such act would have to “pass” in the Legal (Sixth) Committee of the Assembly, or at least in the General Committee in which some of the members of the Legal Committee also participate. Having in mind the fact that on the occasion of the admission of RM to UN membership, contrary to Article 4 of the Charter in which the conditions for admission are determined, other additional conditions were formulated, and thus the question might be: “*Is there a breach of the rights of the Organization in the case of the admission of RM to the United Nations, or whether the Security Council or the General Assembly on behalf of the UN adopted ultra vires act*”? The Court is not legally obliged to initiate procedure for request of advisory opinion. However, there is a belief that, if all previous phases are carried out carefully and successfully, the Court, regarding the representation of its composition, would not miss the opportunity to repeat what was said long ago on the occasion of the rejection of the admission of other states to membership in the Nations.<sup>405</sup> The advisory opinion which might be formulated by the Court is not legally binding act. Still, up until now the opinions have had great influence over the practice of the Organization.

10. In conclusion, in accordance with the quoted acts of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, RM and RG started negotiations to settle “the differences regarding the name” in 1993. The negotiations are still ongoing as planned, namely “*under the auspices of the UN*”. Such formulation in the practice of the Organization is synonym for its facilitation/mediation as a diplomatic technique for peaceful settlement of disputes between member states in particular, and between non-member states as well.<sup>406</sup> In the Macedonian-Greek name dispute, the Organization in general acts as a mediator, instead of a physical entity per se who would perform important functions in the interest of the Organization at any given moment,

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<sup>403</sup> See Article 18 (2) of the UN Charter.

<sup>404</sup> See Article 18 (3) of the UN Charter.

<sup>405</sup> See at <http://www.icj-cij/iccjwww/igeneralinformation/ibook/Bbook8-2.01.htm>

<sup>406</sup> See Article 33 of the UN Charter.

for example the Secretary-General of the Organization, or much less any other person connected in any way to the Organization. The UN decides who and how long will the person perform the mediation function on behalf of the organization! The organization also appoints a person who will present it, as mediator in a concrete dispute. Of course, this is carried out by the supreme administrative official of the Organization - the Secretary-General. He appropriately appoints the adequate person to be personal, special envoy (UN Secretary General personal, special envoy),<sup>407</sup> and it is completely clear that the Secretary-General envoy speaks on behalf of the Secretary, who is representative of the Organization. Hence, the special envoy for the Macedonian-Greek dispute in the process of mediation represents, through the head of the Secretariat, the Organization in general. All his procedures, activities and proposals suggested during the negotiation process, are carried out as an agent of the Organization, meaning that the special envoy acts on its behalf. Therefore, the documents, or the papers, prepared by the special envoy in prospect of a settlement of the dispute, even if prepared entirely as a result of his individual intellectual effort, at the moment of their publication receive the status/treatment of official documents of the Organization.

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<sup>407</sup> See at <http://www.un.org/news/press/dots/1999/19991223.sga717.doc.html> and <http://www.un.org/news/oss/srsg/europa/htm>.

## THE UNITED NATIONS CANNOT IMPOSE NEW CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION OF COUNTRIES<sup>408</sup>

The unusual conditions in *Resolution 817* are extraneous to the limited list laid down in Article 4. Furthermore, these conditions transcend the act of admission in time. Since the Charter does not provide any provision for other conditions for admission, it appears that the conditions imposed on Macedonia have no legal basis. Certainly, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice makes clear that all conditions for admission to membership must be fulfilled before admission is effected. Since the conditions imposed represent purely political considerations, they are incompatible with the spirit of the conditions within the UN Charter.

Further on, another relevant fact is that Security Council Resolution 817, after explicitly recognizing that the applicant state “fulfills the criteria for membership in the United Nations laid down in Article 4”, recommended to the General Assembly that the state be admitted. The act of recommendation recognized that the conditions laid down in Article 4 had been fulfilled. So, the additional criteria added to the recommendation of Macedonia for membership in the United Nations created a logical inconsistency, since the Charter contains a closed list of requirements. Once those requirements are found to have been satisfied, the state obtains a right to admission. The additional conditions added by the Security Council and the General Assembly appear to negate the conclusion that the state is entitled to admission in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Charter that were met by Macedonia.

Thus, the recognition of its fulfillment of the conditions for admission means that the Security Council affirmed that the applicant

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<sup>408</sup> The presented text is excerpted from the monthly magazine *Makedonsko vreme*, October, 1999, and the author is Dr. Igor Janev. Igor Janev completed his Ph.D. degree in Skopje, and specialized in Washington and at the elite School of International Law in Massachusetts, as well as at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. As a special scientific researcher at the School of Foreign Service, within Georgetown University in Washington, and member of the American Society of International Law and the Academic Council for the System of the United Nations, in 1998 he found four documents that refer to the position of the Republic of Macedonia within the United Nations and are significant for the regulation of the country’s constitutional name.

country is a peace-loving country, able and willing to carry out the obligations in the Charter, which include (among others) the obligations defined in Article 2 paragraph 4: “*All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*” On the bases of this, it appears contradictory and incompatible with the law, the Security Council Resolution to report that “*a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighborly relations in the region.*” This provision implies that the applicant country is unwilling to carry out the obligations laid down in Article 2 paragraph 4. The abovementioned advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the General Assembly Resolution 197 do not permit such contradictory declarations: the country has either passed or failed the test for admission. The principles of exhaustiveness, explicitness, prior fulfillment and recognition, which are embedded in the Court’s interpretation of the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, must mean that it would be logically inconsistent to add additional conditions to the resolutions that recommend or the decisions that provide for the admission of a country.

It can be argued that the logic of the Court’s opinion also refers to the provision within Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter which reads as follows: “*Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.*”

Thus, in interpreting this paragraph in connection with the admission of states to membership in the United Nations, the Judge Krylov (who participated in the proceedings of the International Court of Justice in 1948) stated that: “*a member of the United nations is not justified in basing (its) opposition to the admission of a particular state on arguments which relate to matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the applicant state.*” This statement reiterates the principle embedded in the advisory opinion of the Court and in the Resolution 197 of the General Assembly, that, once the appropriate UN bodies determine that the criteria of Article 4 have been fulfilled, neither a UN body nor a member of the Organization can condition the admission of the applicant state on any additional consideration, particularly if it falls within the domestic jurisdiction of the applicant state. Cer-

tainly, the name a state wishes to adopt is a domestic matter having no direct impact on any other state!

Furthermore, on the basis of the principle of separability of domestic and international jurisdiction, it can be argued that the substantive Greek allegation that the name of the applicant state implies “territorial claims” has no legal significance. Obviously, the name of the state, which is a subject of that state’s jurisdiction (since every state naturally has an inherent right to a name), does not create international legal rights for the state that adopts the name, nor does it impose legal obligations on other states. Clearly, the name by itself does not have a direct impact on the territorial rights of states. Greece advanced practically the same objections and demands as regards the recognition of Macedonia by the European Community. Nevertheless, the EC Arbitration Commission on the former Yugoslavia did not link the name of the country (Republic of Macedonia) to Greek territorial rights. Prominent scholars of international law, professors Henkin, Pugh, Schachter and Smit observe that “*there appears to be no bases in international law or practice for the Greek demand Macedonia to change its name claiming that the right to use that name should belong to Greece.*” It is apparent that the Greek demands regarding the name of Macedonia are motivated mainly by the concern that the admission of a country to the United Nations with that name may additionally, in the political arena, strengthen the possible Macedonian claims to Greek territory. The name itself has no legal bearing on such a dispute and no relevance to the qualifications that may legally be considered in connection with the admission of the state to the United Nations.

To nullify the Greek concern that the name of the country implies territorial claims against Greece, Macedonia adopted two amendments to its Constitution on January 6, 1992. The amendments assert that Macedonia “*has no territorial claims against any neighboring country*”; that its borders can be changed only in accordance with the Constitution and “*the generally accepted international standards*”; and that, in exercising care for the status and rights of its citizens and minorities in neighboring countries, it “*shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states and their internal affairs*”. Furthermore, it can be noted that after the two countries concluded the Interim Accord on September 13, 1995, under the auspices of the UN, their relations entered into a period of steady and progressive development.

From the point of view of the legal theory, the inherent right of a state to have a name is derived from the necessity for a juridical person-

ality to have a legal identity. In the absence of such identity, the juridical person (such as a state) could, to a certain degree (or even completely), lose its capacity to conclude agreements and independently enter into relations with other juridical persons. Therefore, the name of a state appears to be essential element in its juridical personality and its statehood. The principles of the sovereign equality of states and the inviolability of their juridical personality lead to the conclusion that the choice of a name is an inalienable right to the state. In this context, external interference with this basic right is inadmissible, irrespective of territorial and similar arguments. This conclusion is consistent with the previously mentioned opinion (*opinion iuris*) of Henkin, Pugh, Schachter and Smit that states have no exclusive right to name under international law. Perhaps the international community should develop appropriate legal mechanisms and rules for hypothetical situations when two or more states wish to use the same name. However, this is not the case in the Greek-Macedonian dispute, since the name “Macedonia” is used by Greece to designate one of its provinces (which is not international legal person).

The question of a legal linkage between the conditions for admission to UN and the conditions for recognition of a state was deliberated in UN at the beginning of the 1950s. The Secretariat prepared a memorandum on legal aspects of representation in the United Nations and communicated it to the Security Council. The memorandum emphasized that the recognition of a state and its admission to UN membership are governed by different rules. Recognition is mainly “political” decision of individual countries, whereas admission to membership is a collective act of the General Assembly based on the right to membership of (any) state that meets the prescribed criteria. Therefore, there is no link – juridical or otherwise – between the conditions for recognition of a state by another state and the conditions for admission to the United Nations. On this basis, the memorandum underlined that it is inadmissible to condition admission by recognition, since admission does not imply recognition by any government. This conclusion is consistent with the previously mentioned advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and with the principle of universality of the United Nations.

In conclusion, once the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the *UN Charter* are fulfilled, the applicant state acquires an inalienable right to UN membership. On the basis of the assessment of the Security Council that Macedonia had satisfied the conditions of Article 4 and

General Assembly Resolution 197 regarding the observance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, it appears that the Macedonian application for membership should have been handled in accordance with the existing standard admission procedure and law. The additional conditions related to the name of the state constitute violation of the Charter!

## MEMORANDUM OF GREECE AND MEMORANDUM OF MACEDONIA REGARDING ADMISSION OF MACEDONIA TO UNITED NATIONS<sup>409</sup>

In the process of establishing its independence and simultaneously obtaining international recognition, the Republic of Macedonia was faced with large number of challenges, at national, as well as, international level. In this direction, in many ways, the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia presented a precedent at political and legal level:

- firstly, the mechanism established for “collective recognition” of all former Yugoslav republics by the European Community<sup>410</sup> through the Arbitration Commission, whose opinion was not respected in the adoption of the political decision on recognition;
- secondly, additional and special recognition terms were imposed on the Republic of Macedonia within the procedure formulated for its recognition by the European Community;
- thirdly, the series of precedents in the admission to the United Nations (processing the Macedonian application for membership, accession under provisional reference, the absence of the Macedonian flag in front of UN building);
- fourthly, the impact of the Macedonian case on the evolution of the international law through the concept of delayed recognition of countries etc.<sup>411</sup>

Taking into consideration all the precedents connected to the process for recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, which were interre-

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<sup>409</sup> The author of this text is MA Misho Dokmanovic, assistant at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” – Skopje

<sup>410</sup> The European Community approach to collective recognition of the former Yugoslav republics; some academics often compare this approach with the collective recognition of independence to the Balkan countries at the Congress of Berlin, held in 1878, when Serbia, Monte Negro, Romania and Bulgaria were recognized as independent countries.

<sup>411</sup> See: Dokmanovic, M., (2006) “The Problem with the international recognition of Macedonia” (*Problemot so me/unarodnot o pri znavawe na Republ i ka Makedoni ja in Zborni kot posvet en na po-esni dokt ori, dokt ori i magist ri na nauki*) (*Collected essays dedicated to honorary doctors, doctors and masters of science*) (2001-2006), Skopje; Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus”, Dokmanovic, Misho (2006). *The Legal and International Aspects of Recognition of States* (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Malta).

lated to the Macedonian - Greek name dispute,<sup>412</sup> this paper shall be focused on the essence of the main theses and arguments of Greece in the whole process. In this direction, I will analyze a document which is relatively unknown to our academic and expert public. It is a matter of Memorandum by the Government of Greece from January 25, 1993, related to the application of the Republic of Macedonia for accession to the United Nations. The Macedonian response to Greek position – the Memorandum from February 3, 1993, shall also be analyzed.

It should be pointed out that since the EC was unable to deal with the issue of recognition, which culminated at the Lisbon Summit,<sup>413</sup> Republic of Macedonia, within its diplomatic activity, in July 1992 put the emphasis on the application for accession to UN. On 23 July 1992, the Macedonian Government submitted to the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia a *Proposal for accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations*. On July 29, the Assembly brought a decision for membership. The following day, the President of the Republic, in accordance with Article 4 of UN Charter and in compliance with the provisions of the *rules of procedures of the Security Council* 50-60 and of the provisions of the *rules of procedure of the General Assembly* 134-138, submitted an application to the UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, for admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN membership. In the *application for membership*, the President Gligorov underlined that Republic of Macedonia accepted the generally accepted norms of the international law and expressed his belief that the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations presented a very significant step towards peaceful solution of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.<sup>414</sup> A *Declaration for acceptance of the obligations contained in the UN Charter* was enclosed within the application for membership.

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<sup>412</sup> See: Dokmanovi } Miso (2006). *The History and the Perspectives of the Macedonian – Greek Dispute over the Name*. (Unpublished postgraduate thesis, University of Malta); Dokmanovi } M., (2006), “The policy of the neighboring countries regarding the independence of Republic of Macedonia” (*Pol i t akat a na sosedni t e zemj y vo odnos na proces t na osamost ojuavve na Republ i ka Makedoni ja*) in the *Annual Book of the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje in honour of professor Dr. Todorka Orovchanec*, Skopje, Faculty of Law, University of Skopje.

<sup>413</sup> At the Lisbon Summit, EC expressed its willingness to recognize the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia within its existing borders under a name which does not include the term Macedonia. (*European Council Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia*, Lisbon, 27 June 1992 (UN Doc. S/24200, Annex).

<sup>414</sup> *Application of the Republic of Macedonia for admission to UN membership*, 30 July 1992 (UN Doc. A/47/876-S/25147, Annex).

However, as a result of number of factors, the first being the position of Greece, as well as the attempts of the British presidency to solve the open issues that prevented the recognition of Macedonia by the Community, the Macedonian application for UN membership was not efficiently administered and it was prolonged till January 1993. Following the failure of the British presidency and Robin O'Neil's mission,<sup>415</sup> and EC Summit in Edinburgh,<sup>416</sup> the process for recognition of Macedonia was indirectly left to the United Nations. Given the outcome of the Edinburgh Summit, in the early 1993, the Republic of Macedonia renewed its application for UN membership, and on 22 January 1993, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, forwarded the Macedonian application for membership, as well as the first application for membership as of 30 July 1992, to the Security Council President. As a response, Greece rapidly submitted a Memorandum to the United Nations in which it presented the position of the Greek Government concerning the application of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for accession to UN. The Memorandum, in an orderly manner in 16 items, expressed the main objections of the Greek Government regarding Macedonia's admission to UN membership under a name that contained the word "Macedonia".

The Memorandum of 25 January 1993 is based on a number of theses that, according to the Government of Greece, question the willingness of "the new republic" to fulfill the obligations arising from the UN Charter. These theses mostly refer to matters like security, legal acts adopted by the Republic of Macedonia in the process of establishing its independence, as well as to symbols and history. In this direction, the Government of Greece believed that the admission of the country to UN membership "under the denomination mentioned in its application for membership" would introduce an element of further desta-

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<sup>415</sup> Robin O'Neil's proposal for the solution of the dispute between Greece and Macedonia was the following: the constitutional name to be used within the country, and the name "Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)" or "Republic of Macedonia – capital Skopje" for international use. This proposal was accepted by the Macedonian top authority, however, under the pressure of the discussions in the Assembly – Macedonia withdrew from this proposal. Greece, referring to the Lisbon Declaration, rejected O'Neil's proposal. Thus, O'Neil's role as mediator ended unsuccessfully. See: Dokmanovic M. (2006), "The Independence of the Republic of Macedonia" (*master thesis*) (*Osamost ojuvawe na Republ i ka Makedoni ja - magi st erski t rud*), Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Skopje

<sup>416</sup> *European Council Declaration on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Edinburgh; 11-12 December 1992 (UN Doc. S/24960, Annex III).

bilization of the Southern Balkans, both in a short and in a long-term perspective. Besides the fact that the Government of Greece presented many objections regarding the application for membership, it emphasizes in the introduction itself that the Republic should not be admitted to the UN before the settlement of certain outstanding issues. Within the Memorandum, the Greek Government also expressed its willingness, after such settlement was reached, to extend recognition and establish cooperation with the country.

In the further elaboration of its reasons for opposing Macedonia's accession, the Government of Greece raises the question on the content of the legal acts adopted in the process of establishing independence, especially the content of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The remarks refer to the Preamble and to the normative part of the Constitution. In terms of the Preamble, the Government of Greece used the reference made in the Preamble of the Constitution regarding the historical decisions of ASNOM, referred to the Manifest of ASNOM and tried to present it as an attempt for annexation of the Macedonian provinces in Greece and Bulgaria and establishment of united Macedonia.<sup>417</sup> Regarding the normative part of the Constitution, the Greek Government underlined Articles 3 and 49 from the Constitution that refer to changing of borders only in accordance with the Constitution "while" the territory of the Republic remains indivisible and inviolable, and the provisions that refer to Macedonia's care for the status and rights of Macedonian people in neighboring countries. The provision of Article 49 from the Constitution has been identified in the Greek Memorandum as an attempt of intervening in the internal affairs of neighboring countries on the pretext of issues concerning "the status and the rights of alleged minorities".

In its objections regarding the history, the Greek Memorandum points out that the ideas launched with ASNOM Manifest were embodied through the creation of "People's Republic of Macedonia" and the

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<sup>417</sup> This objection refers to the call for unity contained in the Manifest of ASNOM: "Macedonians under Bulgaria and Greece! The unification of the Macedonian people depends on your participation at the gigantic antifascist front. Only with fight against the wicked fascist enemy we will earn our right to self-determination and unity of the Macedonian people under the roof of Tito's Yugoslavia, which has become community of free and equal people." See: *Dokument i za borba na makedonski ot narod za samost ajnost i naci onal na dr`ava* (Documents on the fight of the Macedonian people for independence and national state) - Volume I (1981), Skopje; Ss Cyril and Methodius University.

attempts of Tito's Yugoslavia to support the communist uprising. Within this context, as the Memorandum says, "after the failure to annex the Greek lands in 1948" the attempts to monopolize the Macedonian name continued. In the end, the Government of Greece concludes that such practices continuously poison good neighborly relations and stability in the region and even after the adoption of the declaration of independence there is a clear link and continuity in the policy and practice of the new republic in the past 40 years.

There is special segment within the Memorandum dedicated on the alleged expansionist propaganda of Macedonia. Within this context, the Greek Government mentioned examples of wide circulation of maps portraying a greater Macedonia, hostile propagation and literature "usurping" the Greek heritage and symbols, the use of emblem of the ancient Macedonian dynasty, found in the tomb of Philip II, affixed on the official flag, etc.

The last segment of the Memorandum, which is dedicated to Greek positions against admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN membership, includes the question about the symbols, or the name of the country. In this context, Greece believed that Republic of Macedonia used name of a wider geographic region, with only 38.5% to be found on the territory of the country. On the other hand, it is mentioned within the Memorandum that 51.5% of the Macedonian geographic region was in Greece, with population of 2.5 million people, while the remaining 10% in the other neighboring countries. Additionally, it was pointed out that the use of the denomination "Republic of Macedonia" as a name of a country led towards exclusivity and monopolization of the use of the term Macedonia and such exclusive use of the word "Macedonia" into the official name presented an impetus for expansionist claims not only of the present generations, but of future generations "in Skopje" as well.<sup>418</sup>

Besides the abovementioned systematized objections to the Macedonian application for admission to UN membership, Greece used the opportunity to remind the Organization about the procedures and criteria created by the European Community regarding the recognition of new countries, and once again reaffirmed the conclusions and decla-

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<sup>418</sup> *Memorandum Reflecting the View and Position of the Government of Greece Concerning the Application of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Admission to the United Nations*, New York; 25 January 1992.

rations of the Community on the recognition of Macedonia.<sup>419</sup> Following all these objections, the Government of Greece stipulated that “*F.Y.R.O.M. should provide the necessary legal and political guarantees that it will harbor no territorial claims against Greece, that it will abstain from any hostile propaganda against this country and that it will not use the term Macedonia in the state’s denomination.*” And in the end, the Government of Greece concludes that the country failed to comply with the mentioned requirements.

Besides this, the Memorandum underlined the determination of Greece to proceed with the development of the economic and political cooperation with the neighboring Republic, as soon as the country fulfilled EC requirements for recognition. Furthermore, as an expression of Greek constructiveness, the act speaks about the Greek support of EC initiative to provide humanitarian and economic aid to the Republic, as well as the initiative, which is still unknown to us, launched by Greece for alleged recognition and guaranty of the inviolability of Macedonia’s borders by the neighboring countries!?

In terms of the procedure for admission of Macedonia to UN, the Government of Greece pointed out that it was in the competence of UN Security Council not only to resolve disputes but also to prevent them as well, and the application of Macedonia for admission presented a clear case where preventive diplomacy was urgently needed. The Memorandum also underlined that the past practice with applications for membership included cases when admission to UN membership had been conditioned with prior fulfillment of certain requirements in the interest of peace and security, however it did not provide any examples for such practice!?

Due to the seriousness of the listed Greek positions, as well as the fact that the Memorandum was delivered to all UN members that in ultima linea had to decide on the Macedonian application for membership, on 3 February 1992, the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a *Memorandum concerning the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN of Greece Memorandum* whose aim was to prevent

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<sup>419</sup> In this direction, the following documents were mentioned: *Guidelines for the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (UN Doc. S/23293, Annex II), *EC Declaration on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Guimaraes, 2 May 1992, (UN Doc. S/23880, Annex), *European Council Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia*, Lisbon, 27 June 1992 (UN Doc. S/24200, Annex), *European Council Declaration on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Edinburgh, 11-12 Dec. 1992 (UN Doc. S/24960, Annex III).

the admission. The Macedonian Memorandum<sup>420</sup> was a response to the Greek position presented in the Memorandum of 25 January 25, upon all matters: the legal procedure for accession to UN, the effect of Macedonia's admission to UN on the regional security, the name issue, the territorial aspirations and expansionism, as well as the procedure of establishing the country's independence and its international recognition.

Regarding the legal procedure for accession to UN, Macedonia underlined its position in the Memorandum that it fulfilled all requirements provided in Article 4 of the Charter for admission to UN membership. Besides this, the Macedonian Memorandum emphasized that there was no legal or procedural basis a country to obstruct or condition the admission of another country to UN membership due to "certain outstanding issues" and this act was contrary to UN principles and the UN principle of universality. Macedonia assessed the position that the problems must be solved before the admission of the country to UN as unacceptable, explaining that the country was "held in unjust position, so that some ungrounded anti-historical claims would be fulfilled".

Regarding the Greek comments that the admission of Macedonia could influence the safety of the region, the Macedonian Government underlined a number of counter arguments: first of all, Republic of Macedonia was the only former Yugoslav republic that established its independence in a peaceful manner and solved all its problems peacefully, with tolerance and through negotiations; secondly, the Republic of Macedonia, at its own material expense, allowed the former Yugoslav army to leave the country by taking the entire armament, all in order to avoid possible conflict; thirdly, the Republic of Macedonia explicitly stated and guaranteed within its Constitution that the country had no territorial pretensions towards any neighboring states and fourthly, the Republic of Macedonia expressed willingness to sign an agreement with Greece to guaranty the inviolability of the borders, an agreement that would be guaranteed by other international factors, as well as an agreement on good-neighborly relations and cooperation, similar to the agreement between Poland and Germany.

On the other hand, Macedonia informed UN about the acts of Greece that can be considered as attempts to destabilize the region.

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<sup>420</sup> Regarding the reactions to the Macedonian Memorandum see: Andonovski Z. "The Memorandum of Macedonia called 'rudest provocation': Greek reaction to the latest move of the Macedonian diplomacy" (*Memorandumot na Makedonija nare-en „najdrska provokacija“: gr-ka reakcija na ni vi ot pot ez na makedonskat a di pl o-mat i ja*) in the newspaper *Nova Makedonija* (6 February 1993).

Macedonia mentioned the emergence of strong nationalism and hysteria in Greece, the blockade of the border and the transport of oil from Thessaloniki harbor, the military maneuvers along the border with targets located on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the constant violations of Macedonia's air space by Greek military and civil aircrafts.

The Macedonian Memorandum delivered a reply to the comments of Greece about the emergence of expansionism and expansionist propaganda. In this direction, the Macedonian Government apostrophized that the statements by extremists in the Republic of Macedonia and outside the territory of the Republic enjoyed no official support and did not express the official policy of the country in any respect. The same position was emphasized regarding the printing and publishing of the geographic or ethnical maps of Macedonia which were used by Greece as proof for the existence of the territorial pretensions on Macedonian part. The Republic of Macedonia, once again, declared that the country and its governing bodies had publicly and expressly distanced themselves from such events.

In terms of the (in)existence of the Macedonian minority in Greece, and regarding the responsibility about the care for the minorities in the neighboring countries determined with Article 49 of the Macedonian Constitution, the Macedonian Government underlined that the Constitution of Greece contained similar provision. Since the Republic of Greece does not recognize existence of Macedonian minority, the Macedonian Government wonders if there is no Macedonian minority in the Republic of Greece, then what's the point of the Greek reaction since in such case this Article does not refer to Greece!? On the other hand, according to the Macedonian Government, the question remains – if Macedonian minority exists then why the Greek Government does not respect the fundamental rights of this minority determined with UN Charter, Helsinki documents, the Charter of Paris etc.

Finally, great part of the content of the Macedonian Memorandum is dedicated to the name issue. In this direction, Macedonia presented historical facts, as well as Macedonian positions and views on the name dispute.

Recalling that the demands of the Republic of Greece for change of the name of the Republic of Macedonia have no legal, or any other grounded justification, Macedonia reaffirmed the following facts: firstly, throughout the history, the Macedonian region was put under Greek authority for the first time in 1913 after the Second Balkan War, in

other words, after the division of Macedonia under the Treaty of Bucharest; secondly, up till August 1988, the name Macedonia was not used in any official form in Greece, the northern border province of Greece was named Northern Greece; thirdly, the Republic of Macedonia is the only country that is completely with its territory located in Macedonia (on the other hand, the northern Greek province that carries the name Macedonia is only a small part of the Greek territory); fourthly, the Republic of Macedonia has no aspirations to monopolize the name Macedonia, nor does it have pretensions towards the entire region under the name Macedonia and fifthly, the General Consulate of the Republic of Greece in Skopje, till the beginning of 1992 referred to the bodies of the Republic of Macedonia as Socialist Republic of Macedonia.

Besides this, in the end of the argumentation of the Macedonian position it was emphasized that the international Arbitration Commission, established by the European Community, concluded that the Republic of Macedonia fulfilled all criteria for recognition and the name did not imply any territorial claims. Macedonian willingness to compromise was once again underlined, all in the direction of establishing lasting peace and stability in the region.<sup>421</sup>

In the end, besides all of this, the Republic of Macedonia did not succeed in winning over the key countries of the Security Council on its side. In the beginning of February 1992, Great Britain, France and Spain, on behalf of the European Community, submitted to the Security Council a proposal for admission of the country to the United Nations under the name “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. This proposal was accepted by the United States of America, as well!?

Despite the intensive diplomatic activities, the proposal for admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN membership under the provisional reference “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” was not changed. Due to these reasons, the Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski, on 24 March 1993, sent a letter to the UN Security Council President. In this letter, the President of RM Government expressed his disappointment that it had not proven possible for the Security Council to adopt a straightforward resolution on admission of new members in UN. In this context,

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<sup>421</sup> *Memorandum concerning the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN*, New York.; 3 February 1992.

the Prime Minister emphasized that the Republic of Macedonia would in no circumstances accept the reference “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as a name for the country, and that Macedonia refused to be associated in any way with the past connotation of the term “Yugoslavia”<sup>422</sup>. In an additional letter from 5 April 1993, the Prime Minister of the Government, Crvenkovski, informed the President of the Security Council that the Macedonian Government would submit proposals to the co-chairmen of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia, for promotion of confidence-building measures with the Republic of Greece<sup>423</sup>.

The very following day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Michalis Papakonstantinou, sent a letter to the Security Council in which he sent a message that the draft resolution regarding the application of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for membership to the United Nations presented an acceptable basis for admission. Besides this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece emphasized that the settlement of the difference over the name, the adoption of appropriate confidence-building measures and the admission of the state to the United Nations under a provisional name, were integral part of the package which alone can resolve “the outstanding differences” between Greece and “the new” Republic. He also underlined the serious concern of the Government of Greece regarding the problems that might arise from the hosting and flying of the flag bearing the Vergina Sun (Kutlesh) at the United Nations.<sup>424</sup>

As a result of Greece’s consent, UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 817/93 under which it recommended to the General Assembly to admit the state to membership to the United Nations, the state being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, pending settlement of the differences that had arisen over the name of the state.<sup>425</sup> Following the adoption of the Resolution, the President of the Security

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<sup>422</sup> *Letter from the President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia addressed to the President of the Security Council Concerning the Application of Macedonia for Admission to UN Membership*, 24 March 1993 (UN Doc. S/25541, Annex)

<sup>423</sup> *Letter from the President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia addressed to the President of the Security Council*, Skopje; 5 April 1993 (UN Doc. S/25542, Annex).

<sup>424</sup> *Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 6 April 1993.

<sup>425</sup> *UN Security Council Resolution 817/93*.

Council read a statement in which it was underlined that the reference “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” in the Resolution did not raise any implications that the state it referred to had any association with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (present Serbia), but it simply reflected the historical fact that in the past the country had been a republic within the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

On the basis of the Recommendation of the Security Council, on 8 April 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution 47/225 under which the Republic of Macedonia was admitted as 181<sup>st</sup> member of the United Nations.<sup>426</sup> The Resolution of the General Assembly was followed by a presidential statement, in which it was stated that the negotiation process about the differences over the name would continue under the mediation of two co-chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen. Within the admission procedure, the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, addressed the General Assembly in Macedonian language and in his speech he underlined that “*this act has crowned with success the centuries long efforts of the Macedonian people and its 130-year struggle for freedom and independent State*”, as well as that “*the admission of the Republic of Macedonia into the international family of nations is an act in which justice triumphs and a shining example of how a small and peace-loving nation has achieved its right to self-determination and statehood and its responsible position in the international community in a peaceful and legitimate way*”.<sup>427</sup>

Considering the above presented, we can conclude that the positions of the Republic of Greece, presented in the Memorandum of 25 January 1993, strongly influenced the decision of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the admission of the Republic of Macedonia. As we have seen, the Memorandum of Greece does not mention the fulfillment of the membership criteria pursuant to Article 4 from UN Charter, but simply treats the question of recognizing the Republic of Macedonia as a security threat, and the question about the real reasons for the objections by Greece, the name issue and the remaining issues designated under the phrase “certain outstanding issues” are delicately opened in the end of the Memorandum.

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<sup>426</sup> UN General Assembly *Resolution 47/225*.

<sup>427</sup> The speech of the President Kiro Gligorov held at the admission of Macedonia to UN membership, 8 April 1993.

Besides this, with the Memorandum, the Government of Greece avoided and manipulated with certain facts related to the process of independence, as well as to the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. The Memorandum avoids the fact that the Republic of Macedonia, at the request of the international community, amended the Constitution in the mentioned articles. Namely, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, under the pressure of the international community, in December 1991 started the process of amending the Constitution, and through accelerated procedure this process was completed on 6 January 1992 with the adoption of two constitutional amendments. *The first amendment* standardized that the Republic of Macedonia had no territorial pretensions towards any neighboring state and the borders of the Republic of Macedonia could only be changed in accordance with the Constitution and on the principle of free will, as well as in accordance with generally accepted international norms. This amendment is an addendum to Article 3 of the Constitution. *The second amendment* to the Constitution is addendum to Article 49, paragraph 1, in which it was determined that “*The Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries, as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development and promotes links with them*”. This provision was amended with the formulation that “*the Republic will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or in their internal affairs*”.

The manipulation of the facts is best presented with the alleged initiative, mentioned in the Memorandum of Greece, all neighboring countries of Macedonia to recognize and guaranty the inviolability of Macedonia’s borders. The historical facts show something completely opposite: in 1991, Greece was an initiator of a completely different initiative. Namely, back then, the Prime Minister of Greece, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, made efforts for realization of trilateral meeting between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, to discuss the future of Macedonia. Later on, this initiative was rejected by Bulgaria.

Besides this, the presented Greek position that by requesting recognition under the name “Republic of Macedonia” the Macedonian Government insisted on exclusive right to the general use of the name Macedonia can be also presented as an attempt by Greece to avoid facts. Monopoly over the name Macedonia has never been an official position of the Republic of Macedonia and this has been underlined in a series of documents adopted in the process of the international recognition of the country.

The Memorandum of Greece was a successful intervention for maintaining the already-established political positions within the European Community. By supporting the Greek positions, the European Community has brought the political requests of Greece to a level of legal membership criteria! Despite the persistent reference to the UN admission practice, the Government of Greece did not name the countries that were subject to additional criteria for admission into the organization.

Obviously, the well-argued Macedonian positions systematized in the Memorandum from 3 February 1993, were not considered in the decision-making process for the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN membership. From present point of view, it must be underlined that the Macedonian Memorandum successfully explained the arguments and the thesis in favor of the admission of the country to UN membership under its constitutional name. Although, partly filled with emotional content, the positions elaborated within the Memorandum present solid basis for conducting the discussions about the differences with Greece regarding the name. However, the Memorandum missed the opportunity to open the question of repatriation of former Greek citizens with Macedonian background expelled during the Civil War in Greece and the restitution of their property. Thus, in the very beginning, one more element would've been officially added to the army of questions opened between the two countries, which were perceived and still are being perceived solely through the prism of the name dispute.

## ARTIFICIAL INTERSTATE DISPUTE<sup>428</sup>

The “dispute” or the “difference” over the name of Republic of Macedonia, as noted in the official terminology, have been burdening the Macedonian-Greek relations for more than 15 years. As a result of the Greek reluctance to the use of the name “Republic of Macedonia” by the new independent state established in the beginning of the 1990s, the “differences over the name” were created and later on treated as a public legal dispute, which is being settled *de iure* through the mechanism of “good offices” (*de facto* mediation) laid down in the Security Council *Resolution 817* from 1993, established within the UN.

From an international public law point of view, the “difference” over the name of Republic of Macedonia arises as bilateral dispute (between Macedonia and Greece) to be settled in the UN, with potential practical consequences for third states within the multilateral United Nations Forum and other international institutions. In this view, the *Resolution 817* from 1993 provides a provisional “reference” *modus* of the state as “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, as temporary designation for purposes within the UN pending a final settlement of the dispute, which was soon after adopted by other international institutions including the Council of Europe and EU. However, apart from this effective regime for these international institutions (and other as well), and having in mind the bilateral character of the dispute, third countries were legally free to unilaterally recognize the state by its constitutional name, therefore up until now more than hundred states have recognized Republic of Macedonia under this name, such as the Russian Federation, China and USA – permanent members of the UN Security Council.<sup>429</sup>

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<sup>428</sup> The author of this text is Sasho Georgievski, PhD – associate professor at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje.

<sup>429</sup> In addition, member states of EU, such as France, United Kingdom, Switzerland etc., regardless of the absence of formal recognition of Republic of Macedonia, have developed a practice of bilateral communication with Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name. Namely, the Russian Federation was among the first states which recognized the state by its constitutional name. On the other hand, the regime established in the Interim Accord in 1995 (further elaborated in the Memorandum of practical measures in 1995) is valid in the relations between Macedonia and Greece; in particular Article 5 thereof according to which both parties reserve all of their rights in the relations pending the final settlement of the interstate dispute.

In the past fifteen years the aforesaid international (public legal) dispute involving the “difference” over the name of Republic of Macedonia has caught the attention of international jurists resulting in extensive literature. Despite this, the dispute has another more important dimension which appears to be neglected by the professional public. Created by the states, the “difference” over the name of Republic of Macedonia is reflected on individuals as well – private entities in general, in terms of the right of the people from Republic of Macedonia to use the name in the relations with other people. Can people from Republic of Macedonia use this name (on their own free will when they are in a foreign state) if a person and/or the state where they exercise their rights disputes the name?

During this short discussion, an attempt is made to answer the very dilemma, in a course of legal analysis, related to the question of exercising the right of private entities to use the name Republic of Macedonia – hereafter “private aspects” of the dispute over the name of Republic of Macedonia.

We will look into two assumed situations:

a) a situation in which the state acts as a subject of private-public relation, in the form of *de iure gestionis*; and

b) a situation in which an individual from Republic of Macedonia acts as a natural person. Notwithstanding the moral arguments which might be revealed in this sense, we will look for the answer of the previous question by invoking legal rules, not necessarily associated to international public law, the international private law, or to the basic rules that regulate the human rights as part of international law and internal legal orders of the states in which a person from Republic of Macedonia appears as a subject.

### **The use of the name Macedonia in a commercial dispute**

Let us assume that in a private legal dispute, in which one party is Republic of Macedonia, the other (private) party disputes the right of the state to be referred to by this name. Or, that in the procedure Republic of Macedonia disputes any reference other its constitutional name and requests the parties and the Court to use only the name “Republic of Macedonia”. Such issue could be brought before a court of a foreign state and/or (more likely) before trade arbitration under a jurisdiction different from Republic of Macedonia (hereafter “tribunal”) and would have to be solved as some previous/prejudicially question, accidental in terms of the main question in the dispute.

How and according to what rules would the tribunal resolve this issue and what are the prospects the tribunal to be in favor of the use of the “constitutional name” in the procedure? This is not just a theoretical question considering that the state is regularly involved in commercial agreements with foreign partners (including Greek partners), which in general propose foreign arbitration outside Republic of Macedonia as means of resolving any contractual disputes.

***International public law and international private law – basis for determining the designation of the Republic of Macedonia?***

The list of important dilemmas that a foreign tribunal might be faced with and/or that might be laid by the disputed parties in relation to the above mentioned question would include at least the following statements or dilemmas:

- the question is a subject of international dispute and thus it is not to be settled as a private legal dispute; the applicable rules in this case include only the rules of the international public law (hereafter IPuBL); or,

- contrary to this: the question regarding the name is in this case a private legal matter, and the applicable rules include only the rules of the international private law (hereafter IPriL), which refer to the use of the right of Republic of Macedonia;

- if the latter is accepted, can the legal order of the Forum (note: the Court) in that case exempt the use of the right acquired in the prior manner?

The first statement is most likely to be brought out by the party which obstructs the use of the name Republic of Macedonia during the procedure before the tribunal. In addition, this could be supported by the thesis according to which the subject (the name of a state) can not be settled as a private legal dispute, especially not if there is a public legal mechanism laid down in the United Nations Security Council Resolution. Since it is a dispute between two states, it would have to be settled only through the application of the IPuBL and the enforcement of the provisions established in the *Interim Accord* between Greece and Macedonia in which such resolution of the dispute without prejudice to the positions of the contractual states parties is anticipated pending the final settlement of the dispute.

Although this seems logical, the disadvantage of this argument lays in the fact that, in this case, Republic of Macedonia acts as a pri-

vate legal entity, in the form of *de iure gestionis* (*de iure commercii*), regardless of its state character. Therefore, the purpose and the subject of resolving the question regarding the name of Republic of Macedonia in a private legal dispute brought before the tribunal would be completely different from the interstate mechanism for settlement of dispute, the later intends to end with a final settlement of the dispute over the name of the state as a public legal entity, in contrast to the form of private legal dispute in which the only purpose of the tribunal is to *determine* the name of the private entity – participant in the particular dispute with the aim of designating the entity in the procedure before the tribunal, and *not to settle* the dispute over the name of Republic of Macedonia. The resolution of the question over the name falls under the disputed states and/or the International Forum (existing or future forum, i.e. the International Court of Justice) established, in political sense, mainly for this purpose and/or in accordance with the rules and principles of the IPuBL applicable to the states as its subjects, so, it is clear that the arbiter in the dispute involving Republic of Macedonia as private entity would refuse to embark on substantive settlement of the name of the state by applying the rules of IPuBL.<sup>430</sup>

Having in mind that the tribunal would not deal with the interstate (public legal) dispute, the remaining available alternative for it would be to determine the name of the state in a procedure in the exact way as it usually determines a name of a private entity in a private legal dispute, that is according to the rules of IPriL.

### ***Collision rules of IPriL and the name of Republic of Macedonia***

In the absence of a system of rules for settlement of the “conflict/collision of laws” agreed by both party, the tribunal would settle this question by applying the Court rules (*lex fori*) for resolving collision of laws and/or in case of an international trade arbitration – on the basis of the law laid down in accordance with the rules for resolving the collision of laws which the arbiter/arbiters “*would deem appropriate*”,

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<sup>430</sup> Of course, this is also applicable if Republic of Macedonia insisted on such settlement pending the decision on the name through the application of the rules of IPuBL brought by an unbiased judicial or quasi-judicial instance, which under this supposed logic would serve as an additional argument in the process of the final settlement of the “difference” over the name with Greece.

a principle deeply ingrained in the contemporary international arbitration.<sup>431</sup>

However, since the matter is about a status question related to one of the parties involved in the dispute, the rules for resolving the collision of laws in any way would refer to the application of the law of Republic of Macedonia, for being closest to the subject of resolution - the name of the party in question. According to French private law, for example, the questions associated to the personal status of a party (*status personalis*), such as the capacity (ability) or the name of a party, are matters of the party's personal right, which are regulated by a party's right to nationality or a legal entity's right to principal seat (*siege social*)<sup>432</sup>. Such solution is also very common in other states. Furthermore, the fact that the law which determines the name of the legal entity is, in this case, a public law of foreign state (*the constitution of Republic of Macedonia*) can not present an obstacle, given that in accordance with the general principles in reference to collision of laws, the courts and arbitration tribunals in general regularly acknowledge the effects of the application of foreign public law.<sup>433</sup> In case the question of designation of Republic of Macedonia appeared in a procedure before an international arbitration, the arbiter would choose *a fortiori* the law of Republic of Macedonia as "the most suitable" system of rules, for being closely related to the subject of resolution - the name of the disputed party.

In this regard, the designation of the country following a private legal dispute, settled by foreign tribunal, under the name Republic of Macedonia, in accordance with its Constitution whose application would be underlined by IPriL rules, seems quite certain. Still, the tribunal might be asked to answer one more question before applying the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*: the potential exclusion of the application of the Macedonian law (the Constitution) decided on the basis of controlled application of forum public order (public policy; negative

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<sup>431</sup> For example, Article 13.3 of the *Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce* (ICC Rules, 1975); Article 33 of the *Rules of UNCITRAL* from 1976; Article 28.2 of the *UNCITRAL Model Law* from 1985, etc. Such development of the contemporary international arbitration led to gradual abandonment of the former principle of "mechanical application" of collision rules of the law that includes the arbitration.

<sup>432</sup> See P. Mayer's *Droit International Privee*, 6 edition; pp 332 and 650.

<sup>433</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 131. See *Resolution of the International Law Institute* adopted on the session held in Wiesbaden in 1975 (*The Application of Foreign Public Law*, I.D.I., Session of Wiesbaden; 11 August 1975).

ordre public), which must be decided before it allows the use of “the constitutional name” of the Republic of Macedonia. In particular, this could be the case if the procedure is conducted in a state which has recognized Republic of Macedonia under different name, within the bilateral relations, or at least, which has established a common bilateral practice to make reference to the state under a name different from its constitutional name, therefore it can be presumably stated that this is contrary to its ordre public. The latter, however, represents a very weak argument, given that the public order of the states by definition generally includes fundamental universal values, i.e. principles of *justice, fairness, democracy* and so on, making it difficult to fit in the question over the use of the disputed name of a state like Republic of Macedonia. In this view, it might be expected that even if the procedure takes place before a tribunal located in a state which has recognized Republic of Macedonia under different name, it would not exclude the application of the law (the Constitution) of Republic of Macedonia – on the basis of its disagreement with the public order of the state.

In comparison to the above case, the public order of the states commonly involves in its domain the value of *respecting human rights*, which might be utilized when in a procedure before a foreign court a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia is being forced to use a name different from the constitutional name for referring to his/her state. In this direction, we would include later on in the text another private or personal aspect of the “difference” over the name of the state, but this time in view of the rights of the Macedonian citizens.

### **Use of the name “Republic of Macedonia” – personal right of citizens**

A common reaction of a citizen of Republic of Macedonia regarding the “name dispute”, which has been raised on a level of inter-state dispute, would challenge the law of the states (or of other) to limit the citizen’s “*freedom to choose the name of his/her own state or nation*”, or that the name of the nation or the state is a matter that exclusively falls within the domain of his/her personal choice, identity or integrity! This argument is directed towards the authorities in Republic of Greece as well as the authorities in Republic of Macedonia, and towards any other state and/or institution involved in the settlement of the “difference over the name” of the Republic of Macedonia. In other words, the citizens believe that the question over the name of the state is a personal, private matter, alike the question of their own identity

and integrity, just like they feel about the choice of their name, the name of their ancestors or descendants, or their gender and lifestyle.

Logically, following the Macedonian citizens' reaction, it is quite reasonable that the right of the citizens of Republic of Macedonia to use the name of their state (and nation) in the relations with other people should be looked for in the corpus of international rules that guarantee the fundamental human rights and freedoms. Similarly to the way a citizen feels about the question of the name of his/her state, the right to use the freely chosen name of the state (and nation) he/she belongs to, could be located in the domain of rules protecting the private life of people, included in Article 8 of the *European Convention on Human Rights* (hereafter ECHR), which is very relevant if such right of the citizens of Republic of Macedonia is disputed particularly by a member state of ECHR.

Article 8 of the ECHR provides in addition that “*everyone has the right to respect for his private (...) life*”, depending on the potential interference of the states laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article. Divided in various interests of the individual that belong to this protective category, the respect for “*private life*” predominantly represents a respect for “*personal identity*” of the individual, which as a “*fundamental interest*” includes the individual's capacity to determine its own identity – to decide and *be* whatever he wants. Within the individual's powers are the matters such as the choice of name, the style of dressing and gender identity. It is not simply a matter of the right to identity; the individual must be “*free to choose the respect from the state and the way he would represent himself in front of others*” (underlined: S.G).<sup>434</sup>

The respect for “*private life*” mentioned in Article 8 of the ECHR is not reduced to a closed list of protected categories, but its scope is dynamically defined by the *European Court of Human Rights* subsequently in every case. However, it goes beyond the protection of “*privacy*” in its meaning implemented in certain domestic systems (United Kingdom, etc.), therefore, according to some authors, the respect protects the individual against (...) “*attacks on his physical or mental integrity or his moral or intellectual freedom, attacking honor and reputation and similar torts, the use of his name, identity or affiliation (...)*”,

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<sup>434</sup> D.J. Harris, M. O'Boule, C. Warbrick; *Law of the European Convention on Human Rights*, Butterworths, 1995, page 307 (the note in the quoted text is omitted).

etc.<sup>435</sup> The obligation of the states to provide “*respect*” for private life is both positive and negative obligation that imposes a duty for the member states of ECHR not just to restrain itself from intervening in individual’s private life, but also to create conditions in which the individual can exercise the aspects of this right in his/her relations with the state and other people.

In consideration of the aforementioned qualifications, the right to choose and use the determined affiliation to a certain state or nation under established name, like a matter of personal choice, moral integrity and individual’s identity, quite clearly can go into the category of “*private life*” whose respect is regulated in Article 8 of ECHR. The extensive stipulation of the respect in this Article, as well as the fact that, in practice, the European Court of Human Rights is not restricted by the currently identified categories of breach of right to private life and/or by the closely developed doctrines in the application of Article 8 of ECHR, provides a basis for the belief that the Court might secure such case under the respect of this Article.

In addition, it might be interesting to look into the analogy of the individual’s right to personal name as a closer aspect of the respect for private life recognized by the Court in Strasbourg. The European Court, as well as the Commission on Human Rights during its existence, (have) explicitly determined that the regulation of personal names falls under the respect of private and family life. In the same time, with few decisions, such as the one in the case *Stjerna versus Finland*, the Court confirmed the interest of states to regulate the personal identity of citizens, in this case, to limit the possibility for change of applicant’s surname for the reason of public interest, for example: the states to ensure precise records of the population and the means of personal identification and to connect the surname bearer with his family.<sup>436</sup> However, in contrast to the judgment of the Court in this case, it is quite different when the state imposes a name change on individuals which presents a breach of the right provided in Article 8 of ECHR and must be justified in accordance with some exemptions included in the second paragraph of this Article.

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435 F.G. Jacobs, R.C.A. White, *The European Convention on Human Rights*, 2-nd ed.; Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1996, page 173.

436 *Stjerna v. Finland*, Judgment of 25 Nov. 1994; Series A, No. 299-B, paragraph 39 thereof. See the *Burgharz v. Switzerland* judgment, Judgment of 22 Feb. 1994; Series A, No. 280-B.

Such regime for personal names might be per analogiam applied in relation to the right to use the name of one's own nation or state, but in this case, the regime is more interesting in terms of a presumed (although hardly imaginable) case: disputing personal names of citizens, based on the logic of the Greek dispute over the name of the state of Republic of Macedonia. Namely, the basic argument against the use of the name of the state expressed by Republic of Greece states that by using the name Macedonia the state "encroaches the Greek history", "Greek civilization" and/or "Greek culture" (we would not discuss the substantive justification of this argument). But what if some personal names of the citizens are in connection with "*Greek history, culture or civilization*" – i.e. the names Socrates, Plato or Makedonka – that are often names of Macedonian citizens (and not only of Macedonians)? Whether the intervention of a state to impose personal name change in this sense in order to stop the "encroaching" of "the Greek history, culture or civilization" can be considered as justifiable?

The answer of this hypothetical and unbelievable question should be looked for in the second paragraph of Article 8 of ECHR, and, of course, it would be negative! As we have mentioned above, the measure of the state in the form of imposed personal name change of the citizens represents breach of private (and family) life and it could be deemed as justifiable only if interpreted as measure "*necessary in a democratic society*", and "*in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others*" (Article 8.2 of ECHR).

Despite the "room for interpretation" left to the states when applying the basis for exemption of the breach of ECHR Article 8, it does not take much consideration to conclude that the potential measure to impose change of citizens' names due to protection of alleged "historical, societal and cultural" values "owned" by a nation could not be justified under no basis and thus it represents a flagrant disregard of the respect for private (and family) life. Such measure would not "pass" the initial request for its "democratization", which in the practice of the Court is evaluated with European "consensus" or "joint understanding" on its justification – as a standard established in the enforcement of Article 8 (2) of ECHR.

Based on the character, the measure to impose change of citizens' personal names in view of preserving someone else's "history, culture or civilization" would not be any different from the past forced

assimilation practices involving name change of people carried out by authorities in time when the individual fortune of the people was simply a “domestic matter” of the states and the individuals were servants of the administrative bodies, something that would be extremely unacceptable and immoral according to the contemporary social standards of respecting the human rights.

After all, no matter how unlikely this is in practice, the previously supposed situation implies how absurd is the main argument of Republic of Greece in (in relation to) the “dispute” over the name of Republic of Macedonia. On the other hand, if analogously applied, the same implies as well to the lack of justification in possible reference to Article 8 (2) of ECHR by a state as basis denying the right of an individual to use the name of his/her state or nation, within its jurisdiction, as his/her individual right to private life.

### **Key findings**

There are various grounds in the domain of the rules for protection of human rights which can be invoked by Macedonian citizen in his/her defense against possible attempt to be imposed to use other name than Republic of Macedonia. This can be justified, for example, by the use of the “right to self-determination” exercised as an individual right, or the right of people to freely choose their ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation, which is a distinctive feature of minorities, that might be analogously applied also to the right of people to determine their national affiliation. However, the most appropriate argument to allow the citizen the right to use the name of his/her state is the respect for his/her private right, also being closest to the way he/she experiences the name of the state, and that could at least find a subsequent connection with the case if such right is disputed by another state or person.

In cases when the Republic of Macedonia is a private entity in a private legal dispute before a foreign court and it is insisted in the procedure the country to be designated with a name different from its constitutional name, the latter could be certainly avoided with reference to the rules of IPriL, which would indicate to the observance of the country’s constitution. It is important to have this in mind, among other things, since the practice of concluding certain investment agreements with foreign partners shows that the Republic of Macedonia has accepted designation other than its constitutional name to serve as its name while being a contracting party, which on its merits, would mean

implicit (unnecessary) renunciation of the name in a private legal dispute?!

When the “difference over the name” of Republic of Macedonia appears in a private or personal relation, including the relation in which the state acts as a private entity, the rules applicable to determine the designation in case the use of its name is disputed, point to a unique (and logical) result: the state shall be addressed by its citizens as provided in the Constitution. However, in spite of this, the “difference over the name” of Republic of Macedonia remains to be the same from the very beginning: an artificially designed, interstate political dispute!

## INTERIM ACCORD AND ATTEMPT FOR AGREEMENT<sup>437</sup>

On 5 September 1995, it was announced in Athens and Washington that agreement between Macedonia and Greece would be signed in New York the following week. The President Clinton saluted the decision of Athens. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Kinkel, announced German assistance for Macedonia, with reference to the progress in Macedonian- Greek negotiations.

Before our minister, Stevo Crvenkovski, went to New York and Washington, we decided to inform the Assembly about the latest developments in the Macedonian-Greek dispute; however, at the session, as it was agreed with the mediators, the content of the agreement was kept in secret.

The chronology of drafting the new document was the following: on 12 September the mediator Cyrus Vance proposed a new version of the *Interim Accord* with the names of the mediators of “the First and the Second Part”, whereupon we were the “Second part”. Once again, some misunderstandings emerged regarding the lift of the embargo and as a result of this the signing of the accord was postponed. The following day, in New York, the ministers for foreign affairs of Macedonia and Greece, Stevo Crvenkovski and Karolos Papoulias, met to reconcile their positions and on the same day they signed the “*Accord for normalization of the relations between Macedonia and Greece*” (the so-called *Interim Accord*), and both ministers signed their names under “the First, or the Second Part”.

In accordance with the “scenario” the very same day I exchanged letters with the President Bill Clinton under which full diplomatic relations were established between the Republic of Macedonia and the United States of America. In my statement on this occasion, I assessed the reached agreement as a new success of the Macedonian peace-loving policy, and President Clinton held a ceremony in the White House on the occasion of the signed Macedonian-Greek agreement. I sent telegrams to the President Stephanopoulos and the Prime Minister Papan-

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<sup>437</sup> This text is excerpt from the book “Macedonia is all we have” (*Makedonija e se { t o j mame*) whose author is Kiro Gligorov, the first President of independent Republic of Macedonia; Publisher- *TRF*, Skopje, 2001; p. 387-390.

dreou, and they replied with telegrams in which they emphasized the importance of the improvement reached in the relations between the countries. Cyrus Vance informed the Security Council about the reached agreement. I received messages from many statesmen saluting the signing of the Accord.

Twenty days later there was an assassination attempt on me. However, this had no effect on the process. Macedonia approached to implementation of the Accord, hoping that thus it paved the way for successful settlement of the problems between the two countries and arriving at solution for the name dispute. On 9 October 1995, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia ratified the *Interim Accord* between Macedonia and Greece. The expert teams in Skopje continued working on the implementation of the Accord. After exhausting negotiations the *Memo-randum concerning practical implementation of the New York Accord* was signed in Skopje which regulated matters like movement of goods and people across the Macedonian-Greek border. On 15 October 1995, the Greek embargo against the Republic of Macedonia, which was imposed on 16 February 1994, was lifted. The Macedonian-Greek border was definitively opened for circulation of goods and movement of people. Some additional documents were signed in Athens: *Memorandum of Understanding for the mutual establishment of Liaison Offices in Athens and Skopje, Protocol on Visa Regime and Taxes, Protocol on Transport and Communications, Protocol on practical application of customs matters, Protocol on international green card for vehicle insurance.*

We fulfilled our obligation to change the national flag, and on 22 October 1995 the new flag was solemnly raised in front of the UN building in New York.

The official text of the *Interim Accord for normalization of the relations (between Macedonia and Greece)* was published, so the public is familiarized with the text. Practically, after the signing of the Interim Accord the relations between Macedonia and Greece were normalized. A range of issues were settled through memoranda, protocols, regarding the use of the name in Macedonian passports, the issuance of visas, the trade regime... However, the name issue remains to be further discussed in New York. In Article 5 of the Interim Accord this matter was settled in the following manner:

1. The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on

the differences described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

2. Recognizing the difference between them with respect to the name of the Party of the Second Part, each Party reserves all of its rights consistent with the specific obligations undertaken in this Interim Accord. The Parties shall cooperate with a view to facilitating their mutual relations notwithstanding their respective positions as to the name of the Party of the Second Part. In this context, the Parties shall take practical measures, including dealing with the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade and commerce between them in a manner consistent with their respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the Second Part. The Parties shall take practical measures so that the difference about the name of the Party of the Second Part will not obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between the Party of the Second Part and third parties.

These obligations were taken into account in the process of implementation of the Accord. At least on our part, we made efforts to find solutions for use of the name, like for example regarding the visa. The Greek border bodies did not issue visas on our passports – *“to avoid, God forbid, to recognize our name”* – since the passports contained the name Republic of Macedonia – so they issued the visas on separate piece of paper. Whether the Greeks had always done this – that’s another story. We have reasons not to be completely satisfied, especially in terms of what has been written in the Accord regarding the trade and commerce between Macedonia and third countries. There was even one inconvenient situation in the bodies of the European Commission, when due to the reservations of a committee chairman, who was Greek, a procedure with a trade agreement was being delayed. However, this was also overcome...

The discussions in New York continued uninterruptedly. They had their own pace, they were held once a month, then there was a break during the elections in our country, as well as during the elections in Greece, so few months had passed, however throughout the entire process the negotiators remained the same on both parties – the ambassadors Toshevski, as our representative, and Zaharakis, as Greek representative. They got to know each other very well, even had private meetings, lunches, and dinners, whenever there was something one of them wanted to add.

We tried twice to propose something like a basis for the agreement, but Greece refused. After a while, I believed that a solution could

be, if Greece accepted it, our country to be registered in the United Nations under the name the Republic of Macedonia, and there would be no exceptions - our constitutional name to be used in all bilateral agreements with all member states of the United Nations. I also believed that we should show willingness, since anyway we cannot make the Greeks address to us as the Republic of Macedonia. If Greece did not accept this, then I considered continuing the bilateral negotiations, but only on the matter how Greece is going to address us. I made efforts to keep the name issue only in the relations with Greece, not like now, when we have certain relation with the United Nations regarding the name and this is being transferred into the relations with the European Union, other international organizations, even sport organizations, such as FIFA etc.

Firstly, this proposal was orally presented by Vanja Toshevski. Zaharakis replied he had no instructions for such thing so he had to ask Athens. They had a meeting soon after. I told the ambassador Toshevski to prepare the proposal in written and present it at the discussions as our official proposal. Toshevski did this in the presence of Vance and after some deliberation Zaharakis said that Athens had given negative response and Greece could not accept the proposal because the conclusion of the Security Council (from the Resolution) referred to all countries, not only to Greece.

Still, it is a fact, which was proven every day, that the other countries showed no special interest in addressing our country as “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. The practice has shown that more than half of the countries we have established full diplomatic relations with have recognized us as the Republic of Macedonia. All the agreements were submitted to the United Nations, and soon after, certain EU members, such as Germany and some other countries, agreed to conclude agreements with our country not under the reference but by including for e.g. “the German and the Macedonian Government have agreed to conclude the following...” Similar thing happened with France that also agreed to address us as the Republic of Macedonia in all direct communications and letters, as well as in some other official factors, sent by the President Chirac. This practice was accepted by Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, the Queen of Britain and some other head of states and governments.

I would like to underline, despite all speculations, throughout this period there was no precise Greek proposal how this matter should be settled, except for the already known proposal – to change the name.

Greece constantly repeated: our terms are known, we cannot make any concessions, if Macedonia agrees, then the problem would be solved, if not....The time passed, and it was logically to be worried that if the name issue was not solved by the expiry of the Interim Accord, the problem might get complicated again.

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When I addressed to the public I tried to explain: “*Do not put the attention on the fact whether it says one party or the other party, I said. If this is offensive to us, it is offensive to Greece as well, as a country existing for quite a long time. The important thing is to notice the article, I refer to the first article, saying that the First Part, that is Greece, recognizes our independence, it is willing to establish diplomatic relations with our country, to establish liaison office in Skopje, and our country to establish liaison office in Athens. Secondly, I said, 10-12 conventions are mentioned in the Accord, the Charter of UN, the Helsinki documents, the Charter of Paris, OSCE documents, regarding the inviolability of borders, it has not been mentioned anywhere that we cannot, or may not take care of our minority” etc.*

## PRECEDENT IN UN HISTORY<sup>438</sup>

### *Monh quteon th alhqeia, ei tiz istorian grajon esti*

For history, I say again, has this and this only for its own; if a man will start upon it, he must sacrifice to no God but Truth;  
*Lucian, II C*

### Chronology of a “dispute” (polemos)

I. Following the tensed and uneasy declaration of **independence of the Republic of Macedonia** and its separation from SFRY in 1991, its southern neighbor – Greece intensified the campaign to encroach *the Macedonian ancient past*.<sup>439</sup>

So, we can rightfully conclude that this artificially imposed so-called “dispute” is more deeply-rooted cultural and civilization phenomena, than legal phenomenon, originating from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, to be more precise from 338 BC when on 2 August, Philip II of Macedonia at the Battle of Chaeronea defeated the Athens who had always “pejoratively” called the Macedonians *Barbarians*.<sup>440</sup>

In fact, Athens penetrated the Aegean part of Macedonia (which is presently located in Northern Greece) for the first time on 31 October 1912, as invader<sup>441</sup>, on the basis of the Decree by the past Greek

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<sup>438</sup> The author of this essay is Dimche Apasiev. The subtitle of this paper is *Za s(k)ept i ~kat a jama vo cirkusot Zapaden Balkan - eksperiment ot „Makedonija”* (On the s(c)eptic pit in the circus Western Balkan – the experiment “Macedonia”).

<sup>439</sup> This aggressive campaign had actually started few years earlier i.e. in 1998 when Greece named its northern province with the term *Macedonia*. Some other activities followed in this direction, for example: the University in Thessalonica was named with the name “Macedonia”; the image of Alexander III Macedonian (note, the Great) was introduced on the past national currency – the drachmas; the printing of propaganda material with historical subjects in which Macedonia is presented as “Greek land” – and such posters, billboards and geographic maps can be found almost in all hotels in Greece where foreign tourists stay; the department for Northern Greece was renamed in “*Department for Macedonia and Thrace*”; the name of the airport in Kavala was also changed.

<sup>440</sup> For more details see: N. Proeva, “The History of the Argeads” (*I st ori ja na Agreadi t e*), Grafotisk, Skopje (2004), as well as the text entitled “Ethnic Identity of the Macedonians” (*Et ni ~ki ot i dent i t et na Makedonci t e*), by the authors S. Shkaric and Gj. Ivanov.

<sup>441</sup> Part of the *Declaration and appeal to the Macedonian people and the public international opinion*, which was adopted at the Conference at Vienna of the Macedonian political party VMRO (Obedineta) (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (United))

King Georgios I (who actually according to his ethnic origin wasn't Greek, but Danish).<sup>442</sup> An interesting and historically true fact is that the first "Greek" king in 19<sup>th</sup> C – Otto I, who reigned from 1832 till 1863, was actually young Bavarian (German) prince, and throughout his three-decade long reign he was searching for a connection between his Bavarian kingdom in Greece and some "Greek" kingdom from the ancient times; since he could not find such connection – objectively, such connection cannot be found – he reached out for the Macedonian ancient history.<sup>443</sup>

II. In April 1992, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia decided to submit an Application for admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN membership. The past President of the Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, in that time was publicly criticized by the opposition for delaving the submission of the Application for UN membership.<sup>444</sup>

Among other things, there is one interesting detail regarding the announcement to the public from the President's Cabinet saying: "... *the President has once again (!) submitted Application for admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN...*".

The same year, Greece in its position in the EC<sup>445</sup>, to be more precise on 27 June 1992 succeeded in securing the so-called Lisbon

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in 1925, also witnesses the genocide of the Macedonian people and says: "... VMRO (United.) shall fight against the violent policy of the autocrats from Athens, who apply barbarian methods to destroy the Macedonian people: they kill Macedonian peasants (Trlis (Vathytopos), Butim (Kriitharas), Livadishia(Livadaki)); rape, persecute and fiercely torture peaceful Macedonian craftsmen and workers; politically intimidate and economically rob the people, and they are supported in their actions by foreign capitalistic parties. They expel all people that are not of Greek nationality from their hearths, rob their properties in order to give the stolen items as presents to the emigrants from Anatolia, Caucasus and Thrace, to these people who are in similar situation as the Macedonian people and victims of the imperialistic policy of the Greek government and its patrons. VMRO (United) will fight against the dictatorship of the Greek authorities that like the Serbian and Bulgarian authorities strive perfidiously to alter the ethnic feature of the country and continue their work of assimilation and changing the nationality of the remaining Macedonian population!" (Source: **Pero Korobar** – Panko Brashnar, **Veles**, 1992; p. 49-50)

<sup>442</sup> Manifest, no. 9; 15 December 2002.

<sup>443</sup> Angelina Markus: "Macedonian ancient values II" (*Makedonski drevni vrednosti II*); Skopje, 2003; p.9

<sup>444</sup> Later, this was confirmed by the past UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who on a press conference on 6 January 1993 confirmed that "... *the country Macedonia has not submitted Application for admission.*" Due to this, the Cabinet of Gligorov, on 8 January 1993 (two days right after the mentioned press conference) officially submitted the Application in procedure.

<sup>445</sup> At present time, the European Union.

Declaration that says EC shall recognize our country with ...*a name that won't contain the word "Macedonia"*.<sup>446</sup>

III. On 8 April 1993, UN Security Council adopted a decision and admitted Macedonia into the United Nations under the reference "*the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*" (in Macedonian: Pora-ne{ na Jugosl ovenska Republ i ka Makedoni ja). The explanation was that the reference was only a provisional reference and it was for UN purposes only.<sup>447</sup>

However, this event presented an unseen precedent in the history of the United Nations, which cannot be justified under any reason, despite the real politically complicated situation in the period of the disintegration of SFRY, followed by bloody civil wars.<sup>448</sup>

The Resolution 817 under which the Republic of Macedonia was officially admitted to UN, has four archiving numbers, which is quite exclusive fact:

\* S/25147 – the official *Application for admission to UN* is registered under this number;

\* S/25541 –the accord by Macedonia to be addressed as "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (signed by Branko Crvenkovski – the Prime Minister of the Macedonian Government at that time) is archived under this number;

\* S/25542 –the accord by Greece regarding the reference (signed by Konstantinos Mitsotakis) is under this number;

\* S/25543 – contains the disagreement Macedonia to be admitted to UN with a provisional name (signed by Kiro Gligorov in the capacity of President of the Republic of Macedonia).<sup>449</sup>

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<sup>446</sup> On 12 July 1992, in the Republic of Macedonia, and all around the world in places populated by Macedonians, so-called Global pan-Macedonian protest meeting was held under the motto "*Yes, Republic of Macedonia – YES*" against the EC Declaration. An interesting fact is that back then the well-known Javier Solana was Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, one of the countries initiators for this declaration. You can see the whole text of this Lisbon Declaration in the Third part of this book "*Documents*".

<sup>447</sup> The words of the President Gligorov regarding the provisional reference were the following: "*funny reference solely for couple of months...*"

<sup>448</sup> With this situation the EU diplomacy faces a fiasco and complete collapse manifested, above all, through the inability to prevent this catastrophe in its Balkan neighbourhood. In order to wash its "sin" and to transfer the guilt to the so-called Balkan dictators, the so-called "International Community" establishes the famous and controversial *the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia* in the Netherlands.

<sup>449</sup> *Fokus*; no. 511, 15 April 2005; p.10.

This precedent in UN history is composed of the following elements:

1) *Political abuse of the admission*: namely, the Republic of Greece, recalling the *UN Charter* whose purpose is “to maintain international peace and security and prevent the creation of crisis region”<sup>450</sup> – through its diplomatic network managed to present its negative political positions towards Macedonia as possible threat upon the peace (actually, the existence of the state under the name Macedonia on the Greek northern border – according to Greece, would present “threat upon its territorial sovereignty” because its northern province carries the same name)?! This is actually an act of bringing a bilateral dispute to a level of procedural barrier for admission into a world organization, in spite of the fact that our country fulfilled all legal requirements for accession (which was confirmed with the *Report of the Badinter Commission* established by the EC, as well as with other *reports of UN missions* in Macedonia).<sup>451</sup>

2) *Formal and legal abuse of the admission*, in other words, breach of procedure:

(a) Direct violation of Article 4 from the Charter by UN itself!<sup>452</sup> Namely, a name is not a condition for an existence of a state, a name is treated as an internal matter of a state!<sup>453</sup>

(b) “The effort” the dispute to be solved within the EC, which means on a regional level, is doomed to failure from the very beginning – one of the stakeholders in this matter (Greece) is a member of the international organization and holds a powerful weapon, and that is the right to veto.

(c) The admission to membership of a country under a so-called “provisional denomination” (reference) and with temporary absence of the country’s official flag in front of UN building.<sup>454</sup>

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<sup>450</sup> UN Charter; Article 1.

<sup>451</sup> *Me/unarodno javno pravo (International public law)*; Lj. D. Frchkovski, V. Tupurkovski and V. Ortakovski; Skopje 1995; p.62.

<sup>452</sup> According to the professor Dr. Ljubomir Frchkovski from the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje, this precedent is already being studied in the books for International law at the Cambridge University, Great Britain.

<sup>453</sup> For example, this can be seen from the data that Ukraine- as a former USSR member, informed the UN Secretary-General about the change of its name in “Republic of Ukraine” only with a note. Although, this example might seem inappropriate, still, it is a good illustration for the formally legal change of a country’s name.

<sup>454</sup> Just as a recollection, the 16-pointed Macedonian sun of Kutlesh (Vergina), which has been eternal symbol of the Macedonians from ancient till present times, is in question – the flag was later changed under serious international pressure.

The UN Secretary-General, under whose auspices the negotiations on the differences over the name are still being held today in New York, first assigned Cyrus Vance, and later on the American Matthew Nimetz, who on the behalf of UN would mediate in finding ....*common solution acceptable for both parties*. An interesting fact about the latter is that in 1996 when he joined the negotiating team, as a representative of the US President, he came to the capital of Macedonia – Skopje in order to test the willingness of the Macedonian citizens to accept one more “compromise” to their detriment.<sup>455</sup>

IV. In February 1994, Greece, who was presiding the EC at that time, introduced the well-known “**embargo**” (16 February 1994)<sup>456</sup> against the Republic of Macedonia, and it supported its injudicious measure by stipulating that its northern neighboring country refused to change its name, flag and Constitution, and it had ...*territorial pretensions* towards the northern provinces of Greece!?

The same year in April, the EC began court proceedings against Greece before the European Court of Justice, seated in Luxembourg, claiming that the act of Greece was in opposition to the *Treaty establishing the European Community*<sup>457</sup> and requested adoption of provisional measures for suspension of this illegal trading ban. Unfortunately, the Court rejected this request made by the Commission.

V. On 13 August 1995, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, an “**Interim Accord**” was signed in New York (the seat of UN- USA) [between Greece and Macedonia]<sup>458</sup> in which both parties (“*the Party of the First Part*” – Greece and “*the Party of the Second*”

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<sup>455</sup> In a short interview, together with the past Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Stevo Crvenkovski, Matthew Nimetz said: “*We have understanding for the feelings of the Greek people and your leadership!*” This statement shows that foreign diplomats with careers do not put the Macedonian people (as entity) and its feeling vis-à-vis the Greek people and its feelings – which for many Macedonians is bitter and frustrating feelings. By the way, this seemingly naïve and gentle man is well-known lawyer from New York and financier of the Democratic party in USA, who officially does not receive any fee for this engagement, in other words he works “voluntarily”. (!?)

<sup>456</sup> Unilateral economic blockade introduced in the time of Andreas Papandreou, from the party PASOK, who defeated Mitsotakis.

<sup>457</sup> Source: *Memorandum on legal options for settlement of the name issue/Executive summary*; International Law and Policy Group, Boston and London (document labelled as: “restricted and confidential”).

<sup>458</sup> This Accord can be found as: *Interim Accord, Interim Agreement, Provisional Agreement (Vremena soglasnost, Vremena spogodba, Pri vremena soglasnost)* etc. However, for the purposes of this students’ project, we have agreed to use the term *Interim Accord* since we believe it to be the most appropriate.

*Part” - Macedonia) agreed: ... to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).*

This so-called *Interim Accord* was signed by Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski – Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia at that time (who was appointed to this post after the resignation of the previous minister Denko Maleski, who on the other hand was member of the first Macedonian “expert” Government) and Karolos Papoulias - Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Greece at that time. The Accord was intended to normalize the relations between the two neighboring countries.<sup>459</sup>

Although the Accord was ratified by the Macedonian Assembly on 9 October 1995, it was disputed before the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia by the opposition party at that time VMRO-DPMNE, whose leader was Ljubcho Georgievski. In the *complaint* it was stipulated that the Interim Accord was concluded by a representative of the Republic of Greece and a private person – Stevo Crvenkovski, on Macedonian behalf, and that it was a matter of Interim Accord and not of Interim Agreement!?! According to the initiators, this arises from the fact that the accord was not concluded on the behalf of the Republic of Macedonia, in other words, it was not signed by the President of the Republic of Macedonia nor by the President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia (the Prime minister), as determined within the Constitution of RM, and since it was not concluded on behalf of the independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia, or, by its authorized representatives - the initiator demanded full annulment of the first article from the *Law on Ratification of the Interim Accord signed between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece*, which , according to the initiators of the complaint, was not in accordance with the Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court decided not to deliberate on this complaint, in other words, it decided not to initiate a procedure for evaluation of the constitutionality of this law!?

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<sup>459</sup> Namely, after this Accord Greece lifted the so-called embargo imposed on Macedonia, and Macedonia, under strong international pressure, amended its Constitution and its national flag.

VI. In November 2004, **USA recognized the Republic of Macedonia** under its “constitutional name”.<sup>460</sup> There are some matters that must be noted in this situation:

1. Official Washington recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name only a day after the tight win of the President George Bush (Junior), and few days later the Spokesperson of the White House, Richard Boucher, announced that ... “*USA shall accept any name agreed by the parties together with Matthew Nimetz*”?!<sup>461</sup>

2. The recognition happened in very “suspicious” moment – one day before the referendum against the territorial division of the Republic of Macedonia (during the so-called election silence before the referendum day), which was initiated by the past Macedonian opposition, in order to prevent “*ethnically-based decentralization in Macedonia*”.<sup>462</sup>

VII. The EU Commission in the **Report on the candidate status** for Macedonia, as of November 2005, concludes the following: “...*the dispute over the name has remained an open issue (...)* and ...*efforts should be intensified with a constructive approach in order to find rapidly a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution within the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions and in the interest of regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations..*”.<sup>463</sup>

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<sup>460</sup> This country was called Macedonia even in the times it had no Constitution, which means the name of the country does not arise from what has been written in the Constitution, as its highest legal act (the Macedonians called themselves Macedonians even in times they had no state, let alone constitution). The name of a country is only noted in its constitution, so as to tell the different constitutions of different countries, and it is not inaugurated or established. We can agree our complete and official name to be “Republic of Macedonia”, but our short and composite name is composed of only one word – Macedonia. Otherwise, we would be brought in a situation of linking the name to the form of government. And one more thing, the latest tendencies for settlement of the “dispute” are directed towards depriving Macedonia from the exclusivity on its name, which is at its own detriment – regardless of the fact that the entire world, even Greece itself, would recognize Macedonia under such so-called “constitutional name”.

<sup>461</sup> The government coalition at that time “For Macedonia” (SDSM, LDP, DUI) celebrated this pompously at the central city square “Macedonia” in the capital Skopje, whereas the opposition representatives (VMRO-DPMNE, VMRO-NP, LP, DA, the coalition TRETOT PAT and other minor non-parliamentary political parties) – judged all of this as “*purpose-oriented matter in order to prevent the referendum on decentralization of Macedonia*”.

<sup>462</sup> The Macedonian diplomats timidly and reservedly, such behavior initiated by the fear of provoking the aggressive Greek diplomacy, used the argument which undoubtedly would be in the benefit of the Republic of Macedonia; and the argument is that three of five Security Council member-states – China, USA and Russia had already recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name!

<sup>463</sup> This extensive *Report*, in French *AVIS*, was adopted on 9 November 2005, and it is composed of 143 pages in total, and the quoted provision is on page 33 – in the section about the “*Relations with neighboring countries*”.

The Spokesperson of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, emphasizing this section of the *Avis* said:...*This is a special success for the Greek diplomacy because for the first time the Greek request on the name issue has been included in an official document of the Union. This success is result of continuous and systematic efforts – silent, but effective... ”.*

And the Announcement by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues with the following: *“the European Commission’s opinion makes it perfectly clear that the integration of our neighboring country into EU will continue with the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. Our neighboring country must cooperate in the effort to find a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, and thus this question is now officially a political criterion. The Greek position has always been such.... We have remained on our decision, having shown our willingness to be constructive...”* - the announcement says.<sup>464</sup>

However, the Macedonian politicians, from the lines of the governing party, as well as from the opposition, appeared to consciously ignore this statement of official Athens, with the explanation that this Greek opinion is: *“...for (its) internal use solely”*, and the *Avis* of the Commission concludes *“the actual situation...”*<sup>465</sup>

VIII. Another matter that should be noted in the relations between Macedonia and Greece concerning the name is the so-called **Memorandum of the Greek Intellectuals** on rejection of the name FYROM – from 9 March 2006.

In the signed petition, published in the Athens daily newspaper *Eleftherotypia* – 56 progressive, left-oriented, Greek intellectuals declared that they have decided to call the northern neighbor the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name, regardless of the position of official Athens! They publicly announced that they would call Macedonia *“the Republic of Macedonia”* emphasizing that *“...we will disassociate from the state authorities and we will refer to the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name, that is, with its unique, legitimate and real name”*. *In the signed text they announced that: “The Republic of Macedonia is recognized by dozens of states, and what’s most important, it is established under this name in linguistic use and in the conscience of all people round the world, except among the Greek*

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<sup>464</sup> *Dnevnik*, no. 2 909; 11 November 2005, page 2.

<sup>465</sup> *Ibid.*

*nationalists. (...)The term “Republic of Macedonia” is used in scientific books or congresses, all around the world. It would be impossible to change this situation.”*

This petition was predominantly prepared by eminent, respected and above all successful people, who do not come only from Greece (Athens, Thessalonica, Ionia, Ioannina, Florina, Naousa, Icaria, Rethymno and Chios) but live, create and work in different states and cities in Europe, Australia and South America (Brussels/Belgium, Luxembourg/Luxemburg, Oslo/Norway, Rotterdam/Netherlands, Hamburg/Germany, Barcelona/Spain, London/Great Britain; Melbourne/Australia and Sao Paolo/Brazil), and have different education and come from different profiles, professions (academicians, university professors, scientists, doctor of sciences, master of sciences, postgraduates, professors, teachers, historians, engineers, practitioners, psychiatrists, architects, lawyers, attorneys, philosophers, editors, journalists, students, marketing agents, trade unionists, bankers, retailers, private entities, translators, physicists, administrative officers and academic painters).

IX. The relations between the two neighboring countries, Greece and Macedonia, concerning the name, were highlighted in the end of 2006 (the beginning of 2007), when the Macedonian Government<sup>466</sup>, in the course of the New Year and Christmas holidays spread an information in the media that the main, and biggest, **Macedonian international airport “Petrovec”**, near the capital Skopje, would be renamed after “Alexander the Macedonian”! The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately reacted to this position, directly through the minister Dora Bakoyannis.<sup>467</sup> Following this event, the Macedonian Government partly changed its intention, and as “compromise” chose the name “Alexander the Great”, with quite unusual explanation that ...*the translation into English would be easier and it would be more comprehensible to the foreigners!?*

The Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs - Mrs. Bakoyannis, fiercely reacted to this, and announced to the Greek media a possible revision

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<sup>466</sup> It is the new Government composed of representatives of the following political parties: VRMO-DPMNE, DPA, NSDP and DOM, whose Prime Minister was Nikola Gruevski. The political elites of both neighboring countries, regardless of their political provenance, have reached so-called “gentlemen’s agreement” that the name issue would not be brought into light in the years for elections (whether in Macedonia or in Greece).

<sup>467</sup> Former Mayor of the capital of Greece – Athens, who demonstrated her capabilities in the course of the Summer Olympic Games in Athens (SOG). This widow is a daughter of the famous K. Mitsotakis.

of the *Interim Accord* concluded between the two countries in 1995 in New York. Namely, in an interview, published in the newspaper *Ethnos*, she says: “...*the violation of certain aspects of the Interim Accord opens the issue of revision*”.<sup>468</sup>

Contrary to this, the Macedonian younger counterpart, Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of RM Government, defending the position of the Macedonian Government regarding the renaming of the Skopje airport, stated for the Greek newspaper *Kathimerini* that the renaming was not an act of provocation directed at Greece and he didn't expect this event to complicate the discussions about the name between the two countries. Further on, he added that Alexander the Macedonian was a person of greater civilizational significance, or that “...*he has the same meaning as Charlemagne has to the Europeans*”! In the mentioned interview, Miloshoski sends a message to Athens not to expect crucial changes by the new Macedonian Government in the already known positions for the so-called “double formula” (one name for the whole world, i.e. *erga omnes*, and another name “mutually acceptable solution” for bilateral communication with Greece, i.e. *Inter partes*) –concerning the name issue. Regarding the remarks that Athens blames Skopje for not willing to make compromise in the position about the name, which actually threatens to present an obstacle for the integration of Macedonia in the Euro-Atlantic structures, Miloshoski replied: “*Just try to imagine that the name of your country is being disputed and Greece is under strong pressure to change its constitutional name, a name chosen by the people, and you will better understand the position of the Republic of Macedonia*”.

In the political analyses of the Greek newspaper *Eleftherotypia* it was said that the revised segments of the *Interim Accord* (1995) would mean aggravation of the relations between the two countries, and ...*if Greece proposes change of the interim solution, this would make room and give opportunity to FYROM to ask from the UN to be recognized under its constitutional name, and greater part of UN members have already bilaterally recognized the country under the name Macedonia*”.

A Greek intellectual, the professor Loukas Tsoukalis - president of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, in his opinion presented to the Macedonian daily newspaper *Dnevnik* points out: “*I have always believed that it is in the interest of the two countries to establish close relations, based on mutual respect. I have also*

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<sup>468</sup> *Dnevnik*, no. 3 272; 23 January 2007, pages 1and 2.

*been in favor of rapid and mutual solution of the name dispute, because “putting off till tomorrow” is not a wise policy, although it might be understandable in terms of the politicians who want to avoid political responsibility by concluding any type of compromise.”*

A series of “scandals” and diplomatic gaffs occurred one by one after the abovementioned events. Namely, Greece immediately initiated a meeting with the mediator in the dispute - Matthew Nimetz, who instantly went first to Athens, and afterwards to Skopje - although the politicians commented that this was a “*regular meeting with the mediator which had already been planed*”. Afterwards, some unusual events followed:

a) on 22 January 2007, under the pressure of the Greek diplomacy, at the parliamentary session at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg (France), the Macedonian signs and symbols were removed from the place where Macedonian reports should've sat – the Macedonian parliamentary group reacted to this. The following day, on 23 January 2007, after the speech by the Greek Prime minister Kostas Karamanlis, the former Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs - Ilinka Mitreva, asked the Greek Prime minister: *Whether he was willing to find a rational solution to an irrational problem?*, and his reply was the following: “*...I myself am a Macedonian, and another 2.5 million Greeks are Macedonians, so the question cannot be considered unilaterally*”?!<sup>469</sup>

This statement provoked the President of the Republic of Macedonia – Branko Crvenkovski, who the very following day, on 24 January 2007, at a press-conference, to a reporter's question to comment on Karamanlis' speech at the Council of Europe said: ... “*If Karamanlis feels like Macedonian, we shall respect that, but we expect the same respect by Greece towards the Macedonian people*”;

b) on 23 January 2007, during a promotion of the project: *Invest in Macedonia* New business heaven in Europe,<sup>470</sup> the Macedonian Prime

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<sup>469</sup> By the way, Kostas Karamanlis was indeed born in the settlement Kjupki, situated near Serres and Drama in occupied Aegean Macedonia. After this, OMPEM – “Organization of the Macedonian Descendants from the Aegean part of Macedonia” seated in Bitola, published an announcement saying: ... “*we delightfully accepted the public declaration of the Greek Prime Minister as Macedonian by origin. Such democratic gesture gave us the right to register him in OMPEM, and the membership card shall be sent to his home address*” (Source: *Vest*).

<sup>470</sup> The Government project “*Invest in Macedonia – the New Business Heaven in Macedonia*” was projected as pre-campaign for attracting foreign direct investments in Republic of Macedonia, by informing the foreigners about the advantages for investing in Macedonia, through publishing commercials and information in most circulated daily newspapers in thirty countries around the world (EU, USA, Japan, Russia, China and others).

Minister Nikola Gruevski, at a press-conference held in the Government, stated that they as a Government had encountered problems during the attempt to lease commercial space in the Greek newspapers *Kathimerini* and *To vima*, which refused to publish the text containing the word Macedonia – which was a result of the tensed Macedonian – Greek relations following the renaming of the Skopje airport;

c) on 26 January 2007, in the center of Athens the Albanian writer Ismail Kadare<sup>471</sup> caused a diplomatic incident when at the promotion of his two latest novels, translated into Greek language, used the word “Macedonia” referring to the present Republic of Macedonia. After this, the mayor of Athens, Nikitas Kaklamanis, who few minutes earlier had sincerely greeted and praised the Albanian writer, demonstratively left the event.

X. The relations between the two neighboring countries in terms of the name were once again highlighted in the first quarter of 2008. As the so-called Bucharest Summit of NATO approached, the pressure of the so-called “international community”<sup>472</sup> for solution of this “dispute” evidently increased:

a) On 19 February 2008, in Athens, the mediator Matthew Nimetz tabled new official **Proposal in nine items** containing five names.<sup>473</sup> Both parties refused this proposal which was assessed by many world analysts as “pro-Greek”. Namely, both parties remained on their positions. Greece demanded complex name with geographical reference for international use (*erga omnes*), and Macedonia on the other hand asked for the so-called “double formula” – the name Republic of Mace-

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<sup>471</sup> Ismail Kadare is one of the most famous contemporary Albanian authors, who lives in Paris, France and was nominated for Nobel Prize in Literature in 2005. This part refers to the promotion of Greek editions of the novels *Agamemnon's Daughter* (2005) and *The Successor* – the latter, as the Albanian daily newspaper *Shqip* announced, was sponsored by Piraeus Bank that owns branch offices in neighboring Albania. However, some other rumors are associated with the background and works of the “controversial” Kadare, who is considered as open representative of the Great Albanian tendency in Tirana. Namely, the banished Albanian academic, who lives in Geneva, Professor Dr. Kaplan Resuli – Burovich (considered to be “the Albanian Nelson Mandela”) stated that Kadare as favorite, follower and main ideologist of the dictator Enver Hoxha, was launched to the West by Ramiz Alia and the widow of E. Hoxha, with well planned mission.

<sup>472</sup> The so-called “international community” was the embodiment of USA, and the latter had recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its “constitutional name”, however they ...further supported the process for overcoming the differences regarding the name left under the auspices of UN!?

<sup>473</sup> See text below.

donia for the entire world + mutually acceptable name for bilateral communication with Greece (inter partes);

b) The Macedonian Government<sup>474</sup> responded to this with intensive **campaign in world daily newspapers** where it explained that Greece was not able to put a veto (ban) on the admission of Macedonia under its “provisional name” in any international organization, referring to the *Interim Accord* between the two countries from 1995;<sup>475</sup>

c) In this tensed period, information was spread through the world and local media that the US administration would directly get involved in the negotiations, and would even appoint its own direct negotiator, what’s more, the name of Victoria Nuland - US ambassador to NATO was mentioned;

d) This information was followed by many intensive **ambassadorial and ministerial meetings** in New York, Vienna and Brussels. In Vienna, on 17 March 2008, the mediator Matthew Nimetz tabled three proposals that were qualified as “pro-Greek” proposals, however his official position after the meeting with the ambassadors Vasilakis (Greece) and Dimitrov (Macedonia) was that there were no new proposals and that he was optimist concerning the settlement of the issue before the NATO Summit. He encouraged both parties to intensify the negotiations in the following days and invited them to a next meeting in New York;<sup>476</sup>

e) **the last official proposal by Nimetz** before the NATO Summit was “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)”, as a name for international use – tabled on 26 March 2008 in New York. The Greek party refused this proposal immediately as ... “*distant from the objectives of Greece*”, whereas the Macedonian party qualified it as ... “*final ultimate proposal after 17 years of negotiations*”, according to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of RM - Antonio Miloshoski.

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<sup>474</sup> The Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski (VMRO-DPMNE; DPA and NSDP) was at the head of the Government. The move by Menduh Taxhi was symptomatic - two weeks before the NATO Summit in Romania – the leader of the Albanian party DPA in the Government coalition (who was also on the so-called USA “Black list”) left the Government coalition; this provoked a series of “theories” about which foreign structures are behind this move for “the fall” of the Government (Greek, American or others)

<sup>475</sup> The Accord in its original form is enclosed in the last (third) section of this book, titled as *Documents*.

<sup>476</sup> An interesting fact is that some of the meetings were not held in UN headquarters, but in the law office of the mediator Nimetz?

XI. The last event when the relations between Greece and Macedonia in terms of the name issue<sup>477</sup> were highlighted was the so-called **Bucharest Summit** on NATO enlargement (2-4 April 2008). I would briefly mention the main events related to this NATO Summit:

a) at the dinner of heads of states and governments, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, who had previously had fierce discussion with the US President George Bush, tabled the proposal “Republic of Skopje (Macedonia)” which was refused by the Macedonian delegation as inappropriate proposal.<sup>478</sup>

b) Greece used its announced right to “veto” and thus it prevented the admission of Macedonia into NATO, i.e. it divided the so-called “Adriatic Group” (Croatia + Albania + Macedonia). This was done at the informal dinner of the heads of states and governments of NATO member states, on 2 April 2008, and it was officially announced the following day by the NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer;

c) At the press conference, the Macedonian reporters left the hall as a sign of protest. The same day, the Macedonian state delegation<sup>479</sup> did the same and prematurely left the Summit.

d) After the initial euphoria in Greece, a series of undesired events, and the so-called “silent trading war” between the two countries took place:

- on 7 April 2008, unknown ultra-nationalistic armed Greek group published shots of masked people with weapons uttering insulting threats for the Macedonian people;

- on 8 April 2008, the house of the priest/father Nikodim Tsarknias was stoned, ethnic Macedonian from Aegean Macedonia, who was expelled from the Greek Orthodox Church because he gave liturgy in Macedonian language;

- on 9 April 2008, the president of EFA Rainbow - organization of the Macedonians in Greece, and a pioneer in the fight for human rights of the Macedonians in Greece - Pavle Filipov Voskopoulos suffered a stroke and was transferred to intensive care in hospital in Florina,

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<sup>477</sup> This happens in the end of the first quarter of 2008 when we were actually completing this project.

<sup>478</sup> Nikola Gruevski’s address to the nation on 12 April 2008, broadcasted on MTV – when the decision for self-dissolution of the Macedonian Parliament was brought, a precedent in the Macedonian political history.

<sup>479</sup> The official delegation was composed of 50 members, but there was no representative of the opposition.

in a critical condition.<sup>480</sup> Some Greek left-oriented media announced that grounded suspicions existed that he was poisoned by the secret services of Greece. The event took place at his office, and the poisoning had been caused by unknown substance poured into a drink.<sup>481</sup>

- on 13 April 2008, unknown group placed the Greek flag on the Macedonian church in Florina by force. The flag was pushed down by a strong wind, to which father Tsarknias, during a visit by a delegation of the Association of Macedonians expelled from the Aegean part of Macedonia, commented “...even God is on Macedonian side”;

- on 14 April 2008, at an international conference in Athens staged by Diplomacy Magazine, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs Dora Bakoyannis, provoked by a previous act of the Macedonian ambassador to Greece - Blagoj Handzhiski, stated that “... Greece will exercise its right to veto even during the setting of the date for start of the negotiations for EU accession of the neighboring country”<sup>482</sup>

- on 16 April 2008, before Christmas, Greece de facto (but not de iure) banned the traditional import of lamb from the Republic of Macedonia, demanding from the butcher’s shops to issue special declaration explicitly stating that the meat comes from FYROM;

- on 17 April 2008, the Hellenic Civil Aviation Administration banned the Macedonian airliner MAT to fly over Greek territory, so the Macedonian company cancelled all charter flights to the Greek islands;<sup>483</sup>

- on 3 May 2008, the Greek authorities banned all bank transactions (monetary remittance) towards Republic of Macedonia, which were previously realized via the branch offices of Western Union;

- on 10 May 2008, Macedonian transporters were ill treated on Greek territory by a group of 50-60 Greek citizens, who besides denigrating the transporters made them remove the stickers MK from their

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<sup>480</sup> TV Sitel, news program *Dnevnik*; 9.IV. 2008.

<sup>481</sup> It is interesting that the Government did not react to this event, although few days earlier, after an intervention by the Greek MFA, a painting by a Macedonian artist was removed from the billboards in Skopje because the painting included swastika painted in the Greek flag, and thus Macedonia directly violated the constitutionally guaranteed *freedom of expression* of its own citizens for the sake of good-neighborly relations!?

<sup>482</sup> TV A1 and TV Kanal 5; news program *Dnevnik*; 14.IV. 2008.

<sup>483</sup> Although this wasn’t something unusual since previously MAT was not allowed to fly in the Greek air space, still this was the first time the reason for the ban to be declared – the name of the national flag carrier airline?! After this event, the Macedonian Ministry of Transport and Communications sent a Protest Note to Greece.

tracks. The Greek police was present at the scene, however it did not react?!

- on 3 June 2008 NATO apologized to Macedonia for a Greek officer, who during a military drill in France made two Macedonian officers take off their uniforms because the word “Macedonia” was written on them;

- on 4 June 2008, Greek contingent of KFOR attempted to enter the Republic of Macedonia without the necessary technical documentation, during which some insulting words were addressed to the Macedonian customs officers;

- on 5 June 2008 the Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski was not allowed to land in Athens to participate in the SE Europe Heads of State Summit because the word “Macedonia” was written on the plane;

- on 6 June 2008, at the crossing point Dojrani on the Greek-Macedonian border, four Macedonian truck drivers were humiliated by being made to broom the crossing point so that they could exit from Greece;

- on 16 June 2008, at a closed meeting of the foreign ministers of EU member states, the Slovenian Chairman Dimitri Rupel and the Greek chief of diplomacy Dora Bakoyannis clashed, so Rupel interrupted Bakoyannis and cynically reprimanded her for opening the so-called “Pandora’s box”;

- on 18 June 2008 the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dora Bakoyannis promoted the book *Macedonian Identities in Time* by the controversial Greek “historian” Evangelos Kofos, known by his negative position towards the Macedonians;

- on 24 June 2008, the Macedonian Information Agency (MIA) was not accepted as member in the Alliance of Mediterranean News Agency as a result of the protest by the Cyprus Agency, whose representative was a Secretary General of the Alliance as well and had previously received “instructions” from Greek side;

- on 25 June 2008, the Greek national guards, integral part of the Greek Army, in the area of Florina, where significant number of the Macedonian minority in Northern Greece resides, conducted provocative military drills under the slogan “*Macedonia is one and Greek!*”;

- on 27 June 2008 in ALTEA mission within EUFOR, it was ordered the international code of the Republic of Macedonia “MKD” to be replaced with “FYROM”, to which the Macedonian Foreign Minister – Antonio Miloshoski reacted. However, Javier Solana – High

Representative for the EU Foreign Policy did not apologize about the scandal, as Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – NATO Secretary General did few days earlier;

- on 4 July 2008, the US ambassador to Athens Speckhard, when addressing to the American citizens of Greek origin used the name “FYROM” although USA had previously recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name;

- on 10 July 2008, the Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski sent an *open letter* to the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in which he treated the so-called “The question of Aegean Macedonia”. Afterwards, similar letters were sent to Jose Manuel Barroso - President of the European Commission, who in his replay he declared himself as incompetent for solving minority issues!?. On 15 August 2008, letter with similar content was sent by the Macedonian President of the Assembly – Trajko Veljanovski, addressed to his counterparts in EU member states;

- on 20 July 2008, around sixty neo-Nazis from the ultra-right Greek organization “Hrisi Avgi” prevented representatives of the folklore ensemble “Ilinden”, composed of Macedonian emigrants in Australia, to enter in Greece; this folklore ensemble were supposed to participate in the so-called Ilinden meeting traditionally held every year at the fair in the village Meliti (Ovcharani) (Florina Prefecture). In spite of the reports, the Greek police did not intervene!?.;

- on 11 August 2008, the Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski sent an *open letter* to the UN special envoy – Matthew Nimetz requesting the question about the Macedonian Orthodox Church to be included in the negotiations with Greece;

- in the course of August 2008, a “special war” occurred between the posts of Greece and Macedonia. Namely, the Greek post did not accept the letters with Macedonian toponyms, whereas the Macedonian post did not accept the letters with the reference FYROM, and thus a chaos was created in the post communication;

- in August 2008, the Macedonian Parliament adopted *the Resolution on refugees* from Aegean Macedonia;

- on 15 September 2008, two independent UN experts on minority issue (one of them being Gay McDougal) visited Northern Greece and had a meeting in Florina with the representatives of the Macedonian party “Rainbow”;

- on 15 October 2008, the Greek security forces clashed with demonstrators, Greek citizens of Macedonian ethnic origin from Florina

prefecture because the people protested against the usurpation of their lands by the Greek Army to perform unannounced military drills. Four people were severely injured in this intervention. The reporters from Republic of Macedonia who reported about the event were apprehended by the Greek Police;

- on 22 October 2008, Greece announced that it had succeeded to secure withdrawal of the recognitions of Congo and Mexico regarding the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia, whereas, few days later Macedonia announced that it managed to secure the recognition of the country under its constitutional name by India;

- on 29 October 2008, the Greek Army in Thessalonica, at an official parade in front of the diplomatic corps and foreign military attaches in Greece, exclaimed nationalistic paroles like “*Macedonia is Greek - we won't give it to Skopje!*” to which none of the NATO and EU representatives expressed any official protest!?

- on 4 November 2008, the Macedonian negotiator about the name – Nikola Dimitrov was withdrawn from this function by the President of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski, who previously did not consult the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, explaining that by including Martin Protugjer – Chief of Gruevski's Cabinet, the Government was pulling down the positions of the Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian ambassador to USA – Zoran Jolevski was appointed at this position;

- on 17 November 2008, the Republic of Macedonia filed a lawsuit against Republic of Greece before the International Court of Justice in Hague, due to the violation of *the Interim Accord* (1995) with the Greek veto at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, in April 2008;

- in January 2009, Greece cancelled a grant of 50 million dollars for the corridor “North-South” because the Government of the Republic of Macedonia renamed the highway “Tabanovce-Gevgelija” (E-75) into “Alexander the Macedonian” and the stadium in Skopje in “Philip II”. Few days after its fierce reaction against the “encroaching of the ancient past” Greece announced that it would finance construction of a gigantic monument of Alexander the Great in Iraq, to honor the Battle of Gaugamela!?!;

- on 11 February 2009, the Greek lobby in EUROCONTROL managed to secure this international organization to ask the sole Macedonian carrier – Macedonian Airlines (MAT) to change the name of the company so as not to have further problems with its outstanding debts;

- on 13 February 2009, the Greek court in Florina sentenced Macedonian cameraman from Bitola to suspended imprisonment and a fine with confiscation of his equipment, solely because he shot his cousin's wedding in Aegean Macedonia (Northern Greece);

- on 15 February 2009, Greece announced protests to the highest levels, to the UN Secretary-General and to other international institutions and head of states, against the promoted video "Macedonia Timeless" by the director Milcho Manchevski because of the use of ancient symbols in the video!?

### **(Un)official proposals for settlement of the "name issue"**

The Historian ...ne quid falsi dicere audeat, ne quid vera non audeat  
(must not dare to say anything false, he must dare to say anything  
true)!

**C i c e r o**, 1<sup>st</sup> century BC

#### ***I. Names not including the word "Macedonia":***

The unofficial proposals that did not include the word "Macedonia" often came from Republic of Macedonia's neighboring countries:

1) Greek-Serbian sources:

\* **"Central Balkan Republic" – 1992;**

\* **"Republic of South Slavia" – 1992;**

\* **"Republic of South Serbia" – 1992;**

\* **"Republic of Skopje" – 1993:** these proposals deny the existence of Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian people, separating it from *Macedonia* and identifying it with larger geographical and cultural groups (i.e. the Balkans, Slavs, Serbs, etc.);

2) Albanian sources:

\* **"Vardaria" – 1995:** unofficial proposal from some Macedonian politicians and quasi-intellectuals from the Albanian national minority in Republic of Macedonia. The media was not interested enough in this proposal and it was not seriously considered, thus it did not receive much media attention;

3) Bulgarian sources:

\* **"Southwest Bulgaria" – 2008:** unofficial Bulgarian proposal made by ultra-nationalist movements in Republic of Bulgaria.

## II. Names including the word “Macedonia”:

\* **“The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” – 1992** (in Macedonian language and written in Cyrillic letters “*Porane{ na(t a) Jugosl ovenska Republ i ka Makedoni ja*”). This is the official, current name of our country under which it has been admitted to UN. In the time this reference was accepted, the Macedonians were been persuaded that regardless of the number of words or references written before the name “Macedonia”, the communication would continue to be carried out, “*due to practical reasons*”, with the use of the last word of the coinage, that is the word Macedonia. However, there is a remaining dilemma why this ridiculous long coinage hasn’t been reduced to “Macedonia”, but it has been reduced to “FYROM” (or in Macedonian “PJRM” or “BJRM”) – which has become common reference used by everyone, including UN!?,<sup>484</sup>

\* **“Republic of Macedonia – Skopje”** (*Republ i ka Make-doni ja - Skopje*) - 1992 (proposal made by Constantine Mitsotakis, who was the Head of the Government of Greece led by New Democracy, which later on lost the next parliamentary elections under the pressure of the Greek public). The proposal was tabled by the Greek Prime Minister on the meeting with the President of the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia at the time – Mr. Stojan Andov, held in Davos, Switzerland during the World Economic Forum in February 1992.<sup>485</sup> In addition, the first mediator in the “dispute” – Mr. Cyrus Vance favored this proposal. In fact, this idea is quite perfidious since if we consider the aforementioned explanation that the last word is generally used as shortened formula, then the conclusion is that the name would be reduced only to “Skopje”;

\***“Independent Macedonia”**

**“Slavic Republic of Macedonia” – 1992:** this was unofficial name proposal in the so-called “Pinheiro package”, according to the

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<sup>484</sup> According to the past statements made by Kostas Karamanlis from the conservative party New Democracy, this name was acceptable to Greece and there would be no objections if Macedonia applied this name in the process of integration in the EU. However, following the parliamentary elections and the “narrow majority” in the Greek Parliament, he drastically changed his position – threatening that Greece would exercise the power of veto if mutually acceptable solution was not found!?

<sup>485</sup> Source: *Annual Book of the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” in honor of PhD, Professor Todorka Orovcjanec*, volume 42, page 677, Skopje 2006. The quoted text is part of the paper of MA Misho Dokmanovic titled *Pol i t i kat a na sosedni t e zemji vo odnos na osamost ojuvawet o na Republ i ka Makedoni ja* (*The policy of the neighboring countries regarding the independence of Republic of Macedonia*).

Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs João de Deus Pinheiro in the capacity of EC Chairperson;

\* **“New Macedonia” – 1993**: the Greek media claimed, according to “...*reliable sources from Athens*” known only to them, that this was one of the three names proposed by the mediator in the dispute at the time Mr. Cyrus Vance.<sup>486</sup> Indeed, it soon turned out that Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance suggested the name as possible compromise.<sup>487</sup>

\* **“Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” (.....) – 1993** (suggested by Mr. Kiro Gligorov, but originally proposed by Robin O’Neil for the settlement of the dispute). The explanation of the proposal was that the use of brackets instead of dash would eliminate the “cuckoo in the nest” trap – Skopje to be generally accepted name of the state;

\* **“Slavomacedonia” – 1994** (unofficial proposal released in the public by certain reporters who, according to some speculations, were instructed by the President of the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia at the time, Mr. Stojan Andov). The explanation was that “*such was the name of the people in Aegean Macedonia and they did not oppose to it*”!<sup>488</sup> The proposal is considered to be a “Greek trickery”.

\* **“North Macedonia” – 1994** (unofficial *German proposal* for overcoming the “name differences”). In August 1994, the Greek media reported on a new German proposal for settlement of the name dispute. The Head of German’s Diplomacy in that time, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel, suggested a Plan (in six items) for settlement of the dispute, which included two alternatives for the name formula: “New Macedonia” or “North Macedonia”. This proposal was also rejected;<sup>489</sup>

\* **“Upper Macedonia” – 1999/2000** (the proposal was put forward by the former Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis at a press conference in Skopje at the Aleksandar Palace Hotel in the time when his Macedonian counterpart was Mr. Ljubcho Georgievski, and PhD

<sup>486</sup> Daily newspaper: Nova Makedonija, 11 November 1995.

<sup>487</sup> See *Report of Boutros Ghali to Security Council*, registered in the UN archives under No. S/25855

<sup>488</sup> Again, this shameful proposal was connected only to the messenger while the creators were kept in the dark.

<sup>489</sup> *Annual Book of the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus”* volume 42, page 679, Skopje 2006 (MA Misho Dokmanovic – *Politika na sosedni te zemji vo odnos na osamost ojuvawet o na Republika Makedonija* (The policy of neighboring countries regarding the independence of Republic of Macedonia)).

Vasil Tupurkovski was coalition partner of the latter). The proposal was widely criticized by the Macedonian public;<sup>490</sup>

\* **“Republika Makedonija” – 2001** (a proposal from the ICG given in a symptomatic time, shortly after the signing of the imposed Ohrid Framework Agreement). At first glance, this is the constitutional name of the state, however it is not translated in English, only transcribed into Latin alphabet instead. The aim is quite obvious: Greece wants to keep exclusive possession of the name *Makedoni ja*, in English *Macedonia* (not *Makedonija*), by recognizing the above-mentioned name proposal and thus use the name *Makedoni ja* (Macedonia) for cultural, historical, commercial and tourism purposes while our state is de facto and de iure named - *Republ i ka Makedoni ja*. In fact, the intention of this proposal is to divide the historical heritage of Macedonia in two periods, one until the 6<sup>th</sup> century and one from the 6<sup>th</sup> century onwards, and in doing so, the Macedonians would acquire the Slavic history, culture and archaeology, whereas the Greeks would get everything else – appearing as ostensible legitimate successor of the Ancient Macedonian State;<sup>491</sup>

\* **“Republika Makedonija“**

**“Republic of Macedonia“**

**“Republika Makedonija - Skopje“ - 2005** – accompanied by a long and fuzzy footnote, and several other short and medium *revision terms* (official proposal by the mediator Matthew Nimetz). The proposal faced immediate “frontal” rejection by the Greek side, for being “American cunning”, whilst the Head of the Macedonian Government at the time, PhD Vlado Buchkovski, labeled the proposal as “*solid basis for continuation of talks*” and “*elaborated double, not triple, formula*”;<sup>492</sup>

\* **“Constitutional Republic of Macedonia“** (*Ust avna Republ i ka Makedoni ja*);

**“Democratic Republic of Macedonia“** (*Demokrat ska Republ i ka Makedoni ja*);

**“Independent Republic of Macedonia“** (*Nezvi sna Republ i ka Makedoni ja*);

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<sup>490</sup> The explanatory argument was that the ancient kingdom of Macedon included the names of “Upper” and “Lower” Macedonia.

<sup>491</sup> If we accept this proposal, the Macedonian equivalent of United States of America per analogiam would be “*D Junajt et St ejt s of Ameri ka*” – which is absurd!

<sup>492</sup> *Vreme*; 13 November 2005 (D.A.).

“**New Republic of Macedonia**“ (*Nova Republ i ka Makedonija*); or

“**Republic of Upper Macedonia**“ (*Republ i ka Gorna Makedonija*); – 2008 (Athens) – including the so called “**framework plan**” consisted of 9 items (official proposal by the mediator Matthew Nimetz made just before the NATO Summit related to the enlargement of the Alliance by the admission of the countries from the “Adriatic Group”, that is from the Western Balkans (Croatia, Albania and Macedonia);<sup>493</sup>

\* “**New Republic of Macedonia**” (*Nova Republ i ka Makedonija*);

“**Republic of Upper Macedonia**” (*Republ i ka Gorna Makedonija*);

“**Republika Makedonija (Skopje)**” (*Republ i ka Makedonija - Skopje*) – 2008 (Vienna) – (unofficial proposal by the mediator Matthew Nimetz): the official position was that Nimetz did not offer any proposals to the Ambassadors Vasilakis and Dimitrov, at the consultation in Vienna, however the media published these three proposals making remarks that they were presented under direct tutelage of the US administration;

\* “**Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)**” (*Republ i ka Makedonija (Skopje)*) – 2008 (New York) – (the last official proposal by the mediator Matthew Nimetz):<sup>494</sup> the Greek party turned down this proposal without delay for being “... *far from Greece’s pursued objectives*”, whereas the Macedonian party described it as “...*a final proposal after 17 years of talks, on which the highest state authorities will form its position*”. However, the position was not established before the NATO Summit due to the diverse opinions of the President Crvenkovski and the Prime Minister Gruevski;<sup>495</sup>

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<sup>493</sup> The proposal caused minor crisis in the Greek Government, following its publication in the Greek media, about the “culprit” responsible for the leakage of confidential information (whether the culprit was someone close to the Prime Minister K. Karamanlis or to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Dora Bakoyannis).

<sup>494</sup> It is interesting that: 1) this proposal was not presented in the mediator’s law office as usual, but in the UN Headquarters in New York; 2) this was the initial proposal by Robin O’Neil introduced back in 1993 for settlement of the dispute between Greece and Macedonia.

<sup>495</sup> Actually, later on it was established that the “highest state authorities” had reached a compromise for the name change, according to the statement made by Mr. Laze Elenovski, a Minister for Defence at the time. The statement was given during a closed session of the management of NSDP political party.

\* **„Republic of Skopja (Macedonia)”** (*Republika Skopje (Makedonija)*) – **2008 (Bucharest)** – (the last proposal from Greece presented in personal by the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, through the mediators on the NATO Summit in Bucharest, as a final chance for avoiding the announced Greek veto). The proposal was rejected by the Macedonian delegation describing it to be “inappropriate”.

## INTERVIEWS

### LEGAL SUBJECTIVITY AND ADMISSION TO UN<sup>496</sup>

*The legal identity, in other words a name of a state, can not be taken away nor can it be imposed. In addition, a state can not be forced to negotiate endlessly for its own name, and in the meantime be discriminated in terms of its representation. The deprivation of legal identity constitutes a violation of the principle of non-intervention in the legal personality provided in the Declaration on principles of international law from 1970. Without legal identity a state is an incomplete legal personality, that is to say it has partially or entirely reduced capacity for concluding agreements or for representing itself – stated categorically Dr Janev.*

The Government should take immediate action to examine the legitimacy of the admission of Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations. The procedure for admission of any state to UN is regulated in Article 4 of the *Charter*, which lays down that membership in the United Nations is open to all international subjects that fulfill the following conditions:

- 1) To be states;
- 2) To be peace-loving states;
- 3) To accept the obligations contained in the Charter;
- 4) To be able and
- 5) To be willing to carry out these obligations. No additional conditions can be imposed despite these conditions, nor can such conditions be voted upon in accordance with the *Resolution of the General Assembly 197/III* or the *Opinion of the Court* given on 28 May 1948!

According to the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from 1948, the conditions for admission of a state are exhaustive, explicit and final, in other words, they can not transcend in time the act of admission. Furthermore, pursuant to the *Opinion of the Court*, after affirming that the state fulfils the conditions of Article 4, no additional conditions can be imposed nor can such conditions be voted upon!

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<sup>496</sup> This interview with Dr Igor Janev is excerpted from the monthly magazine *Makedonsko vreme* with the consent of the editorial board. We wish to express our gratitude to Mr. Jovan Pavlovski for the provided help and access to the needed materials.

In this case, there are two additional conditions imposed on Macedonia which transcend in time the act of admission. The conditions are: 1. to accept being provisionally referred to as the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and 2. to accept negotiating with another country (Greece) over the inherent right of the state (to determine its own name). The inclusion, and especially the voting upon such conditions, represents an *ultra vires* act (a violation of jurisdiction) on the part of the UN. The imposition of the two additional conditions is a breach of Macedonia’s membership right, in particular, due to the inexistence of “conditional admission” in the UN system, since it constitutes a breach of the right of states to non-discrimination in their representation in the UN. Namely, the legal identity is an essential element of the membership right and the legal personality of an international subject.

– *What is necessary for the recognition of the country under its constitutional name by the UN?*

**Janev:** In order to establish the constitutional name of the country within the UN, the legality of the resolutions for admission of Macedonia to membership must be examined. More precisely, in terms of examining the character of the conditions for admission of Macedonia to membership, the General Assembly of the UN should, upon a request made by the Government of Republic of Macedonia, address the International Court of Justice for advisory opinion on the question whether the *Resolution 47/225* from 1993, in the part relating to the use of the provisional reference for Macedonia and the obligation to negotiate over its name, is in accordance with the *Charter*.

– *Mr. Janev, can you briefly tell us what has been violated in the process of admission of our state to United Nations membership?*

**Janev:** First of all, in the process of admission to UN there is a violation of Article 4, paragraph 1 of the *Charter*, as a result of imposing and voting upon the additional conditions. Such conditions have no legal character and the obligations that have arisen after the admission (to accept the reference and the negotiations over the name) constitute illegal obligations, and therefore violate the principle of sovereign equality stated in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the *Charter*. In addition, there is a breach of Article 2, paragraph 7, regarding the fact that these obligations refer to an inherent right which is within the domestic jurisdiction, in other words, there is a breach of the principle of non-intervention by the UN in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction. Since the legal identity (the name of the state) is an essen-

tial element of the legal personality, such element therefore is not alienable (nor is any inherent right negotiable). There is also a violation of the principle of self-determination (in this case of the legal identity of the state), provided for in Articles 1 and 55 of the *UN Charter*. Finally, there is a breach of the principle of non-discrimination of the state in its representation contained in Article 83 of the *Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character*.

– Can a state be admitted to United Nations membership without a name?

**Janev:** The legal identity, in other words the name of a state, can not be taken away nor can it be imposed. In addition, a state can not be forced to negotiate endlessly for its own name, and be discriminated in terms of its representation in the meantime. The deprivation of legal identity constitutes a violation of the principle of non-intervention in the legal personality provided in the *Declaration on principles of international law* from 1970. Without legal identity a state is an incomplete legal personality, that is to say it has partially or entirely reduced capacity to conclude agreements or represent itself. Other elements of the legal subjectivity have been degraded as well. For that reason a state can not be admitted to United Nations membership without a name, which again proves the ultra vires act on the part of UN by allowing such admission.

– *Why do you consider this name case to be any different from similar cases in which UN makes oversights?*

**Janev:** In the “Macedonian case” there is an ultra vires act performed by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN, whereas the General Assembly performs such act by a two-thirds majority vote, involving the legal subjectivity (responsibility) of the United Nations. It is a procedural ultra vires act that violates the internal law of the Organization, the legal status of the member state and the membership rights due to the additional obligations. In addition, there is also a breach of the international legal order since the use of the name can not be bound only within the limits of the Organization. The name (the identity) is used outside the Organization, in the relations with non-member states and organizations which are not connected to the UN.

– *Does the acceptance of the admission conditions, as we regarded earlier to be illegal, influence the conduct of the procedure in the UN?*

**Janev:** No, it does not! In case of the admission, regardless whether Republic of Macedonia has accepted the conditions or not, these conditions are without legal basis because of the mentioned prohibition to vote on the additional conditions which is invariable in terms of the given consent. Namely, the consent (or lack of consent) to the ultra vires act does not affect the legality of such act! The illegality of the admission conditions to UN membership for our country arises from the possibility of the admission act to transcend in time, in other words creation of additional obligations after the act of admission to UN.

– *Can Greece invoke the Interim Accord from 1995 in which we agreed not to bring this dispute before the Court?*

**Janev:** This consent does not influence the obligation of the UN to allow admission of states under non-discriminatory conditions. The issue could be put before the Court due to breach of the right of Republic of Macedonia to UN membership, since we have a constitutional right (having in mind the constitutional nature of the *Charter*) to sovereign equality between member states. Furthermore, in case of violation of the legal status of a member state, the UN responsibility is to establish conditions for respect of the legal order of the Organization. The UN's duty to forward the matter to the hands of the Court is in accordance with the following legal principles: 1. sovereign equality, 2. bona fide (good faith), 3. nemo iudex in sua causa (no person can judge a case in which he or she is a party) and 4. the mission of the Organization to promote conditions for respect of the rule of law, as well as the contractual obligations, including the obligations under the *UN Charter*.

– *What is the legal quality of this Accord and does it influence the procedure for recognition of the “constitutional name” by the UN?*

**Janev:** As we mentioned earlier, in terms of the name of a state, the additional conditions involving the use of the “reference” and the negotiations do not have a legal basis, having in mind the fact that the denomination does not represent identity within the international legal communication. On the other hand, the states are entitled to possess a legal identity based on non-discrimination. The obligations regarding the name contained in the resolution for admission of Macedonia to UN membership, predominantly for the reason of transcendence in time (quasi-conditional admission), are without legal basis. In addition, they are also in violation of ius cogens (peremptory norm), a principle of sovereign equality. Therefore, the *Accord* with Greece lacks legal marks in the part related to the legal identity, or to the constitutional name.

This part of the Accord is legally invalid and inoperative! The procedure for recognition of the constitutional name should be conducted on the basis of the violation of the actual procedure (additional conditions), more exactly on the basis of the examination of the legality of the membership rights, the legal status and the legal order of the Organization. In particular, the procedure should start immediately given that the duty of any member state is to inform the UN about the violation of the legal order and status of the Organization. The means of doing this are through an initiative by our country (draft resolution) carried out in the General Assembly, hence this organ can address the International Court of Justice and thus question the legality of the resolution for admission of Macedonia to UN membership. Since such judicial case, where the legality of the additional conditions was challenged, already exists from 1948, the Court should be declared competent.

*– Is it scandalous that the Government of Republic of Macedonia has already known, for almost a year now, about the „ultra vires act” of the UN and hasn’t undertaken any actions whatsoever?*

**Janev:** When it comes to the ultra vires act, I believe that the Government should at least issue a statement to inform the public and the UN. Every state in this situation would have taken initiative within the UN to examine the legality of the obligations and the conditions for admission to the UN.

## THE CHARACTER AND THE EFFECTS OF THE “INTERIM ACCORD”<sup>497</sup>

– *Mr. Ambassador Crvenkovski, today is the seventh anniversary of the Interim Accord signed with Greece. As Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, you signed the Accord as representative of Macedonia. According to your opinion, do you believe that Macedonia should continue with the implementation or perhaps it should withdraw from the Interim Accord due to the existence of the clause which prevents the submission of the dispute before the International Court of Justice?*

**Crvenkovski:** First of all, the Accord remains in force! I noticed different opinions in the public, which is very strange, since everything is regulated in two sentences in an article included in the Accord stating that it shall remain in force until superseded by a new agreement. The Accord does not expire today or at any other day.

– *Does it remain in force automatically?*

**Crvenkovski:** No, it does not; it remains in force all the time. There is not a set date which would imply some kind of change after which the accord would automatically remain in force or cease to be effective. It shall remain in force until a conclusion of a new agreement or until any of the states withdraws from the Accord. In order to do so, the state withdrawing from the Accord must deliver a written notice, which shall take effect after 12 months.

– *Mr. Ambassador, does it mean that it shall remain in force for another seven years?*

**Crvenkovski:** The Accord shall not be valid for another seven year, nor has it been valid for the past seven years. These interpretations are wrong. The Accord shall be valid until superseded by a new agreement!

– *Having in mind the disadvantageous clause which ties our hands and prevents us from looking for justice through legal means, should we continue to follow the Accord?*

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<sup>497</sup> This interview with the late Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski was conducted by the reporter Slobodanka Jovanovska and was published in the daily newspaper *Dnevnik*. The original title was *Spogodbat a e { t e t n a z a n a c i o n a l i s t i t e, n e z a G r c i j a i M a k e d o n i j a* (The Accord is detrimental to the nationalists, not to Greece or Macedonia). In 1995, Crvenkovski as former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Macedonia signed the *Interim Accord* with Republic of Greece.

**Crvenkovski:** The Accord does not include such clause. Article 5, paragraph 1, to which you allude, only signifies that the dispute is to be resolved continually, meaning from where it started pursuant to the Security Council Resolution, that is within the UN.

*– How do you assess the effects of the Accord? Do you believe that it can help us to find a solution for the name issue or is it becoming an obstacle?*

**Crvenkovski:** I cannot see anything within the Accord which might become an obstacle, for the reason that everything it regulates is of enormous importance. For example, it regulates a brand new aspect of the mutual relations. Starting from the movement of people and the mutual cooperation related to the rivers and lakes shared by the two states, to the prohibition of Greece to put a veto on or obstruct the accession of Republic of Macedonia to any international organization. Therefore, I cannot see a reason for Greece to withdraw from the Accord. On the contrary, literally all provisions are not directed against either side! If Greece wants to make problems or to withdraw from the Accord, the only way to do so is to put veto on our accession to the European organizations, i.e. to the EU. However, this would represent a very serious political move hence I doubt that either side would choose such action. In spite of this, there are people on both sides who claim that the Accord has a damaging effect for either side, that it is better to withdraw from it or that it would be better off without it, such as people like Papatthemelis. The Accord is certainly not detrimental to Greece, or to us, but it is detrimental according to people who are nationalists like him. If Greece is to be a modern, European and democratic state, it must promote good relations with Macedonia.

*– Mr. Ambassador, perhaps you keep track of the announcement for the creation of a new negotiation team as the current team has brought Macedonia in unfavorable position. What do you think about the negotiations?*

**Crvenkovski:** I cannot say that an unfavorable decision has been accepted up till now, because no decision whatsoever has been accepted during the talks. This type of negotiations, as a process, is meaningless. Whether there is a need of change is a matter of political evaluation based on the recent political considerations and information from both sides. Given that I am quite a long time now out of the politics and I do not have firsthand political information, it would be irresponsible to “ram down somebody’s throat” about what he or she is supposed to do.

*– In general, do you believe our standing in the negotiations has improved from before?*

**Crvenkovski:** My opinion is that it has largely improved regarding the wide use of the name. The name Republic of Macedonia has been used in all world encyclopedias, in the world media and by increasing number of states, i.e. Great Britain, as well as in international agreements, including the official diplomatic list and the complete protocol.

*– Is it reasonable to make compromise in this moment regarding the constitutional name?*

**Crvenkovski:** It was not reasonable before, and I have never heard that any side had intention to do so.

*– For example, what about the proposal by the ICG regarding the Macedonian version of the name of Republic of Macedonia written in Latin alphabet?*

**Crvenkovski:** The proposal by the Crisis Group is not serious! One can conclude this by looking at the composition of the group, for example, Gareth Evans, from whom Macedonia cannot expect anything good.

**PART TWO**

**PROPOSALS FOR DISPUTE  
SETTLEMENT**



**1**  
**PROPOSAL FROM ICG**  
**(10. XII. 2001)**



*I am the ICG for Macedonia!*  
*Edward Joseph – representative of the International Crisis Group,*  
*March 2002*

## ICG COMPOSITION AND PROPOSAL FOR “SLAVIC TRANSCRIPTION” OF THE NAME<sup>498</sup>

1. *ICG Report is entitled as: “Macedonia’s name: why the dispute matters and how to resolve it?”* The Report is composed of 33 pages and has 88 footnotes. It is an analytical material composed on the basis of a number of sources: press analysis, interviews with certain people, direct monitoring of the situation in Republic of Macedonia and consulting certain literature relevant to the name dispute.<sup>499</sup> All in all, the Report has strictly political character. This can be seen from the profile of the Report drafter and the objectives. However, it can also be seen from the lines of the ICG financiers.

ICG is a private and international organization, created in order to improve the ability of “the international community” to solve existing conflicts. At least, it is declared as such. However, it is actually a conducted group, whose function is to realize political objectives of “the international community” in reduced form: USA, EU member states and NATO.<sup>500</sup> The Republic of Greece is excluded from this term “international community”, because it is a third party. But, this is solely declaratively. The authors of the Report take the third party into consideration, more than Greece itself wants to be considered.<sup>501</sup>

The authors of the Report, without hesitation, act on the behalf of the so-called community, although this community includes 1/10 of the existing number of states. They are fully convinced that NATO members, and no one else, represent the international community. UN, as the most prominent institution of the international community, has one role and that is to confirm the decisions of this reduced community. The collapse of the international community and UN and its replace-

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<sup>498</sup> The author of this text is Dr. Svetomir Shkaric –professor at the Faculty of Law “Justinianus Primus” in Skopje. He teaches: *Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law (applied program), Comparative Constitutional Law, Political Systems, Political Theories and Theories of Peace and Conflicts*. This presentation by the professor Shkaric was presented at a Round table, organized by the political party the Democratic Union (Demokratski Sojuz) on 9 March 2002 in Skopje.

<sup>499</sup> *Macedonia’s name: Why the dispute matters and how to resolve it*, ICG; 10 December 2001, Skopje – Brussels: p. 3-33. (See Part three of this book titled as *Documents*).

<sup>500</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27.

<sup>501</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27.

ment with a new notion, which has not been internationally recognized, is in sight. Unfortunately, Macedonia falls within the wider concept of “the international community” which systematically is collapsing especially after the Kosovo war in 1999.

ICG with its full capacity is included in the transformation of the international community in “NATO community”! This can be seen within the report, especially in the latest proposal from the ICG for recognition of Kosovo as independent state.<sup>502</sup>

The ICG does not conceal that its objectives are solely political! It is deeply involved in the political geography, especially in the conflict regions that are of the strategic interest for the NATO community. The conflict avoidance is only an excuse used by ICG. Quite contrary, the ICG creates conflicts in order to find justification for the transformation of the international community in NATO community. The best confirmation for this is the statement by the author of the Report for Republic of Macedonia, Edward Joseph: “*I am the ICG for Macedonia*”.<sup>503</sup>

The political objectives of ICG can be seen through the list of its financiers. The financiers are reach NATO states (Netherlands and Canada), or countries under complete US control (Australia, Taiwan). There are also private foundations completely adjusted to the predominant interests of USA and NATO community as a whole. For example, the main financiers are *Carnegie Corporation* of New York and *Open Society Institute* and Soros Foundation. The ICG is declared as non-governmental and non-profitable organization, and financed by state government and foundations with political background!?

The ICG acts in Europe only on the Balkan Peninsula, in Albania, Bosnia, Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In FRY is located in three positions: Serbia, Monte Negro and Kosovo.

This tells everything about the nature of the group. It is not a group for solving conflicts; it is more like a lobby group for creating more severe crises and conflicts! This can be observed with the situations in Kosovo and Monte Negro.

For instance, the proposal for Kosovo independence is a destabilization of the Republic of Macedonia. The non-recognition of the bor-

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<sup>502</sup> *Косово ќе биде условно независно (Kosovo will be conditionally independent)*, Dnevnik, 6 March 2002, p. 1-2.

<sup>503</sup> Edward Joseph “*I am the ICG for Macedonia*”, ZUM; March 2002, p. 13.

der between the Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Republic of Albania and the newly-elected authorities in Kosovo goes into this direction. The things NATO didn't succeed to achieve by bombing FRY, should now be achieved through ICG proposal. The Resolution 1 244 of the Security Council is being ignored because it is an act of the international community, not a NATO act. The things NATO didn't manage to achieve by throwing 30 tones of explosives in FRY should now be achieved through the "independent" and "nonprofit" ICG!?

A better opinion can be brought about the Group by looking at its members. The head of ICG Martti Ahtisaari (our remark: later on, negotiator and lobbyist for independent Kosovo) – past President of Finland, USA and EU representative in the negotiations for cease of the bombing over FRY. He is well known by his demand for more massive bombing of FRY like the one in Iraq in 1991. He asked for 2 500 flights, not solely 150 flights, per day, similarly to the Persian Gulf War.

I would like to point out three people in the ICG board: Morton Abramovitz, Louise Arbour and Wesley Clark. Morton Ambramovitz is a senior member of the Board, whereas the other two are members from January 2000. Abramovitz is a former US ambassador to Turkey and US Assistant Secretary of State in the time of Carter's administration. In 1992, he created the notion "humanitarian action" that will give birth to the Kosovo war in 1999, as a typical example of international war. This gentleman was the main adviser of UCK/OVK (Liberating National Army) at the negotiations in Rambue in February and March 1999.

Louise Arbour is a former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia. She didn't see any of the 88 children killed during the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO in 1999!? She didn't want to see even the uranium missiles, in spite of the fact that about ten tones were thrown on Kosovo, in the vicinity of the Republic of Macedonia. She jointed the ICG because of her "ignorance", not because she is a good lawyer or observer.

I cannot say much about the "most active" member of this group, the general Wesley Clark. He had participated in the Vietnam War, and was Commander-in-chief during the Kosovo War in 1999. We know him well because he had visited Macedonia at least 18 times before the bombing of Yugoslavia. Membership to ICG is an award for him for the "collateral damages" he caused in the Kosovo War.

In January 2000, Gareth Evans became chief executive officer of this group. When he was foreign minister of Australia he said that we

were not Macedonians but “Slavomacedonians”. This is the person at the head of ICG that should “help us” in the dispute with Republic of Greece. He is well known among the Macedonians in Australia and the nongovernmental organization of the Macedonian Diaspora in USA – “POMNI”.

Still, there are some ICG members that can help Republic of Macedonia, only if they are consulted. Such people are: Uffe Ellemann-Jansen, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Oscar Arias Sánchez, former President of Costa Rica and Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1987. The prior supported Macedonia during the process of its gaining independence, and the latter is known antimilitarist. However, I do not know whether these two had any contact with the Report. It seems like they didn’t participate in its preparation. At least, this can be concluded in the statement by the “guru” Edward Joseph: “*I am the ICG for Macedonia!*” Since the Republic of Macedonia is a small country, the Report can be written by only one person, regardless of the fact whether that person is listed on the official ICG list or not. Unseen arrogance! As if he was uncontested scientist and great politician – a visionary.<sup>504</sup>

The membership of Oscar Arias Sánchez in ICG remains an enigma to me. This is a person who fights against all military systems, including NATO. He is a fierce opponent to all those states producing and exporting weapons and such are the NATO members. It seems like Arias is only an ornament for the ICG, so that the group would hide its real image. Within the ICG there is no widely renowned scientist in social sciences. It has been claimed that Mark Thompson is distinguished English historian and researcher. However, he is on a much lower level than some other English professors that are well informed about the Balkans. I will only mention Mark Mazower, university professor and an expert for the Balkans. So, it is a political, not scientific group! We must take this into consideration since it concerns the Report which addresses the most essential matters about the Republic of Macedonia, such as its name, the Framework Agreement, the internal structure of the state and its sovereignty. So, that is why the science, not only the politics, should have its word in this matter even in a wider context. We must not remain silent because we have many things to say. Our country, our people and our destiny are in question. We must not simply leave everything to the fortune. We must rely on our virtues. The fortune favors the virtuous people, not the obedient people!

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<sup>504</sup> Ibid, p. 13.

2. The aim of the Report is not to help to the Republic of Macedonia, but to justify the presence of NATO troops on its territory by keeping the country in suspense! These can be seen in the concessions Macedonia must make, so that the NATO community would engage itself in the solution of the Macedonian-Greek name dispute.

The ICG acts quite sharply i.e. it imposes ultimatum: before the official recognition of the name “Republic of Macedonia” in Slavic transcription, Macedonia has to invite NATO to extend its mission for at least 6 months (beyond March 2002) and OSCE to extend its mission by 12 months (after December 2001) and substantially increase its election role! This is not something new; it’s simply putting Macedonia under full protectorate, although the Lord Robertson referred to us as “sovereign state”.

The protectorate could be maintained for longer period only if Macedonia entangled itself in more complex relations, at international and national level. This entanglement is created by ICG through its Report on the name of the Republic of Macedonia.

The entanglement at national level is performed through the insistence on the implementation of the Framework Agreement in practice, although the ICG assessed this agreement as unjust for the Macedonian side and a unique solution, unknown in other countries.

At international level, the situation of Macedonia is being more complicated with the Slavic transcription and the special responsibilities it needs to assume towards Republic of Greece, especially at educational and history level.

That’s why the Report should only be acknowledged and nothing more. It is clear to every attentive and good-natured reader that the Report does not favor the Macedonian interests but some other interests. I believe that the Report does not fit Greece either, although it does not seem like that at first instance.

3. The Republic of Macedonia must fight alone for its name! No one can help the country regarding this matter as much as it can help itself. Macedonia has the strength for this, and the international law is on its side. Besides the international law, some of the most famous influential people in this field are on Macedonian side. The opinion of the US professor in international law, Louis Henkin is important. This is accepted even in the Report of ICG.<sup>505</sup>

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<sup>505</sup> Ibid, p. 33.

In the fight for its own name, the Republic of Macedonia must make few consecutive or simultaneous steps:

- firstly, Republic of Macedonia should withdraw from the Interim Accord signed with Greece with written decree and show to all factors that it has decided to fight for its name and dignity with non-violent means.<sup>506</sup> Greece should be timely informed about this with explanation that new ways for solving the dispute should be sought;

- secondly, the Republic of Macedonia should present the dispute over the name before the International Court of Justice in Hague. Macedonia can only have benefit from this, and no detriment. The International Court of Justice was quite objective regarding the dispute between Nicaragua and USA in 1984. The Court took position that USA had no right to bomb Nicaragua due to violation of human rights. The Court showed independence also in the dispute of FRY against NATO members that bombed Yugoslavia in 1999. The Court took the position of being disturbed by the use of force against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Court didn't have the virtue to bring provisional measure to stop the bombing, but the fact is that the judges raised their voices and said that the law could not remain silent during a war. The international law must not remain silent even when the name of the Republic of Macedonia is in question. We should also ask for opinion about the Framework Agreement from 13 August 2001 from the International Court of Justice. This Agreement was concluded under an international pressure and in a time of war!? The ICG Report also confirms this. According to the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* signed on 23 March 1969 "a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force". Pressure and violence were present in abundance in the course of the preparation and signing of the Framework Agreement. This should be presented with arguments in order to prove the voidance of the Framework Agreement. The ICG should help us with this!

All this issues must be professionally developed, with the engagement of the national and international law science. This can easily be done. All we need is good will in the state structures, especially within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. This body should be headquarters for preparation of the listed initiatives and their international promotion.

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<sup>506</sup> *Interim Accord* (official text of the Document for normalization of the relations between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Greece), Skopje, 1995.

## THE NAME BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE<sup>507</sup>

### Why, after all, the use of the term “dispute”?

1. Based on the contemporary international legal doctrine<sup>508</sup> and the political and legal practice, the term “dispute” implies: *a disagreement between two or more subjects of international law (states or international organizations; or between state(s) and international organization(s))*<sup>509</sup> – manifested through certain claims and practical opinions of one party and refusal of such claims and denial of such opinions by the other party.<sup>510</sup>

2. Very often, both in practice and in theory, there is a distinction between two qualities of a dispute: legal and political. The conceptual provisions of these two kinds of disputes are based on different criteria. For example, if the initial element of distinction is objective (explains an objective settlement of the dispute), all disputes in this case would be regarded as legal only if their settlement is based on the application of positive international law (hence the broader reference for such disputes – “*legal disputes*”). And vice versa, in theory, for the purpose of the abovementioned classification, if certain dispute cannot be settled on the basis of the application of the law<sup>511</sup>, in that case it is not a legal

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<sup>508</sup> Since I begin with the science of international law (*Ius inter partes*), it is clear that I include only the technical term (*terminus tehnicus*) “international dispute” (*différend international; internationaler Streitfall – internationale Streitigkeit* in its wider sense (*lato sensu*)). For more information on the meaning of the term “dispute” in the context of the first instance responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security see Simma B., *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 456 et. seq.

<sup>509</sup> In principle, this applies to the parties in a dispute, although only the oldest (in historical sense) and original subjects of international law – the states – can act as holders of contentious capacity (able to acquire rights and obligations during the process) before the International Court of Justice in the Hague, in contrast to the newest (younger) derivative subjects – the international government organizations (see Article 34 of the *Statute of the International Court of Justice*).

<sup>510</sup> *Ibler V.*; “Dictionary of International Public Law” (*Rjecnik mejunarodnog javnog prava*) - Informator, Zagreb, 1987, page 163; Morelli G., *Nozioni di diritto internazionale - CEDAM*, 1967; pp. 368.

<sup>511</sup> Some authors speak about reference by any party in a dispute not to legal provisions, but to the honor and dignity of the state or to the principles of justice and equality (the

but a political dispute, in other words, it represents a conflict of interests. If we include the subjective basis for distinction, legal disputes would be those in which the claims and opinions of one party are denied by another party. A contrario, under extreme conditions, for the purpose of the “model” in question, if the disputes cannot be reduced to the assessment of the legal validity of the specific claim, in that case they are political disputes.<sup>512</sup> Just to mention that the fact on which the parties aim at as a mean of dispute settlement is very often used as a superficial test for the character of the dispute. Is it a question of application of political (diplomatic) techniques<sup>513</sup> or involving legal (judicial) institutions?<sup>514</sup> In addition, we must not neglect the fact that the decisions (judgments) of the international judicial institutions are legally binding acts (even though the binding character is limited on double basis *ratione personae* – only in view of the disputed parties – and *ratione materiae* – only in view of the disputed matter), and thus the states in question are abided by these decisions, otherwise there is a solid basis to be held internationally responsible.<sup>515</sup> On the other hand, the diplomatic methods end with recommendations, which are not legally binding. The responsibility that arises from these acts is political, in other words it is politically binding.<sup>516</sup> In conclusion, various combinations of subjective and objective criteria are established very often in practice.

3. The contemporary circumstances and events on international scene significantly make the previously mentioned distinction between legal and political disputes more abstract and thus lifeless, impractical and inappropriate to the objective reality.<sup>517</sup> Namely, it remains clear that the international community does not have a universal supranational

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application of the last principle does not exclude the legal character of the dispute, since a judicial institution can also settle a dispute based on the principles of equality), Morelli G., *op. cit.*, pp. 371.

<sup>512</sup> Avramov S – Kreca M, “International Public Law” (*Международно јавно право*), Naucna knjiga; Belgrade, 1990; pp. 457.

<sup>513</sup> For more detailed information on political (diplomatic/peaceful) means for settlement of international disputes see Conforti B., *Diritto internazionale*, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 1999; pp. 424 et. seq.

<sup>514</sup> For more detailed information on settlement of interstate disputes see Conforti B., *op. cit.*, pp. 411 et. seq.; Malanczuk P., *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to the International Law*, Routledge, London / New York; 1997, pp. 281 et. seq.

<sup>515</sup> More about the concept of “international responsibility” see Malanczuk P., *op. cit.*, pp. 254 et. seq.

<sup>516</sup> More about the difference between legally binding and politically binding acts see D'Amato A. (ed.), *International Law Anthology*, Anderson Publishing Company; 1994, pp.148 et. seq.

<sup>517</sup> See Ibler V., quote.

entity which would function in the interest of the common good (in favor of the welfare of humanity as special entity), and would exercise its powers to enforce its own (read - general) will, not as a mechanical sum of the individual will of the states but as a new quality based on the particularities of the numerous states. Besides the ongoing and obvious process of transformation, in general, the present international community remains “Westphalian”, that is an autarchic/decentralized type of community! Subsequently, the states remain to be its basic “building material”. The states form its “skeleton”, as well as the space between the “bones”. They continue to be the supreme political subjects who do not primarily act upon the glorious principles of peace, law and justice, no matter how humanitarian and altruistic these sound. The states perhaps pay some attention to these unquestionable values, but they still principally act upon their own aspirations, needs and interests during the procedures. Anyway, a reasonable man would not try to deny openly that this behavior must be regulated within a relatively defined legal framework, especially since the contemporary international law regulates most of the objective international reality. This indicates that every dispute, at least in principle, can be settled under the rules of the international law. The claims and the opinions of the disputed parties are either in accordance with the law or contrary to the law, even though every international dispute is without exception a specific “mixture” of political and legal components, in other words it is both a legal dispute and a conflict of interests.

4. Let's make an attempt to apply the abovementioned criteria in the Greek-Macedonian dispute over the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia. We would apply the objective test first. The requests of Republic of Greece in view of the name of Republic of Macedonia are not based on the international law and they also violate a series of fundamental international legal principles and rules. The requests are such that take into consideration an inherent right (the name of the state) which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Republic of Macedonia, thereby Republic of Greece interferes in the domestic matters of Republic of Macedonia! Under the international law, the inherent rights of the state, such as the right of Republic of Macedonia to freely choose its own name, are undisputed and unalienable! In fact, the absence of international legal basis for the requests of Republic of Greece in view of Republic of Macedonia is unquestionable and straightforwardly (every other approach would be unserious,

or particularly biased or even hilarious, if it is not equally tragic for the organization and the party whose rights are being denied eventually) noted by the International Crisis Group in the *Report* from 10 December 2001<sup>518</sup>, which we would consider below. Therefore, it is certainly not a matter of legal claim, or opinion based on international law, instead it is a “bare” political interest of Republic of Greece not to allow the existence of a subject on its north border which would include the name “Macedonia” in its official designation. Such interest is “wrapped in” a shiny “silver paper” featuring the right of protection of Greece’s integrity and political sovereignty expressed through the claim that the name “Macedonia” means territorial claims towards Republic of Greece. On the contrary, the insistence of Republic of Macedonia on the fact that the use of any name in the international relations, including the name Macedonia, cannot be a threatening factor to someone’s security, much less to someone’s survival, and that by obstructing the use of the name, series of fundamental *ius cogens* principles of international public law are brought into question – principles that form the foundations of the contemporary international community: *self-determination of states; essential domestic jurisdiction of states; sovereign equality of states*<sup>519</sup>, is undoubtedly the most relevant criterion “cementing” the dispute as legal *par excellence*. In view of the subjective component, whether the dispute is analyzed from Macedonian or Greek point of view, it is a question of legal dispute since there is a constant mutual denial of claims and opinions. In conclusion, having in mind the aspect

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<sup>518</sup> “*There appears to be no basis in international law or practice for Greece’s position... , while there is some support in international law for state discretion on recognition, and even imposition of conditions before granting recognition, such discretion is not a matter of arbitrary will or political concession, but is given or refused in accordance with legal principle. In the instant case of Greece and Macedonia, such principle is glaringly absent*”. (Macedonia’s Name: *Why the Dispute Matters and how to Resolve It*, 10.12.2001, ICG Balkans Reports, No.122; Skopje/Brussels, pp.16; at <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/reports/A400507-10122001.pdf>); “*The Greek demand that the Republic of Macedonia change its name at all finds weak if any support in international law; The Badinter Commission... stating that the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ cannot imply any territorial claims against another State...’; ‘The use of a ‘provisional name’ as a condition for membership in the UN is very likely in contravention of Article 4 of the Charter which strictly limits the conditions that can be imposed on membership*” (op. cit. pp. 16-17).

<sup>519</sup> For more information see Petrushevska T., *Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia: problems and perspectives*, paper prepared for the international conference co-organized by the Center for Study and Research on the Balkans and Montesquieu University – Bordeaux IV on the theme: *The Post-Communist State: the construction of an idea*, held in the Paris Senate from 04 till 06 of April 2002; pp. 19-20.

of the characteristics of the Greek-Macedonian dispute, there are no obstacles to bring the dispute before an international judicial institution that is competent to “end” the dispute in a judgment which would be legally binding for both parties. Of course, the decision (not) to take such steps during the dispute has always been political. And it will remain the same in the future. And yet, it cannot be any different! The difference might solely appear in the question what would be considered as priority when making such decision – the political opportunity or whether the claims are based on positive law, even when *ius cogens* provisions are in question, or vice versa, whether the political considerations would be missed out in the light of the “comparative advantages” of the reference to the law.

### **What kind of organization is the International Crisis Group?**

1. According to the formal, institutional characteristics the International Crisis Group is a typical book example of an international non-governmental organization<sup>520</sup> (popularly NGO)!<sup>521</sup> At first instance, ignorant people would conclude that it is a question of one more “salad” on the international scene trying to “earn its share” through someone else’s tragedy. Namely, NGO is not subject to the international law! This means that the decisions brought by NGOs regardless of their content do not have legally-binding force upon any internationally-legal entity, in other words, an entity of the international law cannot be called on internationally-legal responsibility before competent judicial institution for violating the documents/decisions of such organizations.

2. However, in substantive context such organization is an actor on the international scene, or subject of the international policy. Its specific importance becomes clear after superficial listing of:

- ICG activities performed in the process of “*strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent conflicts*”;<sup>522</sup>

- the Board of Trustees which is composed of former politicians coming from the most powerful world forces, former international offi-

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<sup>520</sup> „ICG is a private multinational organization“, *About ICG*, <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/about/program.cfm?typeid=4>; pp. 1.

<sup>521</sup> More information about nongovernmental organizations and their role in the international policy can be found at Lobasso F. - Martini K. - Oriani C., *Organizzazione internazionale: il diritto e le istituzioni delle organizzazioni internazionali*; Edizione Simone, Napoli, 1997; pp. 59 et. seq.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid.

cials in universal or regional organizations, former or current members of the European Parliament, current international officials or politicians or public people from different sphere (still, the percentage of the politicians is the highest – this is an important fact for understanding the reflective system and the “operational” system of the organization)<sup>523</sup>, and

- the list of governments and intergovernmental institutions, foundations, companies and people that finance the ICG, which is important to understand the network of underlying interests, or in other words the interests of the financiers.<sup>524</sup>

When one reads the precise names and surnames of the natural persons and official names of the legal persons, in other words, the states supporting this organization, it becomes clear that the objective influence of this organization on the tendencies of the contemporary international political scene should not be overestimated in a single moment, and what’s important should not be rashly underestimated.

### What kind of document is the ICG Report?

1. *ICG Report on the Balkan, no. 122* titled: “*Macedonia’s name: Why the dispute matters and how to resolve it?*”, from 10 December 2001<sup>525</sup> is the third report in the series of reports in which this organization presented its analyses about the crisis<sup>526</sup> that began in the Republic of Macedonia in the beginning of 2001.<sup>527</sup> The first report no.

<sup>523</sup> About ICG: *Board of Trustees*, op.cit.; <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/about/stuff.cfm>.

<sup>524</sup> About ICG: *Funding*; <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/about/funds.cfm>.

<sup>525</sup> Op. cit.

<sup>526</sup> The notion “crisis” is most commonly used by the ICG in the titles of the reports about Macedonia for 2001. Of course, this notion indicates relatively defined concept on the quality of the developments in and near the Republic of Macedonia in the course of 2001. We might accept or reject this notion. If we reject it we must present serious arguments against the sustainability of the concept “crisis”. However, on this occasion I would not go into details and present any arguments because we have limited space and the topic is strictly specified. I just want to emphasize that the concept “war” in context of armed conflict reflects the reality of the events in the first nine months of 2001 far better and that is why I will use this word in the text where I think that is more convenient than the ambiguous, imprecise and confusing notion “crisis” regardless which word was used in the concrete context of the specific document by ICG.

<sup>527</sup> I refer to the reports from 2001 that resulted from and are dedicated to the war in Republic of Macedonia. The number of reviews by the ICG of RM in the period between 1997 and 2001 is bigger (for details see the analyses: *Macedonia Report: The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict*, 30 Oct. 1997), <http://www.intlcrisisgroup.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/-A400176-30091997.pdf>; *The Albanian Question in Macedonia: Impli-*

109, under the title: “*The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion*”<sup>528</sup> was “produced” right after the beginning of the terrible events in Macedonia. The first frightening events happened on 22 January 2001, and the Report was “faced” with the public on 5 April 2001, only few days before the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Republic of Macedonia and the European Community, in other words, the EU member states.<sup>529</sup> The second report no. 113: “*Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace*”<sup>530</sup> was published on 20 June 2001, after the culmination of the conflict. As a result of this, in the end of June 2001, the international community<sup>531</sup> started pressuring the parties involved in the conflict to start negotiations for amending the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.

2. The reports preceding the Report from 10 December 2001 contain:

- relatively serious analysis of the events in and around Macedonia in the period preceding them;
- relatively complete presentation of the dilemma of the international community regarding the developments in and near Macedonia;

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*cations of the Kosovo Conflict for Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia* (11 August 1998); [http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A\\_400161-11081998.pdf](http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A_400161-11081998.pdf); *Macedonia: „New Faces in Skopje“* (8 January 1999), <http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/-A400174-080111999.pdf>; *Macedonia Update: Challenges and Choices for the New Government* (29 March 1999), <http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A400189-29031999.pdf>; *Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections* (18 September 1999), <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A400014-18091999.pdf>.

<sup>528</sup> The Report can be found at <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A400268-05042001.pdf>.

<sup>529</sup> More details about the Agreement can be found at Petrushevska T., “International and legal aspects of the Association and Stabilisation Agreement signed between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Community and EU member states” (*Меѓународно-правните аспекти на Спогодбата за стабилизирање и за придружување на Република Македонија со Европската заедница и со државите-членки на Европската унија*), *Business law*, no. 3-4/2001, pp. 133-167; Petrushevska T. “The Association and Stabilisation Agreement signed between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Community and EU member states” (*Спогодбата за стабилизирање и за придружување меѓу Република Македонија и Европската заедница и државите-членки на ЕУ*), in the proceedings of the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” Skopje under the title: “EU integration of the legal, political and social system of the Republic of Macedonia: materials from the round table on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Faculty of Law” (*Европска интеграција на правниот, политичкиот и општествениот систем на Република Македонија: материјали од тркалезната маса по повод 50 години од основањето на Правниот факултет*), Skopje, 2002; pp. 265-283.

<sup>530</sup> The Report can be found at <http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A400318-20062001.pdf>.

<sup>531</sup> The category “international community” needs broader elaboration, however we do not have sufficient space for this. On this occasion I would just point out the fact that

- relatively well-founded assumptions about the future progress of the situation;

- relatively acceptable proposals for undertaking certain activities in order to prevent the “crisis” of RM to escalate in multiethnic conflict of larger proportions.

3. *The Report* from 10 December 2001 is characterized by the following properties:

- firstly, it is a more extensive document than the previous two reports (33 pages of text in total, systematized in main part and 88 footnotes);

- secondly, in general context the number of pages does not have to mean a lot, however in this specific case the number of pages is of great significance. Namely, this formal property of the Report is directly connected to the proportion of the problems included in it. Part of this Report is similar (in no case identical) to the context of the previous two reports, namely regarding the current political and security situation in Macedonia. The other parts of the Report are completely new i.e. some issues are subjected to ICG analysis for the first time. It is actually about the analysis of the dispute over the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia (its emergence, its development within the past 11 years, the positions and demands of Greece, as well as the Macedonian position regarding the dispute etc.);

- thirdly, due to the previously listed element, the Report of ICG is more far-reaching than any other past document about Macedonia. Namely, besides the wide range of the analysis contained in it; it is also a thorough report which goes beyond (the past dominant presence of) the superficial, descriptive retrospective of the dispute between the two countries over the constitutional name of Macedonia.

The far-reaching effects of the Report are achieved:

- \* through the presentation of concrete proposals for solving/overcoming of the dispute;

- \*through consideration of some other problems that refer to the open problems of the Republic of Macedonia with Republic of Bul-

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every time this notion is used related to Macedonia and to the Balkans as a whole, its narrow (in geographical context), but far more (this time with no valuable assessments) efficient (in political context) importance should be taken into consideration by including the USA and EU member states, NATO, maybe Russia, occasionally OSCE member states. It seems that no one is interested in the legal meaning of the concept “international community”: “*the totality of all subjects of the international law i.e. of all subjects that in their interrelations sufficiently recognize and respect the international law rules...*”, (Ibler V., op. cit., pp. 169).

garia and Republic of Serbia regarding the Macedonian symbols, and the problems between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Albania and Republic of Bulgaria regarding the status of the Macedonian minority in these neighboring countries. Actually, the far-reaching property of the Report can be noticed at first glance in its relatively complex structure looking like this:

I. *Introduction* (composed of analysis about the political and security situation of Macedonia characteristic for the period starting from 16 November 2001 when the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia adopted the amendments to the Constitution on the basis of the Framework Agreement signed in Ohrid on 13 August 2001 by the leaders of the four political parties of the Macedonian and Albanian bloc);<sup>532</sup>

II. *The name dispute* (separate chapter composed of analysis about the problem origin, the positions of both countries, the interest of the international community for settlement of the problem);

III. *New proposal: Triangular not bilateral* (containing concrete proposals for settlement of the problem on bilateral level between Greece and Macedonia; provisionally speaking on regional level, which if properly analyzed it can be seen that it is bilateral matter because it concerns concrete state in a specific region, on one hand, and Greece or Macedonia on the other hand; and finally on universal level. The reference “regional level” can be interpreted at least in two directions: regionally, in the context of immediate surrounding – the neighboring countries, excluding Greece, with which Macedonia still has some unsettled questions that negatively reflect on the effort for preserving the Macedonian identity: the position of Bulgaria and Serbia regarding the Macedonian symbols, as well as the position of Albania and Bulgaria regarding the Macedonian minority living in these countries, and regionally in wider European and Euro Atlantic context including the EU member states and NATO members);

IV. *Conclusion*.

- **fourthly**, due to everything presented above, and due to the reasons that will be explained below, the Report is an exceptionally complex document. According to the Report:

\* the top priority for stabilization of the situation in the Republic of Macedonia is the realization of the *Framework Agreement*;

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<sup>532</sup> See more details in *Прилоз кон јавната расправа во врска на Нацрт-амандманите на Уставот на Република Македонија*; (*Contribution to the public debate regarding the Draft-amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*); Faculty of Law “Justinianus Primus” Skopje, 2001.

\* the manner this Agreement was achieved (with violence) and the weaknesses of its content combined with the long-term problems Macedonia has with its neighbors brings the Macedonian identity into question;

\* the most critical question of identity, which if solved would have the biggest and most positive influence, is the long-term dispute with Greece over the name.

\* the name dispute is a security issue of wider range;

\* the process of settlement of this dispute should be accelerated, in other words, the time when ICG “presents” proposals for its solution is the most convenient time for final archiving of this interstate dispute.

### **Analysis of the Report on dispute settlement**

1. Apparently, due to the abovementioned entirely examined characteristics of the *Report* in question, the subject of analysis can be, and it must be, every part of the *Report*, and I won't be wrong if I suggest all possible aspects of report reading, rereading and examining. However, in this analysis, mostly due to the long existence of the problem and its lasting actuality, as well as the objective long-range consequences that might be caused by the ICG reports, I would only discuss part III: *A new proposal: triangular not bilateral*. I would analyze the ICG proposals generally from the aspect of the commonly accepted norms of the positive international law and the unquestionably established practice in the international relations lato sensu, in particular the typical practice of the international government organizations stricto sensu, with a special view on the implemented practice in the universal mechanism of the UN.

2. The third part of the *Report* contains the following subdivision:

- a) *The three key elements;*
- b) *International community procedure;*
- c) *Ancillary issues.*

During the analysis I would try to put an accent on III.À, more precisely the subject of this analysis will be section A which involves the proposals for settlement of the name issue. The ICG proposals consist of three key elements:

- firstly, “closing“ the issue on bilateral level between the states directly involved in the issue – Republic of Greece and Republic of Macedonia;

- secondly, “closing” the already “closed” issue on bilateral Greek-Macedonian level, within the relations between any NATO or EU member state (or other states) on one side, and Republic of Greece or Republic of Macedonia on other side;

- thirdly, “closing” the issue over the name of Republic of Macedonia on multilateral level within the international government organizations, mainly in the universal organization of political character – the UN.

3. The first key element of the proposals “insists” on concluding a bilateral interstate treaty as an instrument for harmonizing the will of both states, thereby finally removing the long-lasting issue from the “agenda”. At first glance, a treaty as an international legal instrument for settlement of the issue seems formally and legally legitimate and completely natural. However, it is becoming subsequently clear that the *Report* seeks to incorporate, that is to outline (legally sanction) only the demands on the part of Republic of Greece in relation to Republic of Macedonia! In other words, this means that if such treaty is concluded, it would not be in accordance with most of the interstate, international treaties, which are principally bilateral (reciprocal) legal acts. Even the treaties which do not encompass an entirely reciprocal rights and obligations still have a tendency to be bilateral/equal. The international legal practice has taught us that, in ultima linea, treaties consisted of concessions usually made by one of the party to the other, commonly signify a violation of one of the basic principles of the contemporary international law – the principle of “sovereign equality of states”, in other words such treaties reflect an inferior and non-sovereign position of one state in comparison to the other state. The insistence on concluding a new treaty “*involving only concessions to Greek concerns*”<sup>533</sup> would be a new precedent that won’t be based on international law. Therefore, in case if such high-level political decision is adopted, which would indicate that Republic of Macedonia must conclude a treaty with Republic of Greece for dispute settlement, such treaty ending the negotiation process between the states would have to contain mutual concessions by both contracting parties, not just unilateral fulfillment!

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<sup>533</sup> “*Element One: Bilateral Treaty of concessions to Athens; “After receiving a signal from the international community... Athens and Skopje would conclude a treaty consisting largely of Macedonian concessions”* (op. cit., pp. 19).

4. In view of the content, the potential concession Republic of Macedonia could accept must meet the following presumptions:

- expressing explicit consent by both parties to use precisely determined formulation in relation to Republic of Macedonia;

- mutually and explicitly agreed formulation to be used by Republic of Greece in its relations with Republic of Macedonia (for example, for the purpose of the complete communication between the authorities in Republic of Greece and Republic of Macedonia). The mutually and explicitly agreed new formulation would be legally valid only in the bilateral relations between the two states, more precisely in the direction from Republic of Greece to Republic of Macedonia, not the other way around;

- the mutually and explicitly agreed formulation would not be used by other states on international conferences (not even if they are held on the territory of Republic of Greece), nor in the appropriate bodies of the international government organizations. It is likely to assume that the use of the new formulation for Republic of Macedonia by Republic of Greece, on the international conferences and in the international government organizations, can induce other states (participants or members) to use unconsciously the formulation which was agreed only for the use by Republic of Greece. In this case, Republic of Macedonia would have to make a protest which would render the international intercourse more difficult and would probably have damaging effect on Republic of Macedonia.

5. The potential mutual consent to the formulation “Upper Macedonia”<sup>534</sup> would have to take into consideration the following facts:

- the formulation “Upper Macedonia” a priori may lead to the conclusion that this name reflects a territory which is not politically organized as independent state – a subject of international law and international relations;

- the formulation “Upper Macedonia” refers by definition to one part of the region (geographic region) which has always been named as Macedonia. If one part of the region is “Upper Macedonia”, the only logical deduction would appear that there is another part of the region named as “Lower Macedonia”;

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<sup>534</sup> “...accepting the use by the Hellenic Republic in all its relations with Macedonia, including in multilateral organizations, of the names ‘Upper Macedonia’...”, (*Macedonia’s Name...* op. cit.; pp. 19).

- in light of this fact, perhaps it is possible to defend the thesis that the name “Upper Macedonia” would be to the benefit of Republic of Macedonia, as it implies to the historical fact that the region of Macedonia, or Macedonia within its ethnic borders, was subjected to division in the past. Indeed, if observed comparatively, when the terms “upper”, “lower”, “western”, “eastern”, “northern” and “southern” were used as part of the name of a certain state, the purpose was to demonstrate, that is to explain a result of previously conducted (often by means of force) process of division of a state, or a legal and national organ. For example, after the World War II, pursuant to the *Allied Declaration* from 5 June 1945, Germany was divided into four allied occupation zones – the Soviet zone on the east and the American, British and French zones on the west. On 12 September 1949, Germany was divided into East and West Germany.<sup>535</sup> The official names of the two states were Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic. These names were registered as such in the *UN List of Member States*.<sup>536</sup> In addition, all other states used their constitutional names in the official communication with the two German states, not the formulations “East and West Germany”. Another example eligible for comparison is Korea which was under Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945. In 1945, Korea was divided along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel into North Korea, which remained under Soviet occupation until 1948, and South Korea, which remained under American occupation until 1948. In 1948, the two Korean states became independent states with official names: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North) and Republic of Korea (South).<sup>537</sup> These states were registered under these names in the *UN List of Member States*.<sup>538</sup> Both names were used by all other states in the official communication with the Korean states. Another example is the part of Vietnam to the north of the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel which gained independence under the name North Vietnam (unofficial), or Socialist Republic of Vietnam (official). The part south of the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel named Republic of Vietnam was under American dominance until 1975. It is needless to emphasize once again the fact that the states and the international organizations used the official designations of the Vietnamese states in

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<sup>535</sup> “Small General Encyclopedia” (*Mala opca enciklopedija*), Prosveta; Belgrade, 1959; page 147.

<sup>536</sup> *Growth in United Nations Membership: 1945-2000*; <http://www.un.org/overview/growth.htm>.

<sup>537</sup> “Legal Encyclopedia” (*Pravna Enciklopedija*), Belgrade; 1989; page 664-665.

<sup>538</sup> *List of Member States*; <http://www.un.org/overview/unmember.html>.

the official communication. In conclusion, neither of the abovementioned states was admitted to UN membership under a name which would indicate a geographic area (region), nor any of the states was conditioned to change its name so that it would resemble a region without statehood. All these states function(ed) in the UN system, and in the complete bilateral interstate relations, under their constitutional names. However, a specific case when a state included the term “upper” within its constitutional original name was the state Upper Volta. It is a former African state (existed between 1960 and 1983), known today as Burkina Faso. The territory of Upper Volta was made a French protectorate in 1895, and in 1919 was administered as part of the French colony within French West Africa.<sup>539</sup> Nevertheless, when analyzing the use of the term “upper” in the official name of a state situated on the African continent, we must have in mind the colonial past of the African continent and the way of establishing the boundaries separating the colonies of the great powers. In addition, we must not neglect the fact that until the 1960s there were no nation-states on this continent in an European context. However, even on the African continent and under contemporary conditions, there is no place for the term “upper” in the name of a certain state (Upper Volta became Burkina Faso in 1984). There is no need to explain furthermore that the European experience and the undisputed facts in this view about the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state do not seriously justify the use of the formula “Upper Macedonia”.

6. In direct correlation with the proposal for mutual recognition of the formulation “Upper Macedonia” is the proposal included in the *Report* the Macedonian people living on the territory of Republic of Macedonia to be referred as “Upper Macedonians” by the Republic of Greece.<sup>540</sup> Such proposal is unprecedented in the comparative law! Namely, regarding all previous examples of divided states, in spite of the geographic designation, the names of the people still remained unchanged – Germans, Koreans, and Vietnamese. Even if some indications about the existence of Upper and Lower Macedonia (in ancient times) are acknowledged for being reliable, the people would undeniably be Macedonians in both territories. In addition, after the division of the region of Macedonia in 1913 into Aegean, Vardar and Pirin

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<sup>539</sup> <http://www.bartleby.com/65/bu/BurkinaF.html>.

<sup>540</sup> “...accepting the use by ... ‘Upper Macedonians’ “; (*Macedonia’s Name...*, op. cit.; pp. 19).

Macedonia, the people living on this territory were certainly Macedonians (even though the occupiers called them Greeks, South Serbs and Bulgarians in each region respectively). If the term “South Serbs” reflects a period in which another state occupied part of the Macedonian people in time when Macedonia did not exist as politically independent state, in that case what gives Republic of Greece the right - an entire century later when Republic of Macedonia is constituted as an independent state and when there are no elements of territorial occupation - to use “designations” for the Macedonian people that are relics of past times when even the European context was far from what it insists to be today!? Let’s not forget that the contemporary international law also prevents, in the context of the designation of the members of minorities (there are no dilemmas whatsoever), the change of their names by extending the term that denotes the people, to whom they actually belong, with nebulous prefixes such as: “upper”, “lower”, “western”, “eastern”, “northern” or “southern”. If this principle is without exception applied in relation to the minorities, then it must be subsequently applied in relation to the people par excellence, mostly to the part of the emancipated people living in a state-type political organization.<sup>541</sup>

The potential compromise for bilateral use of a descriptive name of the state, must not lead by no means towards deprivation of the people’s individuality as national substrate since these people could only be what they have been for centuries – Macedonian people. The recognition of the new formula – “*Upper Macedonians*” would seriously jeopardize the Macedonian national identity. If the formulation “Upper Macedonians” is interpreted within a limiting system of the use of adjectival form “of/from Republic of Macedonia, except when referring to the language or the people”, it leads to the conclusion that the ICG proposal does not put in danger the existence of the state Republic of Macedonia, in other words it acknowledges the state’s legal identity, but it does not strengthen the identity of the Macedonian people and restrains the ethnocultural identity of the people. According to the proposal, the adjective “Macedonian” must not be used when describing the terms: “culture”, “identity”, “history”, “tradition”, etc.

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<sup>541</sup> It is very strange that during the Cold War there were certain attempts to create artificial East German nation as a special entity vis-à-vis West Germany (German people). The particular quality, according to the intention of the “creators”, would not be in the context of ethnicity, but in the context of class!? Luckily, it is common knowledge that such attempt was unsuccessful.

7. The second key element of the proposals in the *Report* is related to the recognition of the constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia by the EU and NATO member states. In general, this is not a bilateral relation between Republic of Macedonia and any EU and NATO member state, or even any other state. They would acknowledge the constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia, in Macedonian language written the Latin letters. On one hand, the possible favorable aspect of such decision would mean that the states would finally “forget” the earlier mentioned reference FYROM, even if they have recognized Republic of Macedonia under this reference. However, having in mind the reasons included in the third key element, it would be satisfactory if these states pronounce and write the name of Republic of Macedonia under the rules of their official languages and alphabets. In addition, the EU and NATO member states must not consult only with Greece about “*appropriate measures if the assurances contained in the Skopje-Athens treaty were violated*”.<sup>542</sup> The principle “sovereign equality of states”, which is a cogent norm for all members of the contemporary international community (*ius sogens*), envisages equal treatment of all foregoing states in relation to the two contracting parties!

8. The third key element refers to the adoption and the use of the name Republic of Macedonia for purposes within the UN and all other international government organizations. The first aspect refers to the official name of Republic of Macedonia at the UN and other intergovernmental organizations. The proposal foresees the use of the constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia “*written in the Macedonian language*”,<sup>543</sup> not in the original (constitutional) Cyrillic alphabet but in Latin alphabet!?! The *Report* recognizes the name Republic of Macedonia written in Latin letters as “constitutional name” of Republic of Macedonia. In doing so, it ignores the following facts:

- that the constitutional name of the state is, and can only be, the name Republic of Macedonia, written in the official language of the state – the Macedonian language – and in the official alphabet – the Cyrillic alphabet. The name Republic of Macedonia written in the Roman alphabet, can not be, nor is the constitutional name of this state;

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<sup>542</sup> “...they (*EU and NATO member states, author’s note*) would also promise to consult with Greece about appropriate measures if the assurances contained in the *Skopje-Athens treaty were violated*”. (op. cit.; pp. 20).

<sup>543</sup> *Macedonia’s Name...*, op. cit.; pp. 20.

- that registering the name of a certain state in the UN List of Member States written in the official language, but in Roman letters, is not in accordance at all with the established practice of the Organization. On the contrary, the names of all member states are registered in the List in the appropriate language and alphabet, which are officially recognized by the UN.<sup>544</sup> The potential listing of the name Republic of Macedonia in Macedonian language, but written in Latin letters, would represent, on its merits, an exception to the established rule, another precedent, beyond the rules applied for all other states;

- that this new precedent would not mean *de iure* recognition of the constitutional name - Republic of Macedonia – by a universal forum, instead this newly set precedent would forever (for all times) change the constitutional name which is as *ultra vires* act as the first case. Unlike the first case, the Republic of Macedonia would now accept this procedure, even though the (dis)agreement in general does not affect the legal validity of the illicit act;

- and last but not least, that the possible future precedent would represent a breach of other acts (the acts recognizing Republic of Macedonia under the constitutional name by more than 60 UN member states).

For this reason, the only acceptable decision for Republic of Macedonia is that the constitutional name be registered in the alphabetical UN List of Member States in accordance with the rules applicable for every official language of the UN and the practice applicable for every UN member state.

9. The second aspect of the third proposal is connected with the short (unofficial) name of Republic of Macedonia.<sup>545</sup> This proposal contains new, untypical, and previously unknown decision in the practice of the Organization. Namely, in contrast to many states whose constitutional names are composed of two words one of which (the first or the second) is Republic, i.e. Republic of Bulgaria, Slovak Republic, or the states of former Yugoslavia, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that appear under their unofficial names Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, and are also listed by the first letter of their unofficial name, the state of Republic of Macedonia would be an exception and thus would not have a short name, in other words the

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<sup>544</sup> For example, the List of Member States in English language, <http://www.un.org/overview/un-member.html>.

<sup>545</sup> *Macedonia's Name...*, op. cit.; pp. 20.

unofficial name would be identical to the official name!?! Very much the same is the case of Czech Republic, Central African Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic or Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which unlike all other states with a short name composed of one word (except for Viet Nam, Costa Rica, Cape Verde, etc.)<sup>546</sup> are listed under their full names. However, this fact is completely understandable having in mind the complex name of these states or their close resemblance to the name of at least one more state (Central African Republic / South Africa; Dominican Republic / Dominica; Democratic People's Republic of Korea / Republic of Korea). Regardless of this, all these states are not registered in the alphabetical list under "r", but by the first letter of the first term that forms the complex name of all these states. The example of absence of a short name for Republic of Macedonia would be close to the case of Republic of Korea and Republic of Moldova. In the first case, it is clear why the short name cannot be reduced only to the name Korea. The case involves two states which are a result of Korea's division into two political entities, of which neither has the exclusive right to use the name Korea.

10. The third aspect of the third element is the listing of Republic of Macedonia under "r", not under "m" in the alphabetical directory,<sup>547</sup> the first letter of the first term that composes the complex name (in comparison to the present situation - Republic of Macedonia is listed under "r"). In both cases there is no evidence of the term "Macedonia", hence it would not represent much of a progress when compared to the actually applied "decision".

11. In spite of the three key elements considering the issue with Republic of Greece over the constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia, the ICG proposal addresses additional demands made only by Republic of Greece and delivered by Republic of Macedonia – although they are not directly associated with the dispute as a legal category. Namely, the international community requires "*at least two up-front concessions*" relating to the "*invitation for NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002 and invitation for OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001 and assume an active, participatory role in the organization of elections, beyond that envisioned in the Framework Agreement*".<sup>548</sup> Such for-

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<sup>546</sup> Details: List of Members, op.cit

<sup>547</sup> *Macedonia's Name...*, op. cit.; pp. 20.

<sup>548</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 21.

mulation, regardless of the valuation of its content, is problematic from at least two points of views:

- firstly, it clearly involves a threat, which is prohibited by international law; and

- secondly, it does not provide list of “extensive demands”, but only includes exempli causa enumeration to which the “international community”, theoretically and practically, can add new “demands”.

12. The request of the *Report* that Republic of Macedonia should adopt “*a formal Parliamentary Declaration on cultural and historical issues*”<sup>549</sup> must be addressed to both contracting parties in the following way: “*Both contracting parties are committed to securing formal Parliamentary Declarations on cultural and historical issues which solemnly affirms the obligations of Republic of Greece and Republic of Macedonia, as members of UNESCO and as signatories to relevant international conventions, to respect and preserve the cultural heritage rights of all peoples inhabiting the geographic region of Macedonia*”.<sup>550</sup>

13. The following proposal consisting largely of Macedonian concessions to Republic of Greece<sup>551</sup> must be eventually formulated reciprocally in the following way: “*Both parties pledge to encourage the fullest and highest professional cooperation, in a spirit of scholarship and pursuit of truth, in regional and international academic forums to advance common understanding of the history (ancient, medieval, and modern), of the geographic region of Macedonia and all its peoples*”. This also applies to the request “*to examine the Macedonian educa-*

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<sup>549</sup> „Macedonia is committed to securing a formal Parliamentary Declaration on cultural and historical issues which affirms, pursuant to its obligations as a member of UNESCO and as signatory to relevant international conventions, Macedonia’s solemn obligation to respect, preserve and honor the legacy of Hellenic tradition within the territory of the Republic of Macedonia/Republika Makedonija and the cultural heritage rights of all peoples inhabiting the geographic region of Macedonia” (Macedonia’s Name..., op. cit.; pp. 19).

<sup>550</sup> There is no place in the footnote 85 for such formulation which states: “Greece’s reciprocal obligation as a UNESCO member to respect the ethnic Macedonian heritage in Greece would continue unaffected by this provision” (the provision quoted in the previous footnote).

<sup>551</sup> “Macedonia pledges to encourage the fullest and highest professional cooperation, in a spirit of scholarship and pursuit of truth, in regional and international academic forums to advance common understanding of the history (ancient, medieval, and modern), of the geographic region of Macedonia and all its peoples” (op. cit., pp. 19).

*tional curriculum, particularly on the subjects of history and geography*"<sup>552</sup>, which must be eventually formulated reciprocally for both states.

14. A special group of requests correlates with the further affirmation of the obligations arising from the *Interim Accord between Republic of Greece and Republic of Macedonia*. It was signed in New York on 13 September 1995, in accordance with the *Resolution 845* (1993) of the UN Security Council<sup>553</sup>, by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both states at the time (Karolos Papoulias and Stevo Crvenkovski), in the presence of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Cyrus Vance) as witness. The *Interim Accord* contains, in legal and technical terms, all the elements which by definition are included in every international agreement.<sup>554</sup> In terms of the content, the *Interim Accord* is consisted of *Preamble* and six parts:

- A. *Friendly relations and confidence-building measures;*
- B. *Human and cultural rights;*
- C. *International, multilateral and regional institutions;*
- D. *Treaty relations;*
- E. *Economic, commercial environmental and legal relations;*
- F. *Final clauses.*

This *Interim Accord* entered into force and became effective on the thirtieth day following the date on which it was signed.<sup>555</sup> As indicated by its title, the *Interim Accord* remains in force in the interim, until superseded by a definitive agreement concerning the same matters which are temporary regulated with the *Interim Accord*. The plausible expectations of both contracting parties in the time when they put their signature on the *Interim Accord* perhaps anticipated that after seven years they would conclude a long-term agreement. However, this did not happen. I tend to believe more that there were no assurances that a definitive/permanent legal instrument would be concluded in foreseeable time, therefore the states protect themselves by the *Interim Accord*

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<sup>552</sup> "Inviting UNESCO, the Council of Europe or another agreed third-party (e.g. an independent panel of experts) to examine the Macedonian educational curriculum, particularly on the subjects of history and geography, to ensure that it conforms to international standards and is within the letter and spirit of Article 7 of the *Interim Accord*" (op. cit., pp. 20).

<sup>553</sup> See the *Accord* in the "Official Gazette No. 48"; 12.10.1995, page I – IV or in the third part of this book ('Documents').

<sup>554</sup> For more information see Bartosh M., "International Public Law - Law of Contract" (*Međunarodno javno pravo - ugovorno pravo*), Belgrade, 1985, page 138 et. seq.

<sup>555</sup> See Article 23, paragraph 1 of the *Accord*.

against unilateral withdrawal in the period of seven years. Seven years after the date on which it entered into force, either contracting party may withdraw from the *Interim Accord*. Technically, this is done by a written notice delivered to the other party. Just another technical “trick”. Such written notice shall take effect 12 months after its official delivery to the other Party.<sup>556</sup> Just to remind you that the period of seven years preventing the possibility of unilateral withdrawal from the *Interim Accord* has expired on 13 October 2002. In the meantime, neither party has exercised the right to withdraw from the *Interim Accord*. Considering the principle “*Pacta sunt servanda*” (agreements must be kept), Republic of Macedonia follows the *Interim Accord* exactly as it should. However, this is not the case with Republic of Greece.<sup>557</sup>

15. Having in mind the afore cited facts about the *Interim Accord*, as a matter of principle, the ICG insistence is contrary, at least, to three things:

- firstly, the affirmation of the already undertaken obligations by the *Interim Accord*. It is worthwhile to stress the fact that the ICG addresses only the last demand to both parties. You can get this impression by looking at the relevant part of the *ICG Report*. However, if we examine the *Interim Accord*, we can see that the ICG is furthermore encouraging the imbalance of the obligations of both parties.<sup>558</sup> This conclusion considers in particular the obligation to respect Article 7, paragraph 2 of the *Interim Accord* in which Republic of Macedonia has made pledges to change the symbol on its national flag.<sup>559</sup> One would probably rightly conclude that this matter is already closed, therefore it does not make sense to problematize it again, and in addition it

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<sup>556</sup> See Article 23, paragraph 2 of the *Accord*.

<sup>557</sup> For example, there was a breach of part B: *Human and cultural rights*, in which Republic of Greece has undertaken explicit obligations to respect the basic universal and regional documents for protection of human rights and the rights of the members of the minorities in this context. However, even though this part was not included at all in the *Interim Accord*, Republic of Greece still has an obligation (legal or political depending on the relevant act) to respect the acts determined in Article 9 of the *Interim Accord*. I emphasized this fact with an aim to illustrate the absence of proportionality of the compliance with the obligations which are not undertaken for the first time by this *Interim Accord*.

<sup>558</sup> “*The obligation of both parties considering the use of the symbols constituting part of their historic or cultural heritage, in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 2 and 3 of the Interim Accord*” (op. cit.; pp. 19).

<sup>559</sup> Article 7, paragraph 2 of the *Interim Accord* states: “*Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force*”, op. cit.; pp. IX.

would be suitable to include it as a special obligation of Republic of Macedonia, with an aim to familiarize the various concessions made to Republic of Greece. Unfortunately, however, nothing is as simple as it looks. Namely, this demand on Republic of Macedonia implies the observance of Article 7, paragraph 3 of the *Interim Accord*, which furthermore tolerates the insistence of Republic of Greece on the removal of one or more other/different symbols, used by the other party, if Republic of Greece believes that such use is inappropriate.<sup>560</sup> The contradiction involved in the ICG proposal can be expressed through the fact that this organization believes, on one hand, that the final conclusion of a bilateral treaty, in which Republic of Macedonia fulfils all the demands made by Republic of Greece, would definitely “close” the problem that has burdened both states for over a decade and would open new perspectives for both states, but on the other hand, it leaves space for Republic of Greece to further doubt the hardly agreed positions such as the category “historic or cultural patrimony”, in particular in Balkan or European context, and especially when symbols are in question;

- secondly, in general, when an agreement has entered into force, the basic obligation of the contracting parties is to act in full compliance with such agreement, in other words to act *bona fide*, thereby there is no need to repeat the same obligation in every agreement that might occur between the two states in the future;

- thirdly, considering in particular the previously stated item, the position regarding “*practical measures over vehicles and passports would remain in effect*” is not acceptable by no means.<sup>561</sup> These measures are not common in the international practice and are part of the actual conditions regarding the unsettled name issue. If such issue is resolved on bilateral level by a mutually agreed formulation, in that case it is normal in future to apply the measures which are standard, when comparatively observed. To be stricter, the proposed Macedonian concessions to Republic of Greece by the ICG are so far-reaching that

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<sup>560</sup> Article 7, paragraph 3 of the *Interim Accord* states: “*If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural heritage is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do*”. To be honest, this provision is obviously formulated reciprocally, however the previous experience shows that such demands were only addressed by Republic of Greece to Republic of Macedonia!?

<sup>561</sup> *Macedonia's Name ...*, op. cit.; pp. 19-20.

they infringe the unalienable rights of the states, and in return, in spite of everything, the ICG does not request Republic of Greece to do quite easy gesture, regardless of the fact that Greece on a daily bases violates the interests, honor and dignity of every citizen of our country who faces an extremely humiliating practice by Republic of Greece in terms of the vehicles and passports of the Macedonian citizens.

16. It is not necessary at all for Republic of Macedonia to commit itself to adopting “*a formal Parliamentary Declaration explaining Article 49 of the Constitution*<sup>562</sup> and *Article 6 of the Interim Accord*”.<sup>563</sup> Republic of Macedonia has an undisputed legal and international obligation “to form the concern over the status and rights of the Macedonians in the neighboring States in accordance with the internationally accepted standards”.<sup>564</sup> Let’s not forget that the ICG, by insisting on the formulation of Article 6 of the *Interim Accord*, makes a crucial mistake by putting the enormous and very complex issue regarding the human rights in the sphere of essential domestic jurisdiction of states, a concept which is probably characteristic of the classical Roman law, but not of the contemporary law. If the states are bombed, in modern time, in the name of human rights and the rights of the members of the minorities and if the members of the minorities have the “right to uprising” despite their legal and legitimate participation in the government of a certain state, what is the legal and moral basis in that case that tolerates such an old-

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<sup>562</sup> Article 49 of the Constitution of Republic of Macedonia states: “1. *The Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries, as well as Macedonian ex-patriates, assists their cultural development and promotes links with them; 2. The Republic cares for the cultural, economic and social rights of the citizens of the Republic abroad*”.

<sup>563</sup> Article 6 of the *Interim Accord* states: “1. *The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in the Preamble thereto or in Article 3 of the Constitution, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim by the Party of the Second Part to any territory not within its existing borders; 2. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party of the Second Part to interfere in the internal affairs of another State in order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other States who are not citizens of the Party of the Second Part; 3. The Party of the Second Part furthermore solemnly declares that the interpretations given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article will not be superseded by any other interpretation of its Constitution*”.

(i p. cit., pp. 20).

<sup>564</sup> In this context the footnote 86 should also be abandoned: “As noted above, Article 49 of the Constitution has been amended. The instant provision would amplify those amendments to address the specific issue of advancing the cause of ethnic kin. (*Macedonia's Name*...., op. cit.; pp. 20).

fashioned (in terms of value) and illegitimate concept of “*human rights in the sphere of essential domestic jurisdiction of states*”.

### Conclusion

1. Do the abovementioned obligations undertaken by Republic of Macedonia with the *Interim Accord* prevent the state from initiating a procedure before the International Court of Justice? This question is logically asked in the light of Article 21, paragraph 2 of the *Interim Accord*<sup>565</sup> in which the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice concerning the difference over the name referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the *Interim Accord* is excluded. The answer to this question must include clear distinctions between two kinds of jurisdictions of the International Court of Justice. The first jurisdiction refers to resolution of interstate disputes under the application of the positive international law, in other words through sub-summarization of the specific dispute under the relevant provisions of international law. The performance of this jurisdiction is strongly characterized by the consensual dimension, of which one aspect is the dependence of the jurisdiction of the court on the will of both parties to the dispute. It is obvious that even if Republic of Macedonia expresses political will to bring the dispute with Republic of Greece before the International Court of Justice to reach a meritorious decision, such will of the other party does not exist. *De iure*, however, Republic of Macedonia does not have such will as well, due to the determination of both states not to bring the dispute over the name before the International Court of Justice in the duration of the *Interim Accord*.<sup>566</sup> In contrast to the jurisdiction for making judgments, the second jurisdiction for giving an advisory opinion is not based on consent or agreement. It relies on the constitutive act of the UN – *the Charter*<sup>567</sup> and the *Statute of the Court*.<sup>568</sup> By giving an

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<sup>565</sup> Article 21, paragraph 2 of the *Interim Accord* states: “*Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1*”. Article 5, paragraph 1 has the following meaning: “*The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993)*”.

<sup>566</sup> See Article 21, paragraph 2 of the *Interim Accord*.

<sup>567</sup> See Article 96 of the UN Charter in which the General Assembly, the Security Council, other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies may request an advisory opinion on any legal question.

<sup>568</sup> See Article 65 of the Statute of the Court.

advisory opinion the Court acts as a judicial organ of the UN, not as a judicial organ of the contemporary international community in its entirety! The opinion is intended only for the specific organ of the Organization requesting such an opinion by means of a formal written request laid before the Court as unilateral act, not for the state(s). Therefore, no state can prevent the Court from giving advisory opinions. In other words, if Republic of Macedonia decides eventually to request the first jurisdiction of the Court, it would refer to the relations between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Greece, whilst the second jurisdiction would only refer to the relations between Republic of Macedonia and the Organization as a special entity. The subject of evaluation by the Court would be the legal basis of the act of formulating additional conditions for Republic of Macedonia regarding the admission to UN membership.<sup>569</sup> I even believe that Republic of Macedonia should insist on this procedure, regardless of the ongoing course of bilateral relations, as an act of protection of the rights of Republic of Macedonia arising from the UN membership. The disagreement with the first jurisdiction of the Court does not deny automatically the second jurisdiction. They can be carried out simultaneously without any possibility for Republic of Greece to dispute the act of giving advisory opinion by the Court. Unfortunately, the judgments made by the Court when performing the first jurisdiction are legally binding acts, unlike the advisory opinions. However, the previous fact should not discourage Republic of Macedonia, given that the opinions of the Court have had enormous moral influence and authority in the previous practice, and they still affect the activities of the UN organs. The advisory opinions are extraordinary significant instrument for interpretation of the law.

2. The procedure for requesting an advisory opinion is initiated by the organs or agencies of the United Nations by means of a written request (submission) to the President or the Registrar of the Court. The request must contain an exact statement of the legal question upon which the advisory opinion is asked. In addition, the request must be accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question. Following the delivery, the Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to all states entitled to appear before the Court in the capacity of parties, and the Registrar shall also notify any

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<sup>569</sup> For more information see T. Petrushevska, „*Recognition...*“, op. cit.; pp.17 et. seq.; Janev I., *Legal aspects of the use of a provisional name for Macedonia in the United Nations system*, AJIL, vol. 93, 1999; pp. 155-159.

state entitled to appear before the Court or international organization considered by the Court or, should it not be sitting, by its representative, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question upon which the advisory opinion is asked. If the Court has failed to fulfill its obligation to inform the states that can appear before the Court, the states may request:

- to be heard, or
- to submit a written statement to the Court.

States and organizations having presented written or oral statements or both shall be permitted to comment on the statements made by other states or organizations.

The Court shall deliver its advisory opinions in open court, notice having been given to:

- the Secretary-General of the UN,
- the representatives of Members of the United Nations,
- other states, and
- international organizations immediately concerned.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> For detailed information about the procedure for request of advisory opinion see Articles 65-68 of the Statute of the Court.

## DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTORATE<sup>571</sup>

### Basic reasons

In principle, there are at least two reasons that can equally defend the position that any talks regarding the change of the name of Republic of Macedonia, as well as making any compromises in view of this problem (actually, if seriously considered, it is a matter of a problem), are entirely displaced.

**1. Precedent.** The past international practice does not include an example of negotiations concerning a name of a country! In this context, if discussions about name change are accepted, the Republic of Macedonia will present an exception. However, Macedonia must not rely on, nor live by the principle of precedent, or exceptions, given that this precedent would have unforeseeable consequences for the future of the Macedonian state. The Republic of Macedonia must be built on the principles that are applied to every normal and sovereign state.

**2. “Compromise“.** The proposal of the International Crisis Group, the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece to come to some joint compromise must not be accepted because compromise is needed only in situations when two stakeholders (in this case, two states) present two diametrically opposed demands, which cannot be mutually settled, so both countries must make concessions i.e. find compromise which would be in the interest of both of them! However, Republic of Macedonia does not request anything from anyone, much less from Republic of Greece in this sense. So, from objective point of view, there is no case of some kind of dispute (nor need for any compromise), simply a fabricated (constructed) problem is being imposed on the Republic of Macedonia, and besides this the country is requested to make some concessions, as if a real, not constructed, pseudo-problem was in question. So, it is about imposing problems and orders. It would be the same case if for example someone demands from Greece to give up Cyprus and afterwards generously offers back half of Cyprus territory acting as if it performs wisely, regardless of the fact that Greece has not requested anything from anyone and that the request regarding

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<sup>571</sup> The author of this text is Ljubomir Cuculovski, PhD – professor at the Faculty of Philosophy at St. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. He lectures in *Philosophy of Religion*. The text is prepared specially for the purposes of this students’ project.

the territory is completely illegal and unfounded, and violates the integrity and sovereignty of the country.

### *Analysis of the Report*

The matters cause greater worries after reading the *Report of the ICG* in its entirety. I already mentioned that the Report is titled “*Macedonia’s name: Why the dispute matters and how to resolve it?*” The title itself expresses the perfidious method used by the ICG. Namely, the term “dispute” is used in the very beginning to suggest the alleged existence of a real dispute between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Greece. This would be true, of course, if the natural right of Republic of Macedonia to choose its *real* name, just like every other state, is considered to be a dispute. So, the *Report* through its title suggests existence of a real dispute, giving the ICG a chance to generously provide help for settlement of this dispute. So, it is once again confirmed – first a problem is constructed, and immediately afterwards someone offers to mediate the settlement of the “dispute”!?

In addition, after reading the *Report* carefully, it can be concluded that behind the apparent concern to help Republic of Macedonia lies the intention to furthermore incapacitate Republic of Macedonia to act as a state by taking away all its elementary rights and thus turning it into a protectorate governed by the “international community”. The previously stated can be supported by several examples:

**1. Pseudo-issue.** The ICG believes that the settlement of the dispute would resolve the security of the Republic of Macedonia. This thesis is absolutely naive and can be considered only by the people who have lost the ability of reasonable judgment, since it diverts the attention away from the basic problem to the peripheral, banal or occasional issues. The basic problem of Republic of Macedonia does not lie in the name, but in the existence of the idea of Great Albania, which leads directly to the separation of the Republic of Macedonia. This process is followed by the “international community”, through the services of the ICG, however it does not take any actions. In case it takes some actions, then these are in the interests of the Albanian separatists, extremists and terrorists. This does not help Macedonia; instead it makes it more difficult, e.g. diverting the attention from the *basic* problem (the division of the Republic of Macedonia) to the *pseudo-issue*, such as the imposed name problem. In other words, the symptoms are cured, but the illness is still lingering!?

**2. Discrimination and protectorate.** The *Summary* of the *Report* (the part *Recommendations*, paragraph 1) states “...at the same time meets Greece’s legitimate concerns”. According to this, the Greece’s concerns are legitimate! As a result of this, Republic of Macedonia is put in an unequal position due to the impossibility of two identical requests being legitimate in the same time.<sup>572</sup> Moreover, paragraph 2 states that the best prospects “...for agreement lie in a triangular (Lj.C.) solution”. First of all, it is not clear what the dispute is about, and secondly, why is it necessary to find a triangular solution. However, later on the matters are becoming clearer. Namely, as a result of a triangular solution (the third party would be the “international community”), the Republic of Macedonia is required to make two concessions relating to “...an invitation for NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002 and an invitation for OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations”.<sup>573</sup> According to the formulation “an invitation for...” there is an impression that NATO and OSCE do not want to stay in the Republic of Macedonia, but the state allegedly wants this and “forces” NATO and OSCE to stay contrary to their will! In general, there is a search for a legitimate justification of their stay in the state and its transformation into a protectorate. In this way, even the electoral process would partly be under the competence of the “international community”. Thereby, the Republic of Macedonia eventually loses its sovereignty and turns into an amorphous para-state territory. The situation is more alarming when the *Report* states, among other things, that OSCE “assumes an active, participatory role in the organization of elections, beyond that envisioned in the Framework Agreement”.<sup>574</sup> According to this, the concessions envisioned in the *Framework Agreement* are insufficient and they need to be extended.

**3. Imposition of Greek interests.** The *Report* is prepared in a manner of imposing only the interests of the “international community” and Republic of Greece. For example, on one hand, it states: “Macedonia is committed to securing a formal Parliamentary Declaration on cultural and historical issues which affirms Macedonia’s sol-

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<sup>572</sup> This is in relation to the right of the Republic of Macedonia to keep its name and to the request of Republic of Greece to change it.

<sup>573</sup> See the *Summary*; the part *Recommendations*, paragraph 3 (Lj.C.).

<sup>574</sup> See the *Report*, Part III, A.

*emn obligation to respect, preserve and honor the legacy of Hellenic tradition within the territory of the Republic of Macedonia*"<sup>575</sup>, while on other hand, it does not say anything about the obligations of Republic of Greece in terms of preservation of the cultural rights and the tradition of the Macedonians existing for centuries within its territory. The culmination of the cynicism and of the Macedonian concessions is included in the opinion that "*all the concessions made by Skopje would be unilateral and unreciprocated*". For example, the proposal does not provide for the review of Greek textbooks or for a declaration about Macedonian heritage or the ethnic Macedonian minority that Greece does not acknowledge.<sup>576</sup> In order to explain this part of the *Report* it should be pointed out that the Republic of Macedonia is requested to invite UNESCO, the Council of Europe or another agreed third-party to examine the Macedonian educational curriculum (particularly on the subjects of history and geography). In this way, Republic of Macedonia has been denied the right to prepare own educational curriculum as well. This, on its own merits, would imply that the Republic of Macedonia has been denied the right to have its own education and educational system.<sup>577</sup>

All in all, the principle upon which the *ICG Report* has been written is simple: Republic of Macedonia gets obligations, the others get rights!? In this sense, it is sufficient to quote the following sentence from the *Report*: "*...this proposal goes a long way to addressing Athens' bedrock concerns*".<sup>578</sup> And, in the end, I would like to remind once again that: "*...all the concessions made by Skopje would be unilateral and unreciprocated*"!? Therefore, the Republic of Macedonia gets obligations, the others get rights, and I wonder how this *Report* can be a well-meant advice.

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<sup>575</sup> Ibid.

<sup>576</sup> See the *Conclusion of the Report* (Lj.C).

<sup>577</sup> It is becoming clear in this context why the Minister for Education and Science at the time (Nenad Novkovski) is allowed to do everything. Simply, he was carrying out the plans of the "international community" by dismantling the education in the Republic of Macedonia and thus ruining one of basic pillars of its independence and statehood. Otherwise, this person would've been immediately dismissed.

<sup>578</sup> See the *Conclusion*, paragraph 1 (Lj.C).

## INTERVIEWS THERE IS NO WAY OUT WITHOUT A DOUBLE FORMULA<sup>579</sup>

- *Professor Frchkovski, since you are a professor in International Public Law, we would first of all, ask you to define us the concept “International Crisis Group” and we would like to hear your opinion about this organization?*

**Frchkovski:** The ICG is a non-governmental organization, which means that its members are intellectuals, politicians, ambassadors, diplomats. The Organization deals with investigating crises in Southeast Europe and proposes solutions for their settlement. This is an important organization because the politicians that make decisions need analyses before the decision-making process. The analyses are performed by their internal structures (diplomats, intelligence agents) plus experts from different profiles. The so-called fact finding missions performed by independent, relatively independent experts are very powerful. The ICG is a type of organization that operates on the fact finding mission principle with proposals for settlement of crises.

- *Are there any specific countries that have stronger influence over the ICG?*

**Frchkovski:** Openly, the countries do not have strong influence, however the people in the ICG are profiled, appointed by the states, in other words, they are deliberately appointed to the organization, not by chance, for example such as the ICG Chairperson. Well now, if you want you can look for some “tags” for everyone, you can comment the type of policies they conduct.

- *What’s your opinion on some other past reports of the ICG?*

**Frchkovski:** Their reports can be more or less accurate. The assessments by the ICG about Bulgaria, Kosovo, Turkey and Greece have

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<sup>579</sup> The interview with the professor Dr Ljubomir D. Frchkovski was conducted on 25 May 2002 in his office at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” – Skopje. Dr. Frchkovski is professor in *International Public Law* and *International Law of Human Rights* at the Faculty of Law, Ss Cyril and Methodius University. He was a Minister for Internal Affairs and a Minister for Foreign Affairs in SDSM governments, in the time when Branko Crvenkovski was a Prime Minister. In the period when we were completing this project (2008) he was one of the leaders of the so-called *Platforma (Platform)* – a group of intellectuals with floating positions pledging for rapid “compromise” with Greece (!?) so that Macedonia would be admitted to NATO and EU; in 2009 he was presidential candidate of the opposition SDSM.

mainly presented realistic directions, however there are some parts that turned out to be incorrect.

- *Your position regarding the proposal from the ICG and were you consulted?*

**Frchkovski:** First of all, the Report contains only one segment for the name proposal. A segment of the Report, which became reality and was realized in three months, refers to corruption. One can say for a report “no we don’t like it”, it cannot be said “it is not correct”! These are two different statements. I recognize the right to someone to say “I do not like this”, but when someone says “this is not correct” then arguments for this statement must be presented.

- *Is there a parallel between the Framework Agreement and the name dispute of the Republic of Macedonia?*

**Frchkovski:** The general situation in which name dispute has been established is analyzed in one part of the Report, and the Report states, which is my opinion as well, that the successful settlement of the crises whose element was the dispute, will bring us into a situation in which we will have complete international support. The Report makes a step to “reward” the position of the Republic of Macedonia, its creative, successful and reserved policy by proposing the inclusion of USA as main actors in a new procedural phase in which the double formula for the name (the formula proposed in 1993) would become basis of the international position for settlement of the crises. This is a good basis because if the double formula for the name is rejected and the position is only one name for international and domestic use, then this is very hard, difficult situation for compromise. If we have double formula, we do not have to change the name, we will have our name at international level, and we will discuss the name only for the relations with Greece. This is a solution, there is no way out without a double formula! I believe that everyone that should’ve reacted negatively to this solution did that, which means that the solution is good (I allude to Greece, Bulgaria). The problem was that our country reacted negatively, even though this is obviously in the interest of our position.

- *Professor, as an adviser of the President of the Republic of Macedonia you participated in the negotiations in Ohrid. Was there any pressure for the signing of the Framework Agreement in 2001?*

**Frchkovski:** Not in that context! There was a pressure (on the Macedonian and the Albanian party as well) during the negotiations, otherwise we would not have been brought in such situation to negotiate if we were able to reach an agreement without any pressure. It is

silly to think that there were no arguments in the negotiation process. We had arguments on every word, but there was no pressure; you have pressure when you receive a ready-made formula to be signed.

- *Did the “international community” put more pressure on the Macedonian party?*

**Frchkovski:** That seems to be the case because the Macedonian party was the one that had to accept some changes and make more concession than the Albanians. The lines of the pressures and changes were not unknown. These were: decentralization of authority, respect of the right to language, some guaranties regarding the adoption of laws...

- *Is the Framework Agreement and “Agreement for lasting peace and stability”?*

**Frchkovski:** Every Agreement has potential energy if it is made on “sound basis”. I believe that this is a sound agreement because it respects some standards, in other words it does not “wander” in impossible solutions which are more or less well known. Secondly, it has very strong international assurance. Thirdly, the actors that attended the negotiations consider it as quite successful agreement. So, there are three aspects: firstly, there are standard decisions; secondly, strong guaranties from the international community which invested a lot; and thirdly, the foreign participant, regardless of their comments, believe that the Agreement is quite successful one. Whether it will be a lasting agreement, it depends on the circumstances. In general, I am an optimist – the Agreement will promote a new phase.

- *Were there any obstructions in the adoption of the Agreement?*

**Frchkovski:** The President of the Assembly, Stojan Andov, made some pressure to increase the role of the Parliament. His tactic had positive effect, because the Preamble was discussed in the Assembly. The Preamble was not discussed in Ohrid, it was delivered as ready-made text. The present acting of the “anti-Ohrid fraction” is an apparent position, because in fact they did not resist. The Minister for Internal Affairs, Ljube Boshkovski, also performed obstructions: first Neprosheno; then, Ljuboten; afterwards the way he politicized the special unit “Lavovi” (the Lions); the rejection to return the police in the villages. We had a situation when the Albanians and the international community, even the secretary of NDP, Xhevat Ademi, wanted the police back in the villages, and the minister did not permit this. This is an incredible situation that raises many bad suspicions, but they cannot be realized. The country is stable since it can survive such figures.

- *Did the Republic of Macedonia receive negative points within the so-called “international community” due to the obstructions?*

**Frchkovski:** Of course the obstructions had negative effect, however, the foreign actors were here with us and they were biased in favor of the success. If we were left aside, after few moves they could’ve left us alone. We were lucky.

- *Tell us something about the influence of the Republic of Greece in OSCE and NATO and our responsibilities as UNESCO member?*

**Frchkovski:** We are all aware about the influence of Greece in NATO arising as a result of the voting machine; however the country has bad rating. I don’t believe that the EU will develop the solution for the name issue. This will be settled in New York with US mediation, not in the EU. The European Union will later accept the solution and that would be all on its part. Greece has no influence in OSCE. Regarding the UNESCO responsibilities we will have to deal with Greece in terms of sharing our joint responsibilities about preserving and promoting the joint cultural heritage. The responsibilities from the UNESCO Conventions are something like for example the Agreement on Cooperation signed between Germany and Poland, and this Agreement defines that the states must jointly agree on preserving, using and promoting the arts and heritage on their territories, and not dividing them, like issuing licenses which country is responsible for which arts. The Republic of Macedonia is responsible for everything that is on its territory and Greece is responsible for everything on Greek territory – regardless of heritage. Our position is the following: we can fully accept our responsibilities towards UNESCO and this will be part of additional agreements, should such formula be accepted.

- *Your comment on the relation Macedonia – Greece – Great Albania!?*

**Frchkovski:** I don’t think that the Albanians can create Great Albania because they cannot even make “the little” Albania function well. Albania, as a state, does not function, the northern part is not controlled, and to every other plan is only a victim, a subject to aid. However, the Albanians can create instability and chaos in the region. They do not recognize each other. The informal centers of power are stronger than the formal ones: the Parliament, the Government, Rugova, Rexhepi etc. The institutional frameworks must function like in any other democratic state so that the country would be a stable country. If the families of the “informal” centers of power are stronger, then nothing can be guaranteed, the rest of the population fears their repressive-

ness towards the majorities. I don't think that there is a concept for Great Albania, but I think that there is a concept for Kosovo influence on the Republic of Macedonia. So the question is not about the relation Republic of Albania – Republic of Macedonia, or Albania – Kosovo, but Kosovo – Republic of Macedonia, and now we have a situation when many Albanians in our country try to built their position and maintain it as such, because their number is relatively small (400.000-450.000), and have dominant position in comparison to the two million Albanians in Kosovo and three millions in the Republic of Albania. This is a small group of Albanians that want to be connected to the other Albanians, but not directly related, they still want to remain independent. A separation exists between them which will never be publicly displayed. If they were connected to the Kosovars, they would “disappear” immediately; some other elite would come to command them because they are a small group and cannot be in charge. I am quite sceptic, if for example they are called to referendum, they would not come out. They just want to settle their situation here, in our country, and to have a relatively good position, which can be later compared to the others.

*- Who refused the proposal for the double formula of the name suggested by the ICG, the ruling parties or the opposition parties?*

**Frchkovski:** The proposal was commented by the people politically involved, it was criticized by my colleague, which is a professor of yours, and by few associations that are generally against this formula and against the Framework Agreement. Yet, the name the Republic of Greece would use to refer to us is important to us (we don't want to be called for example “Slavomacedonia”).

*- Are there any examples of other states having problems similar to the problem of the Republic of Macedonia with the use of the name within the UN and if there are such cases what was the position of the UN?*

**Frchkovski:** There have been no such problems. There have been some problems regarding the definition of a state because it had different names (the state itself had problems). These are only two cases when island/ archipelago states in 1947 and 1952 had similar names and there was dilemma how to be called, however this was solved with agreement. There is no example of a country to have such name dispute. This is a precedent!

## THE CONCESSIONS ARE NOT A SOLUTION<sup>580</sup>

– *Professor Muhic, what is the international-legal basis of the request by the Hellenic Republic for the change of the name of our country?*

**Muhic:** The basis of the right of the Hellenic Republic to refer to the thesis to contest the name of R. Macedonia is a special case without precedent. That fact can give the Hellenic Republic a kind of tactical advantage in certain hypothetical, future negotiations, in which the international community would undertake the role of an arbiter and would offer an ultimate “solution”, considering the status of Greece in that very international community. However, there is evidence on the unfoundedness of the argument that one country can dispute the right of the neighboring country to have the wanted name, and the reason to be the identical name chosen by that country with a certain territorial unit of the other country. Namely, there is a province named Luxembourg in Belgium that borders with the state of Luxembourg. Another current topic is the situation with the succession of the USSR, whereby the country of Moldova was established, which borders with Romania. The same methodology can be applied in the case of the flag, as well. There is no country that has been contested the usage of a symbol as a state symbol and therefore no precedent can be sought if we see how many countries use the same symbols (the cross or the half-moon) as their state symbols.

– *How reasonable are the concessions the Republic of Macedonia made with regard to the Hellenic Republic?*

**Muhic:** The examples stated offer a clear picture of the Greek policy, in particular of the way the Hellenic Republic settles the disputes that it sometimes creates by itself. The case of the flag can be treated as a special subject to discussion and seemingly it can be distin-

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<sup>580</sup> The interview with Dr Ferid Muhic was made on 25 April 2002. He kindly received us in his cabinet at the Faculty of Philosophy within UKIM – Skopje, where he lectures *Philosophy of politics and Philosophy of the new century*. At the time we were concluding the project (2008) he acted also in the capacity of a councilor in the Cabinet of the President of R. Macedonia – Mr. Branko Crvenkovski. Our idea was to have informal talks, in order to obtain as much as possible opinions and information, which is why we decided not to use technical means (dictaphone). The professor spoke very lively, clearly, specifically and illustratively.

guished from the name dispute. Nevertheless, the fact that strongly links both cases is their relationship with the identity of the Macedonian nation and this should be regarded as a warning for the Macedonian authorities and warning for the Macedonian nation as well. Another reason for concern for the Macedonian nation is the Greek estimate of the intellectual material of our politicians! They got used to expecting concessions accepted to their benefit. Each possible solution from the negotiations in the past, but also each hypothetical solution from the negotiations to be carried out in future, can be solely to the benefit of the Greek side.

- *What is the realistic position of the Republic of Macedonia in the international policy and in the international law?*

**Muhic:** What the Republic of Macedonia can lose is apparent from the very acceptance of the negotiations, and the final solution from the negotiations for the Republic of Macedonia can be only supposed. As a sole “benefit” thereof can be considered its right to call itself whatever it wants, which is a right characteristic for each country, and recognized in the international law. The only argument opposed to the international positive norms is the right of the stronger. The international community, with respect to the dispute, advises the Hellenic Republic the same as Tukididus did 2 500 years ago: “*The stronger does what he can, the weaker accepts what he must!*” Objectively, the Macedonian diplomacy has all the bases to refuse any discussion whatsoever. However, taking in consideration the situation imposed and the fact that the Macedonian authorities have already agreed on or would accept negotiations, the Macedonian attitude can be changed. Tactically, the Republic of Macedonia should insist on the non-existence of the legal basis for negotiations, as that principle would discourage the Greek side. That would be achieved if the Hellenic Republic is requested a reciprocity in the concessions by the Macedonian side. Especially, as per the proposal of Greece to name the Republic of Macedonia whatever it wants. In such a case, the Republic of Macedonia would refer to the Hellenic Republic using a convenient name accordingly. The reaction by Greece to such requests, classifying them as a non-sense, might induce the very same characteristic of its requests that would thus be reflected. The refusal of the reciprocity would emphasize and confirm the policy of *soft blackmail* that is led by Greece and notify the international community and the world public as well. Thus, the Republic of Macedonia would gain a moral advantage and support that can possibly lead to discouraging of the Greek negotiators.

– *What is your position regarding the proposal made by the ICG on the resolution of the name dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic?*

**Muhic:** In this sense, I would add the estimate that the acceptance of concessions by the Macedonian side, as provided for in the *ICG Report*, is not a solution to the problem! The acceptance of concessions, whatever minimal, does not present a hindrance for new requests by the R. Greece, which would be realized following the same methodology. From what we have witnessed so far, it can be only stated that such a resolution of the dispute (particularly as provided for in the *ICG Report*, with concessions from the Macedonian side only) does not contain a mechanism that would prevent any further requests by R. Greece, which would ensure a kind of legal safety for R. Macedonia.

## THE ICG PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE FOR US<sup>581</sup>

– *Professor Buchkovski, in your opinion, how would you define the iCG, based on what you know about their financiers, their board and about their realistically achieved results?*

**Buchkovski:** Well, ICG is a relevant non-governmental organization that promotes opinions, which afterwards become opinions of the entire international community. What ICG recommended to us is one of the solutions for “closing” the issue with the Hellenic Republic, still the attempt was not successful due to the negative feedback by the public. ICG is supported by prominent persons and a “strong” capital. These prominent persons are former Prime Ministers, Nobel Prize Winners for Peace and serious people of great influence: E. Joseph, W. Clark, M. Ahtisaari...

– *What is your attitude regarding the proposal made by the ICG on resolving the name dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic?*

**Buchkovski:** Specifically on the name issue, the ICG position is closer to us than to the Greeks. Namely, the double name model that is being proposed by the ICG is absolutely acceptable, since for me would be unacceptable to have whatsoever other name in the international communication, apart from our constitutional name, and it is completely irrelevant to me how would the Greeks refer to us. Hence, the ICG proposal is acceptable for us.

– *How reasonable are the concessions that the so called “international community” would require from the Republic of Macedonia in terms of NATO and OSCE and what are the other possible concessions that might be requested?*

**Buchkovski:** As we are facing a dispute, which cannot be resolved, as is the case with any other dispute that cannot be resolved

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<sup>581</sup> The interview with Dr. Vlado Buchkovski, PhD, which lasted around half an hour, was made on 15 April 2002, in Skopje, in his cabinet at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” – Skopje. Dr. Buchkovski is an associate professor at the Faculty of Law, where he lectures *Roman Law*. He was also an active member, and at the time President of SDSM (after Mr. Branko Crvenkovski took the function of President of the R. Macedonia). Following the resignation of Mr. Hari Kostov, he becomes a Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, and at the moment we were finalizing this project (2008) he was a Member of the Parliament of the R. Macedonia.

should only one of the parties insist on something, we need a compromise. It is really pity that greater attention was not paid to the *Report* at that time, since it is realistic and compromising, however, apparently somebody did not agree with the “double name” model and gave a proposal for a single name. Unfortunately, from our side we do not show readiness, still we must understand that the dispute will be solved if concessions are made by both sides, including the Macedonian. Nonetheless, it is the price of the globalization that must be paid, and the international community shall continue to interfere, until it has a room for it and until we become a modern democratic state. Possibly, should we choose the court settlement, we would win the dispute, but for the time, this is not the best solution, as the economic interests would come in-between (the economic dependence on the Hellenic Republic is evident). Even the Hellenic Republic has abandoned its initial rigid position just because of the economic interests.

- *What are the chances of the Republic of Macedonia to request something different than what has been foreseen with the Report proposal?*

**Buchkovski:** Not everything that is proposed in the Report should be accepted. This is only a basis for negotiations. The international community is pragmatic when it comes to proposing of solutions, which are basically always provided as templates.

- *Professor, you are a member of SDSM marked in the ICG Report as a “moderate social-democrats”, in that context, what is your position on the Framework Agreement – is it an “Agreement for lasting peace and cohabitation”?*

**Buchkovski:** Since the time of drafting of the *Framework Agreement*, there were proposals by the President Trajkovski that were not taken seriously by the international community. It was requested for the Republic of Macedonia to be recognized under its constitutional name, since thus the Agreement would have been strengthened, with the argument that in such circumstances of anti-western mood in the Macedonians, the recognition of the name would have gained greater trust in the population. Thus, they would have won the people, who would have more easily accepted the Framework Agreement. Honestly, we have missed a good opportunity. As per the Framework Agreement, it could have been better, however at that time it was the best possible solution.

- *The Report, on several occasions, mentions the so called “Anti-Ohrid” fraction. Do you agree that such a fraction exists and what are your views on that?*

**Buchkovski:** Many of the situations in the Republic of Macedonia would have been different, should the deadlines have been followed, and that was not the case due to the obstructions by Stojan Andov in the Parliament and the statements given by Ljubcho Georgievski and Ljube Boshkovski. A great damage that cannot be repaired was caused, by failing to meet the terms agreed. I claim that without the said obstructions, the Agreement would have been implemented sooner.

*- How, in your opinion, should have Ljube Boshkovski, Minister of Interior, reacted on 11 November, concerning the case of Neproshteno, in the period when you were a Minister of Defense?*

**Buchkovski:** It was a fatal mistake of Mr. Ljube Boshkovski. The plan was for the international community to literally “take by hand” our representatives of the armed forces and to symbolically enter the crisis region, and afterwards to establish measures of confidence building. Those were the last attempts of Ljube Boshkovski not to implement the Agreement, the price of which was the loss of three innocent lives. The reason for the obstructions and the failure to implement the Agreement was the fear of early elections.

*- Do you notice any identification between ONA and the Republic of Macedonia in the Report and were the security forces able to settle the conflict without NATO?*

**Buchkovski:** No, there is a tendency in the Report to link ONA and the “Lions”, but not ONA and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia. The issue with the use of force could have been resolved since the very beginning, however the politics interfered. The international community was involved intentionally, as the conflict was spilled over from Kosovo, which is under the protectorate of the OUN.

*- What was the influence, at that time, of request for declaration of state of war?*

**Buchkovski:** The request for state of war declaration had a negative effect. It was imposed by Georgievski, who believed that the interests would merge and that a separation would occur in a Macedonian and Albanian block and that a general conflict would emerge. Urged by the desire for a military dictatorship, there were even six or seven attempts for declaration of a state of war, but they were prevented by the public, by SDSM and even by Trajkovski. The state of war would have meant end for the Republic of Macedonia, it would have led us to a civil war that certain political structures preferred to end with an exchange of territories and humane move of people, in other words with division of the Republic of Macedonia.

– *What is the accumulated dissatisfaction in the Albanian leaders in the Republic of Macedonia and for how long has it accumulated?*

**Buchkovski:** Georgievski presented an unrealistic image to the foreigners regarding the situation in the Republic of Macedonia. The anger has been accumulated for years, and Xhaferi estimated the right moment. The accumulation of anger is due to the improper way of building the relations. And now a constitutional opportunity is offered for development of the human rights. It was evident that the Albanians considered that an improvement should be requested, and now they have reached the maximum. Georgievski and Xhaferi were the ones to initiate the war!

– *Do you agree that the referendum question in 1991 was (not) established properly?*

**Buchkovski:** The issue for referendum from 1991 was compromising and realistically formulated, since the referendum was organized in circumstances where there was still a possibility for redefining the relations. VMRO both then and now demonstrated a seeming concern for the future of the Republic of Macedonia.

– *Were you, as the largest party in opposition, consulted on the ICG proposal?*

**Buchkovski:** No! We were not consulted on the proposal provided by ICG.

## THE REQUEST OF GLIGOROV FOR ACCESSION OF MACEDONIA TO THE OUN<sup>582</sup>

— *Mister Gligorov, when did the dispute over the name emerge, that is when did Greece decide that it is detrimental for us to be named the Republic of Macedonia?*

**Gligorov:** We have been named Macedonia since 1944, since the First session of ASNOM. Since then, there were several attempts by the Hellenic Republic to negate our existence. Here is one of the said attempts: during the sixties (1961-1963), an *Agreement* was made between Koca Popovic, as a Minister in the former SFRY and his Greek colleague Evangelos Averov, in Athens. This agreement led to certain concessions regarding the treatment of our minority in the R. Greece. It reflected the readiness of SFRY and of the federal authorities, to provide for in their policy the manner to influence the R. Macedonia in

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<sup>582</sup> *The talks with the former President of RM – Mr. Kiro Gligorov were carried out on 16 April 2002 in his working cabinet in Skopje. At the very beginning, Mr. Gligorov started talking about the dispute with the R. Greece. He started by telling us that Greece has published his book Macedonia is all we have (Makedonija e s<sup>c</sup> { to imame). He also informed us that the Greeks, apart from his book, previously published the book by Kemal Ataturk. This is what he told us about the promotion of the book in Greece: ...“The promotion took place in Athens, where I was well received. In a capacity of a promoter acted the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who at the time of the embargo was a member of the Government of the Hellenic Republic. He had been a minister only three weeks, prior the embargo towards the Republic of Macedonia was imposed. At the promotion he said that he didn’t want to argue with the Prime Minister, although he didn’t agree with it. He started his presentation with the following words: ‘I must confess for the injustice done to Macedonia, while I was a Minister in the then Government of Greece’. After he made his presentation, I said to him: - Mister Mitsotakis, you seem to me as a gambler who looses at the first deal. All present at the promotion could not help themselves pronouncing “Macedonia”, regarding me as a representative of the Republic of Macedonia, since although my visit was of an unofficial character, I still represented a country.”*

*Afterwards, Mr. Gligorov told us an for an attempt to give him a certain sum of money, so as to renounce the name “Macedonia”. Namely, during the period of the embargo, the police officers from the near-border region with the Hellenic Republic, occasionally made unofficial visits to Greece, even though it was prohibited. During such a visit, two police officers sent message to the President Gligorov that the Hellenic Prime Minister offers a million US dollars for him to renounce the name. President Gligorov received the message and responded negatively, which was completely understandable. The Greek journalists were informed on this offer and at the promotion of the book in the Hellenic Republic, this question was raised on several occasions. Under such a pressure by the journalists, Mitsotakis said: “If I was to offer money to Mr. Gligorov, I would have offered him more than a million!”*

order not to express such aspirations. It was highly criticized in R. Macedonia and was regarded as action to the interest of R. Greece and to the detriment of R. Macedonia. There were sayings: “*We are a part of Yugoslavia and as there is a great concern for the Slovenian minority in Austria and Italy, why is our case different*”. I am not certain whether Skopje had a complete insight in the negotiations between Popovic and Averov. Perhaps, such a non-engagement of the Republic of Macedonia led to an undistinguished deal.

Upon the Agreement was reached, the Greeks were comforted. They had certain promise from Yugoslavia that it would not cross the line that might be considered as risky - as they claimed “*risky to the Greek national interests*”. They continued to have different observations and doubts on the events in the Republic of Macedonia. When we decided to organize a referendum, Greece obstructed the activities, initially through the newspapers, and as they are a Member State of the EU and NATO, they have a significant diplomatic network. They started an agitation, claiming that we want to arrogate their history and their culture. The position they had enabled them to use the veto on the acknowledgement of the Republic of Macedonia as an independent country. Hence, the dispute could not have been resolved on a European level, although for the case of the Republic of Macedonia an international commission of 5 members was established, so called Badenter Commission, composed of Presidents of Constitutional Courts from France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the Netherlands. It should have inspected the manner of independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Since they have determined that everything was regular, that a referendum has been organized whereon everyone voted for independence, and the same time for independence were almost all the nationalities, with exception of the Albanians, even though a part of them voted positively. Thus, the Badenter Commission decided that the Republic of Macedonia met the requirements for recognition. It was decided that Macedonia and Slovenia could be recognized, whereas Croatia not, as it had not conducted a referendum. It was positive signal for us. However, a sensation happened. All of a sudden, the decision was changed and instead of the Republic of Macedonia, Croatia was recognized!?! The information was received from Germany, where the Greek lobby is very influential. Namely, they have decided on the session of the EU Ministerial Council to recognize Croatia and Slovenia, whereas the Republic of Macedonia should have waited for the resolution of the

dispute with Greece. So was done, even though it was opposite to their rules. However, they were mightier. That was the situation on a European level, where R. Macedonia failed to overcome the dispute with R. Greece, and we decided to proceed with accession to the OUN.

— *The Republic of Macedonia acceded the OUN under a provisional name. As a President, at that time, what was your strategy on resolving the issue, namely Macedonia to be acknowledged under its constitutional name?*

**Gligorov:** There were two specific cases. The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs on his visit to the Republic of Macedonia got familiarized with our problem and our history. Afterwards he left for Athens, and on the meeting with Papandreu he said: “*What do you think you are doing, they are a completely different nation, and you refuse to recognize them?*” The Greek press criticized him for that statement. Afterwards, Papandreu suggested the Greek trade companies to boycott the Danish merchandise and not to purchase it. Later on, I found that the boycott was estimated to billion US dollars, to the detriment of the Danes. The Danish Minister informed us that the dispute cannot be resolved, since the Greeks ‘stuck for the name as leach’, and the EU could not protest against it, given that they would have done the same to all the countries and Europe would have suffered a huge economic damage because of the Republic of Macedonia. Next on the agenda was the embargo imposed to Macedonia. As per the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the OUN, I must say that many were against and were not satisfied for being named Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but could not understand that the name ‘Macedonia’ was retained, which meant concession by the Hellenic Republic. This issue could have been overlooked on none of the sessions of the EC institutions. We constantly requested, based on the decision by the Badenter Commission, which was their Commission, to be recognized. At that time, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic was appointed Samaras, rightist that did not make any compromise. It is important to be said that when EC refused to recognize us, I applied for accession to the OUN under the constitutional name. In the application I stated that as a President, I must comply with the Constitution and to request accession to the OUN under the name “Republic of Macedonia”. In that period of 7-8 months, I visited New York for four times to have a meeting with Butros Gali, who was at that time a Secretary General of the OUN. I was accompanied by Vasil Tupurkovski, as my special envoy. Thus, he was personally acquainted with my applications for

accession to the OUN. We faced many difficulties. Butros Gali continued explaining that we would be recognized, but on the other hand promised the Greeks to impose pressure to us. I found that the first application ended in his drawer, seeing our dispute with the Hellenic Republic as political, and such issues were not discussed on the sessions of the General Assembly.

— *How do you estimate the peace mission of UNPREDEP and their transformation that is replacement with the NATO forces?*

**Gligorov:** This is how it was. In the course of 1992, the Serbian border guards crossed our border at five points. The issue became even more sensitive as they occupied Kodra Fura, which is of strategic importance due to the fact that in a sunny day one can see Kumanovo. They have occupied the territory among R. Albania, SR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia, a place that if ruled gives advantage. Then a forest, which was exactly the one of 3.5 hectares for which the Albanians from Kosovo claimed to be taken from them. The history confirms that immediately after World War II that specific area was granted to R. Macedonia. The Serbs from Belgrade then claimed that in that forest they had a company that exploited the forest. They wanted it to be divided, whereby one part to be used by that company and the other half to be ours. That happened. However, after a while, they have crossed our border with intention to cut wood from the part that belonged to us. A great commotion was raised, as they would occupy Kumanovo, etc. They have cut their forest and they wanted to cut ours as well. Therefore, I inspected the maps to determine whether the territory belongs to us. I was clear that those were our territories. The Minister of Defense at that time, Vlado Popovski said to certain journalists: “*Let them go, I’ll show them*”, he would have made them withdraw, but I am not sure with what army. We had some border guards, but imagining them fight the Serbian forces did not seem realistic to me (laughing). I did not say anything to Vlado about this. The following day the commander of the Peace Corps came and said: “*Can you please show me the spots where the Serbian soldiers crossed the border?*” I showed him the map and he confirmed that the territories belong to us. Of course they are ours, why would we otherwise fight for them! And he replied seriously: “*They must not do that, now they would have to discuss the matter with us. I am going to Belgrade, I will require from them to present the maps and determine whose those territories are.*” He went there, and was informed that the territories belong to us, however the historical mistakes must be corrected at last (laughing). By the

way, the general was Danish. He said to them, unless you return to your former positions, you would have to discuss the matters with us. Thus, the Serbs retrieved by the end of the week. That was UNPREDEP. We requested for UNPREDEP to be deployed, not NATO nor anyone else. I requested from the OUN to deploy a preventive peace mission. No mission would have been needed should a war or something else outbroke. The OUN agreed, and I insisted for them to be deployed along the borders with Serbia, Albania, including Kosovo. Fortunately, the composition of the mission was very good, half of them being Americans, the other half Scandinavians. The commanders were changed every 3 months and the mandate was to be renewed by the OUN.

**(Note. - this part of the recorded material is not clear enough, but here the former President speaks about the Chinese civilization)**

A civilization that has existed for 4.5 million years cannot be burnt that easily and no hasty move should be done. The Chinese Ambassador remained in the Republic of Macedonia ten days upon the recognition of Taiwan. I was not informed on that. I twice appeared on television to state that it is not proper and that it would be to the detriment of the Republic of Macedonia, no billions have been promised. One evening, around 21:30 – 22:00 h, I was at home when the telephone rang, I picked up: “*It’s me, said, the husband of the Chinese Ambassador in Skopje*”, he himself was an Ambassador in Zagreb and when his office expired he joined his wife. He said: “*I am aware that I should not call you at this time, but I and my wife would like to talk to you*”. I said, ... *tomorrow is another day*, but he replied that the following day they had a flight and were leaving for China. I looked around me, my wife in a dressing gown, my daughter was out and had a messy hair, but still I invited them, and they arrived in 15 minutes. They gave me a Shafrani painting, a symbol of fortune in China. I gave them something we had bought in Turkey. Before leaving they asked: “*Is this your idea or America stands behind it?*” I replied, ... *as you know I opposed the recognition of Taiwan, however I know that the Americans are behind it. ‘That is very important for our government’ they said, ‘if it is just you then we have one issue, but if the Americans are involved we must consider what is in-between, do they plan to recognize Taiwan as well’*. And they left.

Therefore, UNPREDEP was a fortunate circumstance for the Republic of Macedonia. Moreover, in many publications presented by the OUN it has been estimated as the most successful attempt of the

OUN for preventive deployment of Peace Corps. However, the worst was yet to come – next was the renewal of the OUN mandate, which must be prolonged every 6 months, and the Security Council decides thereon. When this issue came to the agenda, China said that: “*According to their information, the situation there has been settled and there is no need for prolongation of the mandate. The Republic of Macedonia is capable of resolving its matters by itself*”. And thus the OUN mission to Macedonia came to an end. And that was a result of stupidity. When you are not familiar with your opponent and with the things he can do to you, you should not act improperly. And China, in the meantime, made known to us that Strezhevo would be finished.

— *During the entire office of yours and I believe even now, you have built the Republic of Macedonia as an ‘oasis of peace’, which at that time, was surrounded by various circumstances, that is by the war in Bosnia and in 1999 in Kosovo. Was it essential to sign the SOFA Agreement, which regulates the status of the NATO forces, when the Republic of Macedonia was building a peaceful strategy?*

**Gligorov:** First of all, let me explain the SOFA Agreement. It is provided for each country that has any aspirations to become a member of NATO in future, to primarily sign the SOFA Agreement. In compliance with that Agreement, no foreign forces, including the NATO forces, can be deployed in the country without previous consent by the Government. It is not such a problem. Afterwards, the people in our country became afraid of the whole situation going on Kosovo, calculating what would be spilled over here, and it is known that then the Republic of Macedonia became a refugees’ camp. The fear was whether they would return. In my opinion the majority of them returned, yet one part remained in our country (approximately 20 thousand people). When the situation on Kosovo attained new heights, the Americans started considering the fierce bombarding as a sole solution. There are two or three events that I would like to mention here: first, they required for 2-3 thousand NATO soldiers to be deployed in R. Macedonia for a logistic support. Based on the Agreement, another 9-10 thousand NATO soldiers were deployed in Macedonia, just before the bombarding. That year, NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary and a great conference was organized in Washington, where the, at that time, Secretary General was to give a presentation on ‘*NATO in the XXI century*’. I was invited to represent R. Macedonia as a member of NATO - Partnership for Peace. I went to Washington. During the first day, the Secretary General informed on some general principles, that NATO should extend

towards Eastern and Southeastern Europe, etc. During the second day, when discussions were to be held on what country would be a candidate for some future enlargement, I requested for R. Macedonia to be granted the status of a candidate country. Their forces were deployed in Macedonia, and a great favor was done to them by sheltering the refugees and so on. Upon a comprehensive debate, R. Macedonia was granted the candidateship status, just as Albania. I believed we had achieved something. That day I found, for certain, that bombarding of Serbia and Kosovo is planned. Just then, it became clear to me, why they were deployed to Macedonia. In the course of the celebration, a dinner by Bill Clinton was organized. All the delegations from all of the countries were present and were seated on separated tables, where each of the tables was hosted by an American. Our table was hosted by the coordinator of all General Staffs of the US Army. He was ten minutes late, and when he came he greeted us and said: *“Let me explain you what discussions are being held within the US General Staff. There are two theories. The first one that I support, is that we should go directly to Belgrade. There is no better way to remove Milosevic. The other alternative, supported by Wesley Clark (commander of the NATO forces for Europe, at that time), is that we should enter through R. Macedonia.”* It became clear to me that they were to make a mess. The following day, I used the opportunity to inform the present at the conference. I said that around ten thousand NATO soldiers were deployed in our country, and that I have heard that it was decided for Kosovo to be attacked. Should this be the case, Macedonia shall indirectly attack Serbia, and the Serbs will not forget that in a hundred years. Then Madeleine Albright approached me and said: *“Mister President, why did you say that?”* The following day we were to depart for Skopje. We were at the hotel when Achevska came with information that Clinton invited me in the White House, in his private cabinet. I accepted the invitation, and together with Achevska we went there. When we entered Clinton’s office, present was the Councilor on national security of the USA - Berger. Clinton immediately asked me: *“What was that yesterday?”* I said that I believed I was clear enough, but that I was ready to repeat it. I explained him, how should we live with the Serbs if we allowed Kosovo to be entered through the Republic of Macedonia, being aware what Kosovo means to the Serbs. The whole history of theirs is related to the Kosovo Battle, even though it presents the greatest defeat they had suffered in their history. At that, Clinton responded: *“Yes, but this is a war, and that justifies the means”*. I said: *“That is*

*true from your point of view, but I tell you what the consequences would be on us from that action*". I said that if needed, our Parliament would reflect on that issue. Thus, after a number of negotiations they rejected the alternative of direct attack to Belgrade, given the large number of victims they would have. They accepted the alternative involving fewer victims.

— *Are you familiar with the ICG Report on the Balkans and do you agree with it?*

**Gligorov:** I have read the entire Report, and it is a really long story that reflects the situation with us, around us, the dispute with the Hellenic Republic etc. It is for the first time on the international scene to be said that the name of the Republic of Macedonia laid down in its Constitution should be internationally acknowledged. Perhaps, there would be a problem with the transcription, since it should be registered with the OUN as it is being transcribed in Macedonian, using the Cyrillic alphabet. From a linguistic point of view, it is impossible. For instance, the French would never say 'Republika Makedonija', nor write it in Cyrillic. They would name us in their language, which is in fact recognition of the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia. Another illustration, the name of Germany is Deutschland, whereas in OUN it is named as Germany, the Italians name it Tedesco, which is a name in their language, but it does not imply that they do not recognize Germany. We cannot ensure that through the same formula. The formula must allow all the nations to name the Republic of Macedonia in their language. Then we would have an internationally recognized country. There is another issue. Every country within the OUN has two names, one according to the respective Constitution, and one for everyday use. You would never come across the United States of America, but simply US. On the chairs where the Britons are to be seated you would not read The Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland, but simply Great Britain. Nonetheless, in an exchange of letters, the full name is to be used. This would not negate the constitutional name anyhow. Thus, the question is what would be the abbreviated name of the Republic of Macedonia for a daily use?! It would be logical to say Macedonia, but the Greeks would protest it. Yet, an exception can be made, so that our abbreviated name to be "Republic of Macedonia". Neither "Republic" nor "Kingdom" is used for any of the countries. That would suggest replacement of the name of the country with the type of polity. Still, if that would be a problem, we can go that way.

— *Hence, it can be concluded that there is not problem for our abbreviated name to be “Republic of Macedonia”?*

**Gligorov:** No, it will not be a problem, but that was our legal argument, as R. Greece is leading an unprincipled propaganda, due to its desire R. Macedonia to cease to exist as an independent country. It was a strategy that existed for a long period of time, until Papandreu passed away. Then Simitis came to power. He is a Greek as well, and not less Greek than Papandreu, but more latter-day. Papandreu stuck to the USA and required from them to put pressure on us. Compared to him, Simitis was related to Europe (to EU), there he saw the future of R. Greece, desiring thus to become the key factor on the Balkans. That was their interest. Thus, the intention of Simitis was not to erase R. Macedonia, but to force it change its name, to use it as a market, to acquire powerful companies and to influence the Macedonian economy. Consequently, not to destroy us, but to possess us!

— *What should the Government of RM do, knowing that R. Greece is a strategic investor in the Macedonian economy and that in October the Interim Accord dated in 1995 ceases to be effective?*

**Gligorov:** I do not agree with the ones claiming that we do not need the Hellenic Republic and the Greek capital. We cannot desire the investments from France and Slovenia, for instance, and to refuse the investments from the Hellenic Republic. That should not be. But we could have done something else. We could have allocated the significant entities, so as not to be held by one country. The fact that the Government allowed the Greeks to become owners of everything is a mistake of our governance.


— *What should the Republic of Macedonia do regarding the Interim Accord that expires in October?*

**Gligorov:** First, the Accord does not expire, but as of October starts the period within which the parties can exit the agreement that is to withdraw. Unless this is done within a year, it shall be automatically prolonged. I believe that the Accord should not be terminated. It is a historical fact, and the people understand it only as a loss of the name of the Republic of Macedonia. The real situation is that we have made a concession to be named FY Republic of Macedonia, whereas the Greeks made a concession from what they have been granted with the resolution from the Lisbon conference, when Portugal held the presidency with the EU. The following conclusion has been made – “*Greece shall recognize Macedonia, should it erase the word Macedonia from its name!*”. Thus, the Greeks made a compromise, since the name

‘Macedonia’ remained, and the fact that Yugoslavia does not exist any longer, but is named Serbia and Montenegro, what ‘former’ country are we from? Serbia and Montenegro?! Nonetheless, it will not be resolved that easy.

— *What would have happened unless the Republic of Macedonia remained outside the OUN?*

**Gligorov:** Considering the events that followed, which could not have been anticipated in their entirety, where we were not acknowledged, without army, without a name, without any support whatsoever, in a situation not to be able to refer to the OUN, which pursuant to its *Charter* has the commitment to provide aid to its Member States, I believe it would have been even worse, if we remained outside the OUN.



***Kiro Gligorov with the 16-rayed sun – the first flag of the independent Republic of Macedonia***

## WHO WOULD CARE WHAT WOULD OUR NAME BE - IF WE ARE A MEMBER STATE OF THE EU!?<sup>583</sup>

- *Mister Minister, at the beginning, we would like to hear your views on the ICG Report and whether you were consulted on its drafting?*

**Chashule:** I, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was presented with the Report unintentionally, without any announcement, based on personal researches I found it on the Internet and read it on my way to New York. I believe that the ICG has even previously, with its position on the Balkans, surpassed all the norms of international behavior. It is clear that the international relations lack democracy and order and that the law of the stronger rules; that the stronger powers (in one case the USA) determine the relations with the other countries in the world, and that is completely clear, and that is the reality, as it is clear what is day and what is night. However, opposite to the day and night, our reality can be modified, yet more time is needed for such a modification than it is requisite for the human to invent the electricity and thereby to create the light so as to work, still it would be night. This would be the case here, as well. The large countries will remain large, whereas the small ones will succeed depending on the maturity of the world and based on that will improve their positions. Nonetheless, the ICG and the similar organizations, which cannot be called non-governmental, as they are funded by the governments, sell us a strategy of a great power or, in a brutal way, the specific interests of a political and economic group within that power are being presented to us as a strategy. Such organization should present a substitute of the non-existing democracy in the international relations, behind the image of a group of intellectuals that have gathered to reflect upon an issue. And what are the consequences of this report for us? The consequences are a specific

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<sup>283</sup> The talks with Mr. Slobodan Chashule were carried out in his cabinet within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of R. Macedonia. At the time of the interview (September 2002), Mr. Chashule was a Minister of Foreign Affairs of R. Macedonia, and at the time we were finalizing this project (May 2008) he was the chief editor of the weekly magazine *Forum*. Considering the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was directly concerned with what is the goal of this project, it was the main reason we wanted to hear their opinion on the *ICG Report*.

problem we have inherited with the disintegration of SFRY, and that is, being imposed with such twisted interests within such a substitute of the international interests. Nevertheless, the worst thing in the case with R. Macedonia is that partial, local and selfish interests of individuals are being presented, where behind the ICG, a group of people tries, regarding the crucial issues, to separate R. Macedonia from the overall context of the global trends and to impose to it its own solutions, without organizing elections and requesting verification from their citizens, as is the case with each democratic society. And now, such a group of very selfish people, hiding themselves in the ambitions of a descendant of ICG, as is Mr. Joseph (for whom I have been informed by my friends that are figureheads on the memorandum of ICG acts on the Balkans individually and in collaboration with certain Macedonian quasipoliticians) we are offered with a solution that these people consider it as a sole solution and thus create chaos, whereby they would instrumentalize themselves as parallel institutes of the Macedonian policy that should resolve the national issues. And now, in such a disintegrated society with forms of an international dictation, even though we have a Parliament, this group of people wants to promote the ICG to such an extent that in future, each issue that will be resolved by the Macedonian citizens in the Parliament to be previously controlled by an institution as is ICG (which I cannot find in the *Constitution*) and unless it accepts a specific solution, the Parliament, within the limited sovereignty, shall not be able to act. In my opinion, this position, not only that is not acceptable, but I will put all my efforts to remove it! Due to this, since the first moment ICG approached me, as a form of action in our society, I said that they were what they were, their opinion was as it was, I valued it in a way I did, however it cannot compensate the sovereign Macedonian decision that must pass through the Government and the Parliament, so as to ensure consistent enforcement of the decision.

Regardless how smart they are, the responsibility for us to be smart was gained from the citizens.

Accordingly, Mr. Joseph, can read his views aloud, read them in front of his wife, read them on TV, however, as long as I am a part of the Government, his views would be only one of the many views placed to the Macedonian public. Nevertheless, the function we have (the function undertaken with the elections) imposes to us to be skillful and clever, and accept as ours the smartest opinion that suits the Macedonian citizens best. I cannot reconcile with the fact that three things are being undermined with such a form of interference by different groups: first,

the constitutional order is being undermined, the sovereignty of our country is being violated, where the damage is irreparable. You see, the borders can be agreed upon, negotiated or fought for, however if the Constitution is undermined, than the country is not functional and it becomes an open field for any kind of action. The worst aspect here is that the Constitution is being undermined by shadow people, who without any further responsibility give themselves the right to decide for our lives, regardless whether we accept the consequences or not.

Therefore, Mr. Frchkovski, Mr. Trajkovski (who as a President has greater responsibility) or any other citizen of this country cannot hide behind something related to the major world power, the USA, which do not share the same views with Joseph (source: Collin Powell). However, in our country, helped by the journalists, an opinion is being imposed that the ICG is, actually, composed of Americans behind a curtain and that we would automatically accept what is being said by them. This opinion is being created for the purpose that the people like Mr. Frchkovski, without going out on elections as Mr. Slobodan Chashule, manage the country from a shadow. In such a case, the management shall not be tested, as is the instance with the elections now in September, nor would be taken for liability, as is the case with all of us. Consequently, one can immediately conclude that the aim of the group hidden behind these types of political manipulation is the constant power, which has started since 1990. This group has infiltrated as a metastasis in the governments of SDSM and in the Cabinet of the President Gligorov, and it has now infiltrated in the Government of VMRO and in the Cabinet of Trajkovski, never going on elections, just to see whether the citizens will consider it as a sole solution and response to their problems. Accordingly, we are facing one of the greatest impacts on the Macedonian statehood, in this case conducted by Macedonians hiding behind the ICG and behind Joseph, for whom I cannot find the relation with the latter, still if judged by the results, it becomes clear that the intentions are neither good nor honest.

*- In one of the footnotes contained in the Report, there is a statement that the international community is composed by the Member States of the NATO Alliance. Where are China and Russia here?*

**Chashule:** If that is so, then their views would be that they automatically represent the interests of NATO, since they regard their interests being identical with the interests of the international community, which is absolutely not correct. Just take a look at the Memorandum and the names that appear as “alleged” members of the ICG, such as

Ahtisaari and Sanchez, as two types of people that do not belong to NATO; how can then NATO be an exclusive entity that accepts our suggestions in a restricted way. Now, one cannot place NATO as the main inspirer of the ICG, as 60% of the members of the ICG do not come from the NATO Member States, nor they have any intellectual, professional or economic relation with NATO. It is a lie, it is a part of the illusion that should be placed to the uneducated and satanized Macedonian citizen (I include the Albanians here, as well), to be presented as a real authority, so that Edward Joseph (whose intellectual skills, in my opinion, are below the average – a motivated American official, who in the framework of the templated American university product receives money so as to complete a task, and still cannot explain where he pays his tax, and lectures us on the types of corruption) could undertake an instructive role and talk to the media that it is up to us to combat the corruption. We should by ourselves build political solutions, without using the violence as a means of resolution of our problems, which is my main axiom, leading principle in the life. Namely, the democracy does not imply an ideal order, since it is a competition among the people and is based on an ambition, or if you would prefer selfishness (me to have more than you, you to have more than me) and it involves a set of anomalies that are part of the human nature. However, one society differs from another on the manner of amortization of the democracy occurrences. Such anomalies of the democracy have different resolutions in our country, different in the US, yet it is a fact that they also have problems, and with regard to that, who is Joseph to come here and to request from the young Macedonian democracy, which still clarifies a bunch of old values in the heads of the citizens, to be strongly built and to be even stronger than the American, where the Supreme Court (in the case of the Presidential Elections) must have resolved a case that seemed as a fraud!?! The damage in this case done to the Republic of Macedonia is that such a non-governmental organization is allowed to be taken to a level of a political party and it, as a party represented by foreigners, mobilizes domestic media and washes the brains of the Macedonian citizens with false data on what is democracy. In the heads of the Macedonian citizens, who still do not live in the spirit of democracy, there is a group of intellectuals, which goes around and claims that all the Macedonians are thieves, and that all the Albanians are thieves and that it is most advantageous for us to create a provisional government that would be concentrated around the President (and we know that Mr Frchkovski is a Councillor of Trajkovski),

and the first one without being voted has been chosen to rule and that is the crown of this conspiracy against the Macedonian people, the Macedonian country and the society. The worst of all is that the democracy has been affected, the society is being undermined, and only can be a country reorganized if the society and the order exist.

*- In your opinion, what are the preventive measures that can be undertaken towards resolution of thus created issues?*

**Chashule:** One of the preventive measures are you...

First of all, it is of crucial importance to take away the repression out of the heads of the politicians, since as I said, the ICG is here – I respect it, but do not accept their views. It is valid and should be existent. Accordingly, we should primarily understand that the answer to this must not be the repression, for instance, I can pass a decision to proclaim Joseph as a persona non grata and discharge him, which would make him right in the heads of number of confused people, which would not be true, since simply he is not right!

Secondly, we must not allow promoting Joseph in a way that he has been imposed as a relevant factor for polemics, he is not a relevant factor for polemics! In my opinion, Frchkovski should be regarded as a relevant factor, since he is a citizen of this country, and together we us he suffers the consequences that would result from this problem, and due to that he should be involved in the polemics. Still, it seems to me that the best response would be our consideration, and within the framework of it to develop an opinion whether the opinion by the ICG is harmful or not, to come up with our own judgment, our position. It is up to me to give you my opinion, yet I do not force you to accept my position as a single one, since it is neither sole nor the best. It is necessary to gather several argued opinions and to derive a single one, but even then we must not allow to say that such a position is the best, and to leave the citizens to decide thereon. However, the problem we are facing is that as long as we treat the ICG in a democratic manner, they will use non-democratic means. In other words, such non-democratic means, without public inspection, lead to influencing the decisions that should be made by the citizens on the elections.

Thirdly, one of the best answers is you! You are now making a public verification of their position, using the only possible way, through consultations, which they have forgotten to do. I cannot understand how you find it to be necessary to consult both the civil society and the government, to consult probably persons that would not like to be related with none of them and to make a verification, first of their role

and secondly of their positions, and they have “forgotten” to do that!? Therefore, it is clear that the negative result that emerges as a consequence from the fact that they do not have an image of the entire country, and accordingly, they are not a non-governmental organization and they destroy the definition of the non-governmental organization, with the manner of financing, and prove that they do not reflect the American stands in their entirety, but a segment thereof (since the American opinion is a complex set of different interests, and hence it cannot be regarded that a single person, should he be a top politician, represents a single opinion, but a complex one). So far, we were presented solely a segment of those interests as a single interest and position of the President Bush. Far from that, I claim and I will sign a resignation, should somebody prove that Joseph represents the interests of the President Bush. Joseph is a marginalized person that has found “ears” to promote himself, since in the R. Macedonia he will promote himself, where other persons and citizens of this country will be promoted, including Mr Frchkovski. At the end, it could be summarized that the R. Macedonia would become a victim of the career of several people that would wait certain verification from the people standing behind them, and the glorious minds listed on the ICG Memorandum, probably have no idea who Edward Joseph is and what he is doing here.

– *What is your position regarding the solution proposed by the ICG, according to which the Republic of Macedonia is the only one to make concessions to the advantage of the Hellenic Republic and where do you find the principle of reciprocity that is existent in the majority of the international agreements?*

**Chashule:** I can only say that the manner of solving the problem and the position presented thereby are, in my opinion, improper, since they do not enclose thousands of international practices, apart from the reciprocity, as one of them, whereby these issues should be resolved. Yet, the worst thing is that their proposal eliminates the OUN and also eliminates the will of both countries, since regardless how forced we are to make concessions to the end of the resolution, in certain elements it is applicable not only to us, but also to the Hellenic Republic, completely unacceptable. And now, a non-entity emerges, something that is nonexistent in the world, since globally, the international relations are based on the national and the joint conventions, Agreements and resolutions, either bilaterally or multilaterally. Instead of resolving the issue in such a manner, a nonentity appears, without knowing whose interests it represents and what reflection of the sovereign will they

are, because they cannot be identified!? It is of particular importance to be aware whom they represent in the name dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic that is whether they represent any of the parties. If you ask me, they do not represent anybody! Hence, they eliminate both us and Greece as a sovereign will, and it is clear that an agreement would not be valid unless expression of will by both parties. Thus, what can I say!? It would have been more than enough to roughly go through the Report and you will realize that it was written by illiterate people. Who can convince me that I can give an entity a tutor role and that it would be a garranty for implementation of the commitments. Should have this issue be easily resolved, the world would have not faced any war, since the wars are simply a continuation of the failure of the politicians, as they used force where the agreement was impossible to be reached and if this arbitration was possible and acceptable, all the conflicts would have been resolved, and thus it seems very naï ve.

Namely, if this Government decides to accept the Report and the following elections are won by another political party that does not accept this platform for resolution of the dispute and rejects the solution, then NATO, based on the other agreement would put pressure on us not to consent to the Greeks naming us “Republic of Macedonia” written in Cyrillic, since that would be unacceptable as a precedent. As another precedent we could regard Joseph, who puts himself in a position to decide on behalf of the sovereign will of the Macedonian citizens and to decide how would they name their country. And thirdly, we and the Greeks, as an expression of our will (I do not know to what extent, our decision was a reflection of sovereignty, still it was presented as a will) have agreed to negotiate this dispute under the auspices of the OUN. This agreement now leads to rejection of the OUN by such a surrogate solution, and a conclusion can be withdrawn that everything accomplished there should be simply forgotten. What has happened to us, when we were in a position to come up with a solution, an agreement – for us not to consent the Greeks to name us however they want, which would not be offensive, and for them to show understanding that we cannot change our name, wheras they might name us “XY” and for the rest of the world we would remain “Republic of Macedonia” – in that very moment, the ICG appeared. And at the end, the worst damage – the failure to resolve this issue (let it name a misunderstanding, as I do not want to call it a dispute) – hinders the Macedonian and Greek integration within the EU, hinders the initiation of the

Greek package for stabilization of the Balkans with European money, and above all it hinders the military treaty between R. Macedonia and R. Greece on the promotion of the performances of our security system requisite for the accession to NATO. Thus instability and anxiety is being created on an international level. And who is comfortable with such an anxiety? Of course, it suits the power that would strive to create an environment for redefinition of the borders, so that new country can be created, and it would not stop with the radical and political element of the Albanian factor, since the international crime hides behind it. And why? Of course, if a chaos persists on the Balkans, the drugs, arms and human smuggling and trafficking would pass uncontrolled, so if you sit down and think logically, you will see that the failure to overcome the Macedonian crisis, only stimulates the fear, which presents the basic generator of the chaos. The failure to settle the relations with the R. Greece prevents the relaxed position of the R. Macedonia and it takes it even farther away from the harmonization in the region, and such a position is to the advantage of those who would like to establish the Republic of Kosovo. However, such a country would not be a country of Albanians, but their trouble and concentration camp, as the true boss, being the organized crime, would persist in what has been doing so far, kill politicians that are not suitable for it, to smuggle and trade, since it is the ultimate goal. It is my position and reflection that the ICG obviously serves the interests of the organized crime, as it does not offer solutions and it blocked one – which implies that it supports the chaos that is to the benefit of the ones standing behind ONA, ANA, UCK, where all of them are, at this very moment, the major enemy to the USA.

*- What is the direction, the position our country is moving to in the settlement of this dispute, that is what are the undertakings by the MFA to the end of finding any solution?*

**Chashule:** We have established our platform, which has been verified by the Parliament, primarily by the diplomatic council at the Ministry in Skopje, then by the Parliamentarian Commission and by the Government. The platform would be as follows: what we should do with respect to the Greeks is to be smarter than we were in 1991 and to see whether we would allow for this issue, that can easily be resolved (our remark!?) to persist and to further block us, or not. I believe that we should not. The solution to such a problem is not a betray, but opposite, it is a compromise and a European solution that was being offered by me and Papandreu publicly, and the very moment we proposed it,

the ICG appeared. The Platform implied that we should send a letter to Greece stating that we are not against for them to name us with a non-offensive name, and they to send us a letter expressing understanding for the fact that we cannot change our name and Constitution. Based on such an exchange of letters, we would have eliminated the dispute though a mutual communication, we would have relaxed the relation, and later on they would have ratified the *Stabilization and Association Agreement* that our country signed with the EU, and accordingly to pass laws, make investments and sign international agreements, and the world that has anyway named us by our Constitutional name, would have accepted it as a clear position. As we had obtained the requisite 2/3 majority, based on the said votes we would have automatically eliminated the reference FYROM, within the OUN, where our and the Greek representative would have negotiated for the reference to be transformed with a mutual consent by both countries. The very moment we placed this as a proposal, Joseph emerged and irritated both the Macedonian and the Greek citizens, and the citizens that are frightened and irritated would not easily come up with such a compromise.

– *What is the atmosphere at the Greek side for a resolution of the dispute?*

**Mr Chashule:** There is a great will, particularly with Georgos Papandreu, who immediately accepted my proposal and that is why, before New Year, I traveled to R. Greece, to propose this and to reach an agreement. We also have the international support to the settlement of the issue, to the comfort of both us and Greece. But, then the ICG appeared and blocked this proposal of ours. However, this does not imply that we should easily give up from resolving of this issue in future, and that is what we would do should we be entrusted with the following mandate. Otherwise, I will personally strive to eliminate this problem of ours, and when we would be integrated in Europe, who would care what would our name be (our remark !?), as we would then create values, and the population and the society that creates values, do not allow a room for fight!

## MAJOR HISTORICAL MISTAKE OF GLIGOROV<sup>584</sup>

*- Mister Tupurkovski, in your opinion, why wasn't the support by Bush Senior valorized?*

**Tupurkovski:** The Macedonian citizens have never found that the letter by Bush was lobbied by me, together with the then Deputy Vice Secretary of the USA for the Balkans – Ralph Johnson. The letter was sent to me 24 hours prior being forwarded to President Gligorov. I forwarded the letter to Gligorov and he to the lobby group. The lobby group, for the purposes of creating a confusion and acquiring certain position, send the letter to me, hiding the number of the fax, as it originally came from me in Washington. Such childish and infantile games in such a historical moment, did not impress me. The letter arrived in Macedonia, and I do not know why it was so affirmed, however the initial signal from official Washington was that Macedonia had a perspective and that they would pressure the accession to the OUN. I acted upon that basis and I am sure that if it was taken in consideration, in a lack of a single European external policy, where France and the Great Britain as standing members in the Security Council had no obligation to support Greece, and to respect the *OUN Charter* based on the principle of universality, Macedonia would have become a Member State under its constitutional name. Greece, still, had no idea on the manner of abusing the sovereign right of a nation and of a country to establish its own national attributes. There was neither a clear political line, nor a support for its unclarity.

*- The consequences of these strategic mistakes are felt even now?*

**Tupurkovski:** Of course, it would be established in the history as a major historical mistake, attributed to the President Gligorov! I am certain that it was later affected also by the support by the Government, and the political setup by Branko Crvenkovski.

*- That structure of the SDSM is a master for manipulation with the public opinion. Even though, it was constantly reiterated that Macedonia would not change its name, that approximately 100 countries*

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<sup>584</sup> This is a part of the interview with Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski, published in the weekly magazine *Fokus*, No. 666, dated 4 April 2008, made by the journalist Jadranka Kostova, immediately before the NATO Summit in Bucharest, where Greece imposed veto to the accession of RM.

*have already recognized under the constitutional name... And now, the same politicians, the same experts, the same journalists have switched from the fifth gear to reverse!? And the people are now supposed to “chew that up” without any reaction?! When I talked to you, three years ago, on this very topic, when they claimed that as patriots they would retain the name, you said that “the government is only preparing us for the change of the name that will follow sooner or later, since they consciously or unconsciously have already accepted that”. And during the past period you were called a great traitor, because you have considered such an offer by the European factors?*

**Tupurkovski:** First of all, I have never negotiated the name and I would have never allowed that. Hence, the others, by accepting the exact contents of the *Provisional Accord*, they accepted to lead negotiations, under the auspices of the OUN and to make a compromise, which was even then clear that would end with an offer, with which we might not be happy. In addition, as we were talking about “compromise” and Greece, which allegedly would not have been happy, made a wise diplomatic act and outwitted us. At the beginning, Greece had an extreme position that none of the word Macedonia should be contained in the name of the Northern nation, and we started with the position concerning the Constitutional name. Moving towards a compromise, Greece today accepted that we are Macedonia, yet it requires a geographical reference, and we are still standing at the position of the “Constitutional name”. If you accept to discuss with such a mandate, it is more than obvious that the international community will, at the end, make you pay the price for your own decisions.

*- Only few years ago, did Crvenkovski say that “he would love to see who would be a man enough to change the name”. However, several days ago he said that an “attribute/adjective” to the name would be acceptable!?*

**Tupurkovski:** That is exactly what I was saying, you will come across unbelievably opposed positions, both in the behavior in a political sense and the specific measures undertaken.

*-Your initiative, dated several years ago, on developing special relations with Greece remained not reacted upon?*

**Tupurkovski:** If we would analyse the matters, unless we want to hind behind the fake patriotism, the special relations would have been a solution for Macedonia. I came in public with the *Declaration on Special Relations* and six years have passed since. Today we are

facing a situation where we can completely destroy the relations, now we are in a position where an objective issues may be raised on the destiny of the Greek capital in RM, which is now not only Greek, but has accepted our national characteristics. Today, we are in a position to face a further territory isolation, to farther from the settlement of the interests of 200 - 300 thousand Macedonians from the Eagean part of Macedonia, when there is a realistic critical mass for them to be settled in their favour. And one cannot hide that with a scened euphoria as a patriotism.

- *You have good relations with certain Greek politicians – for instance, with Papandreu, Papuljas... Do you believe they would have accepted such special relations?*

**Tupurkovski:** I got acquainted with some of these people in the early 1980s. Papandreu is a peer of mine, whereas Papuljas is older. Still, never had I problem to discuss with them from a position as Macedonian. I am convinced that Greece would have accepted special relations with Macedonia, as they were and still they are aware on their isolation and the pressures they would be put on.

- *For how long they will resist the pressure by the American President, the most powerful world force at the time being?*

**Tupurkovski:** Less in the past, more now, given that the Greek politics is entirely aware that is not of a major geostrategic importance for the USA any longer. At the time of the Cold War, Greece was in a way a wall to the break of the Black Sea fleet of the Soviet Union in the warm seas and the American bases were stationed there. For a long time, the American bases have not been there, now Turkey is considered as a major factor, as Turkey is the region where America has deployed its military capacity and moved its geostrategic interests, to the Middle East. And in another sense, Turkey is extremely important as a secular country. Turkey is an example of how the possible fundamentalism could be repressed or regulated in a secular Islamic societies where the forms of democracy could emerge.

- *In your opinion, would in a case of a Greek-Turkish dispute, Washington support Turkey?*

**Tupurkovski:** Only have the Turkish Military Forces had practically recognized their right and have always been justified in a case of intervention, when it would be estimated that the secular nature of the country is being threatened, which has been imposed by Ataturk. Under such circumstances, given that Turkey receives high level of im-

portance, it is clear that Greece would not be supported in case of a conflict with Turkey.

- *So you anticipate that the Greek representatives in Bucharest could be very rigid?*

**Tupurkovski:** It would not be that easy for them to be flexible, regarding the positions they have taken, but I believe that they show serious negotiating attempts so as to save their honour.

- *What is the epilogue you foresee?*

**Tupurkovski:** I believe that due to the urges made by Bush there is a possibility for the issue to be solved. There are less possibilities for overcoming the differences by means of compromise and the alternative is to change the OUN references. Considering the proposals by Nimitz, we are not discussing the Constitutional name, it is included in the complex package, whereby the terrible reference in the international communication, FYROM, shall be replaced with another more acceptable.

- *The provision of the last “package by Nimitz” that nobody has the exclusive right to use the attribute “Macedonian” has differently been interpreted, ranging from excellent proposal to threatening everything that is Macedonian!?! Is it possible, as it had happened when certain issues are not specific enough, afterwards to be interpreted in the light of the package, as it has been gone too far with the Framework Agreement, justifying everything as being in the spirit of the Ohrid Agreement?*

**Tupurkovski:** As per the exclusivity, I am not certain what is more of our interest: to have an exclusive right to the Macedonian territory, which actually cannot be realized or, it would be more important for us the Macedonians from the Aegean Macedonia, that is from Greece or Bulgaria to have the right to proclaim Macedonian institutions and have the opportunities to be educated in the mother tongue – Macedonian. Thus, we would not have the exclusive rights, however we shall share them with the authentic representatives of the ethnic territory of Macedonia. Who can today prevent Greece from naming the Airport “Makedonia”? Yes, we are aware of the arguments that thus we would have our national identity threatened, yet I would be careful and would like to assess it from every angle. I do not believe it is possible. Our national identity, in a historical sense, is not disputable! And we have ourselves relativized it, since we do not have a stable country that moves in a stable direction, with a speeded pace on an economic and social plan.

- *As regards the publicized discussionas with Alois Mock. Was there any offer for change of the name Macedonia for 3 billion US dollars, and an association to the EU?*

**Tupurkovski:** The package by Mock was offered at the time when I had already resigned. Mock merely conveyed the messages by Mitsotakis, as they come from parties with the same political orientation.

- *What was the name offered?*

**Tupurkovski:** There were no talks on a specific name. I had never negotiated the name. I believed in other modules, which I have offered. The package contained economic support, as it is known to everybody that solely through an economic development we would develop and stabilize. He proposed a garranty for security from the OUN Security Council, that is a balanced formula for support both from East and West – from China, Russia on the one side and France, Great Britain and the USA on the other side. Hence, since then we would have been relieved from the problem of the territorial integrity and insecurity it implies and finally the association to the EU as a safe path to accession. That offer, dated in 1992, would have been valuable to RM, and we wasted it only for not being proclaimed as traitors!?

## MACEDONIA SHOULD NOT WITHDRAW<sup>585</sup>

– *Mister Haruni, are you familiar with the ICG Report concerning the dispute over the Constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia?*

**Haruni:** No, I am not familiar. Yet, I have information that it is the ICG, in which Boris Trajkovski participated.

– *What is your position on the dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and Hellenic Republic?*

**Haruni:** R. Greece does not have the right to contest the name, but it has other reasons for that. The major issue is that the Aegean part of Macedonia has never been Greek! It aspires for the other parts that were usurped using force, to be disintegrated. It uses its position to influence the process of resolving the dispute. Still, R. Greece cannot be an exemption, When all the other countries around recognize the name of R. Macedonia. The Macedonian side should not withdraw.

– *Would the name “Upper Macedonia” be acceptable for the Hellenic Republic?*

**Haruni:** R. Greece contests the Constitutional name and does not have the right to do that. There is a possibility for an issue to occur with “Lower Macedonia”, as is the case with North and South Korea.

– *PDP has a long tradition. Was it consulted on the Report?*

**Haruni:** It was consulted for certain issues, during the preparation of the Report, I was on a sickleave, and the position of the party is that there we no concessions.

– *Would the name “Macedonian Republic” be acceptable for you?*

**Haruni:** There are many finesses in all such proposals. This name would imply a territory where ethnic Macedonians live. I would not agree. The linguistic proposal is not acceptable, given that R. Greece insists on putting R. Macedonia in a no position.

– *Is there any link between the Framework Agreement and the name dispute and has the “international community” been related to this anyhow, has it put any pressure?*

**Haruni:** I am not in a position to comment on the pressures by those centers of power. The centers of power are not always honest.

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<sup>585</sup> The interview with Mr. Sejfedin Haruni – the then Member of the Parliament from PDP (Party for Democratic Prosperity), was made on 23 April , in his cabinet within the Parliament of RM.

They would only want to have peace. There was a pressure for the *Ohrid Agreement* to be accepted, however the Macedonian side was confused. The Constitution as of 1991 did not offer an adequate solution that would be acceptable for all the ethnicities, I even then from the speaker's platform said that it would be difficult to prevent an interethnic war thus, and that was unfortunately confirmed in 2001. And, there hasn't been any war between the Macedonians and Albanians so far.

- *Is the Ohrid Agreement an agreement for peace and cohabitation?*

**Haruni:** It is not true. We are far from the rights we should enjoy. Even *the Constitution of SRM*, as of 1974, was more liberal (constitutional nation, right to higher education, employment in the commerce and in all the institutions) – and now, we are a minority.

- *Do you see the Republic of Macedonia as a civil country with Albanians or with Macedonian Albanians?*

**Haruni:** I do not perceive the Republic of Macedonia as a civil country, I see it being disoriented, with perspective to be civil, should it get rid of the criminals. I do not understand the Macedonian intellectuals that draw lessons from the historic experience, perhaps thus imitating the Serbian politics. Since the independence of the R. Macedonia, there have been prerequisites for it to become “oasis of peace” and accede the EC family. This Government treats the R. Macedonia as a country of the Macedonians only, and not of the others.

- *Who does imply the term “Anti-Ohrid fraction” to?*

**Haruni:** Andov, Georgievski and Boshkovski have a limited sight and would like to win using the nationalist card. SDSM are aware that they will not have the Republic of Macedonia thus.

- *Were the “Anti-Ohrid fraction” and the obstructions by Andov, at the beginning, pro the amendment to the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia?*

**Haruni:** The first *Preamble* was drafted by Georgievski and Xhaferi – and they are criminogenic structures. This *Preamble* was reached with threats for imprisonment for Xhaferi. Still, Xhaferi has modelled Ali Ahmeti. Andov is not sure what he wants. The division as proposed by MANU would suit him, however the map did not include Skopje, as would be convenient for them. And they do not abandon that idea. Andov is against such R. Macedonia, as are Georgievski and Boshkovski.

- *What is your position on the possible Balkan Federation?*

**Haruni:** Some 200 years ago, few of the prominent Albanians, for instance Daili, and others, supported the idea of a Balkans federation. It was initiated by Dimitru Tucovic and Georgi Dimitrov. I believe that the desolution of the borders, the cultural relations and the economic closeness, whether you want it or not, is the best possible solution.

- *What involved the unclarity in the statement of the President concerning the amnesty and what was its effect on DPA?*

**Haruni:** The Declaration of Amnesty is a type of amnesty practiced by many countries, where the legal country functions, whereas in the Republic of Macedonia, it was not clear to me what they wanted when it wasn't supported by a law. DPA aimed at winning the UCHK participants for the elections. Therefore, there were a number of unjustified apprehensions of UCHK participants. We instited on a law. The aim of the statement was to discipline the representatives of UCHK, And we insisted on a law, as we didn't have trust, since even with the current law there are still people in prison.

- *What is your opinion on the Macedonian minority in the other countries?*

**Haruni:** They should enjoy all the rights wherever they are, and I do not agree that the Macedonian minority in the neighbouring countries to be deprived of their rights!

- *The USA had an affinity towards the Hellenic Republic. Is it interested in resolving the dispute in favour of both parties?*

**Haruni:** One of the parties must be dissatisfied. I am not sure what is the position of the USA, but so as the justice to be served, the constitutional name should be accepted. Yet, I cannot suggest affinity, I can just say the greater the piece the greater the interest.

- *Can the Hellenic Republic win in the dispute?*

**Haruni:** It cannot, given that such a solution would not serve the justice and would give rise of other consequences.

- *What would Europe, the Balkans and the international community gain from this proposal?*

**Haruni:** The interest presents a cooperation without discrimination and mutual respect for the culture, solely the prejudice should be abandoned?

- *The Hellenic Republic felt offended by the maps of Large Macedonia presented by VMRO-DPMNE, and what now, when a large part*

*of the public property is sold to the Hellenic Republic by the same party?*

**Haruni:** VMRO has obtained a nationalistic map, and such emotions rise, do not fall. They are not right, however due to the primitivism, the nationalistic map gains popularity. It is really time to start to think about the future generations. The instable position is characteristic for VMRO-DPMNE, they are not aware what they are doing, they put everything on fire and at the same time act as firefighters, they are not stable people, they are criminogenic structures and cannot deal with the economy and in general with the politics?

*- Is the division of the Republic of Macedonia adequate for VMRO-DPMNE and DPA?*

**Haruni:** I don't believe, but if so, they are not aware that the division would give a rise to a war with irreparable consequences, since the Albanians would never agree with such a division. The merger of all the ethnic Albanians would entail strong Albania, whereas Kosovo would not be a protectorate, and at the same time all the neighbouring countries to be content. If it is insisted on correcting the mistakes from the history, it would mean that the Republic of Macedonia should give up and merge with Bulgaria.

*- Would, in your opinion, the agreement on correction in the Macedonian history, as a political agreement, destroy the objectivity of the history as a science?*

**Haruni:** Where the politics interferes, there is no objectivity, particularly in the history.

*- ICG – its successes?*

**Haruni:** No Great Serbia, dissolution of the socialism!?

## THE NAME IS NOT AN ISSUE FOR NATO<sup>586</sup>

- *Mister Ratcliff, what is your opinion on the “trilateral solution” proposed by the ICG on the name of the Republic of Macedonia?*

**Ratcliff:** It is a question frequently put to us, however NATO does not have a position thereon, as NATO is not involved in the said dispute. It is obvious that the ICG has a position on the issue, since the organization is involved in the dispute between the R. Greece and the R. Macedonia. Even though, it is a good question, I cannot go further discussing it, given that NATO is not a mediator in this dispute.

- *The Hellenic Republic is a member state of NATO, can we expect from NATO and its Member States to support Greece in this dispute?*

**Ratcliff:** NATO is not in a position to support the R. Greece in this dispute. It is not an issue for NATO! It is a problem of the R. Greece. NATO will not get involved in the resolution of the dispute, the dispute must be resolved pursuant to the international law and with mediation by the OUN, and of course, with the will of both countries involved in it.

- *What were the reasons that led to internal conflict in the Republic of Macedonia and caught the attention of the international factors, as are NATO and OSCE?*

**Ratcliff:** First of all, every organization has its own reflections on the reasons stirring the internal conflict in the Republic of Macedonia. For instance, the position of the international community on the reasons leading to the internal conflict is the recognition of the rights and freedoms of the Albanian population that lives in the R. Macedonia!?

- *What were the reasons that urged the international factors to react in the case of the Republic of Macedonia?*

**Ratcliff:** I must say that the Government of the R. Macedonia, itself requested assistance from the international community with a view to an amicable resolution of the problem, where NATO had its own mission. As per the constitutional amendments, it is an issue relevant to the EU, since the R. Macedonia has aspirations towards the accession to this organization, and the R. Macedonia must implement the reforms that are in compliance with the European standards.

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<sup>586</sup> The interview with Mr. Craig Rattclif was made on 10 August 2002. That year he was the spokesman of NATO in the R. Macedonia.

- *Were there any mass graves in the Republic of Macedonia during the conflict?*

**Ratcliff:** I cannot answer this question, because it goes beyond my competence. You can find other competent organizations to answer you the question.

- *How important is the presence of NATO in the Republic of Macedonia for the stabilization and peace establishing in this region?*

**Ratcliff:** The presence of NATO is of utmost importance for the Republic of Macedonia, and wider for the region, as the international community and NATO help in the creation of a peaceful environment in this region, and thus a peaceful settlement of the conflict, nevertheless, not everybody shares the same opinion, some believe that the peace and stabilization in the Republic of Macedonia would be achieved even without NATO and the international community.

- *Was the NATO mission "Essential Harvest" successful in your opinion?*

**Ratcliff:** This question has been frequently posed and everybody says that the mission "Essential Harvest" failed, however it was a success, since the mission could not have resulted in entire disarmament of ONA. Thus, its representatives showed that there is a will for peaceful settlement of the conflict, which led to enhancement of the requirements for implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Nobody ever said that all the arms owned by ONA would be gathered within the mission.

- *NATO acted as a mediator in the adoption of the Ohrid Agreement. Does NATO suppose that this Agreement would guarantee the stabilization of the Republic of Macedonia, or is it possible, in future, for new internal conflicts, new escalations to outbreak between the Albanians and the Macedonians?*

**Ratcliff:** Nobody ever said that the Ohrid Agreement would guarantee peace, it is solely a platform for the establishment of peace, prosperity and stabilization in the R. Macedonia, but I can tell you that the Ohrid Agreement was a motive for ceasing the conflict, therefore, at the end, not only NATO, but also the international community together with the political leaders in the country, sat on a table and signed the Ohrid Agreement. The Ohrid Agreement presents a roadmap leading to a more stable and peaceful R. Macedonia.

## STUDENTS' DEBATE WITH EDWARD JOSEPH<sup>587</sup>

Following the debate dedicated to the *ICG Balkans Report*, held in “Holiday Inn” hotel in the center of Skopje, we have decided to visit Mr. Edward Joseph, representative of the ICG in the Republic of Macedonia and have a brief talk with him. Upon the initial contact, we were kindly accepted by his employee (for everything, secretary, interpreter etc.)!?

The meeting with Mr. Joseph was scheduled for Tuesday, 19 March 2002, at 10:30 a.m. As is the case with every busy “lawyer” we waited for half an hour, accompanied by his employee (for everything). From the discussion with the employee (for everything) of Mister Joseph, we found that he was a visiting University professor, that professor Shkaric is a good theoretician and scientist who is always busy with something... While we were waiting, many telephone calls were received by journalists asking for a meeting with him.

Around 11 a.m., Mister Joseph arrived and immediately made a comment about the traffic jam.<sup>588</sup> We were surprised of how young he was. We have kindly greeted with each other and shook hands. His employee explained to Joseph, in English, the objective of our visit. When he said that we are students of the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus”, Joseph smiled, however, when the name of our professor was mentioned, he bursted: “*What, Shkaric criticized me in all the newspapers, and now he would like me to give a lecture to you? Why didn't he visit me in person?*”

We were a bit surprised from his reaction, we tried to calm the emotions and we explained that the initiative was ours. We said that the talk with him would be an advantage for us, as we were working on the ICG Report, which is actually a part of our exam. Before he accepted, he carefully asked whether any journalists would be present on the meeting, whether it would be a lecture only or a debate, where professor Shkaric would negate and interrupt him, and whether the meeting

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<sup>587</sup> Mister Edward Joseph, in 2002, was a representative of the ICG for the Republic of Macedonia. These are stenographic notes taken at the tet-a-tet meeting of the young students with Mr. Joseph, held in the amph. 3 at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” – Skopje.

<sup>588</sup> That day there were protests by the Trade Union of the loss-making companies.

was to be held. We “calmed” him, explaining that the meeting would comprise solely a lecture with no political background whatsoever, without presence of journalists and without objections and remarks by the professor.

Mister Joseph accepted, but we didn’t agree on the exact date immediately, given that he was too busy, and said that we would be additionally informed thereon.<sup>589</sup>

The meeting was held on 21 March 2002 and lasted a bit longer than an hour. It came unexpected, as Mr. Joseph had lost our number, and contacted the professor directly.

Even though we weren’t prepared appropriately, the meeting went smoothly, Mr. Joseph was “bombarded” with different students’ questions. The questions were answered in a “diplomatic” way, revealing nothing specific or direct.

Prior to the discussion, Mr. Joseph presented the basic lines of the Report. He underlined that after the several month crisis in the Republic of Macedonia and upon the adoption of the Constitutional amendments, as of 16 November 2001, which had previously been “agreed” in Ohrid, an environment for settling the situation in Macedonia has been established. Yet, as a fundamental criteria for resolution of the situation, Mr. Joseph emphasized the implementation of the Framework Agreement. The implementation of this Agreement would be the greatest step further of the Republic of Macedonia towards peace. However, the adoption of this “agreement”, Mr. Joseph said, gave rise to two issues: first, the Macedonians do not trust the “international community”<sup>590</sup> as they “consider”<sup>591</sup>, they were forced to conclude the Framework Agreement; second, the importance of the Macedonian identity crisis has been dramatically increased. Aiming at resolution of these issues, the ICG drafted the Report.

As regards the name dispute, Mr Joseph underlined that, by the efforts of the ICG to find a compromising solution, he concluded that

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<sup>589</sup> Mirjana Ristovska and Biljana Sekulovska (then students at the Faculty of Law “Justinianus Primus”) invited Mr. Edward Joseph to be our guest, on 19 March 2002.

<sup>590</sup> The term “international community” in Mr. Joseph’s opinion, entails the USA and the Member States of the EU and NATO, without Greece – *ICG Report*, p. 27.

<sup>591</sup> It is believed that the international community supported ONA, or at least tolerated the cross-border activities from Kosovo, and afterwards rehabilitated ONa from ‘terrorists’ into ‘partners for peace’; limited the Government into the dealing with the ‘terrorist threats’, and finally it forced it to accept the painful concessions of the Ohrid Agreement – *ICG Report*, p. 14.

there is no clear political will for that. He believed that we were too emotional when it came to our name and that we should be more flexible.

In the course of his half an our presentation, Mr Joseph managed to provide a brief overview of his career: that after his studies in law, in the early 90s, he worked in the Bush (Senior) administration and participated in the negotiations between Bush and Gorbachov, thus he had certain knowledge of the international law; then he worked in NATO, and during the crisis he resided in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the presentation by Mr. Joseph, we had the opportunity to talk to a man, who according to professor Shkaric, is familiar with the Balkans circumstances, and that is, of course, a good chance to learn something new. Moreover, we agreed with our guest to discuss other topics of interest to us, for which Mr. Joseph had knowledge, and which were not directly related to the *ICG Report* on the name. Prof. Shkaric underlined that it would be good for us, the students, to talk to our colleagues from the Hellenic Republic, which would be an invaluable experience, as well as a step further in the resolution of the problem, as the problems are best resolved through debates and discussions.

We shall try to report the discussion with Mr. Joseph in its original, with only few omissions, which do not change the meaning of the discussion.

Followed the questions by the students addressed to Mr. Joseph, as well as the answers he gave.

The discussion was initiated by Biljana Sekulovska. With their questions, to the discussion, also contributed Sofka Trajchevska, Nebojsa Cvetkoski, Panche Kjosev, Petar Popovski, Magdalena Arsova, Jane Gjeorgiev, Tome Gushev, Jugoslav Gjorgjievski, Elizabeta Spiroska and Mitre Georgiev – all of them students at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje. Their questions, and the answers by Mr. Joseph, follow bellow:

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***Sekulovska:*** You, Mr Joseph, in your presentation said that you have consulted our political leaders. Why didn't you then consult the professors and the experts in this field, who do not have political affiliation? Since you said that you are a kind of researcher of the Balkans crisis, you should have known that in our country, as well, our professors and experts are far more familiar with the issues, as they are personally concerned, it is our country we are talking about and it is more of an emotional issue?

**Joseph:** Well, I have consulted experts, in addition to your political leaders. I cannot point out the experts I have consulted, as you would see them as biased!?

**Sekulovska:** *In your previous presentation you said that there is no political will for resolving the name dispute of the Republic of Macedonia. What did you want to say with that? That we are the ones lacking will, the Greek side lacks will, or both parties lack will?*

**Joseph:** Well, both your and Greek political leaders stand firmly on their positions. You do not withdraw and react pretty emotionally when it comes to this issue. However, as the professor has proposed, you should meet the Greek students and get familiar with their opinions concerning the dispute. Nevertheless, should have regard to the fact that Greece receives great support from the USA, as the USA have great interests there.

**Sekulovska:** *What is your nationality?*

**Joseph:** American.

**Sekulovska:** *Are you trying to tell me that you, as an American, are not biased and that you do not protect the interests of your country?*

**Joseph:** I am not here to represent my country, I am here in the capacity of a ICG representative!

**Trajchevska:** *Since the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, dated 1991, an amendment was made concerning the non-existence of any territorial pretensions whatsoever, towards the neighbours, including the Hellenic Republic. Why isn't Greece satisfied with this position of the Republic of Macedonia and what should be, according to the ICG, our next concession?*

**Joseph:** The territorial pretensions of Macedonia are not an issue, but the Hellenic Republic considers that there are commercial pretensions in between. From Greek perspective, it would imply monopolization and usurpation of Greek property by Macedonia. It is a quite emotional issue for the Greeks. We should discuss the issue with the Greek students and understand their problem. The commercialization of the name is really a key issue and problem for Greece. They believe that they will lose much in financial and economic terms, should they allow the use of the constitutional name. This is, in fact, a complex issue and its resolution is not easy, and I'm aware that our proposal is not ideal. But, if you can come up with another proposal better than this and than the Report drafted by the ICG, do not hesitate. I will express my kudos.

**Cvetkoski:** *Mister Edward Joseph, you and “your” crisis group declare yourselves as a non-governmental and international group. You’re certainly not a non-governmental, given that you are financed by countries and governments, and instead of non-governmental, you are protecting the state interests. You are an international, but not inclusive of Russia, China, India!? You as a “non-governmental”<sup>592</sup> crisis group, resolve the dispute to the favour of the Hellenic Republic, since you are paid for that. In the capacity of a “non-governmental” group, you do not have the right to interfere in interstate disputes, and you and “your” group are not invited by Macedonia to support us in the dispute with Greece. We, Macedonians are a poor nation, but even if we had the money, we wouldn’t have appointed a crisis group that would work against our national interests, i.e. sovereign and independent Republic of Macedonia. If the Albanians want a state, would the Greeks want Macedonia with its history?*

**Joseph:** Does Human Rights Watch have the right to tell President Boris Trajkovski not to proclaim amnesty?<sup>593</sup>

**Cvetkoski:** *Humans Rights Watch has stated its position, but President Trajkovski refused it and proclaimed amnesty, which in my opinion is wrong, but that would be decided by the citizens on the following elections, they would punish the President if they think he was wrong.*

**Joseph:** I am aware that the law is on the side of Macedonia, but the power is on the side of Greece, which as a Member State of NATO and EU enjoys greater power and respect, and hence with greater influence in the world!

**Kjosev:** *Are you, Mr. Joseph, familiar with the fact that upon the conclusion of the Balkans war, in 1913, the Bucharest Peaceful Agreement was signed, whereby it was provided for that if after a hundred years it establishes itself as a developed country, it could reclaim its territories, however it would not be possible, unless it is registered, that is recognized in the world registers under the name Macedonia?*

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<sup>592</sup> „...The ICG declares itself being non-governmental and non-profit organization, while being funded by countries, governments and foundations with political background – “Analyses of the ICG Report and proposals for resolutions of the name dispute” (Анализа на извештајот на МКЕ и предлози за решавање на спорот со имејто), Prof. Shkaric, p. 2..

<sup>593</sup> At the time of the talks, of relevance was the position of the Human Rights Watch referred to the then President Trajkovski, not to proclaim amnesty, due to the breach of the human rights, where actually, the President of R. Macedonia, from a formal and legal point of view, had no competences for amnesty!?

**Joseph:** The territory would not be reclaimed by Macedonia, still the property in ownership of Macedonians could be required back in a court proceedings before an international court.

**Popovski:** *You propose one solution consisting of three items, which would entail a bilateral agreement providing for great concessions to be made by the Republic of Macedonia. What are the concessions that Macedonia should make?*

**Joseph:** It is a really good question. You should visit our web site, where you will find the entire Report, page 33 thereof contains your answer.

**Arsova:** *If you consider that the resolution of the name dispute is one of the prerequisites for internal stability of the country, then why now, after the conclusion of the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, the international factors that have regarded this issue, which emerged along with the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, with indifference, became interested in the settlement of this complex and sensitive problem?*

**Joseph:** The international factors realized that unless a political stability is reached on the Balkans, there would not be a political stability in the South Eastern Europe, which is contrary to the international global plan for cooperation and peace. That is the reason why the international factors monitor the crisis regions and the potentially risky regions. It is one of the foundations of the globalization, which is an objective of the entire world, and to which many are opposed.

**Gjeorgiev:** *How do you, Mr. Joseph, explain the successive destruction of the Balkans after 1990, starting with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, through Serbia, to end with the Republic of Macedonia?*

**Joseph:** Bearing in mind that I lived in Bosnia, I am aware of the consequences of the war that followed upon the rise of the interethnic conflicts. Trust me, the consequences are terrible. The responsibility for the war in former SFRY should be shared by all of its member states, yet most responsible is Serbia and the policy of Belgrade (*After he saw the ironic smiles on the faces of almost all students, Mr. Joseph continued*). I don't know why are you so emotionally related with the Serbs, when "I know" that there was a great danger for you to be attacked by them!? Nonetheless, in my opinion, the presence of the NATO mission – *The Amber Fox*, as well as the conclusion of the Framework Agreement would contribute to the reconciliation of the Macedonian and Albanian block and normalization of the relations. I honestly hope that the Republic of Macedonia will retain its internal identity and in-

tegrity and would not end up with fatal consequences, as was the case with the former wars in the Balkans.

**Gushev:** *Is the “international community” you, Mr. Joseph talking about, legitimate? Why are then, perhaps the greatest powers in the world – Russia and China, out of it, not to mention India? And if possible, Mister Joseph, can you tell us the criterion to be met for one country to be a member state of the “international community”, you mention in the Report?*

**Joseph:** More details on this issue can be found on the Internet. For a country to be a member state of the “international community” its economic power counts most.

**Gushev:** *Does it imply, for instance, that Taiwan could be considered as a member of the “international community”?*

**Joseph:** Yes, it could.

**Gjorgjievski:** *Mister Joseph, you said that in 1990 you were a lawyer in the US Administration and you worked in NATO as well, and you have knowledge of the international law. So, what is your opinion on the constant practice by the USA and the other Western countries to constantly violate the international law; for instance, the Agreement on Antibalistic Armament has been infringed with the construction of the protective shield in the USA, and on the other hand they refer to the international law when requisite (for example, when the American diplomat was detained in Belgrade, the USA referred to the international law). And how can we be certain that if we sign an agreement with the Hellenic Republic, it would be complied with, when we know that Greece has once infringed the international law, by imposing sanctions?*

**Joseph:** I am not competent to answer this question, but if you want to know why the USA infringes the international law, please contact the Embassy of the USA to be given an answer.

**Gjorgjievski:** *But, I asked you for an opinion!?*

**Joseph:** All right, if you would like to hear for the opinion, I believe that we are not infringing the international right and what you described is only one example, and it cannot be regarded as a proof.

**Gjorgjievski:** *Let me tell you another example: The USA threw and throw cassette bombs in Yuhoslavia, Iraq and Afganistan. I, also asked how can we be certain that our agreement with the Hellenic Republic will be complied with, when the USA and your “international community” are hypocritical?*

**Joseph:** My country is a democratic one, listening to the voice of the people and I am proud to be an American and I can always address my Government and they will always listen to me.

**Spiroska**, who has patiently waited to take the floor, wanted to Make a brief comment before Mr. Joseph on *the ICG Report*, as of 10 December 2001, whereon certain questions would be implemented:

- **first**, *the name of the Report does not comply with its contents, since one third of the Report is realistically dedicated to the name dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic, and the other part pertains to the Framework agreement, which refers to conclusions sui generis;*

- **second**, *the issue related to the “international community” is of utmost importance for all, and in this case in particular for the Republic of Macedonia, as these 33 pages of the Report contain categories of significance such as (apart from the main “international community”): “international influence”, “international standards”, “international law”, “international legal practice” and similar;*

- **third**, *a characteristic of the Report that caught my attention, since the first reading is the confusion of terms: “civil country” with the term “ethnic country”, in the sense of propagating a country – demos through the elements of a country - etnos, given that the Republic of Macedonia as a civil country in the right sense of the word does not imply Macedonians and Albanians, but unite and loyal citizens. Moreover, the attribute “Anti-Ohrid fraction”<sup>594</sup> is improper term. I am from Ohrid, and I personally find this term as offensive;*

- **fourth**, *the Report constantly refers to Macedonians and Albanians, and again Macedonians and Albanians, and again Macedonians and Albanians. What about the other ethnic minorities, where are they?;*

- **fifth**, *I agree with you that the Report is just a proposal and not an order, still it is not disputable that it has an influence on the directions for acting by the countries. Having regard to the authority that the ICG enjoys in the so called “international community” and the one that the Republic of Macedonia enjoys as FY Republic of Macedonia, it is clear that Macedonia has no right to request, as it will not get anything even it does request;*

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<sup>594</sup> The reference “Anti-Ohrid Fraction” can be found several times in the *ICG Report*.

- *sixth*, a specific question that you can avoid answering: Do you believe that the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic could, without any mediators, more efficiently resolve the name dispute? You have said that you believe in an immediate dialogue on this issue;

- *seventh*, to what extent do you believe that this is an “Agreement on Peace”? Imanuel Kant has said that the agreement containing prerequisites for war is not an agreement on peace. And your report implies exactly that. I quote: ‘Almost all the concessions made by Skopje would be unilateral and non-reciprocal’ (!?) For instance, the proposal does not provide recension of the Greek school textbooks regarding the ethnic Macedonian toponyms in Greece, or the declaration on the Macedonian heritage in Greece.<sup>595</sup> And all of this, because a different solution, I quote: ‘... would expose Greece to isolation and mockery in the international community’.<sup>596</sup> And what about the Republic of Macedonia? Have you thought of it, even though I do not understand what is that laughter in the international community like;

- *eighth*, I know that I have overreacted and usurped much more time than it is foreseen, but I would ask you to spare me from a diplomatic answer that the name issue is gaining on importance just right now and the Republic of Macedonia is required, apart from the concessions with respect to Greece, to make also concessions in relation to NATO and OSCE, since it is a requirement for its stability and security!? Such an answer implies that the war in Macedonia was previously planned, and the solution of the name dispute would be a jockey for improving the rating of the so called “international community”.

**Joseph:** The term “international community” referred to in the Report is not of great importance, and it is composed of five countries: USA, England, France, Italy and Germany!

**Spiroska:** *China perhaps?*

**Joseph:** No! As per your question on the place of the other minorities in the Framework Agreement, I believe that they should be involved therein. As regards the “Anti-Ohrid Fraction”, we all know how it has been established. With respect to the concession made by the Republic of Macedonia towards NATO and OSCE, we consider that the role of NATO and OSCE are of utmost importance for the stability and security of your country. This has been estimated by our

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<sup>595</sup> *ICG Report*, 10 December 2001, p. 32.

<sup>596</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 32.

analysts. Regarding the concession, not only that your country makes them, but concessions are made by Greece as well, and your concessions are not anything else but solemn confirmation of the obligation of the Republic of Macedonia, as a Member State of UNESCO.

*(Upon our intervention and reference to the quote from the Report that “the concessions by Skopje shall be unilateral and non-reciprocal”, Joseph would conclude):*

- All right, as I said, I agree with you that this Report is not perfect, but if you could do anything better, I will express my kudos.

**Georgiev:** *Aren't the seven points<sup>597</sup>, which provide for the concessions, a condition of outbreak of a new conflict, in a sense that Greece would cease the stated concessions?*

**Joseph:** I will tell you something in confidence. Those concessions are only an “eye-wash” for Greece!?<sup>598</sup>

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<sup>597</sup> Ibid.; p. 28 and 29.

<sup>598</sup> Afterwards, gratitude was expressed to Mr. Edward Joseph for the meeting held on 21 March 2002 at the Faculty of Law in Skopje. Mr. Joseph was asked to present his reflections on this meeting, however he wasn't willing to respond to our request!?

## THE PROCESS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE NAME SOLUTION<sup>599</sup>

With regard to the *Framework Agreement*, Mister White, did not wait for a specific question, and from the very beginning of the talks said that it was an excellent agreement, clear, brief and offers a solution! Compared to the *Daiton Agreement*, containing 70 pages that nobody understood, the Framework Agreement was composed on 5 pages and was clear in each of its segments. At least, everybody has read it. He also stated that the most important issue is that the Republic of Macedonia was referred to by its constitutional name, and not by the acronym FYROM. Concerning the Report, he claimed that still another solutions can be found, that he does not accept it in its entirety, but, for the Time being it was the only solution that would be acceptable for the Greek side. In addition, he said that the creator of the report would not contest unless everything is accepted, until another solution was found.

- *Mister White, what was the motive for drafting of the ICG Report on the Balkans, No. 122?*

**White:** The motive for drafting of the Report was the fact that a person from Skopje (our remark, insisted on not naming the Republic of Macedonia) initiated it, but did not realized it, that is “did not draft it”. Then the issue was forwarded to another organization (not named again) and when the ICG realized that nobody would draft it, we made a team and started the process... “*The process is more important than the name solution*”. Although I believe that the R. Macedonia and the international community should decide that by themselves, still I con-

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<sup>599</sup> The talks with Mr. Nicholas White – one of the ICG employees, officially dated in May 2002, were made in the mid of 2002. Even though, he was relatively new in the ICG, he was completely familiarized with the issues concerning the R. Macedonia and the international community. The interview was made in Hotel Varazdin, Selce (R. Croatia) during the Summer University on European Integration, which lasted from 24 to 31 August 2002. Mister White was a lecturer, and in the course of the lectures within the Summer University, preceding the interview, he was asked whether he had visited R. Macedonia and in what kind of mission? He said he had been in Macedonia, during the conflict, together with the team of two Bulgarians, two Greeks and Albanian, and that their task was to achieve provisional trust between the two parties in the war. He was very proud of persuading the mayors (from the regions with majority of Albanians) to contact the local police, on several occasions, in order to establish closer cooperation.

sider this Report as an aid, as a step further in the resolution of the problem. In addition, I know that the international community, the USA and the Hellenic Republic have been troubled with the drafting of the Report, that in their opinion only slowed down the process and the issue resolution.

*– Do you consider as relevant political figures and factors, the people who have signed, that is supported the Report?*

**White:** Personally, there are politicians that would agree with everything and once that would agree with nothing!?

*- What are your thoughts on the Macedonian minority in the Hellenic Republic, and at the same time on the Macedonian minority in the other neighbouring countries of the Republic of Macedonia?*

**White:** The Hellenic Republic should regulate its relations with the nationalities, just as France. You know, France has problems with the Basques. And not only does the Macedonian minority face that problem, it is general with all the nationalities. The attitude of the Hellenic Republic towards the nationalities horrifies me. The Republic of Macedonia should give on importance not only to the Macedonians in the Hellenic Republic, but also to the Macedonians in the other neighbouring countries. Republic of Macedonia should pay the due attention they deserve! The Macedonian intelligence should make a strategy covering all the Macedonians in the neighbouring countries, without any pretentions towards border changing.

*- Don't you think it would threaten the good neighbourly relations of the Republic of Macedonia, as it would touch upon sensitive issues?*

**White:** It depends on how it would do everything. We must not forget the aid, the Republic of Macedonia can receive from the international community. I believe that there is not a single linguistically, religiously, culturally and ethnically normal border in the world, except for, of course, the border between England and France. Hence, it is normal for such problems to emerge, for which there is always a solution. As regards the Albanian minority in the R. Macedonia, in my opinion, only their higher education would lead to creation of a generation of Albanians that would be distinguished everywhere, and thus the life in the R. Macedonia would improve. The educated minority is important for the cohabitation in the country!

*- What is your opinion on the conflict that outbreake in the Republic of Macedonia in March 2001?*

**White:** The conflict in the Republic of Macedonia emerged by mistake (!?) Namely, there was a fight between dealers from Albania and the local Macedonian police. The conflict, in this case, was not planned in advance as is in the other crisis territories in the world, although there was an influence from Kosovo and uncaredful maintenance of the border with Kosovo, where from the escalation of the conflict has been imported.

- *Who do you consider as blameworthy?*

**White:** In my opinion, the responsibility should be sought in KFOR, which did not maintain the border as agreed! However, the major influence for the conflict to become a small war was made by the Republic of Macedonia. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia promised a lot of things to the minorities, which afterwards have not been fulfilled in years (for instance, higher education). Thus, the delicate situation escalated, which I underline, was not planned.

- *And what is the interest of the USA in the Republic of Macedonia?*

**White:** The USA have not and do not want to have in terest in the R. Macedonia (!?). It was an unplanned problem, where a prompt intervention was needed, so that to prevent the escalation of the war, as it was the case with the other Balkan countries.

- *What about the great investment by the “international community” for the Albanian, and the small interest in the Macedonians?*

**White:** The international community invested in the construction and renovation of the houses in the crisis regions. Greater aid than the existent is not possible, given that the Eastern part of Macedonia needs more funds for renovation of entire industries. The reactivation of those factories is way too expensive for then and it must wait for now.

## **CONTACTS WITH THE OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICG**

As we wanted to hear the opinions of the other ICG representatives, we decided to establish a contact with any of them, apart from Mr. Edward Joseph and Mr. Nicholas White. The initiative was made by Professor Shkaric, who referred us to the people, who apart from their world prominence, have a connection with the topic of this report and the current situations related to our country, from whom we hoped to receive at least any comment on the Report edited by the ICG. The list of representatives of the ICG, we decided to contact, among the others, included: O. A. Sanchez, M. Ahtisari, M. Abramovich, U. E. Jensen, M. Rokar, J. Soros and others, as well as people that are not related to the ICG anyhow, such as M. Chosudowski.

First of all we decided to contact Mr. Oscar Arias Sanchez, as a Nobel Laureate in Peace for his dedicated work in establishing peace in Central America (The Arias Plan), also known as promoter of peace and demilitarization of every country. He was also, a great critic of the countries that manufacture and import weapons. Another thing that made us contact Mr O. A. Sanchez was that the *Constitution of Costa Rica*, as one of the most peace-promoting in the world, has been translated in Macedonian in the book “*Mup u ycūāaβu*” (*Peace and Constitutions*) by Svetomir Shkaric and Tadakazu Fukase, so that it was available to us. These were some of the reasons we wanted to get into contact with Mr. Sanchez, who among the other, is a member of the ICG. Being unable to find his address to send our letter and the book containing the translation of the *Constitution of Costa Rica*, dating in 1949, we through the Internet, first contacted the ICG offices (Paris, Washington, Brussels and New York), so that they would refer us to his contact. Responses were received from Brussels and Washington, however, most helpful was the response from the Paris office, giving us the address of the Peace Foundation, whose founder is Mr. O.A. Sanchez. Further on, we sent another letter to the Foundation, and received a response from Sanchez’s assistant:

*Dear friends, we have received your request for the opinion of Dr. Arias on the ICG Report on Macedonia and his proposal for resolution of the name dispute of the country. Unfortunately, Dr Arias was on a trip and was not in a position to respond to your request so far. Since 20 April has passed, I am not sure whether you are still inter-*

*ested in his considerations, and should I have the opportunity to discuss with him, I will ask for his opinion and notify you thereon.*

Regards: **July Witmann**, Assistant to Dr Arias Sanchez

Upon this kind response, we sent another letter, whereby we hoped to receive a response as soon as possible. Namely, with the letter addressed to Sanchez, we requested for him to provide us with his opinion on the Report, if familiar therewith, since he himself was a representative of this organization. Additionally, we invited him to visit the Republic of Macedonia, so that we could discuss the issue in person. We would appreciate if we received his opinion, which as any other, would matter to us. Unfortunately, we did not receive a response.

Among the persons, we received a response from upon our request was M. Chosudowski (Economy Professor from the University in Ottawa). He is a member of the Antimilitary Movement in Canada and has done extensive writing on the war in Yugoslavia. His publications have been translated to over 20 languages, which in itself is a proof of the abilities of this person. Considering the fact that he analytically follows the situation on the Balkans, very often analysing the situation of the Republic of Macedonia (in view of the interests of the great powers) providing his critical review. As we have managed to read some of his publications, we decided to contact him (even though he wasn't a member of the ICG) so to obtain his position on the Report drafted by the ICG. Immediately after we have sent our request, we received his confirmation, whereby it can be seen that he is, at any time, prepared to be contacted (even by students like us) on the issues from the area he studies. The letter he sent did not contain his comment on the *Report*, although it contained his position on the nature of the ICG, which drafted the report:

*The ICG is an instrument of Washington, supported by George Soros. Washington supported the terrorism so as to destabilize the Republic of Macedonia and incorporate its marionettes (such as Ahmeti) in the focus of the electoral democracy. ICG as an instrument of the external policy of the USA is not a solution, but a factor contributing to the crisis. I cannot refer this to the Macedonia-Greece issue, yet I would doubt an organization that tactically supports the terrorism.*

Regards, **Michael Chosudowski**

Moreover, we sent a letter to Ufe Eleman Jensen (member of the ICG and Minister of Denmark - 1994), who has supported the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name. He at the beginning expressed an interest to contact with us, by promising us

to receive his comment via e-mail, however we did not receive any reply:

*I am currently in Estonia – I will be home during the weekend and I will provide you with answers to your questions. In the meantime, you can research what has been debated in the European Parliament in January 1993 – when I in the capacity of the President of the Council of Ministries participated in a hot debate, supporting your independent status and the use of your actual name.*

**Ufe Eleman Jensen**

We haven't still received any response from the other members of the ICG that we have tried to contact and to whom we duly sent our modest requests so as to learn something more. Among those persons are: George Soros, Marti Ahtisari, M. Abramovich, M. Roccar, Wesley Clark and other. Even though none of them provided us with a specific answer to our questions, yet we are satisfied for them expressing even a slightest interest to contact with us.

## CONTACT WITH FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN MACEDONIA<sup>600</sup>

### Turkish Embassy<sup>601</sup>

We could not obtain the position on the dispute and the *ICG Report* in writing, since then it would present as an official position of the Republic of Turkey. Thus, we obtained only a personal opinion. As we did not have a dictaphone with us, only the major points of the discussion were noted down, which put in a text would have the following contents: On 16 May 2002 we were accepted by the Assistant to the Ambassador, Mister Sever. First, he read the position by the Turkish Ambassador, and then he stated his personal position.

In the beginning, he proudly said that the R. Turkey was and is the first country to recognize the R. Macedonia under its constitutional name, the nation, the church and the territorial integrity. He also said that the R. Macedonia should not have changed the flag with the Sun of Vergina, due to the pressures put by the R. Greece and that the European countries, and even the OUN, had an incorrect attitude towards the R. Macedonia. As regards the name dispute, Turkey strongly opposed to any change of the name of the R. Macedonia and that it was a precedent to discuss a name within the OUN and that the R. Macedonia acceded the OUN under the reference FYROM. Concerning the *ICG Report*, he said that it was to a certain extent positive, but not realistic, and to a certain level provocative. Moreover, he underlined that the *Report* urged to thinking on that subject, yet it was not objective. As per the “Anti-Ohrid Fraction”, he said that everybody opposing the prosperity of the country, either on economic or political plan, coming from any of the communities, was not only anti the Agreement, but also anti Macedonia.

On our question, what were his views on the *Ohrid Framework Agreement*, he said that the Framework Agreement did not cover the

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<sup>600</sup> In this section we present the talks and the unsuccessful attempts for interviews with the heads of the diplomatic missions of some of the foreign countries in the R. Macedonia.

<sup>601</sup> The interview was enabled by the secretary Dilek Hanm, to whom we express our gratitude. The questions were submitted two days before the interview, and having in mind the length of time requisite for obtaining the diplomatic responses, this interview was even too quick. Apart from the short time, they put effort for the responses and the proposals to be as objective and specific as possible.

entire problem and that it was not realistic, however it was the best solution to avoid escalation of the war, since in a time of war, any agreement is better than none. He also added that this agreement excluded the Turkish community (which according to certain analysis exceeds 6%), as well as other smaller communities. He also stated that the other communities should be represented with at least 5% in the Parliament. The Turks should have their own representative, since they are on the whole territory and that he did not believe that through the elections they could have at least one representative in the Parliament. It was interesting to state that all the official documents on the relation NATO-USA-Turkey, and even with Macedonia, including the reference FYRepublic of Macedonia, which is being used under the pressure of Greece, under the pressure of Turkey contain the Constitutional name – Macedonia.

When we asked for his opinion on the use of the flags – whether the flags of the communities should be used, his answer was negative! We were said that the Turkish position was that all the countries should use the national flag, as their symbol, and also that everybody must be loyal citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. It was his position that should the other communities use their flags, the Turks should not do that, as they respect the Republic of Macedonia as their country and thus they would violate the good relations with it. Moreover, we were informed that he disapproved of the desecration of the churches, in particular of the Leshok Church. He explained that the ones doing that, are not Muslims anymore, since the Islam forbids destruction of other religious objects. They reacted and expressed compation on the events in Bitola during the conflict. Concerning the educational system, there were views that a bit more attention should be paid on the Turkish community, as they have only a primary education, whilst only three courses in Turkish language can be found in the secondary education.

On the question regarding the implementation of the Framework Agreement, we were told that if done within a speeded up process, without further amendments, I quote: *“It could bring peace and stability, even though the Agreement is not entirely realistic and fair”*. At the end, he informed us that concerning every issue that could arise in future, the Republic of Macedonia could request any type of aid by the “friendly Turkey”.

## German Embassy

*- Ambassador, what is your position on the ICG Report?*

**Burkart:** The ICG Report provides a detailed overview on the name issue. The Report places the problem within its historical circumstances and clarifies the importance against the crisis last year. Essentially, I share the opinion stated in the analysis of the ICG, which gives significance to the identity issue in relation to the name issue. Certainly, some points in the Report are out of date. The implementation of the Framework Agreement is moving forward. Moreover, today we are in a new position as regards the proposals for solution that pertain, for instance, to the presence of NATO and OSCE in 2002. Nonetheless, the ICG Report provides a wide picture of the situation, without losing the focus on the essence.

*- How do you estimate the Framework Agreement, and what are, in your opinion, the positive and negative aspects of its (non)implementation?*

**Burkart:** *The Framework Agreement* was drafted and signed in August 2001, by relevant political powers in the Republic of Macedonia. It put an end to the armed conflict and was voted for by the Macedonian Parliament, and its implementation has been on a satisfactory level so far, apart from the minor and major hindrances. This success wouldn't have been possible, unless the Agreement contained the crucial topics for the participants. Unquestionably, the implementation of the Framework Agreement in everyday life is far more difficult rather than what is put on paper. Solely the use of the languages has been preconditioned with comprehensive changes in the administration, even in the selection and the training of the employees. Similarly, even to a larger extent, is its introduction to the local self-government. Now we have the legal prerequisites for better cohabitation among the nationalities in the Republic of Macedonia and that will have a positive reflection in everyday life, probably not immediately and for everybody, but more and more in a time. This development, however, must be supported with the preparedness for mutual contacts. It cannot be reached with a legal regulation only. The reality must bring closer the different nationalities, should there be will for implementation of the requisite reforms in the country. There is a long way, the Republic of Macedonia must walk to its European integration. It can be realized, should the focal points be set another way in future; let me mention some of them: the education, economy, environment and their reform of the social sys-

tem should be among the first items in the agenda, and not how to dissociate one from another best. The old saying is applicable in this case: *The chain is strong as is its weakest link*. The internal fights would not bring the R. Macedonia any closer!

- *What is your position on the name dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic and your proposal for its resolution?*

**Burkart:** *The ICG Report* in its tripartite review contains an interesting starting point of view for agreed resolution. The bilateral agreement between Athens and Skopje is among the priority items without reason. Should both countries agree on the name issue, the international community would not obstruct it for sure. I am generally for a pragmatic solution. The official name must, of course, justify the personal identity. In the everyday life though, Macedonia will remain what it is, namely Macedonia, as is the Federal Republic in the informal use named Germany.<sup>602</sup>

### **Italian Embassy**

The attempt to talk to the Italian Ambassador was unsuccessful, due to his busy schedule (!?) Nevertheless, we had an unofficial talk to one of the employees in the Embassy, who said he will gladly give us answers to our questions. When he saw the questions, he was not prepared to answer, although, in the unofficial talk, he had very negative position on the name dispute between our country and the Hellenic Republic. Namely, he did not agree with us retaining the name Macedonia, which he considered should be changed into any other, for instance Skopje or similar. When we asked him to put this proposal on a paper, even “unofficially”, stating them as personal views, we were kindly refused (with explanation that nobody from the Embassy could give a statement or a position). Thus, we “unofficially” decided to put it in the form it was expressed to us.

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<sup>602</sup> *“I hope that the answers below would be of use. Kind regards, Burkart, signed.”* At the time the interview was prepared, 17 May 2002, his excellence Burkart was an Ambassador and his mandate was ended soon afterwards, June/July. The interview was originally received in German, in writing and it was translated by a certified court translator.

PRAZNA

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**THE PROPOSAL BY MATHEW NIMITZ  
(9. XI. 2005)**



*The negotiations process concerning the name dispute  
has mainly been realized in the  
legal office of the Mediator **Mathew Nimitz** in New York (USA)*

## WHO IS MATHEW NIMITZ!?!?<sup>603</sup>

1. Mathew Nimitz<sup>604</sup> is a personal, Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the OUN – Ban Ki Mun in the Greek-Macedonian dispute concerning the “different positions on the name”, assigned on 23 December 1999<sup>605</sup>, upon the resignation (due to personal reasons) of the previous representative, primarily of Butros Butros Gali, and then of Cofi Anan – Cayrus Vance<sup>606</sup>, who was appointed on 1 August 1993.<sup>607</sup>

2. The meticulous reading of the relevant provisions of the *Resolution 817/93* of the OUN Security Council, allows for clarification that from a legal and technical aspect, the obligation of the negotiating parties<sup>608</sup> - HR and RM, involves initiation and leading of negotiations

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<sup>603</sup> Author of this paper is Dr. Tatjana Petrushevska – professor at the Faculty of Law “Justinianus Primus” in Skopje. She lectures *International public law, Law of the European Union and International organizations*.

<sup>604</sup> He was born in 1939, among the other activities, he was an assistant in the staff of the US President Lindon Johnson (1967-1969), Councillor to the State Secretary of the USA (1977-1980), State Vice Secretary for Security, Aid, Science and Technology (1980), special Envoy of the US President Bill Clinton for the Balkans (1994-1995), partner in the Attorney’s Office Paul–Wiss–Rifkin–Wharton–Garrison (See: <http://www.theipa.org/aboutipa/barbios/tl> è <http://www.americanpresidt.org>).

<sup>605</sup> See: <http://un.org.news/press/dots/1999/19991223.sga717.doc.html>.

<sup>606</sup> He was born in Clarksbourg – Western Virginia (USA) on 27 March 1917, and died on 12 January 2002 in New York. He graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Yale University (1942); State Secretary of the USA (1977-1980) in the administration of Jimmy Carter; one of the Co-Presidents of the Managing Committee of the Conference on former Yugoslavia, who together with Lord Owen, in 1992, proposed to the Secretary General of the OUN – Butros Butros Gali approval of a group of military, police and civil staff that would assess the situation on field and would draft a report concerning the possible deployment of a special mission to maintain the peace in RM; special envoy of the OUN Secretary General in the process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis, appointed in accordance with the *Resolution 817/93* of the OUN Security Council (See: [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cayrus\\_vance](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cayrus_vance) è <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/secretaries/cvance/htm>). During the special representation of the OUN secretary General in the negotiations between RM and HR the *Interim Accord for normalization of the relations* was achieved (13.09.1995), but not a compromise related to the “differences over the name”.

<sup>607</sup> See: <http://www.un.org/french/news/oss/fstrsg/htm>.

<sup>608</sup> Of course, on this occasion, for a moment, we left aside the provisions of the international law, and of the law of the Organization that were breached with the Resolution that is subject to our analysis. Having regard to the fact that the obligation based on the infringement of the law is not a real obligation, the term “obligation” can be put in inverted commas. However, on the other hand, it is undisputable that there is a unbiased obligation according to the general international law for all the countries, to resolve all the mutual dispute with application of amicable (political/diplomatic or judicial) methods and techniques.

concerning the “different positions on the namr”, since apart from the existence of the name dispute, there is not anywhere stated that a dispute on any other issue subsists! The obligation of the OUN to mediate in the existing/established/defined dispute is directly related to the thus defined obligation. Otherwise, there is no obligation for the Organization to practice mediation in a context of any other issues that go beyond the context of the dispute as such. The possible broadening of the scope of activities by the Special Envoy and in this case would imply self-initiated, outside of any established procedure, redefinition of the dispute scope, and hence new violation of the law of the Organization. Therefore, neither his predecessor, nor Matthew Nimetz has a mandate to discuss issues that go beyond, conditionally speaking, although it can never be conditional, technical manipulation with the name of RM within the OUN, both on multilateral and bilateral level (RM-HR), i.e. going outside the scope of the *Resolution 817/93* and to treat issues that touch upon the history, culture, traditions, heritage – redefining, that is putting in question the identity of the Macedonians and of Macedonia.

3. As a conclusion, Matthew Nimetz is a person that since 1999, on behalf of the Secretary General of the OUN, that is on its behalf has mediated in the Macedonian-Greek dispute, enabling it, facilitating it and urging it through proposals (sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other or sometimes, simultaneously, to both parties). Such is the case with his proposal, which on 8 November 2005<sup>609</sup> was officially presented to the special and authorized ambassador of RM to the USA and, at the same time, negotiator of RM in the dispute with HR – Mr. Nikola Dimitrov, a proposal that the very next day, 09.XI.2005, was declared as a proposal by the OUN.<sup>610</sup> Thus, although he ensured the unofficial label “document by Nimetz”, “proposal by Nimetz”, “proposals by Nimetz”, that is “package by Nimetz”, under which appears in the diplomacy, politics, journalistic, even in the science (particularly in RM), the paper drafted by Matthew Nimetz becomes an official document of the OUN!<sup>611</sup>

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<sup>609</sup> See: <http://www.2dw-world.de/macedonian/temamace/1.157161.1.html>.

<sup>610</sup> See: <http://www.A1.com.mk/vesti/default.asp2vestid=52476>; 52 442; 52 458; 52 425; 52 444.

<sup>611</sup> See the text of the *Document*: <http://macedonian-heritage.92/officialDocument/Ni-metz/html>.

### **What kind of document is the one containing the Proposal by Nimetz?**

1. The paper containing the proposal by Nimetz is by its scope a short document, in total of six pages, which contain solely the main text, without any footnotes and without final notes!?

2. The contents of the Document covers three titles:

- “*Protocol on the usage of the name within the Organization of the United Nations*”;

- “*Draft of the Proposed Resolution of the Security Council*” and

- “*Appendix 1 to the Resolution \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) of the security Council*”.

3. Even with a superficial reading of the Document, one shall notice its characteristics:

- Great similarity of a part of the proposals contained therein with part of the proposals contained in the previously analysed *Report of the International Crisis Group*, as of 10.XII.2001<sup>612</sup>;

- confusion, unclarity, ambiguity of the proposal formulation that leaves room for different interpretation and explanation, that is for numerous problems in the process of their application, which would follow, should the proposals be accepted by RM and HR;

- from the aspect of the international law, there is an irregularity/unfoundedness of specific terms, particularly in the first and the third title;

- inconsistency of specific titles (the first and the last) with the contents stated below them;

- Unnecessary repetition of an identical proposal in a context, that is under a title that logically and linguistically should not treat the content it actually has;

- treating issues, that is offering solutions to issues that formally and legally go beyond the mandate of the OUN, i.e. of its representative in this very dispute;

- statement of proposals, suggesting ideas for definitions that put into question the national identity of the citizens of RM, that is of the national substrate of RM, as a national country of the Macedonian people;

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<sup>612</sup> See the details with Petrushevska T., *ibid*; p. 328 and further on.

- accordingly, the Document does not contain solely one proposal, but several proposals “connected” in a package that through an alleged formal reference to the law of the OUN, does not imply affirmation of the key principles and rules of the general international law in a specific case, but its violation, as an additional precedent with long-term negative implications for RM and for the international legal order in its entirety.

### **Detailed analysis of the “proposals by Nimetz”**

1. The first title of the Document has the following wording: “*Protocol on the usage of the name within the Organization of the United Nations*”. The use of the term “protocol” in the first part of the Document is seemingly a clear technical issue. However, it is not free of contents. Namely, the title of the first part of the Document “protocol”<sup>613</sup> in the international and legal doctrine and practice is being used with at least three meanings:

- first, as a name of an international agreement, that is most oftenly concluded in a simplified form (even though the simplification does not imply lack of ratification) or to an additional agreement, which has previously been concluded, i.e. supplementary agreement as and addendum or partial or full explanation of the existing agreement that does not function independently, but as addendum to the initial/basic agreement. It is clear in this case that it is a not a document that would have a character of an agreement as a bilateral legal act, although, due to the wide use of the term “protocol” with the described meaning, there is a certain level of risk that by prima vista reading, the people that are not informed to a wide extent will gain a wrong impression on having an agreement with mutual consent between the concerned parties, which after being reach, is forwarded to the OUN;

- second, as a synonym of a minutes, that is as a name of a document that notes down the course and the results of a specific discussion, negotiation, agreement between the representatives of the international and legal entities that negotiate/have negotiate, as a proof for the agreed, decided or done. Having regard to the fact that there are continual rounds of Greek-Macedonian negotiations taking place in New York, the title “protocol” can be misleading towards a conclusion

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<sup>613</sup> Greek. *protos* – first + *kollao* – connect, strengthen, relate, i.e. minutes, form, ethical rules; rules of ceremony.

that it contains specific results from what is mutually agreed, in which case the title would be appropriate. However, the fact that the Document by Nimetz, the following day after the proclamation was refused by RG, explicitly implies that it is not a minutes of the undoubtedly agreed on a relation RM-RG and

- thirdly, as a sum of types/forms of behaviour in the international relations, i.e. as a title for the rules of behaviour that regulate and facilitate the requisite contacts among the state bodies, as a synonym of ceremony/comitas gentium. Perhaps, at a second glance, upon the absorption of the contents of the text that follows after the quoted title, the “good intentioned” reader will allow himself to ascertain that most probably, the term “protocol” was used as a label of an aspect of the manner of international behaviour, namely, the international reference of RM, under the names that are consecutively stated as proposals. However, “the good intentioned” interpreter must not be as “good intentioned” so to forget the fact that the rules of behaviour/reference on an international level have emerged due to the need for respecting the dignity of each of the Member States of the international community, in compliance with the cogent principle of sovereign equality among the countries. Other than the abovestated, the proposals for international reference of RM, as set in the Document by Nimetz, would mean touching upon the dignity of RM, that is of its treatment in a far less favourable manner than of any other sovereign country! Due to this apparent fact, the term “protocol”, even used in the last, seemingly, most proper meaning, does not comply with the essence of the solutions that follow, that is to the nature of the paper as such - proposal/draft agreement between the countries that “discuss the differences over the name”.

2. The formulation of the entire title leads to a completely logical conclusion that its contents will be exhausted with the proposals for usage of the name of RM within the framework of the OUN. Nevertheless, in fact, within the framework of thus formulated title, a proposal is being defined for the reference of RG to RM in the bilateral relations. Apparently, the formulation of the title does not refer to the contents following, that is the contents of the text that follows the title is wider than the title itself.

3. More specifically, in terms of the contents, the first title contains the following proposals:

- First, alternative formulation of the formal/official name of RM (either Republika Makedonija or Republic of Macedonia). The first alternation – the constitutional name of RM transcribed in Latin alpha-

bet is not an original proposal by Matthew Nimetz, but a proposal already presented in the *Report No 122 of the ICG*, dated 10.XII.2001.<sup>614</sup> The second alternation – the constitutional name of RM in English (I am not certain whether deliberately or unintentionately without the required definite article – the Republic of Macedonia – pursuant to the rule of the English language on writing the full official constitutional names of the countries), due to the discretion of the entire negotiations process, I am not certain whether it was put on table ever or it is an original proposal by Nimetz. In any case, the formulation of the alternatives is not sufficiently clear, whether the proposal involves agreement on one of both alternatives, or both Republika Makedonija and Republic of Macedonia to be cumulatively two simultaneous variants, with possibility for using one of them in each specific case;

- second, the possibility for use of other translations, for instance, Republique Macedoine; it is not clear in the proposal whether the other alternatives of translation of the constitutional name of RM shall be regarded as an official name of RM!? The systematic interpretation of the entirety of this part of the Document, allows interpretation that it is not the case, yet, the gravity of the issue being regulated, requires at least maximum preciseness, by elimination of any ambiguity of the formulations used. Otherwise, the use of the expression “for instance”, implies a conclusion that the French alternative is considered as *exempli causa*, not as final, closed number of possibilities;

- Third, the alternative Republika Makedonija as a formal name should be used in multilateral agreements, treaties, communiqués, resolutions etc., explained by a footnote “*For Republika Makedonija*”. This proposal is merely an elaboration of the proposal on the usage of the mentioned official name in the multilateral mechanism of the OUN, contained in the *Report of the ICG* – where the multilateral level of communication/reference shall be common, as already analysed in a context of the preceding text and I will not put much attention thereto. The need for the footnote with the stated contents that practically, clarifies nothing, remains unclear!? The people ignorant of the dispute and of the possible manner of resolving it, coming from different parts from the world, and to whom the Macedonian language means nothing, will not be in a position to understand to which country the official name Republika Makedonija refers to;

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<sup>614</sup> See in details with Petrushevska T., *ibid*; p. 334 and further on.

- Fourth, to apply Republic of Macedonia in the recognized official international use and reference, involves unclarity either in the proportion/scope of the use of both alternatives or in the character of the occasions when each of them would be used, as explained in details in the text above;

- fifth, the Secretariat of the OUN shall use the alternative Republika Makedonija, within the OUN; This proposal, in its entirety, means undertaking of the corresponding one from the *Report of the ICG*, to the analysis of which I refer;

- sixth, the Member States of the OUN and the other parties shall refer to RM by using one of both alternatives. This proposal is partially a copy-paste of the proposal that the ICG in the *Report No 122* presents, in relation with the use of the constitutional name of RM, transcribed in Latin alphabet, by the Member States of the EU and NATO and its extension by adding the English variant as an alternative. Unfortunately, the same unclarity, as noted on two occasions in this text, remains;

- seventh, RG can also refer to RM by using the name Republika Makedonija – Skopje. The logic of this proposal is identical with the one contained in the proposal by the ICG in the *Report No 122*, namely a special module for reference of RG to RM, where the ICG proposed the attribute “Upper Macedonia”;<sup>615</sup> - the unofficial, shortened name to be one of the following three alternatives: Republika Makedonija, Republic of Macedonia or Republika Makedonija – Skopje.

4. The simplified analyses of the proposals contained in this part of the Document characterize it as a sublimation/emanation of the so called “double formula” that has been on a table in New York for a long time. Is it necessary to underline that it is not a case, since the double formula involves reference to RM under its constitutional name, without any modifications whatsoever, by all the other countries and within all multilateral documents and for a, a merely by RG, strictly bilaterally, reference to RM under the attribute that would be mutually/bilaterally acceptable.

5. On a short-term, the proposed alternatives of the official and unofficial name in the Document suggest their use in the following time frames:

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<sup>615</sup> Detailed elaboration of the unacceptability of the first part of this reference to the dash in the text dedicated to the *ICG Report 122*, as well as to the fact that its unacceptability will be increased with the text following the dash; see at Petrushevska T., *Ibid*, p. 334 and further on.

- from 2006 to 2009, period of time, the determination of which is not clear at all, that is the reasons for its definition, but which in the light of the forthcoming resolution of the final status of Kosovo and of the redefined status of RM with the *Framework Agreement*, as of 2001, it must entail precaution and

- from 2009 to 2021, a long term, and a relatively clearer (but not entirely clear) period of time, which is explained as follows – for the year 2021, Nimetz proposes for the Secretary General of the OUN to appoint a Special Envoy that will consult the parties concerned (RM and RG) and give recommendations to the Secretary General and to the Council for Security on the possible amendments in the *Protocol for reference in the OUN*. In other words, the proposals by Nimetz, even if acceptable and accepted by both parties, would not give rise to permanent consequences, but would become new provisional solution, to a new occasion when new people, in a capacity of Special Envoys of the Secretary General of the OUN, would organize new “balls” practicing their negotiating, persuasive or writing skills. Thus, new monitorings, inspections, observations, surveillances, supervisions, problemizing of the Macedonian nation and of the Macedonian country, with new possibilities of depersonalization, deprivation and extinction.

6. The title of the second part of the Document is as follows: “*Draft of the Proposed Resolution of the Security Council*”. The draft contains proposals for all the integral parts that are usually contained in the Security Council Resolutions – Preamble, Dispositive and Transitional and Final Provisions.

7. As per the first part of the draft document – *The Preamble*, Nimetz proposes reference to:

- Resolutions 817 and 845 (1993), in other words, to the acts whereby the international law was infringed, unfortunately, this time also as a continued infringement, and not as overcoming of that situation with a final instalation of the law and

- to the need, the resolution that follows to be in the light of strengthening of the peace and security in the Southeastern Europe and promotion of the relations among the neighbours, which as a floscula is not in any aspect disputable, unless freed of the empty rethorics and thrown in the light of the dark postulate of each legal order, inclusive of the international – rule of the law, so as its brutal violation is presented as a serious basis for undermining of the regional/international peace and security.

8. As per the second part of the draft-document - *Dispositive*, Nimetz proposes to be composed of the following parts:

- one part containing the proposals that have already been presented under the first title, significantly reinforced with the obligation that none of the countries involved in the dispute, nor their official integral part, use independently the name “Macedonia”, in an international use, in any time (in any language). This solution formulated on a reciprocal basis should seem “fair” enough so to be “swallowed” without any protest. However, the reciprocity in the obligation for reservation is not in a position to “hide” that by a possible acceptance of this proposal, RM would deprive itself from the historically acquired right to use the term “Macedonia” both in a historical and current sense. This item interrupts the continuity of the Macedonian history, whereby the proposer drastically exceeds the boundaries of the mandate granted to the OUN with the quoted resolutions;

- a second part that reiterates the proposal pertaining to the time limit 2021;

- a third part that would contain a recommendation to the organizations other than the OUN, to the governments and to the other official parties to adopt the aforementioned official use and another mutually defined obligation for RG and RM to refrain from any influence towards the official use concerned, by any government, official party or international organization;

- a fourth part that contains an assertion that the term “Macedonia” is used as a designation for a geographic area that covers parts of several countries in the region of the Southeastern Europe, including RM and RG, but not merely to them; that the term is important to the heritage and has for a long time been related to the history and culture of both countries, a part that annuls the entire history of the region, makes an imprecise scan of an aspect of the current situation on the field and, not less important, it promotes the term “Macedonia”, as a clearly geographic region covering (not “being divided among”) a number of countries, thereby exceeding the scope of competencies within the mandate;

- a fifth part that lays down a reciprocal obligation for both countries to refrain from the claims they have the exclusive right on the term “Macedonia” or “Macedonian” in a historical, geographical and commercial sense;

- a sixth part that emphasises the obligation of both countries to resolve all the mutual issues in the spirit of peace and good neighbourly

relations, in compliance with the international agreements and the international law (absolutely superfluous proposal, considering the international and legal obligation in a noted direction) and a support by RG to the economic and security development of RM and to the accession of RM to NATO and the EU (another superfluous proposal for obligation in the light of the general obligation of all countries for development of mutual friendly relations, which inter alia, per definitionem, cover the proposed items).

9. In the *Transitional and Final Provisions* of the draft document, Nimetz defines the date of its possible entry into force (on the 13<sup>th</sup> of its adoption - !?) and the termination of the legal effect of the part of the Interim Accord pertaining to the “differences over the name”. It implies that the other unfavourable provisions for RM, contained in the Interim Accord<sup>616</sup> would continue to generate legal consequences.

10. The third title would be as follows “*Appendix 1 to the Resolution \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) of the Security Council*”. It lays down the same proposals on the name, elaborated in the two previous titles, just classified otherwise.

11. The only new proposal presented for the first time under this title is the proposal on how the attribute meaning Macedonian, or the expression of nationality Macedonian/Macedonians should be used under the following versions:

- of Republika Makedonija;
- of Republic of Macedonia;
- of Republic of Macedonia – Skopje,

whereby no step further would be made from what is functioning today within the Council of Europe, for instance, under the flscula “citizens of FYROM”. Nonetheless, the proposal by Nimetz makes a clear step further in the definition of the Macedonian language as Macedonian (the current practice in the Council of Europe is to depersonalize the Macedonian language as a “language of the citizens of FYROM”).

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<sup>616</sup> For details see with Petrushevska T., *ibid*; p. 338 and further on.

## HOW WILL APOSTLE NIMETZ RENAME “THAT COUNTRY” IN THE BIBLE!?<sup>617</sup>

*“The Republic of Macedonia should accept a name for international usage different than its constitutional name. Such a name should be unique, be applied for Macedonia, for Greece and for the entire international community. This proposal is contained in the document presented by mediator Matthew Nimetz to the negotiators in the Macedonia-Greece name dispute, Nikola Dimitrov and Adamantios Vasilakis respectively, in New York two days ago”* - according to Macedonian print media. The state establishment rejected the proposal in favor of “carrying out analysis”!?

If that’s the case, now it is my turn to analyze something that perhaps should be conveyed to Nimetz. Someone should tell him that his proposal imposes serious threat not only to Macedonia, and not only to the Macedonian people, but also to the most popular book on this planet, the source of all world literature: the Bible will have to undergo serious changes, for the way it is-it is not after the fashion of Nimetz and his proposal!?

Macedonia is a biblical country: it is mentioned in the Bible as the place where Apostle Paul was sent to in order to spread the word of God. In the *Acts of the Apostles of the Holy Apostle Luke*, New Testament, it is said: *“And they passing by Mysia came to Troas. And a vision appeared to Paul in the night; There stood a man of Macedonia, and prayed him, saying: “Come over into Macedonia and help us.” And after he had seen the vision, immediately we endeavored to go into Macedonia, assuredly gathering that the Lord had called us for to preach the gospel unto them”* (Acts 16, 8-9).

This is the first appearance of a Macedonian in the Bible named with his natural (not only “constitutional”) name. Interesting enough, he does not call himself a Macedonian, but this is done by the voice of God, the holy narrator in the Bible - the omniscient storyteller. It is clearly stated, through the storyteller in third person: *“There stood a man of Macedonia...”* The main feature of the storyteller in third per-

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<sup>617</sup> The text is borrowed from *Premin* magazine for spiritual values, November/December 2007; Double Issue 45/46, year VII. The author of the text is Venko Andonovski, Ph.D – Professor at Faculty of philology Blazhe Koneski, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University – Skopje, famous writer and columnist.

son i.e. the omniscient (all-knowing narrative voice) in all theories of literature is that there is no disputed grounds in respect with the authenticity of the information set forth. His information is accepted without being subject to authenticity test.

So, he was Macedonian and that's that. According to Nimetz, as well as according to the Greek chauvinist policy in the name dispute with our state, in his vision Apostle Paul should have first established the identity of the man, the Macedonian, and ask him whether he was Macedonian from FYROM or Macedonian from present-day Greece. Greeks would probably say that the Macedonian, the one that appeared to Paul, was not Macedonian at all, but Greek, and one has to admit that the Bible does not say Greek, but-Macedonian! So, he might have been Macedonian from present-day Greece, and I do not dispute that. However, since the present-day Greeks say that in their country there never have been and there will be not one blessed Macedonians, it all comes down to the fact that the Macedonian was from the present-day Republic of Macedonia.

Now, since the present-day Greeks are not eager to admit that there are Macedonians in present-day Republic of Macedonia, since they do not even allow the existence of Macedonia in present-day Europe, it turns out that they and Nimetz are directly uprising against the Bible. In other words, they want to prove that the Macedonian in the Bible today has no and he is not supposed to have a motherland, that he had affiliated to some dead, inexistent people (without legal descendants, in technical terms). Such as it is, the word "Macedonian" remains to be just an empty "word" in the dictionary with no counterpart of its own in reality, so what we are talking about here is a senseless role in the Holy Scripture. How could that be, when it is known that in the Bible there is not a single line of senselessness and verbiage, and that the verbiage is considered to be one of the greatest sins? With this Nimetz - Greek interpretation, that Macedonian becomes "ineligible" character in the Bible, so the travels of Apostle Paul (two missions witnessed by the Holy Scripture) probably did not take place!? And even if they did take place, they should be politically censured and erased from the Bible! The passages on Macedonia should be changed by an amendment in a manner that "Macedonia" is replaced with the word "Greece", and "Macedonian" is replaced with the word "Greek".

So, let Apostle Paul do the thinking whether he saw a Greek or a Macedonian in his vision. If he wants to be admitted to the EU, perhaps he will think it through and change his mind. Even God will have to

reconsider what kind of names for nations He uses in His scriptures! That is, if He also wants to be admitted in the EU. Since Europe showed it can manage without Him, and on several occasions. Last time that was in 1918, when it dismembers His Biblical country where Paul had been preaching the earliest Christianity on the Balkans. It was that year that it shared out Macedonia as cake - to Greece (AAegean Macedonia), Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) and to Serbia i.e. the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Vardar Macedonia). Now it wants to eliminate the last remaining third that defends the honor (authenticity) of that little fragment from the Bible!

It came to pass that Nimetz has become the most significant postmodern reformist of the palimpsest, the Bible. He is a genius: he edits Holy Scriptures. For this merit of his he should be amply awarded with few proposals from our side. For instance, for no hard feelings on which Macedonia is “old”, and which one is “new” (is there anything more stupid than insisting to be as much as older in times of complete globalization, which brings only new things with itself), he should propose renaming entire Greece into “South Macedonia”. That way, we would remain to be “The Republic of Macedonia”. And that’s not all; in that case we would probably have no need to argue where the Macedonian who merged into Apostle Paul’s vision in the Bible came from.

The only problem here is when that Macedonian will merge into “Apostle” Nimitz’s vision!?

## STUDENT ESSAYS

### CRITIQUE OF THE NIMETZ “PROPOSAL”<sup>618</sup>

The unofficial integral text of mediator Matthew Nimetz proposal for the settlement of the dispute with Greece on the name Republic of Macedonia was published in *Vreme* newspaper on 13 October 2005. The proposal met different interpretations and observations by the Macedonian relevant factors. Many saw it as “good basis for continuation of the negotiations”, other were making comments that it depersonalized us as people, erased everything that was Macedonian, it was high treason, some were advising that “we should not be splitting the hair”... what irritates us is that all members of parliament, experts, professors, journalists and other relevant factors utilized the very proposal merely as an objective for putting forward their opinion and discussing the opinions of all others, and none of them tried to say what the mediator proposed in a language intelligible for “the broad(er) public” – for the Macedonian citizens, since we believe that the thing that was published as a translation of the original text is not something that the citizens would give identical interpretation to, which should be the case, since we are not talking about some of Tolstoy’s books so that everyone can get different impression!

What Nimetz proposes is that the Republic of Macedonia, to which most of the states have referred as FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since 1993), should appear as “*Republika Makedonija*” in all multilateral agreements, contracts, communiqués, formal resolutions, etc. from 2006 until 2008. The official international usage will also acknowledge the reference “*Republic of Macedonia*”, and “*Republika Makedonija - Skopje*” for Greece. In 2009 and beyond, the Secretariat within UN will use the name “*Republic of Macedonia*”.

According to us, this is the part of the proposal that is a nice overture for our state, and bad foreplay for Greece. We must not, however, rejoice before hearing the main part!

What Nimetz proposes in the *Draft Resolution of the Security Council*, paragraph 7 in particular, is taking note that “Macedonia” has reference to a geographic area encompassing all or portions of several

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<sup>618</sup> Coauthors of this essay are Zorica Velkovska and Vladimir Patchev.

States in the region of Southeast Europe, including the State and Greece, and not only them, and that “Macedonia” has importance to a long association with the heritage, culture and history of many of those states. In paragraph 8, on the other hand, proposes that no state shall claim exclusive right over the term “Macedonia” or “Macedonian” in historical, geographical or commercial sense.

Paragraph 13 is also interesting, stating that in 2021 the Secretary General and the Security Council shall appoint Special Envoy who will consult with the involved parties and shall give recommendations both to the Secretary General and the Security Council on whether there should be change in the usage between the involved parties. What is the point of this provision? If the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece come to an agreement on the name, then why would there be need for assigning special envoy? In fact, why should there be recommendations in terms of some changes in the usage of the name between the involved parties? Now, we come to a conclusion that even this solution is not final, but it is even further entanglement of the knot. If this is an attempt for expressing the UN will for settling the issue through the guarantee of the right to freedom of choice for the name of one’s own state, then may God help the one that has to make the choice. This situation slightly resembles to baptizing a newborn in church. The priest should not allow you to give a certain name to the newborn just because there were many others with the same name!?

Such cases are absolutely not possible in the real life, and yet, unfortunately, the very same issue is subject to number of disputes between two states. This issue involves many fields in the relations between the two states.

In view of all this, these seem to be more serious subject and text, which change the first impression. You cannot just tell to a state that the name it uses refers only to the geographic region that covers many states. The name of a state includes the things that characterize it, its features, its tradition, bill, its food, music and folklore, cultural heritage, its history and people! Everyone wants to drink French wine, drive German car, eat Swiss chocolate, drink English tea (although not tasty, but it is English!), wear Spanish and Italian shoes...

We would like to ask the mediator, as well as those relevant factors that have supported the Proposal – Who are they going to give the Macedonian features to? Would it mean so much to them if we exist as “Republika Makedonija” or “Republic of Macedonia” in the “global village”, without existing as we – Macedonia people, Macedonian music,

Macedonia ajvar, Macedonian wine, Macedonian denar... Macedonian history, which has existed (as it is) even before the mediator and which should continue existing?

Here I will also point out the part of the proposal that offers solution to the attribute and nationality, saying that in general, two alternative names may be used: *Republika Makedonija*; *Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Macedonia – Skopje*, the last as an option for Greece. If this is how the things are, then why is the usage of *Republic of Macedonia – Skopje* so crucial? Our capital city is named Skopje, and it is administrative, political and cultural centre of the Republic of Macedonia, not of the City of Skopje itself! Our cultural, historical and political heritage is Macedonian and stretches all over the territory of the Republic of Macedonia – in Ohrid, Struga, Bitola, Tetovo, Veles, Shtip, Strumica, Skopje and the other cities. Skopje is our capital city, same as Athens to the Republic of Greece. They do not say Republic of Greece – Athens, just Republic of Greece. Does this mean that we will no longer be able to talk about Macedonian features? Does this mean we will have to talk about “features of the Republic of Macedonia”, “ajvar of the Republic of Macedonia”, “music of the Republic of Macedonia”...”citizens of the Republic of Macedonia”!?

For this to sound normal, acceptable, or bottom line, “good basis” for further on, you must live on another planet. Macedonia has already become unique with so many changes pursued, but should we also allow such thing? At the beginning, the mediator offers a proposal in a very precise and well-scrutinized manner, a proposal that offers something that the citizens of this geographic region has been seeking and expecting for years, the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia. However, if you think it through and thoroughly read his entire proposal, it is dishonest – or even, I can freely say, an indecent proposal! It makes us judge between the name, on one side, and the Macedonian, on the other. So, we will have to see if there is a balance. Is Republic of Macedonia weighs more than all the things that make it?

At the end, these questions should not be addressed to the mediator, but to our Macedonian relevant factors (i.e. “the relevant factors of the Republic of Macedonia”), since we believe that perhaps the proposal will please the world, but it will double the problems “at home”. If we agree that the proposal is a good start (and we could not even imagine how much it will be milled at the end and what kind of shape will get) and if we do not “split the hair”, then we ask these “tailors of fate” in the country of ours, how are they planning to carry further all of this within our European Republic of Macedonia?

Focusing on the second part of the proposal, we ask: *Should we transform ourselves from Macedonian people into “citizens of the Republic of Macedonia?”* If the answer is affirmative, respectively to the terms in the proposal, then allow us to point out to you certain things from the aspect of the meaning of the usage of the term “Macedonian nation” in the *Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*. The term “Macedonian nation” itself is much narrower than the term “citizens of the Republic of Macedonia”. So, please explain to me how will the applicable *Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia* of 1991 sound like? Allow me to remind you that on 16 November 2001, pursuant to the concluded

*Framework Agreement* of August 2001, *Amendment 4* changed the *Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*, which now reads as follows: “*The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as citizens living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Romany people, the Bosnian people and others, taking responsibility for the present and future of their fatherland...*”

Herewith is clearly stated who the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, and who the Macedonian people are. So, how should the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia read? What are you going to write instead of Macedonian people, as citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, and what instead of the parts of the other peoples (Albanian, Serbian, Turkish...) who live within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia as citizens of the Republic of Macedonia? Would you write, let's say, parts of the people of Albania, of Serbia... who live within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia? What we are talking about here is so sensitive subject that may lead (and it does) to erasure (loss) of the Macedonian people as majority in their own state in favor of the parts of other people who live within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia as “communities that are not a majority”.

What I am trying to point out is that we must not forget that the Republic of Macedonia is multinational society, that the capital city, Skopje, is bilingual, that we have four state universities (two for each “ethnic community”) and that the mediator has not considered covered it thoroughly, but at the end, that is not his objective, it is ours and it is up to us to further arrange, pursue and live it in an European manner! The question is, did the “tailors of fate” in this country of ours even thought about it, do they know how to solve it, did they commission a

mediator who will again help us with a proposal with different precisely and well-scrutinized solutions or they do not even consider it as a problem (which would be a real waste)?

Also, the national identity is very sensitive subject. To this end, the famous British historian Erick Hobsbawm in his book *Nations and Nationalism* writes: "...I do not regard the "nation" as a primary nor as an unchanging social entity. It belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period. It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the "nation-stat", and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it."<sup>619</sup> In this context, the new Preamble and Draft Text contradict themselves. On one hand, the Preamble opens with "*The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia*" and recognizes the national identity of the other ethnic communities that are part of already existing national states! Hence, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are different in terms of their national identity. "*It also also implies the multiplicity of such constituted national state and it was truly necessary consequence from the popular self-determination*"<sup>620</sup> On the other hand, the *Draft Text* mentions the term Macedonian people. What happened with the other nationalities? Here is another question: how does this state of ours plan to convey census in future and how will the Macedonians declare themselves in the column for nationality? We do know that the census gives the percentage of the nationalities in the Republic of Macedonia. Those who have citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia prove they are its citizens regardless whether they are Macedonians or part of the people living within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia. Based on the nationality, can they declare themselves as Macedonians, Albanians, Serbs, Romany and others? The questions is, if someone cannot declare as Macedonian, citizen of the Republic of Macedonia in the column for nationality, would it be possible for the others to declare themselves as Albanians, Serbs...-citizens of the Republic of Macedonia in the column for nationality? The results are identical to those from the previous example, all of this questions the position of the Macedonian people in relation with the parts of the other people living within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia.

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<sup>619</sup> Erick Hobsbawm: *Nations and Nationalism since 1780 – Programme, Myth, Reality; Preface*, p. 18 and 19.

<sup>620</sup> Erick Hobsbawm, *Ibid*; Chapter 1: *The Nation as Novelty: from Revolution to Liberalism*; p. 30.

Hence, having in mind how specific and subtle this subject is, and not only for the term national identity, but also as part of the dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece on the name and the consequences from it, Erick Hobsbawm in his book concludes: "... "nations" and "nationalism" are no longer adequate terms to describe as such, or even the sentiments once described by these words."<sup>621</sup>

No matter how we continue, or how many examples we give, several questions are constantly squeaking through: *How much are the Macedonian powers that be prepared to get into negotiations based on the mediator Nimetz proposal and reasonably persevere to the end? Do we have conditions and sufficient relevant factors prepared to realize such a proposal in the state of ours? And would it be fair to the Macedonian people if such proposal is accepted?*

After all this, the only thing we know is that whatever help they provide, we are the ones who have to use it smart, rationally and honestly. At the end, we will say that we are not pleased with the proposal at all, since "it is (not) a good basis for further negotiations". Let us remind you on the famous saying: *It's up to him to offer, and it's up to us to refuse!*

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<sup>621</sup> Erick Hobsbawm, Ibid; Chapter 6: *Nationalism in Late Twentieth Century*; p. 263.

## CONDITIONS, SOLUTIONS AND OPINIONS ON THE “PROPOSAL BY NIMETZ”<sup>622</sup>

A “dispute” is a non-accord of at least two parties over a certain issue. A dispute may involve misunderstanding, argument, proving and seeking the justice between two parties. In the specific case, we believe it is imposition of will by the one side (country) – R. Greece to the other countries, to the detriment of another country – R. Macedonia. It is an ultimatum, practicing and showing power. Greece, using its geographic position, the historical gains, the membership in the EU, NATO and the OUN, imposes its “truth” and its position that it has an exclusive right to use the name Macedonia. Whilst, any other country shall not use the name Macedonia, without mentioning Greece in the same context. The name Macedonia must not be a name of a country, not even in the wildest dreams!/? This is particularly true with reference to a neighbouring country, which covers a territory that in centuries has been named solely Macedonia, and a part of which territory has been usurped by force. The historical facts, the archaeological findings, the written documents undoubtedly show that Macedonia is one of the oldest organized countries in Europe. It had been established, even prior Athens became city-state, that is prior Rome marked its beginnings and established its empire. One of the Macedonian kings, Alexander III Macedonian, has immortalized the name Macedonia forever and left traces that could not have been erased by the conquerors in the centuries to follow.

Apparently, the Macedonian history was not favourable to Greece, and that was confirmed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Kostas Mitsotakis, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, on 5 December 1991. He stated that the problems begun to emerge since the ancient time and the ancient Macedonians were Hellenes, moreover, that they were more meritorious than any other Hellenes for the spreading of the Hellenism. And all of a sudden, he said, many people from our Northern neighbour claim that they were the successors of the ancient Macedonians and the the Ancient Macedonians were not Hellenes at all.

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<sup>622</sup> Coauthors of this essay are: Vera Kostovska, Ivana Angjelovska, Marija Blazhevka, Emilija Dimikj and Dragana Kiprijanovska.

However, taking in consideration the broader sense, if the disputes dating from the Hellenism are to be involved in the politics, then all of us would have problems, since it was governed not only by Athens and Sparta, but from Alexandria, Palmira, Philadelphia as well, so would Greece now initiate a dispute with Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Jordan?!

At the end of the XX century, one country on the Balkans – SFRY - marked its dissolution, and at the European and global scene, new countries have emerged that transformed their irrevocable right to sovereignty into independent and sovereign countries. Then, in 1990/91, the world family of countries marked the entry of R. Slovenia, R. Croatia, R. Macedonia, R. Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR Yugoslavia, afterwards R. Serbia and Monte Negro (and today R. Serbia, R. Monte Negro and R. Kosovo). The Hellenic Republic has brought to light its nationalistic obsession and imposed the issue on the name Macedonia, a wish substantiated by the Greek diplomats, who presented different unfounded and untrue stories. One of them concerned our origin, which was already elaborated in the text (that the Ancient Macedonians were Hellenes)!? Among the presented reasons, culminated the one, whereby the request for change of the name is directly presented, since there is a geographical area in the Hellenic Republic named “Makedonia” (this Northern province was named Northern Greece until 1988, when with a Decree by the Prime Minister, and not with a law or a decision by the Parliament, was renamed “Makedonia”), 51% of which belongs to Greece and it is an integral part of it. The statement by Mitsotakis on this in Davos was as follows: *„If your country should be named Macedonia, then the very name entails aspirations for the entire area Macedonia! Therefore, in my reflections, I suppose that Greece can allow itself in favourable general circumstances to accept a name of your country Republic of Macedonia – Skopje. As it would imply that RM does neither cover nor have any pretensions towards the area Macedonia, but would cover solely the territory that is now marked with the boundaries of the country with a capital city – Skopje”*.

The Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian nation must change their name, their history, to be erased from the political and ethnographic map, in one word to accept the Greek position as a single, correct and acceptable!? The Member States of the EU, burdened by the historical past and the reality, found themselves in an unsolvable maze, and the

European diplomacy find its way out in the OUN. The OUN opened its door in the moment when the Macedonian nation showed the entire democratic world that it has its own sovereign and independent country – R. Macedonia. Instead of being admitted in the OUN under the name “Republic of Macedonia”, R. Macedonia was admitted under the reference FYROM, in accordance with all the international acts adopted, ratified and binding for the countries becoming Member States of the OUN. However, in the case of RM, the OUN adjourned the international acts and the name of the country became a reference. It made a conclusion that both countries should resolve the dispute, the secretary General appointed his representatives, who should have jointly with both countries (and in reality with the R. Greece), find mutually acceptable solution that would be accepted by the OUN. As if was not sufficient that China, Russia, the USA and many other countries recognized us under the constitutional name. Did not our scientific elite, our diplomacy, our friends and supporters have a sense that with the entry in the dispute imposed by Greece, Macedonia would become hostage of Greece. Moreover, the OUN and EU became hostage of Greece, Macedonia became hostage of its own – to prove what is been proved, what Europe and the world, the OUN and EU already know.

### **Conditions**

- On 7 August 1991, a *Decision for announcing a referendum* was made. In compliance with Article 1 of the said decision, a referendum was announced in the Republic of Macedonia for previous voting of the citizens for a sovereign and independent country Macedonia, with the right to enter a future federation of the sovereign countries of Yugoslavia;

- The referendum was conducted on 8 September 1991 (preceded by the adopted *Declaration of Independence* by the first multiparty Parliament, on 25 January 1991<sup>623</sup>), where out of 1 495 807 citizens aged over 18 years, concerning the referendum question: “*Are you for an independent Macedonia with a right to enter a future federation of sovereign countries of Yugoslavia?*”, 1 132 981 citizens voted (75,74%

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<sup>623</sup> “*Official Gazette of SRM*”, No. 5/91, Skopje.

of the electorate of the R. Macedonia). 1 079 308 voted “for” (or 72,16% of the registered citizens in the electoral roll, that is 95,26% of the citizens that voted); 36 639 of the citizens voted “against” (or 2,65% of the registered citizens);<sup>624</sup>

- The formal will of the nation for an independent country was confirmed on 18 September 1991 with the *Declaration for acception of the Referendum results*, where, inter alia, it is stated: “... *The Republic of Macedonia shall be bound to base its acts in the international relations on the compliance with the international standards and principles for respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-intervention in the international relations, enhancing the mutual interest, trust and full cooperation with all the countries and nations*”.<sup>625</sup>

- The Constitution of RM was adopted on 17 November 1991;

- On 17 December 1991, the Parliament of RM adopted the *Declaration of International Recognition of RM as a sovereign and independent country*, requesting for international recognition;

- On 6 January 1992, two amendments were adopted pertaining to the change of the articles of the Constitution on the borders of the Republic of Macedonia and of the parts of the Macedonian nation living as a minority in the neighbouring countries (on request of the Badenter Commission, under the pressure by Greece);

- On 11 January 1992, the “Badenter” Arbitration International Commission of EC, established a position that Macedonia should be recognized as an independent and sovereign country and that “*the name Macedonia does not imply territorial pretensions towards its neighbouring countries!*”;

- On 27 June 1992, the *Lisbon Declaration* was adopted, whereby, inter alia, EC laid down the requirement for a change of the name of our country, where the new name will not contain the word Macedonia, or an attribute of the word;

- On 8 April 1993, with acclamation, in the General Assembly of the United Nations, Macedonia was admitted as the 181th full-term member state of the World Organization;

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<sup>624</sup> Svetomir Shkaric, “*Macedonia on all continents*”, (*Македонија на сите континенти*) Union Trade; Skopje, 2000; p. 46-47.

<sup>625</sup> “*Official Gazette of RM*”, no. 42/91, Skopje.

- Due to the opposition and the pressures by Greece, which did not accept the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia, the accession to the UN was realized under the provisional reference “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”;

- Due to the opposition to the name and the national flag of RM, Greece in 1993 imposed a full trade embargo towards Macedonia. The trade embargo had been into force for 18 months, until October 1995, when the Republic of Macedonia changed its national flag;

- The Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic, within the framework of the UN commenced negotiations on resolving the name dispute with mediation of the US diplomats Cayrus Vance and Matthew Nimetz. The relations of both countries have significantly improved with the signing of the *Interin (Bilateral) Accord for Cooperation* in 1995, upon the lifting of the unilateral embargo.

- In 1996, the then President of RM – Kiro Gligorov promoted the British-Irish formula, i.e. the fourmula of the “double name” use;

- Greece, objecting to the name of RM, until then had the support by all the Member States of NATO, apart from the R. Turkey, which on 6 January 1992 recognized the R. Macedonia (after it Slovenia, on 12 January of the same year) under its constitutional name.<sup>626</sup>

### Solutions

It is difficult to anticipate the solution to the dispute, to which direction should the Government of the R. Macedonia focus. Cayrus Vance, and now Matthew Nimetz, authorized representatives of the OUN Secretary General, have led the negotiations. A negative aspect was that it was waited on the parliamentary elections, on the establishment of the new governments, on the new ministers of foreign affairs and the reference remained to be used as a solution to the name of the country.

The crucial step further was made by the USA, recognizing the constitutional name of the country the Republic of Macedonia (in November 2005). This supports the views of an US analyst who said that Alexander has conquered Athens, but also presented the fact that today's Macedonia has never been a part of Greece. The decision of

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<sup>626</sup> Stojan Andov, “My way” (*Ha moj начин*); Matica Makedonska, Skopje; 2003, p. 380.

the USA was received with enthusiasm, but everything remained to that!?

The final issue was presented by the mediator Nimetz, who proposed a double formula, so confusing that there is a need for a number of footnotes. However, the essence of the solution was a use of “double name” – one for the entire world, and another for the Hellenic Republic. On the background, it seems that nobody ever should mention the name Macedonia, that is there are no Macedonian people, Macedonian nation, Macedonian history, tradition, customs, law or anything Macedonia. There is a country named Macedonia and only that would be valid and true. By accepting the proposal, the centuries behind, the victims, the intelligence, the scientific workers, the prose and the poetry, the customs would be erased. R. Greece has nothing to fear from the thousands Macedonians forced to leave their ancient homes from “their” Greek Macedonia. When the Macedonians were expelled from the Egeon Macedonia they were deprived from the right to ownership (although they have evidence for that), which is one of the most respected rights within the international community!? A proof thereto are the declarations stating that there is no Macedonian minority in Greece and that all the citizens who had left Greece due to the tragical events in 1946-1949, and who were its citizens, as well as their heirs, shall not have any rights and claims in and from Greece. This a reason more for the Hellenic Republic to prolong the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name.

Greece immediately rejected the *Proposal by Nimetz*. As per the R. Macedonia, the government met and supported the proposal as a “good basis for resolving the dispute”. The scientific authorities, from all the fields of scientific acting and from the practice, organized round tables, pointing to the detrimental implications from the Nimetz’s proposal, and advised the Government, the President of the country and the current diplomacy to be reserved and cautious.

## Opinions

### ***Debate on the last set of proposals on the name - in organization of SPM***

(5 October 2005):

The Academician **Blaze Ristovski** considers that “*the constitutional name would be respected even if transcribed in the Latin alphabet, however far more important issue is the cultural, national and historical identity. This act is merely a crown of the historical tendencies to negate the Macedonian nation. It is crucial for the fate of the Macedonian nation – whether tomorrow we could be Republicomacedonians. Let us even be FYROM in EU, but we must not allow to be depersonalized!*”.

**Dr. Svetomir Shkaric**, PhD: „*By the prohibition of the attributes Macedonian – Macedonian people, MASA (Macedonian Academy of Science and arts), MOC (Macedonian Orthodox Church), the authors of the proposal try to depersonalize us and the Macedonian negotiators must insist on dropping such prohibitions. The Nimetz’s proposal is merely a continuation of a dangerous geopolitics by the UN towards Macedonia, which has been initiated with the Framework Agreement. The time limitation of the Resolution and the proposal for it to be reconsidered 15 years later, would have a destabilizing effect both on Greece and Macedonia, and on the region as a whole*”.

Shkaric and Ristovski believe that the Government should not rush into concluding the name issue with unfavourable proposals, as was the one by Nimetz. They consider that the UN, though the 2005 Nimetz’s proposal, transformed the name issue into a decree for deprivation of the identity of the Macedonian nation. According to them, it would be better to wait for years, instead of hastily accept the detrimental solutions for the Macedonian national identity.

**Dr. Biljana Vankovska**, Phd. considers that the last proposal by the UN for the name is an offer of an unacceptable exchange. „*They offer us to recognize the name of the country, but to lose the name of the nation!? We will be Macedonians at home, but we won’t be able to identify ourselves abroad.*”

The journalist **Mirka Velinovska** (has an identical position as the prof. Vankovska), believes that the Resolution... “*offers an identity to be used at home only.*” The proposal given by Nimetz did not solely offer solution to the technical usage of the name, but it also touched upon the national identity. The negotiations were not technical anymore involving just the name, but they were involving the history, the

politics and the civilization as well. The Macedonian government was requested to just conclude the so called “Macedonian issue”, by accepting the depersonalization and renounce of the identity. *“The politics is always on the top in our country. The political parties are keen on promoting and using the individuals recruited from their political parties, instead of scientists, proved people in specific areas. The legal issue with the name is placed ad acta, however therefore the political views are on the top, discussed and practiced by the so called authorities, in the Government, the diplomacy, the President of the country. However, it must not simply be thus. The aforementioned positions by our legal authorities, prominent people in their field in the country and abroad, their argued and founded views, their objectivity and expertise tell us that they are a significant and crucial factor in the establishment of the position of RM as a country on the Nimetz’s proposal (in this specific case), as well as on any other issues of relevance to our country.”*

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**Goran Momirovski:** *The Nimetz’s proposal entails three names*  
(8 October 2005)

„Last evening, at 6 p.m., the new formula was presented in New York. Matthew Nimetz proposes for internal use of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as in the bilateral relations with the countries having us recognized under the constitutional name, “Republic of Macedonia - Skopje” for use by Greece, Republika Makedonija transcribed in the Latin alphabet for use by the international institutions and the UN.”

According to Momirovski, this proposal entails already known proposals that have been discussed during the past 10 years, which implies that the announced modification of the double formula was abandoned. Namely, the formulation Republic of Macedonia - Skopje is more than familiar option, and it would have been discussed by the Parliament of RM.

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**SMK:** *The name issue was concluded on 8 September 1991!*  
(10 October 2005)

**Todor Petrov:** *“The name issue was definitely concluded with the referendum carried out on 8 September 1991, where the Macedonian nation and the citizens, with absolute majority, voted for an independent and sovereign country Macedonia, without any adjectives or at-*

*tributes. Neither the Parliament, nor the President, nor the Government have any mandate to discuss or negotiate a double or any other formula for the name, with an exclusive right towards anybody, concerning the internal and external use, apart from the name Macedonia. SMK encourages and invites the governments and the presidents of Macedonia and Greece to sign an agreement on permanent peace and good neighbouring relations, which would replace the Interim Macedonian-Greek Accord and a Joint Declaration of Understanding and Reconciliation. According to SMK, the foreign policy of Macedonia on the name issue is servile, defensive and non-initiative, excluding the civil sector therefrom.”*

Several important points can be noted in the views by SMK. Primarily, the focus is on the will of the citizens as the essential, expressed through the Referendum. Further on, it advises the Government not to forget that the mandate will expire, but the opinion of the citizens will persist. Additionally, it invites establishment of permanent peace and good neighbouring relations between both countries, that is, it appeals for an amicable resolution of the problem.

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**Irena Chaushevska:**

***The Nimetz’s proposal entails 7 versions*** (10 October 2005)

*“According to the reporter of the Greek newspaper “Ethnos” from New York, the new proposal by Nimetz, definitely contains the name Macedonia. The proposal that Matthew Nimetz offered to both parties entails 7 different versions in the transcription – Cyrillic and Latin and certain suffixes, supported by a recommendation that each of the parties can choose the alternative that is most favourable for naming of the country. RM would choose which of the 7 alternatives would be used in the international communication for the country, and Greece would decide which alternative to choose to refer to Macedonia in the bilateral communication. According to ‘Ethnos’, it would practically mean acceptance of the position by RM on the use of the double formula.”*

Regardless of the number and the combinations of the alternatives offered in the said proposal, the basis remains the same, again both countries defend one solution that is not acceptable for the other country. Thus, this dispute would be prolonged again.

**Hristos Paputsis** – Head of the Sector for Foreign Affairs and Defense and of the Political Council of the opposition Greek party

PASOK, once again accused the Greek Government for not having a strategy to lead the foreign policy, thus putting the country in an unfavourable position and requested for a comprehensive briefing on the contents of the new proposal by Nimetz on the name of Macedonia by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petros Moliviatis: “*The Coalition of left-oriented parties requested from the Minister to immediately convene a session of the National Council for Foreign Affairs. It is completely unacceptable for the political parties not to be elementarily briefed by the Government. I am afraid, that we are in an unpromising situation upon this issue, which has paralyzed the policy of Greece towards the Balkans for a decade now*” – undelined a member of the Political Secretariat of the Party.

These statements and reactions show that the opposition in Greece were in a more unfavourable position than the Macedonian, since they were not fully familiar with the Proposal, and rightfully requested a briefing thereon. The name issue can be solved by means of cooperation – both external and internal.

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**Kole Chashule: *Buchkovski for the proposal, Gruevski requests indepth analysis*** (10 October 2005)

„The Government has officially announced that the proposal of the mediator Nimetz was positive for Macedonia and that it was a good basis for resolution of the dispute with Greece.”

„*The arguments of the Government were presented at the meeting of the relevant political parties from the opposition, organized by the President Branko Crvenkovski, where also the suggestions by the opposition parties were considered. The remarks provided by the opposition parties will be incorporated in the instructions presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*” – stated Dr. **Vlado Buchkovski**, President of the Government.

However, the political leaders did not manage to ensure political consensus from the larger parties. Apart from the five-hour heavy discussions, Crvenkovski and Buchkovski could not convince the leader of VMRO-DPMNE to give unconditional support. **Gruevski** regarded the proposal as involving certain unclarities for which the Government could not provide an answer. He advised the announcement of the country’s position not to be hastened. „*The Government will make a mistake should it haste with the response, without previous indepth analysis of the offered and conducting wider consultations. I really do not*

*see why we should rush into it, having in minde that Greece has already refused the proposal. This proposal leaves the double formula and introduces a new, triple one! The positive response in a situation when Greece has already refused the proposal, might be detrimental.*

VMRO-NP agreed with the governmental position: „*The Nimetz’s proposal entails certain points that should be more seriously discussed, still basically the proposal is suitable*” - said **Vesna Janevska**, acting president of VMRO-NP.

The positive aspect of these statements is that the position and the opposition jointly reflected on and discussed the proposal, individually stating their views. It is completely normal for them not to overlap in their entirety, as the different opinions discussed might lead to a positive effect, if the benefit of the country and the citizens is the basis thereof.

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**Goran Momirovski:**

*The former Ministers consider the Nimetz’s proposal as positive* (10 October 2005)

The first Minister of Foreign Affairs in independent Macedonia, **Denko Maleski**, considers that “*Macedonia must demonstrate constructivity, to support the proposal as a basis for resolution and to continue in the untying the knot, as situation that has persisted for a long time, and which exhausts us from every aspect and hinders the good relations with Greece.*”

**Slobodan Chashule** believes that the proposal is positive, since for the first time in the official proposal by the United Nations, the use of the constitutional name is proposed. Should Macedonia refuse the latest Nimetz’s proposal, then it will refuse its proposal for a double formula, as this case involves a developed double formula. „It is a serious proposal. One should regard it as an exceptionally good basis for further discussion with Greece on their problem with our name.”

**Alexandar Dimitrov** considers the new proposal for the name as interesting for analysis, but at the same time as unrealistic. He fears that it is a provisional proposal and that in near future we will face another proposal that will require final compromise.

**Ljubomir Frchkovski** believes that the proposal is a drastic change with the foreigners to the advantage of Macedonia!? His personal opinion is that the proposal is positive and that it should put an end to the name dispute. Regardless of the express refusal by Athens, Macedonia must not completely disregard the new Nimetz’s proposal.

All the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs consider the Nimetz's proposal as positive in its basis, which should be seriously considered. According to Slobodan Chashule, the positive aspect can be seen in the fact that the OUN proposes the use of the constitutional name. The Republic of Macedonia did not accede the OUN under the constitutional name, that is the OUN neglected the Act of Constitution, the agreements, the resolutions and made a legal precedent not seen previously since the constitution of the OUN, however the ruling settings in Macedonia did not see it and do not see it, as they have always been and are for politics and all the issues see through the prism of politics.

**Terry Davis** – Secretary General of the Council of Europe, understands the frustration of the Macedonian citizens, but rejects the possibility for either him or the Council of Ministers of the oldest European organization to influence the possible decision over the name, until the UN are responsible for the dispute: „I raise this issue on the highest level within the UN and I will continue until it is resolved. It is said that so much time is needed for resolving the issue. You can put a discrete pressure on the people that bear the responsibility, to incite them to solve the concern as soon as possible.”

As regards the judgments, whereby the Court on Human Rights imposes to Greece to respect the rights of the Macedonian minority, Davis said that “the decisions of the Court are binding for the countries they pertain to.” Thereby, Mr. Davis implies that the hands of the Council of Europe are tied until the issues is under the jurisdiction of the UN, but also that he closely monitors the situation and wishes for speeded resolution of the dispute, yet with a discrete pressure and without any aggression whatsoever (such is the Macedonian policy) and advises Macedonia to protect its right and the right of the minorities, as confirmed by the Court on Human Rights and not to concede from it.

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**Vesna Velkova: According to the Nimetz's proposal  
there are no Macedonians!**

“The latest proposal of the Special Envoy of the OUN Secretary General, Matthew Nimetz, on the constitutional name is composed of three items and two annexes. The first item pertains to the triple formula on the name; the second item pertains to the nationality. It is stated in the official document in English that our nationality is citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, and not Macedonians! In stead of Macedonian

language the unclear abbreviation MCDS is laid down, which is explained by the Government as a technical error.”

One of the highest values listed everywhere in the international law is the national identity. This proposal strongly threatens this very value. and the evidence for the undisputed existence of the Macedonian people and nation are more than apparent and should be pointed to the ones who deliberately, due to other objectives, refuse to see it and accept it as such. Thus, Greece is presented in a negative light in front of the international community, violating some of the fundamental human rights and freedoms.

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**The Greek intellectuals denied to use the name FYROM:  
“We will name it Macedonia!”**

In the petition published in the Athens daily newspaper “Elephterotipia”, 56 left-oriented Greek intellectuals declared their decision to name the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name, regardless of the position of official athens. Thereby, 56 prominent citizens from the neighbouring country stated that from then on they will refer to Macedonia as “Republic of Macedonia”, categorically emphasizing: *“We will get separate from the leaders in the country and refer to the Republic of Macedonia using its constitutional name, which entails it single, legitimate and real name.”* In the text signed, they, inter alia declare that: *“The Republic of Macedonia has been recognized by tens of contries and, what is most important, it has been established under this name in the liguistical sense and in the conscience of all the people worldwide, except in the Greek nationalists. When certain persons refer to the “nameless country”, which is our northern neighbour, in the printed or electronic media, in the sports, in the scientific books or congresses, worldwide, use the term “Republic of Macedonia.” It would be humanly impossible to change this situation!”*

The said petition was signed by: Josephina Anastasiadu – Brussels, Stavros Alatas – marketing agent, Athens, Georgos Alexandridis – electrical engineer, athens, Grigoris Ampatsoglu – psychiatrist, Thessaloniki, Amdreas Anastasiu – journalist, Athens, Katherina Arvanitaki – Trade Union official, Athens, Dimitrios argiros – businessman, Ionia, Pavlos Voskopulos – architect, Florina, Akis Gavrilidis - translator, Brussels, Dionisis Gusetis – engineer, Athens, Sotiris Dimitriadis – student, Thessaloniki, Dimitris Dimulis – academician, sao Paolo, Ioana Durala – professor, Brussels, Marios Emanulidis – official, Thessaloniki,

Alexandros Ilias – student, London, Nasos Teodoridis – attorney-at-law, Athens, Michailis Kavoriadis – teacher, Ikaria, Neli Kaburi – athens, Christos Kanelopoulos – Athens, Lazaros Karaliotas – student, Thessaloniki, Anton Kara – Brussels, Spiros Kasimadis – philologist, Athens, Georgos Kasisoglu – Thessaloniki, Tasos Kiprianisis – physician, Athens, Georgos Konstantino – artist, Barcelona, Dimitris Lavatsis – Chios, Sofia Lalopolu – Thessaloniki, Lukia Mano – Brussels, Panaiotis Marko – Athens, Nikos Menegakis – electrical engineer, Athens, Sofia Nikolaidu – neterpreneur, athens, Tanasis Mavrakis – academician, Retimno, Marta Mihaelidu – academician, Athens; Georgios Nakratsas – pneumologist, Rotherdam, Maria Papadima – psychologist, London, Ianis Papadimitriu - attorney-at law, Ianina, Nikos Papadoianis – postgraduate student, London, Christopharos Papadopoulos – banker, Athens, Paris Papamichos-Chronakis – historian, Thessaloniki, Michailis Papanunis – editor, Athens, Vasilis Papasteriu – attorney-at law, Athens, Nikos Papasteriadis - academician, Melbourne, Tanisis Parizis – chairman of the Greek office of EBLUL, Nausa, Christos Pulakis – Oslo, Vasilis Sakelariu – Athens, Vasilis Klias – Luxembourg, Petros Stavru – athens, Nikos Somitakos – athens, Dimitris Samprunis – electrical engineer, Athens, Vasilis Tsiános – Hambourg, Alexia Tsiuni – Athens, Georgios Furtunis – Thessaloniki, Zoi Chalidia - Athens, Panos Hadziprokopiu – London, Pavlos Hadzipoulos – Athens and Tanos Christidis – Brussels (*Eleftherotipia*, 9 March 2006).

“The majority of the signatories to the petition are left-oriented Greek intellectuals and university professors that live in Greece and abroad” (*Vreme*, 10 March 2006).

The news on this petition was received with delight, but also with a bit of suspicion. It is positive that the attitude of the Greek intellectuals has finally been made public and it announces the possible solution of the name dispute. The profiles of the signatories promise that the intellectual conscience will take precedence and win over the apathetic close-nationalistic, regressive ideas that have for a long time unjustifiedly retained the situation in status quo to the detriment of both countries. Yet, the dilemma remains why so much time should have passed, so that unexpectedly or not, the reaction by the Greek intellectuals to be interpreted as an introduction to the speculations that the EU will close the doors for accession to the Union by part of the countries from Western Balkans. Should this speculation become reality, Macedonia will be deceived, and its efforts – futile. The losses would be reflected through the infringement of the human rights by Greece, and Macedonia for the

years past has suffered damage on political, economic and international plan.

### **Conclusion**

The years behind us are years of captivity, we must find solution to the dispute! Possible solutions have been promoted, more and more countries have been recognizing the Republic of Macedonia under the constitutional name. R. Macedonia was the name used by the diplomats, the government of the EU Member States, there is no map on the Internet that does not show the name Macedonia, didn't the USA recognized us under our constitutional name, yet the dispute is still ongoing. The representative Nimetz proposed a possible solution, yet again Greece is the one refusing the proposal. Being aware that the dispute it imposed to everyone is not a dispute, but ultimatum, and it is known that the ultimatum is imposed immediately before war, and in the XXI century the war on the territory of Europe is inconceivable. The international community is getting exhausted by the dispute imposed by the Hellenic Republic. The Republic of Macedonia has on many occasions proved to be maturing into a modern and democratic country, unstoppable on its way to the accession in the EU and NATO. The dispute must be once and for all concluded, yet we must have a serious and strong attitude that will result in the most favorable and only solution for us. Thus opened, it might give rise to disputes in some areas where nobody hopes, which would be detrimental to all the countries in Europe and worldwide.

As from the aforementioned conditions and opinions by the relevant factors, one can ascertain that we are on our way to resolve the dispute. The Republic of Macedonia has been developing pursuant to the European model. More or less, there is consent that the most recent proposal by Nimetz contains major flaws, yet it is a good basis for continuation of the negotiations.

Another major and very significant change is the fact the the public opinion in the Hellenic Republic is being changed, led by the Greek intellectuals. They have signed a petition for the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, considering that the dispute exists merely in the brains of the nationalists. The Greek unyielding attitude, says a young attorney-at-law from athens is a condition of a domestic policy, who admits that: "the problem over the name is absurd, however nobody can say that publicly, as it has become a test of patriotism." The patriotism does not entail defense of falsehood aiming at realization of

hidden objectives, but love towards your roots. a reporter from Athens points to the absurdity of the name dispute, claiming that: “for Greece, there are certain things that are more important from the truth.”

The damages done to bilateral relations of both countries in the course of the past years will be repaired solely through the resolution of the said dispute. The solution is on the tip of the tongue of any citizen of the R. Greece and the R. Macedonia – the name is irrevocable and unchangeable by the will of the others. The name of a country is the name that emerges and that realizes the nation that has established and lived in the country. The country constituted by the Macedonian nation is the Republic of Macedonia. Never can the Macedonian nation name its country other than the Republic of Macedonia. Never it can agree with the change of something that has been carried for centuries, and its country has carried that name for more than fifty years (which is not the case with the Greek Northern province)!<sup>627</sup>

It is apparent that the major goal is to disable the use of the term Macedonian in relation to everything that is connected with our identity and history. Are we aware at all of the cultural and national genocide that is being served to us in a hidden and sophisticated “European” manner!?

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<sup>627</sup> Svetomir Shkaric, “Macedonia on all continents” (*Македонија на сите континенти*), Union Trade; Skopje, 2000; p. 30.

**ANOTHER EPISODE FROM THE SERIES  
OF PROPOSALS OF THE SO CALLED  
“INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY”<sup>628</sup>**

The proposal for the resolution of the name that was drafted by the Special Envoy of the OUN, Mr Matthew Nimetz and submitted to the Government of RM<sup>629</sup>, is actually a “set” of proposals containing: *A Protocol on the usage of the name within the OUN, Draft-version of the proposed Resolution of the Security Council* (hereinafter referred to as: SC) and *Appendix to the SC Resolution*. It is a well “packed” set by the “international community”, for which this might mean a final resolution of the name “dispute”.

Just to remind ourselves on the historical development of the events related to the application of the Republic of Macedonia on its recognition and the later objection of the name of the Republic of Macedonia, by our Southern neighbour, which resulted in change of the name Republic of Macedonia into “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.

The EC, on 7 september 1991 established the so called Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY). Within the Conference the so called Arbitration Commission was established, composed of five Presidents of Constitutional courts of the EU Member States, headed by Robert Badenter (named after him “Badenter Commission” - ECAC). The objective of the Commission was to establish criteria and to assess which of them, concerning the recognition of the countries that have emerged with the dissolution of the SFRY, would be applicable and to which of the countries.

On 16 December 1991, the EC in Brussels adopted a decision that the Yugoslav republics desiring independence can file an application for consideration to the Badenter Commission.

All of the six countries filed their applications to the Badenter Commission until 23 December 1991, and the response thereto was to be submitted to 15 January 1992. The operation of the Commission resulted in consideration of the constitutive documents by each of the republics and adoption of opinions - decisions.

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<sup>628</sup> Author of this essay is Borche Razmoski.

<sup>629</sup> The new formula was announced in New York, on 7 October 2005, at 6 p.m.

*The Opinions 4, 5, 6 and 7* pertain to the question of meeting the requirements and the assessment by the Commission on the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. *The opinions 8, 9 and 10* pertain to Serbia and Montenegro.

The Commission regarded the solely two of the republics are fully compliant with the requirements for recognition: Macedonia and Slovenia (not Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro)! The EC initially recognized Croatia and Slovenia, afterwards BiH and finally Macedonia, conditioning it on the name issue!

The conditioning was for the first time realized in the *Declaration on Yugoslavia*, adopted by the Ec in Bussels on 19 December 1991. It contains a paragraph with the following wording: “*The Yugoslav Republics, prior to their recognition, shall adopt Constitutional articles binding them not to have any territorial claims towards their neighbours, including the name (denomination) that would imply any territorial claims...*”? Actually, the EC refuses the recognition based on the objections to the name of the new country by its neighbour. The criterion concerning the “political reality” as is stated by the EC in the *Declaration* dated 16 December 1991, in this case is more applicable to the relations inside the EU than to the condition of Macedonia.

The Badenter Commission accepts that the Constitutional amendment (amendment to the *Constitution of RM* as of 6 January 1992) by the addition of an article entailing the aforementioned is good, however it clearly suggests its opinion that: “... *the usage of the name Macedonia cannot imply any territorial claims whatsoever towards any other country...*”.<sup>630</sup>

Contrary to this position, the EC refused to recognize Macedonia due to the opposition by Greece and thus the name of Macedonia becomes an issue. At the Lisbon summit (26-27 June 1992), the EC adopted a *Declaration*, whereby the Ec is prepared to recognize Macedonia, under a name that will not contain the word “Macedonia”!

Macedonia applied for accession to the UN on 30 June 1992. The SC proposed *Draft-Resolution* for Macedonia to acced the UN, under the provisional reference “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.<sup>631</sup> The President of the Republic of Macedonia, through a letter

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<sup>630</sup> Quoted from *Opinion no. 6* of the Commission.

<sup>631</sup> *Resolution 817*, as from 1993, as a response to the application of Macedonia; UN document S/25147.

informed the UN on the preparedness of Macedonia to realize the obligations ensuing from the membership in the UN, yet Macedonia could not accept the reference “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as its name.

On 7 April 1993, the Security Council adopted the *Resolution 81*, whereby it is determined that the applicant has meet the criteria on accession in compliance with Article 4 of the *Un Charter* (paragraph 2), and that within the UN, Macedonia shall be referred to under the provisional reference “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Macedonia was formally admitted to the UN on 8 April 1993.

As of 12 April 1993, until September-October that year, the co-chairmen of the Conference on former Yugoslavia – Cayrus Vance and Lord Owen, provided “good services” to the parties in order to resolve the Greek problem over the name of Macedonia (in compliance with the recommendations of the *Resolution 817*). As a result to the hindrance in the resolution attaining, the Security Council adopted another *Resolution 845*, dated 18 June 1993, whereby the parties are invited to continue the efforts in finding a solution. The mediators, on the other hand, continued with the meetings and the proposals for a mutual solution.

In February 1994, Greece unilaterally imposed an economic embargo towards Macedonia. In April 1994, within the EU, the legal procedure against Greece was initiated before the European Court of Justice, concerning the infringement of the *EU Treaty*.<sup>632</sup>

The mediation of this initial type ended with the signing of the so called *Interim Accord* between Macedonia and Greece, on 13 September 1995, in New York, without solution to the name dispute and with obligation to continue with the discussions under the auspices of the Secretary General and the representative appointed thereby.<sup>633</sup>

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<sup>632</sup> *EU Treaties from Rome and Maastricht*, infringement of article 224, in relation to the violation of the rules of the trade competition. The request by the EU to the Court on the urgent measures for elimination of the embargo that was rejected by the Court! On 1 February, the secret hearing of the Greek positions was held. The Decision of the Court was expected for the beginning of 1995, and after the rejection of the position of the General Defense that the Court should not touch upon the dispute between Macedonia and Greece, the Court took the position that it would limit its decision on the legal basis of the embargo and not include the Greek contest of the usage of the name Macedonia. The procedure before the Court was terminated due to the signing of the *Interim Accord* between Macedonia and Greece.

<sup>633</sup> More details on the name dispute, see in the published paper by Dr. Ljubomir Danailov Frchkoski, PhD: “Trends in the recognition of the countries in the international law and the case of Macedonia” (*Трендови во признавањето на државите во меѓуна-*

This was not the end. Due to the objection by Greece, the R. Macedonia could not become a full-term member state of other regional organizations (e.g. OSCE), due to the consensus required at the accession of new members, which implies that Greece, used any possible way to obstruct the integration of the Republic of Macedonia in the international and regional institutions.

Wasn't it enough that the R. Macedonia made many concessions, placing the interests of the international factor on the top, compared to the interests of the Macedonian nation; wasn't enough that we changed the flag, changed the name, and few years ago, after the war (in 2001) we changed the Constitution by the signature of the defeatist, publicized *Framework Agreement*, or as some want to refer to "*Peace Agreement*", whereby the bilinguality was introduced, as well as the separation of the Republic of Macedonia, based on ethnic grounds, didn't they convince us that "*Macedonia is everything we have*" or "*Everything for Macedonia*". Now, 15 years upon the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the OUN under the "provisional reference", another precedent was made, once again under the auspices of the international community, reflected in the proposal by the Special Envoy of the OUN, Mr. Matthew Nimetz. The question that is emerging now is: what does the Republic of Macedonia loose with the new "set" of proposals?

If we make an indepth analysis of the proposal, we will see that Macedonia is being treated as a geographical term in many countries, that is, in the part where it is stated that: "*no country shall claim that it has an exclusive right over the term 'Macedonia' or 'Macedonian' in a historical, geographical or commercial sense*".

Reading this, I cannot help noticing that it is conscienceously put into question one of the fundamental freedoms and rights, the freedom of expression (so that nobody can call himself/herself Macedonian professor, Macedonian actor, we would not have Macedonian language, Macedonian music, Macedonian film, the MOC and the MASA would not exist, or I suppose would be reregistered). Accordingly, the terms Macedonian nation and Macedonians would cease to be used, whereby a substitute of this term would be established "*citizens of RM*", which would entail negation of the Macedonian people as a nation. Conse-

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*родното право и случајот на Македонија*), published in *the Proceedings of the International Conference Macedonian-French Days of Law – 200 years of the Code Civil*.

quently to such an 'ingenious idea' of the authors of this proposal, the existence of different ethnic communities would be acknowledged in Macedonia, as a right to an individual personal choice, and not as a right of a majority collectivity to identify itself as a nation with its own country.

The acceptance of this proposal would, in fact, mean discarding of our history, of our national identity, whereby we will ourselves put our "head in the noose". The history of a nation is being questioned, and we know that the history does not acknowledge a nameless nation, and I would not like to believe that, as a result to the different adventures of our official negotiators and of our governments, we would be the sole exception.

In addition, there is unclarity in the part of the proposal referring to the fact that... "*after a period of 15 years the Secretary General will appoint a Special Envoy that would consult with the parties concerned, and afterwards give recommendations to the Secretary General and to the SC on whether to amend the Protocol in terms of the anticipated usage*". This refers to a conclusion that we are offered an unfinal and unstable proposal that would be easily subjected to a review, which upon a period of 15, would again be subjected to analysis with possibility to reinstate the official negotiations within the OUN.

We should not be surprised if in near future any of the representatives of the "international community" will pose the question: *Who lives in the Republic of Macedonia?* Some of our selfproclaimed "patriots" would accept the answer that in Macedonia live Albanians, Turks, Bulgarians, Serbs, but not Macedonians, more specifically, that in Macedonia live '*citizens of Macedonia*', alike the ones that wanted to push through the same thing in the Framework Agreement, with the amendment of the Preamble, or similarly to the "pleasant" surprise on the official website of the Eu, few months ago.

Finally, my conclusion would be that the name of a country and of a nation simply cannot be negotiated, since in order a compromise to be attained on a specific issue, a dispute should exist, however I only see an artificially imposed "dispute" based on others' interests.

However, there is no way back. Macedonia has already undertaken the obligations within the OUN based on the *Resolutions No. 817 and 845* for negotiations, yet apart from these obligations, I believe that the proposal should be made by ourselves, since, basically it is our identity and our national interest we are considering. In addition to this, it should be underlined that Macedonia should not succumb to any pres-

sures and threats by Greece. Therefore, the primarily task of Macedonia is to persist as a country, to retain its national identity, and merely the form Republic of Macedonia, to ensure the persistence of the Macedonian nation, to allow rule of law and the establish Macedonia as a perspective country that would be capable of resolving its problems, and not to say “yes” to every proposal originating from the ‘international community’, even if that proposal is that miserable, but would enable us become a part of that family. Only thus might Macedonia hope for accession to the EU, regardless of the position of Greece, and gaining trust before the international community, since Europe does not need unstable, nameless and servile entities!

## INTERVIEWS THE COUNTRIES CHOOSE THEIR NAMES BY THEMSELVES!<sup>634</sup>

Mister Nimetz was appointed as a Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General in the negotiations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereinafter referred to as: FYROM) to provide suggestions and assist in the establishment of a mutually acceptable solution to the ‘name’ issue. The interview was made on 25 September 1995, upon the accession of the R. Macedonia to UN under the reference FYROM.

**A1 TV:** *On several occasions you have mentioned that the negotiations between Greece and Macedonia will continue with the mediation by Cayrus Vance, but you haven't mentioned yourself. Are we losing your services as a mediator?*

**Nimetz:** Yes. I was appointed by the President of the USA to assist the negotiations. Now, that I have drafted the *Interim Accord* and since the USA has established diplomatic relations with your country, my job is done. I spent the last year and a half on this issue and I believe I am not needed anymore. Yet, you will see me again!?

**Greek TV ET:** *How would the rest of the world refer to this country? Greece will name it “Skopje”, the people in FYROM will name it “Macedonia”, but how will the others refer to it?*

**Nimetz:** We call your country Greece, and actually your name is “Hellenic Republic”. I do not refer to your country as Hellenic Republic, but I name it Greece. In addition, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is simply referred to as Britain. We use many words, which technically speaking are not the names of the countries. In my opinion, it is not a huge problem. The USA recognized the country and established diplomatic relations using the reference FYROM. Still, a number of countries recognized it under its constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia”. In my opinion, a number of people in this country when referring to this country or in an unofficial

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<sup>634</sup> The text from English was translated by Zorica Velkovska. The interview with Matthew Nimetz was published on the website of MAK-NEWS “M.I.L.S.” (See more on: [www.hri.org/news/balkans/mils/1995/95-09-25.mils.html](http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/mils/1995/95-09-25.mils.html)). The original introductory part has the following wording: *Continuation of the discussion with the special envoy on the name “issue”*- MILS NEWS („M.I.L.S.“ - I ācedonian Information Liaison Service); *Special Addition*: interview with Matthew Nimetz (*Puls*, 25 September 1995), Second part.

reference, show the tendency to use the word Macedonia. Many people do that. But what with that? I cannot now say anything, but whatever they use, either formally or informally, should not be subjected to criticism.

**Questions to Nimetz in Washington via telephone:** *Why such a long period of time was needed so that an agreement can be reached and did Germany or the European Union at the end have generally any important role?*

**Nimetz:** The question is why such a long period of time was needed, but I ask myself how is it possible that we had luck to finalize the issue that quickly. I have worked on the Cyprus issue for almost 25 years. Such problems usually require longer period of time to be resolved. However, I believe that it took us a reasonable time, where the circumstances in both countries significantly changed from being flared in the past. The progress can actually be seen in the fact that both countries can communicate and enter direct mutual negotiations. As per the role of the EU and Germany, I can say that there were diplomats mainly working in the capitals of both countries, who have tried to negotiate with both countries, to provide useful suggestions, whereby I can say that their efforts presented a constructive support to us.

**Antenna TV:** *While the Interim Accord is in force, should both countries come to New York and continue the negotiations or they will have the freedom to say: "We are not discussing the name?"*

**Nimetz:** We have agreed for the negotiations to continue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General and I believe that it involves good will for continuation of the negotiations on the issue that has persisted and that has been identified as a problem by the Security Council. There are mechanisms, modalities and thus the things would be easier for both countries, for both nations and for the UN. The objective is to find a solution. The objective is not to humiliate any of the parties or to push them in corner. The final goal is the good neighbourly relations. My opinion is that this agreement, in some sense, at the end leads to certain relations. This problem would have been easily resolved should the atmosphere in both countries be focused on cooperation, rather than on hostility. Should the flag be changed, a feeling will be created that something is achieved and would eliminate the feelings of antagonism and tension. It would lead to creation of a better atmosphere, enabling both parties to establish diplomatic relations and in general an atmosphere where the talks could be easily realized, thus contributing to finding a solution.

**MEGA TV:** *You say that this agreement would not resolve the name issue, but can we say that the parties agree with this agreement?*

**Nimetz:** I believe that they agree on the existence of differences. It is true. They also agree that they would not allow for these differences to stand on the way of the other manners of cooperation that they can mutually realize. That is what matters. They, also, agree to continue the discussions on the differences under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. It is a very reasonable attitude towards the problem.

**Greek Press:** *I have three brief questions. Nothing here is brief, but I will try anyway. The USA yesterday inaugurated an Embassy in Skopje. Under what name - FYROM or Macedonia?*

**Nimetz:** Please allow me explain this. Our diplomatic relations and the recognition are based on the formulation “FYROM” under the conditional, provisional usage (our remark the USA later on recognized RM under its constitutional name).

**Greek Press:** *Let us suppose that the Parliament of Skopje will reject the agreement. What will happen then?*

**Nimetz:** It would be a serious problem. Should the Parliament reject the agreement, then the agreement will fail, and it would create a bad feeling and we will see what would happen then. In my opinion, this agreement is good for both sides. Nevertheless, I believe that the President Gligorov and his Government, which is a majority in the Parliament, had certain standings when they signed the agreement and, of course, without expectations that the agreement would be rejected.

**Greek Press:** *And the last brief question: let us suppose that we will agree on the name issue and that it would be accepted by the UN. Would be allowed to the “Scopians” to change it again?*

**Nimetz:** Allow me to say few words on the name issue. The name of this country was, actually, chosen by the country itself. We didn’t choose the name Canada, we didn’t choose the name Mexico... The countries choose their names by themselves!

**Greek Press:** *No, not in this case.*

**Nimetz:** The sole reason here is that the neighbours contest the name. However, they are the ones to choose their own name. Greece cannot choose the name/ Greece can declare to be against the name chosen by the other party. Of course, this problem has already been solved somehow. Even the UN are not the ones to choose names. The UN can only acknowledge a country as a full-term member state. After they recognize it, they can agree how that country would be represented. It is up to them. In this case, they did not choose the name of the coun-

try, but decided to temporarily refer to the country as “FYROM”. As I have already said, they can refer to us as the “Former British Colony of Northern America”. It is not our name, just as FYROM is not the name of this country. It implies certain disagreements, and until consent is being reached with the international organization, certain countries can use the same formulation in order to overcome the sensitivity in their relations. We are only using the provisional reference.

## MEETING WITH NIKOLA DIMITROV<sup>635</sup>

On 19 April 2006, at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” within UKIM – Skopje, in the premises of the Depository library of the OUN, starting at 2 p.m., a meeting was held between the students and Mr. Nikola Dimitrov – former ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia in the USA and an official negotiator concerning the name dispute of R. Macedonia with its southern neighbour – Greece<sup>636</sup>, led in the headquarters of the OUN in New York (USA) under the auspices of the OUN Secretary General, represented by the Special Envoy Mr. Matthew Nimetz, attorney-at-law.

The meeting with the former Ambassador, during whose mandate the USA recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name, was initiated by the students from the Department of Law, working on the Project: “*Name Dispute between Greece and Macedonia*”, realized with support of the professors Svetomir Shkaric and Tatjana Petrushevska, who are also managers of this students’ project.

The debate was attended by approximately 30 students from the Faculty of Law, from different year of studies, both from fourth year (group of constitutional law and international law) and from the second year of studies (political system).

Several topics were raised during the debate, which are of interest to this project, which is in the final phase, and has been realized by a group of students from different generations continually, for several years.

### 1. *Introduction by the Ambassador/negotiator Dimitrov:*

At the beginning, Mr. Nikola Dimitrov, who is actually B.Sc. Law and M.Sc. International Law, made a brief introduction on the essence of the dispute with the Hellenic Republic concerning the name of the Republic of Macedonia.

With this presentation, he introduced the students to many details that were not known to the wider public until then:

- that Matthew Nimetz suggested several tens of proposals annually;
- that he is not remunerated for this function;

<sup>635</sup> This summary of the meeting with the Ambassador Dimitrov was prepared by D. Apasiev.

<sup>636</sup> Nikola Dimitrov was an Ambassador of the USA, while his father was an Ambassador in Russia! In 2008, the President of RM – Mr. Branko Crvenkovski dismissed Dimitrov from the function “negotiator on the name”.

- that the Macedonian side in the talks in New York avoided the usage of the term ‘dispute’, as it was not a dispute, but a unilateral request by Greece addressed to Macedonia to change its constitutional name, which was a precedent in the theory and practice of the international law until then.

In this so called “informal part” of the talks with Mr. Dimitrov, for which there was no minutes taken, but the interested students, self-initially took notes – we could have heard their personal opinions on the problem, for instance that the Macedonian diplomacy failed to succeed in the attempt to impose its truth to the international community, as well as that the constitutional name is the last pillar of the legitimacy as a country and should the Republic of Macedonia change the name under the international pressure, it will then go beyond the Macedonian dignity and so on.

2. *Questions addressed to the guest:*

In the second, interactive part of the meeting, Mr. Dimitrov was asked questions by the present students, to which he tried to be as transparent as possible.

The students’ creativity was once again proved, thus the present addressed around ten questions to the guest, covering different aspects of the problem, such as:

- on the property of the displaced and exiled Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia;
- on the biological researches of some foreign scientific institutes regarding the ethnogenesis of the Macedonian nation;
- on why does this ‘virtual dispute’ last for so long and consume so much energy;
- on the (latest) official proposal by Matthew Nimetz on the resolution of the name dispute and on the possible pressure on Macedonia by Greece, in context of its European and Atlantic integrations etc.

However, compared to the first part, where some informal statements, positions and thoughts of our guest could have been heard, in this so called “official part” of the talks, for which a special minutes was taken by the student appointed, a certain rigidity and diplomatic inflexibility in the answers could have been noticed, which were pretty short and poor with information. Namely, there was a tendency on legal interpretation and explanation of the dispute, for which it was previously underlined to be civilizational, and not a legal phenomenon.

Thus, after two hours of discussion, which was planned to last an hour, and owing to the resourcefulness and the interest of the audience

lasted twice as longer, professor Shkaric, in the capacity of a moderator of the meeting, expressed his gratitude to the guest for his time, and gave him as a present a copy of his book “Macedonian and Comparative Constitutional Law” (*Македонија и компаративно уставно право*).

With this act of respect and friendship he closed the meeting, which generally speaking, in many ways helped the students that worked on the aforementioned project, to get familiar with certain aspects related to the events determining the result of this “dispute” – directly from a person that has participated in a number of activities of the Macedonian diplomacy in this field.

PRAZNA

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**THE PROPOSAL BY MATTHEW NIMETZ  
(19. II. 2008)**



*Press conference of the mediator **Matthew Nimetz** (in the middle) and the negotiators **Nikola Dimitrov** – RM (on the left) and **Adamantios Vasilakis** – RG (on the right) - Athens, February 2008*

## “RAINBOW” LETTER TO NIMETZ<sup>637</sup>

To: Matthew Nimetz  
*Special Envoy of the OUN secretary General, New York*  
Re: Proposal of 19 February 2008

Dear Mr. Nimetz,

We write in relation to your latest proposal regarding the so-called “name” dispute between our country (Greece) and the neighbouring Republic of Macedonia. Our position on this issue is well known and indeed it has been outlined to you on several occasions over the past few years. Therefore, we shall not repeat ourselves here in relation to our basic position on this issue. Rather, we wish to take this opportunity to directly address aspects of your latest proposal, as reported in Greek newspaper *To Vima* last week. In particular, we feel obligated to comment on Paragraphs 3, 8 and 9 because they are directly connected to our identity, as ethnic Macedonians in Greece and as European citizens we care very much about the stability of the region and want the peaceful co-existence of all people (nations) in South Eastern Europe.

### **II - Paragraph 3 and Annex 1**

We wish to comment on two names that you have listed in Annex 1, namely “Republic of Upper Macedonia” and “New Republic of Macedonia”.

a) In relation to “Upper Macedonia”, while the Greek government has indicated its willingness to agree to this name (as the Greek media has reported in the last few days), it should be pointed out that this name is inconsistent with its official position. If an “Upper Macedonia” exists then logically there is also a “Lower Macedonia.” Therefore, having this in mind, how can the Greek government argue, among other things, that the name “Republic of Macedonia” has irredentist claims on northern Greece, but the name “Upper Macedonia” would

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<sup>637</sup> “Vinozhito” is a member of the European Free Alliance – European political party (E.F.A. – E.P.P.); Member of the Federal Union of the European Nationalities (F.U.E.N.). Address: “Stefanou Dragumi” 11, Florina T.K. 53 100 P.O. Box 51 Greece. Tel/fax: ++0030 23850 46548. Website: [www.florina.org](http://www.florina.org). E-mail: [rainbow@florina.org](mailto:rainbow@florina.org). The original text of this letter, dated 26 February 2008, was drafted in English, and translated into Macedonian by Vladimir Patchev.

not? It is clear that a name such as “Upper Macedonia” could encourage irredentism on both sides, which therefore means that it is problematic.

b) As for the proposal “New Republic of Macedonia”, we must stress that every attribute related to the national-ethnic character of the state and its population directly or indirectly rejects ethnic Macedonian identity, both in respect to citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and members of the ethnic Macedonian minority in Greece. If ethnic Greeks who live in the historical territory known as “Macedonia” have the right to a “Greek-Macedonian” cultural identity (even though the majority of them arrived in the area in 1922-1928) then why do ethnic Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia (living also in a part of the historical territory known as “Macedonia”) not have the right to the historical and cultural past of the same area? If the prefix “New” is intended to distinguish between modern Macedonia and ancient Macedonia, then logically, the same should also apply to Greece’s name i.e. Greece should be called “New Greece” because modern Greece is not the same as ancient Greece. Furthermore, if the prefix “New” has the intention of distinguishing citizens of the Republic of Macedonia from citizens of Greece (ethnic Greeks), it should be mentioned that more than 700,000 orthodox ethnic Greeks were moved from Asia Minor to northern Greece between 1922 and 1928. Therefore a term such as “New Macedonians” might be an appropriate term to use to describe this group and clearly distinguish them from Macedonian citizens in the Republic of Macedonia.

### **II - Paragraph 9**

It is proposed in this paragraph that the use of the term “Macedonian” be restricted to the economic sphere. We find the premise in this paragraph to be inconsistent with democratic principles. To restrict the use of the term “Macedonian” to the economic sphere is to deny the right to self-identification and would effectively mean, inter alia, the prohibition of term “Macedonian” to describe our language. As you would be aware, the denial of the existence of a distinct ethnic Macedonian identity has been the official policy of the Greek state for many decades and as members of the Macedonian minority of Greece, we have and continue to be victims of this deplorable policy. Therefore the proposal to deny the fundamental right to self-identification (the end result of what is proposed in paragraph 9) should be reviewed.

We would like to take the opportunity to once again remind you that there are a number of official Greek documents which long before

1945 defined “Macedonian” as something different to “Greek.” These include the primer in the Macedonian language, the *Abecedar*, printed in 1925 for the Macedonian minority of Greece and the 1920 Greek census document which explicitly notes the existence of the Macedonian language in Greece (both documents have been sent to you previously).

### **A proposed addition to the final Agreement**

Having in mind our comments in relation to *Section II, Paragraphs 9* of your proposal, we wish to make the following suggestion. A key component of a fair, just and viable solution to this “dispute” will be one which safeguards ethnic and cultural identity. Having this in mind, we strongly encourage the inclusion of two paragraphs in the final agreement along the lines of the following:

*“The Greek state recognises the existence of a distinct ethnic Macedonian identity as it is expressed and has developed in the Republic of Macedonia and elsewhere as a separate ethnic identity different from the Greek-Macedonian cultural identity that developed in the Greek state after 1912-1913 when a part of Macedonia was incorporated into the Greek state”;*

*“The Republic of Macedonia recognises the existence of a separate and distinct Greek-Macedonian cultural identity as has developed in the Greek state after 1912-1913.”*

Therefore, both Parties shall respect the right of self-identification with respect to an individual’s ethnic and cultural identity. The use of the prefixes before the word “Macedonian” clearly distinguishes between the two groups (i.e. ethnic Macedonian and Greek-Macedonian). Moreover, both terms are ones of self-identification which is of fundamental importance. No undesired names are being imposed and both identities are not being tampered with. As you will notice in our proposal, no side monopolises the use of the term “Macedonian” (in accordance with Section II, Paragraph 8 of your latest proposal).

Further to *Section II, Paragraph 8* of your proposal, it is stated that no Party shall have exclusive rights to the name “Macedonia”. If this is to apply to the Republic of Macedonia, then surely it must also apply to Greece. Therefore, as it is proposed that the Republic of Macedonia be further defined by the addition of another prefix, then surely this would also apply need to apply to the Greek administrative regions which also utilise the name “Macedonia”. It may be useful then, as well as fair, to suggest that the Regions of West, Central and Eastern Macedonia be further defined through the addition of prefixes or suffixes.

The same principle would also apply to names such as the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace (the name suggests that it is a Ministry for the whole of the historical territory of Macedonia which is inconsistent with *Section II, Paragraph 8*) and also to the international airport in Thessaloniki called “Makedonia” (Macedonia).

Furthermore, it may also be fair and useful to propose some new names for the geographical region of northern Greece, in order to make the distinction between this region and the Republic of Macedonia clearer, just as the Greek side has demanded from the Republic of Macedonia. Some suggestions:

1. Greek Geographical Region of Macedonia;
2. Geographical Greek Macedonia;
3. Greek Macedonia;
4. Greek Historical Macedonia;
5. Region of Greek Macedonia

Finally, let us also mention how important it is for peace and stability at this time as well as in the future and in particular when talking about the Macedonian issue, for there to be a recognition of a separate Macedonian identity as it is expressed by citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and the members of the ethnic Macedonian minorities in other Balkan countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Kosovo). This is a very important point when taking into consideration that the denial of a Macedonian ethnic identity and the right of self-determination of the Macedonian people pushed the stronger Balkan states (Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia) in to a bloody conflict during the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. In other words, from our perspective the crucial issue on this so-called “name issue” is to eliminate any irredentist aspirations from these states by protecting the ethnic and national identity of the Macedonian people in the Republic of Macedonia and elsewhere.

Finally, if the issue of ethnic and cultural identity is to be part of a final agreement, as members of the ethnic Macedonian minority of Greece, we would insist on being consulted in relation to the above. Therefore, we again remain at your disposal for a consultative meeting at your convenience.

*Yours sincerely*

***Pavlos Filipov Voskopoulos***

*- Member of the Political Secretariat EFA – “Rainbow”  
(the Political party of the Macedonian minority in Greece);*

*- member of the Office for the European Free Union –  
European Political Party.*

## NIMETZ'S "NEW" IDEAS AND DIRECT INVOLVMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA<sup>638</sup>

As expected, the pressure on us regarding the name is increasing. This is confirmed with the announcements that Washington directly undertakes the case, which is contrary to our interests. We all know that USA are prepared, when necessary, to solve the problems by use of force. So, we have to be aware that the direct engagement of US in the dispute (although by now it seemed certainly that the US were behind Nimetz's proposals), would most probably lead to some kind of Dayton Agreement and an imposed solution that might have far-reaching negative consequences on our nation. The US "solution" might not satisfy Athens maximalist demands, but it will (definitively) consider its basic interests, and Athens' interests are reduced to destruction of the Macedonian nation. Although our room for maneuvers is small, we must not allow the change of Nimetz's position to be sanctioned outside the UN, which is the organization that allocates the mandate. We must use all mechanism to relativize the procedure and avoid exposing and confronting with USA.

Since we know the Greek position and its interest, there are no dilemmas that the involvement of Washington does not announce anything beneficial to our country. US engagement is a result of the deep concern for NATO future. It can even be expected that US would be willing to impose us some kind of solution just in order to avoid blockade in Bucharest. The problem has been emphasized because due to Greece the whole enlargement process might be blocked, which would provoke (a deep) crisis in the Alliance. If Greece does this, Turkey will show that our century-long friendship is true and lasting. Such move might even be solution for the situation: it might pave the way to the invitation of the whole Adriatic group. This would only prolong our trauma – till the ratification. The NATO invitation opens wide range of perspectives for our country, so in these key moments we must be ex-

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<sup>638</sup> The author of this text is the Macedonian diplomat Risto Nikovski, a diplomat in SFRY for many years and Macedonian Ambassador to London, Tirana and Moscow. The text was published as a column under the title "Shall we face another Daiton" (*Дали сме ѿред нов Дејџон?*), in the daily newspaper *Dnevnik*, no. 3621; 15 March 2008.

tremely careful and prepared for firm actions. It is not easy to say NO to the biggest and most powerful state in the world for something that is connected to its strategic interest. As it seems, we would be forced to do so because our survival is in question. In the new situation, which seems (pretty) probable, we must bravely and directly show to US that we are disappointed by its position of ignoring our fundamental national interests. We are interested in the settlement of this issue, but not at any cost! We cannot accept the fact that they are not aware that the existence of the Macedonian nation presents a problem to Greece. We are brought to a hopeless situation, without any real option, all because of NATO and EU member state that does not recognize the fundamental human rights – which are the foundations of democratic societies. Secondly, they make us undertake some unwilling actions, which are not in the (long-term) interest of the Republic Of Macedonia, nor of the region, NATO, EU. Thirdly, we will be forced to re-examine our foreign-political priorities. If our admission to NATO and EU is, and remains, blocked by one (irresponsible) member state, then we will have to look for another perspective. We must think of initiating procedure for reassessment of the process related to the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to UN, when illegally a responsibility was imposed on our country to negotiate about its historical and constitutional name.

The present situation is a result of the past violation of UN Charter and its procedures, as well as the disregard of the international law. We must withdraw from the Interim Accord with Greece, because Greece does not respect it, and we would be forced to reconsider our relations, in the light of their latest blockade of our country. Till today, the Republic of Macedonia has presented nothing but reservation and cooperation (we did not strike back to the border blockade, we amended our Constitution, changed the flag...), but now we must reconsider our relation with NATO, preliminarily through our participation in the peace operations, something we were proud with. For a decade now, the Republic of Macedonia has acted as full member of the Alliance, undertaking responsibility for the security problems in the region and beyond, and during the Kosovo crisis the Alliance would not have functioned properly without our help. So, the Republic of Macedonia deserves absolute support of its aspirations for membership, in other words, it deserves invitation in Bucharest. If we make some kind of an agreement with Greece, as Nimetz announced, then all questions opened between these country must be included (the recognition of the Macedonian minority, the Macedonians' estates...). The interview of Nimetz

for “The Voice of America”, Nimetz’s last visit to Skopje (when he talked to the highest authorities) and to Thessalonica (where he had meeting only with the negotiator), then the visit by Daniel Fried (who didn’t need to go to Greece, which actually confirms that concessions from Macedonia are being asked) clearly indicate that the matters are not going into our direction. This was obvious from his statements. He said “*the membership to NATO means that the USA, the most powerful country in the world, shall pledge to defend Macedonia...and this means that Great Britain, France, Italy... will guaranty that they are your allies*”. He did not mention that mostly probably the impossible will be asked from us: To renounce ourselves).

In the interview, Nimetz once again (in a roll) commented beyond his mandate that “*efforts were made at that time (1995), however the (Interim) Accord has ended. We are referring to a new agreement now and people should consider what can be done now*”. He even gives himself the right to conclude that “*the Macedonian question has been present for almost hundred of years, going back to the Bucharest Agreement in 1913*”! Does Nimetz send us a message that he wants to end the process, which began in Bucharest 100 years ago, by finishing off the Macedonian nation? Does Nimetz think that he has a mandate to focus the problem with our name, which was illegally imposed by the Greek extreme nationalism, within the decisions brought at Bucharest? It is completely vulgar and irresponsible on his part, within the present context to mention the undertaker of Macedonia – Bucharest 1913.

This statement opens other key questions: Whether our “quadruplet” responsible for the negotiations knew about the idea of new agreement? If they know, why haven’t they undertaken anything because a new agreement would impose complete change of our strategy? If they don’t know, which is more probable, then this speaks a lot about our (negotiation) capacities, and about the unprofessional and improper behavior of Nimetz, which must be sanctioned. Actually, Nimetz aim is not to dispute Greece’s right to veto, which is prevented by the Interim Accord, redirecting the pressure on us. So the situation we are brought to, through no fault of ours, demands actions without any compromises. The question is to be or not to be! When are brought to a complex closing and every move is crucial. Although they are trying to check mate us, the prospects for success are not small. We need to make difficult moves to win. We need to mobilize top national experts, and what’s more important we must immediately ask for help from

foreign experts, people with experience in solving international problems. Without them, we might mix up the moves, and this would be end of our aspirations. There are no emotions in politics, only interests. We must be brave, decisive and direct since this is a question of fundamental interest for our country and nation. The politics acknowledges only this. We must show our teeth in a situation like this, because if we don't do this the prospects for success are small. There is no room for inferiority, close party interests, doubts, ambiguity, hypocrisy. The US is an important and key strategic partner of our country and this must be respected and cherished. However, no one has the right, especially the friends to reach out for our identity. This cannot be allowed and our responsibility is to prevent it. True friends will understand and justify this, and what's more important, they will appreciate it. It's our turn....

## MACEDONIA DISPUTE IS NOT ABOUT A NAME!<sup>639</sup>

There is little doubt that a large part of the Greek population, especially in northern Greece, feels sincerely threatened by what it perceives as “irredentism” on the part of the Skopje government. Recent actions, such as the decision to rename the airport in Skopje after Alexander the Great, or the circulation in public of maps of “Greater Macedonia”, confirm the fears of many Greeks that the “expansionist” ideology of their neighbor poses a threat to Greece’s territorial integrity. While some foreign observers concede that Greek fears are well founded, the majority sees them as ludicrous. Yet, one question is rarely posed: Even if one accepts that Greek fears are justified, how will changing the country’s name remove the grounds upon which those fears are based? If that is the case, Greece’s policy over the last 20 years, focusing on forcing Skopje to change the country’s constitutional name, makes little sense. Let us assume the government in Skopje succumbs to international pressure and accepts the name “Upper Macedonia”. The Greek government, so the story goes, will then welcome “Upper Macedonia” into NATO with open arms. The question, however, is why? Why should the adoption of a composite name like “Upper Macedonia” make Greeks feel less threatened by their neighbor’s so-called “irredentism”? Irrespective of which name is adopted, the respective historical discourses on which the two countries base their national identities will not only continue to diverge but will also continue to come into conflict with one another. And it is those discourses – not the name itself - that lie at the heart of the dispute. Today, Greece claims that the country is “an artificial creation” of the former Yugoslav strongman Josip Broz Tito. Macedonian historians on the other hand see the creation of a republic within Yugoslavia as the outcome of long historical processes. Greece does not recognize the existence of even traces of a “Macedonian” ethnic consciousness among the Slav-speaking population of the region during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. To the north, the exact opposite view is held. Greece refuses to recognize that the everyday means of communication in its neighbor is a “language”, term-

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<sup>639</sup> The author of this text is the Greek journalist Takis Michas. We took this text from the daily newspaper *Dnevnik*, no. 3 621 as of 15 March 2008, where it was published as column. Source: BIRN: Balkan Investigative Reporting Network.

ing it in all official documents a “spoken idiom” or “dialect”. Finally, Greece denies any “right of return” to the Slav-speaking Macedonians who fled Greece after the Second World War, claiming they were traitors who forfeited their claims to citizenship. Whether this situation will change if the country adopts the name “Upper Macedonia” is doubtful. The Slav Macedonians who left Greece after the War will not suddenly get a welcome mat in Greece. Nor will Greece recognize that the speech people use in Skopje constitutes a “language” rather than an “idiom” because it is now called the “Upper Macedonian language”. Nor should one expect official Greek historiography to suddenly accept that once upon a time groups of people living in Greece developed a “Macedonian” (or should we say “Upper Macedonian”?) ethnic consciousness. Put bluntly, all the serious points of contention between the two countries, all the claims and counter-claims, will persist, irrespective as to whether the name of the country changes or not - because the problem between the two countries is not a “name dispute” but a general dispute concerning competing national mythologies, symbols and historical points of reference. In other words, it is a conflict that concerns all the items over which people in the Balkans have been happily butchering one another in the distant and the not-so-distant past



the opportunity this is correct, blunder by countries engaged ten years on all name”, perhaps d situation – a situation that only confirms international suspicions that the Balkans are after all - the Balkans!

*The newspaper “Macedonia” from Thessalonica - Greece*

## THE TERM MACEDONIA - DERIVATIVES AND ASSOCIATIONS<sup>640</sup>

This dispute, which is made to appear as absurd by Republic of Greece, contains a whole chain of historical and current political and cultural issues. Therefore, there is a need of analyzing the word Macedonia using dictionaries and encyclopedias.

Let's begin in the following order:

1. Macedonia, a geographic term. The country borders Thrace in the southeast, Thessaly in the south, Epirus in the southwest, a mountain range in the west, i.e. Albania, the Kosovo Field in the northwest, the Preshevo Valley in the northeast, etc.

2. Macedonia, a political and administrative term. This is a designation for the state of Republic of Macedonia and a designation for the administrative province consisted of three regions within Republic of Greece: east, central and west.

3. Macedonia, a traditional designation of a country consisted of three parts: Pirin, Vardar, and Aegean (Belomorska) Macedonia.

The following nouns are derived (generated) from this noun:

1. Macedonian, an inhabitant of Macedonia.

2. Macedonian, a member of the modern Macedonian people and of the Macedonian nation.

3. Macedonian, a member of the ancient Macedonian people.

4. Macedonian, a member of the people that lived or are living in the territory of Macedonia.

The following attributes are derived (generated) from this noun, which are part of complex terms: Macedonian people, Macedonian lan-

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<sup>640</sup> The author of this text is PhD Ljudmil Spasov – professor at the Faculty of Philology “Blaze Koneski”, at the University Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje. The text was published as part of the column in the daily newspaper *Utrinski vesnik* No. 2629, from 6 March 2008, and it was also part of the round-table discussion on the occasion of the *Nimetz's proposal* from 19 February 2008, held at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje on 4 March 2008. It is interesting to mention that Prof. Spasov cooperated with the Finnish Slavist Prof. Jouko Lindstedt from the Slavic Department of the University of Helsinki, who is famous for examining for several years the writing known as *Manuscript 268*, which is placed in the Library of Alexandria. Even though Prof. Lindstedt's specialty is the Bulgarian language, he made an extraordinary discovery that the mysterious manuscript is the so-called *The Konikovo Gospel* (after Pavel Bozhigropski's home village Konikovo in the area of Voden, who was the editor of the text), which is written in the Greek alphabet, but in the Macedonian language in the southern dialect of the Lower Vardar, and that it is written in the late 18<sup>th</sup> or early 19<sup>th</sup> century and that it is probably the oldest known text written in modern Macedonian language.

guage, Macedonian culture, Macedonian music, Macedonian food, Macedonian product, etc.

The previous complex terms have various meanings, e.g.: the language of the modern Macedonian people (the Macedonian nation), the language of the ancient Macedonian people, the culture of the Macedonian people, the culture of another people living in the territory of Macedonia, a mixed culture of one or more peoples which is typical more or less for Macedonia, the traditional music of the modern Macedonian people, the music characteristic of another people living in the territory of Macedonia, a specific food of the Macedonian people, a specific food of another people living in the territory of Macedonia, or a common food of the people living in the territory of Macedonia, etc.

Apart from these terms, the noun Macedonia is associated with different words (terms), such as a member of a certain people (Serb, Bulgarian, Albanian, Turk, Vlach, Gipsy, Rom, ...); a part (region) of a certain state, e.g. Bulgarian Macedonia, Albanian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia, Macedonia as part of the territory of the Republic of Macedonia.

The term Macedonia and its derivatives have neutral, positive and negative meaning. An example of a positive meaning is – Macedonian beauty. An example of an associative negative meaning is – Macedonian salad, Macedonian knot... The term Macedonia is a complex term, i.e. a complex predicate in need of arguments. They can be explicit or contextual. For example, the Macedonian language is an explicit term due to its relation to the ancient or modern Macedonian language, while the Macedonian culture is a contextual term due to its relation to the culture of the Macedonian people, to the culture of other people living in the territory of Macedonia or to a mixed culture of all or some peoples in Macedonia.

Some terms associated with the term Macedonia can also require an explanatory paraphrase. For example, the Turkish language of the Turkish people living in Macedonia, or the Turkish language of the Turkish people in Aegean Macedonia, Republic of Greece, etc.

The terms associated with the term Macedonia, such as Skopje, cannot be a substitute for other associated terms. For example, Skopje cannot be a substitute for the Republic of Macedonia, not even in the syntagma Republic of Skopje. Another example that can be semantically supported is the impossibility of the term language of Skopje, which is the language of the people living in Skopje, to replace the term Macedonian language, considering the semantic absurdity that may

occur in the phrases, such as the language of Skopje of part of the non-Greek people in Republic of Greece, the language of Skopje of Krste Misirkov, the dialects of the language of Skopje in Republic of Bulgaria (Pirin dialects), the mother language of Skopje (the mother tongue) of Krste Misirkov born in Pella (Postol) in the area of Giannitsa (Enidze Vardar), the language of Skopje of the people of Skopje (of the Greeks originating from Skopje) in the area of Lerin (Florina) in Republic of Greece... In addition, the adjective (attribute) north and its derivatives cannot be a substitute for other terms associated with the term Macedonian. For example, the North Macedonian dialect of the people of Skopje (North Macedonians) in the area of Kostur (Kastoria)...

There can be only one resulting conclusion from the previously stated which is that the entire reality related to the term Macedonia must be taken into consideration when using this term, together with all its derivatives and associations. Any other use is inappropriate and represents a linguistic and conceptual manipulation with an aim to manipulate the reality.

## **NIMETZ PROPOSALS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA<sup>641</sup>**

*I. Constitutional changes* - In the *Name Proposals* of 19 February 2008, Matthew Nimetz sends open request to the Republic of Macedonia to insert in the text of the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia* the new official international name for official international purposes, due to be set forth in new resolution of the UN Security Council.

Furthermore, mediator Nimetz requests that the new name be embodied in other parts of the legislation, such as laws, bylaws and acts by legislative officials in the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>642</sup>

Provided that the new resolution of the Security Council containing the new official name is enacted, the Republic of Macedonia will have to initiate new procedure for amending the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. It would be the second constitutional revision prompted by the name dispute following the 1992 revision with the adoption of *Amendment I* and *II*.

The amending shall replace the applicable constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” with a new one as set forth in the UN Security Council resolution.

Nimetz suggests that the new name should be considered among the following alternatives: Democratic Republic of Macedonia; Independent Republic of Macedonia; New Republic of Macedonia; Republic of Upper Macedonia and Constitutional Republic of Macedonia.<sup>643</sup> The new name shall be included in the Constitution’s title, as it is the case with the other constitutions in the world. Each constitution bears the name of the country that is adopted by as the highest legal act. Instead of the title “Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia”, we

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<sup>641</sup> Author of this text is Svetomir Shkaric, PhD – Professor (Emeritus) at Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University – Skopje. In fact, this is his addressing at the Round Table on *M. Nimetz Proposal of 19 February 2008*, held at Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus on 4 March 2008.

<sup>642</sup> *Integral Document with Nimetz Proposals, Dnevnik*; 22 February 2008 Section IX, p. 3.

<sup>643</sup> *New Name in Passports as Well, Utrinski Vesnik*; 21 February 2008; p. 1.

shall have a constitution with a new title: Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Macedonia; Constitution of the Independent Republic of Macedonia; Constitution of the New Republic of Macedonia; Constitution of the Republic of Upper Macedonia or Constitution of the Constitutional Republic of Macedonia.

The Constitution of the Constitutional Republic of Macedonia!?

This illogical title is backed by Matthew Nimetz, not as a solicitor or an attorney at law, but as former Secretary of State at Jimmy Carter's administration (1977 - 1980), American diplomat involved in the process of the dissolution of SFRY (1992 - 1993) and U.S. representative commissioned for the settlement of the name issue by President William Clinton (1995).<sup>644</sup>

Apart from change in the title of the Constitution, this will also result into changes in names of the central state organs, such as: Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Supreme Court of the Republic of Macedonia, Judicial Council of the Republic of Macedonia and Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Macedonia.

The gravity of the changes will also affect those constitutional provisions that contain the adjective "Macedonian", such as the provisions regarding the Macedonian people and the Macedonian language.

According to Nimetz, the Macedonian nation should be erased as ethnos from the *Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*, which was adopted in 2001. It would be second heavy blow for the Macedonian identity after the promulgation of the 2001 *Framework Agreement*.

*The Framework Agreement* is in close correlation with the name issue. By the means of disfigurement of the Macedonia people, the position of the Macedonian party in the name talks is being weakened. On the other hand, the Macedonian party is being pressed to pursue the Framework Agreement in practice in favor of success in the talks. This can be seen in the International Crisis Group Balkans Report of 10 December 2001.<sup>645</sup>

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<sup>644</sup> "Macedonia - Greece Name Dispute - Facts and Solutions, Student Project (working paper)", Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, Skopje, 2008; p. 451.

<sup>645</sup> Ibid. pp. 512-547.

The name “Macedonia” will also fall in the line of fire. The proposer insists that the word “Macedonia” should not be used as official name in both countries, nor in any other country.<sup>646</sup>

Realistically speaking, the ban on the name usage applies only for the Republic of Macedonia. Ban on using the name “Macedonia” as a political and geographic notion is also proposed.

The impact of the constitutional changes will also affect the word “Macedonia”, found in the Preamble of the Constitution (Amendment IV) and Amendment IX: “*Independent and sovereign state of Macedonia*” (political notion), and “*the historical and artistic heritage of Macedonia*” (geographic notion).<sup>647</sup>

If the *Framework Agreement* conducted reversed ethnic process for the historical and the artistic heritage of the Macedonian people, then the Nimetz proposal breaks up the bonds between the Macedonian nation and the geographic Macedonia, the bond between the nation and the soil populated by Macedonians. There is also breach in the tie between Macedonia and those Greek citizens who feel like ethnic Macedonians.

Nimetz talks about the “Historical Macedonia”. He does not talk about present-day Macedonia. He regards Macedonia as a historical category, not something that is reality in the present. This aggravates the breach in the bond between the Macedonians and Macedonia as a territory.

The model for amending the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia* is similar to the 2001 model. Instead of a Framework Agreement, there should be adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that will stipulate precisely all 9 items of Chapter II of the Draft Document. If such a thing comes true, the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia will become the first constitution in the world to be amended by UN Security Council resolution.

Should there is adoption of such a resolution, it will not be a blow only for the Republic of Macedonia, but for the United Nations as well. With such an act, the UN will be undermined as an organization of sovereign states. This is precisely the aim of the global protagonists-

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<sup>646</sup> “Integral Document of Nimetz Proposals” *Dnevnik*, 22 February 2008; Section II, par. 7; p. 3.

<sup>647</sup> Svetomir Shkaric “Comparative and Macedonian Constitutional Law” (*Споредбено и македонско уставно право*); Matica, Skopje; 2004; p.185.

bringing down the current international law and building new international order that will protect the interests of the narrower international community.

**2. Amending the legislation** – According to Nimetz proposal, there are certain changes in laws and bylaws that should be carried out in effect of providing full acknowledgement of the new official international name, due to be laid upon in the new UN Security Council resolution.

The applicable legislation should omit the following: the name “Republic of Macedonia”, the word “Macedonia” and the adjective “Macedonian”. In light of the the proposal, there could not exist Macedonian National Theatre, Macedonian Academy of Science and Arts or Macedonian Sun.

No need for further comment. It is clear that the listed proposals complicate the key issue: the Macedonian people’s identity and the value of the name “Macedonia”.

The name determines and proves the existence. The name “Macedonia” has existed for more than two thousand and five hundred years and will continue to exist and defy the centuries and the powerful empires. This particularly reflects in the student minds, which draw their great inspiration and creativity from Macedonia’s values.

**3. The connection between the prior documents and the Nimetz proposals of 2008** - There is close relation between the new proposal of Nimetz and the prior documents concerning the dispute over the name “Macedonia”: *Declaration of the European Community Council*, adopted at Lisbon on 27 June 1992; UN Security Council *Resolution 817* of 7 April 1993; UN Security Council *Resolution 845* of 18 June 1993; *UN General Assembly Resolution* of 8 April 1993 by which the Republic of Macedonia was admitted to membership under provisional name; *Interim Accord* of 1995 between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic; *Framework Agreement* of August 2001; International Crisis Group *Balkans Report* of December 2001; Matthew Nimetz Name Proposal of 2005.

*EC Council Declaration* was the first to roughly deny the name “Macedonia”, just like Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey did in the late nineteenth and at the threshold of the twentieth century. At Lisbon, the EC acted like the former empires, lacking sense for the fate of the minor peoples and their states.

UN Security Council *Resolution 845* raises major concern. This document exceeds the mandate of the UN General Assembly Resolu-

tion by which the Republic of Macedonia was admitted to membership in the UN under provisional name (FYROM).

By Security Council *Resolution 845* of 18 June 1993, for the first time the dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic gains other dimensions. Besides the differences over the name, the documents also mentions “speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them”, thus transcending the dispute into the historical heritage of Macedonia, as well as into some other issues. Hence, the UN Security Council had exceeded its mandate as defined by the UN General Assembly Resolution of 8 April 1993. Pursuant to the *Resolution of the UN General Assembly*, the two parties shall only negotiate settlement on the difference that has arisen over the name that will be used for all purposes within the UN.

Instead of seeking withdrawal from the talks, the disputed parties should negotiate only over the difference concerning the name of the Macedonian state, that is, only over the name that will be used for “*purposes within the United Nations*”, as it is set forth in the UN General Assembly resolution of 8 April 1993.

Why did the UN Security Council exceed the mandate granted by the UN General Assembly?

And what is even more important: Why did the Republic of Macedonia sign the *Interim Accord* of 13 September 1995 so widened scope of disputed matter?

There should be talks, but only within the framework of the mandate as established by the UN General Assembly. The Macedonian negotiators should insist on this in the subsequent talks.

**4. Student project** – The relationship among the abovementioned documents is scrutinized by a group of some 40 students of the Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus in the student project *Macedonia – Greece Name Dispute – Facts and Solutions*, realized within a six-year period (2002-2008).

The students shed light on the name dispute from a historical, economical, legal and geopolitical aspect, in consult with the relevant literature and conversations with a number of protagonists involved in the dispute, as well as a number of analysts studying the name dispute from a scientific viewpoint. With regard to the involved protagonists, there are many views are noteworthy, such as those of Kiro Gligorov, International Crisis Group members, Craig Ratcliff and Edward Josef, foreign Ambassadors to Skopje, as well as the negotiators Nikola Dimitrov and Matthew Nimetz.

In the group of scientists, the views that attract most attention are those of Chausidis, Proeva, Papageorgiou, Borza, Litoksou, Shea, Stojchev, Kikerkova, Petrushevska, etc. what we are talking about here is an analytical project that also offers certain proposals for overcoming the differences; student minds showing high level of creativity and accountability for the situation and its settlement without discrediting the arguments of the involved parties.

The publication of the project in Macedonian will be followed by publication in English as well. Thus, the students from the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic will have the opportunity for direct participation in the debate on the name dispute and the cultural heritage of Macedonia.

The project should serve to the ends for academic understanding of the historical and cultural heritage of Macedonia and overcoming the dispute in spirit of respect for all cultures and nations abiding on the geographical region of Macedonia.

## **STUDENT ESSAY**

### **MORPHOLOGICALLY TOTEMIC ANGER<sup>648</sup>**

On 19 February 2008, the Special Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, set forth a new draft proposal for settlement of the decade-long “name dispute” between our country, the Republic of Macedonia, and the Hellenic Republic. The proposal has resulted from the Greek pressure on the international community, and on us in particular, for changing our constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia, in the eve of the NATO Bucharest Summit of April 2008. On one hand, and at first glance, the proposal itself appears to be tempting and favorable for our country, but on the other hand, it contains array of unclear theses, words that reveal their duality with every further reading. In this view, the entitlements and commitments of both parties seem to be about the same; however, there is the prevailing impression that the First Party (Hellenic Republic) prepares itself for some odd defensive attack, as if the Second Party (Republic of Macedonia) had performed an act of aggression upon them. This fact seems paradoxical.

On the other hand, there is a lot of suspicion around the thesis about renouncing the exclusivity over the names “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” for both parties. Is it possible for the Second Party to be deprived from the entitlement to a name in the international relations, a thesis pinpoints the unequal position of our country in the international relations? When reading the content, each and every subsequent paragraph gives the impression that the draft proposal is transcending back and forth into other dimensions, an agreement in one moment, and suggestion in another. Which is which? On the other hand, the inequality between the involved parties questions one of the fundamental rights in international law, that is, the right to equity.

At times it hurts in the constitutionality and identity of our country, or to rephrase what I previously said, if there are no equal negotiating conditions, what are the chances of winning the fight over the identity? If that is the case, how can one speak about right to equality in international relations when this very same right to equality is violated throughout the document? Talking in terms to an agreement, there should

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<sup>648</sup> Coauthors of this essay are Vladimir Patchev and Emilija Dimikj.

be equal approach to both involved parties, which is not the case here. Then, how can we speak of fight for identity?

There are many arising issues, many of which remain to be unaddressed (perhaps it is better that way), but given the fact that in the period following the reveal of the proposal there have been many political strains, and even a new one, to which I would refer as “some-what of a proposal”, there are two key issues that constantly slip away: 1) *Are we witnessing here the creation of new tensed crisis situation on the Balkans, coming from the artificial boost of nationalism by the means of the morphologically totemic anger?; and 2) What is this ”morphologically totemic anger?”*

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For the purpose of more profound consideration of the proposal, I believe there is essential need for giving an account on certain notions, which, on the other hand, are critical to understanding the text. Furthermore, it is important to give an explanation for the terms morphology, totemism and anger, for I believe that precisely these terms will unveil the nature of the text of Mr. Matthew Nimetz.

Their importance, or at least their direct relation to certain key notions from the text of Nimetz (proposal, suggestion, agreement, etc.), I believe, will contribute to wider analysis of the text.

In this view, the word *proposal* in our, Macedonian standard language and in free translation in other languages denotes a morphological form naming an abstract state of affairs. Abstract, since it is not there to be imposed, but only to confirm the variability of the very nature of the proposed matter. Therefore, it should be mentioned that the opening part of the latest proposal of Mr. Matthew Nimetz reads as follows: “...*(the First Party represented by Ambassador Vassilakis – “First Party” and the Second Party represented by Ambassador Dimitrov – “Second Party”)* as a proposal for the settlement of the issue of the “name”, etc.!?”

Having in consideration that the opening part of the text clearly states the both sides in the “talks”, it would be a logical aftermath that the very essence of the comprehension of the word “proposal” gives further account on the role of the both parties. It underlines the character of harmonization and talks, but not necessarily accepting the proposed.

On 19 February 2008, the special mediator in the “name dispute” between our country, the Republic of Macedonia, and the Hellenic

Republic put forward several proposals in which he explained their use. The intensity of the paragraphs and the items listed there goes from one extreme to another. To illustrate, paragraph 2 reads: "... Acknowledges that the constitutional name of the Second Party is the Republic of Macedonia and that the territory of the Second Party encompasses part of the historical Macedonia..."

On the other hand, paragraph 5 of the proposal stipulates: "... The official international name will be used as a name for the Second Party: a) in multilateral agreements, contracts and conventions; b) passports and c) for admission and official usage in international organizations....", while paragraph 8 and 9 state: "the words "Macedonia" and "Macedonian" can be used only in economic sense, acknowledged only by the international legislation without having exclusive commercial and political right over them."

According to these paragraphs, the "proposal" gets new dimension. It transcends into another morphological form, so-called suggestion. *The suggestion is having influence on somebody, imposing somebody's own opinion over others, persuading, leading to something.* Such a process is always subtly squeak through the will of the other party. The other party is the one that has to bear with the "frame-ups" that penetrate into its psyche. In most cases it is not aware of it, and even if eventually realized the volitional supremacy, it would be helpless to come to a compromise on what has been offered. The rougher variant of the suggestion carries a hypnotic element within itself. It is through the hypnotic categorical order that the "patient" is forced to carry out during the hypnotic dream or after waking up. Thus, the suggestion of Nimetz points out the actions that the Second Party (the Republic of Macedonia through Ambassador Nikola Dimitrov) will have to take, in this case paragraph 9.<sup>649</sup>

Hence, it is obvious that these unclear, intrusive, morphological mutations shed illogical light of suggestiveness, without giving consideration to what was written prior and why it was written in the first place. Logically speaking, this raises several issues in terms of whether

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<sup>649</sup> "... "Macedonia" or "Macedonian" are allowed to be used in an economic sense by each of the parties and by their citizens, or by organized groups legally recognized by both parties- however, only in accordance with the applicable international legislation on the basis of agreements and practice related to the usage of geographic names for economic and other similar purposes." – 19 February 2008, *Proposal of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General*, Mr. Matthew Nimetz.

these “lapses” are intentional or unintentional, but talking in terms that they have already been written and proposed, why do they refer exclusively to one of the involved parties (the Second Party)? If the nature of the word suggestion implies some sort of an agreement, then the word agreement, according to the legal and any other meaning, carries within a commitment for both parties, but where is this commitment?

The morphological illogicality of this text stretches to such extent that seems to even hurt the constitutionality as a principle of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia and its identity as law of universality of a nation.

In his textbook *Споредбено и македонско уставно право*, the professor at constitutional law and political system, Svetomir Shkaric, PhD, comprehends the constitutionality as a congruency among all legal acts and material actions with the Constitution, that is, consistent pursue of the Constitution in practice and existence of synchronized legal order towered by the Constitution as the most systematic and the strongest legal act.<sup>650</sup>

As a science, on the other hand, the constitutional law recognizes two meanings of the constitutionality, material and formal meaning (comprehension):

a) The Material notion covers several elements, such as: congruency between the content of laws and bylaws with the content of the Constitution; congruence between material actions by state organs with the content of the Constitution; constitutional guarantee for the basic rights and freedoms that all humans and citizens are entitled to, as well as existence of constitutionally restrained state power.<sup>651</sup>

b) The formal notion of the constitutionality, on the other hand, also encompasses several elements: hierarchical subservience of laws and other bylaws to the Constitution; congruency of the form of laws and other bylaws with their counterpart, as established by the Constitution; adoption of laws and bylaws pursuant to procedures, as established by the Constitution; adoption of laws and bylaws by the subjects commissioned by the Constitution and laws and bylaws enforcement in accordance with the constitutional provisions.<sup>652</sup>

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<sup>650</sup> “Comparative and Macedonian Constitutional Law” (*Споредбено и македонско уставно право*), prof. Svetomir Shkaric; Matica Makedonska - Skopje, 2004; *Владеење на правото, Поим за уставност и законийост*; p. 326.

<sup>651</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 327.

<sup>652</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 327.

This is sufficient proof that the text of Matthew Nimetz not only confronts with the constitutional provisions of the Republic of Macedonia, but also with the text itself. How can one recognize the constitutional name<sup>653</sup>, which, by the way, is guaranteed with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, and violate the Constitution at the same time?<sup>654</sup>

This raises another issue. Provided that the abovementioned gives clear account on the morphological “metamorphosis” in the latest text of Nimetz, then how come a document, which does not have the power of an international agreement (international law), imposes itself over the Constitution of a sovereign and independent state? There are solid grounds that the legal acts of international character have superior legal scope of action than the Constitution of a state and that they are incorporated into the legal system of a state through the Assembly, but isn’t the principle of constitutionality at stake here? Changing constitutionality, and moreover, through a document that lacks any legal significance whatsoever!? The “metamorphosis” is only confirmed in *Annex A* to the Proposal of 19 February 2008 by listing the proposed names.<sup>655</sup>

On the other hand, the constitutionality as a code of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia is exercised through the following principles: constitutional supremacy; statutory constitutionality; guaranteed constitutionality, firm constitutionality; constitutional value of the rights and freedoms of the humans and the citizens and division of the estates into legislature, executive and judiciary.<sup>656</sup>

Hence, having in consideration that the constitutionality includes the constitutional value of the rights and freedoms of the humans and the citizens, it also means hurting the civic and ethnic identity in the

<sup>653</sup> “...Acknowledges that the constitutional name of the Second Party is the Republic of Macedonia and that the territory of the Second Party encompasses part of the historic Macedonia” – 19 February 2008, *Proposal of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General*, Mr. Matthew Nimetz.

<sup>654</sup> “...IX – **The Second Party** will act through the constitutional procedures to pursue the Security Council Resolution, which is set forth in the aforementioned paragraph 2, in order to secure, in compliance with its legislation, adoption of the “Official International Name” for official international usage – as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution...” - Ibid.

<sup>655</sup> The following names suggest the alternatives for the Official International Name (in English): Constitutional Republic of Macedonia; Democratic Republic of Macedonia; Independent Republic of Macedonia; New Republic of Macedonia; Republic of Upper Macedonia...” - Ibid

<sup>656</sup> “Comparative and Macedonian Constitutional Law” (*Споредбено и македонско уставно право*), prof. Svetomir Shkaric; Matica Makedonska - Skopje, 2004; *Владеенje на правото, Начелото на уставноста во Македонија*, p. 330.

Republic of Macedonia. The civic identity in Macedonia includes the ethnic entities recognized in the constitutional Preamble of 2001.

In the Preamble, the civic identity includes the ethnic identities, interconnecting them with fragile civic bonds. The text of the Preamble opens with the words: “*The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia*”, which is sufficient base for the conclusion that the members of the ethnic communities in Macedonia are citizens themselves. This civic status serves as basis for moral maturing and enhancement of the civic virtues in Macedonia.<sup>657</sup>

The identity, however, as a natural legitimacy for congruency is an insignia for any notion, for any object, to stand for what it stands for (A is marked as A, for A=A). For this reason, if a Greek identifies himself with the meaning, the essence and the mark of the Greekness of his language, culture and ethnos, then he is entitled to calling himself in that way.

The same acknowledgement is also carried by the words “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” for us, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. It stands for ethnic, historical and geographic naturalness rooted into historical and everyday trivialities and traditions. It is daily need of a nation and represents its zenith, not mutated morphology extracted from somebody else’s boring daily routine.

Unfortunately, this text does the latter, but to crown it all, it does not affect just us, as the Second Party in the document, but the First Party (Hellenic Republic) as well, which party subtly heats up the wrath out of sheer redundancy.

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Roman philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca in his book *On Anger* has a good reason to say: “... *You must not assume either that anger contributes to anything to the greatness of the soul. That is not greatness; it is a swelling; nor when disease distends the body with a mass of watery corruption is the result growth, but a pestilent excess. All whom frenzy of the souls exalts to powers they are more than human believe that they breathe forth something lofty and sublime; but it rests on nothing solid, and whatever rises without a firm foundation is liable to fall.*”<sup>658</sup>

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<sup>657</sup> Ibid., p. 350.

<sup>658</sup> *On Anger (De Ira)*, Lucius Annaeus Seneca; XX, p. 45; Magor, Skopje; 2003.

Seneca, whose writings contain the traditional themes of Stoic philosophy, was striving towards a philosophy that would be helpful for the people. He wanted to put the philosophy in the function of guidelines for the people on how to work and choose their actions, not how to make senseless disputes. He insists that everyone should live according to their own principles, which should not be opposite to the words. He instructs that one should live reasonably, patiently, moderately, thriftily, clemency and consciously, seeing the highest virtue in the love for everybody, love for all the people in the worlds.

Mindful of the latest text of Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Seneca has a good reason to say that the anger breeds anger, that inconsistency raises doubts and inconvenience. This position in the document evolves from the very beginning to the end of the document. The vague morphological points of reference, invidious statements and suggestions come as a result from the Nimitz's inconsistency towards the justice and truth, a motive for the Greek and Macedonian anger towards each other; the desire of the First Party to overcome the Second only supports the thesis that "the Earth is flat", as well as that lack of confidence in the existing real-time attributes. These attributes posit the centuries-old human strives for outshining the existing conflicts. Instead, they are being replaced with the totemic primordial scarecrows that do not bring reasonability, forbearance and amenability.

Such an artificial symbolization and manipulation with a name resembles a modern totemism, which is in function of diverting the attention from the real aspirations of the subjects. I say "modern totemism" because the people are made to believe in something so illusory that their subconsciousness adopts it as part of the reality, while the reality has completely diametrically opposed principles.

Sigmund Freud, the father of the psychoanalysis, in his book *Totem and Taboo* makes note that totemism is one of the earliest forms of religion, belief in the common background of the mystical bond between a tribe and a certain animal, or even a herb; this animal or herb (totem) was worshipped and considered to be founder of the tribe, and accordingly, the entire tribe would bear its name.<sup>659</sup>

Corresponding to our case, the name is the object of "worshipping", while the truth is completely different, that is, the name of

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<sup>659</sup> "Totem and Taboo" (*Тотем и Табу*) - Sigmund Freud; "Small Lexicon for Easier Reading" (*Мал лексикон за полесно читање на книгаџа*), p. 194; TNID Gjurgja, Skopje; 2006.

Macedonia belongs exclusively to the nation that affiliates itself as such and to the identity protruding from the name Macedonia.

Freud puts forward the possible comparison between the psychology of the “primitive nations” and the psychology of the neurotics in modern times. He argues that such comparisons hold ground, for both display identical symptoms. He continues saying that totemism and taboo are engaged in a mutual relation, that is, the ban on action or usage of a certain object or thought in the later stages manifests itself as worshipping or fear from the same, thus converting itself into totemism. This phenomenon is actually ambivalent, containing both fear and love for the thing, a neurotic desire for reaching the forbidden, and at the same time showing manifestation of fear from the awareness of the totem. He says: *“The psychical impulses of primitive peoples were characterized by a higher amount of ambivalence than is to be found in modern civilized man. Neurotics, who are obliged to reproduce the struggle and the taboo resulting from it may be said to have inherited an archaic constitution as an atavistic vestige; the need to compensate for this at the behest of the civilization is what drives them to their immense expendity of mental energy.”*<sup>660</sup>

In this manner, if we consider the subject matter of the dispute, the name, the fear appears to be omnipresent, characterized by ambivalence manifested by both involved parties. The Hellenic Republic at the same time shows both self-afflicted fear of the errors and nebulousness being created by itself and anger towards everything that gradually undermines the strong determination for denying the name “Macedonia”. The Republic of Macedonia’s fear for its own future, on the other hand, surfaces from its stressful past, which as a flashback appears in the cruel reality. The ambivalent position, the willingness for adopting the idea for a brighter future and the fear of getting to a position of unpredictability, breeds anger.

Consequently, after a thorough reading of the latest text of Nimetz set forth on 19 February 2008, with insight into the “name dispute”, and even taking into consideration the repercussions resulting immediately after the revealing of the latest proposal, the symbolism of these morphological totems, which constantly feed the anger of both sides,

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<sup>660</sup> Ibid., II, “Taboo and Ambivalence of Emotional Excitations” (*Табуио и амбиваленцијата на емоциивниите стиремежи*) (Chapter 4); p.69.

brings us to the conclusion that the abovementioned thesis of creating tensed crisis state on the Balkans is justified.

The anger would mean fertile ground for thriving nationalism via subtle planting of word forms to prompt a state of artificial “mystical” bond of the involved subjects towards the object (in our case, the name Macedonia).

The scale of the consequences from this condition is to be revealed by the future, judged by the present and recorded by the history.

*“Soon shall we sprew forth this frail spirit. Meanwhile, so long as we draw breath, let us cherish humanity; let us not cause fear to any man, nor danger. Let us scorn losses, wrongs, curses, insults and let us endure with heroic mind our short-lived ills. While we are looking back, as they say, straightaway death will be upon us...”*

*Seneca,  
On Anger*

PRAZNA

**4**

**MATTHEW NIMETZ PROPOSAL**

**(26 March 2008)**

*The latest proposal of Nimetz, same as the previous ones, is disastrous!  
It will leave us both nameless and subordinated in the international  
relations. We owe a great deal to Athens for rejecting the latest offer.  
Risto Nikovski, May 2008.*

## THE NAME AND THE “EXPERTS”<sup>661</sup>

With certainly unheard-of media pressure and from only to them known reasons, many quasi analysts, paraxperts, and other disputed or recognized experts have subdued the Macedonian national identity to our NATO accession, as if the identity suddenly became something irrelevant, underestimated, anachronic and opposite polarity to the European and world perspectives of the Republic of Macedonia. In this view, neither do I prefer scrutinizing the personal motives of these orthodox NATO followers who were changing (and still are) the constitutional name of the state, nor am I willing to avail myself into putting them in line with the fifth column, nor labeling them as mercenaries or traitors. Anyhow, no matter how hard I try to refuse acknowledging their anti-Macedonian urge and not attaching disgraceful attributes to them, still there is the sad prevailing fact about a terrifying nonnational campaign in which there was very little or if none care about the interests of the state and its nation.

In all these years of confusion, and within a certain linguistic galimatias Macedonia was mistreated by all of the abovementioned experts, university professors, academicians, politicians, nongovernmental analysts, journalists, raping and dishonoring their own country, and while talking in terms to the artificially-created dilemma - either NATO or the name - the efforts and choices were favoring the first option, for, as they said, it was critical to Macedonia's fate and survival. However, amid these occasional manipulative attempts to delusion the public, accidentally or not, something has been forgotten. They have left out the very same public, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, their voice and irreconcilable position against any change of the name of the state. Or, let me put it this way, the experts have been trying to cover up the 83 percent of the citizens who provided categorical and uncompromised -"No!" to the question: "*Are you for admittance to NATO membership at the expense of change in the constitutional name?*"

And if this is the case here, there should no longer be doubt about the inapplicability and inoperability of the calculations promoting that the same percentage of citizens (which may have inclined meanwhile)

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<sup>661</sup> Author of this text is the journalist Milan Banov. The text was originally published as a column in the daily newspaper Dnevnik No. 3 633 of 29 March 2008, under the headline: "Raped State" (*Силувана држава*).

has clearly chosen our integration into the Euro Atlantic structures, since you will all agree that the overlapping percentage does not antagonize the figures, irrespective to someone else's "expert" persistency to prove it otherwise. As a conclusion, and to avoid any misunderstanding, nobody is against joining NATO and EU, and furthermore, even without the parrot-like chanting by the same characters, whose inflatory appearance brings you well-founded fear they will start jumping out of your refrigerators, the population here has a quite clear picture of the benefits from the Macedonian integration into these structures. Rather, the desire and endeavors and that, I would say, nationwide consensus do not necessarily mean giving up on the name and voluntary rejection of the national identity and ourselves.

Hence, it is very hard not to define otherwise the poor, humiliating, disparaging attempts of the bunch of "experts" who like Sisyphus are pushing the thesis about necessity for compromise (meaning: change in the constitutional name and loss of identity) that would secure us accession to membership in the Alliance and at the same time prevent the disastrous consequences for Macedonia, the threatening apocalypse, and guarantee for our survival. Taking an objective look, there is no need for wider elaboration to prove the obtuseness of the thesis, except perhaps for the reminder that the Republic of Macedonia has never been NATO member state (as it is the case with most of the states in the world), and still has not ceased to exist or disappeared from the world map. Therefore, one can clearly recognize the lack of nationality of the abovementioned gang of "concerned" experts, whose positions, at least in my view, are no different than those of our southern neighbor. At the same time, besides the obvious attempt for kneading and molding the public opinion after their own (who knows, perhaps someone else's) fashion, it is also not too hard for one to see the shameless attempt to underestimate their fellow countrymen, who were publicly branded as irrational, ignorant and lacking by these intellectuals, scribblers, hypocrites and vanity-encumbered people. Even now I can see them after April 4, after the almost inevitable Greek veto on our NATO accession, didactically pointing fingers over and over again, assuring us they were right when acting shamelessly...

## STUDENT ESSAYS

### ANOTHER “LAST” PROPOSAL<sup>662</sup>

How many last proposals there will be? Or to clarify myself on what I am referring to, I will use the date of publication of the proposal in the print media, 26.03.2008. In respect with the role of the mediator, I find this situation rather contradictory. Calling upon the states’ laws, which should be all equal, I cannot help noticing a sign of inequality. There is absence of the essential right that underpins its existence, the equality in the international order.

The name has been an issue for several years, and more importantly, we are avoiding its settlement. We are eager to see our fatherland getting the one thing that every subject is entitled to, its name. I can’t seem to find either egalitarianism or equality in the last proposal of Mr. Nimetz. I respect his support and arduous efforts as a mediator, but I believe that our name is our right and no one can take it from us. On one hand, it is good that the name of the Republic of Macedonia still appears, at least for us, but in our introduction to the world we have to use name that is not identical with ours, the domestic name. I cannot seem to resolve this illogicality. At home my name is Emilija, and when I travel abroad don’t I introduce myself with the same name?!

It is my opinion that the territorial pretensions, in which they find disputed grounds, is an issue settled a long time ago. One year after the adoption of 1991 Constitution.

In 1992, two amendments were adopted. These amendments were passed under the pressure by the European Union channeled through the Badinter Commission. The Commission requested amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, which amendments would clearly declare that Macedonia had no territorial pretensions towards any neighboring state and it would not interfere in the internal affairs of the other states. The Hellenic Republic was behind this pressure, having believed at the time that the name Macedonia implies territorial pretensions on the country.<sup>663</sup>

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<sup>662</sup> Author of this essay is Emilija Dimikj.

<sup>663</sup> Svetomir Shkaric, “Comparative and Macedonian Constitutional Law, Nation, Content and Structure of the Constitution - Concept, Content and Structure of the Constitution of the R. Macedonia” (*Споредбено и македонско уставно право, Поим, содржина и структура на Уставот* - Концепција, содр`ина и структура на Уставот на РМ); p. 182, Matica Makedonska; Skopje; 2004.

In the entire history I have not find a single case of a country having problems with the name of another state! It is said that the repetition is the mother of learning, but this repetition keeps pushing us towards the void of shapelessness, a process of losing identity, the sense of being somebody... Is there anything worse than being unable to call your home by its name? The actual position should overcome, tired from this entire situation, we are weary from reaching for the impossible - a name that will preserve our identity, but a name different than the current one. Who are we supposed to be when in reality we do belong here? Wherever we go to, we will still be talking in Macedonian! I found confusing the solution of having two names, one for ourselves, and one for international cooperation. It is through the international relations that we introduce the foreigners with our culture, tradition, and above all, we introduce ourselves with a name! The Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) for those who live in Skopje, but what happens with the others? Should they migrate to Skopje or should the major cities be given a new name, Skopje?!

Why can't they simply support us, so we can together be stronger and proud of our origin, we are neighbors after all. Cicero once said: *Ad utilitatem vitae omnia consilia faciaque nostra dirigenda sunt* - *All our goals and efforts must lead towards improving of our lives.* Without any territorial pretensions towards Greece, we leave the past and the former borders of Macedonia behind us. We live in a time when the warfare does not take place on the battlefields, as it was the case throughout the history. Nowadays, everyone tends winning by the means of tourism, technology, science... The latter-day "weapons", if I can call them that way, are focused on the improvement of people's life, not on destruction. It is quite natural that there will be victims, all those who cannot afford competing on the world market with a "weapon" of their own to direct the attention of the world public to us. Aware of the situation we are in, we cherish the history, but we continue striding out! We cannot stop at a certain stadium in life and stay there. We want progress, we want to be, if not shoulder to shoulder, at least within the same circle with the other states in the world. The isolation can do no good for anyone. There is tension, impatience, and bitterness due to the divisiveness in the world. There are no boundaries, but the terms globalization and boundaries are incompatible, or at least not in the manner that our southern neighbor comprehends them. Is it really necessary to put barbed wire along our borders as a proof that we are not trying to claim foreign territories? It is sheer nonsense.

It seems to me that we are in position to have to choose between some of the offered names, as if we were a newborn, and not a state with centuries-old tradition. What I am trying to do here is establish the legal basis, for this text of mine resembles a legal debate rather than a critique of the current situation. I am trying to understand our southern neighbor, but I seem to have been failing in all attempts, and I believe they are not the only ones to be blamed, but also those who allow the applicable law to be neglected. However, there is one thing that constantly bothers me... *Why the law bows to the stronger side!?*

## A CIRCLE THAT AROUSES RESENTMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES<sup>664</sup>

Less than a week before the NATO Summit at Bucharest, the UN Secretary General-appointed mediator, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, set forth his latest and last proposal for settling the decade-long name dispute to the negotiators - Mr. Adamantios Vassilakis (Hellenic Republic) and Mr. Nikola Dimitrov (Republic of Macedonia) at their meeting in New York.

Before unveiling the *Proposal* to the wider Macedonian and Greek public, immediately after the meeting Nimetz pointed out that it contained elements from all previously tabled proposals; it was fully-fledged and included name with geographic reference. Nimetz also highlighted that the proposal might serve as a good basis for honorable and fair solution. Before the “controversial” proposal was made public, Nimetz expressed hope that the governments of the two countries would seriously considerate it as a possibility for arriving at a reasonable compromise.<sup>665</sup>

After a while, Macedonian and Greek media revealed that the proposal of Mr. Matthew Nimetz was “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)”.

Even at first glance the proposal displays the tendency of Mr. Nimetz to come to a balance between the two parties, a balance that will contribute to reaching a compromise. Inter alia, it also contains the fact that the Republic of Macedonia will use the name “Republic of Macedonia” in Cyrillic script.<sup>666</sup> Further in the text, paragraph b states that the name “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” will be used for international purposes.<sup>667</sup>

The Hellenic Republic immediately launched a reaction that such proposal is unacceptable for them. According to Foreign Minister Mrs. Dora Bakoyannis, this proposal is far from the Greek expectations, and the country cannot agree to partnership relations with Skopje if there is no mutually acceptable solution to the name issue.<sup>668</sup>

Our, the Macedonian party, stepped forward with silent reac-

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<sup>664</sup> Author of this essay is the student Vladimir Patchev.

<sup>665</sup> *Utrinski Vesnik*, No. 2 647; 27 March 2008; In the First Place: *Metthew Nimetz Proposes Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)*; article by journalist Boris Georgievski.

<sup>666</sup> Proposal of Mr. Matthew Nimetz of 26 March 2008, New York; paragraph a.

<sup>667</sup> *Ibid*, paragraph b.

<sup>668</sup> *Dnevnik*, No. 3 631; 27 March 2008; Bakoyannis: *New Proposal Far From Greece's Expectations*.

tions. It seemed to have been content for the *Proposal*, but at the same time it seemed there was lack of courage for making an official stand. The state establishment was waiting to the very beginning of the NATO Summit in expectancy for a final decision. Although other factors in the state encourage state establishment to put forward its position and accept the proposal, this was not the case. Inter alia, the Prime Minister and the President of the State held confronted positions on the proposal for referendum (at which the citizens would give their opinion about the name issue), which overshadowed the positions on the essence of the proposal itself.<sup>669</sup>

In view of these conclusions, it would be reasonable for one to ask what exactly this “notorious” proposal does contain. Let’s start from the “beginning”. The document contains a proposal promoting double formula. The first provision, “Republic of Macedonia”, in Cyrillic script for internal usage, and the second, “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)”, for international usage. Furthermore, it states that the international name is advised to be used, without demanding change in the positions of the countries that have acknowledged our current constitutional name.<sup>670</sup> The paragraph clearly states that the constitutional name of our country is the Republic of Macedonia and does not question the identity of the Macedonian nation, which, inter alia, is also guaranteed with the Constitution.<sup>671</sup> On the other hand, realistically speaking, even if the name “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” is recognized for international usage, no country will refer to us as Skopje citizens or will use this entire name to acknowledge us differently. This is cat-

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<sup>669</sup> *Utrinski Vesnik*, No. 2 650; 31 March 2008; In the First Place: *Macedonia Still Without Final Position of Nimetz Proposal*.

<sup>670</sup> Matthew Nimetz proposal of 26 March 2008, New York; paragraph c.

<sup>671</sup> “*The Preamble of the Constitution provides four key statements: first, it takes as starting points the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people as well the traditions of statehood and legality of the Krushevo Republic and the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People’s Liberation of Macedonia, together with the constitutional and legal continuity of the Macedonian state as a sovereign republic within Federal Yugoslavia; second, it underlines the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people; third, the framework of the Macedonian state provides full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people to the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia; fourth, it points out the freely manifested will of the citizens in the Referendum of 8 September 1991 for the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state with the entitlement to alliance with other countries in different forms of affiliation and cooperation*”- d-r Svetomir [ kari ], *Споредбено и македонско уставно право*; „Поим, содржина и сѐруктура на на уставој - концепција, содржина и сѐруктура на Уставој на РМ“; str. 180; *Mati ca Makedonska*; Skopje, 2004.

egorically stipulated by with paragraph c of the proposal<sup>672</sup>. In other words, how is it possible for a state that has acknowledged our constitutional name to change its position over night? As a point of fact, why would it want to do such thing, and secondly, if it is in vain to change its position, regardless of the name for international usage, why there is such paragraph in the document in the first place?

If it is amining at a strict international reference that would bilaterally make a clear statement on what Greece demands from us (distinction between the Republic of Macedonia and the northern Greek province of Macedonia), then why there is recommendation for the international name if it is recognized that the name by which the other countries (which have acknowledged our constitutional name) communicate with us is the Republic of Macedonia? The *Constitution of 1991*, including the *constitutional amendments of 2001*, provide civic sovereignty in the Republic of Macedonia. The civic sovereignty posits that the sovereignty is from and for the citizens.<sup>673</sup> Hence, having regard to the *Constitutional Amendments of 2001*, which, besides the macedonian nation, also embed the other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia (Albanians, Turks, Bosniacs, Serbs, Romanians and Vlachs), and it is in this direction that the transformation of the nationalities into “parts of nations” does represent a balance as the Macedonian nation re-enters into the *Preamble*. Thus, the Preamble has become a source of multinational sovereignty, and what is more important, it expresses the spirit of civic sovereignty.<sup>674</sup> Therefore, Article 3 of Mr. Nimetz’s latest proposal provides a broader picture for the character of this new document i.e. secures room to guarantee protection and respect to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the two countries. If that is the case, then what was the argument of the Party of the First Part – the Hellenic Republic - to have immediately rejected the proposal? It is undeniable, obvious fact that even these matters have unilateral character, that is, the will of one of the parties must be congruent with the will of the other. But, for how long?

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<sup>672</sup> “... c) *Bilateral usage: the international name is recommended, while the states that use the constitutional name can continue doing so, but they are not requested to change their positions*”, Matthew Nimetz proposal of 26 March 2008, New York.

<sup>673</sup> S. Shkaric, “Macedonian and Comparative Constitutional Law; Sovereignty - The Sovereignty in the Constitutional Documents of Macedonia” *Македонско и споредбено уставно право; Суверинитетот - суверинитетот во уставните документи на Македонија*; p. 297; Matica Makedonska; Skopje, 2004.

<sup>674</sup> *Ibid*; p. 299.

Further reading of the content of the Proposal reveals another very important observation regarding the proposed text. It is Article 5, which states that the Party of the First Part (Hellenic Republic) will give active support to the Party of the Second Part (Republic of Macedonia) in the country's efforts for admission to membership in the international organizations, including NATO and the European Union.<sup>675</sup>

New York, 13 September 1995 - witnessed, in accordance with *Resolution 845* (1993) of the Security Council, by Cyrus Vance - Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the representative of the Hellenic Republic, Mr. Karolos Papoulias, and his counterpart of the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, signed *Interim Accord*, hereby bounding the countries to mutual cooperation, security and good-neighborly relations.

Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Accord states: "*Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, The Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent of the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 (1993).*"

The comparison of these two, at first glance similar provisions brings us to the conclusion that the position in the latest proposal of Mr. Nimetz is attempting either to revise or reaffirm the document of 13 September 1995. It is more than apparent that the Hellenic Republic is violating the *Interim Accord* by threatening to object the admittance of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO due to the name dispute, but if this is the case, then what is the purpose of Article 5 of the new document? Regardless whether we are talking about revision or reaffirmation of the provision in Article 11 of the *Accord*, for it is being violated de facto and de iure, this move means acknowledgement that the *Accord* is rendered invalid. In addition, the open refusal of this proposal by the Hellenic Republic also means acknowledgement of their intentional violation, thus confirming the fact that only constitutional changes would be solution to the dispute.

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<sup>675</sup> *Matthew Nimetz proposal of 26 March 2008*, New York; Article 5.

Respectively, it can be concluded that no matter how positive the document for the Party of the Second Part (Republic of Macedonia) is, this remains to be just another false round of talks, since the tendency for unilateral solution for the issue is more than transparent. Everything that has been written so far, chronologically speaking, is just another procrastination of the process and artificial attempts for settlement. The proposals are mere farce for expressing good will, and the words they contain a constant tautology that nourishes resentment between the two sides.

In such a circle, with no beginning and end, the only option is revising the mistakes and gathering strength to prevent similar ones. This applies for both parties, since they have the power to make moves, or by contrast they will be faced with the danger of being swallowed by the circular vortex they have created.

*“..This circle I devised, this circle I created  
This circle I shattered and in wind dispeled.  
Wind thinks, wind knows everything that know you and I  
It loves me, it takes me, it chrashes me...”*

**Circle**  
**by Keaterina Velika<sup>676</sup>**

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<sup>676</sup> Excerpt from the lyrics of the hit single of the famous Serbian rock bank

PRAZNA

**GREEK VETO AT NATO BUCHAREST  
SUMMIT  
(2-4 April 2008)**

*The latest Nimetz proposal was accepted by the Macedonian side. The fact that the Assembly held no sessions to confirm the decision of the executive branch was irrelevant to Nimetz, NATO, U.S.A. and other Alliance member states, as it was seen as an internal formal procedure for verifying the decision. **Branko Crvenkovski** - President of the Republic of Macedonia, April 2008*

## WHAT HAPPENS AFTER BUCHAREST<sup>677</sup>

The responsibility for the negative outcome for the Republic of Macedonia at the NATO Summit in Bucharest should fall on the Macedonian side, which has been holding on the dress of U.S.A. as “an infant”. Their fears were favorable, but not necessarily useful for us, especially in view of the creation of strategy for finding way out of the deadlock that we had underestimated. We had underestimated it since we were certain that our “big mother” will protect us. However, it turned out we were wrong, for the “mother” can only give us a boost, comfort, but the “child” is ultimately responsible for the steps it makes and their outcome. The political elites from all provenances must realize that a state neither can be built nor strengthened without clearly determined foreign policy. Only the “fools” act without clear priorities and options. We had the priority, but it was outshined by the confusion and ignorance about what should be done.

Nevertheless, let’s get back to the blockade of our NATO accession. Before any further analysis of the means at our disposal after the blockade of our NATO accession, we must consider the current framework regulating the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece in the so-called name issue. The Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VI and the Greek ungrounded claims, adopted *Resolution 817* of 1993 herein instructing the UN General Assembly to grant us with admission to membership in the UN under provisional name. Obligation for cooperation, that is, negotiations under the auspices of the UN General Secretary was first mentioned in the *Resolution 845* of the same year. However, the common in both resolutions, inter alia, was the recommendation for “*speedy settlement of the dispute.*”

Now, someone might ask: What is a “speedy settlement of the dispute?” Of course, no matter which criterion has been chosen, speedy most certainly does not refer to 18-year period. In this context, our side can argue that the abovementioned resolutions have lost their effectiveness, since they offer certain provisions, but the reality is a completely different story. Furthermore, the framework regulating the issues in this so-called dispute at bilateral level is the *Interim Accord* of 1995. I believe that the Macedonian party, after the fiasco in Bucharest,

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<sup>677</sup> The author of this text is Jana Lozanovska – Master of Science in International Humanitarian Law. Source: *Dnevnik*; No. 3 639 od 5 April 2008.

will finally utilize the legal measures it is entitled to. These measures include withdrawing from the Interim Accord and initiation of proceedings against Greece at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Greece's blockade of our NATO accession is a flagrant violation of the *Interim Accord*, so I cannot see any other reason for complying with this document, given the fact it has been ineffective for a long time. I disagree with the claims of adverseness from withdrawing from the Accord, since this agreement has set up liaison office with Greece for the first time after Macedonia's independence from former Yugoslavia. Thus, the potential withdrawal would allegedly mean standstill in the diplomatic relations between the two countries. The *Interim Accord* is a bilateral agreement and prior any subsequent analysis on this matter it would be helpful if we have an insight into the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, which regulates an array of issues, but on this occasion I will underline the provisions relevant to the abovementioned claims. Here, the most relevant is the part referring to the extraction of the agreed provisions.

The general rule holds that in case of withdrawal from an agreement, the same shall apply for the entire agreement. However, there is a provision stating that should the reason for withdrawal holds grounds only on certain provisions that can be abstracted from the remainder of the agreement, then the withdrawal can be applied only to the disputed provisions. In this case, our ground for withdrawal is the Greek blockade of our membership in the international and regional organizations under the provisional name. Therefore, the provisions that refer to this entitlement to withdrawing can be subtracted from the Accord without impairing the part that regulates the diplomatic relations. These provisions include: commitment for negotiations and impossibility for initiating application against Greece at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Provided that the Macedonian party decides to withdraw from the Accord, there will be two legal measures at disposal under The Hague. The first is initiation of appropriate opinion to the Court regarding the legality of imposing additional conditions for our accession to the UN, which opinion can be submitted only by the organs (the Security Council and the General Assembly) and the specialized UN agencies; or institution of proceedings against Greece. If we choose the first option, it must be pointed out that the opinion refers only to the UN organs that have the mandate to ask the same from the Court, and

what is even more important, it is not binding in nature. By initiating proceedings, on the other hand, not only that there will be consideration for the issues such as: insubstantiality of the Greek claims for territorial pretensions and ungrounded blockade of our pursue of membership in NATO by calling upon legal arguments, it will also scratch the surface of the issue or our admittance to the EU, which will tremble the already shaken credibility of the Organization.

However, the most important is that the verdict of The Hague Court is mandatory for the involved parties, that is, both for Greece and Macedonia. Unfortunately, any other course of action different than the abovementioned alternatives for overcoming this so-called name dispute would bring unfavorable outcome for us. I feel obliged to point out that I still doubt Macedonia's capacities for taking such a step out of a simple reason that a number of legal lapses had been made in the past, as well as the current incompetence for building up a clear strategy. At any rate, if there is determination for building such capacity, the only way out of the deadlock is The Hague!

## **THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE IS AT STAKE HERE, NOT THE NAME OF THE STATE<sup>678</sup>**

Let's face it, judging from what has been done and said, there can be only few conclusions: the only way for settling the Greek issue is accepting the Greek blackmail and changing not only the name of the state (used in communication with other states) but the name (and the name in particular) of the language and the nation. Don't get me wrong – by no means do I claim their blackmail should be accepted, I am just saying this is the only way for settling the Greek issue. And I intentionally avoid saying “name issue”, since there is no issue with the name. The Greeks have an issue with us (not only the name) i.e. with our existence and their concept for their national interests on the Balkans, where they do not prefer us from various reasons. Let's be straight, this can be seen in their behavior for the past 17 or even 100-150 years. For, everything is crystal clear now, Greece will continue exerting pressure, lobbying and vetoing until it settles the issue after their fashion and nobody would really care (apart from the slight and short-lived concern by the U.S.A.). The Greek reaction after the statement of Daniel Fried of the State Department that there is Macedonian nation and language suited us down to the ground. Their reaction was swift and had nothing to do with geography. The true aim of the negotiations was finally unveiled. The Greeks, as all good players, were hiding their cards. While ours were bashing away on the added word “Skopje”, whether they should accept it with a bracket or a hyphen, Greece was focusing on the only thing that really mattered to them – the name of the people and the language. When the bargaining did not go as expected, they brought in the veto. And they did not feel a thing. They are yet to be in full swing. So, if we want to settle the dispute with Greece, we will have to yield to their blackmail.

### **Veto for EU as well**

Do we need a settlement of the issue with Greece? A sensible man would say yes, since no rational man would like to have a quarrel with the neighbors. On top of all, there will be several practical benefits

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<sup>678</sup> The author of this text is Mr. Milcho Manchevski – the most famous film director and screenwriter, Professor at the New York University in U.S.A. Source: *Dnevnik*, No. 3645; 12 April 2008; p. 25. In 2008, he received the title Ambassador of Culture of the Republic of Macedonia in the U.S.A.

from settling the Greek issue. Greece invented a name issue, thus making itself the laughing stock to everybody. Unfortunately, the plain truth is that it does not matter. What matters is the real issue (and not the one with the name). The real issue is that Greece has the power to affect the life in Macedonia. Otherwise, it would have been all the same to us, let's say, if North Korea had an issue with our name and our existence, since North Korea cannot affect the life in Macedonia. This way, with Greece vetoing our accession to NATO, Macedonia will not be joining NATO in spite of the fact that all criteria have been met, in spite of the great and open endeavors by the "most equal among the equal" in NATO itself (and quite frankly, in the world as well), the U.S.A. Oh well, one would say - at the end it does not really matter whether we are a member of a military alliance that has lost the meaning of its existence. True, but now it is clear that Greece will also exercise its right to veto Macedonia's accession to the EU (and it is already well on its way for that matter) unless their blackmail comes true, talking in terms that there is no country in the EU that will dash into giving hand to Macedonia, such as the case with the U.S.A. backing our country at Bucharest.<sup>679</sup>

The worst part is that our - often unjustified - need for self-indulgence is already getting an empirical confirmation. Would it matter if we fail to join the EU? Someone might say: life goes on, nobody will die, the mountains will stay where they are, and the Vardar will continue flowing... However, according to all polls, almost all citizens of Macedonia prefer economic prosperity through integration into the European flows. Without the EU, the chances for speeding up the economic development in poor Macedonia will be considerably decreased. There will be less money flowing from funds and investments, thus bringing damages to the economy and consequently to the people, which will prompt additional internal social and psychological pressure that will recursively affect the economy. We have becoming poorer and poorer, more and more isolated, and more and more humiliated for too long. Also, there will be no growth in the direct influence of the European institutions and traditions on people's lives in Macedonia, something that is more important than financial investments, for Europe has a lot more to offer. There will be no upsurge in exchange of ideas and people. The migration out of Macedonia will continue (or it even may

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<sup>679</sup> Europe, Continent of Decisive Leaders and Honest Relations; See: Sarkozy Nikolas, Chamberlain Neville.

increase).

On the other hand, there probably is a way for prosperity even without being part of Europe. Surely such thing would be very, very hard and no one knows whether we have the required capacity. We have not exactly showed much of a performance so far. Unquestionably, there are more informed people than me capable of explaining the ways of working out such thing (if it is possible at all), but such will surely demand a lot of self-denial, focusing and change in a number of social (especially business) matrices. Frankly, no doubt we could use such a change.<sup>680</sup> (As far as NATO is concerned, the best solution would be political and security settlement of the potential security issues, not swearing by NATO. In other words, NATO will not come clearing up the imbroglio in Brodec, Tanushevci or Tetovsko Kale.)

## NAMING THE IDENTITY

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<sup>680</sup> Just for illustration, here are some countries that exist outside the EU: Moldavia, Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, but there are Switzerland and Norway, or even a country such as Taiwan, which is even a non-EU state. Some of these are willing to be admitted to membership, and in some (rich countries) the people rejected accessing the EU on a referendum. In conclusion, the life does not end with the European aspirations. Now, what is better, in or out of the EU? That is up to us to figure it out.

Is it really that important to us to keep the name as it is laid in the Constitution (and in the hearts for many people)? According to official and unofficial polls, almost all citizens expressed desire for keeping the constitutional and historical name. Should there is any consideration or room for compromise in respect with the name issue (how many people would accept “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)”, or “Upper Macedonia”, or Republic of Skopje, or even “Republic of Macedonia (Stobi)”?), the plain truth is that there are very few who are willing to settle with a change in the name of the language and the people. Imposing or accepting change in the naming of the identity (since our mere identity cannot be changed by anyone) will probably have long-term (and not very pleasant) consequences, psychological, and consequently both political and practical. More specifically, it would probably be appalling for our feeling about us, something that cannot be measured empirically, and the importance of which is impossible to be accounted for in a short column.

Of course, many people would say that even now we are provisionally referred to as FYROM in the UN and everybody knows us as Macedonians; so the label “FYROM” would do us no harm. True, but after the contours of the Greek demands started taking shape (which will not give up on - because it does not have to and is not willing to do so), it is becoming obvious this new change will be a radical one. Reaching compromise implies to our voluntary abnegation from using the adjective “Macedonian” when referring to the language and the nation (“Upper-Macedonian?”, “Povardarie?” “Skopje?”, or “Drachevo people and language?”), as well as requesting from the countries that have already recognized our constitutional name to cease with this practice. The red line has not been defined yet, but it seems that even those who are plotting change in the name are not exactly prepared to do the same with the language and the nation.

Now, this is the real dilemma. Would it be a mature thing to do if instead of a rational view on the situation we keep insisting on some wish list? We are advised on reaching some sort of a compromise. Well, what an excellent idea (as Gandhi would have said to the Western civilization). Yet the common sense is not the driving force in the current negotiations, the muscles are. And we are not exactly muscular. By now it has been proven that the Greek position annihilates the potential for diplomatic outwitting, compromise, fair play within the international community, faith in getting assistance from the stronger,

endurance or hope.

The saddest thing is that a lot of Greeks are fine with the promotion of hatred. They don't mind hating and thus flaring up hostility with their neighbors. For the hatred is like a virus, especially the nationalism-based one. The internet is soaked in hatred (especially by the Greek surfers), which in a creepy kind of way resembles the times of the Balkan Wars, when in Greece were being sold posters with a Greek soldier gnawing the face of a Bulgarian soldier with his teeth, like some beast of prey, and the inscription "Bulgar-eater" (in the twentieth century!) or the letters in which Greek soldiers proudly write to their mothers how they tortured and shot prisoners of war and civilians in the Balkan Wars.<sup>681</sup> Greece can freely carry on with its behavior without moving a hair. So far, it has not born any consequences for its dangerous behavior whatsoever. Neither in the past nor now. Those who were the most active in the past 17 years just scored off points among the domestic (Greek) public. The European partners mind their own business and preach demagoguery. It is the same reason that makes the dog lick its testicles – just for the sake of it. So, they can freely do whatever they want. It's not like they have something to lose.

### **The snake and the donkey**

It is a clear-cut situation - it has been proved that if Macedonia wants to become EU member, it will have to change the name of the state, language and people. There is nothing more to it! This is a very bad situation. Even worse than the tale when it has to be made a choice between the snake and the donkey. Or perhaps this is not the case? We are those who should provide an answer to this one. The aim of this text is to (try) to give an account on the entire situation. I believe that those who are seeking for a solution where *not only that we will eat the cake, but we will also have something left for tomorrow* (as the Americans say) are either really naïve or demagogues.

I am not here to take sides (either the name or Europe), but I am only trying to set the focus on the dilemma and call it properly. The way things are, I do not believe that both goals can be achieved with small compromises. Of course, we could now resort to analyzing whether we had made the wrong turn somewhere in the past. Perhaps it is more important to analyze why Greece is acting the way it does:

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<sup>681</sup> See: *Carnegie Commission Report*, 1914.

aggressively, hysterically and irrationally. This way we might conclude that their actions are just aggressive. However, if we add to our assessment the Greek fascist insistence that they live in ethnically clean state (in the ethnic melting pot, the Balkans!), their perpetual and illegal pressure over Macedonia (just remember the Greek embargo), the denial of their genocide over the Aegean people, the Greek foreign policy, which does not restrain itself from conflict and interference with the internal affairs of Turkey and Cyprus, as well as the endorsement for Milosevic, then we just might conclude that the big picture is rather different. Perhaps the name is not an issue at all. Perhaps we might conclude that Greece pursues extremely ethnocentric policy, and in this context, it does not want to see stable Macedonia (since the admission of Macedonia to NATO would have meant stabilization in the Greek neighborhood) and shall not accept any solution – except for a solution that would mean long-term instability of Macedonia.

How could one call this a “solution” when it guarantees long-term destabilization of Macedonia (which as a bonus also offers settlement of the issue with the territory occupied by Greece in 1912 and the Aegean people issue)? Of course, such is the solution in which neither the state, nor the language, nor the nation for that matter, would be named Macedonian. For illustration I will use (besides the reaction to Fried’s statement) the fact that new issues and demands of completely different nature are emerging in the negotiations.<sup>682</sup> And out of the blue, it is not just the name but the adjectives as well. Now it is the exclusivity over the name (there is, however, one thing I do not understand, how will someone stop me from using the name on my blog!?). The Greek Prime Minister even demands from the Greek parliament internal change of the name of another state (!). Here is a test to check whether this thesis is on strong foothold. We can, and I really mean it, propose changing the name with something with a stark geographic reference, for instance, “Upper, North, Vardar Macedonia” or simply “Macedonia 41.50” (the longitude of Macedonia). However, we should insist on maintaining the name of the people and language i.e. the adjective “Macedonian”, as well as on the confessions that there is Macedonian minority in Greece, which has been established by a number of

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<sup>682</sup> Were they not standing for name with geographic reference, so when Macedonia started sending signals for accepting the reference “Skopje”, Greece bounced the ball off the court!?

international bodies. So, let's see if there will be something wrong with these geographically specified names as well.

Now, let's go back to the beginning - we are to choose between:

- 1) Changing the name of the state, people and language; and
- 2) Accession to the EU.

Unfortunately, anything else would be a whole lot of words, which eventually would bring us back to the same choice. So, what will it be?

## THE HIDDEN “PASSIONS” OF A DISPUTE<sup>683</sup>

It has been well known, that for several years already, the cooperation between the two states, both bilaterally and internationally, functions relatively “normally” by using the “descriptive” name “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, according to the UN resolutions from the beginning of 1991, when this question was raised by Greece after the independence of the neighboring country. First, the use of the acronym for this name – FYROM was not foreseen, nor internationally, neither bilaterally between the two countries. More specifically, the interim use of the acronym PGDM in Greek and FYROM in English for “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” was not foreseen, but the use of the full “descriptive” name with no “acronyms”, on bilateral level and international level in the UN, until the resolution of the “problem”.

However, from the very beginning, Greece has systematically “pushed” the F.Y.R.O.M. or the FYROM acronym at different forums, international unions, sports and cultural federations, in Greece and internationally, avoiding the use of the “descriptive” name like the devil, because thus it avoids to use the part *Macedonia* from the “descriptive” name, in written and oral form. Very often, you may notice the use of PGDM or FYROM in the Greek media or the use of the even funnier FYROM acronym in Greek alphabet by the Greek public, which proves the previous statement. On international level, Greece persists (ridiculously) to push the use of the acronym in associations and international unions, such as those of fishermen or hunters. Following the instructions of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek representatives upset the managements of different international institutions by demanding the use of the acronym or if that fails, then the use of the “descriptive” name, disgracing Greece abroad.

Clearly, by signing the *Interim Accord* our country agreed not to obstruct the membership of the neighboring country in international organizations under the “descriptive name” “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. It is familiar that little before the “veto” at the

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<sup>683</sup> This article was written by Pavle Filipov Voskopoulos, member of the political secretariat of the European Free Alliance “Rainbow”, political party of the Macedonian minority in Greece. It was published in the daily newspaper “Dnevnik”, no. 3942, from April 11, 2009.

Bucharest Summit, Greece used and respected the “descriptive name” of the neighboring country (or abused it by employing the acronym) many years after the expiration of the Accord in 2002. Hence, according to the Greek practice, the validity of the Interim Accord was informally extended from 2002 until today. The statement of the Greek party (before the Hague-based tribunal in the lawsuit raised by the neighbors for blocking their NATO membership) that the Accord is not binding because seven years have passed since its signature in 1995 does not hold water. Why did it not respect or why did it block NATO membership of the neighboring country? This act reveals the hidden “passions” and “wishes” for dissolution of the neighboring country. The goal of the constant blocking of the membership in the European Union and international organizations is to destabilize Republic of Macedonia. Greece believes that it will be “positive” for Greek politics if the neighboring country remains out of NATO and EU, out of these two powerful organizations. The followers of Samaras hope for “dissolution” of the neighboring state and pray for ethnic tensions (between Albanians and Macedonians) to destabilize internally the Republic of Macedonia. This is nationalist politics, the politics of creating an enemy practiced by the “profound state” of Greece in the previous two decades.

The rejection of the neighboring country’s constitutional name by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on international level is explained with “arguments” related to “irredentism”. “Disguising politics” with arguments about “hereditary rights” related to ancient world civilization. Inside Greece, these positions, targeted at citizens wet behind the years and flooded with myths of nationalist ideology, have been repeated for decades. When Greek diplomats dare to repeat similar “historical” arguments abroad, very often they receive ironic smiles at any rate. There was a change in previous years of the Greek MFA politics from historical argumentations to presentation of the “irredentist” politics of the neighbors.

Lately, Greece has claimed that a good basis for resolution of the problem would be a geographical qualification before the word “Macedonia” for the neighboring country, referring to the so called problem of non-acceptance of Greece to use the constitutional name of the neighboring country. Internationally, Greece constantly underlines that this is the first “compromising step”, “generous” withdrawal from the first position not to use the word “Macedonia”, expecting an appropriate step by “the other party”. The Greek foreign policy claims i.e. argues that the use of the name “Macedonia” by the neighboring country

contains irredentist views against Greece because it “monopolizes” the term “Macedonia” by using the constitutional name of the state. This Greek position is hypochondriacal, contradictory and dangerous to the future peace for several reasons. More specifically, the discussion about the proposal for a “step forward” of the Greek politics regarding the geographical qualifications, such as North or Upper Macedonia, logically create a mindset that there is a “divided” South Macedonia. Automatically, any logical mind would wonder: Why are North and South Macedonia divided? Are they like Korea or Vietnam? Are they supposed to be united? It is not by chance that irredentism in our country regarding Northern Epirus dreams of uniting Epirus with its “motherland” Greece. “Upper Macedonia” is mentioned in the Greek nationalist ideology for Greek Ancient Macedonia, according to which there was a territory called Upper Macedonia in the Kingdom of Macedonia which is located in the current south part of the Republic of Macedonia. Any Greek nationalist would think that the current ancient south part of the state was not liberated during the Balkan Wars 1912-1913. A proposal for solution comprising geographical qualifications would be fruitful ground for the dreams of the Greek nationalists of uniting-conquering “Upper Macedonia”. Of course, it is not excluded that the discussion of geographical qualifications in time will spur the enthusiastic nationalists from the neighboring country. I consider enthusiastic the ideologies by anyone or any politics that are expressed in a small, poor, weak country which may not implement political ideas for a greater state.

The name of the state “Republic of Macedonia” is the “most neutral” realistic name for the neighboring country when it comes to “technical solutions”. The political supplement “Republic” describes a political and state entity. Internationally, “Republic of...” represents an ideal solution that captures the political and state entity of an independent country that does not have any political relationship with territories of neighboring states, because they are simply geographical “Macedonias” (in Bulgaria and Albania) or geographical and administrative entities, territories (in Greece). These territories are not political and state entities, such as federations or autonomous territories with the same name – nor in Greece, neither in Albania and Bulgaria. In our country these are only administrative territories which are part of the administrative division of Northern Greece and which carry a political and geographical qualification, such as “Periphery of West Macedonia”, “Periphery of Central Macedonia”, “Periphery of East Macedonia”. As such they may not be related to the state status of entity in our neigh-

borhood. It is clear that there will be no solution better than the constitutional name of the neighboring state.

Mrs. Bakoyannis slipped in her statements about divided Macedonia during her recent visit of USA. She even made a mistake in stating the percentages regarding different parts of the Macedonian geographical area, according to the borders of the territory determined in the last century. Here is what Bakoyannis answered to a question: “*nobody wishes to change the name of anybody... I would like to emphasize... Macedonia is a large geographical territory. 51% belong to Greece, 38% belong the Bulgaria... I do not know for sure... I think 27% belong to FYROM and 1% to Albania.*” This is an example of lack of understanding of the issue – nervousness or math problem? Why do 100% become 127%?

The statement of Bakoyannis and the arguments of the Greek MFA that the geographical qualification is required for the territorial stability as well as the denouncement of the “Macedonian irredentism” are in essence absolutely contradictory to the statements of Bakoyannis and the “councilors” when they speak of affiliation i.e. divisions. At last, when Mrs. Bakoyannis or anyone else speaks of divisions and divided territories, unworkable solutions and naming exercises, especially when it comes to the Macedonian issue, acts in favor of the nationalists in both countries, the enthusiastic ones there and the serious ones here. This is food for Balkan nationalism in the following decades. The rhetoric and politics of creating an enemy continues by throwing mud on the very poor and weak country. The main expression of this characteristic politics may be found in Samaras and his followers. Also the statements of the newspaper “Kathimerini” and the state TV channel NET are characteristic because, among other things, they support blocking of NATO and EU membership and are hoping that in time, Republic of Macedonia will fall apart. Of course, there is a possibility that the Greek MFA proposes not only geographical qualifications but also new qualifications – such as “New”. On the one hand, this means negation of the right to choose identity requiring “new” identity and “new” language for the neighbors and on the other hand it is absolute usurpation of ancient Macedonian world by Greece. What the Greek MFA wants is to kill two birds with one stone. This is classic nationalistic sick ancient politics. It is proof that Greek identity is insecure in the contemporary reality and it is constantly digging in the ancient past.

In the end, the goal of denying of the neighboring country's basic right to use its constitutional name on bilateral and international level and the insistence to geographical or other "new" qualifications aims at "denationalizing" the neighboring country by not recognizing, indirectly or directly, the identity of the people of the Republic of Macedonia. This is the key of the question and the essence of the Greek nationalist politics from 1991 until today. Greece does not recognize the right to self-determination of every nation! Not only is this an insult to the people from the neighboring country but also an important reason for the absence of mutual respect between populations, nations and states. This is a priori the hostile Greek politics which is unproductive for the Balkans and Europe in general and it is a mortgage of negative standards in our country for the new generations of our fellow citizens.

P.S. The first step that Greek politicians and relevant institutions should make is to inform and educate Greek society about the basic universal human right and principle of self-determination of any individual or group. In other words, Greek politicians should inform the Greek society that any group, any population has the right to choose its identity and name. The same as they did with the self-determination of the mixed people in the newly created Greek state 180 years ago. Indeed!

## INTERVIEW

### IF THERE WASN'T SUCH COUNTRY, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVENTED

- *Mr. Pangalos, as former chief of the Greek diplomacy, what is your view on the current relations between Macedonia and Greece after the Bucharest Summit?*<sup>684</sup>

**Pangalos:** To begin with, I must first reiterate the story as seen from the Greek side. The position of all political forces has never been as united as now. Let's see why. At the beginning of the name dispute, the government of Mitsotakis and his Foreign Minister Samaras in a way created the name issue with their maximalist position, according to which, we are not to accept the name Macedonia or the adjective Macedonian in the name of the state. At the time I told them that such position would be unsustainable, but in spite of this, the entire political class being pressed by the public opinion in Greece, with rare exceptions, adopted this policy of the conservative government.

What was done by Karamanlis should be welcomed, going beyond the previous thesis and accepting a compound name for the country that will contain the name Macedonia but in a way that it will not produce any misunderstandings and issues with the Macedonia that is part of Greece.

Our view in Athens is as follows - Since we have made step forward to accept a compound name, now it is up to the other party to accept a name with geographic reference. I must say, with all of my honesty, that I do not know why it is so difficult for the government in Skopje, as it is a new country, and the geographic reference neither shrinks nor humiliates the country, which would have the word North, Upper, Skopje-seated attached to the term Macedonia... This is the solution that our international partners are looking forward to. Afterwards, we may get on with the real issues, such as the security problems of the country, including its territorial integrity and unity, for which it should be endorsed.

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<sup>684</sup> The interview with Mr. Theodoros Pangalos – Greek Member of the European Parliament and former chief of diplomacy, is taken from *Utrinski vesnik*, No 2 666 of 18 April 2008, originally published under the headline: *Великото нема да им најинтеши на преџоворците*. The interview was hosted by Toni Glamchevski – Strasburg correspondent.

Once I said a sentence that cost me dearly: “*If there wasn’t such country, it should have been invented.*” I still stand behind this even today; we have interest in being neighbors with a small country in which there is orthodox Christian majority, speaking Slavic language, and living side-by-side with a Muslim minority. You should know best that you cannot have impaired political and diplomatic relations and close economic bonds at the same time. We are the major investors in the country, we are culturally close, perhaps even closer than any other country in the region, and that is why we have to overcome this name saga. In the past there were some unfortunate gestures from both parties that certainly did not do much for easing the debate, such as our rejection of the term Macedonia in the name of the country, a term that is critical to our neighbor’s identity.

- *Precisely the fear of identity loss is one of the greatest reasons why the Republic of Macedonia and Macedonians show restraint to some of the proposals of mediator Nimetz.*

**Pangalos:** If the country accepts the name Upper Macedonia or North Macedonia to be its official name, I do not see a reason why should the country lose its identity. What they need here is courage for adopting an unpopular decision. You see, the decision for accepting compound name for the country is not popular as well.

You had some unwise initiatives that were seen as provocations in Greece, such as the flag, then there is the latest decision for renaming the Skopje airport into *Alexander the Great*. Making a reference to the Greek culture is not offensive for the Greeks, but it is the quite opposite. How come they did not name the airport *Icarus*? So, it is not the problem in the Greek culture and tradition, since it is common historical heritage for the entire world. By contrast, it would have been paranoia.

-*The veto in Bucharest was regarded as an insult in Macedonia. What is your opinion?*

**Pangalos:** It should be clear that NATO, same as the EU, is an organization with statute, which regulates the prerogatives, inter alia, is the right to veto. It does not mean that we will make unreal demands for the country to become NATO member, but what we are asking had been regarded by a certain NATO member states as something logical and rational. They were not many, but still, their number is greater than few months ago. What happened in Bucharest will not harm the negotiations. Of course, at least according to my view. Besides certain few irresponsible persons from the political world in Athens, there was no

celebration; on the contrary, what happened in Bucharest was received with precaution and sensibility. I am not happy with this, as I already said it to the Greek parliament. I will be happy when the country will become NATO member with Greek consent.

*-Did the veto violate the Interim Accord of 1995?*

**Pangalos:** There is no need being hypocritical. The Interim Accord has never been followed. On one hand, they say that over one hundred countries have recognized the state under its constitutional name; however, one of the elements of the accord was precisely the provisional name FYROM. The government in Skopje managed to replace FYROM with the constitutional name, meaning that the agreement had been constantly violated.

*-What is your view on the current name talks?*

**Pangalos:** I prefer working without being under constant pressure. The American pressure should not be disqualified, but we should be careful, as U.S.A. has interests being part of the plan for world domination. They are not care what we or you are doing. They are interested in pandering the Muslims on the Balkans, planning the space to suit their bases, etc. We should see the Americans as they really are. They have great influence in NATO, but they are not almighty. However, things started changing in NATO as well. It was the first time for a country to say “no”, and that decision to be respected. And for the first time, three issues that were in favor of U.S.A. were not settled in the way they wanted.

*-When should we expect real normalization in the relations between the two countries?*

**Pangalos:** I believe that the relations we now have are not bad. However, there is a need for settling the name issue in the manner I had previously described. Under my command we had been working on compound name for many years, in spite of the disapproval of the Greek party. We were very close to a solution when Mr. Ljubcho Georgievski served as Prime Minister. I do not know what happened afterwards, there were problems, we have lost sight, there was change of governments and ministries and we were back at the beginning.

**Theodoros Pangalos** – *Former Mayor of Athens and Foreign Minister of the Hellenic Republic*

## EU AND NATO PRESSURE FOR THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION<sup>685</sup>

Despite the appeal of “Henry Jackson Society” and other eminent institutions that the international community should make Greece stop blackmailing Macedonia, there is a real problem which drives this state in corner – either it will accept a new name or it won’t join NATO and EU. Why is there a lack of will to press the “troublemaker in the region” as you called Greece, so that it would stop blackmailing?

- The problem is not so much that western leaders support Greece, but more that they do not show enough interest to support Macedonia. When facing global problems, it is easier for them not to do anything about the problem between Greece and Macedonia. Greece is in better situation than Macedonia as a NATO and EU member and that is why it is supported by default. Macedonia must be patient and try to wind the battle for the European and Western public opinion by systematic lobbying and developing close bilateral relations with the countries that support it, such as USA, Great Britain, Turkey, Italy and Russia.

Even officially, Greece confessed that the negotiations are not related only to the name of the state but also Macedonian identity. Is it possible to achieve a solution which will not endanger our identity?

- The Greek gate will not open any time soon, but Macedonia may not give up and thus endanger its identity. The Greek politics aims at making the international community dispute the existence of a Macedonian nation and force Macedonia to accept a name that denotes a geographical notion and not a national one. Athens will continue to pressure until it believes that it can rape Skopje and make it withdraw. Until EU believes that Greece and not Macedonia is the party that refuses a compromise, it will encourage Skopje, as a more reasonable party, to withdraw from its positions in the negotiations. This is the way EU works – it always awards the stronger and less reasonable party! Therefore, it does not pay off to be the “reasonable party”. I believe it is important for Macedonia not to perceive NATO and EU

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<sup>685</sup> The interview with Mr. Marko Attila Hoare, director of the British Institute “Henry Jackson Society” was made by the journalist Ivana Kostovska. It was published in the daily newspaper “*Нова Македонија*” no. 21 662 from 11 April 2008. In the introduction he explains that he is emotionally attached to the Balkans because he studied History of former Yugoslavia and lived in Bosnia and Serbia when he covered the fall of Milosevic.

membership as a motto. Your country must accept that it will not join these institutions any time soon which is not the end of the world. The state must try to benefit as much as it can from a closer economic and military cooperation with NATO and EU, as well as with Russia and other countries. In the long run, Skopje must make Athens and EU understand that it will not cede no matter how long it will have to wait to join NATO and EU. In the meantime, Macedonia has friends and it will not fall apart.

When do you believe the dispute will be resolved?

- I am not an optimist that it will happen soon. The resolution of the name depends on the democratization of Greece and the change of Greek culture from nationalist to post-nationalist. This is a slow process but it must happen. It may be compared to the Turkish position on the Armenian genocide: official Turkey does not recognize the genocide, but more and more educated Turkish citizens are ready to talk about it. Therefore, Greece will be democratized when more and more educated Greeks will rise against the nationalist paradigm of Athens. Macedonians must be patient and accept they will have to wait for a democratic change in their southern neighbor.

There was a debate in the Macedonian public whether EU can help Macedonia and Greece to resolve the dispute in the way it offered helping hand to Slovenia and Croatia. This idea is supported because of the impression that the negotiations under the United Nations are blocked but on the other hand, if this happens Greece will have a more favorable position as EU member.

- I am skeptical that the negotiations will end with a solution in both cases, between Macedonia and Greece as well as between Slovenia and Croatia. In both cases, EU refuses to make a difference between right and wrong and thus the negotiations are in favor of the stronger party i.e. the country already inside EU that used its right to veto. Macedonia should oppose EU pressures to accept unprincipled compromise, not only for its own good but also the good of all Europeans. As a European citizen, I don't want to live in a European Union that supports territorial expansionism! I want to live in a Europe that makes a difference between right and wrong. I hope that Macedonia and Croatia will not concede for the good of all Europeans.

Macedonia filed a suit against Greece in the Hague-based court for violation of the Interim Accord by imposing the veto in Bucharest, while Greece insists that the decision was brought unanimously by all

members of the Alliance. What are Macedonian chances to win this process?

- I believe that Macedonia has really good chances to win the process. However, even if the International Court brings such a verdict, this will be only one won battle, but the struggle will continue.

Greece denies the existence of Macedonian minority in the country and refuses to respect the recommendations of numerous organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations to recognize minority rights. Why does EU turn a blind eye to the fact that one of its members does not respect minority rights?

**- EU failure to press Greece about the question of Macedonian minority is absolute shame. Again, this is result of the lack of interest of some member-states.**

In your column you stated that the Greek insistence to keep Macedonia out of NATO and EU is the result of the strong support by Sarkozy and the fact that on the other hand there is not support for Macedonia on EU level. What is the reason for that, is this lack of diplomacy or something else?

- Macedonia was not very lucky with the election of Sarkozy for French president. A little country as Macedonia has a limited possibility to influence European states. However, Macedonian diplomacy should lobby even more strongly, but also start a propaganda targeted at the European public. Macedonia must continue to develop tourism so that more European citizens visit the country and become aware of the problem with Greece. Macedonians must be persistent but also reasonable, because no one respects nationalists.

*You assess that Albania, as a NATO member, could make a real nightmare for other countries in the region.*

- Imagine if Albania, as NATO member, follows Greek steps and starts to make unreasonable demands from the NATO candidates, including Macedonia. Then what? I do not want to run out with such an assessment because so far Albania leads reasonable regional politics. But in principle, Tirana may demand territorial autonomy for the Albanian minority from Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, as a precondition for their NATO membership. Where will you be then? I do not claim that this will happen, but if Macedonia surrenders to the Greek blackmails, such things will be encouraged.

**PART THREE**

**DOCUMENTS**

PRAZNA

**PEACE TREATY  
BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA,  
THE KINGDOM OF GREECE, THE KINGDOM  
OF ROUMANIA AND THE KINGDOM OF  
MONTENEGRO – ON THE ONE PART, AND  
THE KINGDOM OF BULGARIA – ON  
THE OTHER PART<sup>686</sup>**

*Bucharest (July 28/ August 10, 1913)<sup>687</sup>*

*Their Majesties: the King of Roumania, the King of the Hellenes, the King of Montenegro, and the King of Serbia, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, on the other part, animated by the desire to put an end to the state of war at present existing between their respective countries and wishing, for the sake of order, to establish peace between their long-suffering peoples, have resolved to conclude a definitive treaty of peace.*

Their Majesties have, therefore, appointed as their plenipotentiaries, namely:

**His Majesty the King of Roumania:**

His Excellency Alexander Marghiloman, his Minister of Finance;

His Excellency Take Jonesco, his Minister of the Interior;

His Excellency Constantin G. Dissesco, his Minister of Public Worship and Public Instruction;

Major-General C. Coanda, Aide-de-camp, Inspector-General of his Artillery; and

Colonel C. Christesco, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of his Army;

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<sup>686</sup> The document, widely known as the *Peace Treaty of Bucharest*, is taken from the book “Macedonia in International Agreements 1875-1919” (*Makedonija vo mejunarodni dogovori 1875-1919*), prof. Aleksandar Hristov, PhD, and Jovan Donev, Matica Makedonska; Skopje, 1994. The document in this quoted work is registered under No. 33; p. 186-191. (See also: text “Macedonia’s in Division in Bucharest - 1913” (*Podel bat a na Makedonija vo Bukure{ t - 1913*), in the first part of the book.

<sup>687</sup> The document provides two dates in order to indicate that they conform to the Julian and the Gregorian calendar respectively.

**His Majesty the King of the Hellenes:**

His Excellency Elefterios Venizelos, President of his Council of Ministers, Minister of War;

His Excellency Demetre Panas, Minister Plenipotentiary;

M. Nicolas Politis, Professor of International Law in the University of Paris;

Captain Ath. Exadactylos; and

Captain C. Pali;

**His Majesty the King of Montenegro:**

His Excellency General Serdar Yanko Voukotic, President of his Council of Ministers, Minister of War; and

M. Jean Matanovic, formerly Charge d' Affaires of Montenegro at Constantinople;

**His Majesty the King of Serbia:**

His Excellency Nicolas P. Pasic, President of his Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

His Excellency Milhailo G. Ristic, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Bucharest;

His Excellency Dr. Miroslav Spalaikovic, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary;

Colonel K. Smilianic; and

Lieutenant-Colonel D. Kalafatovic;

**His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians:**

His Excellency Dimitri Tontcheff, his Minister of Finances;

Major-General Ivan Fitcheff, Chief of Staff of his Army;

M. Sawa Ivantchoff, Doctor of Laws, formerly Vice-President of the Sobranje;

M. Simeon Radeff; and

Lieutenant-Colonel Constantin Stancioff of the General Staff;

Who, in accordance with the proposal of the Royal Government of Roumania, have assembled in *Conference at Bucharest*, with full powers, which were found to be in good and due form.

*After having happily reached accord, they have agreed upon the following stipulations:*

**Article 1**

From the day on which the ratifications of the present treaty are exchanged there shall be peace and amity between His Majesty the King of Roumania, His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, His Maj-

esty the King of the Hellenes, His Majesty the King of Montenegro, and His Majesty the King of Serbia, as well as between their heirs and successors, their respective States and subjects.

### **Article 2**

The former frontier between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Roumania, from the Danube to the Black Sea, is, in conformity with the *Proces-Verbal* drawn up by the respective military delegates and annexed to *Protocol No.5* of July 22 /August 4 1913, of the Conference of Bucharest, rectified in the following manner:

The new frontier shall begin at the Danube above Turtukaia and terminate at the Black Sea to the south of Ekrene.

Between these two extreme points the frontier line shall follow the line indicated on the 1/100,000 and 1/200,000 maps of the Roumanian General Staff, and according to the description annexed to the present article.

It is formally understood that within a maximum delay of two years Bulgaria shall dismantle the existing fortifications and shall not construct others at Rustchuk, at Shumla, in the intervening country, and in a zone of twenty kilometres around Baltchik.

A mixed commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of each of the two High Contracting Parties, shall be charged, within fifteen days from the signing of the present treaty, with delimiting the new frontier in conformity with the preceding stipulations. This commission shall supervise the division of the lands and funds which up to the present time may have belonged in common to districts, communes, or communities separated by the new frontier. In case of disagreement as to the line or as to the method of marking it, the two High Contracting Parties agree to request a friendly Government to appoint an arbitrator, whose decision upon the points at issue shall be considered final.

### **Article 3**

The frontier between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia shall follow, conformably to the *Proces-Verbal* drawn up by the respective military delegates, which is annexed to *Protocol No.9* of July 25/August 1913, of the Conference of Bucharest, the following line:

The frontier line shall begin at the old frontier, from the summit of Patarica, follow the old Turco-Bulgarian frontier and the dividing

line of the waters between the Vardar and the Struma, with the exception of the upper valley of the Strumitza, which shall remain Serbian territory; the line shall terminate at the Belasica Mountain, where it will bend back to the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. A detailed description of this frontier and the 1/200,000 map of the Austrian General Staff, on which it is indicated, are annexed to the present article.

A mixed commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of each of the two High Contracting Powers, shall be charged, within fifteen days from the signing of the present treaty, with delimiting the new frontier, in conformity with the preceding stipulation.

This commission shall supervise the division of the lands and funds, which up to the present time may have belonged in common to the districts, communes, or communities separated by the new frontier.

In case of disagreement as to the line or as to the method of marking it, the two High Contracting Parties agree to request a friendly Government to appoint an arbitrator, whose decision upon the points at issue shall be considered final.

#### **Article 4**

Questions relating to the old Serbo-Bulgarian frontier shall be settled according to the *Understanding* reached by the two High Contracting Parties, as stated in the *Protocol* annexed to the present article.

#### **Article 5**

The frontier between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Bulgaria shall follow, conformably to the *Proces-Verbal* drawn up by the respective military delegates and annexed to *Protocol No.9* of July 25/7 August 1913, of the Conference of Bucharest, the following line:

The frontier line shall start from the new Serbo-Bulgarian frontier on the summit of Belasica Planina and terminate at the mouth of the Mesta on the Aegean Sea.

Between these two extreme points the frontier line shall follow the line indicated on the 1/200,000 map of the Austrian General Staff, in accordance with the description annexed to the present article.

A mixed commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of each of the two High Contracting Parties, shall be charged, within fifteen days from the signing of the present treaty, with delimiting the frontier in conformity with the preceding stipulations.

This commission shall supervise the division of the lands and funds, which up to the present time may have belonged in common to

the districts, communes, or communities separated by the new frontier. In case of disagreement as to the line or as to the method of marking it, the two High Contracting Parties engage to request a friendly Government to appoint an arbitrator, whose decision upon the points at issue shall be considered final.

It is formally understood that Bulgaria renounces from henceforth all claim to the island of Crete.

### **Article 6**

The headquarters of the respective armies shall be immediately informed of the signing of the present treaty. The Bulgarian Government engages to begin to reduce its army to a peace footing on the day after such notification. It shall order its troops to their garrisons, whence, with the least possible delay, the various reserves shall be returned to their homes.

If the garrison of any troops is situated in the zone occupied by the army of one of the High Contracting Parties, such troops shall be ordered to some other point in the old Bulgarian territory and may not return to their regular garrisons until after the evacuation of the above-mentioned occupied zone.

### **Article 7**

The evacuation of Bulgarian territory, both old and new, shall begin immediately after the demobilization of the Bulgarian army and shall be completed within a period of not more than fifteen days.

During this period the zone of demarcation for the Roumanian army of operations shall be determined by a line running as follows: Sistov-Lovcea-Turski-Isvor-Glozene-Zlatitza-Mirkovo-Araba-Ko nak-Orchania-Mezdra-Vratza-Berkovitza-Lom-Danube.

### **Article 8**

During the occupation of the Bulgarian territories the various armies shall retain the right of requisition in consideration of cash payment.

Such armies shall have free use of the railways for the transportation of troops and of provisions of all kinds, without compensation to the local authority.

The sick and wounded shall be under the protection of the said armies.

### **Article 9**

As soon as possible after the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty all prisoners of war shall be mutually restored.

The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall each appoint special commissioners to receive the prisoners.

All prisoners in the hands of any of the Governments shall be delivered to the commissioner of the Government to which they belong, or to his duly authorized representative, at the place which shall be determined upon by the interested parties.

The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall present to each other, respectively, as soon as possible after all the prisoners have been returned, a statement of the direct expenses incurred through the care and maintenance of the prisoners from the date of their capture or surrender to the date of their death or return. The sums due by Bulgaria to each one of the other High Contracting Parties shall be set off against the sums due by each of the other High Contracting Parties to Bulgaria, and the difference shall be paid to the creditor Government in each case as soon as possible after the exchange of the above-mentioned statements of expense.

### **Article 10**

The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Bucharest within fifteen days, or sooner if it be possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have hereunto affixed their names and seals.

Done at Bucharest the twenty-eighth day of the month of July (tenth day of the month of August) in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.

#### **Signatories:**

*For Romania:* **T. Maioresco; Al. Marghiloman; Take Ionesco; C.G. Dissesco; GENERAL AIDE-DE-CAMP Coanda; COLONEL C. Christesco.**

*For Greece:* **E. K. Veniselos; D. Panas; N. Politis; CAPTAIN A. Exadactylos; CAPTAIN Pali.**

*For Montenegro:* **GENERAL Serdar I. Voukotic; I. Matanovic.**

*For Serbia:* **Nik. P. Pachic; M. G. Ristic; M. Spalaikovic; COLONEL K. Smilianic; LIEUTENANT-COLONEL D. Kalafatovic.**

*For Bulgaria:* **D. Tontcheff; GENERAL Fitcheff; Dr. S. Ivantchoff; S. Radeff; LIEUTENANT-COLONEL Stancioff.**

**EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DECLARATION  
ON FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC  
OF MACEDONIA**

*(Guimaraes, 1-2 May 1992)*<sup>688</sup>

The European Community and its member states, gathered in an informal ministerial meeting at Guimaraes on 1st and 2nd of May 1992, had an in depth discussion on the request of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be recognized as an independent state.

They express their readiness to recognize the republic, within its existing borders, as a sovereign and independent state under a name that will be acceptable for all involved parties.

They expressed their high appreciation for the efforts of the Presidency, which included the preparation of a global package.

The community and its member states look forward to establishing with the authorities of Skopje a fruitful cooperative relationship aimed at the promotion of meaningful cooperation capable of improving political stability and economic progress in the area.

Simultaneously, they urge the directly involved parties to continue to do their utmost to resolve the pending questions on the basis of the Presidency's package.

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<sup>688</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kniga III); Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, p. 333. The document is registered in the UN archives under No. S/23880. For information, the reference "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" was first used in this declaration, which was adopted at an informal ministerial meeting at Guimaraes (Portugal).

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**EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON  
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA<sup>689</sup>  
(Lisbon, 27 June 1992)**

The European Council strongly condemns the continuing violence which has ravaged the territory of former Yugoslavia for over a year, resulting in an appalling loss of life and a desperate humanitarian situation, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although all parties have contributed, in their own way, to the present state of affairs, by far the greatest share of the responsibility falls on the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav army controlled by it. The Community and its member States stress again the need for full application of the sanctions stipulated by the UN Security Council.

The European Council deplores in particular that the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, in accordance with UN Security Council *Resolution 758*, has not been achieved. Further measures are therefore required. EU Member States will propose that the legally competent body, the UN Security Council take, without delay, all necessary measures for the reopening of the airport and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and neighboring areas. The European Community and its Member States are ready to cooperate in that so far as is legally and practically possible for them to do so. This may include airborne humanitarian aid. While giving priority to peaceful means, the European Council does not exclude support for the use of military means by the UN to achieve these humanitarian objectives.

Noting the *Declaration by WEU Council of Ministries* of 19 June 1992, the European Council welcomes the study being carried out by

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<sup>689</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kniga III); Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 333-335. The infamous *Lisbon Declaration* was adopted during the Portuguese presidency with the EC. The Portuguese Foreign Minister at the time, João de Deus Pinheiro, acting as EC Chairman, tries to "help" in the negotiations with Greece at the meetings with the representatives of the Republic of Macedonia by putting forward proposal known as the Pinheiro Package, which offers double name – one for internal usage, and other for international (as proposals in the public were mentioned "Independent Macedonia" and "Slavic Republic of Macedonia"). This package also stipulated changes in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. However, the Pinheiro mission failed as the proposals were rejected by the two involved parties.

this organization of possible means in support of actions undertaken in the framework of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

The European Council is gravely preoccupied by the increasingly intolerable situation of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In spite of actions already undertaken, in particular by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Council considers that further important financial help will be needed. The Commission will coordinate these efforts with the other G-24 countries.

With regard to Kosovo, the European Council expects the Serbian leadership to refrain from further repression and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives of this territory. The European Council reminds the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt with in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia. It stresses the need to immediately dispatch observers to Kosovo as well as to neighboring countries in order to prevent the use of violence and with a view to contributing to the restoration of confidence. The Community and its member States call upon the CSE to take the necessary steps to that effect and stand ready, as far as they are concerned, to take part in such a mission.

The European Council reiterates the position taken by the Community and its member states in Guimaraes on the request of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be recognized as an independent State. It expresses its readiness to recognize that republic within its existing borders according to their *Declaration* of 16 December 1991 under a name which does not include the term Macedonia. It furthermore considers the borders of this republic as inviolable and guaranteed in accordance with the principles of the *UN Charter* and the *Charter of Paris*.<sup>690</sup>

The European Community and its Member States will not recognize the new federal entity comprising Serbia and Montenegro as the Successor State of the former Yugoslavia until the moment that decision has been taken by the qualified international institutions. They have decided to demand the suspension of the delegation of Yugoslavia in the proceedings at the CSE and other international fora and organizations.

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<sup>690</sup> The paragraph is bolded by the editors as it directly refers to the Republic of Macedonia.

The European Council states its determination to help the people of the former Yugoslavia in their quest for a peaceful future in Europe and reiterates that the EC Conference on Yugoslavia chaired by Lord Carrington is the only forum capable of ensuring a durable and equitable solution to the outstanding problems of the former Yugoslavia, including constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Council urges all parties involved in the peace process to participate fully without further delay in the negotiations sponsored by the Conference.

**REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA ASSEMBLY**  
**DECLARATION ON THE LISBON**  
**DECLARATION<sup>691</sup>**  
**(Skopje, 3 July 1992)**

*Pursuant to Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, and reviewing the Declaration of the European Community's Council of Europe on the Former Yugoslavia adopted at Lisbon on 27 June 1992 in light of the part referring to the Republic of Macedonia, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, on its session held on 3 July, passed the following*

**DECLARATION**

1. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia considers as unacceptable and rejects the part of the *Declaration of the European Community's Council of Europe on the Former Yugoslavia* adopted at Lisbon on 27 June 1992, referring to the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia "under a name which does not include the term Macedonia."

By accepting such a position, even temporarily, a precedent has been made with extremely serious international consequences.

2. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia appreciates the part of the Declaration which considers the borders of the Republic of Macedonia as inviolable and guaranteed in accordance with the principles of the *United Nations Charter* and the *Charter of Paris*.

3. By transferring part of its sovereignty into Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, based on the right of self-determination, the Republic of Macedonia is an international subject with clearly distinguished and recognized name, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and as such is equal legal successor of SFRY as acknowledged by the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia and its documents.

4. By its Declaration of 17 September 1991, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia reaffirmed the will of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia as expressed on the Referendum of 8 September the same year in favor of an independent and sovereign state under the

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<sup>691</sup> Source: Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 40, 1992.

name Macedonia, which was embodied in the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia* adopted on 17 November 1991.

The aforementioned documents note that the Republic of Macedonia will endeavor for consistent compliance with the principles of international relations contained in the UN documents, *Helsinki Final Act* and *CSCE Charter of Paris*.

5. For the legitimacy and justifiability of its request based on the *Declaration on International Recognition*, the Republic of Macedonia has also received an official confirmation in the *Report of the Arbitration Commission of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia* in which it is concluded that “*the Republic of Macedonia satisfies the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the EC Council Declaration on Yugoslavia of 16 December 1991*” as well as that “*the use of the name Macedonia does not contain any territorial pretensions toward another state.*”

6. The name Macedonia is the basis for a name of a nation—the Macedonian, which represents the majority in the Republic of Macedonia, and denying this nation also means discrimination of the same nation and the minorities living in the country.

This is not in favor of the pursuance of peaceful and stabile versatile development of the Republic of Macedonia and the preservation of its sovereignty and independence gained in a peaceful and a democratic manner.

7. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia continues to insist and request from the European Community, as well as from the wider international community, the *Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* and the United Nations and Member States an international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its name and within the existing borders.

8. This Declaration shall be published in the *Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia*.

No. 08-2812/1

3 July 1992

Skopje

President of the Assembly of the  
Republic of Macedonia  
(Signed) *Stojan Andov*,

**REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA MINISTRY OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM  
RELATED TO THE ADMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF MACEDONIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS [AS  
REACTION TO THE *MEMORANDUM* OF GREECE-  
WHICH ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THIS]<sup>692</sup>  
(New York, 3 February 1993)**

1. The Republic of Macedonia meets all criteria for accession to membership in the UN under Article 4 of the Charter.

With regard to this, there is no legal or procedural basis for a country to block or condition the accession of another country to the UN due to prior settlement of certain outstanding issues. It is opposite to the commitments of the UN and the principles for universality of the Organization. Furthermore, the position holding that the issues ought to be settled prior our accession to the UN is unacceptable pressure that places the Republic of Macedonia in unequal position, and for the purpose of the realization of ungrounded, anti-historical demands. Most importantly, the postponement of the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN is what imposes danger to the peace and stability in the region, not the accession of the Republic of Macedonia.

2. Greece is attempting to question the preparedness of the Republic of Macedonia to fulfill the commitments of the UN Charter due to “past experiences end practices, as well as the constituent acts and policies of the new Republic.”

This is completely opposite to the truth:

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<sup>692</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - “Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)” - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republ i ka Makedoni ja (1990-2005)* - edi ci ja *Dokument i za Makedoni ja* (Kni ga III); Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 517-521. The *Memorandum* was reaction and response to the *Memorandum* submitted to the UN by Greece on 25 January 1993, as an attempt to prevent the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN, containing the objections of Greece why the Republic of Macedonia should not be admitted to membership in the UN. Previously, in January 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, under the activities related to the application for admission, had sent *Aide memoire* to the UN, providing arguments and short history of Macedonia and the Macedonian people.

- Nowadays in the Hellenic Republic there is prevailing nationalism and mass hysteria, which is well known to everyone and which is extremely dangerous for the peace in the region;

- The Republic of Macedonia is the only one of the former Yugoslav republics that has settled and still settles all issues in a peaceful manner, with the necessary tolerance and through talks, insisting on reaching a long-standing solution to any issue, and taking care of the interests of its neighbors. The Republic of Macedonia has so far showed exceptional sense of tolerance and patience in spite of all injustice and damages it has suffered. The Republic of Macedonia did not allow development of nationalism and populism;

- In spite of the major material damage, the Republic of Macedonia has allowed the former Yugoslav army to leave its territory, taking away the entire armament solely to the purpose of avoiding potential clashes;

- While the Hellenic Republic was blocking our border and our oil at the Thessalonica port, the Greek transit through the Republic of Macedonia was unimpeded: there was daily transit of some 200 carriages and above 70 heavy motor vehicles with Greek goods without any problem whatsoever;

- Due to the blockades imposed to the Republic of Macedonia by Greece, the country is now being faced with significant impairment of the economic situation, thus severing the social tensions, which altogether leads to severing interethnic relations in the country;

Taking all this into consideration, the Republic of Macedonia can in no case be held as a factor that destabilizes the region.

Furthermore:

-Last autumn, Greece held large military maneuvers on our very border including targets in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia;

-On several occasions within the past six or seven months Greek military and civil airplanes violated our airspace;

3. Greece is trying to exploit the statement of extremists in the Republic of Macedonia and outside the borders that have no official support and in no sense do they reflect the official policy of the Republic of Macedonia.

The same applies to the printing and publishing of geographic or ethnic maps of Macedonia, in the Republic of Macedonia and outside the borders, which the Hellenic Republic utilizes to prove that we have territorial aspirations. The Republic of Macedonia and its organs of governance distanced themselves from these occurrences.

Simultaneously, in the Hellenic Republic is being claimed that “Macedonia is Greek” with every move, and at all levels! What is the meaning of all this?

4. It is of utmost importance to be noted that the requests by the Hellenic Republic for change in the name of the Republic of Macedonia has no legal or other justified grounds whatsoever, not to talk about historical grounds. For right understanding of the same, the followings things should be made clear:

a) For the first time in the history, part of the region Macedonia fell under Greek power in 1913, after the Second Balkan War, that is, after the division of Macedonia by the Bucharest Peace Treaty;

b) Before August 1988, the name Macedonia had never been used in Greece in any official form. Its northern province was named Northern Greece. By a decree of the Prime Minister in August 1988, this province was renamed into Macedonia. To conclude, Greece has been using this name for little more than four years;

c) The Republic of Macedonia has existed as a state since August 1944, that is, nearly for half a century. The Republic of Macedonia as one of the six republics of former Yugoslavia, until its disintegration, was also UN Member State. Furthermore, the President of the thirty-second General Assembly of the United Nations was the Macedonian citizen Lazar Mojsov;

d) The Republic of Macedonia is the only state that is completely, with its entire territory, encompassed into Macedonia. The northern Greek province, which now bears the name Macedonia, is merely a small part of the overall territory of Greece;

e) The Republic of Macedonia makes special note that it has no aspirations for exclusivity over the name Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia does not mind that the northern Greek province is named Macedonia.

f) In the Republic of Macedonia, in its capital city, there is a General Consulate of the Hellenic Republic. This Consulate until recently referred to the organs of the Republic of Macedonia officially, using its name, Socialist Republic of Macedonia (enclosed herewith are copies of the notes of the General Consulate, as well as a copy of the letter from the President of Greece accrediting their General Consul to SRM). Hence, the Hellenic Republic considered the name of our state legitimate and had denied it until the beginning of 1992.

In view of the aforementioned facts, it can be concluded that: due to a province that has been carrying a certain name for four years, it is

demanded a change in the name of a state, which has carried the name name for nearly 50 years, while the Macedonian people have had that bane with centuries. Or, due to a province, which is a small part of another state, there is denial of the name of a state that is encompassed with its entire territory in the region with the same name. Actually, the Republic of Macedonia was the first to use that name, and according to the rule, *Qui prior est tempore, potior est iure*, nobody has the right to deny it.

5. Another important fact is that the International Commission on Arbitration, established by the EC, whose members is Greece as well, composed of five top European lawyers and chaired by the French President of the Constitutional Court, Mr. Badinter, unequivocally decided that the Republic of Macedonia had met all terms for recognition and that the name did not imply any territorial pretensions. Prior the adoption of such conclusions, the Commission had set a number of terms to the Republic of Macedonia, which were fulfilled.

6. The Republic of Macedonia clearly and categorically stated and guaranteed that it had not territorial aspirations towards any of its neighboring countries. It has even embodied this in its Constitution at the request of the Badinter Commission. The Republic of Macedonia is even prepared to sign an agreement with the Hellenic Republic to guarantee the borders, which agreement may be also guaranteed by other international factors in accord with the both parties in case such need arises. The Republic of Macedonia is also prepared to sign an agreement on good-neighborliness and cooperation on similar basis as the agreement between Poland and Germany. The Republic of Macedonia is also open to similar suggestions in this direction that would be mutually acceptable for both parties.

7. The name Republic of Macedonia under no means implies to pretensions on the entire region known under the name of Macedonia. The name of the U.S.A., which can be used here as a comparative example, does not mean that the U.S.A. have aspirations towards all states of North, Central and South America. Same as the case with the U.S.A., the Macedonian Constitutions clearly defines the territory of our state and its borders.

8. At the least, it is odd that the Hellenic Republic denies Article 49 of our Constitution, which makes reference to the care of the Republic of Macedonia for our minority living in the neighboring countries. It should be noticed that the Greek constitution has similar provi-

sion as well. It is widely known that the Hellenic Republic denies the existence of a Macedonian minority there.

This raises the following logical questions:

a) If there is no such minority in the Hellenic Republic, then why this Article does not apply to this country and what is the purpose of their reaction?;

b) If there is such minority, which is undeniable, why Greece does not exert at least the fundamental rights of this minority as stipulated by UN Charter, Helsinki Committee, Paris Charter, etc., whose signatory state is Greece?; and

c) The most important – is that the reason why the Hellenic Republic objects the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name?

9. The European Community was allocated with the mandate to settle the issues that have arisen from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and in that context, the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as well. With regard to the Republic of Macedonia, the EC, under the pressure of Greece, was violating its principles, acting against the spirit it is promoting and denied the conclusions of the Badinter Commission, which has been established by EC. It was not coincidence that the EC President, Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen stated that the issue with the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia had become a black stain on Europe's conscience. Now, there is a serious danger of becoming black stain on UN's conscience as well.

10. On the other hand, another significant fact to be pointed out is that the change in the name Republic of Macedonia, which is against the will of our people, will undoubtedly lead to destabilization of the country. It will unequivocally lead to the activation and uncontrolled raise of nationalism in the Republic of Macedonia, confrontations on interethnic basis in the state and severing relations with the neighbors.

11. With the constant endeavors of the Republic of Macedonia for arriving at a solution and providing international recognition and its accession to membership in the UN, we have shown tolerance and moderateness, as well as preparedness for certain compromises for the purpose of securing long-lasting peace and stability in the region. Greece, however, showed no preparedness for solution. Just to mention the endeavors of Great Britain, as EC President State, which through Ambassador O'Neil attempted to propose a resolution that will be mutually acceptable for the two parties. This was acceptable for 11 EC Member States, but not for Greece. President Gligorov initiated meetings with

Prime Minister Mitsotakis and addressed letters, but there was no feedback. There were other initiatives from our side, which, unfortunately, were met with lack of understanding. Last week President Gligorov reinitiated meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis, which was rejected as well.

12. The postponement of the international recognition brings tremendous damage to the Republic of Macedonia. The country lives in real isolation and all of this contributes for the internal situation to undergo a process of permanent severance, which leads to inevitable destabilization not only in the country, but in the region as well. The responsibility for this is now in the hands of the UN. Hence, the mistakes of the EC earlier and those of the UN now, as well as the Greek policy for postponing the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia inevitably lead to a new Balkan war, since they awaken the old dreams for division of the Republic of Macedonia. There are many indications in support of this. Therefore, the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia is significant prerequisite for enhancing the peace and stability in the region. The problems on the Balkans cannot be settled at once: they should be settled one at a time, and in effect to the Republic of Macedonia, apart from the illegal and ungrounded hindrance by the Hellenic Republic, there are no substantial issues. With its recognition, the Republic of Macedonia can become a pillar of peace on the Balkans, not an apple of discord. It should be long-term interest of Greece as well. The Republic of Macedonia is profoundly interested in stable and prosperous Greece, with which would like to have widely developed relations in all fields, just as the case with all of our neighbors.

13. Last but not least, it should be noted that the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN can only help overcoming the issues, since the Member States have many instruments and institutions for settling disputes, for which there are many examples in the history of the UN.

**LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KIRO  
GLIGOROV ADDRESSED TO THE UN  
SECRETARY – GENERAL<sup>693</sup>  
(Skopje, 5 February 1993)**

Your Excellency,

Allow me first to express my satisfaction that the request of the Republic of Macedonia, along with Your letter, was transmitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly. This act fulfills the legitimate request of the Republic of Macedonia, pursuant to the decision of its citizens to live in independent and sovereign state as a member of the world community.

We are forced, however, to express our discontent with the establishment of prerequisites for the accession to membership, which prerequisites have not been stipulated by the *Charter of the United Nations*. We regard the establishment of new, for us, unconceivable and so far unprecedented prerequisites as serious threat to the applicable practice in the United Nations, which reputation, You, Mr. Secretary-General are trying to substantiate in these troublesome and full of temptations times.

Although the accession in the United Nations is of utmost significance to us, we, however, seek only to be allocated with the same obligations that apply for the other 183 respected Member States.

Having into consideration that until recently you circulated the Greek *Memorandum*, as document No. A/47/877 S/25158, which contains a number of incorrect and imprecise data regarding my country, please find enclosed herewith our *Memorandum*, which contains clear positions in respect with the issues raised by the Republic of Greece.

With regard to the fact that the *Memorandum* of the Republic of Greece was distributed as a document of the United Nations to all Mem-

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<sup>693</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republ i ka Makedoni ja (1990-2005)* - edi ci ja *Dokument i za Makedoni ja* (Kn i ga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 515-516. On 5 February 2008, President Kiro Gligorov sent a letter to the Secretary-General regarding the procedure for accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN. To the letter was enclosed *Memorandum* prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, with Undersecretary Risto Nikovski, acting as project leader.

ber States, and in order to avoid our country being placed in unfavorable position, I would like to ask my addressing, along with the enclosed *Memorandum*, be circulated as *Annex* to our request for membership, which is circulated under No. A/47/876 S/25147.

Please, Mr. Secretary-General, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

*Very truly yours,*  
(Signed) **Kiro Gligorov**

**H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali**  
UN Secretary-General

**LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BRANKO  
CRVENKOVSKI ADDRESSED TO  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UN SECURITY  
COUNCIL<sup>694</sup>**

*(Skopje, 24 March 1993)*

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to address you with regard to the application of the Republic of Macedonia for admission to the United Nations, dated 30 July 1992 (document *S/25147*) and to the informal consultations of the members of the Security Council on the subject.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia I would like to express to you and to the members of the Council our appreciation for recommending my country for membership in the United Nations.

However, I wish to bring to your attention our disappointment that it has not proved possible for the Security Council to adopt the standard straightforward resolution on admission of new members.

Regardless of our concerns I would like to assure you that the Republic of Macedonia is able and willing to carry out the obligations under the *Charter*. We shall proceed with our policy of good-neighborly relations and cooperation aiming at establishing our country as a factor of peace and stability in the region and in the broader international community.

I would also like to express our willingness to continue to cooperate with the Co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavian in setting up a mechanism to settle the difference that has arisen and to promote confidence-building measures with the Republic of Greece, on the clear understanding that this in no way affects the completion of the process of admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the membership in the United Nations.

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<sup>694</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kniga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 524-525. The document is registered in the UN archive under No.S /25541.

The Republic of Macedonia will in no circumstances be prepared to accept the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as the name of the country. We refuse to be associated in any way with the present connotation of the term “Yugoslavia”.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly

yours,

(Signed) *Branko Crvenkovski*  
President of the Government of  
the Republic of Macedonia

**H.E. Mr. Terence Christopher O'Brien**  
President of the Security Council  
United Nations

**UNITED NATIONS GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 817<sup>695</sup>  
(New York, 7 April 1993)**

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3196th meeting, on 7 April 1993

The Security Council,

Having examined the *Application for admission to the United Nations* in document *S/25147*,

Noting that the applicant fulfils the criteria for membership in the United Nations laid down in Article 4 of the *Charter*,

Noting however that a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighboring relations in the region,

Welcoming the readiness of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, at the request of the Secretary-General, to use their good offices to settle the above-mentioned difference, and to promote confidence-building measures among the parties,

Taking note of the contents of the letters contained in documents *S/25541*, *S/25542* and *S/25543* received from the parties,

1. Urges the parties to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference;

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<sup>695</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republ i ka Makedoni ja (1990-2005)* - edi ci ja *Dokument i za Makedoni ja* (Kn i ga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, p. 540. This Resolution, by which the Security Council actually recommends to the General Assembly to admit the Republic of Macedonia in the UN, was adopted after several-month uncertainty, negotiations and obstacles to the accession of the Republic of Macedonia by Greece. President of the Security Council during the accession of the Republic of Macedonia was the Pakistan representative – Jamsheed Marker. On 1 February 1993, France, Great Britain and Spain (SC Member States at that time), on behalf of the European Community proposed to the Security Council that the Republic of Macedonia be admitted to membership in the UN and in the system of its special agencies and programs under the reference "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia".

2. Recommends to the General Assembly that the State whose application is contained in document *S/25147* be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the outcome of the initiative taken by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

United Nations  
**A/RES/47/225**

**UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
RESOLUTION 225 ON THE ADMISSION OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA TO  
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS<sup>696</sup>  
(New York, 8 April 1993)**

A/RES/47/225 98th plenary meeting 8 April 1993.

Admission of the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 to membership in the United Nations

**The General Assembly,**

Having received the *Recommendation* of the Security Council of 7 April 1993 that the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,

Having considered the application for membership contained in document A/47/876-S/25147,

Decides to admit the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.

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<sup>696</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - “Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)” - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Knjiga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, p. 545. By this Resolution, adopted at the plenary session of the General Assembly – Republic of Macedonia was admitted as the 181st UN Member State. The session was attended by Macedonian delegation led by President Kiro Gligorov. On 6 August 1993, the President of the Republic of Macedonia appointed Denko Maleski Ambassador (Chief) of the resident mission of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN at New York. The document is registered in the UN archive under No. A/RES/47/225.

**LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KIRO  
GLIGOROV ADDRESSED TO THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE UN  
SECRETARY-GENERAL<sup>697</sup>**  
*(Skopje, 29 May 1993)*

Your Excellency,

After the admission of my country into the United Nations, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the international Conference on Former Yugoslavia at Your Excellency's request, and in accordance with Security Council *Resolution 817* (1993) had begun their good offices and negotiations with the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece.

Inspired by the permanent interests for good-neighborly relations with the Republic of Greece, for peace and stability in the region, we have confirmed to the Co-Chairmen our fullest participation and cooperation, so that the speedy settlement of the difference between my country and the Republic of Greece could be achieved.

I would like to express our belief that these negotiations have proved so far that it is conceivable that the request of the Security Council could be successfully met, to which end the Co-Chairmen, Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen, have rendered an important contribution. We are prepared to continue to cooperate with them in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining unsolved matters.

We have, however, specific objections in connection with certain suggestions of the Co-Chairmen, in particular regarding the following:

-the unacceptability of Article 5 of the proposed Draft, which is directly in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and may, if accepted, imply change of the Constitution with unforesee-

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<sup>697</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kni ga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 467-469. President Kiro Gligorov's letter put forward the position of the Republic of Macedonia with regard to the pursue of good offices of the Co-Chairmen, Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance. The letter was transmitted by a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on 3 June 1993 to become integral part of *Secretary General Report* of 26 May 1993. The letter is registered in the UN archive under No. S/25855/Add.2.

able consequences and destabilization of the situation in my country and in our region;

-our reservations on the content of Article 7, which could denote serious grounds for misunderstandings and disputes between the two countries due to its wide and imprecise drafting;

-the necessity to stipulate Macedonian and the Greek language (apart from the English language) as the languages of the two parties that are to sign an international agreement.

We suggest that Article 8 should read:

“1. The parties shall guarantee the rights and obligations of persons members of national, ethnic or similar groups in accordance with applicable international standards, in particular: (further on, besides already mentioned documents, Article 8 should include: the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National, or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Council of Europe’s parliamentary Assembly Recommendation on the Rights of Minorities).

2. (As proposed)”

We would like to emphasize our firm conviction that our constitutional name “The Republic of Macedonia” does not imply territorial or other aspiration whatsoever. Therefore, other proposals are not necessary. To the contrary, the confirmation of this name shall represent significant contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, which is an essential requirement to *Resolution 817* (1993).

In a word, we find it indispensable that the existing process of negotiations continues in accordance with the abovementioned resolution of the Security Council. However, that does not preclude the prospects for bilateral talks and negotiations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece in correlation with the abovementioned process. They, certainly, could not represent a substitute for the ongoing negotiations on the basis of good offices of the Co-Chairmen, in hope that they could contribute to the strengthening of the mutual confidence and to the achievement of solutions acceptable for both parties.

I am fully convinced that the Security Council shall take into account the content of this letter when considering Your Excellency’s report to the Security Council and shall decide that the ongoing process be accomplished in the specific and the shortest possible period.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,  
(Signed) *Kiro Gligorov*  
President of the Republic of Macedonia

H.E. Mr. **Boutros Boutros-Ghali**  
United Nations Secretary-General  
New York

**UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY**  
**RESOLUTION 845<sup>698</sup>**  
**(18. June 1993)**

Adopted by the **Security Council** at its 3243rd meeting, on 18 June 1993

The Security Council,

Recalling its *Resolution 817* (1993) of 7 April 1993, in which it urged Greece and the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference,

Having considered the *Report* of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to *Resolution 817* (1993), together with the statement of the Government of Greece and the letter of the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dated 27 and 29 May 1993 respectively (*S/25855* and *Add.1 and 2*),

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for their efforts and commends to the parties as a sound basis for the settlement of their difference the proposals set forth in *Annex V* to the report of the Secretary-General;

2. Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress of these further efforts, the objective of which is to resolve the difference between the two parties before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report to the Council on their outcome in good time, and decides to resume consideration of the matter in the light of the report.

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<sup>698</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - “Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)” - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edi cija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Knj ga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, p. 470. Pursuant to this Resolution, Co-Chairmen Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance were given the mandate to commence their good offices, which as of July 1995 were provided by Cyrus Vance only.

**LETTER FROM THE UN SECRETARY–  
GENERAL ADDRESSED TO  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL<sup>699</sup>**

*(New York, 13 July 1993)*

By *Security Council Resolution 845* (1993), regarding the settlement of the difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Council urged the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary – General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them.

I have the honor inform you that Mr. Cyrus Vance, the former Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, has accepted my request to continue his good offices to help the parties reach an agreement.

Mr. Vance will begin his assignment on 1 August 1993.

It is my hope that, as stated in *Resolution 845* (1993), it will be possible to resolve the difference before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) *Boutros Boutros - Ghali*

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<sup>699</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kniga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, p. 471. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali appointed Cyrus Vance Special Envoy to provide good offices in the settlement of the "difference" over the name between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. In November 1997, the Secretary-General, as Deputy to Special Envoy Cyrus Vance, appointed Matthew Nimetz, who had been serving as Special Envoy of U.S. President Bill Clinton on the "difference" over the name between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. After the resignation of Cyrus Vance in December 1999, Matthew Nimetz was appointed Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on the "difference" over the name between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. The letter is registered in the UN archive under No. S/26088.

**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT  
TO RESOLUTION 845<sup>700</sup>**

**(New York, 22 September 1993)**

**I. Introduction**

1. At its 3243rd meeting on 18 June 1993 the Security Council unanimously adopted *Resolution 845* (1993) by which, inter alia, the Council:

... “a) Recalling its *Resolution 817* (1993) of 7 April 1993, in which it urged Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference...;

b) Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them;

c) Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress of these further efforts, the objective of which is to resolve the difference between the two parties before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report to the Council on their outcome in good time, and decides to resume consideration of the matter in the light of the report.”

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<sup>700</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - “Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)” - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kniga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 472-475. This is the second and last *Report* of the UN Secretary General and the UN Special Envoy regarding the settlement of the “difference” over the name between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, although they have the commitment pursuant to *Resolution 817* and *845* to keep the Council informed about the course of the negotiations for settling the “difference” over the name between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. The Report is registered in the UN archive under No. S/26483.

In addition, the first *Report of the UN Secretary General* – Boutros Boutros-Ghali was submitted to the Security Council on 26 May 1993, and refers to the good offices of Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance. Interesting fact about this first report, which is registered in the UN archive under No. S/25855, and which contains five *Annexes*, is that the two “facilitators” proposed the name “New Macedonia” as a possible compromise!

2. On adoption of *Resolution 845* (1993) I asked Mr. Cyrus Vance, former Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to continue his mission of good offices. On July 15 I informed the Security Council that Mr. Vance had accepted my request, and that he would begin his assignment on 1 August 1993 (S/26088).

## II. Review of Discussions

3. Since undertaking his current assignment, Mr. Vance has held a series of separate meetings with the parties which led to their first direct meeting under his auspices. In accordance with the terms of *Resolution 845 – 1993(S/25855)* the proposals contained in *annex V* of the *Report of the Secretary-General* to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 817 (1993), which contained a *Draft Treaty Confirming the Existing Frontier and Establishing Measures for Confidence Building, Friendship and Neighborly Cooperation* proposed by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on 14 May 1993, served as a basis for these discussions.

4. On 11 and 12 August Mr. Vance met with the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, and the former Foreign Minister Mr. Denko Maleski. On 22 August he met with a delegation of Greece led by Ambassador George D. Papoulias, Special Envoy. On 23 August he met with a delegation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia led by Ambassador Ivan Toshevski, Special Envoy of the President.

5. Following these separate meetings with the two sides, the parties, represented by Ambassador Toshevski and Ambassador Papoulias and their delegations, met for the first time together for direct discussions in Mr. Vance's presence on 23 August.

6. The direct discussions focused on Mr. Vance's proposed schedule for ongoing, direct talks at New York under his auspices. He proposed that continuous, direct and high-level discussions begin on 28 September 1993. In the separate meetings and in their direct discussions, both sides expressed strong support for this proposal and assured Mr. Vance that they did so with the full confidence that it was acceptable to the leadership at the highest levels of their Governments. The parties also approved a joint statement which was released to the press at the United Nations Headquarters (annex I).

7. The direct meeting on 23 August took place in a cordial and cooperative atmosphere. Both sides welcomed this “new phase” in the effort to resolve their remaining differences which they hoped would lead to a “new era” in their relations. Pending the commencement of ongoing, direct talks, both delegations reserved their positions as reflected in their statement by the Government of Greece (S/25855/Add. 1) and in the letter of the President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Secretary-General dated 29 May 1993(S/25855/Add. 2)

### **III. Observations**

8. While it has not proved possible to resolve the difference between the two parties before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as called for in *Resolution 845* (1993), their direct meeting in the presence of Mr. Vance and their agreement to enter into ongoing, direct discussion under his auspices demonstrate the desire on both sides to come to a resolution of the differences between them. Normalization of the relations between these two States would contribute to peace and stability in the region.

9. As members of the Council will be aware, on 9 September the Prime Minister of Greece announced the dissolution of Parliament. Elections have been called for 10 October. The Greek authorities have said that this development will not affect the direct talks which will take place as scheduled at the end of September.

10. Mr. Vance and I continued to stand ready to assist the parties in their efforts to resolve their difference. In the meantime, I strongly urge both sides to continue their own efforts towards building mutual confidence and to refrain from any action which might contribute to tension between them.

#### **Annex: Joint statement (of the delegations of Greece and of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)**

On 23 August 1993 delegations of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, headed respectively by Ambassador George D. Papoulias, Special Envoy, and Ambassador Ivan Toshevski, Special Envoy, met together at New York under the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus Vance. At Mr. Vance’s suggestion, which both parties warmly welcomed, they have

agreed to commence direct discussions on a continuing basis in Mr. Vance's presence at New York on 28 September 1993, to be followed in due course by a visit of Mr. Vance to Athens and Skopje. These direct and continuous discussions will mark a new phase in the effort to resolve the differences between the parties, in accordance with Security Council *Resolution 845* (1993.)

Pending the opening of the discussions on 28 September, both parties reserve their positions, as stated in United Nations documents *S/25855/Add. 1* and *S/25855/Add.2*.

The parties wish to express their deep appreciation to Mr. Vance for his tireless efforts in pursuing his mission of good offices.

**LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KIRO  
GLIGOROV ADDRESSED TO  
THE PRESIDENT OF U.S.A. –  
BILL CLINTON<sup>701</sup>  
(Skopje, 22 February 1994)**

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to once more use the opportunity to personally express my profound appreciation for your decision for establishing full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia. Your decision is of utmost importance to the Republic of Macedonia, to the enhancement of the security of our state and furthermore the peace and stability in the region of the southern Balkans.

At the same time I would also like to congratulate you on the extraordinary leadership that you have shown during the Bosnian crisis and on the successful outcome of the NATO-conducted activities for ending the Sarajevo siege. I am assured that you will continue with your persistence in your successful role and efforts for resolving and overcoming the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The principled position and the interest of the United States of America for maintaining peace and stability in the Republic of Macedonia, and in the broader region played a crucial role in the past period. I would like to make special reference to the American contingent within UNPROFOR stationed in the Republic of Macedonia. Their presence is a clear manifestation of the interest of the United States in reducing the tensions in the region and for efficient preventive action. Our cooperation with the American forces in the Republic of Macedonia is extraordinary. Their presence here is welcomed heartfully. In this context, the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two states is another significant step.

Unfortunately, the Republic of Macedonia has recently faced with another serious issue, the trade embargo imposed by the Republic of

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<sup>701</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kni ga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 397-399.

Greece on our country. Not only that these measures have caused economic consequences and damage to the economy of the Republic of Macedonia, but they are also a threat for prompting new and unwanted tensions in the region. Today, the border between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece is completely closed for all practical measures. Significant percentage of the goods and products in the ownership of the Republic of Macedonia remain seized at the Thessalonica port. This act by the Greek Government is a classic example of economic pressure, as well as an attempt for creating a new center of conflict in the Balkans region. This took place while the Republic of Macedonia was expressing its full will for continuation of the negotiations, and discussion on all outstanding issues with the Republic of Greece within the United Nations.

This new development of events on the Greek - Macedonian border was received with serious condemnations and concern in the broader international community. The European Union has initiated a procedure at the European Court of Justice for considering the legality of the measures by the Greek Government. In the meantime, however, the Republic of Macedonia is suffering enormous damage and is being faced with serious threat to its stability. Out of these reasons, and in view of the confirmed interest of the United States for stability in this part of the region, I would take the liberty to ask for your assistance and support. The role of the United States in resolving the differences in the dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece is of crucial importance. I am assured that the best form of assistance would be the restoration of the Macedonian-Greek negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and brokerage of Mr. Cyrus Vance, in whom we have complete trust. Other form of assistance would include providing Macedonia with an alternative way of trade in goods and products, which is now being disabled due to the Greek embargo. In this context, I would like to ask you to assist us by transmitting to the United Nations Sanctions Committee our request for providing such corridor through the territory of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The best solution would undoubtedly be lifting the Greek embargo, a measure which is dangerous for the overall stability in the region. I am assured that this is a matter that will be surely discussed in the United Nations Security Council. At this moment, your economic and technical assistance would also be of precious significance to us. I would like to point out in particular the urgent need for establishing

diplomatic relations at a level of embassies between our two states as perhaps the most significant assistance at this time.

Dear Mr. President, I would like to once more assure you that the Republic of Macedonia is undoubtedly interested in peace and good-neighborliness for stability in the region, and in particular in overcoming the difference in the dispute with the Republic of Greece. This is of interest to our general policy in the Balkans.

In hope that you will pay attention to these requests and that you will have the opportunity for exchange of opinions on these matters, please, Mr. President, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

*Very truly yours,*  
(Signed) **Kiro Gligorov**

H.E. **William Clinton**  
President of the U.S.A.

**INTERIM ACCORD<sup>702</sup>**  
**(New York, 13 September 1995)**

Minister **Karolos Papoulias**, representing the Party of the First Part (the “Party of the First Part”) and Minister **Stevo Crvenkovski**, representing the Party of the Second Part (the “Party of the Second Part”), hereby DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:

Recalling the principles of the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of States incorporated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki,

*Bearing in mind the provisions of the United Nations Charter and, in particular those referring to the obligation of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,*

Guided by the spirit and principles of democracy and fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights and dignity, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and pertinent acts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Considering their mutual interest in the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in their region,

Desiring to confirm the existing frontier between them as an enduring international border,

Recalling their obligation not to intervene, on any pretext or in any form, in the internal affairs of the other,

Desiring to develop their mutual relations and to lay firm foundations for a climate of peaceful relations and understanding,

Realizing that economic cooperation is an important element for the development of mutual relations on a stable and firm basis, as well as desiring to develop and promote future cooperation,

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<sup>702</sup> Source: *Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia* No. 48/95. The accord is registered in the UN archive under No. S/1995/794. The conclusion of *Interim Accord*, was a result of several-month negotiations under the auspices of Cyrus Vance. It was ratified by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (9 October 1995), but not by the Parliament of the Hellenic Republic! Due to the attempted assassination of Kiro Gligorov – President of the Republic of Macedonia at that time, the decree for the enactment of the *Ratification Law* (registered under No. 08-3396/1) was signed by Stojan Andov – the Speaker of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia at that time, who was acting President of State pursuant to the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*.

Desiring to reach certain interim agreements that will provide a basis for negotiating a permanent Accord.

Have agreed as follows:

## **A. FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES**

### **Article 1**

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part recognizes the Party of the Second Part as an independent and sovereign state, under the provisional designation set forth in a letter of the Party of the First Part of the date of this Interim Accord, and the Parties shall at an early date establish diplomatic relations at an agreed level with the ultimate goal of relations at ambassadorial level.

2. The Party of the First Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Skopje, the capital of the Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the Second Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Athens, the capital of the Party of the First Part.

### **Article 2**

The Parties hereby confirm their common existing frontier as an enduring and inviolable international border.

### **Article 3**

Each Party undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the other Party. Neither Party shall support the action of a third party directed against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other Party.

### **Article 4**

The Parties shall refrain, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force, including the threat or use of force designed to violate their existing frontier, and they agree that neither of them will assert or support claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or claims for a change of their existing frontier.

### **Article 5**

1. The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

2. Recognizing the difference between them with respect to the name of the Party of the Second Part, each Party reserves all of its rights consistent with the specific obligations undertaken in this Interim Accord. The Parties shall cooperate with a view to facilitating their mutual relations notwithstanding their respective positions as to the name of the Party of the Second Part. In this context, the Parties shall take practical measures, including dealing with the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade and commerce between them in a manner consistent with their respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the Second Part. The Parties shall take practical measures so that the difference about the name of the Party of the Second Part will not obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between the Party of the Second Part and third parties.

### **Article 6**

1. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in the Preamble thereto or in Article 3 of the Constitution, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim by the Party of the Second Part to any territory not within its existing borders.

2. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party of the Second Part to interfere in the internal affairs of another State in order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other States who are not citizens of the Party of the Second Part.

3. The Party of the Second Part furthermore solemnly declares that the interpretations given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article will not be superseded by any other interpretation of its Constitution.

### **Article 7**

1. Each Party shall promptly take effective measures to prohibit hostile activities or propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other.

2. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force.

3. If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so.

### **Article 8**

1. The Parties shall refrain from imposing any impediment to the movement of people or goods between their territories or through the territory of either Party to the territory of the other. Both Parties shall cooperate to facilitate such movements in accordance with international law and custom.

2. The Parties agree that the European Union and the United States may be requested to use their good offices with respect to developing practical measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5 so as to assist the Parties in the implementation of Article 8.

## **B. HUMAN AND CULTURAL RIGHTS**

### **Article 9**

1. In the conduct of their affairs the Parties shall be guided by the spirit and principles of democracy, fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights and dignity, and the rule of law, in accordance with the *Charter of the United Nations*, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, the *International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination*, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, the *Helsinki Final Act*, the *document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* and the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*.

2. No provision of the instruments listed in paragraph 1 above shall be interpreted to give any right to take any action contrary to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, or of the Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of the territorial integrity of States.

### **Article 10**

Convinced that the development of human relations is necessary for improving understanding and good-neighborliness of their two peoples, the Parties shall encourage contacts at all appropriate levels and shall not discourage meetings between their citizens in accordance with international law and custom.

## **C. INTERNATIONAL, MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

### **Article 11**

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council *Resolution 817* (1993).

2. The Parties agree that the ongoing economic development of the Party of the Second Part should be supported through international cooperation, as far as possible by a close relationship of the Party of the Second Part with the European Economic Area and the European Union.

## **D. TREATY RELATIONS**

### **Article 12**

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Parties shall in their relations be directed by the provisions of the following bilateral agreements that had been concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part on 18 June 1959:

- (a) The convention concerning mutual legal relations,
- (b) The agreement concerning the reciprocal recognition and the enforcement of judicial decisions, and
- (c) The agreement concerning hydro-economic questions.

The Parties shall promptly consult with a view to entering into new agreements substantially similar to those referred to above.

2. The Parties shall consult with each other in order to identify other agreements concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part that will be deemed suitable for application in their mutual relations.

3. The Parties may conclude additional bilateral agreements in areas of mutual interest.

### **Article 13**

Having regard to the fact that the Party of the Second Part is a land-locked State, the Parties shall be guided by the applicable provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as far as practicable both in practice and when concluding agreements referred to in Article 12.

### **Article 14**

1. The Parties shall encourage the development of friendly and good-neighborly relations between them and shall reinforce their economic cooperation in all sectors, including that of water resources management. In particular they shall promote, on a reciprocal basis, road, rail, maritime and air transport and communication links, using the best available technologies, and facilitate the transit of their goods between them and through their territories and ports. The Parties shall observe international rules and regulations with respect to transit, telecommunications, signs and codes.

2. To this end the Parties agree to enter forthwith into negotiations aimed at promptly implementing agreements of cooperation in the aforementioned areas, taking into account the obligations of the Party of the First Part deriving from its membership in the European Union and from other international instruments. Such agreements shall relate to visas, work permits, "green-card" insurance, air space transit and economic cooperation.

## **E. ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LEGAL RELATIONS**

### **Article 15**

1. The Parties shall strengthen their economic relations in all fields.
2. The Parties shall in particular support development and cooperation in the field of capital investments, as well as industrial cooperation between enterprises. Special attention shall be paid to cooperation between small and medium-size companies and enterprises.

### **Article 16**

1. The Parties shall develop and improve scientific and technical cooperation, as well as cooperation in the field of education.
2. The Parties shall intensify their exchanges of information and of scientific and technical documentation, and shall strive to improve mutual access to scientific and research institutions, archives, libraries and similar institutions.
3. The Parties shall support initiatives by scientific institutions and by individuals aimed at improving cooperation in the sciences.

### **Article 17**

1. The Parties shall take great care to avoid dangers to the environment and to preserve natural living conditions in the lakes and rivers shared by the two Parties.
2. The Parties shall cooperate in eliminating all forms of pollution in border areas.
3. The Parties shall strive to develop and harmonize strategies and programs for regional and international cooperation for protecting the environment.

### **Article 18**

The Parties shall cooperate in alleviating the consequences of disasters.

### **Article 19**

1. The Parties shall cooperate in improving and promoting business and tourist travel.
2. Consistent with the obligations of the Party of the First Part arising from its membership in the European Union and from relevant

instruments of the Union, the Parties shall make joint efforts to improve and accelerate customs and border formalities, including simplification in the issuance of visas to each other's citizens, taking into account Article 5, paragraph 2, of this Interim Accord.

3. The Parties shall endeavor to improve and modernize existing border crossings as required by the flow of traffic, and construct new border crossings as necessary.

### **Article 20**

The Parties shall cooperate in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting.

## **F. FINAL CLAUSES**

### **Article 21**

1. The Parties shall settle any disputes exclusively by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1.

### **Article 22**

This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international organizations.

### **Article 23**

1. This Interim Accord shall enter into force and become effective on the thirtieth day following the date on which it is signed by the representatives of the Parties as set forth below.

2. This Interim Accord shall remain in force until superseded by a definitive agreement, provided that after seven years either Party may withdraw from this Interim Accord by a written notice, which shall take effect 12 months after its delivery to the other Party.

3. In witness whereof the Parties have, through their authorized representatives, signed three copies of this Interim Accord in the English language which shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Within two months of the date of signature, the United Nations is to prepare, in consultation with the Parties, translations into the language of the Party of the First Part and the language of the Party of the Second Part, which shall constitute part of the registration of this Accord.

**Karolos Papoulias,**

*Representing the Party of the First Part*

**Stevo Crvenkovski**

*Representing the Party of the  
Second Part*

Witnessed, in accordance with *Resolution 845* (1993)  
of the Security Council, by:

**Cyrus Vance**

Special Envoy of the  
Secretary-General of the United Nations

DONE at New York on the 13th day of September 1995

Related correspondence regarding the Interim Accord as follows:

**RELATED LETTERS**  
**THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

In implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today's date the Government of Greece recognizes the Party of the Second Part within its internationally recognized borders with the provisional name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

**Very truly yours,**  
**KAROLOS PAPOULIAS**  
*Minister of*  
*Foreign Affairs*

**The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance**  
**Special Envoy of the Secretary-General**  
**of the United Nations**  
**The United Nations**  
New York City

Vol. 1891, 1-32193

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UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

13 September 1995

Dear Minister Crvenkovski:

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today's date.

Very truly yours,

**CYRUS R. VANCE**  
Special Envoy  
of the Secretary-General  
of the United Nations

His Excellency Stevo Crvenkovski  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Skopje

Vol. 1891, 1-32193

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**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC**  
**OF MACEDONIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS**  
**NEW YORK**

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date, under cover of which you transmitted to me a copy of a letter addressed to you today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today's date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,

STEVO CRVENKOVSKI  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honourable Cyrus R. Vance  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General  
of the United Nations  
The United Nations  
New York City

Vol. 1891, 1-32193

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THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

With regard to Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Interim Accord of today's date the Government of Greece would like to confirm that the symbol referred to in the above-mentioned Article of the said Accord is the Sun or Star of Vergina. In all its historical forms.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,

KAROLOs PAPOULIAS  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General  
of the United Nations  
The United Nations  
New York City

Vol. 1891, 1-32193

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**UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES**

13 September 1995

Dear Minister Papoulias:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date concerning Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Interim Accord of today's date. I have made the other Party aware of the content of your letter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,

CYRUS R. VANCE  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General  
of the United Nations

His Excellency Karolos Papoulias  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Athens

Vol. 1891, 1-32193

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**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF MACEDONIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK**

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date, under cover of which you transmitted to me a copy of a letter addressed to you today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today's date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,

STEVO CRVENKOVSKI  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General  
of the United Nations  
The United Nations  
New York City

Vol. 1891, 1-32193

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**UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES**

13 September 1995

Dear Minister Crvenkovski:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date concerning the legal effect of the instruments exchanged in connection with the Interim Accord of today's date. I have made the other party aware of the content of your letter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,

CYRUS R. VANCE  
Special Envoy  
of the Secretary-General  
of the United Nations

His Excellency Stevo Crvenkovski  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Skopje

**Annex**

*Statement  
of Cyrus R. Vance, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the  
United Nations, upon signature of the Interim Accord between Greece  
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 13 September 1995.*

I am very pleased to welcome the signing of the Interim Accord between the two neighboring States. The accord establishes a new relationship between them that will be based on concepts of international law and peaceful, friendly relations.

The Hellenic Republic has authorized me to make the following statement on its behalf in so far as this statement refers to actions to be

taken by it, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has authorized me to make the following statement on its behalf in so far as this statement refers to actions to be taken by it.

The Accord provides that each party will respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the other and confirms their common existing frontier as an enduring and inviolable international border.

The Accord further provides for recognition by the Hellenic Republic of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent and sovereign State, and that the two countries will establish liaison offices in each other's capital.

The Accord also provides that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will cease to use in any manner the symbol that is now on its national flag. It also provides specific and binding assurances that the Constitution of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is consistent with the principles of international law and good-neighborly relations mentioned earlier.

The Accord provides for unimpeded movement of people and goods between the two countries. In this connection I can confirm that the accord, by its terms, provides for terminating the measures that had been imposed by the Hellenic Republic on 16 February 1994, and provides for replacing these measures by an open and cooperative economic relationship.

The necessary steps required to implement the accord fully will commence upon signature and will take place over the next few weeks, with the effective date of its operative provisions 30 days from today.

The Accord provides that the parties will continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with respect to the outstanding difference between them referred to in relevant Security Council resolutions.

Finally, the Accord contains other important provisions relating to areas of cooperation between the parties, a commitment to settle disputes exclusively by peaceful means, and the timing and terms of implementation.

As the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, under whose auspices this lengthy mediation effort has been conducted, I congratulate the parties on the important step they have taken to achieve a new relationship, which will promote peace and security between them and in their entire region.

**MEMORANDUM ON “PRACTICAL  
MEASURES” RELATED TO THE INTERIM  
ACCORD OF 1995<sup>703</sup>  
(Skopje, 13 October 1995)**

In the framework of the Interim Accord signed at New York on 13 September 1995, delegations of the Party of the First Part and the Party of the Second Part to the above-mentioned Accord met in Athens on October 3 and 4, 1995, and in Skopje on October 10, 11, 12 and 13, 1995, in a spirit of good will and constructive atmosphere agreed on a certain number of concrete, practical measures to be taken to the effect of entering into force the Interim Accord, pursuant to the obligations stipulated in Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Interim Accord. It is understood that the following agreed practical measures shall not in any way affect the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Interim Accord.

**1. Liaison Offices**

The Liaison Offices shall be established in a coordinated manner in the capitals of the Parties of the two Parts.

The further talks shall be held at Athens in the following week.

**2. Movement of people and goods**

a. With regard to the matters related to the visas, the Party of the First Part shall issue to the citizens of the Party of the Second Part entry visas on a separate visa document in the form as annexed thereof.

The Party of the Second Part shall also issue visas to the citizens of the Party of the First Part visas on a separate visa document in the form as annexed thereof.

Such visa documents shall be issued by the Liaison Offices in the Capitals of both States, as well as by the consulates abroad.

It is understood that the entry in the two States shall be approved by the border authorities exclusively on the basis of presentation of the aforementioned documents provided that all prerequisites stipulated by the respective domestic legislations have been met.

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<sup>703</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - “Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)” - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kniga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp.488-493.

Therefore, no seals or stickers shall be placed on the passports of both sides. In extraordinary cases, such visa documents may be issued by the border authorities. In any case, prior the establishment of liaison offices such visa documents shall be issued by the border authorities in reasonably limited number.

The Party of the First Part shall take specific practical measures with regard to the columns for the country of origin and citizenship on the statistical lists which are filled out by the citizens of the Party of the Second Part, and in particular with regard to the designation to the name of the Party of the Second Part which is not recognized by the Party of the First Part.

It is understood that the officers of the Party of the First Part shall put a stamp on the aforementioned columns, as stipulated in paragraph b. The issues related to the mutual visa regime and the taxes shall be considered at the next expert delegations' meeting due to be held within 7 days following the date of entering into force of the *Interim Accord*.

b. With regard to the official correspondence between the two Contracting Parties, the Party of the First Part shall not return the documents of the Party of the Second Part, on which documents the latter Party is designated with the name that is not recognized by the Party of the First Part.

The Party of the First Part shall act on these documents only when its competent authorities will put a stamp on the same documents with the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*.

Accordingly, the authorities of the Party of the Second Part shall not return the documents of the Party of the First Part, on which documents the Party of the Second Part is designated with the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*.

The Party of the Second Part shall act on these documents only when its competent authorities on the same documents will put a stamp with the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*.

The provisions of the previous paragraph shall also apply for the legal and judicial documents sent through the respective Ministries of Justice to the citizens or organs of both Contracting Parties.

The entire correspondence between the Liaison Offices in Athens and in Skopje sent to the organs and agencies to the host country

shall be transmitted only through the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both States.

Such correspondence shall be sent to the addressees only after the same will be stamped in the aforementioned manner.

c. With regard to all kinds of regular mail, the Party of the First Part shall not return the letters and consignments coming from the Party of the Second Part on which the latter Party is designated with the name that is not recognized by the Party of the First Part.

The Party of the First Part shall act on these only when its competent authorities on the same will put a stamp with the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*.

Accordingly, the authorities of the Party of the Second Part shall not return the letters and consignments coming from the Party of the First Part on which the Party of the Second Part is designated with the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*.

The Party of the Second Part shall act on these documents only when its competent authorities on these documents will put a stamp with the name that is not recognized by the Party of the First Part.

It is understood that the transit mail shall be conveyed to its final destination without impediment by the two States.

The documents accompanying such mail shall be treated in the manner set forth in paragraph d.

Any correspondence of the Party of the First Part sent to the Liaison Office of the Party of the Second Part at Athens, in which correspondence is used the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*, shall be received by the Liaison Office of the Party of the Second Part.

Accordingly, any correspondence of the Party of the Second Part sent to the Liaison Office of the Party of the First Part in Skopje, which correspondence is designated with the name that is not recognized by the Party of the First Part, shall be received by the Liaison Office of the Party of the First Part.

d. Having received electronic messages, the banking institutions of the two Agreeing Parties after shall communicate in accordance with the already established practice.

Meeting between representatives of the banking institutions should be convened as soon as possible in effect of the enhancement of the cooperation in this field.

e. The Party of the First Part shall not return the trade documents (cargo manifests, invoices, etc.) of the Party of the Second Part on which documents the Party of the Second Part is designated with the name that is not recognized by the Party of the First Part.

The Party of the First Part shall act on these only when its competent authorities, besides the existing stamp, will also put a stamp with the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*.

Accordingly, The Party of the Second Part shall not return the trade documents (cargo manifests, invoices, etc.) of the Party of the First Part on which documents the Party of the Second Part is designated with the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*.

The Party of the Second Part shall act on them only when its competent authorities, besides the existing stamp, will also put a stamp with the name that is not recognized by the Party of the First Part.

With regard to the ships' cargo manifests, the abovementioned stamps shall be put on a special paper attached to them.

The abovementioned engagements shall be applied only in cases of bilateral trade.

f. With regard to the documents related to the bilateral road and railroad traffic, the same shall not be returned by the authorities of the two Contracting Parties and shall be acted upon them only when they bear the stamp referred to in paragraph e.

g. With regard to the documents for transit transport, the authorities of the two Contracting Parties shall attach to them special paper with the stamp referred to in paragraph e.

h. Representatives of the competent authorities of the two Parties shall meet as soon as possible (no later than 7 days) for the purpose of arranging in detail the bilateral cooperation in the fields referred to in paragraph e to g.

i. With regard to the international car insurance "green cards", the two Contracting Parties decided to sign as soon as possible a uni-

formed bilateral agreement between the agencies of the two Contracting Parties in charge of the insurance “green cards”.

j. Meetings between representatives of the Ministries of Transport and Communications, railroad authorities, postal offices and telecommunications, directorates for civil aviation, customs authorities and “green card” bureaus of the two Contracting Parties shall be held within 7 days in effect to consider and confirm, on reciprocal basis, the relations between the two Contracting Parties in these fields, pursuant to the *Interim Accord of 13 September 1995* and the respective provisions thereof.

Until the bilateral regulation of the relations in the field of transport and communications, due to be determined by the end of this year, and for the purpose of providing unimpeded application of the *Interim Accord*, the two Contracting Parties agreed as follows:

- Road transport: the freight vehicles of the two Contracting Parties, loaded or empty, shall enter into the territory of the two Contracting Parties without permits and paying road taxes for bilateral and transit transport except for the cases of transport for and from third countries.

- The bus round-trip transport with “closed doors” under the *ACOP Convention* and the *European Union Regulation 684/92* shall be carried without permits, with registered passenger lists and without payment of road taxes.

- The railroad freight transport shall be carried out on reciprocal basis with the obligatory compliance with the provisions of the *Agreement the former SFRY and the Republic of Greece* of 1976.

Both Parties agreed not to discriminate the forwarding agents of the other Contracting Party in favor of its domestic forwarding agents.

k. With regard to the products that the Party of the Second Part exports into the Party of the First Part and bear the name of the country of origin, name that is not recognized by the Party of the First Part, prior the customs clearance of the products by the Party of the First Part the importers of the Party of the First Part shall cover the name with a sticker bearing the provisional designation by which the Party of the Second Part is referred to in the *United Nations Security Council Resolution 817/93*.

It is understood that the Party of the First Part shall treat the transit of the products that are produced in the Party of the Second Part in a manner as described in paragraph g.

l. The usage of the distinguishing mark “MK” for the vehicles with license plates of the Party of the Second Part that enter the territory of the Party of the First Part shall not imply recognition of its validity by the Party of the First Part, pursuant to the *reservation* that the Party of the First Part has deposited in the UN Secretariat, as a depositary of the *Convention on Road Traffic* (Vienna, 8 November 1968).

Accordingly, upon the entry of private vehicles with “MK” designation into the territory of the Party of the First Part, the officers of this Party shall put on the free space on the rear window of these vehicles a sticker containing the aforementioned reservation and should not be bigger than the distinguishing signs used in international transport.

The sticker shall remain on these vehicles so long as they circulate in the territory of the Party of the First Part.

The same shall also apply for the busses and trucks with the “MK” designation.

The aforementioned sticker will be placed either on the front or on the back side of these vehicles.

In accordance with this, and related to “65 MZ” code on the side of the train coaches of the Party of the Second Part, upon their entry into the territory of the Party of the First Part and so long as they circulate in it they will carry a sticker, placed in the manner as described above, containing the objection of the Party of the First Part regarding the code.

m. The issues arising from the designation of the aircrafts of the Party of the Second Part, such as traffic rights, service, etc. shall be considered within a period of 7 days.

n. Should a citizen of any of the two Contracting Parties during his/her stay on the territory of the other Contracting Party needs to sign a document, form, etc., and which document contains the name or the provisional designation that is not accepted by any of the Contracting Parties, then his/her signature shall in no way imply any position regarding the name of the Party of the Second Part.

In case of a dispute or difficulties arising from the application of the provisions of this *Memorandum*, the expert delegations of both Foreign Ministries or other competent ministries of the two Contracting Parties shall meet as soon as possible in order to resolve the disputed matters.

With regard to the compliance of this *Memorandum* with the obligations of the Party of the First Part that arise from its membership in the EU, the relevant articles of the *Interim Accord* shall be applied.

Done at Skopje on 13 October 1995, in two copies in English.

**Dimitrios Kypraios**  
**Ambassador**  
*Party of the First Part*

**Ljupco Arsovski**  
**Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs**  
*Party of the Second Part*

**MEMORANDUM ON THE MUTUAL  
ESTABLISHMENT OF LIAISON OFFICES  
RELATED TO THE INTERIM ACCORD<sup>704</sup>**

**(Athens, 20 October 1995)**

In the framework of the Interim accord signed in New York on September 13, 1995, delegations of the Party of the First Part and the Party of the second Part to the abovementioned Accord met in Athens on October 18, 19 and 20, 1995, and in a spirit of good will and constructive atmosphere agreed on the following arrangements, without prejudice to their respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the Second Part:

The Liaison Offices shall be established in a coordinated manner in the capitals of the Parties of the two Parts by the end of the year.

**1. Establishment of the Liaison Office of the Party  
of the Second Part in Athens**

a) In case the Liaison Office is established in an apartment: At the building's entrance, there will be placed an inscription bearing the provisional designation by which the Party of the second Part is referred to in the UN Security Council *Resolution 817/93*. At the bottom corner of the inscription there will be an indication that it was placed by a third party. In the building's entrance hall an inscription "LIAISON OFFICE" will be placed, displaying also the coat of arms and the flag of the Party of the Second Part and indicating the floor on which the office is accommodated. The entrance of the apartment, for security reasons and in order to facilitate the access to the Liaison Office, will be covered by a special plain unmarked protective glass construction with its door, as it is the practice with other diplomatic missions. On the front side of the main door inside or on the wall beside this door, there will be an inscription bearing a name which the Party of the First Part does not recognize. It is understood that the flag and the coat of arms will be displayed from the apartment.

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<sup>704</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Knjiga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 493-495.

b) In case the Liaison Office is established in a private house (villa): Just beside the entrance of the garden fence there will be placed an inscription bearing the provisional designation by which the Party of the second Part is referred to in the *UN Security Council Resolution 817/93*. At the bottom corner of the inscription there will be an indication that it was placed by a third Party. On the garden fence there will be placed an inscription “LIAISON OFFICE”, displaying also the coat of arms and the flag of the Party of the Second Part. The entrance of the house, for security reasons and in order to facilitate the access to the Liaison Office, will be covered by a special plain unmarked protective glass construction with its door, as it is the practice with other diplomatic missions. On the front side of the main door inside or on the wall beside this door, there will be an inscription bearing a name which the Party of the First Part does not recognize. It is understood that the flag and the coat of arms will be displayed from the house.

The abovementioned shall also apply to the residence of the Head of the Liaison Office in Athens, as well as to all sections, departments or offices of the Liaison Office.

## **2. Establishment of the Liaison Office of the Party of the First Part in Skopje**

The Liaison Office will be established at the premises of the ex-Consulate General of the Party of the First Part in Skopje. The inscriptions bearing the name of the Party of the First Part, the coats of arms and the flags displayed will follow the existing practice.

## **3. Title of the Head of Mission in Athens and in Skopje - personnel**

Both Parties agreed that the Head of Mission will bear the title “HEAD OF THE LIAISON OFFICE”. As far as the number of the personnel is concerned, it was agreed that it should be sufficient as to enable the two offices to carry out their duties. The number of the personnel will be determined in accordance with the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*.

## **4. Immunities and Privileges**

Normal diplomatic immunities and privileges will be granted in accordance with International Law (the *Vienna Convention on Diplo-*

*matic Relations* and the *Vienna Convention on Consular Relations*) and customs, on the basis of reciprocity.

### **5. Assistance to the Party of the Second Part**

If so requested, the Party of the First Part shall assist the Party of the Second Part in the search for an appropriate location in Athens for the establishment of its Liaison Office.

In case any difficulty arises over the practical implementation of the above articles, the Parties will deliberate with a view to reaching an appropriate solution.

Done at Athens on 20 October 1995, in two original copies in English.

**AIDE-MÈ MORIE REGARDING  
THE INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF GREECE TOWARDS  
THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA VIS-À-VIS  
THE INTERIM ACCORD OF 1995<sup>705</sup>  
(Skopje, 23 July 1996)**

**I**

1. During the negotiations and especially at the last round of negotiations, before the initialing of the *Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union* (EU), on 29 June 1996 at Brussels, by the European Commission, and under the pressure of the Republic of Greece, the European Commission strongly insisted on the use of the designation of the United Nations in the text of the Agreement. Therefore, our proposal to neutralize the whole text of the whole text of the Agreement, i.e., instead of the reference “FYROM” to use “Contracting State”, with a footnote that that referred to the country which has been admitted to membership in the United Nations by *General Assembly Resolution 47/225* of 8 April 1993, was not accepted. We explained that we had suggested this, with the purpose that such a neutralized text would be most acceptable for the European Commission, taking into consideration that Greece was a member of the EU, and at the same time that such a text was most suitable for ratification in our Parliament. However, owing to the obstruction of Greece, the Agreement, on the insistence of the European Commission, was initiated by way of an exchange of letters. Our letter explained that we accepted the agreed text but we did not accept the reference for our country, since our constitutional name is the “Republic of Macedonia”.

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<sup>705</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - “Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)” - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Knjiga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 496-499. This *Aide-Memoire* regarding the inappropriate conduct of the Republic of Greece towards the Republic of Macedonia vis-à-vis Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 was transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Republic of Macedonia resident representative to the UN, Denko Maleski, PhD. The reason for submitting this *Aide-Memoire* to the UN is contained in the document itself. The documents is registered in the UN archive under No.S /1996/605.

Greece made an attempt to obstruct this form and thus postpone the initialing of the Agreement; however, we still managed to reach a mutual solution.

2. In connection with the regulation of trade in some products, in one part of the Agreement, where there is specific documentation and where the countries are identified by two letters, we suggested that our country be identified by the letters “MK”. Under the pressure of Greece the European Commission did not accept our proposal; therefore a numerical identification for the trade in those products with EU Member States was agreed, i.e., all countries, including our country as well, were to be indicated by numbers. This represented an exception from the already accepted international code for our country (MK) in several international systems where such identification is essential (Vienna Transport Convention, International Organization for Standardization, Internet, etc.).

3. Greece exerted strong pressure through the European Commission with regard to the mention of the Macedonian language in the text of the agreement; thus it was stated in the relevant article that the Agreement had been drawn up in all the official languages of the Contracting Parties.

4. Besides the temporary disrespect of the Provision of the Interim Accord signed on 13 September 1995 at New York, which represented a first step towards regulating the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, and regulation of the relations with the EU, the European Commission in the preamble to the Cooperation Agreement that the Interim Accord be set up as a factor for regional stability which favored the relations of cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece.

With the above-mentioned activities and measures, Greece managed to complicate the initialing of the Cooperation Agreement with the EU, which may be an indication that it would continue similar activities during the implementation of the Agreement, due to start on 1 January 1997.

## II

1. We have been informed through the Liaison Office of the Republic of Macedonia in Athens and the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Macedonia that from time to time, in particular cases, the Greek Customs has not accepted the certificate of origin of goods from Macedonia, EUR – 1, although this issue had been regulated with the

practical measures completed according to Article 5 of the interim Accord as well as with *EU Regulation No. 343/92* (Official Gazette I, 38/92). This hampered the preferential treatment of particular goods entering the EU.

2. On 17 July 1996, the airplane of the Macedonian airline company “Palair Macedonia” was held for several hours at the Corfu airport in Greece and the word “Macedonian” was painted over. This act of the Greek authorities was not in accordance with the provisions of the *Interim Accord* (Article 8) and did not reflect the spirit of the confidence-building measures between the two countries.

3. Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia who were born in Greece cannot travel to Greece because the Greek authorities do not issue visas for them. This is contrary to the international norms and regulations, as well as the provisions of the EU for the free movement of persons.

### III

The Conference of Foreign Ministries of Countries of Southeast Europe, which was held recently at Sophia without the presence of Macedonia, opened several issue regarding the implementation of the Macedonian-Greek Interim Accord of 13 September 1995.

During the preparations, the Macedonian side made efforts to prevent what actually happened at the meeting: the absence of one of the two parties. Taking into consideration the understandable problems on the Greek side caused by the convening of the meeting in a country which had recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, with the aim of the successful realization of this regional initiative, the Macedonian delegation pointed this out and offered a solution in the spirit of the *Interim Accord*, namely, giving up the possibility on insisting on the use of the name “Republic of Macedonia”. This was offered in all segments where this issue occurred so as to avoid the use of names of countries. Instead, it was proposed that the names of the Foreign Ministers be used.

The Greek side had accepted this solution at the preparatory meeting held on 3 May 1996, as had the other countries, also owing to the fact that a similar formula had been applied at the previous Balkan meetings (Belgrade 1988, and Tirana 1990).

At the last preparatory meeting, held on 5 July 1996, the Greek side first refused participation in the preparatory meeting if the Macedonian delegation did not agree to use the aforementioned reference,

and subsequently rejected any contact with the Macedonian delegation.

Owing to the fact that the host had decided to use the reference in a case of disagreement, the Macedonian delegation was practically forced to leave the preparatory meeting and not to take part in the Ministerial Conference.

With regard to the *Interim Accord*, we consider that the following provisions have been breached:

(a) The spirit of the *Interim Accord*, in the first preambular paragraph of which the same formula is applied: the names of the Ministers without the corresponding country names; further, the terms “Party of the First” and “Party of the Second” are applied;

(b) Article 5 (2), in which it is anticipated that, taking into consideration the difference regarding the name, both parties shall cooperate and seek practical measures, so that the difference shall not present an obstacle;

(c) Article 8 (2), which provides for the possibility of requesting the good offices of the European Union and the United States of America, was not utilized;

(d) Article 11, under which both parties are obliged not to raise objections to membership in regional institutions. Also, Greece departed from the reference contained in *Security Council Resolution 817* (1993) by using the abbreviation FYROM, which is not contained in that resolution.

(e) Article 21 (2), which anticipates the settlement of disputes by peaceful means only; in the given situation an ultimatum was presented stipulating that either the reference should be accepted or Greece would not take part in the meeting;

(f) Article 22, which anticipates that the *Interim Accord* is not directed against another country, i.e., against relations with a third country; in this case it resulted in the non-observance of the Macedonian – Bulgarian agreements according to which Bulgaria (as well as a number of other participating countries) shall use the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia.

**LETTER FROM THE UN SECRETARY–  
GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL<sup>706</sup>  
(New York, 10 November 1997)**

I have the honor to refer to Security Council Resolution 845 (1993) of 18 June 1993 concerning the difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, by which, inter alia, the Council requested me to keep it informed on the progress of further efforts under my auspices.

By a letter dated 13 September 1995 my predecessor transmitted the *Interim Accord (S/1995/794)* to the members of the Security Council. As you and your colleagues are aware, according to Article 5 of the *Interim Accord*, the parties agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, pursuant to *Resolution 845 (1993)*.

As my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance has continued his mission of good offices and the most recent meeting between the parties took place on 2 October 1997.

Following a personal request by Mr. Vance, and with the consent of the parties, I have decided to appoint Mr. Matthew Nimetz, a national of the United States of America, as Deputy to my Personal Envoy. Mr. Nimetz, who served as United States envoy and supported Mr. Vance's efforts between March 1994 and September 1995 when the Interim Accord was concluded, will chair the continuing talks between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

I shall continue to keep the Council informed.

(Signed) **Kofi A. Annan**

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<sup>706</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Knjiga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 499-500. By this letter, transmitted to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General informs to have appointed Matthew Nimetz as Deputy to Cyrus Vance. The letter is registered in the UN archive under No.S/1997/890.

**LETTER FROM THE UN SECRETARY –  
GENERAL ADDRESSED TO  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL<sup>707</sup>**

**(New York, 21 December 1999)**

I have the honor to refer to *Security Council Resolution 845* (1993) of 18 June 1993 concerning the difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, by which, inter alia, the Council requested me to keep it informed on the progress of further efforts under my auspices.

By a letter dated 13 September 1995 my predecessor transmitted the *Interim Accord (S/1995/794)* to the members of the Security Council. As you and your colleagues are aware, in article 5 of the interim accord, the parties agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, pursuant to *Resolution 845* (1993). You will also recall that, by a letter dated 10 November 1997 (S/1997/890), I conveyed to the Council my decision to appoint Mr. Matthew Nimetz as Deputy to my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance.

Negotiations between the parties under my good offices have continued, with the most recent meeting on 6 December 1999.

My Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, has informed me of his resignation from his position for personal reasons. I have accepted his resignation with great reluctance, and wish to pay tribute to him for his untiring efforts and invaluable service to the United Nations. I will cer-

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<sup>707</sup> Source: Sasho Georgievski, PhD, and Sasho Dodevski - "Documents for the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2005)" - edition Documents for Macedonia (Book III) (*Dokument i za Republika Makedonija (1990-2005)* - edicija *Dokument i za Makedonija* (Kniga III). Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at ss. Cyril and Methodius University; Skopje, 2008, pp. 500-501. By a letter, transmitted to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General informs to have appointed Matthew Nimetz as Special Envoy on the "difference" over the name between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. The ongoing negotiations between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece regarding the "difference" over the name, imposed by Greece, which has been in effect since 1993 are under the brokerage of the United Nations. Over the past few years mediator Matthew Nimetz offered several proposals for settling the "difference", but it has not been arrived at a final solution. The official position of the Republic of Macedonia is the so-called "double formula", providing the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia for international purposes and another name, that is, unilateral reference in the bilateral relations with Greece. The letter is registered in the UN archive under No. S/1999/1286.

tainly miss the benefit of his wise counsel and his tenacity and graciousness in dealing with this very delicate issue.

In light of Mr. Vance's resignation, and with the consent of the parties, I have decided to appoint his deputy Mr. Matthew Nimetz, a national of the United States of America, as his replacement and my Personal Envoy. As you are aware, Mr. Nimetz has been involved in the negotiation process since March 1994 and has chaired the continuing talks between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since November 1997.

(Signed) *Kofi A. Annan*

**ICG BALKANS REPORT NO. 122**  
**(Skopje / Brussels 10 December 2001)**

**“MACEDONIA’S NAME: WHY THE DISPUTE MATTERS  
AND HOW TO RESOLVE IT”**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

**A. A glint of optimism**

The signing of the Framework Agreement at Ohrid on 13 August 2001 was a notable success for the European, United States and NATO mediators who brokered the deal. It laid the basis for a lasting multiethnic solution to long-standing nationality problems in Macedonia. The first phase of implementation also went largely to plan: Albanian rebels handed part of their arsenal to NATO troops and formally disbanded in September.

Since then, progress in Macedonia has been elusive. Macedonians were angry that NATO had treated partial disarmament as if it were total. Their leaders delayed submitting the Ohrid reforms to Parliament. Tensions in mixed areas of the country remained.

The first breakthrough came in mid November, as the unexpected sequel to a dramatic escalation of violence. On 11 November, the country seemed again on the verge of wider conflict after President Boris Trajkovski and Minister of Interior Ljube Boshkovski ignored international warnings and sent armed police units into rebel areas,<sup>708</sup> ostensibly to secure a suspected mass gravesite near the village of Neprosteno.

The elite forces quickly arrested seven alleged rebel leaders and deployed into a village neighboring the grave. Armed Albanians responded with rocket-propelled grenades, killing three police. Dozens of Macedonian civilians were rounded up and held hostages for the seven Albanians detained.<sup>709</sup> Boshkovski told journalists: “*We’ve just started the second half of the match.*”<sup>710</sup>

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<sup>708</sup> This refers to areas controlled by the ethnic Albanian Nationals Liberation Army (NLA) when NATO troops arrived in late August. Although the NLA formally disbanded during NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest (27 August to 26 September 2001), it may still control the areas where government forces have not yet fully deployed.

<sup>709</sup> The self-styled ‘Albanian National Army’ took public responsibility for the attack and kidnappings. NLA leader

Ali Ahmeti managed to secure release of the Macedonian kidnap victims.

<sup>710</sup> Comments to journalists made on 11 November, according to *Reuters*

Five days later, on 16 November, in a surprise midnight session, Parliament easily mustered a two-thirds vote to pass a set of landmark constitutional amendments – the core of the Framework Agreement that was signed by Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders at Ohrid on 13 August 2001.<sup>711</sup> The same day, President Trajkovski issued a letter to senior EU, OSCE and NATO officials accepting the strict international interpretation of the amnesty declaration the President had published on 8 October 2001.<sup>712</sup>

Boshkovski now declared himself a “man of peace”, who would take a “cautious and relaxed” approach to returning his police to Albanian-majority areas and cooperate with the international community.<sup>713</sup> Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski also dropped his usually aloof stance, agreeing to meet and cooperate with international representatives.

The dramatic turn-around showed the pro-reform camp seizing its change when the gravesite gambit backfired. Most Macedonians do not want a war. Rather than being applauded for defending Macedonian victims, Boshkovski was excoriated by most Macedonian parties for recklessly creating three new ones. Trajkovski tried to walk away from his own enthusiastic approval for the mission, drawing sharp criticism

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<sup>711</sup> The final vote tally was 94 for and 13 against. All present MPs from VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, PDP and DPA voted for the amendments. MPs from the Liberal Party, New Democracy, Democratic Alternative and VMRO-VMRO voted against. On the *Framework Agreement*, see ICG Balkans Briefing, *Macedonia: War on Hold*, 15 August 2001.

<sup>712</sup> President Trajkovski’s letter to senior EU, OSCE and NATO officials confirms that immunity applies to all ex-NLA who disarmed by 26 September 2001, and the government will have the burden of providing that an individual had not disarmed, or otherwise was not a member of the NLA and thus does not enjoy immunity; that no new arrests or prosecutions will be made for the related crimes; that, following receipt from the [currently ethnic Albanian] Minister of Justice, a Presidential Pardon will be issued for individuals held in pre-trial or post-conviction detention; and that the Macedonian government will cooperate with the ICTY (the Hague Tribunal) in respect of individuals suspected of having committed ICTY-covered crimes, and therefore not enjoying immunity. ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte held talks on 20 November 2001 with government leaders on this issue, and on the exhumation of a suspected mass grave. Trajkovski told the North Atlantic Council on 28 November that Justice Minister Ixhet Mehmeti had submitted a list of 88 former NLA members in pre- or post-trial detention. The President continued: “*I am starting with the application of my amnesty decree. As is publicly known, we have reached a common understanding with the state authorities not to initiate any new cases or proceed with existing ones which are connected to the amnesty.*” The President’s Amnesty Commission is expected to complete its review on the 88 cases by 8 December.

<sup>713</sup> ICG interview with Minister Boshkovski, 22 November 2001. See also Boshkovski interview on Macedonian Television (MTV), 21 November. This was by no means the first time that Boshkovski has pledged cooperation.

in the media.<sup>714</sup> And an exhumation monitored by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has reportedly uncovered some human remains, but not the mass grave that had been alleged.

Passage of the reforms and the amnesty letter also allayed rising discontent among Albanian leaders. Reportedly, a few NLA commanders had been impatient with the process and with the pliant Albanian leadership.<sup>715</sup> From this perspective, the Albanians had upheld their end of the Ohrid bargain, only to be reward by almost two months of delaying tactics in parliament over the constitutional reforms;<sup>716</sup> the hoped-for amnesty law had been diluted into ambiguous Presidential declaration;<sup>717</sup> sporadic firefights on the ground and occasional interruptions to freedom of movement; arrests and court proceedings against former NLA members; and alarmist rhetoric from anti-Ohrid politicians and media.

In addition, the Albanian political cohesion evident since their leaders met on 22 May in Kosovo, at Prizren,<sup>718</sup> threatened to unravel as the two leading Albanian parties split over the issue of the *Constitution Preamble*.

While Albanians are waiting for the release of those former NLA members still detained (and the trial of the seven recently arrested), and

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<sup>714</sup> President Trajkovski insists that his approval of Boshkovski's plan was limited to the purpose of guarding the mass gravesite. ICG interview with Trajkovski, 14 November 2001.

<sup>715</sup> Many Macedonian consider NATO operation Essential Harvest to have been a sham. They believe that the NLA has far more weapons than the nearly 4,000 collected by NATO, and they believe that the organization has not disbanded.

<sup>716</sup> Passage of the constitutional reforms had been linked to three phases in the weapons surrender process. That process was completed on 26 September – the date originally envisioned for final passage of the constitutional reforms.

<sup>717</sup> The amnesty statement issued on 8 October 2001 stated, in part, the President's "intention to grant amnesty to members of the so-called NLA who voluntarily surrendered weapons... by 26 September... The amnesty does not refer to those who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, torture and murder of civilians, ethnic cleansing, demolition of religious buildings and other acts for which the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia is responsible." Presidential statement, "Amnesty to the members of the so-called NLA", 8 October 2001. The statement neither provided for the release of those held in pre-trial or post-trial confinement, nor explained how the exception for Hague-indictable offences would be administered. Trajkovski's letter of interpretation, discussed above, was intended to remove these ambiguities. Given the pervasive mistrust, swift release of those Albanians held on related charges will be critical. Equally, the Albanians arrested in the course of the 11 November incident, the *Trebos Seven*, must be given a fair trial.

<sup>718</sup> On the so-called Prizren Declaration, see ICG Balkans Report No. 113, *Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace*, 20 June 2001, p. 10.

Albanian politicians are anticipating the passage of the rest of the laws agreed at Ohrid,<sup>719</sup> the achievement of 16 November certainly removed the immediate incentive to take up arms. Indeed, the situation on the ground suggests that Macedonia has moved perceptibly away from the conflict since NATO deployed in August.

### A. The anti-Ohrid faction

Yet, Macedonia's coalition government includes a powerful faction that has opposed the reforms agreed at Ohrid, and must be expected to continue to do so. Led by Prime Minister Georgievski and Minister of Interior Boshkovski from the VMRO-DPMNE<sup>720</sup> and Parliament Speaker Stojan Andov from the Liberal Party, this faction delayed the parliamentary passage of the reforms while mobilizing resentment against the international community for compelling the government to accept the Framework Agreement.

These leaders have consistently expressed hostility to the *Framework Agreement*. In the Prime Minister's words, "*we all know that these constitutional changes were imposed through terrorism, force and pressure.*"<sup>721</sup> Andov's view is that "*the international community imposed the Ohrid Framework Agreement on the Macedonians and has taken the Albanian side... The attempts to destroy Macedonia are backed by the U.S. and the West in order to push away the Russian interests in the Balkans.*"<sup>722</sup> Boshkovski has echoed these sentiments, stating to ICG that the Ohrid Agreement is a "*disaster for Macedonia.*"<sup>723</sup> None

<sup>719</sup> A Law on Local Self-Government is already overdue. Laws on the Public Attorney and Municipal Boundaries are due by the end of the year. Six other laws are due by the end of the parliamentary term. Framework Agreement, Annex B, Legislative Modifications.

<sup>720</sup> VMRO-DPMNE is the internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity. This party and the ethnic Albanian DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) have governed Macedonia in a coalition (with two different partners) since the 1998 elections. A "unity government" was formed under international pressure in May 2001 by bringing in the Social Democrats (SDSM) and the ethnic Albanian PDP, as well as VMRO-VMRO, the Socialist Party, the Liberals, and the Liberal Democratic Party. On 21 November, five days after parliament finally approved the Ohrid Constitutional reforms, SDSM, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Social party announced their intention to leave government. A new government was approved by parliament on 30 November 2001.

<sup>721</sup> Address by Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski on the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Macedonian Constitution, 17 November 2001.

<sup>722</sup> *Utrinski Vesnik*, 15 November 2001, reprinting an interview from the Yugoslav newspaper, *Dnevnik*.

<sup>723</sup> Interview with ICG, 19 October 2001.

of the three shows any belief in joint existence with Albanians as out-lines in Ohrid.<sup>724</sup>

### ***1. Anti-Ohrid, Pro-Division?***

Consistent with their ideology or outlook, Georgievski and Andov have been notably ambiguous about the notion that Macedonia might pursue a limited territorial division along national lines. A proposal along these lines by members of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU) provoked acute controversy when it was publicized at the end of May 2001. *“I consider that their idea comes from the fact that Macedonia has been at war for three months. Actually, we have an armed rebellion by Albanians in Macedonia, and academicians have tried to find peaceful, short-term and strategic resolution of this crisis”*, Georgievski said, adding, however, that he did not accept the idea.<sup>725</sup>

Andov’s reaction was quoted as follows: *“The idea is civilized. The text of the proposal is very interesting and provocative and is not irritating. I would suggest that this idea be well examined because it includes all the civilization principles that we have accepted as a country”*<sup>726</sup> Public outcry over the proposal led almost all of its opponents to avoid further comment on the matter. In an interview with ICG on 6 June, Andov said *“the MANU idea has no political substance; it is not a political fact.”*<sup>727</sup>

### **2. A Setback, Not A Knockout**

However, the anti-Ohrid faction is unwilling to take full responsibility for defeating the Agreement. At the end of October, the govern-

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<sup>724</sup> Separate ICG interviews with Georgievski, Andov and Boshkovski.

<sup>725</sup> Remarks quoted in MILS, 31 May 2001. See also ICG Balkans Report No. 113, *Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace*, 20 June 2001.

<sup>726</sup> *Dnevnik*, 31 May 2001.

<sup>727</sup> Those who wish to contemplate a “peaceful” or “agreed” partition should not that the Academy’s proposal was in fact not for partition (dividing the country between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians), but for the even more daunting and unrealistic option for a highly one-sided territorial and population swap involving Albania (the Mala Prespa area). As such, it suffers from several dangerous misconceptions: (a) that ethnic Albanians from Macedonia would be willing to be absorbed into Albania; (b) that they would be willing to acquiesce in the loss of Skopje; and (c) that they would, after the demonstrable prowess of the NLA, let Macedonians set the terms of partition. In sum, with this plan as with most such, reaching agreement on it would be just as problematic as agreeing the terms of joint existence in a multiethnic state, if not more so, with the other option’s redeeming features. Further, it would provide no guarantee against later claims that the settlement was “unjust” or “imposed”.

ment secured a change to the amendment of the constitutional preamble that had been agreed at Ohrid, and a minor adjustment to the provision on religious communities. This gave Georgievski and Parliament Speaker Stojan Andov the “cover” to let the amendments and amnesty pass. Instead of doing so, they engineered the incident at Neprostenovo. Only when that backfired did they discharge the commitments they had taken on three months earlier. They chose to do so, moreover, in a late-night, unannounced continuation session of parliament. As one pro-Ohrid politician told ICG, “*They were loud in criticism of Ohrid, but silent – even stealthy – in passing it.*”

A similar pattern emerged the following week when, on 21 November, the moderate Social Democratic Union (SDSM) announced it was walking out of the VMRO-DPMNE-led government. Party leader Branko Crvenkovski lashed out at VMRO for exploiting the crisis for “*military profit, personal wealth, and promotion of party feudalism in Macedonia.*”<sup>728</sup> Georgievski at first accused SDSM of “*stabbing Macedonia in the back*”, but then held out an offer for the Social Democrats to return to the government. He eventually indicated his readiness to schedule elections in late April 2002 – later than the January date agreed at Ohrid – but many be expected to call them whenever he believes his party can beat its rivals (and no earlier).

Georgievski has announced the formation of a new government that keeps both Albanian parties in government and brings back stalwarts Vlado Popovski (at Defence) and Dosta Dimovska (as Deputy Prime Minister) to replace the departed moderate SDSM minister and Deputy Prime Minister (and coordinating body chief) respectively.

The international community should resist the temptation to see recent setbacks as a turning point. While the new amendments and amnesty are undoubtedly major steps forward, and while Georgievski finds his margin of maneuver restricted, it would be mistaken to believe that he, Andov or Boshkovski are without options. They remain unreconstructed in their views and largely undiminished in their authority.

Moreover, the passage of the Constitutional reforms has transformed Macedonians across the political spectrum from feeling beleaguered by international pressure to feeling entitled to international sup-

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<sup>728</sup> “Press conference with SDSM and LDP”, Macedonian Information Agency, 21 November 2001.

port. As President Trajkovski stated on the day the reforms were passed, *“we have fulfilled our share of commitments. Now (the international community has) to fulfill their share”*<sup>729</sup>

What Trajkovski has in mind, however, goes far beyond the obligatory donors’ conference now scheduled for 20 December 2001, and routine economic assistance. Macedonians of all opinion now expect full international backing for the equivalent of a *“zero tolerance policy towards anything smacking of Albanian obstruction or violence. We expect unreserved support and involvement from the international community for the return of security forces to the crisis regions (i.e. areas under NLA control)”*, said the President.<sup>730</sup> *“I see no reason why Macedonia shouldn’t get completely reintegrated starting from tomorrow”*, said Georgievski.<sup>731</sup>

Based on his overall record, it seems clear that for Minister of Interior Boshkovski, whatever his recent “conversion”, the aim is just not to re-assert control over territory but to preserve tensions and, perhaps, spark a renewed conflict.

Boshkovski’s clashes with the departing moderate Minister of Defence, Vlado Buchkovski, revealed not only a hawkish approach to return of refugees and displaced persons, but a fundamentally different approach toward the concept of coexistence with Albanians in an integral, unified state. As SDSM’s Buchkovski stated just prior to leaving office, *“the main problem is the clash of two concepts in the Macedonian block, not about solving the crisis, but regarding the future of Macedonia. One concept is for maintaining the territorial integrity of the country, the other is based on starting the war for dividing Macedonia.”*<sup>732</sup>

The current danger is that the anti-Ohrid faction will use the re-entry of security forces to Albanian-majority areas – due to be completed by mid January 2002 – as a springboard for heavy-handed counterinsurgency operations. In this respect, Boshkovski’s action on 11 November achieved one key objective: by provoking a converted Alba-

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<sup>729</sup> Presidential statement on adoption of constitutional reforms, 16 November 2001. Among the key international “debts” that Trajkovski cited are a donors’ conference and recognition of Macedonia’s constitutional name.

<sup>730</sup> Ibid.

<sup>731</sup> Address by Prime Minister Georgievski on the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Macedonian Constitution, 17 November.

<sup>732</sup> Buchkovski statement in *Zum* magazine, 16 November 2001.

nian response, he demonstrated that Albanian armed groups retain not only firepower, but also the capacity to mount operations at short notice.<sup>733</sup> This could be cited to justify further military action, on the ground that the Macedonians have fulfilled their part of the deal, in contrast to the Albanians (whose armed groups should have disarmed and disbanded) and NATO (which accepted Albanian rebel claims to have done this).

The anti-Ohrid sentiment has rested, in part, on a cherished and dangerously widespread illusion that international pressures stopped Macedonia from defeating the NLA by force of arms. This sentiment seems not to have been dented by the all too manifest inability of the Macedonian security forces to halt the NLA rebels during the spring and summer, let alone to drive them back.<sup>734</sup>

Indeed, an increasing number of Macedonians appear to believe that victory is possible. Recent military procurement, recruitment and training have buoyed the confidence of “hawks” who dream of a military solution. Believers in this scenario need a pretext for action: an obstruction to the return home by Macedonians displaced by the conflict, or some other incident, or “evidence” of an Albanian threat.

This helps to explain why Georgievski predicted a “*pan-Albanian offensive*” following the 17 November Kosovo elections,<sup>735</sup> and why he talks up the abiding “terrorist” danger. “*There is no reason for the “tense security situation”, but still we can all feel it and see it out there. The members of the Macedonian security forces know that best, as they are still in a way to target of terrorist activities.*”<sup>736</sup>

The Macedonian-language media have, in the days since the amendments were passed, duly reported an upsurge of incidents on the ground. One widely reported story, suggesting that OSCE monitors were being targeted by “terrorists”, verged on being an incendiary fabrication.<sup>737</sup>

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<sup>733</sup> Equally, it may have indicated that hawks in the government, after months in the government, after months of procurement, recruitment and training, have gained crucial confidence in Macedonia’s military capability.

<sup>734</sup> See ICG Balkans Report No. 113, *Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace*, 20 June 2001.

<sup>735</sup> See *Dnevnik* lead story on 14 November 2001.

<sup>736</sup> Address by Prime Minister Georgievski on the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Macedonian Constitution, 17 November 2001.

<sup>737</sup> OSCE effectively denied the allegations and took the media to task for ruining a story about “such a monitor event.” OSCE Urgent Press Advisory, 18 November 2001.

In sum, while the passage of constitutional reforms, tightening of the amnesty, and the shake-up in government have left the anti-reform camp off balance, there has been as yet no fundamental re-ordering of the forces allied against Ohrid.

### C. International hesitancy

Despite appearances to the contrary when the reforms were adopted by parliament, the international community is not strongly placed to overcome sustained anti-reform obstruction. Although Prime Minister Georgievski has softened his stance toward the international community, for example by signalling his government would accept a three-month NATO extension (up to March 2002), international influence has slipped markedly since the signing of the *Framework Agreement*.

In the first place, the international process of mediation that led to Ohrid has created a reservoir of resentment. In addition, there is a perception that the events of 11 September 2001 and the 'war on terrorism' have both distracted the major Western states and encouraged them to toughen their stance towards Albanian groups in Kosovo and Macedonia. In the words of Stojan Andov, the U.S. "*has other problems right now.*"<sup>738</sup> Politicians and the media continue to draw links between the terrorism in the U.S. and the NLA's actions in Macedonia.<sup>739</sup> Thirdly, the Macedonian conviction that the onus is now on the international community to deliver, not to make demands, will make it harder to press for reform implementation.

To make matters worse, the relationship of the U.S. envoy, James Pardew, with leading figures in the Macedonian government, including the President, has deteriorated badly. Pardew's anticipated departure (along with the earlier exit of his EU counterpart, Francois Leotard, who has been replaced by a French foreign ministry official, Alain Le Roy) has created an impression of waning international engagement.

The international community's anxiety to avoid risks and to stick within the narrowest interpretation of its mandate has further advantaged

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<sup>738</sup> ICG interview with Speaker of Parliament Andov, 2 October 2001. In his 16 November statement, President Trajkovski also welcomed "*the position of the United States of America to characterise all future acts of armed provocations from Albanian groups in Macedonia as acts of terrorism*". Former Foreign Minister Mitreva (SDSM) also made the terrorism argument (there is no difference between domestic and international terrorism), in an address at the recent meeting of the UN General Assembly.

<sup>739</sup> See ICG Balkans Report No. 119, *Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism*, 9 November 2001.

the anti-reform camp. The incident over the mass gravesite illustrated the problem. The international community has an interest in such sites, and a duty to secure them, regardless of the Macedonians' own attitude. Instead of insisting, or even offering, to deploy OSCE monitors at the site under NATO protection, there was a debate about mandates. OSCE alternately claimed that it does not have a human rights mandate, only a "human dimension" one, and that the location was not secure. NATO, meanwhile, stated that its presence at the site depended on OSCE, and that it could not provide security for monitors, but only "extract them."<sup>740</sup>

Due to understandable suspicion of Ministry of Interior motives, negotiations over a joint deployment to a site possibly containing the victims of war crimes took on the colour of a 'concession' to be haggled over. Ironically, this vacillation ended up putting NATO troops in harm's way (as they ultimately rushed to the site to prevent escalation following the Albanian grenade attacks) while incurring the wrath of the Macedonian media for interposing in favour of the 'terrorists'.<sup>741</sup> Thus, neither of the international objectives – force protection and due deference to sovereignty – was attained.

The international community looks to new elections, as stipulated in Ohrid, to bring the country more amenable leadership. Prime Minister Georgievski has recently acquiesced to a late April 2002 date for the poll. But there is worry among moderates that, even if the elections are held at that time (and there is no guarantee that the government will actually hold them then), they will not be free or fair. The formation of elite police units like the "Lions" in the Ministry of Interior, say moderates, may be intended as a means of electoral pressure and intimidation against Macedonians even more than Albanians.<sup>742</sup>

Macedonia's chequered electoral record – with credible allegations of massive voter fraud and violence at the polls – suggests that the will of the people may not be expressed in the final vote tally. OSCE has a modest "*election observation*" and "*confidence-building*" mandate under *Ohrid Agreement*. However, it has interpreted its confidence-

<sup>740</sup> ICG interviews with OSCE and NATO officials in Skopje after 11 November.

<sup>741</sup> "They ... finally said that the "foxes" (i.e. NATO troops) do not have a mandate. The next day they suddenly got the mandate to ... deploy their forces with tanks and APCs ... to prevent incidents between the Macedonian security forces and the Albanian terrorists", *Zum* magazine, 23 November 2001.

<sup>742</sup> ICG interviews with senior pro-Ohrid politicians and observers, Skopje.

building role narrowly so far, showing wide deference to the government. More to the point, it is unlikely that observation alone will ensure that elections are free and fair.

In sum, while the passage of constitutional reforms, tightening of the amnesty, and the shake-up in government have put the anti-reform camp off balance, there has been as yet no fundamental re-ordering of the forces allied against *Ohrid Agreement*. The Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and Speaker of Parliament have not changed their views, only their tactics.

#### **D. Macedonian resentment**

If unscrupulous politicians, 'hawks' and the media were the only source of opposition to the *Ohrid Agreement*, the outlook would be less grave than it is. The foremost reason why the international community is not strongly placed to push the reforms through is, quite simply, that the great majority of Macedonians profoundly resents the way the Agreement was reached. It is generally believed that the international community helped the NLA or at least tolerated its cross-border activities from Kosovo, then expediently rehabilitated the organisation from 'terrorists' to 'peace partners'; constrained the Macedonian government from vanquishing the 'terrorist threat'; and, finally, forced it to accept the painful concessions in the *Ohrid Agreement*.

These concessions are set to become more painful still. Implementing the *Ohrid* reforms will eventually entail ceding thousands of state sector jobs to Albanians, recruiting Albanian police, conducting a new census that will almost certainly raise the official count of Albanian citizens, bringing more Albanian students into university, allowing far greater power and representation to minority representatives in the central government and at the local level, and permitting the wide, official use of the Albanian language and of sensitive symbols such as national flags. Moreover, these measures will have to be taken in the context of overall reductions in public service and state sector employment, in line with ongoing public sector and economic reforms.

Even pro-reform politicians tell ICG that where public support for the *Ohrid Agreement* does exist, it is because the deal is seen as representing an interim solution until ever more extravagant Albanian demands trigger the next conflict, rather than from any affirmative belief in the necessity or the viability of the reforms.

The disgust with the international community is more than an image problem; it actively undermines belief in the international com-

mitment to the project's lofty goals, and leads many to suspect that NATO will either stay as a permanent buffer force or leave and allow the next war to begin.<sup>743</sup>

### E. The structural problem with Ohrid Agreement

The international community's frustration with the Macedonians seems to have blinded it to the underlying structural problem in the *Ohrid Agreement*: namely, that it provided security to the Albanians at the direct cost of Macedonians' own sense of security, and so poses a unique challenge to the country's national majority.<sup>744</sup>

Signed on 13 August 2001, the Framework Agreement represents a pact between the majority Macedonians and the largest national minority, the Albanians, on fundamental power-sharing arrangements. The goal was to move Macedonia away from a Dayton-style accommodation based purely on nationality and toward an advanced model of consociational democracy – in plain terms, a “civic state”.<sup>745</sup>

The Agreement achieves this by dramatically scaling down Macedonian administrative authority (ceding central power to local municipalities) and legislative power (granting Albanians a quasi-veto over the choice of judges, laws on local government, culture, use of language, education, documentation and use of symbols). In addition, the Agreement surrenders Macedonian advantages in state hiring and admissions practices. Finally, the supremacy of Macedonian symbols is reduced by granting free use of Albanian (and other) symbols, such as the Albanian flag. Taken as a whole, the *Framework Agreement* requires the Macedonian majority to do what has been done in no other Balkan state. It has to cede its imprimatur on the character of the state without obtaining any reciprocal opportunity to shore up its identity in ways that other Balkan peoples take for granted, or to advance the cause of its own outlying minorities.<sup>746</sup>

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<sup>743</sup> The persistence of the belief that NATO is in league with the NLA cannot be overstated.

<sup>744</sup> More immediately obvious, in August, was the risk that the scheduled departure of NATO forces after a mere month's deployment would create a security vacuum in the country. See ICG Balkans Briefing, *Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum*, 8 September 2001. Skopje's agreement to a follow-on force, Operation Amber Fox, averted this immediate danger.

<sup>745</sup> For more on the contradictions of the *Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina*, see ICG Balkans Report No. 108, *After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace*, 26 April 2001, pp. 133-165.

<sup>746</sup> Neither Croatia nor Serbia, for example, has adopted formal and symbolic measures to equalise their substantial minorities, such as those in the *Framework Agreement*.

What sparked outrage among Macedonians were not so much the gains made by Albanians in the Agreement (e.g. the language provisions or the virtual veto on many types of legislation), as the losses to Macedonian identity. For example, rather than scrutinise the broad legislative veto granted to Albanians by the *Framework Agreement*, parliamentary debate focused on the entirely symbolic language of the preamble. While VMRO-DPMNE and allied anti-Ohrid parties certainly hyped the issue of the preamble, there is no question that the histrionics resonated with a public that interpreted the new, “civic” text (excising the phrase, “*the national state of the Macedonian people and their struggle for national freedom*”) as a literal erasure of the Macedonian people. The pro-Ohrid SDSM party also demanded that the proposed preamble be changed. Had international mediators not relented and brokered a compromise at the end of October, it is unlikely that the reforms would have come to a vote on 16 November.<sup>747</sup>

A second and related problem is that *Ohrid Agreement* proposes to turn Macedonia into an anomaly: a “civic state” in a region where statehood is understood and structured in emphatically ethnic terms. Furthermore, three of Macedonia’s neighbors – Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, retain long-standing challenges to the Macedonian identity. While Greece vetoes Macedonia’s name, Serbia continues to deny the autonomy of Macedonia’s Church,<sup>748</sup> and Bulgaria denies the existence of both a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation. In the case of Bulgaria, Sofia’s stated policy of “one nation - two states” may sound relatively reassuring, but is not, for it subverts the essential Macedonian claim to statehood: that they, as Macedonians, are a different and unique nation. Most Macedonians chafe at the remark of a former Bulgarian President that Macedonia is the most romantic part of Bulgarian his-

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Numerical minorities in Bosnia’s two entities – even though they are not legal minorities, but constituent peoples – enjoy few of the practical entitlements accorded the Albanians by the *Framework Agreement*. And even the protections nominally enjoyed by the Serbs in Kosovo do not equal those of the Albanians in Macedonia.

<sup>747</sup> The preamble change restored mention of “the Macedonian people” along with similar mentions of part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, etc. Notably, the only other change to the *Framework Agreement* was a slight modification to the amendment on religious communities. The change made (including the words, “as well as” after mention of the Macedonian Orthodox Church) was seen by Macedonians as protective of this institution.

<sup>748</sup> Although the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church has not been recognised by any Orthodox hierarchy, it is widely believed the main obstacle to recognition lies with the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy.

tory,<sup>749</sup> and the comment of Bulgaria's ambassador to Skopje that "*Bulgaria will not insist on changing the current borders but the Bulgarians across the border (i.e. Macedonians) should (not) be afraid of being Bulgarians.*"<sup>750</sup>

Taken together, these persistent, mutually reinforcing<sup>751</sup> challenges to the Macedonian identity suggest that centuries old claims to Macedonian territory and its people are not extinct.<sup>752</sup> Returning Minister of Defence Vlado Popovski has summed up this widely felt Macedonian concern: "*Pressure on the part of Macedonia's three neighbors (Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia) continues to exist, applying pressure to the (public) psyche ... maintaining the feeling of being actively endangered one moment or insecure the next.*"<sup>753</sup>

In sum, the Framework Agreement has undermined the Macedonians' sense of security – internal supremacy – without guaranteeing

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<sup>749</sup> Statement by Bulgarian President Petar Stojanov at a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly session in response to a question on the language-issue posed by Macedonian representative Atanas Vangelov. A1 TV, 24 April 1997. A1 TV reports that Stojanov told the subsequent press conference that there was no Macedonian minority within Bulgaria. Recent changes to Bulgarian law that facilitate citizenship for those who claim Bulgarian origin have caused offence in Macedonia. The criteria for establishing such origin are subjective and can be determined not only by the state, but by organisations of Bulgarians living abroad or the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Some Macedonians see the *Law on Bulgarians Living Abroad* as a bid to recruit Macedonians into ceding their independent identity. See Citizenship Law, Art. 15 and Law on Bulgarians Living Abroad, Art. 2.

<sup>750</sup> This remark was made by the current Bulgarian Ambassador to Macedonia, Aleksandar Jordanov, in Blagoevgrad in 1993 on the occasion of the centenary of VMRO. Jordanov was further quoted as stating "*Bulgaria will not insist on changing the current borders and will not participate in our neighbor's conflicts, but the Bulgarians across the border should recognise and be proud of his history without fear of being Bulgarian.*" *Start weekly*, 2 November 2001.

<sup>751</sup> The names, "Slav Macedonians" or "Bulgarians", both favoured by Greeks, reinforce the Bulgarian position that Macedonians are merely a subset of the larger Slav or Bulgarian people in the region. The Serb claim on Macedonians as "South Serbians" is defunct, thanks to Tito's federalist policy. The claims against the Macedonian identity not only reinforce each other, but sometimes actively conspire: "*It appears that the Bulgarians ... have united with Greece in denying the existence of a Macedonian nation as espoused by Yugoslavs.*" *Who Are the Macedonians?* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 168-169

<sup>752</sup> As for contemporary territorial pretensions on Macedonia, "*It is widely believed that discussions took place in 1992 and 1993 between the Yugoslav and Greek foreign ministers on a possible territorial division of FYROM.*" James Pettifer, *Former Yugoslav Macedonia – The Shades of Night?*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Surrey, UK, July 2001, p. 9.

<sup>753</sup> Vlado Popovski, *Why do the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia feel secure or insecure?*, in *Inventory Macedonia 1989-99*, Open Society Institute Macedonia, 2001, p. 271.

an end either to Albanian aspirations or to the challenges mounted by Macedonia's Orthodox neighbors.

Aggravating matters further, the Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria, Greece and Albania nurse valid grievances of their own, none of which were considered by the international community as it wrested a host of concessions from Macedonians to their chief minority group, the Albanians. In this situation, it is a simple matter for the anti-Ohrid faction to exploit legitimate Macedonian grievances for illegitimate ends. The scope for such exploitation will increase even further when the Ohrid reforms lead to the recruitment of thousands of Albanians to public sector employment and the likely dismissal of many Macedonians.

### F. Macedonia's loss of "equidistance"

The armed conflict with Albanians that began in February 2001 not only upset the basis of inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. It has also skewed the country's relations with its more powerful neighbors.

During the 1990s, under President Kiro Gligorov and governments led by Branko Crvenkovski, independent Macedonia pursued a regional policy of "equidistance" from its neighbors. This stabilising policy was born of necessity, given the twin threats to Macedonia from Albanian nationalism and traditional Orthodox pretensions. Regional and internal developments tested the policy several times over the decade, most notably during the NATO operation against the FRY in 1999.<sup>754</sup>

After taking office in 1998, Prime Minister Georgievski dropped the notion of "equidistance" in favour of a new "principle of positive energy."<sup>755</sup> This has had implications for Macedonian identity. Georgievski is widely regarded as cleaving to the pro-Bulgarian wing of Macedonian nationalism,<sup>756</sup> and there was public consternation in February

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<sup>754</sup> Besides the Kosovo refugee crisis in 1999, the so-called "arms plot" of 1993 and ethnic violence in Tetovo and Gostivar in 1994 and 1997 also shook Albanian politics and inter-ethnic relations. See discussion in Pettifer,

*Shades of Night?* Pettifer points out that from its inception, independent Macedonia relied on ambiguity for survival – even the 1991 referendum on independence allowed for the return of Macedonia to a new Yugoslav federation.

<sup>755</sup> Ljubcho Georgievski, *The Challenges and Problems on the Road of Reform Implementation*, in *Inventory: Macedonia 1989-1999*, Open Society Institute, Skopje 2001, p. 113.

<sup>756</sup> See Georgievski's article, *If Goce Delchev was alive in 1945 he would have finished up in Idrizovo*, *Puls*, 7-14 July 1995, where he attacked Andov for suggesting that Bulgaria was Macedonia's main enemy. (Idrizovo is Skopje's main prison.)

1999 when he accepted a drafting device to permit Bulgaria to avoid formally recognising the Macedonian language.<sup>757</sup> Two years later, he reportedly accepted Greece's demand for a compound name for Macedonia.<sup>758</sup>

Yet on the critical question of relations with the predominantly Muslim Albanians, Macedonia maintained a largely independent policy until spring 2001, when the conflict with the NLA exposed the weaknesses of the Macedonian military. Desperate to build up its capabilities, Skopje turned east – to Ukraine and Russia and also to Orthodox neighbors Serbia and Bulgaria, who are now its number two and three suppliers of munitions.<sup>759</sup> **Greece has provided helicopters.**

Meanwhile Macedonia has aligned itself closely with Serbia against Albanians. The two have closed their sharp differences over Kosovo and forged a virtual condominium against independence for the province. Presidents Kostunica and Trajkovski recently signed agreements for a joint security policy against the “*threat of Albanian Muslim terrorism throughout the southern Balkans.*”<sup>760</sup> Serbia's deputy premier, Nebojsa Covic, who holds special responsibility for Kosovo and southern Serbia, has become a frequent visitor to Skopje. And armed units under the Serbian Ministry of Interior are reportedly deployed in northern Macedonia to “*protec*” Serb villages.<sup>761</sup>

While the trend toward cultivating strong relations with the East, even to the point of subordinating the Macedonian identity, is strongest

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<sup>757</sup> *The Mutual Declaration of the President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia and the President of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria* ends with the ambiguous signature phrase: “*Signed in Sofia on 22 February 1999, in two original copies, each of them in the official languages of the two countries, the Macedonian language in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and the Bulgarian language in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.*” Standard practice in international agreements would be to state, “in the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages”. Thus, the Declaration preserves the Bulgarian challenge to the Macedonian language.

<sup>758</sup> Citing “always well informed Greek journalists”, *Start* reports that “*an agreement about a compound name (Northern or Upper Macedonia) was reached between Macedonian authorities and Greece. It was only up to the Macedonian parliamentary opposition whether this solution would be approved and whether the whole dispute could be resolved by the termination of the Interim Accord in October 2002.*” *Start* weekly, 2 November 2001. Government sources tell ICG that Georgievski accepted the name at a meeting in Greece in February 2001.

<sup>759</sup> ICG interview at the Macedonian Ministry of Defence, 2 November 2001.

<sup>760</sup> “*Macedonia will benefit greatly from Yugoslav military technology ... Overall, Macedonia is woefully short of the necessary means to pursue and defeat a determined Muslim insurgency.*” Armed Forces Intelligence Research, November 2001.

<sup>761</sup> ICG interviews with senior officials, Belgrade, November 2001.

among anti-Ohrid leaders, even pro-Ohrid politicians like former Defence Minister Buchkovski have also cultivated the defence relationships with Sofia and Belgrade.

For the international community, the situation is precisely the opposite of what is desired. By increasing Skopje's military confidence while doing nothing to ease its deeper sense of national insecurity, Macedonia's Orthodox neighbors are making conflict with Albanians more likely.

Little wonder, then, that Albanians have vigorously supported calls for Macedonia's name to be acknowledged internationally.<sup>762</sup> They realise that the greater the external challenge to Macedonian identity, the more Macedonians will press for internal supremacy. And the greater the military support from Orthodox neighbors, the more inclined Skopje will be to keep open the military option.

## II. THE NAME DISPUTE

While the Bulgarian and Serbian challenges to Macedonian identity are painfully felt by many Macedonians, there is no question that Greece's veto is the most acute problem. The denial of international legitimacy to the country's constitutional name poses a profound challenge to both national and state identity. During its first decade of independence, Skopje learned to accommodate this denial without accepting it. Now, the conflict with the Albanians has changed the name dispute by giving it a strategic security dimension for Macedonia and its neighbors.

### A. Origins and evolution

*The "Macedonian Question" and the historic challenge to Macedonian identity.* After the Congress of Berlin (1878), Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria contended for the largest remaining, nationally undetermined portion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The tripartite split of the region that emerged after the Second Balkan War (1913) more or less survived two World Wars up to the present day: Aegean Macedonia went to Greece; Pirin Macedonia went to Bulgaria; Vardar

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<sup>762</sup> DPA leader Arben Xhaferi has written Secretary of State Colin Powell urging a change in U.S. policy and use of the name, Republic of Macedonia. ICG interview with Xhaferi, 2 October 2001. Dr. Xhaferi rejected the use of an adjectival solution to the name dispute like Macedonian Republic as offensive to the Albanian people of Macedonia in that it would suggest that the state belonged only to the Macedonian majority.

Macedonia went to Serbia (succeeded by Yugoslavia, then by the Republic of Macedonia). Despite the apparent durability of the territorial split, the Macedonian Question remained “open” through much of the twentieth century, with Bulgaria in particular mounting efforts to reverse the “unfair” settlement and gain, principally, Serb-controlled Vardar Macedonia.

During the interwar period, Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians were united in denial of the Macedonian identity. Serbia designated them “South Serbians”, while Bulgaria claimed them as their own. Greece called them “Slavophone Greeks” before also settling on the term Bulgarians.<sup>763</sup> Policies on language, education, and even surnames followed suit, with the dominant ideology imposing its forms. Thus, suppression of the Macedonian identity was from the outset a critical element in consolidating territorial control (for Serbs and Greeks) and challenging it (for revanchist Bulgarians).

The Greek civil war, which drew Partisan-backed “Slavo-Macedonians” (in Greek parlance) into a bitter fratricidal conflict, eventually, with steadfast Allied support, closed the Aegean part of the question.<sup>764</sup> Macedonians and other Slavs in Greece paid a heavy price for Tito’s ambitions, presented under the guise of a “United Macedonia” which would have brought together the Greek and Bulgarian slices under a pro-Tito government. Thousands fled during the war, and many more emigrated afterwards in the face of forceful Greek efforts to assimilate them into the mainstream Greek population. Greece today still refuses to recognise Macedonians or “Slavo-Macedonians” as an “ethnic minority.”<sup>765</sup>

Under Tito’s communist rule, Serb domination over Vardar Macedonia was replaced by a new Macedonian republic inside federal Yugoslavia. The republic strengthened the Macedonian identity independent of the Bulgarian challenge, giving Macedonians the first official

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<sup>763</sup> Andrew Rossos, *The British Foreign Office and Macedonian National Identity, 1918-41*, *Slavic Review*, vol. 53, number 2, Summer 1994, p. 9.

<sup>764</sup> See Evangelos Kofos, *The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943-1949)*, Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy: Occasional Papers No. 3 (Athens 1989). Kofos states (p. 3), “Hardly one single issue had such diverse and longstanding repercussions on the inception, planning, conduct and perceptions of the Greek Civil War as the Macedonian question.” Tito’s concept for a united, autonomous socialist Macedonia was also Comintern policy for much of the interwar period. Tito’s continued pursuit of the policy after 1945 brought him into conflict with Stalin.

<sup>765</sup> Poulton (see footnote 44 supra), p. 171.

sanction of their language and existence. For its part, Greece saw and still sees Titoist Macedonia as an artificial creation – a mutation of the underlying, “true” Bulgarian identity of the Slav peoples in all Vardar and Pirin regions.<sup>766</sup> Over time, as Greek-Yugoslav relations improved, Athens began to look to Belgrade to restrain irredentist tendencies (toward Pirin or Aegean Macedonia) on the part of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia.

### **Independent Macedonia and the dispute over the name**

When the former Yugoslavia disintegrated a decade ago, five successor states emerged. The international community soon recognised three of these (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and accepted the fourth under its self-proclaimed name, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising Serbia and Montenegro. The one successor state that was not accepted under its own name was Macedonia.

The decision not to recognise Macedonia in January 1992, along with Slovenia and Croatia, contradicted the finding of the European Union’s own advisory body on legal issues arising from the Yugoslav conflict. The Arbitration Commission, under Robert Badinter, found that Macedonia, having amended its constitution to renounce all territorial claims and any hostile propaganda, had satisfied the tests in the (EC) guidelines for recognition.<sup>767</sup>

The EC’s reasoning had nothing to do with nationality relations inside Macedonia or with its neighbors. At that time, Macedonia had

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<sup>766</sup> Professor Kofos, for example, argues that Tito contrived the entire Macedonian identity, including the state, language, Church, and history. See Evangelos Kofos, *The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation*, *Institute for Balkan Studies* (Thessaloniki, 1987), pp. 3-4. Elsewhere, Kofos has stated that Greece, unlike Bulgaria, recognises a “separate Slavic people” in Macedonia, but merely objects to their use of the name “Macedonians”. In practice, it is hard to see that the distinction makes a difference. There is no alternative name to “Macedonian” that would fend off the persistent Bulgarian challenge to ethnic Macedonian existence. Compound, regional names like “Upper Macedonian” or “Vardar Macedonian” simply reinforce the Bulgarian position that Macedonians are “Bulgarians” of the “Macedonian region”. See Kofos, *Greece’s Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM’s Independence and Recognition, in Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades, Andre Gerolymatos, (New York, The Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Queens College of the City University of New York, and Pella Publishing Company, N.Y., 1999), p. 363.

<sup>767</sup> Conference on Yugoslavia: *Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 6 on the recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its member states*. Paragraph 5. The term “EC” refers to the European Communities, which became the European Union (EU) with ratification of the *Maastricht Treaty* in 1993.

the smallest potential for conflict of any successor state except Slovenia. Rather, its southern neighbor, Greece, objected to Macedonia's "appropriation" of a name and symbols that deemed exclusively Hellenic.

In Macedonia as in Yugoslavia's other republics, the end of the one-party system in 1990 brought a revival of both national and nationalist euphoria. The VMRO-DPMNE, the leading anti-communist party, pledged to work for the "*ideal of all free Macedonians united*" in a Macedonian state.<sup>768</sup> Maps were sold showing "Solun" (the Macedonian name for Thessaloniki) in a "greater Macedonia". Symbolic links to Alexander the Great were claimed and publicized.

In these ways, independent Macedonia trod on the most neuralgic Greek taboos: irredentism towards northern Greece and the appropriation of the ancient Macedonian legacy. Greek politicians, academics and journalists sensationalized both the threat that the new state opposed, and the exclusivity of the Greek claim. Huge demonstrations were staged, with the participants declaring that "*Macedonia is Greek*"... Both leading political parties encourages the trend and the Greek government mobilized to block recognition of Macedonia unless it changes its name and dropped the use of the "Star of Vergina" on its flag.

On the name, a consensus formed around the position, "*no use of Macedonia, or any of its derivatives*", denying Skopje the option of employing the name "Macedonia" in any form, even with a prefatory adjective like "Upper", "New" or "Vardar".<sup>769</sup>

Athens used its membership in the European Community, and then the EU to thwart Macedonian recognition. The Union accommodated the Greeks, granting them an effective veto on any name and expressly prohibiting one that would include Macedonia. To Athens's chagrin, Macedonia was admitted to the United Nations in April 1993, although under the "provisional name" of 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM).<sup>770</sup> Nevertheless, most countries, including the U.S., declined to recognise Skopje out of deference to Greece.

The following month, the co-chairmen of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, took over the issue. Reviving early compromise efforts, Vance proposed the name "Nova Makedonija" (New Macedonia). Both parties rejected it, with

<sup>768</sup> *Oslobodjenje*, Sarajevo, 23 June 1990, cited in Poulton, p. 173.

<sup>769</sup> See discussion in Kofos, *Greece's Macedonian Adventure* (see footnote above).

<sup>770</sup> Although "former" is formally in lower-case, this paper follows common usage and abbreviates the name as FYROM, not FYROM.

Greece hewing to its maximalist position and Macedonia continuing to insist on its constitutional name.

The dispute hit bottom in February 1994, when Greece under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou imposed a total embargo on FYROM except for food and pharmaceuticals. Vance's mediation went nowhere until September 1995 when he split off the name issue from the question of the flag (with its motif of the ancient Macedonian "Star of Vergina"). On the eve of the Dayton negotiations, and with the involvement of U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, Athens and Skopje finally signed Vance's proposal (the *Interim Accord*) for lifting the embargo and recognising Skopje in exchange for the latter relinquishing the flag.<sup>771</sup> The U.S. and other major countries soon established full diplomatic relations – four years after Macedonia had declared independence.

Pursuant to the Interim Accord, talks have continued under Vance's successor, Matthew Nimetz, with only modest movement in each side's positions. Athens has dropped its demand that Skopje not use the name "Macedonia" in any form, in favour of a compound name like "Upper Macedonia". For its part, Skopje is ready to accept a compound name in its relations with Greece, but continues to demand recognition of its constitutional name in both multilateral and other bilateral relations.

The Nimetz talks have permitted the two governments to explore various solutions to the problem in a confidential diplomatic channel. The special representative has also met separately with the two sides, including at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 2001. The Secretary-General himself has also discussed the issue with the parties. These persistent efforts have not yielded a solution, let's hope that they are likely to do so in future.

## **B. Where Athens stands**

Greek hypersensitivity on Macedonia has multiple sources: the Greek civil war in which Slavs played an active part; the long-standing vulnerability of Greece's northern borders to irredentism; fears of

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<sup>771</sup> The *Interim Accord* also includes a number of practical measures to facilitate normal trade and commerce in spite of the difference on the name. For example, Greek immigration officials do not stamp Macedonian passports (which would imply recognition of the name) at the border; they stamp a separate visa paper instead. The agreement is noteworthy as well for awkwardly avoiding naming either country – instead using the legalistic formulation "Party of the First and Second Part". In 2002, either party has the right to withdraw from the agreement, such withdrawal taking effect a year later.

destabilising traditional, internal divisions between Athens and its northern provinces; and, periodically, the irksome challenge to modern Greece's own lineage to classical Greece and Byzantium.

Today, these considerations are less incendiary than they were even a decade ago. The eminent Greek scholar Evangelos Kofos argues that as Greece has stabilised and matured since the Second World War, the Macedonian issue has evolved from a true "national security issue" for Greeks to one of identity, and finally, in the wake of Greece's recent emergence as a secure, prosperous EU and NATO member, to a matter of human rights: the Greeks' right to their cultural heritage.<sup>772</sup>

Anyhow, the Greek position is still that the Republic of Macedonia or Macedonia is a denial of the Greek identity and an expression of irredentist intent. Official Greek policy on the issue is to find a "compromise" around a compound name such as "Upper Macedonia". As an inducement, Greece offers its pledge to "*safeguard FYROM's stability and development.*" ICG discussions with Greek officials suggest that this could be expanded to include increased investment, security assistance, and guidance on moving Macedonia to EU membership.<sup>773</sup> Greece rejects any linkage of the name dispute to Macedonia's recent internal crisis with Albanians, and blames Skopje's "nationalistic" intransigence for its problems.

Several views, not necessarily held as official policy, inform the Greek position:

*-The belief that, despite the Framework Agreement, Macedonia's partition is just a matter of time.* Under this thinking, it makes no sense for a Greek government to take the political risk to stabilise a country that has a limited future. Furthermore, some Greek analysts simply do not believe that the name issue contributes significantly to Macedonia's instability, and hence doubt that ceding the name would assist its stabilisation.<sup>774</sup>

*-The conviction that Macedonia needs Greece much more than Greece needs Macedonia.* While Greece is Macedonia's third biggest trading partner, Macedonia ranks only in the second dozen of Greece's

<sup>772</sup> ICG interview with Professor Kofos, on 4 October 2001. See also discussion in Kofos, *Greece's Macedonian Adventure*, op. cit., pp. 361-394.

<sup>773</sup> Greece is already the main foreign investor in Macedonia, reporting investments through 2000 of over U.S.\$300 million. The Economist Intelligence Unit, *East European Investment Prospects 2001*.

<sup>774</sup> ICG discussions at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens.

trading partners.<sup>775</sup> Further, as an EU member, Greece wields enormous influence on Macedonia's aspiration to membership. The *Stabilisation and Association Agreement* (SAA) with the EU, which Skopje signed in April 2001 as the foundation for the accession process, will not come into full effect until ratified by all EU member states, including Greece;

*-A suspicion that stubbornness, rather than intrinsic sensitivity, is the reason why Skopje has not yet yielded to Greek terms.* The impression that Prime Minister Georgievski has indicated willingness to accept a compound name ("Gorna Makedonija", "Upper Macedonia") reinforces this suspicion;

*-A feeling that Greek sensitivities are utterly misunderstood and unappreciated.* The tendency of many diplomats to slight the Greek position infuriates the Greeks and reinforces their view that Macedonia's monopolisation of the name has blinded the world to the existence and identity of Greek Macedonia;

*-The anxiety that ceding on the name would not only be an indignity for the Greek people and a political risk for the government, but would also open a Pandora's Box of claims and complications.* Under this view, it is feared that Skopje would flaunt acceptance of its name to mount legal challenges to Greek use of the name Macedonia, and institute legal and other claims concerning the current and exiled ethnic Macedonian population. In other words, "irredentism" for the Greeks is manifested less by a potential land-grab than by steadily increasing legal and commercial usurpation. (This also partly explains why the repeated Macedonian promises about having no territorial claims, some codified as constitutional amendments, do not satisfy.);

*-The belief that there is not such thing as a (non-Greek) Macedonian.* The notion that Slav Macedonians are "really" Bulgarian (or something else) underlies the Greek attitude toward the name issue. In support of this view, intellectuals have lent their weight to the view that Macedonian identity is largely a Titoist contrivance;

*-The conviction that the mere use of the name denies the existence of the Greek Macedonian identity.* This is the crux of the problem. For all the foregoing reasons, many Greeks see the mere use of the name not simply as an insult, but as a denial of their own identity. These views coalesce around the bottom-line demand that Skopje accepts, at most, use of a compound name instead of its constitutional name.<sup>776</sup>

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<sup>775</sup> Source: Greek Liaison Office, Skopje.

<sup>776</sup> Greece cites the UN precedent for countries like France to use a form other than their constitutional name, *Republique Francaise*.

### C. Where Skopje stands

For Macedonians, “Macedonia” serves as the sole name of both the state and the people. This distinction is crucial: the name of the state, Republic of Macedonia, is inextricably tied to the Macedonian people’s identity. Denying Macedonians the full use of their name necessarily exposes them to the charge that they, their state and their language are an “artificial creation” (as some Greeks and Bulgarians argue) and exist only as part of the Bulgarian nation (as Bulgaria implies).

In short, for Macedonians the name issue is a question not only of identity, but of existence. This view is reinforced by three considerations:

- That the name at once identifies the state and the people, and Macedonians have no other “kin” or “matrix” state to secure their identity;

- That their identity is persistently challenged by Bulgaria, which maintains that they are a sub-set of the same nation;

- That the provisional name FYROM is not only a humiliation, but implies a provisional acceptance of the state, as if its present form were merely a precursor to a final status to be decided later.

Nevertheless, for the past two years Skopje has been ready to accept a separate, negotiated name (e.g. Upper Macedonia) for use by Greece alone, in order to distinguish the state from Greece’s own northern province of Macedonia.<sup>777</sup>

The fourth consideration is this: After the painful concessions at Ohrid, including those on identity, there is no more scope for concessions on issues of identity, whether to Greece, Bulgaria or Serbia.

This accounts for the deepening of Macedonian conviction on the name issue during 2001. Former President Kiro Gligorov, Macedonia’s most respected political figure, spoke for the political and popular majority (though not necessarily for Prime Minister Georgievski) earlier this year: *“I am convinced that there is no statesman in the Republic of Macedonia who is ready and authorised to give consent for the change of the constitutional name of the state. Also, not one state or international organisation is allowed to require us to change our con-*

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<sup>777</sup> In Greek, *Periphēria Makedonias*, the Department (or Province) of Macedonia.

stitution or to impose a name that does not belong to us.”<sup>778</sup> More recently still, Boris Trajkovski, Gligorov’s successor, has “renewed our call on the international community for the recognition of our constitutional name – the Republic of Macedonia. This would represent a true support to our sovereignty, our identity, and a huge contribution to lasting stability in the region.”<sup>779</sup>

The new Deputy Prime Minister, Dosta Dimovska, has told ICG that, “in terms of importance to Macedonia, the name issue is a “ten” on a scale of one to ten.”<sup>780</sup> In interviews with ICG, other leading figures in government and opposition, including Georgievski himself and former prime minister and SDSM leader Branko Crvenkovski, share this sentiment.

#### D. Comparing the positions

The crux of the “Macedonian question” today is that the clash over the geographic and historic region known as “Macedonia” has fused with the controversy over the existence of a people and their state. Consequently, affirming the Greek (or Bulgarian) position means not only denying the Macedonian one, but denying Macedonian existence.

- The basic problems with Athens’ position do not stem from the quest for human and cultural rights *per se*. The Greek position implies a superior – often exclusive right to the contemporary appellation as well as the ancient heritage of Macedonia. From the Greek perspective, Skopje’s use of the name “Republic of Macedonia” is the “appropriation” and “monopolisation” of Greek property. Skopje’s use of the name inherently “denies” the existence of Greek Macedonia and “deprives” Greeks of their heritage. In short, the Greek position is that Macedonia’s mere use of the name poses a threat to its heritage and identity;

- The historical region of Macedonia indeed forms an important part of the Greek identity. But however important ancient Macedonia may be to Greeks, there is an objective difference: Greece does not depend on the name Macedonia as the exclusive signifier of the Greek identity;

- As a matter of law, the Greek claims fail;

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<sup>778</sup> Kiro Gligorov, *The Struggle for the International Recognition of Macedonia*, in Inventory: Macedonia 1989-1999 (Skopje, Open Society Institute, 2001), p. 79.

<sup>779</sup> Presidential Statement of 16 November 2001.

<sup>780</sup> ICG interview with VMRO-DPMNE party vice-president Dosta Dimovska, 14 September 2001

- The Greek demand that the Republic of Macedonia change its name at all finds weak if any support in international law.<sup>781</sup> The Badinter Commission disposed of the issue in its *Advisory Opinion*, stating “*the Republic of Macedonia has renounced all territorial claims*”; (therefore), the use of the name “Macedonia” cannot imply any territorial claims against another State.<sup>782</sup> Whatever the legitimacy of the Hellenic claim to the legacy of Alexander, history and cultural heritage do not grant a copyright on place names.

The use of a “provisional name” as a condition for membership in the UN is very likely in contravention of Article 4 of the *Charter* which, according to the International Court of Justice, strictly limits the conditions that can be imposed on membership.<sup>783</sup> The Security Council’s rationale for departing from UN provisions and practice – the “*interest (in) maintenance of peaceful and good-neighboring relations in the region*” – would now, in light of Macedonia’s clear instability, militate in the opposite direction: permitting Macedonia the swiftest possible use of its constitutional name.

Fairness requires examining the record to see what steps have been taken to resolve the dispute. “*However culpable Macedonia may have been for its nationalist euphoria around*

*1990, the Greek decision to impose a total embargo was unconscionable.*”<sup>784</sup> At Greek behest, Macedonia has already once changed

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<sup>781</sup> “*There appears to be no basis in international law or practice for Greece’s position (that recognition of Macedonia be withheld until it changes its name).*” Henkin, Pugh, Schacter, Smit, *International Law, Cases and Materials*, Third Edition (Minnesota 1993), p. 253. While there is some support in international law for state discretion on recognition, and even imposition of conditions before granting recognition, such discretion is “*not a matter of arbitrary will or political concession, but is given or refused in accordance with legal principle.*” In the instant case of Greece and Macedonia, such principle is glaringly absent. See *International Law*, London, Ninth Edition, Volume I, Chapter 2, *Recognition of States and Governments*, Sections 39 and 34, emphasis added.

<sup>782</sup> Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, *Opinion No. 6 on the recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States*.

<sup>783</sup> See *Admission of State to the United Nations*, Advisory opinion; 1948, ICJ Rep. 57, 61.

<sup>784</sup> The European Commission in April 1994 challenged the legality of the embargo before the European Court of Justice as a matter of European Union law. The court’s Advocate General supported the Greek view that its subjective decision to take “countermeasures” against Macedonia could not be challenged (on the grounds that national security is a matter of subjective perception), and the court elected not to hear the case on its merits. See Szasz, *Greece-the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Interim Accord and Practical Mea-*

its Constitution, inserting three amendments to the effect that the Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against neighboring states, will not interfere in their internal affairs, and will only change its borders in accordance with international norms.<sup>785</sup>

### **E. The international interest**

The international community wants to stabilise Macedonia and ensure that the far-reaching reforms agreed at Ohrid are adopted and implemented. This, in turn, gives the international community a compelling strategic reason to work with Greece to find a way to acknowledge Macedonia's constitutional name as a *matter of regional stability*.<sup>786</sup> The challenge is to break the zero-sum dynamic and find a way to affirm the Macedonian identity without denying the Greek one, and while addressing bedrock Greek concerns.

International community observers consulted by ICG agree that a fair mechanism for permitting international use of the name of their country preferred by Macedonians would help significantly to:

- relieve some of the bitterness and frustration felt by Macedonians over the concessions to the Albanians, and the role of the international community;
- increase the influence of the international community;

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*asures Related to the Interim Accord, International Legal Materials*, November 1995, p. 1,464. Nevertheless, if asked by a court to support with evidence its position that the 'threat' posed by Macedonians justified the "countermeasures" imposed (i.e. the embargo), it is hard to see how Athens could satisfy any reasonable standard. As noted above, the Badinter Commission had specifically stated that Macedonia had renounced all territorial claims, and denied that its name implied any territorial claim against another state. Moreover, the withdrawal of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) had decimated Macedonian military capabilities, making the prospect of a cross-border strike against Greece thoroughly implausible. See Badinter Arbitration Commission, *Opinion No. 6, paragraph 5*.

<sup>785</sup> *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia*, Article 49, paragraph 1. *Amendments enacted 6 January 1992*.

<sup>786</sup> This would not be the first time that strategic interests guided the decision on the Macedonian question. Greek scholar Evangelos Kofos has pointed out that the State Department took the view (after the Second World War) that the crux of the Macedonian problem was the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Greece itself. The fight against Communism ensured that this imperative could not be challenged during the Cold War. With Macedonia's preservation now at issue, and the Cold War over a decade ago, the crux has moved back to Skopje. Kofos, *The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943-1949)*, Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy: Occasional Papers No. 3, Athens 1989, p. 24.

- strengthen the moderates and build a critical mass of support for the Ohrid reforms as more than a device to postpone the next war;
- slow the centrifugal forces that are tearing at the country's fabric;
- stymie those in Macedonia intent on war as well as those outside Macedonia who have designs on the country; and
- re-establishing Macedonia's relations with its neighbors.

By contrast, to persist in imposing an idealistic accord like Ohrid without addressing the name issue suggests to Macedonians that the international community is either not serious about the project or refuses to understand Macedonian security concerns. In short, it is hard to see how a permanent compromise like Ohrid can work in a country with a provisional name.

### **III. A NEW PROPOSAL: TRIANGULAR, NOT BILATERAL**

To be worth pursuing, any proposed solution to the name dispute should meet three criteria:

- It must help preserve Macedonia as an integral state and contribute to regional stability. It must not allay Macedonian fears at the expense of Greek ones, and it must address Skopje's relations with its other neighbors – not only Athens, but also Sofia and Belgrade;
- It must contribute significantly to *Ohrid Framework Agreement* implementation, by helping to overcome the most significant obstacle – Macedonians' sense of insecurity not playing into the hands of the anti-reform camp. It must provide the international community with some leverage should Skopje continue to backslide on its commitments;
- It must be practicable to achieve and implement. It should not require a heroic diversion of international diplomacy or the creation of an unwieldy framework or structure. Further, it must be consistent with the overall objective to minimise international deployment in the Balkans.

The solution proposed here, which has been the subject of wide-ranging consultations in Skopje, Athens and with several of the major international players – has novel elements designed to meet these criteria. It replaces the vain hope of striking a bilateral compromise over a subject – identity and cultural heritage – that defies compromise, with a

trilateral formula that makes the international community<sup>787</sup> an active participant in achieving a solution.

The ICG proposal has three main elements which would come into effect simultaneously:

- Bilateral treaty between Skopje and Athens involving concessions to Greek concerns;
- Diplomatic notes from EU and NATO member states and others acknowledging both Macedonia's name as "Republika Makedonija" and the terms of the bilateral treaty, while promising to consult with Greece on appropriate measures if the treaty is broken;
- Adoption and use for all working purposes by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations of the Macedonian-language name "Republika Makedonija".

Before acknowledging the name "Republika Makedonija", it would be reasonable for the international community to require at least two up-front concessions by Macedonia relating to the Framework Agreement reforms:

- Skopje would invite NATO to extend its mission for six months beyond March 2002; and
  - Skopje would invite OSCE to extend its mission by twelve months after December 2001 and substantially increase its election role.
- The proposal follows in full detail.

### **A. The three key elements**

**Element One:** Bilateral Treaty of concessions to Athens.

After receiving a signal from the international community that it is prepared to move on the issue, Athens and Skopje would conclude a treaty consisting largely of Macedonian concessions:

1. Accepting the use by the Hellenic Republic in all its relations with Macedonia, including in multilateral organisations, of the names "Upper Macedonia" and "Upper Macedonians" (or similar agreed formulation) for the state and people of the Republic of Macedonia;
2. Binding both parties not to challenge, in any forum, the use of the name "Macedonia" or "Macedonian" in a commercial context for

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<sup>787</sup> The term "international community" is invoked to mean, in the first place, the United States and the members of the European Union and NATO (except Greece) as the third-party states with the strongest interest in resolving the name dispute, plus the capacity to implement the solution described in this report.

reference to products or services emanating from either the Hellenic Republic or the Republic of Macedonia;

3. Committing Macedonia to securing a formal Parliamentary Declaration on cultural and historical issues which:

- affirms, pursuant to its obligations as a member of UNESCO and as signatory to relevant international conventions, Macedonia's solemn obligation to respect, preserve and honor the legacy of Hellenic tradition within the territory of the Republic of Macedonia and the cultural heritage rights of all peoples inhabiting the geographic region of Macedonia<sup>788</sup>; and,

- pledges to encourage the fullest and highest professional cooperation, in a spirit of scholarship and pursuit of truth, in regional and international academic forums to advance common understanding of the history (ancient, medieval, and modern), of the geographic region of Macedonia and all its peoples;

4. Affirming provisions of the *Interim Accord*, including:

- the continuing obligation on the part of both parties, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the *Interim Accord*, to prohibit state-controlled propaganda and discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility;

- the obligations that apply to each party pertaining to use of symbols constituting part of the historic or cultural patrimony, pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 of the *Interim Accord*; and,

- all other provisions of the *Interim Accord*, except those that the parties agree are no longer applicable. This means that practical measures over vehicles and passports would remain in effect.

5. Inviting UNESCO, the Council of Europe or another agreed third-party (e.g. an independent panel of experts) to examine the Macedonian educational curriculum, particularly on the subjects of history and geography, to ensure that it conforms to international standards and is within the letter and spirit of Article 7 of the *Interim Accord*;

6. Committing Macedonia to securing a formal *Parliamentary Declaration* further clarifying Article 49 of the *Constitution* (which provides for Macedonia to “*take care of the status and rights of Macedonians living in neighboring countries*”), and Article 6 of the *Interim Accord*. The clarification would state that attending to such status and

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<sup>788</sup> Greece's reciprocal obligation as a UNESCO member to respect the ethnic Macedonian heritage in Greece would continue unaffected by this provision.

rights would be pursued strictly in accordance with international law and with the cooperation of relevant international organisations;<sup>789</sup>

7. Stating that while reserving all its rights under international law concerning possible claims of its citizens or of the state, the Republic of Macedonia acknowledges that the existence of this Treaty, or any of its provisions, or the acceptance of its constitutional name by third-parties, shall not be construed as giving the Republic a unique or enhanced platform to bring such claims.

**Element Two: Acknowledgement of the constitutional name by the international community.**

The member states of NATO and the European Union and others would formally welcome this bilateral treaty through exchange of diplomatic notes with the two parties. These diplomatic notes would both acknowledge Macedonia's name as "Republika Makedonija" and simultaneously acknowledge the terms of the bilateral Skopje-Athens treaty. They would also promise to consult with Greece about appropriate measures if the assurances contained in the Skopje-Athens treaty were violated.

**Element Three: The United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations would adopt and use for all working purposes the Macedonian-language name "Republika Makedonija".**

*-Formal name:* The formal name at the UN and other intergovernmental organisations

would be the constitutional name, Republika Makedonija, written in the Macedonian

language and the Roman alphabet.

*- Short name:* The short name (or informal name) would remain Republika Makedonija– not "Macedonia" or "Makedonija" – and be listed under "r", not "m" in the alphabetical directory.

*- Greek usage:* Greece shall have the right in the United Nations to use "Upper Macedonia" for the state and "Upper Macedonian" for the people (or similar formulation as agreed with Macedonia in the bilateral treaty).

*- Adjectival:* All others shall use the adjectival form "of Republika Makedonija" except when referring to the language or the people, in

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<sup>789</sup> As noted above, Article 49 of the *Constitution* has been amended. The instant provision would amplify those amendments to address the specific issue of advancing the cause of ethnic kin.

which case the adjectival forms shall be “Macedonian people” and “Macedonian language”.

- *Examples: “The Security Council welcomes the representative of Republika Makedonija and congratulates the Macedonian people on their national day. Greece, too, wishes to congratulate the representative of Upper Macedonia and the Upper Macedonian people on their national day.”*

Before formally acknowledging the name “Republika Makedonija” bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, it would be reasonable for the international community to require at least two up-front concessions by Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms, namely:

- Authorising and inviting NATO to extend its mission up to six months beyond its likely expiry date (March 2002). In return, the international community would use its good offices to explore a further increase in cooperation under Partnership for Peace, and to study all means of accelerating the process for NATO membership;

- Authorising and inviting OSCE to extend its mission by twelve months beyond December 2001 and assume an active, participatory role in the organisation of elections, beyond that envisioned in the *Framework Agreement*.<sup>790</sup> While OSCE would not be permitted to direct or veto decisions of the government or election bodies, it would have full access to and participation in such bodies from the beginning of the electoral process. Further, it would be permitted to recommend steps and furnish advice and material assistance. Particular attention would be paid to the development of accurate voter registers and procedures to avoid double-voting or other fraud.

## **B. International community procedure**

The U.S. and members of the European Union should assume the role as facilitators for the proposal. They would signal to Athens and Skopje their support for this solution, and request that both capitals approach the UN Special Representative to convene special negotia-

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<sup>790</sup> *Framework Agreement*, Annex C, Paragraph 2.2: “Parliamentary elections will be held by 27 January 2002.

International organisations, including the OSCE, will be invited to observe these elections.”

tions on the bilateral treaty. Should the Special Representative report that Macedonia was failing to accommodate legitimate Greek concerns, then the U.S. and the European Union states would not change their policy on using the name “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Should he state that Athens was insisting on overly onerous terms, then the U.S. and European Union states could signal their readiness to move forward without the bilateral agreement.

The proposal is proof against possible attempts by Skopje to exploit it for more foot-dragging on the Framework Agreement. If Skopje tried to insist that it would not implement the Agreement unless its name was recognised, the answer could be straightforward: *“no change on the name, even under the suggested proposal, until you uphold your obligations.”*

This proposal creates no new structures, nor, once the process was agreed to in principle, would it require extraordinary diplomatic efforts or attention at the highest levels. The issues that are the subject of this proposal, the dispute over Macedonian identity and the choice it poses for Macedonians – exist regardless of this proposal. Failure to address them will have a serious impact on the rest of the international community’s agenda in Macedonia and the region.

### **C. Ancillary issues**

#### **1. Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonian symbols**

ICG also recommends that Bulgaria and Serbia take steps to affirm their recognition of Macedonian symbols. As a condition for consideration of membership in NATO, the EU, or other international organisations, Bulgaria in particular should demonstrate its full disavowal of any claim, express or implied, on the Macedonian language, nation or state.

#### **2. Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonian minorities**

Bulgaria and Albania should consult the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to ensure that the position of their Macedonian minorities meets all European standards. (Such issues pertaining to Greece and Serbia should be dealt with separately, out of the context of this proposal.) Given that Albanians in Macedonia receive substantial concessions under Ohrid, Albania in particular should ensure that its Macedonian minority has appropriate rights in education,

language use, and representation in local and central government and police.<sup>791</sup>

#### IV. Conclusion

While international use of the name “Republika Makedonija” is not how Greece would prefer the dispute to end, this proposal goes a long way to addressing Athens’ bedrock concerns:

- Its primary demand for associating some distinguishing feature with the name “Republika Makedonija” is met in two ways:

- by the accepted international name being in the Macedonian language;

- by the short name “Makedonija” not being used in the UN and other

intergovernmental organisations.

- Athens’ concern over Skopje’s cultural and historical pretensions is addressed by the Parliamentary Declaration discussed in paragraph 3 of Element One above (describing the bilateral treaty), and in the educational curriculum provision in paragraph 5.

- Its worry that Skopje would hypothetically be able to challenge Greek use of the name Macedonia is addressed in paragraph 2;

- Its worry that Skopje will exploit the Treaty or the name to press territorial claims, or the property or human rights claims of ethnic Macedonians living or formerly living in Greece, is addressed by the proscription in paragraph 7;

- Its concern that the bifurcated “*Ireland solution*”<sup>792</sup> would expose Greece to isolation and ridicule in the international community is addressed by the proposal that the bilateral notes acknowledge specifically the terms of the Athens-Skopje Treaty. Rather than exposing Greece on the issue, this would bring other countries into alignment with Athens to the extent of endorsing the legitimacy of Greece’s use of the name “Upper Macedonia”.

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<sup>791</sup> Constitutional reform in Albania should not be ruled out. As is stated in the Basic Principles of the Framework Agreement: “a modern democratic state in its natural course of development and maturation must continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets the needs of all its citizens”. *Framework Agreement*, paragraph 1.4. Macedonian minorities should not have to mount violent insurrections to win attention to their grievances in Albania or elsewhere.

<sup>792</sup> Great Britain almost exclusively refers to Ireland as the “Republic of Ireland” to reinforce the distinction between Dublin and Belfast, i.e. “Northern Ireland”.

Almost all the concessions made by Skopje would be unilateral and unreciprocated. For example, the proposal does not provide for the review of Greek textbooks, for ethnic Macedonian place names in Greece, or for a declaration about Macedonian heritage or an ethnic Macedonian minority that Greece does not acknowledge.

There are several reasons why this moment is opportune to approach Greece on the question of the name:

- The deployment of NATO troops and a major OSCE mission in Macedonia are proof that the Albanian conflict has internationalised the Macedonian situation. This constrains the options available to Athens in its dispute with Skopje over the name.

- Athens has its own interest in seeing the missions in Macedonia succeed. A resumption of conflict could endanger its investments and expose it to refugee flows.<sup>793</sup> Any substantial influx of Macedonians and/or Albanians would threaten to reopen the Macedonian question in Greece itself and again expose Greece to human rights scrutiny concerning its minorities.

Over time, the name "Macedonia" is gaining in currency and customary use.<sup>794</sup> This could encourage Skopje to become more inflexible on concessions. Thus, now may be the optimal time to strike a deal.

The Interim Accord expires next year (with expiration taking effect in 2003, should one side elect to end the accord.) While the agreement need not go automatically out of force, it will inevitably throw the issue back onto the agenda, giving Skopje a platform to push the issue.

The PASOK government is not due to face elections until April 2004. Prime Minister Simitis is at full strength after the recent party congress. The crisis in Macedonia, and its potential impact on Greece, gives the government "cover" to change policy.

Greece has sought, constructively, to act as a regional leader. Resolution of the name dispute would display Greek statesmanship in the best light.

If the Macedonian anxiety over national identity is not addressed, the Framework Agreement might still "muddle through" its present dif-

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<sup>793</sup> Cognisant of the risk of refugee flows, a Greek general in August 2001 urged the creation of a "cordon sanitaire" in Macedonia to keep refugees from crossing the border into Greece. (Information from Tomislav Ivanovski, editor-in-chief of *Start* weekly.)

<sup>794</sup> The *Framework Agreement* itself used the name "Macedonia", not FYROM. (The Greek position is that, although it was brokered and witnessed by U.S. and European envoys, the *Framework Agreement* is an internal document and hence not a precedent for the use of the name.) Even Greek journalism is beginning to use "Macedonia" in unqualified conjunction with FYROM. See the September/October issue of *Odyssey* magazine, p. 10.

faculties. More likely, however, it would buckle under the various stresses analysed in this report. While the present proposal to resolve the name dispute is not without its difficulties, they are outweighed by the far more serious risks involved in letting Macedonia slouch toward violence.

This proposal is not a panacea but it would provide Macedonia with its long-sought assurance of identity, and give not only the international community but also Macedonian moderates significant leverage to gain Skopje's lasting commitment to the Ohrid reforms.

The choice for the international community is whether it will commit itself fully to Macedonia's preservation. It is for this reason, rather than for abstract "justice" or "fairness", that a way should be found to acknowledge Macedonia's constitutional name and the Greek Macedonian identity. Acknowledging the name will not in itself guarantee Macedonia's survival but continuing to use the anachronistic substitute, FYROM, or adopting a compound name, will only aid those internal and external forces that prefer confrontation and division. In short, a permanent compromise like Ohrid cannot be expected to work in a state with a provisional name like FYROM.

The choice for Macedonia is whether to seek security with the Albanian minority in a multiethnic state, or risk an escalation of violence that could threaten the survival of the state. In exchange for the decision on the name, Macedonians would be expected to commit themselves fully to the Ohrid project of a shared existence with Albanians in a multiethnic state. In other words, true ethnic security – the protection of the ethnic Macedonian identity against its persistent, historic challenges, can only be guaranteed by the international community in so far as Macedonians make a good faith effort to build a common state.

While the present proposal affirms the Greek right to claim its Macedonian heritage in every way except the denial of Macedonian use of the name, Greece too faces a choice. Will it continue to advance claims that have little support in international law<sup>795</sup> and, in so doing, jeopardise regional stability and its own larger interests? Or will it demonstrate that it is fully ready to accept the responsibilities that attend its role as the leading power in south-eastern Europe?

Skopje / Brussels,  
10 December 2001

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<sup>795</sup> See Henkin, et al. at p. 253 and Badinter Commission, *Opinion No. 6*, paragraph 5. ICG has consulted other eminent international legal scholars who have backed the Henkin and Badinter view.

**ICG BALKANS REPORT NO. 122**  
**(10 December 2001)**

**“MACEDONIA’S NAME: WHY THE DISPUTE MATTERS  
AND HOW TO RESOLVE IT”**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

On 16 November 2001, Macedonia’s parliament passed a set of constitutional amendments that were agreed in August, when Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Later that day, President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for Albanian rebels, in line with international requests.

These positive moves have breathed new life into the Framework Agreement. But they do not put it beyond risk, or take Macedonia itself out of danger. A powerful faction in government still opposes the agreed reforms, and will resist their implementation. Ordinary Macedonians deeply resent the way the Framework Agreement was reached and remain suspicious of the international community’s entire role. This provides a serious obstacle to the reform process, and a valid grievance for the anti-reform camp to exploit.

So far as Macedonians are concerned, the Agreement contains a double weakness. First, it redresses long-standing minority grievances mainly by reducing the privileges of the majority. Secondly, its purpose of turning Macedonia into a ‘civic state’ – while admirable and necessary – makes Macedonia an anomaly in a region of emphatically ‘ethnic’ states, three of which uphold fundamental challenges to the Macedonian identity. Greece vetoes international acceptance of Macedonia’s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria (while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.

Following its success at Ohrid, the international community has tended to underestimate the profound challenge that the Framework Agreement poses to Macedonia’s already fragile sense of identity, and how this erodes the country’s capacity to implement the agreed reforms. This in turn has led to a loss of influence. The NATO and OSCE missions have let themselves be outflanked by the anti-reformists. Parlia-

mentary elections – due next April – are no guarantee that more amenable leaders will come to power.

The conflict with part of the Albanian minority has pushed Skopje to seek security help (both weapons and political support) from the very neighbors who challenge Macedonian identity. There is a real risk that the anti-reform camp in Skopje will be tempted by a military solution, even at the risk of national partition – a move that would be welcomed by Albanian extremists.

In sum, the conflict with Albanians and the perceived shortcomings of the Framework Agreement have abruptly increased the importance of Macedonia's identity crisis. The international community needs to reassure Macedonians on this issue in order to re-establish a more promising political environment for good faith implementation and constructive cooperation.

The most acute identity issue – and the one that if resolved would have most positive impact – is the long-running name dispute with Greece. While both countries claim the name and heritage, the Macedonian claim is not exclusive. However, only the Macedonians depend on the name 'Macedonia' as the designation of both their state and their people.

Greece has a more direct interest than other European Union members in stabilising Macedonia, but is extremely unlikely to amend its position without a clear message from its partners that they sympathise with and will be helpful to its basic concerns. Greek statesmanship is crucial. The Greek offer of financial and security assistance, while helpful, cannot substitute for the need to secure the Macedonian identity.

Bilateral talks to resolve the dispute at the United Nations have not yielded a solution, nor – given the nature of the issue and the regional record on bilateral negotiations – are they likely to do so. The international community has a compelling strategic reason to acknowledge Macedonia's constitutional name as a matter of regional stability, and this can be done in a way that meets Greece's legitimate concerns.

ICG proposes a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously:

- A bilateral treaty would be concluded between Skopje and Athens in which Macedonia would make important concessions, including declarations on treatment of the Greek cultural heritage in the Macedonian educational curriculum, agreement that Greece could use its own

name for the state of Macedonia, and strict protection against any Macedonian exploitation of its constitutional name to disadvantage Greece commercially or legally.

- The member states of NATO and the European Union and others would formally welcome this bilateral treaty through exchange of diplomatic notes with the two parties, in which they would both acknowledge Macedonia's name as 'Republika Makedonija' and promise Greece that they would consult with it about appropriate measures if the assurances contained in the treaty were violated.

- The United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations would adopt and use for all working purposes the Macedonian-language name 'Republika Makedonija'.

Before formally acknowledging the name 'Republika Makedonija' bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, it would be reasonable for the international community to require at least two up-front concessions by Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms, namely:

- An invitation for NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and

- An invitation for OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.

The most crucial benefit of this package is that it would consolidate the achievement at Ohrid by boosting the Macedonian sense of security and confidence in the international community. International recognition of the country by its own preferred name would supply the critical missing ingredient in the present situation – reassurance about Macedonian national identity.

The proposed package would also address critical Greek demands: that Macedonia's name should be changed, and that it should not monopolise the single name 'Macedonia'. Greece would retain the right in the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations to use its own preferred name for Macedonia (such as "Upper Macedonia"). There would be no bar on commercial use of the name "Macedonia", or any variant of it, with respect to products or services from either Greece's province of Makedonia or Republika Makedonija.

Also to Greece's advantage would be the explicit reference to the proposed bilateral Athens-Skopje treaty in the proposed diplomatic notes acknowledging Macedonia's name. For the first time, Greece would not have to depend on Macedonian promises, but would be backed by

leading powers that would make clear their endorsement of the total package.

This proposal is not a cure-all and it requires the international community to break with the habit of a decade. It will be difficult to negotiate, but – in ICG’s judgement, after canvassing the proposal at length in Skopje, Athens and among some of the major international players – not impossible. The alternative – letting the name dispute fester – signals to Macedonians that the international community may not be fully committed to the Ohrid reforms, or to preserving Macedonia as an integral state. This is a message with dangerous implications.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In order to establish the psychological basis for achieving the crucial next steps toward securing sustainable peace in Macedonia, a major effort should now be made – led by European Union members and the United States – to resolve the dispute over Macedonia’s name in a way that provides Macedonia vital reassurance about its own national identity but at the same time meets Greece’s legitimate concerns;

2. The best prospects for agreement lie in a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously:

- a bilateral treaty between Skopje and Athens involving Macedonian concessions to Greek concerns, including allowing Greece to have its own name for Macedonia, and assurances as to future behaviour;

- diplomatic notes from EU and NATO member states and others acknowledging Macedonia’s name as “Republika Makedonija” and the terms of the bilateral treaty, while promising to consult with Greece on appropriate measures if the treaty is broken; and

- adoption and use for working purposes by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations of the Macedonian-language name “Republika Makedonija”;

3. Before formally acknowledging the name “Republika Makedonija” bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, at least two up-front concessions should be required of Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms:

- to invite NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and

- to invite OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.

*Skopje/Brussels, 10 December 2001*

**MEDIATOR MATTHEW NIMETZ**  
**OFFICIAL PROPOSAL**  
*(9 November 2005)*

**I. Protocol for usage of the name within the UN**

**Formal Name** (alternatives):

Republika Makedonija<sup>1</sup>  
Republic of Macedonia<sup>2</sup>

**Unofficial (short) name** (alternatives):

Republika Makedonija<sup>3,4</sup>  
Republic of Macedonia<sup>4,5,6</sup>  
Republika Makedonija – Skopje<sup>7</sup>

*1. to be used from 2006 to 2008 in multilateral agreements, accords, communiqués, formal resolutions, etc. accompanied with the following footnote: “For Republika Makedonija the accepted official international usage also acknowledges the reference Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija – Skopje by Greece”;*

*2. to be used in 2009 and beyond in multilateral agreements, accords, communiqués, formal resolutions, etc. accompanied with the following footnote: “For Republika Makedonija the accepted official international usage also acknowledges the reference Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija – Skopje by Greece”;*

*3. The Secretariat will use Republika Makedonija within the United Nations Organization in 2006 until 2008;*

*4. The Member States and other parties may use either Republika Makedonija or Republic of Macedonia when referring to the State, and Greece may also use the name Republika Makedonija – Skopje;*

*5. The Secretariat will use the name Republic of Macedonia within the United Nations organizations in 2009 and beyond;*

*6. Other translations are also allowed, for instance Republique Macedonie;*

*7. Republika Makedonija – Skopje may be used by Greece.*

**15 - Year review**

In 2021 the Secretary General shall appoint Special Envoy who will consult with the involved parties and shall give recommendations

both to the Secretary General and the Security Council on whether there should be change in the Protocol related to the stipulated usage.

### **Security Council Resolution**

The Security Council shall adopt this Protocol along with several other provisions related to the non-exclusivity which are acceptable for the parties, etc.

## **II. Main Points of Proposed Security Council Resolution**

1. Makes reference to Security Council *Resolutions 817 and 845* (1993) which admitted the State provisionally as “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (hereinafter referred to as “The State”) pending resolution of the dispute with respect to the name of the State.

2. Here follows the statement that a solution to the dispute would enhance peace and security in Southeast Europe and promote better relations between neighboring states in the region.

3. Recognizes that the constitutional name of the State is “Republika Makedonija” (as transliterated in Roman alphabet).

4. Acknowledges that the following shall be used for official purposes with the United Nations and for referring to the State:

#### **A. Formal Name** (alternatives):

Republika Makedonija<sup>1</sup>  
 Republic of Macedonia<sup>2, 6</sup>

#### **B. Unofficial (short) Name** (alternatives):

Republika Makedonija<sup>3, 4</sup>  
 Republic of Macedonia<sup>4, 5, 6</sup>  
 Republika Makedonija – Skopje<sup>7</sup>

*1. to be used from 2006 to 2008 in multilateral agreements, accords, communiqués, formal resolutions, etc. accompanied with the following footnote: “For Republika Makedonija the accepted official international usage also acknowledges the reference Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija – Skopje by Greece”;*

*2. to be used in 2009 and beyond in multilateral agreements, accords, communiqués, formal resolutions, etc. accompanied with the following footnote: “For Republika Makedonija the accepted official inter-*

*national usage also acknowledges the reference Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija – Skopje by Greece”;*

*3. The Secretariat will use Republika Makedonija within the United Nations Organization in 2006 until 2008;*

*4. The Member States and other parties may use either Republika Makedonija or Republic of Macedonia when referring to the State, and Greece may also use the name Republika Makedonija – Skopje;*

*5. The Secretariat will use the name Republic of Macedonia within the United Nations organizations in 2009 and beyond;*

*6. Other translations are also allowed, for instance Republique Macedonie;*

*7. Republika Makedonija – Skopje may be used by Greece.*

**C.** The adjectives and the other subsidiary forms of reference will be in the form as set forth in the Appendix to this Resolution or, for occurrences that are not explicitly stipulated, as set forth by the Secretary General or his representative.

**D.** Several forms of the name of the State referred to in Part 5 will be legally equivalent.

5.<sup>796</sup>

6. Recommends that other international organizations, governments and other official parties adopt the usage referred to above for international official usage, but declares that no State shall seek to exert undue influence on others to affect the usage by any other official organization, State or other official party.

7. Takes note that “Macedonia” has reference to a geographic area encompassing all or portions of several States in the region of Southeast Europe, including the State and Greece, and not only them, and that “Macedonia” has importance to a long association with the heritage, culture and history of many of those states.

8. Declares further that no State or official subdivision thereof shall be referred to in international official usage at any time as “Macedonia” or “Makedonija”.

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<sup>796</sup> We could not find paragraph 5 of the *Proposal!*?

9. Declares further that no State shall claim exclusive right over the term “Macedonia” or “Macedonian” (in any language) in historical, geographical or commercial sense.

10. Takes note of the commitment of the Hellenic Republic and the State to resolve all issues by themselves on the basis of peaceful and neighborly relations and in conformity with international agreements and international law, and the further commitment of the Hellenic Republic to support actively the security and economic development of such State and to support in its application to become a member of applicable regional organizations including the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

11. Declares that this resolution shall be effective on 30 days from date of adoption provided that the Secretary General as well as national authorities may adopt reasonable measures for transition to the usage adopted above and provided further that no past agreement document or other usage shall be rendered invalid in the future by virtue of having used a different usage prior to the effective date.

12. Provides that the Interim Agreement dated September 13, 1995 between the State and the Hellenic Republic shall be deemed superseded to the extent necessitated by this resolution which revolves the difference between the parties that is referred to in Article 5 thereof.

13. Decides that in 2021 the Secretary General shall appoint Special Envoy who will consult with the involved parties and shall give recommendations both to the Secretary General and the Security Council on whether there should be change in the usage with regard to the name and the other provisions thereof.

### **III. Appendix to the UN Security Council Resolution \_\_\_\_\_ (2005)**

#### **English version (comparable in other languages)**

##### **Short Name**

##### ***Capital City:***

In general two alternative versions are allowed Skopje  
Republika Makedonija\*

Republic of Macedonia  
Republika Makedonija – Skopje can be also used by Greece

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**Formal Name**

Two alternative versions are allowed:  
Republika Makedonija<sup>1</sup> Republic of Macedonia<sup>2</sup>

**Adjective/nationality**

**Language:**

In general two alternatives are allowed:  
of Republika Makedonija

Macedo  
of Republic of Macedonia  
of Republika Makedonija – Skopje can be also used  
by Greece

\* Any of the aforementioned versions of the name are allowed to be used as an option by the user: Provided that the Secretariat use Republika Makedonija in 2006 until 2008 and use Republic of Macedonia beyond.

1. Republika Makedonija will be used from 2006 to 2008 in multilateral agreements, and other documents with the following footnote: “For Republika Makedonija the accepted official international usage also acknowledges the reference Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija – Skopje by Greece”;

2. Republika Makedonija will be used in 2009 and beyond in multilateral agreements, and other documents with the following footnote: “For Republika Makedonija the accepted official international usage also acknowledges the reference Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija – Skopje by Greece.”

**DRAFT DOCUMENTS  
(Ohrid, February 2008)**

**DECLARATION OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD-NEIGHBORLI-  
NESS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE HELLENIC  
REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

The Governments of the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Macedonia,

Reaffirming their strong commitment to the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, as well as to those of International Law and Agreements, with regard to the relations among peoples, fundamental human rights and freedoms,

Recalling the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 between the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic with which Macedonians and Greeks reached out to each other,

Stressing that the further integration of South East European States with the Euro Atlantic institutions will favorably influence the security, political and economic situation in the region, as well as the good-neighborly relations among the States;

Recalling the conclusions reached at the Summit of the European Council held in Thessaloniki, Greece, on 19 and 20 June 2003, the decisions of the European Council on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnerships with all countries of the Stabilization and Association Process, confirming that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union,

Acknowledging the high level of friendship, good-neighborliness and ever increasing cooperation between the Greek and Macedonian peoples, in the context of the European and Euro Atlantic institutions, which reflects the substantial interests of the two peoples and constitutes a guarantee for peace, development and European perspective for the broader area of South East Europe,

With a desire to found upon the new environment of European integration a mutually beneficial enhancement of their relations,

Mindful of the long history of fruitful, peaceful and good-neighbourly relations between the two peoples during which a rich and continuing cultural heritage was created,

Jointly declare the following:

#### I

Both states are aware of their obligation and responsibility to further develop Greek-Macedonian relations in a spirit of good-neighbourliness and partnership, thus helping to shape the integrating Europe.

The Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Macedonia today share common democratic values, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the norms of international law, and are committed to the principles of the rule of law and to a policy of peace.

On this basis, they are determined to cooperate closely and in a spirit of friendship in all fields of importance for their mutual relations, and are fully committed to resolving any outstanding issues in the best possible manner.

Both states affirm that, based on the principles of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 and this Declaration, they will work to maximize their common interests and minimize their differences and, through friendly consultations, appropriately handle the issues, differences of opinion and disputes which currently exist and may arise in the future, thereby avoiding any restraint or obstacle to the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

#### II

Both states share the view that promoting personnel exchanges between the two countries is extremely important for advancing mutual understanding and enhancing mutual trust.

Both states confirm a biannual visit by a leader of either country to the other, an annual visit by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the further enhancement of personnel exchanges at all levels, in particular among the younger generation who will shoulder the heavy burden of the future development of the two countries.

Both states stress the need for intensifying the contacts between ministers in the areas in which successful cooperation is already con-

ducted (interior, defense, justice, finance, environment, tourism, etc.), as well as continuing the cooperation and contacts between representatives of the customs services, of public and state security agencies, intelligence agencies, aiming at more successful cooperation in the fight against crime and illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics, goods and human beings.

### III

The Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Macedonia agree that signing bilateral agreements in all areas of common interest will contribute to the further development of the relations between the two countries.

Both states confirm that signing the already coordinated Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation should be the first step in this direction.

Both states reaffirm their support to the initiatives for opening new border crossings, particularly for opening the already agreed border crossing Markova Noga–Agios Germanos in the course of 2008.

### IV

The Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Macedonia are fully committed to constructively participate in the UN sponsored talks to overcome the difference over the name, as stated in the UNSC Resolution 817 (1993).

Both states reaffirm their obligations arising from Articles 7 and 11 of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995. In accordance with Article 7, both parties agreed to promptly take effective measures to prohibit hostile activities or propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other. In accordance with Article 11, the Hellenic Republic agreed not to object to the application by or the membership of the Republic of Macedonia in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which Greece is a member.

### V

The Hellenic Republic consistently supports Macedonia's intensive efforts to fulfill the aim of becoming a member of the European Union and provides the necessary political and technical assistance. Both states stress the importance of acquiring a date for start of accession negotiations in the course of 2008 and the willingness of the two states to cooperate closely on issues relating to the European acquires.

Both states express their readiness to cooperate in a number of crucial areas, such as economic and social policy, energy, transport, the environment, education, agriculture and tourism, by coordinating their respective competent authorities, with a view to elaborating policies on the basis of common principles, values and interests. To this end, they call on their respective Ministers to convene joint meetings as soon as possible in order to identify long-term prospects of interest to the two countries.

In view of Macedonia's integration into NATO, which Greece strongly supports, both states are willing to enlarge and deepen their cooperation in the defense and security fields and intensify their efforts to advance regional cooperation, aiming at the consolidation of peace and security in South East Europe.

## VI

Both states are aware that their common path to the future requires a clear statement regarding their past that would serve as a solid basis for strengthening the democratic processes, reconciliation and tolerance between the two states.

The Greek side regrets for its unilaterally imposed embargo against the Republic of Macedonia on 26 February 1994. This act had serious political, security and economic implications for the Republic of Macedonia, but also for the entire Region.

The Greek side acknowledges Macedonia's substantial concessions made in order for the Interim Accord to be reached by changing its national symbols and constitution.

The Macedonian side reiterates that it does not have and will never have any claims to any territory outside its internationally recognized borders and in this context it fully supports territorial integrity of the Hellenic Republic.

The Macedonian side appreciates the Greek economic activities in the Republic of Macedonia. The Hellenic Republic is the leading investment partner in the Republic of Macedonia.

Both states agree that past events belong to the past, and will therefore orient their relations towards the future. As they remain conscious of their history, they are determined to continue to give priority

to understanding and mutual agreement in the development of their relations. Both states therefore declare that they will not burden their relations with political issues which stem from the past.

## VII

Both states will set up a Greece-Macedonia Future Fund. The Greek side declares its willingness to make available the sum of \_\_\_\_ for this Fund, and the Macedonian side, respectively, the sum of \_\_\_\_\_. Both states will conclude a separate arrangement on the joint administration of this Fund.

This Joint Fund will be used to finance projects of mutual interest (such as youth meetings, care for the elderly, the preservation and restoration of monuments, partnership projects, Greek-Macedonia discussion fora, joint scientific and environmental projects, language teaching, cross-border cooperation).

## VIII

Both states agree that teaching a joint and multi-perspective history of the Balkan region can play an important part in the process of reconciliation with the past, preventing using the historical events to feed future misunderstandings and helping students to understand other viewpoints, and therefore endorse the establishment of a Greece-Macedonia Joint Committee on Education and History.

The Joint Committee composed of academics and history teachers, will review primary and secondary level history textbooks currently in use in both states, and will propose to the Governments of both states alternative common ways of reflecting the political, social and cultural history of the two countries.

## IX

Both states believe that through establishment of a partnership of friendship and cooperation, the bilateral relations will enter a new level of development. To this end, a wide range of participation and sustained effort of both Governments and peoples of the two countries is essential. Both states firmly believe that, if the peoples of both countries, thoroughly demonstrate the spirit shown in this Declaration, it will not only contribute to the friendship of the peoples of both countries for generations to come, but also make an important contribution to the peace and development of the South East Europe region and of the Europe.

## **FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL FOR ADVANCING THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

*In order to overcome the standstill in the bilateral relations and revive the political dialogue disrupted by the Greek side in March 2005, we consider that the two states should continue the practice of holding regular consultations and meetings at various levels. This will contribute to further enhance the cooperation and mutual understanding and to building mutual trust, as well as to promoting regional cooperation, which is a necessary condition for creating a stable and prosperous region and its integration into the European and Euro Atlantic structures.*

*For that purpose, the Macedonian side proposes that the joint activities for advancement of the bilateral relations be conducted in two stages:*

*1. First stage: urgent activities to be realized in the upcoming period*

*· adoption of a Declaration of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between Republic of Macedonia and Hellenic Republic. Deadline: February 2008*

*· signing the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation – the text has been coordinated and both the Macedonian and the Greek business community call for its conclusion. Deadline: March 2008*

*· opening of the already agreed border crossing Markova Noga–Agios Germanos. Deadline: April 2008*

*2. Second stage: activities to be realized in the course of the year*

*· presidential and prime ministerial level summits between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. At least once per two years*

*· official meetings of the foreign ministers of the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. At least once a year*

*· promotion of parliamentary cooperation – meetings of parliament presidents and of presidents of foreign policy committees. Once a year*

- holding political consultations at the level of deputy ministers, state secretaries or directors between the MFAs of the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. Once a year
  - intensifying the contacts between ministers in the areas in which successful cooperation is already conducted (interior, defense, justice, finance, environment, tourism, etc.). Annually
  - continuing the cooperation and contacts between representatives of the customs services of the two countries, of public and state security agencies, intelligence agencies (aiming at more successful cooperation in the fight against crime and illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics, goods and human beings). Annually
  - signing an agreement on local border traffic, in line with the EU regulations in this area and with the political recommendations of the EC. Deadline: first half of 2008
  - signing/drafting coordinated agreements (on scientific and technical cooperation, on encouragement of investments) and continuing the procedure for signing agreements on cooperation in the areas of health and tourism. Deadline: in the course of 2008
  - initiatives for opening new border crossings (Pulevac–Aridea, Bitola–Florina and Nikolik–Doirani). Deadline: in the course of 2008
- trilateral meetings of the MFAs of Macedonia, Greece and Albania for intensification of regional cooperation.

## **GREECE-MACEDONIA JOINT COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND HISTORY**

Taking into account the expressed sensitivity of Greece towards historical issues, the Macedonian side considers that one of the possible steps for building confidence between the two states and peoples is joint facing with history. Teaching a joint and multi-perspective history of the Balkan region can play an important part in the process of reconciliation with the past, preventing using the historical events to feed future misunderstandings and helping students to understand the viewpoints of others.

### **For this reason, the Macedonian side proposes the following:**

1. Establishment of a Greece-Macedonia Joint Committee on Education and History composed of academics and history teachers that will work in the presence of independent observers (representatives of Ambassador Matthew Nimetz and of the NGO Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, seated in Thessaloniki). **Deadline: 2 months**

2. The Joint Committee will review primary and secondary education history textbooks currently in use, as well as those used in the military academies in the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, and will propose to the Governments of both states alternative common ways of reflecting the political, social and cultural history of the two countries. **Deadline: 6 months from the date of establishment of the Joint Committee**

3. Organizing a joint conference sponsored by the Ministers of Education of both countries with the main purpose of evaluating the proposals of the Joint Committee and producing a joint report. The proposals of the Joint Committee and the joint report from the Conference will constitute the basis of the final report that will be submitted to the Governments of both states. **Deadline: 3 months from the date of conclusion of the work of the Joint Committee**

4. Upon endorsing the final report, the Governments of the two states will call upon the relevant education and science institutions in their respective countries to improve the history textbooks and upon

history teachers to apply the alternative common material contained in the final report. **Deadline: 3 months from the submission of the final report**

These tasks will be implemented in several stages. The final goal will be to overcome the dominant nationalistic/ethnocentric concepts in school history education by avoiding the creation of stereotypes, by identifying the attitudes that encourage conflict, by suggesting alternative teaching methods and by promoting the idea of multiple interpretations of one event. This approach would strengthen the overall potential for independent, critical analysis and assessment that would serve as a solid basis for strengthening the democratic processes, reconciliation and tolerance between the two states.

**MEDIATOR MATTHEW NIMETZ OFFICIAL  
PROPOSAL<sup>797</sup>  
-INTEGRAL BASIC TEXT-  
(19 February 2008)**

*In continuation of the talks, which are being pursued in accordance with Article 5 of the bilateral accord dated 13 September 1995, the subsequent commitment for understanding is contained in the Parties (the First Party represented by Ambassador Vassilakis – “First Party” and the Second Party represented by Ambassador Dimitrov – “Second Party”) as a proposal for the settlement of the issue of the “name”, etc.*

**I** - These parties express the desire for settling the differences in respect with the “name” in spirit of good-neighboring relations and friendship, having into consideration the higher interest for peace and security both between the two countries and in the region as well;

**II** - Requests from the United Nations Secretary General to present to the Security Council the conclusions of these interlocutors and the requests from the Security Council to adopt a Resolution on the below mentioned objective related to *Resolution 845* (1993) and *817* (1993);

1. Acknowledges that the three administrative parts of the First Party are called East Macedonia, Central Macedonia and West Macedonia and that the territory of the First Party encompasses part of the historical Macedonia;

2. Acknowledges that the constitutional name of the Second Party is the Republic of Macedonia and that the territory of the Second Party encompasses part of the historical Macedonia;

3. Apart from the constitutional name of the Second Party, the name of the Second Party, which is used for international usage (“Offi-

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<sup>797</sup> Source: *Dnevnik*, No. 3 602 of 22 February 2008. This is the basic integral text that mediator Matthew Nimetz presented to the Macedonian and Greek representatives in the name talk at the meeting at Athens. The proposals for new name are contained in Annex 1 of the Proposal, which was initially not available to the public.

cial International Name”), will be as described below: (see **Appendix 1**);

4. The “Official International Name” will replace “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as an official name of the Second Party in the United Nations automatically, instantaneously;

5. The “Official International Name” will be used as a name of the Second Party in:

- a) multilateral agreements, contracts and conventions;
- b) passports, and
- c) accession and official usage in international organizations.

6. Suggests that the “Official International Name” be considered for usage in other official international context and in official bilateral international usage.

The official international name may also be used where considered useful in short forms (acronym)- in accordance with the established practice, which is valid in any international organization and in consistency with the adopted practice which is generally pursued by the states, except by those mentioned in paragraph 7;

7. The word “Macedonia” alone will not be recognized as an official name, both typical and atypical, for the Second Party or as an official name of any other State;

8. None of the State will have exclusive rights, political or commercial, to the name “Macedonia” or “Macedonian”.

9. “Macedonia” or “Macedonian” are allowed to be used in an economic sense by each of the parties and by their citizens, or by organized groups legally recognized by both parties- however, only in accordance with the applicable international legislation on the basis of agreements and practice related to the usage of geographic names for economic and other similar purposes.

**III** - Each party will strictly comply with the terms of the direct accord of 13 September except for those that are amended below.

**IV** - Each party disclaims any territorial pretensions towards the other party and will not endorse any irredentist statements in any official way and will act towards the discouragement of any similar hard radicalism – since it is supposed that it will act at the expense or in favor of that party.

**V** - The parties will express their proposal for leading the talks to a degree of an accord or joint declaration and will reiterate their desire to enhance mutual peaceful and close relations, express mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, cultural heritage and confirm their contribution to close cooperation for security issues and economic development- as well as other issues of mutual interest.

**VI** - The parties will express their proposal for the commencement of talks for the creation of a joint committee, which will examine and provide suggestions with respect to the issues in the culture and education in a manner of submitting proposals to the Committee.

**VII** - The First Party will endorse the applications of the Second Party for accession to membership under the official international name in the joint regional and international organizations, including the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

**VIII** - The Second Party will request from the competent administrative authorities to reconsider the naming of the national airports, with respect to the concern (sensitivity) of the First Party.

**IX** - The Second Party will act through the constitutional procedures to pursue the Security Council Resolution, which is set forth in the aforementioned paragraph 2, in order to secure, in compliance with its legislation, adoption of the “Official International Name” for official international usage – as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution.

## **ANNEX 1**

### **(APPENDIX A to Proposal of 19 February 2008)**

The following names suggest the alternatives for the Official International Name:

1. Constitutional Republic of Macedonia;
2. Democratic Republic of Macedonia;
3. Independent Republic of Macedonia;
4. New Republic of Macedonia;
5. Republic of Upper Macedonia.

**MEDIATOR MATTHEW NIMETZ**  
**OFFICIAL PROPOSAL<sup>798</sup>**  
**(26 March 2008)**

In my function as a personal diplomat of the Secretary General and based on the talks with the contracting parties, the parties involved in the dispute, pursuant to Article 5 of the *Interim Accord* dated 13 September 1995 and the Security Council *Resolution 845* (1993) and *917* (1993), the contracting parties are to smooth the differences on the basis of “package-solution” done on the ground of the following items:

1. The resolution on the name issue will be embodied in a United Nations Resolution pursuant as follows:

a) domestic name: “Republic of Macedonia” in Cyrillic script (Republika Makedonija) for domestic usage;

b) international name: “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” (English version) for international usage;

c) bilateral usage: the international name is recommended, while the states that use the constitutional name can continue doing so, but they are not requested to change their positions;

d) The word “Macedonia” standing alone will not be used as an official name by the Second Party or any other state;

e) The words “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” may be utilized independently (except in case as described in paragraph “d” thereof) and used on non-exclusive basis by both the First Party and the Second Party pursuant to the international legal and commercial practice.

2. The parties will negotiate for binding mutual commitment against irredentism in any form by each of the two parties, or any organization supported by each of the two parties against the other party.

3. The parties will negotiate for appropriate agreements and/or joint declaration with respect to peaceful and close relations, respect to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, economic cooperation, agreed usage of the nomenclature for names of places and other issues of mutual interest.

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<sup>798</sup> Source: *Utrinski Vesnik*, No. 2 649 of 28 March 2008. This is the basic integral text that mediator Matthew Nimetz presented to the Macedonian and Greek representatives in the name talk at the meeting at New York.

4. The parties will negotiate on the establishment of a joint committee for considering the issues in the field of culture and education.

5. The First Party will give active support to the Second Party in its efforts for admission to membership under its constitutional name in the international organizations, including NATO and the European Union.

6. The issue of the naming of the national airports will be reconsidered by the Second Party in view of the enhancement of the overall good relations with its neighbor.

7. The aforementioned items of full understanding will be implemented with good will and instantaneously through the constitutional processes of each of the two parties and through the UN Security Council and General Assembly, which implementation will be facilitated through extended mandate of the UN Secretary General.

8. The details of the aforementioned settlement will be considered with good will and be documented by the parties through a United Nations process.

**BUCHAREST SUMMIT DECLARATION**<sup>799</sup>  
*Issued by the Heads of State and Government  
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic  
Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008*

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, met today to enlarge our Alliance and further strengthen our ability to confront the existing and emerging 21st century security threats. We reviewed the significant progress we have made in recent years to transform NATO, agreeing that this is a process that must continue. Recognising the enduring value of the transatlantic link and of NATO as the essential forum for security consultations between Europe and North America, we reaffirmed our solidarity and cohesion and our commitment to the common vision and shared democratic values embodied in the Washington Treaty. The principle of the indivisibility of Allied security is fundamental. A strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces is the core purpose of our Alliance and remains our most important security task. We reiterate our faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Today, we have decided to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join our Alliance. We congratulate these countries on this historic achievement, earned through years of hard work and a demonstrated commitment to our common security and NATO's shared values. The accession of these new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro Atlantic area, and bring us closer to our goal of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

3. We look forward to the 60th Anniversary Summit in 2009, which will underscore the enduring importance of the transatlantic link. We continue to transform our Alliance with new members; better responses to security challenges, taking into account lessons learned; more deployable capabilities; and new relationships with our partners. The Summit will provide an opportunity to further articulate and strengthen

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<sup>799</sup> Taken from NATO's official web site: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08049e.html>.

the Alliance's vision of its role in meeting the evolving challenges of the 21st century and maintaining the ability to perform the full range of its missions, collectively defending our security at home and contributing to stability abroad. Accordingly, we request the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a Declaration on Alliance Security for adoption at the Summit to further set the scene for this important task.

4. We have welcomed to Bucharest a number of our partner nations; Mr. Ban Ki moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations; and prominent representatives of other international organisations. Many of today's security challenges cannot be successfully met by NATO acting alone. Meeting them can best be achieved through a broad partnership with the wider international community, as part of a truly comprehensive approach, based on a shared sense of openness and cooperation as well as determination on all sides. We are resolved to promote peace and stability, and to meet the global challenges that increasingly affect the security of all of us, by working together.

5. The success of this common effort depends greatly on individual commitment. We pay tribute to the professionalism and bravery of the more than sixty thousand men and women from Allied and other nations who are involved in NATO's missions and operations. We extend our deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of those who have died or been injured during the course of their duties. Their sacrifices will not be in vain.

6. Euro Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan's future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. For that reason, our UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, currently comprising 40 nations, is our top priority. Working with the Afghans, we have made significant progress, but we recognise that remaining challenges demand additional efforts. Neither we nor our Afghan partners will allow extremists and terrorists to regain control of Afghanistan or use it as a base for terror that threatens all of our people. With our ISAF partners, and with the engagement of President Karzai, we will issue a statement on Afghanistan. This statement sets out a clear vision guided by four principles: a firm and shared long term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan. We welcome announcements by Allies and partners of new force contribu-

tions and other forms of support as further demonstration of our resolve; and we look forward to additional contributions. We welcome as well the appointment of Ambassador Kai Eide, the United Nations' Secretary General's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), who will provide added impetus and coherence to the international community's efforts. We welcome the upcoming Paris Conference that will review progress on and strengthen international efforts to further implement the Afghanistan Compact.

7. Our commitment to regional security and stability throughout the Balkans remains steadfast. We praise the prompt, impartial and effective performance by KFOR in the face of violence, and we deplore all attacks against the UN mandated NATO led KFOR and other international presences in Kosovo. We reiterate that KFOR will remain in Kosovo on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 to ensure a safe and secure environment, including freedom of movement, for all people in Kosovo unless the Security Council decides otherwise.

8. In Kosovo, NATO and KFOR will continue to work with the authorities and, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR will cooperate with and assist the United Nations, the European Union and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. We support UN action to ensure respect for the rule of law and call on all parties to take affirmative steps to prevent and condemn violence in Kosovo. NATO and KFOR welcome the restraint shown thus far by the authorities in Kosovo. We expect continued full implementation of their commitments to standards, especially those related to the rule of law and regarding the protection of ethnic minorities and communities, as well as the protection of historical and religious sites, and to combating crime and corruption.

9. NATO stands ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements. Recalling UNSCR 1244, we note the necessity of maintaining international presences throughout Kosovo, whose efforts contribute to freedom of movement and the flow of people and goods, including border monitoring. We call on all actors of the region to engage constructively and to avoid any actions or rhetoric that could undermine the security situation in Kosovo or in any other part of the region. KFOR will continue close security dialogue with all parties.

10. Today's information environment, in particular with regard to our operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, underlines the need for appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive communication with local and international audiences in relation to NATO's policies and engagement in international operations. We welcome the progress made in enhancing NATO's strategic communications capability, as demonstrated by the rapid response Media Operations Centre. We also welcome the launching at our Summit of a new NATO TV channel on the internet which will include regular news updates and video reports, in particular from the various regions of Afghanistan. We underscore our commitment to support further improvement of our strategic communications by the time of our 2009 Summit.

11. Experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans demonstrate that the international community needs to work more closely together and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non Governmental Organisations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. We have endorsed an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach. These proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and reconstruction. They relate to areas such as planning and conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors. We task the Council in Permanent Session to implement this Action Plan as a matter of priority and to keep it under continual review, taking into account all relevant developments as well as lessons learned.

12. We welcome over a decade of cooperation between the United Nations and NATO in support of the work of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. We have developed operational cooperation in peacekeeping through the UN mandated NATO led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. These shared experiences have demonstrated the value of effective and efficient coordination between the two organisations. Further cooperation will signifi-

cantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges to which the international community is called upon to respond. NATO reaffirms its faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations including the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self defence recognised by Article 51 of the UN Charter, as stated in the Washington Treaty. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council.

13. NATO is also playing its role in contributing to the implementation by nations of UNSCR 1373 and related UNSCRs in the fight against terrorism, and is lending its support to non proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by playing its role in contributing to the implementation by nations of UNSCR 1540.

14. NATO EU relations cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning. Our successful cooperation in the Western Balkans, including with EU operation Althea through the Berlin Plus arrangements, is contributing to peace and security in the region. In the light of shared common values and strategic interests, NATO and the EU are working side by side in key crisis management operations and will continue to do so. We recognise the value that a stronger and more capable European defence brings, providing capabilities to address the common challenges both NATO and the EU face. We therefore support mutually reinforcing efforts to this end. Success in these and future cooperative endeavours calls for enhanced commitment to ensure effective methods of working together. We are therefore determined to improve the NATO EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency, and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. A stronger EU will further contribute to our common security.

15. We condemn in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism, whatever their motivation or manifestation. Our nations remain determined to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, as long as necessary and in accordance with international law and UN principles. Terrorists are using a variety of conventional weapons and tactics, including asymmetric tactics, and may seek to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to threaten international peace and security. We attach great

importance to the protection of our populations, territories, infrastructure and forces against the consequences of terrorist attacks. We will continue to develop and contribute to policies to prevent and counter proliferation, with a view to preventing terrorist access to, and use of, WMD. We will also continue to support our programme of work to develop advanced capabilities to help defend against terrorist attacks, including through the continuing development of new technologies. We remain committed to strengthening the Alliance's ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in support of NATO operations. Our Alliance provides an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism and our nations will continue to contribute to the full implementation of UNSCR 1373 and related UNSCRs, in particular UNSCR 1540, and to the wider efforts of the international community in this regard. Dialogue and cooperation with other international organisations, as appropriate, and with our partners are essential, and we welcome efforts towards revitalising the implementation of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. We reiterate our commitment to Operation Active Endeavour, our maritime operation in the Mediterranean, which continues to make a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism.

16. We remain deeply concerned by the continued violence and atrocities in Darfur and call on all parties to cease hostilities. NATO remains ready, following consultation with and the agreement of the United Nations and the African Union (AU), to support their peace-keeping efforts in the region. At the request of the African Union, NATO has agreed to provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia and we are prepared to consider further requests for support to this mission. As an example of our comprehensive approach, we welcome the direct cooperation between NATO and the AU, demonstrated through our recently concluded support to the AU Mission in Sudan and our ongoing support to the African Standby Force. NATO welcomes the European Union's EUFOR Chad / Central African Republic operation and the EU's contribution to stability and security in the region.

17. We reiterate the Alliance's commitment to support the Government and people of Iraq and to assist with the development of Iraqi Security Forces. We have responded positively to a request by Prime Minister Al Maliki to extend the NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM I) through 2009. We are also favourably considering the Government of Iraq's request to enhance the NTM I mission in areas such as Navy and Air Force leadership training, police training, border security, the fight

against terrorism, defence reform, defence institution building, and Small Arms and Light Weapons accountability. NTM I continues to make an important contribution to international efforts to train and equip Iraqi Security Forces and, to date, has trained over 10,000 members of these forces. Complementing these efforts, NATO has also approved proposals for a structured cooperation framework to develop NATO's long term relationship with Iraq and continue to develop Iraq's capabilities to address common challenges and threats.

18. NATO's ongoing enlargement process has been an historic success in advancing stability and cooperation and bringing us closer to our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values. NATO's door will remain open to European democracies willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. We reiterate that decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself to make.

19. Our invitation to Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join our Alliance marks the beginning of a new chapter for the Western Balkans and shows the way forward to a future in which a stable region is fully integrated into Euro Atlantic institutions and able to make a major contribution to international security.

20. We recognise the hard work and the commitment demonstrated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>800</sup> to NATO values and Alliance operations. We commend them for their efforts to build a multi ethnic society. Within the framework of the UN, many actors have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached. We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible.<sup>801</sup>

21. Admitting Albania and Croatia will enhance the Alliance's ability to face the challenges of today and tomorrow. These countries have demonstrated a solid commitment to the basic principles set out in the Washington Treaty as well as their ability, and readiness, to protect freedom and our shared values by contributing to the Alliance's collective defence and full range of missions.

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<sup>800</sup> Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name.

<sup>801</sup> The text was bolded by the authors, since this is the only paragraph referring to the Republic of Macedonia.

22. We will begin talks immediately with the aim of signing Accession Protocols by the end of July 2008 and completing the ratification process without delay. During the period leading up to accession, NATO will involve the invited countries in Alliance activities to the greatest extent possible, and will continue to provide support and assistance, including through the Membership Action Plan (MAP). We look forward to receiving the invited countries' timetables for reform, upon which further progress will be expected before, and after, accession in order to enhance their contribution to the Alliance.

23. NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.

24. We remain committed to the strategically important region of the Balkans, where Euro Atlantic integration, based on democratic values and regional cooperation, remains necessary for lasting peace and stability. We welcome progress since the Riga Summit in developing our cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. We encourage each of these three countries to use to the fullest extent possible the opportunities for dialogue, reform and cooperation offered by the Euro Atlantic Partnership, and we have directed the Council in Permanent Session to keep the development of relations with each of these Partners under review.

25. We welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina's and Montenegro's decisions to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. We look forward to ambitious and substantive Action Plans which will further the Euro Atlantic aspirations of these countries and we pledge our assistance to their respective reform efforts towards this goal. To help foster and guide these efforts, we have decided to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to begin an Intensified Dia-

logue on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to their aspirations to membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision.

26. We stand ready to further develop an ambitious and substantive relationship with Serbia, making full use of its Partnership for Peace membership, and with a view to making more progress towards Serbia's integration into the Euro Atlantic community. We reiterate our willingness to deepen our cooperation with Serbia, in particular through developing an IPAP, and we will consider an Intensified Dialogue following a request by Serbia.

27. We expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and will closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard.

28. We recall that the NATO Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism. Looking back at a history of more than a decade, we have developed a political dialogue as well as concrete projects in a broad range of international security issues where we have common goals and interests. While we are concerned by recent Russian statements and actions on key security issues of mutual concern, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), we stand ready to continue working with Russia as equal partners in areas of common concern, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration and the Founding Act. We should continue our common efforts in the fight against terrorism and in the area of non proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We urge Russia to engage actively in important cooperative offers that have been extended. We believe that United States Russia bilateral discussions on missile defence and CFE, among other issues, can make an important contribution in this field. We believe the potential of the NATO Russia Council is not fully realised and we remain ready to identify and pursue opportunities for joint actions at 27, while recalling the principle of independence of decision making and actions by NATO or Russia. We reaffirm to Russia that NATO's Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.

29. We note Russia's ratification of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, and hope that it will facilitate further practical cooperation. We appreciate Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian territory. We would welcome deepened NATO Russia cooperation in support of, and agreed by, the Government of Afghanistan, and look forward to building on the solid work already achieved in training Afghan and Central Asian counter narcotics officers. Our continued cooperation under our Cooperative Airspace Initiative and Russia's support to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean contribute to our common fight against terrorism. We also welcome our cooperation on military interoperability, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency planning.

30. We reaffirm that NATO's policy of outreach through partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is an essential part of the Alliance's purpose and tasks. The Alliance's partnerships across the globe have an enduring value, contributing to stability and security in the Euro Atlantic area and beyond. With this in mind, we welcome progress made since our last Summit in Riga in strengthening NATO's policy of partnerships and cooperation, and reaffirm our commitment to undertake further efforts in this regard.

31. We value highly the contributions that our partners are making to NATO's missions and operations. Seventeen nations outside the Alliance are contributing forces to our operations and missions and many others provide different forms of support. We will continue to strive to promote greater interoperability between our forces and those of partner nations; to further enhance information sharing and consultations with nations contributing to NATO led operations; and to offer partner countries NATO's advice on, and assistance with, the defence and security related aspects of reform.

32. We welcome our Euro Atlantic Partners at the Bucharest Summit and reiterate the enduring value of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. We remain committed to substantive political discussions and effective cooperation within these frameworks. We welcome Malta's return to the PfP and look forward to its active engagement in the EAPC. We welcome the strengthening of political dialogue through the EAPC Security Forum. We will give priority to several new practical initiatives, which include building integrity in defence institutions and the

important role of women in conflict resolution as outlined in UNSCR 1325. We value the Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre's successes over the past ten years in coordinating NATO and partner countries' contributions to disaster relief. We will continue to make full use of the NATO/PfP Trust Funds and of their opening to other partner countries. We welcome and will continue to support the engagement of all interested Partners across the Euro Atlantic area in programmes to support defence and broader reforms, including the Individual Partnership Action Plan. Recalling our Istanbul Summit decision, we are committed to engage our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in these regions, and will continue dialogue with our Central Asian Partners on Afghanistan. We appreciate the significant contributions provided by our EAPC Partners to Alliance operations and look forward to working with them to address the security challenges of the 21st century.

33. We are pleased to note the significant progress achieved in the framework of our Mediterranean Dialogue since the Istanbul and Riga Summits. Political consultations with our Mediterranean Dialogue partners have gained both in frequency and substance, and the meeting held between our Foreign Ministers and their seven Mediterranean Dialogue partners last December contributed to a further deepening of our partnership. We therefore plan to pursue this momentum through deepening our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with the region. Our practical cooperation has grown in several areas, and new opportunities have been created especially in training and education. We welcome the progress made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were successfully conducted. We encourage our Mediterranean Dialogue partners to work with us to develop this Initiative further. The conclusion of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) with Egypt and Israel will help in establishing long term, structured and effective cooperation with those countries. We encourage our other Mediterranean Dialogue partners to develop their own ICP in the near future. We welcome the implementation of the first ever Mediterranean Dialogue Trust Fund project to assist Jordan with the disposal of unexploded ordnance and ammunitions, and the launching of the feasibility study for the Trust Fund project to

assist Mauritania with the disposal of ammunitions. We thank our Mediterranean Dialogue partners for their various contributions to our operations and missions.

34. We welcome the response of four countries in the Gulf region to our offer of cooperation in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and encourage other countries of the region to take up that offer. To that end, we plan to develop our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with this region. We are pleased to see their increased interest and participation in NATO training and education activities, and stand ready to enhance our cooperation in this and other fields. We welcome the progress made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were successfully conducted. We encourage our ICI partners to work with us to develop this Initiative further. We encourage our ICI partners to develop an ICP with a view to better structuring our cooperation. We very much appreciate the support provided by our ICI partners to Alliance operations and missions.

35. The Alliance places a high value on its expanding and varied relationships with other partners across the globe. Our objectives in these relationships include support for operations, security cooperation, and enhanced common understanding to advance shared security interests and democratic values. We have made substantial progress in building political dialogue and developing individual Tailored Cooperation Packages with a number of these countries. We particularly welcome the significant contribution by Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore to NATO led efforts in Afghanistan. We also welcome the valuable contributions by the Republic of Korea to efforts which support the NATO led mission in Afghanistan. Recognising that each of these countries wishes to pursue a unique degree of relations with NATO, and that other countries may wish to pursue dialogue and cooperation with NATO as well, we reiterate our willingness to further develop existing, and openness to new, individual relationships, subject to the approval of the North Atlantic Council, and at a pace that respects mutual interests in so doing.

36. We reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro Atlantic security. In this regard, we welcome the progress in consolidation of regional ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance will continue to support,

as appropriate, these efforts guided by regional priorities and based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness, in order to develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.

37. Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European based United States missile defence assets. We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO wide missile defence architecture. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.

38. We also commend the work already underway to strengthen NATO Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns. We encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.

39. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non proliferation will continue to make an important contribution to peace, security, and stability and, in this regard, to preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We took note of the report prepared for us on raising NATO's profile in this field. As part of a broader response to security issues, NATO should continue contributing to international efforts in the area of arms control, disarmament and non proliferation, and we task the Council in Permanent Session to keep these issues under active review.

40. The Alliance has reduced both its conventional forces significantly from Cold War levels and has reduced nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by over 90%. Allies have also reduced their nuclear arsenals. France has reduced the types of its nuclear systems to two, the number of its nuclear delivery vehicles by over half, and has announced it will reduce the number of its nuclear warheads to fewer than 300,

with no other weapons beside those in its operational stockpile. The United Kingdom has reduced to one nuclear system, and has reduced the explosive power of its nuclear stockpile by 75%, and its number of operationally available nuclear warheads to fewer than 160. The United States has reduced its nuclear weapon stockpile to less than 25% of its size at the height of the Cold War, and decreased tactical nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by nearly 90%.

41. We remain deeply concerned about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We call on Iran to fully comply with UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803. We are also deeply concerned by the proliferation activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and call on it to fully comply with UNSCR 1718. Allies reaffirm their support for existing multi lateral non proliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, and call for universal compliance with the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and full compliance with UNSCR 1540. Allies agree to redouble their efforts to fully implement the non proliferation agreements and relevant UNSCRs to which Allies reaffirm their support and by which they are bound.

42. We fully endorse the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 28 March 2008 and reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to the CFE Treaty Regime, as expressed in the Alliance's position contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna and Alliance statements reflecting subsequent developments. We place the highest value on the CFE Treaty regime with all its elements and underscore the strategic importance of the CFE Treaty, including its flank regime, as a cornerstone of Euro Atlantic Security. We are deeply concerned that the Russian Federation has continued its unilateral "suspension" of its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. This action does not contribute to our common objective of preserving the long-term viability of the CFE regime and we urge the Russian Federation to resume its implementation. The current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely. We have offered a set of constructive and forward looking proposals for parallel actions on key issues, including steps by NATO Allies on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and by the Russian Federation on outstanding commitments related to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We believe these proposals address all of Russia's stated concerns.

We encourage Russian authorities to work cooperatively with us and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so that together we can preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.

43. We are concerned with the persistence of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles.

44. We have already done much to transform our forces and capabilities in line with our political objectives, in particular the priorities laid out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, and our operational experience. We will continue this process to ensure the Alliance remains able to meet its operational commitments and perform the full range of its missions. Our operations highlight the need to develop and field modern, interoperable, flexible and sustainable forces. These forces must be able to conduct, upon decision by the Council, collective defence and crisis response operations on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance, with little or no host nation support. We will also ensure that we have the right kind of capabilities to meet the evolving security challenges of the 21st century, and to do so, we will transform, adapt and reform as necessary.

45. Transformation is a continual process and demands constant and active attention. We therefore support our Defence Ministers' efforts as they oversee the management of the defence aspects of transformation to ensure NATO remains effective and efficient, especially by pursuing ongoing efforts in the following areas:

- We must ensure that we provide the forces required for our operations and other commitments. To that end we will continue efforts to be able to deploy and sustain more forces. We are committed to support the NATO Response Force by providing the necessary forces, and to improving the availability of operational and strategic reserve forces for our operations. We will seek greater domestic support for our operations, including through improved public diplomacy efforts.

- We will further develop the capabilities required to conduct the full range of our missions and to remedy specific shortfalls. We will work particularly at improving strategic lift and intra-theatre airlift, especially mission-capable helicopters and welcome national initiatives

in support of this work, as well as addressing multinational logistics. We will further strengthen information superiority through networked capabilities, including an integrated air command and control system; increased maritime situational awareness; and timely delivery of the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability. We will continue to enhance the capability and interoperability of our special operations forces. Supported by the defence planning processes, we will enhance our efforts to develop and field the right capabilities and forces, with the greatest practicable interoperability and standardisation. This will be furthered by improving trans-Atlantic defence industrial cooperation.

- We are committed to develop policies and capabilities to deal with emerging challenges and threats. This includes the development of a comprehensive policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.

- We are pursuing the adaptation and reform of the Alliance's structures and processes. In this context we are reviewing the peacetime establishment of the NATO Command Structure to make it leaner, more effective and efficient, and reforming defence planning processes in order to promote timely delivery of the capabilities sought by the Comprehensive Political Guidance.

46. Transformation is not possible without sufficient, properly prioritised resources. We are committed to continuing to provide, individually and collectively, the resources necessary for our Alliance to perform the tasks we demand from it. Therefore we encourage nations whose defence spending is declining to halt that decline and to aim to increase defence spending in real terms.

47. NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information systems against cyber attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy on Cyber Defence, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on Cyber Defence emphasises the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. We look forward to continuing the development of NATO's cyber defence capabilities and strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities.

48. We have noted a report "NATO's Role in Energy Security", prepared in response to the tasking of the Riga Summit. Allies have

identified principles which will govern NATO's approach in this field, and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO's endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organisations that are specialised in energy security. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for our consideration at the 2009 Summit.

49. Demands on our Alliance have grown in complexity in the last twenty years, as the security environment has changed and both the scope of our missions and operations and our membership have expanded. This requires continual adaptation and reform of NATO Headquarters' structures and processes. We note the progress that has been made in this field, as part of NATO's overall transformation; but more remains to be done, including to get full benefit from our move to a new Headquarters building. In evaluating where we need to change, we need to make fuller use of lessons drawn from our experience in delivering our core functions, including meeting operational, capability development, partnership and strategic communications requirements. Building on our Defence Ministers' work to take forward the defence aspects of transformation, Allies will also need to consider how to achieve the fastest and most coherent flow of sound political, military and resource advice to support our consensual decision making, and to enhance our responsiveness to time sensitive operational needs, including those of NATO Commanders. We have requested the Secretary General to chart a path forward, in time for the 2009 Summit, on how to meet these objectives.

50. We express our sincere appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Romania. The city of Bucharest has been the venue of NATO's largest ever Summit meeting, highlighting the Alliance's determination to work closely with the International Community as well as its own unique contribution to promoting security and stability in a fast changing strategic environment. At our meeting we have taken decisions and given further direction for NATO's own ongoing adaptation to that environment, through its mis-

sions and operations, the modernisation of its structures and capabilities, closer engagement of other nations and organisations, as well as its continuing openness to the inclusion of additional member states. We have strengthened our dialogue and cooperation with countries and organisations vital to our security. We will meet again next year in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate NATO's 60th anniversary, take stock of its adaptation, and give further direction for the modernisation of our Alliance to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

**MACEDONIA'S NAME: BREAKING  
THE DEADLOCK EUROPE BRIEFING NO. 52  
(12 January 2009)**

**OVERVIEW**

Macedonia is a relative success story in a region scarred by unresolved statehood and territory issues. International engagement has, since the 2001 conflict with an ethnic Albanian insurgency, brought progress in integrating Albanians into political life. This has been underpinned by the promise of European Union (EU) and NATO integration, goals that unite ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. But the main NATO/EU strategy for stabilising Macedonia and the region via enlargement was derailed in 2008 by the dispute with Greece over the country's name. Athens claims that, by calling itself "Macedonia", it appropriates part of the Hellenic heritage and implies a claim against Greece's northern province. At summits it blocked Macedonian membership in NATO and EU accession talks until the issue is settled. Mystifying to outsiders, the dispute touches existential nerves, especially in Macedonia, and has serious regional implications. The parties need to rebuild trust; member states need to press both to compromise, especially Greece to respect its commitment not to block Skopje in international organisations.

Efforts to overcome the name dispute through negotiations under UN auspices have been fruitless for well over a decade. Crisis Group argued in a December 2001 report that resolving the issue was vital in order to bolster Macedonians' fragile sense of identity, which is challenged by three neighbors: Greece, which disputes the country's name; Bulgaria, which has questioned the existence of a Macedonian nation or language; and Serbia, which denies the autonomy of its church. Macedonians' sense of identity has been further challenged by the necessary concessions they have made to their compatriots pursuant to the Ohrid Framework Agreement that ended the 2001 conflict. These seek to turn the country into a "civic state", by bolstering the rights of the Albanian and other ethnic minorities, but they also dilute its essence as the homeland of the Macedonian people.

In 2001 Crisis Group suggested a compromise, under which the name "Republika Makedonija", in Macedonian, would be used by the UN and all other international organisations and be acknowledged by

NATO and EU member states and others. Today Greece has upped the ante at NATO and in the EU. Macedonia was granted the status of an EU candidate in 2005 but no date for the start of accession negotiations. By 2008 it had fulfilled the criteria for entering NATO but was not issued a membership invitation. Apart from Greece's threat over the name issue, the opening of EU accession talks is also delayed by the country's failure to meet benchmarks set by the European Commission. Notably, serious shortcomings that came to light in the June 2008 elections will need to be addressed in elections in 2009.

Despite considerable progress, Ohrid has not been fully implemented. Inter-ethnic tensions and a risk of instability remain. The regional environment is fragile, and the potential for Kosovo to have a destabilising influence on Macedonia, as it did in 2001, continues. An indefinite delay to NATO and EU integration could undermine what has been achieved in stabilising the country, with consequences that would be particularly harmful not least for Greece itself. The name dispute is more than a bilateral issue between Skopje and Athens. It risks derailing the main strategy of both NATO and the EU for stabilising Macedonia and the region through enlargement and integration. Member states should not allow the organisations' credibility to fall victim to an intractable dispute involving one of their fellow members.

At NATO's April 2008 Bucharest summit, Skopje signalled its readiness to compromise on the name of the country. However, a combination of moves by both sides has poisoned the environment in which talks are being conducted to such an extent that the two countries are further apart than at any time since the early 1990s. Macedonia's decision in 2007 to re-name the Skopje airport after Alexander the Great seemed calculated to provoke Greek sensitivities over the Hellenic heritage. By blocking Macedonia's NATO and EU integration, Greece appeared to contravene its undertaking in the 1995 *Interim Accord* not to let the name issue stand in the way of the country's membership in international organisations. The fact that other NATO and EU members allowed that to happen undermined Macedonian faith in international goodwill.

In order to rebuild trust and finally resolve the name dispute, the following steps should be taken:

- Skopje should reverse its decision to rename its airport after Alexander the Great and desist from similar moves certain to provoke Athens;

- Skopje and Athens should jointly examine the common history of the region, with a view to avoiding references in their respective educational curricula that offend the other's national sensitivities;

- both sides should reaffirm their commitment to the *Interim Accord*, and pending agreement on the name, Skopje should use only the provisional form "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" in all multilateral organisations, while Athens should drop its veto threats at NATO and the EU;

- Skopje should publicly state its readiness to accept the latest proposal of the UN mediator that "Republic of North Macedonia" be the name for all international purposes;

- Athens should respond by acknowledging the national identity and language of its northern neighbor as "Macedonian" and accepting Skopje's assurance that use of that adjective does not imply any exclusivity or territorial claim over the northern Greek province of Macedonia; and

- other NATO and EU member states should actively encourage Athens to unblock Macedonia's integration into both organisations and to respond positively to Skopje's concessions on the country's name.

## EPILOGUE

*Nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio sed multorum  
nec una hominis vita sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus!*  
“The constitution of our republic was not the work of the genius  
of one, but of many; and not for only one generation, but for many  
years and many lives!”

*Cicero, De re publica (II, 1.2)*

### **On (Re)Cognitions**

*Memoria est thesaurus omnium rerum et custos  
Memoria is treasury and guardian of all things.*

*Euphantus*

During our studies at the Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, we got acquainted with a subject matter that somehow invisibly covers all pores of the human existence – the law. At our joint amaze, we have noticed that precisely this layer of the subtle and old science has been frequently vulgarized. And that injustice in particular was the initial stimulus for us to scrutinize some of the essential parts of the iursprudenta, as exceedingly noble discipline. However, we always had in consideration the fact that what was written in the textbooks was merely the tip of the iceberg, merely one piece of the puzzle, and that practice and reality were by far unlike and more complex than we could ever imagine... We were immediately being faced with the dilemma: *Is the power dominant over the law or is the law dominant over the power in the international relations?* At that point we discovered the ingenuity of the Roman Cicero, who argues that “power of law”, not “law of power”, is fundament upon which ever healthy society should be based.

It is amazing how history as a process somehow strangely repeats itself. Irrespective of the fact that throughout history (ours or world's, it does not matter) different people ruled over same states and regions, it appears that the same mistakes are made over and over again. More precisely, and in light of our project, there is the prevailing question; How come the name “Macedonia”, regardless whether it refers to

state, geographic region, people abiding on that piece of land, their language, culture, etc., has been turned into a political banality in this Balkans region? And, where are we in this Circus Europea, which has lost its compass?

While collecting materials, re-reading and putting forward opinions about “one’s own”, or “someone else’s problem”, there was the looming answer that the name, in the full sense of the word, was actually not the real hindrance here. This has also been proven with our broad-mindedness regarding this “dispute”. Given the fact that we have offered several viewpoints of scrutiny to the name issue itself, we have clearly noticed that this issue of force is shoved in all segments of our lives. At our surprise, we have noticed that even the law is deeply entangled in the settlement of this complicated “name issue”. We have learned that culture and tradition are not mere momentary expressions of identification, but one long-lasting, historical process that has evolved in what represents today. To make matters more paradoxical, exactly the involvement in an irrational dispute resulted into entanglement of law, culture and history – so, the passage of time showed that the law vis-à-vis the position of strength and power was becoming inert. *When might enters in a grand manner, the right jumps through the window...*

### **On Burden**

*Our work is unscrupulous critique of all existent –  
unscrupulous in sense that the critique will not be afraid of its  
results  
and even less afraid of clashing with the existing forces*  
**Karl Marx**

We did not know how to address this issue, but we secretly felt that the involvement in such an extensive scientific project required efforts still unknown to us as young peoples. It was not due to the complexity of the aspects ranging over the dispute, nor due to the volume of materials we have collected, but it emerged from the very dynamics of the dispute itself. Chronologically speaking, the intensity of the Nimetz proposals, which he had been offering to both of the parties, their content and double rhetoric, at times caused both bitterness and justified revolt: *So, what’s the deal here?* – we often wonder.

This insecurity among us has been arising from many different sides. Primarily, there were the everyday statements of politicians, states-

men, academics, “experts” and public people here in view of the development of events. They change(d) their positions as often as their bank accounts may require. On the other hand, there were the statements of certain foreign “career diplomats”, and at our surprise, even petitions by Greek intellectuals.

The second involved party, the Hellenic Republic (although in all official documents it is referred to as the “Party of the First Part”, perhaps because it is *primus*, and we *secundus* in the dispute) played the same double game as our position – it seemed to us as we had complied with them, and to them as they had complied with us. Is it even likely that we will see the end of this intrigue with such pretending?

Our idea-impotent “academic community” seemed to have shown certain degradation: from intellectual down to vulgar political level. Their abortive position resulted in their complete diminishment as a factor for shedding a different light on the Macedonian people and the essence of the issue. It is due to this flaw that the politics is in its full swing, and the power of the word and the pen seems to have lost itself in someone else’s hallways and drawers. All of this brought us to the conclusion that we, as students, and as part of the youth of the Republic of Macedonia, are in the middle of this crossroad without any guidepost pointing at somewhat of a certainty that tomorrow we will not wake up with the idea that someone else had made the choice for us, and we were living through the consequences. Hence, this is what we say to the official policy: Not in My Name!

From the burden we have felt emerged our obligation to scrutinize this problem, as we believed it was only up to us to mark the black stigmas being constantly increased, and at the same time neglected by both parties.

### **On Truth**

*Truth stands, even if there be no public support.  
It is self-sustained!  
Mahatma Gandhi*

With the very start of the project we have commenced a quest... This quest was no need for self-assertion, moreover a need for accounting for the question: *Why was this entire dispute raised to a level of identity authentication?*

The quest for identity somehow imposed by itself, also being *facta naturalia*, since in no case there was doubt over the historical truths. Hence, the identity quest itself is superficial, talking in terms there was increased desire for getting to the truth behind this dispute. Speaking from constitutional law viewpoint, the identity is guaranteed with the Constitution as the highest state act (*lex fundamentalis*). On one hand, it contains all cultural, political, economical, social and legal aspirations of certain people, their tradition, present and future. On the other hand, it emerges from ... *the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia*, since it is primarily a reflection of their will, their joint efforts and determination. Thus, a distortion between the identity and the truth that we are looking for is impossible! The “truth” that we have come across is political, vulgar, devaluated, populist – deeply penetrated into the consciousness of the common citizens of both countries, and presumptuously manipulated to defocus us from the true social problems weighing down on us in the reality.

It is long believed that conflict/dispute/issue/difference or discord are negative experiences and should be avoided at any cost. However, the conflict is actually a complex phenomenon; it is product of the human interaction, result of differences. When the conflict is being addressed *bona fide*, openly and with harmless curiosity, it may serve as motivation for achieving mutual growth, provided we are treated as equal partners.<sup>802</sup>

The chronic social conflicts, that is, “deeply enrooted conflicts” like this one have long history and are carried from generation to generation. They are practically unsolvable, but transformative – they can be transfigured! It is in this ground where we see our chance, and base our optimism upon. The transformation differs from the “settlement” by the following:

a) Transformation includes ongoing process at all levels of social structures through thousands of dialogues (*dia* – through + *logos* – word = “through word”), without exclusivity to the political elite infected with nationalism and rating;

b) Transformation does not require short-term effects (“right here, and right now”), but works on the transfiguration of the accumulated hatred, which is toxic to the future relations, starting from deep analy-

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<sup>802</sup> Olga Murdzheva Shkaric, “Non-Violent Transformation of Conflicts”, The Center for Peace in the Balkans (Faculty of Philosophy); Skopje, 2007; p. 40.

ses and sustained critiques of the applicable system – it seeks new system, new structure, new spaces; it abandons the winner-loser logic;

c) Since conflict reasons are cultural and running deeper, the solution is not arriving at compromise or compensation –transformation is control over the variability of the conflict, not over its source; which presupposes reinvigoration of positive tendencies, and does not imply that we have simply eliminated the conflict, but that we have comprehended its dialectical essence;

d) Transformation includes no capitulation, incrimination and rigid alternatives but bravery, consistency, virtuousness, responsibility and “creative tension”; it increases the moral development of the dispute protagonists accompanied by empathy – recognition and taking account of the other’s problems;

e) The key to all transformations lies in the truth, justice, charity and need for inevitable mutual cooperation – they lead to qualitative system changes and changes in the mindset of the indoctrinated rhetoric. The result is tranquility, for the process is more important than the outcome, since “*joy is to seek, not to find something!*”

## **On Future**

*Happiness is reward to labour*  
*Par est fortuna labori*  
*(Latin saying)*

On 8 April 1993, the Republic of Macedonia became the 181<sup>st</sup> UN Member State. It was admitted under the provisional “reference”: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It was not admitted under its “constitutional name”, as other Member State denied its accession due to the name of the State (which, on the other hand, is not one of the terms for UN entry). Long story short, this was the beginning of the new, modern phase of the “name dispute” that has lasted to this very date...

Moreover, the dispute is going to be here tomorrow, the day after tomorrow... For it has become a test of patriotism for both squabbled peoples and went so deep that simply cannot be settled “without winners and losers” – it can be only transformed i.e. to transfigure persons, protagonists, structures and relations between the “parties”! Moreover, the transformation is reformulation, expression in a wider and different context, with different approach and from different viewpoint. The trans-

formation requires the participation of many social strata (state functionaries, intellectuals, students, civil sector, etc.). Deep conflicts cannot be settled completely and at once, they should be dismantled into a number of smaller conflicts – so, the so-called *instant formula* should be converted into the so-called *salami technique!* In the field of psychology, on the other hand, the hatred management needs to be converted from *culture of revenge* into *culture of reconciliation*.<sup>803</sup>

We believe that the most appropriate transformation would be the one from political into legal dispute, since the law (should be) is the last social, civilized resort for protecting the weaker. Thus, the dispute would gain another dimension. We even regard this book project as an appeal to the academic circles and intelligence in the Republic of Macedonia and the Hellenic Republic for a full-scale awakening and bringing minds nearer. Precisely these academic circles should take a joint stand upon the reason for common good, not upon reason for power, for the politicians are part of the elite, which is always in background of the conflict and are not direct victims!

As a conclusion, we are not aiming at idealizing or intellectualizing this issue – it is not in the nature of the problem to be indoctrinated, but to be felt, approached and transformed. We do not imply that what we are proposing here is fast and easy, but we do imply that gathering strength and making decisive attempt are worthwhile... Whether we will endure – it is up to us. So: *Let's get realistic...Let's seek the "impossible"!*

### **On Conflict-Management Methods**

*Conflict is both destroyer and creator,  
as well as golden opportunity to create something new*  
**Johan Galtung**

There are two ways of dealing with conflicts, including the dispute between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Macedonia on the name.

The choice depends on the mindset of the parties, and the balance of forces involved in the conflict.

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<sup>803</sup> Ibid, pp. 60- 0.

**Method 1:** Once upon a time a Mullah was on his way on camel to Mecca.

Coming to an oasis he saw three men standing there, crying. So he stopped the camel, and asked: *"My children, what is the matter?"* And they answered: *"our father just passed away, and we loved him so much... he left behind camels. And in his will it is stated one-half of the camels to the eldest, one-third to the second and one-ninth to the youngest. We agree with the parts to each. But, there is a problem: he left behind 17 camels and we have been to school, we know that 17 is a prime number – so we cannot divide them.*

Mullah thought for a while, and then said: *"I give you my camel, then you have 18 and you can divide them."* And they cried: *Oh no, no, you cannot do that, you are on your way to something important".* The Mullah interrupted them and said: *"Nonetheless, take it my children."*

So they divided 18 by 2 and the eldest son got 9 camels, 18 by 3 and the second son got 6 camels, 18 by 9 and the youngest son got 2 camels. A total of  $9+6+2=17$  camels. One camel was standing there, alone – the Mullah's camel. The Mullah said: *"Are you happy now? Can I have my camel back?"*

And the three men, full of gratitude allowed the Mullah to take his camel back, not quite understanding what had happened. The Mullah blessed them, mounted his camel, and the last they saw was a tiny cloud of dust, quickly settling in the glowing desert sun...

**Method 2:** Once upon a time a lawyer was on his way in a luxurious car through the desert.

Passing an oasis he saw three men standing there, crying. So he stopped the car, and asked *"what's the matter gentlemen?"* And they answered: *"Our father just passed away, and we loved him so much."* *"But surely he has made a will"* – said the lawyer. *"Maybe I can help you, for a fee of course."*

The three men answered: *"Yes, he did indeed, he left behind camels. In his will it is stated one-half to the eldest, one-third to the second and one-sixth to the youngest. We agree with the parts to each, but there is a problem: he left behind 17 camels and we have been to school, we know that 17 is a prime number – so we cannot divide them."*<sup>804</sup>

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<sup>804</sup> Johan Galtung, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means* (transcend method), Center for Peace in the Balkans, Skopje, 2000; p.144.

The lawyer thought for a while and then said: “*Very simple. You give me 5 camels, then you have 12. You divide by 2, 3 and 6 and you get 6, 4 and 2 camels respectively*”. And so they did!

The lawyer<sup>805</sup> tied the five unhappy camels to the car, and the last they saw was a vast cloud of dust, covering the evening sun.<sup>806</sup>

If the weaker party in the name dispute (the Macedonian) is pressed by the more powerful force (Greece, NATO and EU), the transformation of the conflict should also engage the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia (state referendum at national level).

The transformation should be conducted in a democratic manner, not through violence, as it was the case with the dispute between the Melians and the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>807</sup>

*Skopje, April 2009*

*Editors' Note*

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<sup>805</sup> Whether it is our fate or not, but the leading “mediator” in the name dispute – Mr. Matthew Nimetz is a lawyer by profession!?

<sup>806</sup> Johan Galtung, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means* (transcend metod), Center for Peace in the Balkans, Skopje, 2000; p.144.

<sup>807</sup> Svetomir Shkaric and Gjorgje Ivanov: *Political Theories - Antiqui ty*; Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus; Skopje, 2006; pp. 246-248.

# PARTICIPANTS

## 1. Project managers:



Doctor **Svetomir Shkaric** was born in 1941 near the lake of Dojran in the village of Sretenovo situated on the border between Greece and Macedonia. He graduated from the Faculty of law in Skopje in 1965 and obtained his master degree (1972) and his doctoral degree (1978) in Belgrade. He teaches *Constitutional law, Comparative Constitutional law, Political System, Political Theories, and Theories of War and Conflicts*. He constantly works and cooperates with his students and is committed to building a solid

academic community with them. He has published about ten monographs and four collective articles with Professor Tadakazu Fukase (Sapporo), academician Elena Guskova (Moscow), Doctor Gjorgje Ivanov (Skopje) and Doctor Gordana Siljanovska – Davkova (Skopje). He has published two books in English: *Law, Force and Peace – Macedonia and Kosovo* (Skopje, 2002) and *Democratic Elections in Macedonia 1990 – 2002* (Berlin, 2005). This student project has been significantly influenced by his books *Macedonia on All Continents, Law, Force and Peace – Macedonia and Kosovo, Comparative and Macedonian Constitutional law*. He considers this project to be very important for him as a professional and it has been given a significant place in his long academic career. He was running this project from 2002 to 2008. He is the editor of *Law, Political Science, Sociology and Military Science* field within the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts. He works in close cooperation with Greek Constitutional law Professors Dimitris Tsatsos, Evangelos Venizelos, Nikos Mavrias and Antonis Pantelis. He has published a huge number of works in Greece in the field of constitutional law which were edited by Professor Spiridon Flogaitis, the director of the European Public Law Centre (EPLC) in Athens. He is strongly attracted to the Gandhi's ethics and the moral personality of the Greek antifascist Jorgos Janulis – the legendary commander on Gramos Mountain.

Doctor **Petrushevka** is an associate professor at the Faculty of law, the University of St. Cyril and Methodius of Skopje. She teaches *International Public law, International Organisations and European Union law*. She graduated from the Faculty of law in Skopje for three and a half years with the highest grade point average (10) and obtained her master and doctoral degree at the Faculty of law in Belgrade. She worked as a visiting professor at FON (Faculty of Social Sciences), at the Faculty of law – the University of Trieste and at the Institute of Sociology in Gorizia, Italy. She is a member of several national and international professional associations: Forum on EU Integration (Macedonia), Forum on Macedonia (Macedonia), International Studies Association, University of Tucson (USA); International Political Science Association, University College (Ireland), Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, (Serbia). She underwent several professional specialisations abroad: in Serbia, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, Great Britain, USA etc. She wrote around 150 source works, scientific and professional articles which are very popular and which have been published in publications both at home and abroad; those articles were presented in conferences taking place in Macedonia and abroad. Her works are very important for this project in both practical and empirical sense of the word. She is the editor of *Law, Political Science, Sociology and Military Science* field (The Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts).

## 2. Members of the research team<sup>808</sup>:

**Ivana Angjelovska** – Angjelovska was born on 23 January 1986 in Skopje. She is a fourth year student at the Faculty of law “Justinianus Primus”. She actively participates in the Mobile Cultural Container “*In*

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<sup>808</sup> The surnames of all the participants are given in alphabetical order, regardless of their function and contribution to the project. In spite of all our efforts during several months, we were not able to reach some of them, especially those from the first generation (due to objective reasons) and that is the reason why we listed their names and surnames only without additional information: Magdalena Arsova, Erkan Balashi, Alber Baliu, Faton Bejta, Arta Biljali, Marija Blazhevka, Jane Georgiev, Mitre Georgiev, Jugoslav Georgievski, Maja Grozdanovska, Gjulten Dalipovska, Suhala Gjerishi, Mate Gjorgjevski, Bekim Emimi, Emilija Efimova, Aleksandar Ivanovski, Nedim Ismailovski, Florim Ismailovski, Jasmina Jovchevska, Jusuf Juseini, Mihail Karajakov, Daniela Kojcheska, Bozhana Lazareska, Marjan Maksimoski,

*Defence of Our Country*” and took part in the 10<sup>th</sup> Oratorical Nights “Ivo Puhan”. She is an active member of the Club of Orators and of the Student Organisation AIESEC. She is fluent in English and has basic knowledge of German and Albanian.

**Dimitar Apasiev** – Apasiev is a final year student at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje. He has participated in more than 30 seminars and schools in various fields both in Macedonia and abroad (Serbia, Croatia and Greece). He participated in a study stay at the Lomonosov Moscow State University in Russia. He is the founder of the *Institute of Peace*

*Geopolitics* within “Magna Carta” Assosiation and editor – in – chief of the first Youth electronic Magazine for anti - globalism “Magna Carta”. The fields in which he is most interested are: *jurisprudence* (he is the advocate of the concept of jusnaturalism), *metaphysics* (he strongly supports the Cynics), *politolgy* (in favour of the anarchist and anti – authoritarian ideology and the concept of Gandhi’s Satyagraha), *history* (Antiquity and Middle Ages), *philosophy* (Mysticism), *esothery* and *etymology*. In compliance with his principles he does not mention the certificates and prizes he has won because he considers that they cannot truly show people’s aptitude and capability. He has translated around 10 essays from world famous theoreticians and written more than 20 professional articles and speeches. His attitudes were published in several Macedonian media under a pseudonym. Up to this moment his grade point average is 10 and he has one more exam to pass before his graduation form the faculty. Pres-



Mirjana Machukovska, Idaver Memedov, Gjorgji Nadzi, Pajazit Pajaziti, Gjorgji Popkochev, Bekim Redzeqi, Mirjana Ristovska, Helga Spasova, Marija Stoicheva, Vladimir Stojanovski, Ilir Sulejman, Igor Tashtachoski, Sofka Trajchevska, Slobodan Hristovski, Erol Sherifovski.

ently, he works as a demonstrator for the Roman law course. Judging by the texts included in this student project we can clearly perceive his quest for source data and interesting personalities, we can very distinctly feel his need for direct action, change and scientific progress and his contempt for conformity, nepotism, and poltroonery. He is a rather promising researcher and scientist in the field of social and humanitarian sciences and is one of the most remarkable and brightest students from the new generation at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus”.



**Zorica Velkovska** – Velkovska was born on 16 August in 1985 in Skopje, where she completed her primary and secondary education as the best student in the generation. Presently, she is a fourth year student at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje. Apart from the studies in law, she actively participates in the work of several student non – governmental organisations. Since 2005, she has been a member of ELSA and AEGEE. She took part in many projects, conferences as well as in winter and summer universities in Italy. During her stay in Melbourne, Australia she was part of the *Open Week at Monash University* for foreign students. She works as a swimming coach in several swimming clubs and in 2006 she founded the swimming and water polo club “Orion” and since then works as a coach there. She is committed to hard work, precision during the researches and she disapproves of the “lost in space” concept.



**Emilija Dimic** – Dimic was born on 26 June 1985 in Skopje. She was an excellent pupil during the primary and secondary education. She enrolls at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje, St. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje. She participated in the public debate dedicated to the draft – amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. She twice represented the Faculty of law on a regional level in the field of International private law. She is one of the

founders of the NGO “Young for Young” and she is also a member of Balkans Youth Fund, Youth Educational Forum and ELSA. She lives and studies in Skopje. Apart from her mother tongue, she is fluent in Serbian and English and has basic knowledge of French.

**Dragana Kiprijanovska** – Kiprijanovska was born on 10 September 1985 in Skopje. During the primary and the secondary education she writes and publishes several articles in magazines and takes part in the Oratorical Nights. In 2004, she enrolls at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje, Department of legal science where she still studies. She participated in several scientific workshops, seminars and conferences at home and in the region and her involvement in the NGO sector is worth mentioning, too. In 2007, she represented the Faculty of law from Skopje in a regional competition in Belgrade. During her studies, she works as a demonstrator at the Institute for Penal law at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje for the Penal (material) law.



**Monika Kostic** – Kostic was born on 22 September in 1985 in Skopje. During the secondary education which lasted for four years she took part in a seminar on “*Raising the awareness of gender relationships in secondary schools*” organised by ESE. In 2004, she participates in the *European Fair for Virtual Companies* as a representative of the State Secondary Vocational School (legal and economic department) “*Vasil Antevski – Dren*”. At the moment she is a student at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje, Department of legal studies.



**Vera Kostovska** – Kostovska was born on 18 January in 1986 in Skopje. At the moment she is a fourth year student at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus”. She is actively included in the activities of the project *Mobile Cultural Container* and she writes for the newspaper *Feder* and for the *City Informer Skopje 365*. She participated in the 9<sup>th</sup> Oratorical Nights “Ivo Puhan” and she is member of the assessment



committee of the public speaking competition organised by “*Educational rendez – vous 2006*”; she is doing a training for a lecturer provided by Youth Educational Forum, where she also works for the programme “*We learn law*” as a teacher. She is a member of the UNESCO Club; she is fluent in English and has considerable knowledge of French and Italian. As a person she is very determined and nothing can stop her on her way to achieving her goals.



**Vladimir Naumoski** – Naumoski was born on 23 November in 1985 in Belgrade, Republic of Serbia. He finished primary education in the primary school “Ljuben Lape” in Skopje and was the best student in the generation. Four years later, he completed his secondary education in the State Secondary Vocational School (legal and economic department) *Vasil Antevski - Dren* where he got the title *legal assistant*. In 2002 he passed the highest level course in English language (FCE) and he also has some knowledge of French. He presently lives in Skopje and is a student at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje, Department of legal studies.



**Vladimir Patchev** – Patchev was born in Skopje and is a third year law student. He likes music, painting and literature through which he is constant quest for truth. He does not approve of any ridiculous denials and limitations of freedom that are so much part of our everyday life nowadays. The unconventional pieces of music have been a great inspiration for him and he firmly believes that true music contains roots of pure and innocent thought which thus reaches our psyche. So far, he has published four essays: *Passive Public* and *Cultural Competition* in the high school magazine *Feder* and *The Mysterious Skulls from Chihuahua* and *A Glance through SF History of Hu-*

*mankind* in the magazine *Sixth Sense*. Since November 2006 he has been an active member of ELSA. His articles contained in this book abound with theoretical subtleness, spiritual values and admiration for scientific thinking inspired by Hinduism and the works of the contemporary Indian philosopher Kapur.

**Borche Razmoski** - Razmoski was born on 22 August in 1983 in Vevchani. In 2008 he graduated from the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje (Department for constitutional law). Apart from the studies, he is an active member of several organisations like the association “*Magna Carta*” and the editorial board “*Mahatma*” in which he continuously publishes his own articles in the field of law. He also underwent a traineeship in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia and he is very skilled in the field of computer technology. He wrote several essays, the most important of which are: *Capital Punishment: Yes or No?* (2002), *The Political System of the Countries of Latin America* (2006), *The Secrets of Lost Civilisations – Mayas and Aztecs* (2007). He enjoys small things and likes sports, reading, research.... he is responsible, reasonable and calm, always ready for action and he resents violence (ahimsa).

**Biljana Sekulovska** – Sekulovska was born on 7 September 1981 in Bitola, where she finished primary and secondary education. In 1995 she graduated from the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus”, St. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje and becomes a lawyer. During the studies, she was member of the AEGEE PR team for organisation of conferences and seminars, and she was also participated as an observer in the activities of the NGO “*Coalition – Everyone for a fair trial*” for preventing corruption during the trials. She is fluent in English and in French.

**Maja Simonovska** – Simonovska was born on 29 November 1985



in Skopje. At the moment, she is a fourth year student at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje. She is an active ELSA member. She participated in several seminars, academic projects and workshops; she underwent Moot Court trainings, she went to a summer university in Austria (Vienna, Graz) etc. She attended several workshops: *International humanitarian law* organised by the Red Cross (2006) and *Transitional justice* (2006). She is fluent in English, has a considerable knowledge of Spanish and she is taking a course in Italian.

This project reflects her ability to overcome the bureaucratic barriers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.



**Elizabeta Spiroska** – Spiroska was born in 1979 in Ohrid. She graduated from the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje and she is presently working on her master thesis in the field of international law. She participated in numerous regional and international competitions, for some of which she was even awarded a prize. She actively participates in several projects predominantly related to legal sciences. She wrote a poem collection “*Nezaborav*” (*Unforgettability*, 1993). In the period between 1999 and 2002, she was doing practical work in constitutional law with law

students from the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in cooperation with Professor Svetomir Shkarikj. She presently works as a lawyer in Skopje. Her conversation with Edward Joseph depicts her ability to make syntheses and ask relevant questions.

**Ana Shajnovska** – Shajnovska was born on 23 August 1985 in Skopje. She is presently a fourth year law student at the Faculty of law “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje. She was a vice president of ELSA and was responsible for academic activities and also a lecturer within the programme “*We learn law*” provided by Youth Educational Forum; she is also an active member of the Model of United Nations in Macedo-

nia, where she worked as part of the executive body of the organization. Presently, she works for PricewaterhouseCoopers Macedonia as a legal and tax advisor. Throughout her education she participated in more than 20 international scientific seminars, trainings, and scientific visits organized by The Fund for American Studies from Washington, Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC), International Organisation for Migration, Constantin Brancusi University from Romania, World University Service from Austria. European Public Law Centre in Greece, Centre for European Studies (Jean Monnet summer school) in Turkey, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, ELSA, AEGEE. She is a very promising young lawyer as she is in contact with lots of different people facing different challenges.



PRAZNA

## LIST OF ACRONYMS<sup>809</sup>

- ABC – Australian Broadcasting Corporation;  
ABECEDAR – a primer intended for Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, which was printed in Greece (1925);  
Acts – the book *Acts of the Apostles* which is part of the New Testament of the *Bible* (The Holy Script);  
AEGEE – European Students' Forum (Association des États Généraux des Étudiants de l'Europe);  
AIESEC – International Association of Students in Economics and Business (Association Internationale des Étudiants en Sciences Économiques et Commerciales);  
ANA – Albanian National Army (paramilitary terrorist organization);  
ANA – Athens News Agency;  
ASNOM – Anti-Fascist Assembly for Macedonian National Liberation;  
AU – African Union;  
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation;  
BCF – Balkan Communist Federation;  
BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina;  
CFE – Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency;  
CID – Center for Institutional Development;  
CIP – Cataloging in Publication;  
CoE – Council of Europe;  
CPB – Center for Peace in the Balkans;  
CSCE – Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (now OSCE);  
CV – Curriculum vitae;  
DA – Democratic Alternative;  
DFY – Democratic Federal Yugoslavia;  
DOM – Democratic Renewal of Macedonia;  
DP – Democratic Party;  
DPA – Democratic Party of Albanians;  
DS – Democratic Union;

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<sup>809</sup> The list of frequently used acronyms in the text has been made by Dimitar Apasiev.

DUI – Democratic Union for Integration;  
EAPC – Euro Atlantic Partnership Council;  
EBLUL – European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages;  
EC – European Commission (executive branch of EU);  
EC – European Council;  
EC – European Communities (forerunner of the European Union);  
ECCY – European Council Conference on Yugoslavia;  
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights adopted under  
the auspices of the Council of Europe;  
ECHR – European Court of Human Rights, seated in Strasbourg  
(France);  
EEC – European Economic Community;  
EFA – European Free Alliance (Rainbow, the party of Macedonian  
minority in Greece is member of EFA);  
EPLC – European Public Law Center „RES PVBLICA“ (its seat is  
in Athens);  
EPP – European Political Party – Rainbow, the party of Macedo-  
nian minority in Greece is member of EPP;  
EUFOR – EU mission in Chad/Central African Republic;  
ELSA – The European Law Students Association;  
EP – European Parliament;  
ESE – Association for Emancipation, Solidarity and Equality of  
Women of Republic of Macedonia;  
EU – European Union;  
EAM – Central Committee of the Greek National Liberation  
Front;  
ELAS – Greek People’s Liberation Army;  
FCE – First Cambridge Certificate in English;  
FDI – Foreign Direct Investments;  
FIFA – International Federation of Association Football (Federa-  
tion Internationale de Football Association);  
FON – Faculty of Social Sciences (the first private university in  
Macedonia);  
FOSIM – Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia“ (popu-  
larly known as Soros Foundation);  
FP – Federal Republic;  
FPY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (subsequently Serbia and  
Montenegro);  
FUEN – Federal Union of European Nationalities;  
FYROM – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

FYROM – The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;  
G7 – Group of Seven;  
G8 – Group of Eight;  
GHM – Greek Helsinki Monitor;  
GOX – Greek Orthodox Church;  
HCHR – Helsinki Committee for Human Rights;  
HQ – Headquarters;  
HS – Holy Synod;  
IAEA – International Atomic Agency;  
ICG – International Crisis Group;  
ICG – International Crisis Group;  
ICI – Istanbul Cooperation Initiative;  
ICJ – International Court of Justice in The Hague;  
ICP – NATO Individual Cooperation Programs;  
IMF – International Monetary Fund;  
IPAP – Individual Partnership Action Plan  
IPriL – International Private Law;  
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force;  
JNA – Yugoslav People’s Army;  
KFOR – International Security Forces in Kosovo (Kosovo Force);  
KKE – Greek Communist Party;  
KSCS – Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes;  
LD – League for Democracy;  
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party of Macedonia;  
LoN – League of Nations;  
LP – Liberal Party;  
MA.KI.VE. – Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity;  
MAO – Macedonian Anti-Fascist Organization  
MAP – Membership Action Plan (i.å. Action Plan for NATO membership);  
MAT – Macedonian Air Transport;  
MD – Ministry of Defense;  
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs;  
MIA – Macedonian Information Agency;  
MILS – Macedonian Information Liaison Service;  
MKD – International country code for Macedonia;  
MOC – Macedonian Orthodox Church;  
MOI – Ministry of Interior;  
MRG – Minority Rights Group International;  
MRO – Macedonian Revolutionary Organization;

MRTV – Macedonian Radio and Television (same as MTV);  
MTV – Macedonian Television (same as MRTV);  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization;  
NDC – Nansen Dialogue Centre;  
NDP – National Democratic Party;  
NGO – Non – governmental organization;  
NIP – News Publishing Agency;  
NLA – National Liberation Army (terrorist-extremist Albanians organization, continuation of the paramilitary KLA);  
NSDP – New Social Democratic Party;  
NTM I – NATO Training Mission in Iraq;  
NY – New York;  
OMPEM – “Organization of the Macedonian Descendants from the Aegean part of Macedonia” seated in Bitola;  
OSCE – The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; its forerunner was KEBS;  
OUM – Organization of United Macedonians (Canada);  
PASOK – Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Greek: **Pa**nellenio **S**ocialistiko **K**inima) i.e. Greek centre-left political party;  
PDP – Party for Democratic Prosperity;  
PE – Public Enterprise;  
PEN – World Writers’ Association;  
PfP – Partnership for Peace Program;  
POMNI – Revival and Unification of the Macedonian National Ideals;  
PR – Public Relations;  
PRM – People’s Republic of Macedonia;  
Revelation - book Revelation of St. John the Apostle, an integral part of the New Testament, the last part of the Holy Bible;  
RF – Russian Federation;  
RG – Republic of Greece;  
RM – Republic of Macedonia;  
SC – UN Security Council;  
SCG – Serbia and Montenegro;  
SDSM – Social Democratic Union of Macedonia;  
SEE – South East Europe;  
SEEU - South East European University (“Van der Stuhl”) - Tetovo  
SEP – Secretariat for European Affairs at the Government of the Republic of Macedonia (previously Secretariat for European Integration);

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SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;  
 SLMO - Secret Liberation Macedonian Organization  
 SLMO – Secret Liberation Macedonian Organization, in region  
 around Edessa (Voden) in Aegean Macedonia, during the World War II  
 (1939-1945);  
 SMK – World Macedonian Congress;  
 SOC – Serbian Orthodox Church;  
 SOFA – Status of Forces Agreement signed with Macedonia;  
 SOG – Summer Olympic Games;  
 SPM – Socialist Party of Macedonia;  
 TMORO – Secret Macedonian Odrin Revolutionary Organiza-  
 tion;  
 TV – television;  
 TNID – Publishing Company;  
 UDF – Union for French Democracy;  
 UK – United Kingdom;  
 UMD – United Macedonian Diaspora;  
 UN – United Nations;  
 UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan;  
 UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural  
 Organization;  
 UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;  
 UNPREDEP – United Nations Preventive Deployment Force;  
 UNSCR – designation for adopted United Nations Security Coun-  
 cil resolution;  
 USA – The United States of America;  
 USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;  
 VMRO – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization;  
 VMRO - NP – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization  
 – People’s Party;  
 VMRO (United) – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organi-  
 zation - United;  
 VMRO-DPMNE – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organi-  
 zation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity  
 WEF – World Economic Forum, traditionally held in the winter  
 resort Davos (Switzerland);  
 WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction;  
 WTO – World Trade Organization;

PRAZNA