

NATO VS EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: DIVERGENT CONCEPTS OF SECURITY

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Abstract

Since 1999 when it began the process of establishing the European Security and Defence Policy as an operating part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy many problems and issues have emerged, but also the need for cooperation with NATO. The EU through the ESDP has obtained the possibility for undertaking autonomous actions, but only by the requirement of "separable but not separate" capabilities. This paper aims to elaborate the problems that appear on the international scene during the undertaking of operations and the participation of NATO and EU member-states. Operations undertaken solely by the EU through ESDP with participation of NATO member-states, create difficulties in decision-making and cooperation, and thus interfere in the way the two organizations understand the concept of security. Further problems arose by the (un)necessary duplication of existing efforts and abilities, spending resources and the creation of a second set of military capabilities, as NATO and EU do not possess identical abilities, but rely on national contributions. For this purpose, the paper determines and elaborates five factors that affect the relationship between NATO and the EU/ESDP, as well as the development of mutual consultation and cooperation for the purpose of improving the relations. The conclusion includes proposals for solving mutual problems by answering several questions. Future actions of the two organizations, although they should act as joint venture partners for the maintenance of international peace and stability, will face with problems and deficiencies in cooperation, because of the different perceptions of the concept of security.

Key words: *European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, NATO, concept, security.*

1. INTRODUCTION: SOME OF THE EVENTS BEFORE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Several years before the Cologne Summit and the creation of European Security and Defence Policy, NATO started to strengthen its European pillar through development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) responding to European requests and contribute for the security of the Alliance.¹ NATO helped in creating the ESDI, but not as a fully independent entity, but in the frame of NATO, drawing out from capabilities as “separable, but not separate”. Most of the work was done during the NATO’s foreign ministers and defence ministers meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, at the end resulting with Berlin-Brussels agreement and creation of the possibility for the EU to become military-effective organization.

On 4th of December 1998, United Kingdom and France hold a meeting in St. Malo and adopted a Declaration, giving new meaning to the ESDI in the frame of NATO.² The Declaration from St. Malo is invocation for acceleration of the implementation process of what was anticipated in the Treaty of Amsterdam - formulating common defence policy. Although the Declaration refers to the ESDI in NATO, it endeavours for the EU to possess capacity for autonomous actions, requiring necessary structures and capacities in areas where NATO as a whole or USA have superiority and where Europe is dependent.

After St. Malo, key focus was put on NATO’s Summit in Washington in April 1999, where the allies acknowledged EU’s determination to possess the capacity for autonomous actions, to decide and approve military actions in areas where NATO is not engaged.³ NATO’s Strategic Concept agreed that the ESDI should continue to develop, helping European allies to act autonomously based on each case and by consensus, as well as to make its assets and capabilities available for operations where the Alliance is not military engaged.⁴

2. CREATION OF THE ESDP

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was created at the European Council Summit in Cologne in June 1999, when started the development of military and civilian capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management and strengthening the EU’s capacity for external actions.⁵ As far as the military capabilities for crisis management, member-states at

¹ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, (Brussels: NATO, December 2, 1993).

² Franco-British Summit, *Text of a Joint Statement by the British and French Governments*, (Saint-Malo, France, December 4, 1998).

³ NATO, *Washington Summit Communique, Press Release NAC-S(99)64*, (Brussels: NATO, April 24, 1999).

⁴ NATO, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, (Brussels: NATO, April 24, 1999).

⁵ Cologne European Council, *Annex III: European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, (Cologne: Presidency Conclusions, June 3-4, 1999).

the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, introduced the Headline Goal declaring that EU is capable of setting 60.000 troops, deployable for 60 days and sustainable for one year.⁶ In 2004, the Headline Goal was further elaborated in Headline Goal 2010 introducing the concept of battle groups, European Security Agency and civilian-military cells. At the Nice Summit in December 2000 new innovations were created such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Personnel (EUMP).⁷ At the Laeken Summit in December 2001, the European Council officially confirmed that the Union is capable of undertaking wide range of military and civilian crisis management operations from peace missions and rule of law to protection of human rights.

Following these initiatives, by the European Council Summit in Santa Maria de Feira, EU made major steps in developing ESDP modalities, not only in the military area, but also in the civilian crisis management.⁸ Therefore, the EU member-states agreed in creating an Action Plan for introducing four priority areas: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening the civil administration and civil protection. With the Civilian headline goal 2008⁹, these four areas were complemented with two new areas: monitoring and support for EU's Special Representatives. Also, other measures were undertaken for improvement of the ESDP civilian capabilities: Committee responsible for civilian aspect of the crisis management, Civilian Response Teams and European Gendarmerie Force were established.

3. COOPERATION WITH USA AND NATO

At NATO's foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 8th of December 1998, USA gave its first response regarding St. Malo Declaration, underlining the support for ESDI through measures for increase of capabilities. While emphasising the support, at the same time, USA placed three standards for evaluation, known as the "Three D's".

- **De-linking** - autonomous activity by EU along with the absence of "separable, but not separate" and to avoid appropriation of NATO decisions regarding ESDI;
- **Discriminating** - to avoid discrimination against NATO member-states that are not EU members; and
- **Duplicating** - to avoid duplication of the existing efforts and capabilities, spending resources and creating second set of capabilities.

⁶ Helsinki European Council, *Annex IV: Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on "Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense" and on "Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union"* (Helsinki: Presidency Conclusions, December 10-11, 1999).

⁷ Nice European Council, *Annex VI: Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy*, (Nice: Presidency Conclusions, December 7-9, 2000).

⁸ Santa Maria de Feira European Council, *Annex I: Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy*, (Santa Maria de Feira: Presidency Conclusions, June 19-20, 2000).

⁹ Brussels European Council, *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, (Brussels: Council of EU, December 7, 2004).

USA viewed on ESDP through NATO's objective, respectively as a controversy that represents a threat for NATO and USA influence in Europe, especially after the introduction of the Headline Goal. EU statements for autonomy, self preservation and independence reflected the ambitions and visions which may threaten the institutional designation after the Cold War. Whatever happens in Europe, of political and economic reasons, USA not have the possibility to withdrawal, although reserves regarding ESDP shall exist.

As most of the European states are both EU and NATO members (with *de facto* "double veto"), at first sight disturbed USA, as they had problems with the situation where Europe is becoming more and more parasitic and, at the same time, more united. However, USA and EU reached new level in mutual relations from two directions. First is the fact that the ESDP basically changed the institutional designation and the shape of transatlantic connection. Second is that USA feels satisfied of reasons that Europe may take greater responsibility for its security, while USA may focus on new priorities, such as homeland security. This does not mean that the USA have no concerns for Europe, that NATO is out of use or that transatlantic relations are disrupted. USA and ESDP focus on homeland security is not because of strategic disagreement, but development of new relations out of the traditional transatlantic ones.

NATO's view is no longer relevant and it is in interest of USA to maintain wider perception of ESDP and European security arrangements. For all elements, except the European collective defence and peace-keeping in Europe, EU may be more interested partner in global conflict prevention than the European pillar in NATO. The development of partnership is not going to solve the debates regarding European priorities, securing budgets, NATO-EU relations, as these issues are going to be solved in a different and more constructive manner. Europe wishes to be treated on same level with USA, at the same time maintaining its national agendas and close bilateral contacts, as well as to prove its value as a strategic partner in global security.

3.1 Factors Regarding the Relations Between NATO and ESDP

Since Helsinki decisions, attention started to focus on quality of relations between NATO and ESDP. Three reasons were of particular significance. First, the risk that a competitor may emerge; second, effort in creating the ESDP structures; and third, the "unnecessary" in the word "duplicating" could be removed as the European states saw the opportunity in creating its own structures. Five other factors influenced the relations between NATO and ESDP: (1) military and economic cultures; (2) size of armament; (3) European NATO members; (4) military manufacture and trade; and (5) crisis management.

Military and economic cultures. One factor was the progressive decreasing of the WEU role, which in years served as a "buffer" between the NATO and the EU. Issues regarding

defence in the EU, if not solved by NATO, were transferred to WEU. After Helsinki, these buffer zones progressively disappeared.

Armament relations. Since Helsinki, it became clear that NATO and ESDP are going to cooperate and mutually coordinate regarding the military planning. Since some European states started to press the ESDP for “autonomous” capability and creating special planning capabilities, for NATO this was a risk, especially by the need of creating homogenous connection among those operations which EU is not able to undertake and the potential involvement of NATO if the military threat escalates to a point where it must be involved. At the same way, NATO should need to know ESDP intentions regarding operations, in order to assess which military assets may be at disposal.

Decision-making and European alliance in NATO. The development of ESDP institutions raised the question regarding the decision-making, as well as the way in which non-EU NATO members are able to participate in ESDP military operations. Still, the main question is: Does the EU member-states acts as a single community in NATO? The answer may have a practical effect in execution of NATO matters, especially in the North-Atlantic Council working on consensus. Such consensus is based on understanding that no allied state is prepared to give up its right on others to determine the circumstances in which their military forces are put on risks and that, after the consensus is reached, NATO respects its commitments. But, if European alliance in NATO emerges, the way in which the North-Atlantic Council operates will change.

Defence productivity and trade. With ESDP development, several questions arise regarding the European defence industry. First, USA started to call on European states to keep pace with defence industry in order to create mutual partnership. Second, European states started giving bigger significance on assets for production of defence goods. Third, the USA pressure to stabilize European defence expenditures increased Europe’s interest regarding the role of domain defence industries, rather than their assurance from the USA. Fourth, European states acknowledged the need of undertaking efforts for strengthening the industrial and technological defence basis in order to be competitive, dynamic and to improve the industrial defence cooperation. Fifth, defence industrial relations are more and more under influence of the USA military technology *vis-à-vis* European partners.

Crises management. ESDP is designed to function as a CFSP instrument, contrary to NATO being more independent. The Alliance never developed a successful mechanism for crisis management. On the other side ESDP is designed and construct to have responsibilities for crisis management, capacity to confront with the situation from the beginning to the end. The European Council gave the mandate of establishing a mechanism for non-military crisis management and use of non-military instruments in order to coordinate and make more efficient the civilian measures and resources at the disposal of the EU and its member-states. This should not be seen as a challenge to NATO, but rather as a peak of own lack of competence.

3.2 Developing Consultations and Improvement of Relations

EU in Santa Maria de Feira established formal arrangements for dialog, consultations and cooperation in crisis management, keeping its decision-making autonomy. The exchanges with European non-EU NATO members are realizing on the basis of nature and function of EU-led operations, using NATO assets and capabilities. In periods with no crisis there shall be two meetings during each EU presidency, as well as two meetings with non-EU NATO member-states. In addition, two phases distinguish in times of crisis: in pre-operational phase, dialog and consultations are intensive on all levels, by the time Council decision is made. If the possibility for use of NATO's assets and capabilities is considered, attention is put on consultations with European non-EU NATO member-states. During operational phase, European non-EU NATO member-states may participate in operations if there is a will and if NATO's assets and capabilities are being used. In case when assets and capabilities are not included, they may be invited to participate by Council decision.

The Nice Summit signaled the determination of member-states for making the necessary effort regarding the improvement of their operational capabilities, especially in areas where European states rely on NATO. The Summit underlined the cooperation build with NATO on principles of consultation, cooperation and transparency, as well as the modalities for EU access to NATO's assets and capabilities. In one of the Presidency conclusion annexes, EU member-states draw out a distinction between situations where and where not the NATO's assets and capabilities are going to be involved. In the first case, non-EU NATO members are involved, according NATO procedures. But, in the second case, where non-NATO EU members are invited to participate, they may dispatch liaison officers for information exchange and operational planning. Such formulation had particular implications for non-EU NATO members with Turkey being most offended by the sense of expulsion from EU membership. Without full engagement, Turkey may find in a position where an operation is executing in its neighbour, attacking its interests, but with no possibility for active participation in all phases.

Since then, the relations rapidly improved, at the same time seeking means for resolving the key opened issues during meetings between the North-Atlantic Council and the PSC.¹⁰ The ambassadors of the two institutions are meeting six times a year, and foreign ministers two times a year. Regarding the role non-EU NATO members played in the ESDP process, it is agreed that NATO shall work with consensus, and PSC rely on decisions when some of the non-EU NATO members interests are involved; meaning no mission without consensus.

Further improvements were reached in formal and informal efforts for resolving the remaining issues. These issues included: importance in strengthening European military

¹⁰ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, (Budapest: NATO, May 29, 2001); Goteborg European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, (Brussels: Council of EU, June 11, 2001).

capabilities for NATO missions and EU-led operations where the Alliance is not engaged; value on non-European allies forces; bilateral meetings with non-European allies forces for confirmation and evaluation of the contribution in the European crisis management; EU's acknowledge for the need of capabilities improvement; strengthening the nature of EU's Headline Goal; and consultations between EU and non-EU NATO member-states. Improvements were also made in following areas: EU secures the access to NATO's operational planning, access to NATO's assets; identification of EU's command options for fully and efficient undertaking of its responsibilities; and adaptation to NATO's defence planning. Also, institutional concerns reflected the reality that most of the EU member-states are NATO allies and that the NATO decisions are adopted as long as there is a consensus. This illustrates the overlay membership value and international consultations; a pressure to reach agreement in EU and the formal consensus in NATO.

3.3 Proposals for Mutual Problems

NATO first. A full European commitment is needed on the principle "where NATO as a whole is not engaged" and political processes needs to develop in order to secure that there shall be no doubts about this point or regarding NATO's capability at the beginning of the crisis. Most of the European states shall consider this as an implication of "NATO first", but it is important for maintaining NATO's cohesion.

Shared risks/shared effort. A confirmation for NATO's main principle that risks should be shared among allies is needed; and that there should be no share of efforts between NATO and ESDP or implicitly regarding some allies. The avoidance of sharing efforts is not only what EU member-states are doing regarding ESDP, but also the USA's will is critical for engagement in operations falling under NATO's article 5.

Cooperative planning. Defence planning methods should be common and compatible, meaning unique set of processes. Cooperation should include mutual planning, governed by NATO, with full participation of the EUPM. Furthermore, military logic instructs need of just one methodology, regarding command, control, communications and intelligence. At the same time, EU should select potential command arrangement before the crises occur.

Defence expenditures and capabilities. European governments should dedicate themselves on higher defence expenditures. Emphasis should be put on production, capabilities and interoperability, not only as a issue of mutual relations, but also as a critical issue for NATO as a whole, and allies should avoid duplication of NATO's assets available for ESDP.

Interoperability. EU through ESDP needs to focus its force modernization on interoperability with NATO. It is particularly critical not to develop two sets of interoperability,

leading to implicit division of labour among allies. Furthermore, interoperability is critical if USA expects to be capable for execution of military operations with the allies outside of Europe, whether formally through NATO or as coalition of will. NATO with double technology may not be able to execute operations out of area covered by article 5.

NATO's crisis management. NATO should develop means to connect with the crisis management mechanism, along with ESDP relations. Also, priority arrangement is needed that the NATO-EU dialog shall be deepen, wide, gradual and effective on all levels for every future crisis that may affect both institutions. If the crises occur suddenly, most likely there shall be numerous informal exchanges and consultations between NATO and ESDP, in frame of their bureaucracies and bilaterally with other governments. Even with NATO-ESDP cooperation, doubts whether USA shall be willing to share risks with other allies in peace-keeping missions creates worries regarding NATO's capacity to operate as a effective crisis management actor.

Political and strategic dialogs. There should be political and military dialog on all levels between ESDP and NATO and member-states. Quality dialog on this issue is significant if the share of labour and risk do not become too irritating in mutual relations. Wrong evaluation of USA's pressure for share of labour with European states may be interpreted, not as an effort for consolidation of NATO, but as stimulation for the increase of ESDP's role and influence.

Managing rhetoric and ambitions. EU must practice limitations and clarity in its rhetoric about what ESDP is. There is a risk that ESDP declarations might be taken for granted and start to believe that USA might do much less military in Europe, than the actual ESDP capabilities would guarantee. It is of significant importance that those EU member-states, mostly concerned with trans-Atlantic relation, to secure that the decision-making autonomy and acting through ESDP is not going to be the central focus of the European pillar, but it is to be held in perspective regarding other security purposes.

Defence cooperation. Effective NATO-EU dialog should be developed on defence cooperation among governments and needs to focus on five principles: (1) mutual NATO-EU market; (2) exchange of defence high technology; (3) developing common standards and measures for protection; (4) emphasizing interoperability for defence cooperation; and (5) securing new technologies in order to allow compatibility with NATO's military equipment.

Use of military force and leadership. Continual strategic dialog in NATO needs to exist about military capabilities and defence expenditures. The latter suggestion in a way is harder to implement, but in a long-term probably the most important for NATO's future and ESDP development. For NATO and ESDP, building, training, sustainability and deployment of military forces must be connected with the expectations. For democracies to continue on spending significant funds on defence, strategic analysis, political vision and dialog among states and institutions are necessary.

4. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL STEPS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF CAPABILITIES

Europe must cope with all kinds of crisis and to be prepared to accept higher risks for deployment forces, if speed is not of key importance and if no competing military priorities exists. If European states are able to accept casualties and collateral damage and if political consensus is build for deployment forces, then Europe may have great role on international scene. If USA's high war intensity is the unique standard, if risks are to be kept on minimum and if high level is needed for sustaining the public support, then Europe may face with greater challenges. Greatest potential for increase of capabilities lies in following areas: conflict prevention and crisis management, strengthening strategic decision-making, expansion of international contact points and intelligence coordination. On the other side, three main issues shall be decisive in defying the ESDP's success: creating political will, promoting partnership with NATO and capabilities development.

Conflict prevention and crisis management. The two threats ESDP is facing are the failure to act successfully and the noninvolment of European key actors. European states may have difficulties in decision-making process during crisis development regarding the kind and the best way to cope with it. If EU should decide to undertake a military operation means that the conflict prevention was unsuccessful. The second threat potentially may have more serious and long term consequences than the failure. Mass recesions, collapse of euro or mass unemployment contribute for the political attention to be far away from ESDP and influence on defence budgets, building capabilities and crisis management aspects.

Strengthening the European strategic decision-making. Ideally, one body should coordinate all ESDP elements and external relations with states in potentially crisis areas. Only when crisis management assets are connected, the conflict prevention is going to be successful. Such body needs to include the long-term capabilities development, defence-industrial cooperation, police coordination, as well as to coordinate crisis management and intelligence, bilateral military cooperation non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and arms trafficking.

Expansion of international contact points. EU's external official should expand its international contact points by establishing connections with international organizations (UN, OSCE and NATO) and needs to be infromed on all CFSP and ESDP issues and be able to contribute. On EU-USA realtions must be given priority, and although priorities and principles may vary, EU member-states should not hide anything from USA and vice versa.

Establishing intelligence coordination. Whatever activity is undertaken by ESDP in the pre-crisis or crisis phase, intelligence for strategic decision-making is of highest importance. Whether EU-NATO or EU-USA engagement needs coordination or wheter it is a matter of

autonomous EU operation, EU bodies and member-states should be able to undertake decisions based on their own assessments. EU intelligence is needed on two levels - strategic decision and operational level - and for two reasons - long-term conflict prevention and active crisis management. Common European intelligence capabilities are important step towards more effective strategic decision-making for conflict prevention and crisis management.

Creating political will. ESDP is not going to show any progress if not supported by strong political will. The most contemporary crisis are not a direct threat for the territorial integrity or survival of European states and actual cure is not always easy to discover. Such approach makes possibilities for further development of common European views on crisis management. Whether with persuasion or because their security has smaller value for several decades, European states, most probably, are not willing to become more militaristic on short or middle term. This does not mean that they lack of actual military culture. In some way, EU is step forward than NATO. Despite its imperfections and flaws, no other international organization have so many tools, military and civilian, essential for peace-building and peace-keeping. Certainly that there are differences in member-states interests and visions, but ESDP is not facing with some of the acute dilemmas, since its implemented only "out of area".

Practical approach towards cooperation with USA and NATO. EU-NATO cooperation needs not only a formal agreement on the political front, but also a strategic compatibility and practical arrangements, identification of common strategic goals, compatible procedures and priorities of highest political level. The alternative for close EU-NATO cooperation is in accentuating, principally, EU-USA relations. With wide specter of security elements, EU may become more important partner for USA then the more limited and focused European pillar in NATO. In addition, there are missions EU is willing to undertake through ESDP in which USA is not showing particular appetite. On one side, these include operations where EU has the advantage because of its capability for mobilizing non-military elements, and on other side, resolving conflicts in its neighborhood. The danger is conducting ESDP operations that might undermine NATO's success, because there is only one set of forces.

Development of defence and operational planning. EU is willing to strengthen its planning capabilities and develop its own planning process, essential for preparation and conducting ESDP missions and operations. EU's defence planning, connected with military and non-military capabilities, may play great role in increasing European capabilities.

Capabilities development. Lisbon Treaty help in improvement of capabilities, not only for ESDP, but also for NATO. ESDP should be equipped with structures that may go further than the already designated ones and to enable produce desirous results. Capabilities should be available and prepared when necessary to confront with the increasing security challenges. EU should develop defence technological and industrial base, having in mind the fact that the majority of operations and missions do not require most developed technology equipment.

Finally, EU may face with situations where some member-states cooperate in the area of military capabilities, while other prefer to continue focusing on the civilian front. Cooperation and mechanisms should be elaborated in order to secure interoperability between civilian and military mission components and not to undermine the effectiveness of overall EU approach.

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