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*National security and contribution to global security **

The program for defence and national security will continue to embody the standards and principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. Among its core values, national security constitutes the foundation for a democratic development and a genuine economic growth of the country.

The reform of the armed forces, in line with NATO standards, will aim to increase the level of professionalism, depoliticization, dignity and integrity, by transforming it into an active force in the country's service and a dignified force for the standards of the Alliance's member countries.

Key steps for meeting these objectives will commence with the institutional commitment to the preparation of the National Strategy Document. Not reviewed since 2004, this important document will be drafted in accordance with the new security environment, and based on the "New Strategic Concept" of Alliance, 2010. After the approval in Parliament, the government will prepare a new document Military Strategy to realize the conformity of the national level ambitions, with financial resources in the field of defence, provided already in the Strategic Defence Review document.

Government will enable a deep reform in the Armed Forces in doctrinal, conceptual and structural terms, in order to enhance professionalism, to depoliticize the structures and to strengthen the fight against corruption.

A solid platform will be prepared to increase cooperation with NATO member and partner countries, in order to provide their greater support in meeting the required standards and the implementation of our contribution to collective defence and peacekeeping missions led by the Alliance.

Government will draft a Medium-term and Long term Development plan of the Armed Forces for the period 2013-2020. The aim of the formulation and implementation of long-term development plan will be:

- Establishing a new organizational structure of the Armed Forces, by gradually reducing the current personnel number;

* Excerpt from the Government Program 2013-2017, "Alliance of European Albania", on Defence, Tirana 2013.

- Review the entire system of education and training of the Armed Forces, in order to prepare professional soldiers, NCOs, and staff officer corps of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the new needs of the force structure.

Attainment of the operational readiness group of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion and Special Operations Land Forces Group will be of priority, thereby fulfilling its obligations to NATO's military capabilities, required for collective defence and peacekeeping operations.

We will review the legal framework that regulates the activity of the Armed Forces. At the core of this review will be the improvement of the status of Military, restoration of the trampled dignity and increase of their confidence in the state.

Review of the legal framework for improving the financial treatment of active military is a necessity for keeping and attracting quality human resources in the Armed Forces for the future, but also for decent treatment of the retired and reserve military.

*Incarnation of Strategic Partnership with USA in NATO front **

Edi Rama
Prime Minister of Albania

In this environment, where more than elsewhere, strict application of the rule is a fundamental part of the work and discipline is the first condition for the realization of its major objective, the protection of life of citizens and our common Fatherland, I had no desire at all to break the rule, even the basic one, the protocol procedures. But in my first visit in the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the as Prime Minister, above all I want to honour the work, efforts and sacrifices of our soldiers and along with that, undoubtedly and inseparably, the work and the high sense of responsibility of everyone in the chain of command of the Armed Forces who has done his best for Albania in NATO.

Armed Forces are an indispensable bridge that inextricably links our country with NATO. Through this bridge, Albania has joined its future destiny, today's weapons and blood of the youngest generation with the alliance of countries that make up their daily lives on the priceless values of peace, freedom and democracy.

I feel obliged to highlight from this square that freedom, peace and security that Albania enjoys today, as a NATO country, are neither given once and forever nor are they natural benefits like the sun, water or air. Nowadays they stand on the basis of the road for every NATO country, thanks to a dignified service from the military people, who with their dedication and discipline serve to peace and freedom, not only at home, but also in the battle fronts far from their country.

The Albanian people owe gratitude to each of you. On the other hand, the Albanian government owes to each of you its full attention and support, on behalf of Albania and of every Albanian.

Selection of the New Chief of Staff, who I have the honour to greet today in front of you, is carried out with a special care, in order to give you the most comprehensive

*Speech delivered at the Training and Doctrine Command, on the occasion of the presentation of the new Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Major General J. Bazo.

support, and through his figure guarantee you a leadership of high professionalism and integrity.

I believe that General Jeronim Bazo, with his good values, completed education, long experience and salient dedication that characterizes his career, without any doubt, will accomplish this new task in the best way. He will be a crucial collaborator in the further transformation of the Armed Forces and an infallible interpreter of the major role of these forces in the joint front of NATO battle for a better and more secure world.

Our government gives special prominence to the strategic partnership with the United States. Incarnation of this partnership in NATO front, from the trenches of Iraq and Afghanistan, to the attempt to disarm without war the murderous regime in Syria is not only inalienable obligation, but also a source of pride for us Albanians. Therefore, we will never and for whatever reason forget that through this partnership and above all, thanks to the United States, as a friend and the biggest ally of Albanians, Albanians are better off today than ever before, wherever they live in our region. But, at the same time, our government pays special attention to efficiently and rapidly advancing of the overall reform in the Armed Forces, which, in compliance with the recommendations of Strategic Review of Defence, will include the organizational restructuring, education system, education and training of the Armed Forces, enhancement of efficiency and operational capacities in dealing with civil emergencies; qualitative accomplishment of our obligations in the framework of collective defence embodied in the objectives of capacity building.

Having a clear view of the inherent problems and being aware of current difficulties the country is undergoing, the Government will make every effort to create the necessary conditions for the AF to successfully perform this profound process of reforms. Through a wide and deep program, we will review some of the key strategic documents of the country and the Armed Forces, and will modernize the legal basis of the Armed Forces. The purpose of this process, of this ongoing comprehensive reform will be raising the Armed Forces at the level of expectations of the Albanian people and NATO alliance.

Albania not only needs a thoroughly modern force, but it can and will have such a force. Manifestations of corruption at the highest level of leadership or other shortcomings identified to date belong to the past.

We will try hard to meet the high obligations we have toward allies, we will make efforts to raise the social usefulness of AF at a higher level.

The government will create the possibilities for the Armed Forces to rise at a higher level of professionalism and readiness so that they take over possible a broader range of obligations for the benefit of the citizens of this country, as in the cases of emergencies or disasters, as well other necessary services for the public good.

While speaking about the future work and obligations in the following years, I cannot forget to greet the Armed Forces for what they have achieved so far, in co-operation with previous governments. Making use of the opportunity I would like to underline not only the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, led by NATO, but also the operations

led by KFOR in Kosovo or ALTEA operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by EU.

Our country is firmly entering the path of a comprehensive renovation, which certainly is not easy, but we will carry every kind of weight, we will face every kind of difficulty and we will rely on each friend and partner given that it can be achieved. Fortunately, we are not alone. We are a member of a family of values and large capacities, the Euro-Atlantic family. Our being part of this family, facilitates the carrying of this great burden of the necessary change that we should and will bring together.

There is no doubt that the Armed Forces will be one of the bastions of success for the versatile modernization of Albania, which thanks to these forces, will continuously be a process of active participation in every effort of the Euro-Atlantic family for a better and more secure world.

Your profession is the profession of honour. If for many other groups of occupations, honour is a high and required virtue, for the military it is part of the job description. If certain crafts have honour as something required, for the military honour is the profession itself. It is that criterion and force that motivates the military to serve with sacrifices that know no limits and who often surprise everyone else by going beyond limits.

To establish and maintain an army relying on honour, at least two conditions should be met. First, the military itself should place the code of honour in its flag. It should make every effort to recruit those citizens of this country who consider honour as something sacred and further, it must ensure the conditions that honour remains the highest norm that regulates the military life in the Armed Forces. Second, the society itself should always appraise as higher as possible its army by highly respecting the members of the Armed Forces.

Albania's government will make all its efforts to treat Armed Forces with the deserved honour. Our army will definitely have the deserved uniforms, a decent financial treatment, the necessary equipment and systems to successfully fulfil its high mission in a constant way. We will make every effort that the fair and equal treatment of the military people, equal opportunities for education and training, equal opportunities for a fair career based on merit, become a tangible reality for every member of the Armed Forces.

Appointment of the new Chief of Staff based on these values and principles, is the first signal that we are giving to all members of the Armed Forces for the unwavering will that the hierarchy in the Armed Forces should be constituted on merit and only on merit of each member of these forces.

The Armed Forces of our country do not represent only military organization that consists of the active military of this country. A very big army, even bigger, of military people in reserve and veterans, naturally identify themselves with the Armed Forces. This honourable community of patriots and professionals deserves much more attention and esteem from state and society, not only for what they have given to this country, but also for the sake of what they can and should contribute for the country in the future.

Incarnation of Strategic Partnership with USA in NATO front _____

Their professionalism, patriotism and readiness represent a tremendous potential, which can and must put at the service of our country and society. We are determined to do the utmost to achieve this.

The government will take all the necessary steps to institutionalize and create the necessary legal and organizational mechanisms that will enable a greater contribution of the retired military and veterans for the benefit of the country's Armed Forces.

Let's work together to create a new synergy for the Armed Forces, defence and security of the country, as well as our contribution to regional security and beyond, being convinced that success is in the hands of each of us. As of today, and here, more than in any other place everyone should feel and convey the limitless devotion to Albania.

*National Security Policy for the Review of the Strategic Defence **

Mimi Kodheli
Minister of Defence

Janusz Bugajski: How would you summarize the Albania's national security policy? In other words, very basically, what are the threats, the challenges, the forced postures and capabilities?

Minister Kodheli: Albania became a NATO member in April 2009 and this event marks our history the same as it marks our future. This event constitutes a fundamental shift from an individual defence and security strategy to a collective strategy. We used to have a big army in the area of communism, large properties, a great number compared to number of inhabitants, and a huge amount of surplus ammunitions. This affects the way the Albanian army would like to be transformed and is going to be transformed, by respecting and meeting the NATO obligations, NATO strategy and by fulfilling our national security strategy, the security of our country, protection policy of our civilians, our heritage, and of course, the way we are supporting the Balkans countries to be part of NATO. As you know, only Croatia is a member at this moment, and of course we support Kosovo in having another way of transforming through the same path of becoming a NATO and EU member, and altogether have a safe, secure and democratic region, and why not a global one.

We are a NATO member today and we have lot of obligations to fulfil. We have already combat troops in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF program and we are going to support the Afghan security forces to defend their weak democracy and their citizens in the nearest future. We have been earlier just supporters to the combat brigades or battalions, now we are in the first front line and later on, we, as Albanian troops, will support the Afghan security forces. These are very good steps, through a more efficient, well-prepared and professional army, as the Albanian army would like to be in the nearest future. We have some special troops, we have done modernizations and we are trying to depoliticize the army, but this process is not something we can do just

* Interview at "Bugajski Hour", in Albanian Screen TV, October 2013.

like this. The Ministry of Defence under the Rama Government is going to work on different directions to make things function better, and to assure that the Albanian citizens can be protected more than before, that they can and be supported and in this case, the democracy and the rule of law can function better, and the future of their children can be a better one. Ministry of Defence and the Albanian Government policies are part of this context. We have to lead this process.

Janusz Bugajski: I wanted to go on to the bigger NATO question including post Afghanistan in a few minutes but let me ask you specifically about the Strategic Defence Review that was concluded last year. The next plan is of course the plan of implementation by the Defence Ministry. What is the plan, and I suppose very important is how it would be affected by the defence budget. The financial situation as you know in your government case is not very healthy. How would this affect the implementation of the Defence Strategy?

Minister Kodheli: The SDR was approved in Parliament this year. This is a very strategic paper and based on it we are going to build our national defence strategy. But of course, we need some money to implement it, and this is not the best of the periods financially speaking. On the contrary! I am an economist and finance by background, so I know what I am talking about more than other people do. Yes! We have found one of the worst scenarios Albania has ever been in the last two decades.

The worst one was in the year 1997 during the pyramid schemes, and the other one I think is this one. I have seen the data, and at the end of the year we are going to have less and less revenue, from 25.3 % of the GDP, to 23.8, and this is a big amount of money. This means that we will have cuts all around and this will affect the Ministry of Defence, but not for that we are going to fulfil the NATO obligations and the important thing is to have good ratios when we are preparing budget, personnel obligations in salaries and payments, implementations of maintenance and operations, and other expenditures, and for sure we will help the Albanian army and the Ministry of Defence to fulfil and to fully respect the Strategic Defence Review which is a very important aspect not only of military politics, but of foreign policy as well. We will try hard to cut expenditures which we don't need in order to use in an efficient way the money we have. The last but not least, on the contrary, it is the most important, to fight corruption.

Janusz Bugajski: I was going to ask you about this.

Minister Kodheli: We are fully involved in this budgeting period. Thanks God I do have some very good colleagues who are very good experts on that, and me myself, which is not necessary a ministers' duty, but I am going to check it myself, because of all these reasons, which I was trying to explain. This is very important, because we need to meet some obligations, and one of them is that our troops has to be modernized, has to be supported and modernized, and should be supported with modern equipment, and I am talking about troops who in general are prepared to go to Afghanistan, but who are going to other peacekeeping missions as well.

Janusz Bugajski: They have to be improved into interoperable troops.

Minister Kodheli: Of course. So we need to be in the same level, to have the same

preparation, equipment and all the stuff that they need. There is some expenditure that we have to do, but we can do it to the best of our ways. We are here to do that, because people gave us their vote to do it in a better way and this is one of the things that we are going to show to them. With less money we can make it.

Janusz Bugajski: Europe and America face the same problem. Less budget more streamlining, more efficient defence ministries and military network. Albania is not alone in this struggle I suppose. Let me ask you specifically, when you were in opposition, the Socialists criticized the then Defence Minister on questions of corruption on military property transfers and so on. There was one specific question which was the Central Army House which was given to the Democratic Party after the elections. What's going to happen with such questions as this one I mentioned?

Minister Kodheli: Well, as I mentioned, before, the army owned many properties before, and some were in very nice places, or in delicate strategic parts of Albania and also in the centre of Tirana. We had a very big discussion when we were in opposition, not only how these properties were treated, but on all the corruption process, when they were given as gifts or they were sold out, or when they were put in auction. So it is going to be a big discussion, and we are going to check one by one all the cases certainly by auditing and inspecting them, and at the end of the story, I am sure that transparency can happen nowadays. We will show people, we will show citizens that their properties, since they are common properties, are used by the right persons or by the wrong persons, are sold in the right way or in the wrong way, they if they are donated or are they sold, if they are considered as common properties or as properties of the government which is a big difference, if the properties are ours or they belong to the government. They always have to be ours.

So you have to be really transparent when you move the ownership from one side to the other side, and in this specific case. In principle, I am not against the fact that a common property will go from Ministry of Defence to another public organization which is the case of a party. The problem is procedures. The problem is transparency. So this is the most important thing. If there are no procedures, if there is no transparency, if there is no law enforcing these procedures, if everything is against law, illegal, we do have a big problem. And we had big discussion, even before I went to the office, it was focused on this. Why did they have to have such big walls between themselves and the public, between themselves and the media, between themselves and the people who are interested to know that these properties are not sold out as pieces of cakes, or that they are not sold for very personal interest but are sold for common interest, which in the end of the day is where we have to focus on, the common interest.

Janusz Bugajski: Allow me to ask you a related question on corruption which is politicization. Would you say that the Albanian army is wholly depoliticized according to NATO standards?

Minister Kodheli: Not at all. On the contrary.

Janusz Bugajski: Could you explain?

Minister Kodheli: Look, we would need more than an hour to elaborate, but I will

try to be brief. In the Armed Forces (AF) and Ministry of Defence there was lot of pressure regarding the fact that “if you don’t vote for Democratic Party (DP), you are not like us”. It can’t be like this. We will stop this once and for all. Army is army. It exists to defend the integrity of Albania, to defend democracy of Albania, to defend the property of the citizens, to defend everything; this is for the best of our future. So it is not there to show if they have voted SP or DP or other parties.

There is a lot of corruption not only when we discuss about properties or when we discuss on tenders or auctions or any economic activity that the Ministry of Defence has inside of it, but also when we talk careers which is another topic that we are going to face I am still facing even nowadays. Just to say one, my predecessor, put some more stars in the shoulders of some generals or colonels of the Albanian Army in the month of May, one month before the elections, and by law the process had to finish in September.

Janusz Bugajski: In the previous September.

Minister Kodheli: No, in this September. So they just hurried up to put some more stars in somebody’s career, just to have some more votes because I can’t find any other reason. And this is not the only thing that I am facing with. There are too many things. There is a big “but” in this case. Lucky us to have within the Albanian Army and in the Ministry of Defence even professionals and good people who respect the law, the constitution and of all the procedures. So in this case there are still some well-prepared civil servants or military people that maintain as they have to, the Albanian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence.

In this case I hope it will not be easy but there is lot of work to be done. Something that I have to mention is the fact that corruption has affected the Intelligence Service as well, and very negatively. There are confidential relations between the intelligence service within the NATO members and if someone outside learns that there is lot of corruption over there, then there might be a very dangerous and big problem. Thus the agency that is dealing with the Intelligence Services within the Ministry of Defence is to be reorganized and restructured according to the NATO standards and fighting corruption will become a much better and affective service.

Janusz Bugajski: You have a lot on your plate during over the next term in office. Let me turn now to the NATO question. You mentioned already Albania’s role in Afghanistan and the plans after making the withdrawal.

Minister Kodheli: Yes in 2014.

Janusz Bugajski: Exactly in the next year. Could you sort of give us an overview of what’s Albania’s contribution to the Alliance, including Afghanistan but also in other missions and in other combat theatres.

Minister Kodheli: We are a modest army, but during these years we served with 5.000 troops all around the world. It is a big number compared with the number of the army we have, compared with the number of citizens!

Janusz Bugajski: Even some older NATO members contribute proportionally the same as you.

Minister Kodheli: There is more than that. Our troops are among the best troops that have been in the front over there. So this is now good news for us. But not the only one, we have been in peacekeeping mission as well and combating in the first line of front and of course we have lot of thing to do, otherwise try to improve our strategy within the NATO strategy. Something that is very important and I would like to stress is that role of Albania in general, politically speaking and role of Albanian Army in Balkans is a very important role. We are trying to support countries which would like to be part of NATO in the future, such as Montenegro, Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of course to support the new path that Brussels opened with the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, which undoubtedly will open new perspectives for the region in general, and a new perspective for all of us. Because we know our target and our target are EU and Euro-Atlantic structures.

All of us have to work together and Albania is a big help and a big support of all the countries which are not yet in NATO, but all the countries have to be a big support for Albania in the walking in the EU path. The region now is safer, and we have to take advantage of this situation, something that would help us a lot, all of us. This is very important because we have a very constructive role as Albanians in the region. This is a very important role. It is going to be a much bigger support within NATO, so I think that strategically speaking, this is very important for all of us, and of course we have to meet all the NATO obligations that we do have as a NATO member. But of course in the say way we have to force the function of democracy within our country and which will help us having a safer country, more foreign investors coming to Albania, more prosperity and having better economic results, which in this period of financial crises is really one of the biggest issues we are facing.

Janusz Bugajski: Right. You mentioned Albania's neighbourhood, and let's stick now to the next NATO Summit in London in 2014, which should be an enlarging summit. There are many conferences, many debates over this question Do you believe that any country has been qualified for the next country if there was to be a next round in the next Summit?

Minister Kodheli: Well, look at my country. My country is a wonderful example of how a small country can be a NATO member. The agenda of the summit hasn't been published yet, but there are lots of opportunities that other countries can be part of NATO. I think that in the London Summit we are going to discuss the successes that the NATO members have achieved already, the position of the NATO members in Afghanistan, because a mission is going to end.

Janusz Bugajski: The mission is going to end.

Minister Kodheli: Yes. Another one is going to start. I think that this is going to be one of the discussions and of course why not enlargement! NATO has the "opened door policy", all of us, but of course other nations have to face with the strong requirements of NATO as well. These strong requirements need to be fully fulfilled, otherwise I see enlargement as a question that is going to be postponed.

Janusz Bugajski: But enlargement has been a big impetus of NATO in the past 20 years, particularly for the Central European and the Balkan states. In terms of

qualifying for NATO, would you say that Montenegro and Macedonia and the others are qualified to enter? Do they now have the level that Albania had when it was invited?

Minister Kodheli: Good question. I don't know if my answer is going to be a good one, but what I know for sure is the fact that, yes, maybe they have fulfilled most of the NATO requirements, but there are some political questions that are involved in this process. Macedonia has the problem of the name. Montenegro has some other political problems which are involved in their NATO path. After solving them, I am pretty sure that they are going to be part of NATO. That's for sure. So it's not only a question of the technical issues to be resolved, but political ones as well. That's why Balkans is now living in a very safe environment but not in the environment we would like to have. Without solving some problems between us, I don't think that this will be an easy task to be reached.

Janusz Bugajski: Right. You know that there is a big debate both, in Washington and in Europe about the future of NATO. What is the purpose of the Alliance after the most troops come home after completing the Afghan mission, the question of how successful and how out of the area should NATO be, should it focus more on its core mission or in other words mutual defence? What is your viewpoint? What is the future of NATO?

Minister Kodheli: Well, the threats to democracy have changed their face. Now we can still discuss the missile defence or chemical weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, energy security, terrorism and all this kinds of threats which change dimensions, their nature, the ways they are threatening our democracies, the weak and the strong ones. I think that NATO has to be prepared for these new changes, these new threats. Hence, NATO will be still there working and focusing on these issues, as far as these threats are going to exist. NATO members and NATO itself as an organization has to be prepared and prepare civilians and military troops for a good defence. This is very important for all of us.

Janusz Bugajski: Going back to the enlargement question, I think this is linked with what you are saying. The initial mission of the transatlantic strategic relationship after the Cold War was to make Europe whole, free and in peace. Europe is not yet whole, free and in peace, there are parts of the puzzle not only in the Balkans but also in the Eastern Europe which haven't been included either in NATO or in the European Union. How do you see this? I mean is Albania the Albanian Government is committed to include all the European states once they qualify, including Ukraine, Georgia and other countries.

Minister Kodheli: Why not? I think it's good. We will play our small and intensive part, in trying to have more nations and states included in this big organization which is build up since the beginning as you said, since the creation of the Atlantic Treaty in the distant 1949, as an organization to keep peace, security and prosperity for democratic countries. This is very important; to Europe this is particularly important. I think that many of the countries are well-prepared to make steps in the right direction. Of course there are some political issues that we have to face on this path, and one of them of course is the former Soviet Union countries which have their own scenarios

and their own environment in that part of the world. I would be happy to have more and more countries within the NATO, countries having the capacities. This might be an easy way to combat threats whenever they will emerge. This is good. I think this is good.

Janusz Bugajski: Do you think NATO should intervene?

Minister Kodheli: I think that the first step was a good one. So moving chemical mass destruction weapons from the places where they are so that nobody has a chance to use them, it's a good step. It's the first step, a weak one but it's a very good one. Then we'll see.

Janusz Bugajski: Well there is a whole question if NATO or a part of NATO within the Alliance should be involved in civil wars, in active democracy promotion which is called in some parts of the world. What is the Albania's position?

Minister Kodheli: If we are fighting for democracy, we have to do it. They way you do it might be different in different places and different times, but fighting for democracy its worth. Because democracy means lot of things: it means security for the future, means good economy and prosperity for all of us. I am for democracy. The way we are going to find one country's democracy or one country's safeness, it depends. So in this case, as I mentioned, it would be a good thing to destroy all kind of chemical weapons, Secondly, we are going to sit and discuss, and maybe find another solution without having a military intervention. This most probably is going to be a good way of doing things. We will see. It depends on the reaction of the Assad Government and not only. Other international factors influence as well.

Janusz Bugajski: Part of the picture in these countries I would say is now black and white, good guys against bad guys; it is not that all of the Assad opponents are model democrats even new democrats. Some of them let us say are authoritarian Islamists, even fascists within the rebel movement. So the question is that innocent people have been murdered. How does NATO intervene or how diplomatically or in other ways, how to rule democrats and prevent civilian slaughters. This is the key issue.

Minister Kodheli: Well, the situation over there is a little bit a complicated one. The problem is that if the democracy is not functional in a country, and if somebody who is leading the country is acting like a dictator, then somebody has to show him that he has to act differently. This is the point. Of course there are different ways of showing it. There are different ways how you can deal with it and can commit, and make agreements with this regime. The best way is to talk to them, and let them understand, that maybe it's time for Syria to have some free elections, to have some more space for pluralism and of course now it's time to stop killing their own people, by using violence against its population and not only. It is time to stop and to show that Syria can make it with the help of NATO of course, and with the help of UN and all the international factors.

Janusz Bugajski: The most important thing is certainly not to be tied with only the chemical weapons, because many more civilians are killed in the conventional weapons. I think we shouldn't submit over a long a period of time presumably the chemical weapons ask for. I personally believe that Russia is protecting this regime

and will continue to do so. This is just a tactic to maintain Assad in power. In terms of the Albania's policy presumably you look at the case to case if there are futures conflicts are there any other conflict where NATO should intervene?

Minister Kodheli: Yes of course, but in any case this is part of the political situation, which might change because of many international events. The Magreb country revolutions have affected our foreign politics and of course the decisions that we make under the NATO decisions. This is a lesson learned for us. It is a big lesson. Things can change dramatically just like this. Thus we need to be prepared. This is very important since Albania is part of the Mediterranean area. We need to have a careful action in all kinds of fields, in the political field in foreign affairs discussions in political and military issues. Certainly by joining the NATO decisions and offers help in all kinds of actions NATO is going to deal with.

Being a small country, we are a very good catalyst of what's happening all around. Albania, due to its geographical and strategic position is just in the border of East and West. We always have been like this. This is good for us because it makes us feel citizens of the world, part of Europe but not only. We have been part of many empires in the history; Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, the Soviet and Chinese, and now we are part of the western democracies. Even we have a fragile democracy within our country, we have to look forward and fight for having a more functional democracy because this is very important, very fundamental.

Janusz Bugajski: Security starts at home. Let me ask you. As you said, I fully agree with you, things can change very rapidly, deteriorate very rapidly. Does that apply to the neighbourhood here? Do you see still any danger in the Balkans region among your neighbours? In other words, can some domestic dispute lead to international crises?

Minister Kodheli: No, I don't see it. On the contrary! Not by chance, NATO and EU ask for pre-assessment before becoming NATO and EU candidates. They have fixed some requirements and one of them is Balkans integration and good neighbourly relations among Balkans countries. This is very important. We have to learn the lesson. I think Balkans have already learned the lesson, because many of our countries within the Balkans came out from a bloody war, and this happened less than 15 years ago, a period which all of us remember very well. In order to look forward, we have to do it together, because we are going to walk the same path, and if we are doing altogether, it is much easier for all of us, to reach our goals. So no, I think the Balkans is a safe region.

Janusz Bugajski: In terms of the Balkans environment, what is your view on this B-6 proposal by Montenegro? In other words, what are the possibilities and limits of regional cooperation? I know some of the neighbouring countries have said "We do not want to create a new Yugoslavia." "We want to be part of Europe, part of NATO. What is your view of this? If it materializes, can it embrace for example sharing of some security assets can it involve some of the common defence questions in the region?

Minister Kodheli: I don't think that a new Yugoslavia is going to be created. Not at all. We would like to be under the same umbrella, the EU umbrella, and maybe of course for sure if we are talking about Balkans, the NATO umbrella as well. This

means that these organizations would be a big help for us and we have also to fulfil some obligations. In order to meet these obligations, certainly we can have regional agreements, string regional relationships, naturally we have to and we can do it. But this is always going to be according to my opinion under those two big umbrellas which are really big enough to embrace us and to take us in one direction and this direction is democracy and free market. So these are the two main topics, democracy and free market. Local or not, Balkan or not, regional or not, we have intense relations among us and we are going to have them in the future. It is normal to have such relations which are economic, but not only,

Janusz Bugajski: But not in new international structures.

Minister Kodheli: Not in new international structures. Not at all.

Janusz Bugajski: One thing I forgot to ask you before when we talked about enlargement. I presume Albania supports Kosovo's membership in NATO as soon as the country qualifies.

Minister Kodheli: Yes. We are going to support them. It's normal to be like this. They have done tremendous steps forward in this direction. I am really happy for them. They are working hardly to meet the requirements and I really hope that they become members as soon as they can.

Janusz Bugajski: How long do you think may this process take?

Minister Kodheli: A little bit, but it is okay. I think that they are doing the right things and this is much more important than how long will take. We are there. But we are not the only ones to support them, in their way. Not at all! There are many other countries in the region and not only. Certainly our main strategic partner which is US is doing its best to support Kosovo as they have done in Albania's case for sure.

Janusz Bugajski: I presume that you would support Serbia's membership in NATO.

Minister Kodheli: Yes of course. It has to be like this. Although Serbia is a partner of NATO, it does not take part in NATO led missions, but I am sure that for their part they will do their best, to walk toward the NATO membership which for them is very important issue and of course NATO membership process as well. I think these issues are for Serbia as important as they are for all the Balkans countries.

Janusz Bugajski: I have another question regarding the neighbours. We will conclude in a couple of minutes. One of the neighbours a question is about the role of Turkey. Albania has a strategic partnership with Turkey. Visit of the Foreign Minister of Turkey here in Tirana. What is your view in relation to the Albanian-Turkish relationships? How important is how strategic?

Minister Kodheli: They are both, important and strategic. Yes, first of all, because Turkey is a NATO member. Secondly, we do have a long history in common. We have millions of Albanians living in Turkey. Yes, Turkey is going to be a strategic partner, not only military speaking, politically speaking but also economically speaking as well. They have been a big support for us in the Ministry of Defence and Albanian Armed Forces is supported by Turks with trainings, with health assistance,

with equipment and this is going to continue because we have a very good relationship with them.

Janusz Bugajski: Let's go a little bit further the field. With this new energy plan, the TAP natural gas pipeline, crossing from Azerbaijan through Anatolia through Greece and to Albania to Europe Does it bring you closer to Caucasus countries particularly to Azerbaijan. Do you see that relationship developing in a positive way?

Minister Kodheli: I see it in a positive way because if something is worth economically speaking, it's always positive. So yes, people can be linked even by a pipe, not only because they have common cultural things, or they don't have to be only neighbours. This is the new technology and this is the new area that we are living which is good. I think for the Albanian economy this will be one of the most important happenings. So we will be all glad to begin with this pipe network and in this case Well I don't know who I have to thank you maybe God that our regions is so rich with gas and all other resources which can help us have a good economic performance and not only. So it is good to have this new friendship if I may call it like this, with the Caucas countries. The more markets you deal with the better is.

Janusz Bugajski: There is more diversity.

Minister Kodheli: There is more diversity, your economic portfolio has, and the better is. So, this is good for Albania as it is for the other countries where the pipe has to pass through.

Janusz Bugajski: And it is good for Azerbaijan. It is good for strategic reasons.

Minister Kodheli: Yes of course! Lucky them to have such kinds of resources with gas and not only. And lucky us to have such a nice geographic position like Albania. And lucky others to have such other nice resources! That's why the diversity makes the world nicer and more beautiful. This must help all of us not in becoming enemies but in becoming in why not friends.

Janusz Bugajski: The very last question Minister Kodheli. How much intensive is the defence cooperation between Albania and United States? Do you see areas which can be enhanced, improved, or developed further, what are the plans of the socialist administration?

Minister Kodheli: I am pretty sure that Rama Government is going to support the idea of having the United States as the biggest and most important strategic partner. USA has helped us a lot in building up strategic defence papers in trying to modernize and restructure the army, in training people, military as well as civilians, in supporting us in Afghanistan missions, in supporting us with equipments of all kinds, in supporting us in the demilitarization process, a support provided through the American Embassy in Tirana. I would like to thank particularly Ambassador Arvizu on that and the Office which is supporting the Ministry of Defence and me in particular "Cubic Team."

We signed a couple of weeks ago a very important agreement with the New Jersey Academic School Our people are going to have very important training over there and be prepared as leaders when they come back, be prepared as good military I

really would like to appreciate all that is done through the American taxpayers money and I would like to assure the Albanian taxpayers that their money is going to be spent in the right way, in an efficient way, not in a abusive way, and in this case transparency is going to be improved. They will have the chance to know much better what the Ministry of Defence is doing, why the Albanian army exists, and why is spending 1.3% of GDP, their money in such a field. Being transparent means lot of things for democracy and this what we are going to do.

Janusz Bugajski: Ok, Minister Kodheli. Thank you very much for your insights. Thank you for joining me in the studio. I am sure we will have you back at some point. Please have some rest you are going to have a very full portfolio.

Minister Kodheli: I will try. Thank You.

*Leadership is built upon trust and trust is built upon honour **

Major General Jeronim Bazo
Chief of General Staff of AAF

I feel honoured and privileged to take the high position of the Chief of General Staff of the Albanian Armed Forces. I accepted this task with humility, hope and determination. By this appointment, I also take the responsibility to lead, plan and prepare the Armed Forces in carrying out their noble mission in the service of the Fatherland and the Constitution, for order and good discipline in the Armed Forces of my country through the best of our capacities and within the limits of available resources. I strongly believe, but I also request the full support of the government, MoD, and all members of the Armed Forces at a time when the wide range of challenges we are facing are associated with training, equipping and modernization of our forces according to NATO standards. The country entrusts his sons and daughters to the Armed Forces, while we owe them guidance, training and the best support possible.

Our common goal is to achieve the highest possible level of individual preparation and practical skills by the entire Armed Forces. I am confident that our people, especially those serving under the uniform of the Armed Forces, have the whole gifts and practical and individual skills to cope with future challenges. Our capacity to participate in operations of coalition level, and participation in the planning and development of military duties or in support of peace, needs a deep analysis and examination, but also for the preparation of integrated modernization plans. As Chief of the General Staff, my main objective will be the inspiration of every member of the Armed Forces with a clear purpose and a burning desire to do the utmost to reach a higher level.

As military, our primary task is to support the needs and requirements of our country in regard to peace and security. Albanian taxpayers pay for the Armed Forces and my intention is to spend this money in the most appropriate way. Thus, as the Chief of

* Speech by Chief of the General Staff, delivered during the visit of Prime Minister of Albania, Mr. Edi Rama, on the occasion of the presentation of the new Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces.

the General Staff, I will take advantage of every opportunity to combine professional training of forces with specific projects, in order to expiate and justify this confidence taxpayers have in AF. We will do this with honesty, transparency and always in compliance with the laws and regulations of our country.

Since 2009, Albania sits as a member with full rights at the Alliance's table, while since October this year, AF finalized the process of full integration into this entity. These achievements are the result of several years of work from all members of the Armed Forces and especially the military leadership over the years, and I take this opportunity to thank them for their contribution and service.

NATO membership requires that we improve our capacities and capabilities to effectively participate in coalition operations. As partners, we must not do less than that. Armed forces have a significant amount of surplus materials, which are not used any more. This is an unbearable burden for our human resources and infrastructure. We will work together to eliminate the excessive materials in a transparent and legal way. We will also need to modernize our forces; however this will be achieved as part of a long-term coherent plan, which takes into account the costs of lifecycle management, requirements for training, maintenance and repair capabilities, and many other management related factors. Our planning will be comprehensive, coordinated and with priorities that will focus on enhancing the capabilities of the Armed Forces. We will also re-evaluate the way all members of the Armed Forces are treated from the moment they enter the Armed Forces until they retire in an honoured way. Political decision, made by Parliament some years ago, to abolish compulsory military service, radically changed the management requirements of the Armed Forces. We will continue to manage human resources in a coherent and permanent way, preparing policies and methods that improve the skills of each member of the Armed Forces.

We will permanently be a vital organization that constantly improves. We will prepare detailed plans for a comprehensive preparation and training of the military, which intend to improve both the quality and real training during all time. I remain confident that with the support of our government and by continuing to work efficiently, our armed forces will reinforce and maintain a high reputation of professionalism in the eyes of our people and the Alliance. In this regard I would like to paraphrase the outstanding leader Churchill who stressed: "Success is not final, failure is not fatal, it is the human courage that makes the difference."

I appreciate your confidence in my appointment as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. I'll take on this responsibility very seriously and I swear in front of you and all members of the Armed Forces that I will put all my strength to meet the requirements of this important post with integrity. Finally, I would say that I belong to that kind of military who strongly believes in the maxim that is taught to young cadets from the fall to serve in the Armed Forces. More or less it's like this: "Leadership is built upon trust and trust is built upon honour!"

SECTION ONE

SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ASSESMENTS

This is a permanent section of the Military Review, addressing a wide range of topics on security and defence.

Military leadership is approached from the globalization perspective. So far, the research is mainly characterized by focusing on tactical and technical level, while strategic insights are scarce. No frequently, a research is focused on military leadership to date. This fact makes us understand how little was the attention given to the most important military topic, such as leadership. Based on his long experience in various management positions in the Armed Forces, Brigadier General, PhD. Sandër Lleshi gives some insights on military leadership trying to give an answer to the question, what is the specific share of the human role in the success of a military structure. Basically this is the central question that his paper seeks to approach.

In today's democratic society, one of the inherent features of a leader and the constructive leadership is the responsibility, understood as responsibility towards the followers for honest leadership, in order to protect their interests and the fulfilment of the major goals of the community and society.

The mix and method regarding how hard and soft security policies are implemented in times of crisis and conflict, are still contentious issues. There is a substantive amount of discussion among scholars and experts on how to make the best use of these policies. The common denominator in such discussions seems to be that the elements of soft security are of a rather preventive nature and best employed to reinstitute stability and introduce normalcy in afflicted areas-emphasises Brigadier General Bardhyl Hoxha in his paper.

According to the researcher's opinion of PhD. Jaup Zenuni, it seems as if public diplomacy is not connected with the Armed Forces. *Such an approach is not only outdated but also counterproductive because in the context of the battle "to win hearts and minds", which constitutes one of the pillars of "soft power", the AF today conduct an asymmetric war which requires the contribution of public diplomacy in their activity.*

Language is not only a major defining characteristic of the political identity of individuals, groups or states, but also the most natural element of political behaviour. The use and spread of languages constitutes a reliable indicator of geopolitical processes.

In this section, do not remain out of the focus, researchers coming from the regional countries, such as Colonel PhD. Metohija Dojcinovski, from Macedonia, participant at the Senior Course on Security and Defence Studies.

Military leadership in the age of globalization

Brigadier General PhD. Sandër Lleshi
Prime Minister's Security Advisor

Short commentary. *The idea for a thorough research on military leadership has motivated the author of this paper for a long time. The abundance of world literature and the almost complete absence of Albanian literature on this field represent an abnormality that deserves attention.*

There is almost no Albanian systematized research in the field of military leadership. Even the efforts made in the recent decades to encourage the reliable research in this field have not changed the situation. The recent scientific work has been focused on other topics, leaving the military leadership out of the focus of the scholars.

Out of 110 doctoral dissertations, conducted at the Defence Academy since the beginning of 1982 until 2010, or 18-20% of them belong to military history, 18-20 % have focused on operations and 15-17 % cover issues of tactical character. Other dissertations, smaller in number, cover other narrow fields, mainly those related to arms and services of the Armed Forces.




Figure 1: *Distribution of PhD topics at the Defence Academy*

The research is mainly characterized by focusing on tactical and technical level, while strategic insights are scarce. No dissertation is focused on military leadership to date. Suffice this fact to understand how little was the attention given to perhaps the most important military topic, i.e. leadership.

The lack of scientific approaches in the field of military leadership and the drastic global changes that are typical for nowadays development, often impairing many theories and doctrines of the field, were the impetus that encouraged this paper.

My long experience in various management positions in the Armed Forces has often led to the question, what is the specific share of the human role in the success of a military structure. Basically this is *the central question* that this paper seeks to approach.

Oscillation between extremes in all areas has been accompanied by major and deep flaws in many aspects. Deep flaws, similar to those that suffered by metals during they are tempered and immediately go from very high temperatures to very low ones and vice versa. NATO integration and progressive alignment with the EU is a new phase. Extinction of oscillations during this course, approach with the centre of geographic, political, economic, military, cultural and spiritual gravity seems to be the new trend of development of the country and our military. Globalization seems to be the indispensable lubricant that will facilitate this progress.

The military leadership in the context of globalization

“Every era has its defining terms. Nowadays, one of these terms is “globalization”, which contains the widespread belief that we live in a world without borders. Sovereign states seem unable to control international flows of goods and services (less people) and in many countries the state itself is falling apart.”¹

Apart from enthusiastic or fatalistic comments globalization, does not represent a new and unknown phenomenon worldwide. The new phenomenon is the “human perception” about the speed of change the nowadays world is facing. The future again will continue to bring other surprises, due to the human inability to predict. Change will follow its exponential course of growth, while humankind will follow its linear trend in forecasting the future, finding themselves among inevitable and unpredictable suddenness.

As a trend, globalization progressively increases the role of individuals, multiplying their knowledge and strengths, while it weakens and alters many of the characteristics of other traditional actors, including the state. The growth and expansion of freedom space and economic and cultural prosperity, constant combination of economic and political interests parallelly reduces the possibilities of interstate conflicts as well.

Globalization affects war and conflicts with the same force as it affects other social, economic, political or cultural phenomena. The general conclusion is that globalization is not only reducing the number of military conflicts, but also is profoundly changing the way they evolve. Even in the field of military conflicts we can clearly notice the

¹ Ethan B. Kapstein, *Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 1.

propensity of their decreasing in size and diminishing of the role large structures and heavy systems. At the same time we observe the tendency of a growing role of individuals and small structures. The space created by the “withdrawal” of large structures and heavy systems is occupied by network in its broadest sense. The network is constantly becoming a global platform, which provides information, multiplies the power, optimizes cost etc. Network is somehow replacing what is disappearing.

Globalization compels states to consider conflict as a new problem rather than a solution to the problems that arise in interstate relations. Overlapping of the other actors with global role like international concerns, international or supranational organizations, which often pursue other goals than those followed by states, makes global actors to often play inhibitory role for potential conflicts generated for traditional state reasons.

Even in those extreme cases when traditional military conflict and war cannot be avoided, anyhow, what is avoided is the way of their evolution. There is a general assumption that wars and military conflicts today tend to be limited in many aspects. They are limited in space, in time, forces and equipment. The general tendency is to operate with fewer forces and means, the attempt to reach in a short time limit the strategic objectives, maximum reduction of side effects etc. The only element that tends to increase is the speed of operation, which relies on the ever-growing information and ever improving technology.

Increased speed based on more and more information and technology is the response toward development. *“A new information revolution is occurring It will radically change the meaning of information both for enterprises and individuals. This is not a revolution of technology, machinery, techniques or speed. It is a revolution of CONCEPTS.”*²

It seems that in the battlefield speed will be the criterion that will make the difference between those who win and those who lose. No big fish, but fast fish seems to have more chances to win. This shift in importance from the weight and measure to speed seems to open an extraordinary perspective to those who still do not own a problematic measure. At the same time, it presents a serious challenge to those who own so much measure and weight that it becomes a problem.

As a trend, globalization presents a tremendous opportunity for those countries and the armies, which aim to link their success not with the measure, but with energy, a thing that is always a function of speed, the speed to develop, to adapt, to make decisions and to operate.

In the field of international relations the conclusion is that globalization, in its present form has challenged many of the fundamental pillars of the system. Some of the most important taboos of the system as territory, sovereignty, borders, language, and population have been disturbed a lot in their traditional “sanctity”.

Globalization has affected influenced, created precedents and has necessitated the

² Peter F. Drucker, *Management Challenges for the 21st Century*, second edition.

important rethinking and development in regards to international system as a whole and the role of national states and their sovereignty in particular. Even though we still cannot define the future of the international system regarding its past we can assume that it has lost its sanctity acquired 1648.

Despite the anti-state enthusiasm vibrant in the era of globalization, the need for it [state] remains to indisputable. What should be discussed is the need for a new profile of the modern state. The new profile of the state requires a fundamental revision, a review that must affect its entire classical image. The present and the future do not call for less state, but the need for a different state. State as the exclusive manufacturer of the public good will continue to be charged with the burden of meeting the public need. Meanwhile the public domain expands, the need for the public good increases, its insurance becomes increasingly more complex and difficult. The public good cannot be provided by relying on old instruments and procedures. In this sense, the traditional state faces challenge of radical change.

One of the key notions that require a deep rethinking is the national territory, its meaning and significance. The meaning for national territory needs to be “digitized”. This means that the concept should be expanded to include a lot more than just ground or water surface of the country. It should include the virtual space of the digital world. As part of the “national territory” should be considered even those areas which, although geographically do not belong to it, but in functional terms contribute to national interests.

*“Only the Third World countries think that the territory is still important. We, the others, have understood that life exists exclusively on the World Wide Web and on CNN. States must submit their “fetishes of the land” and find a new role.”*³

It is likely that globalism may influence even the concept of **state borders**. The classical meaning of national borders risks to transform into a useless historical relic, and sometimes harmful, if its adaptation to the radically changed conditions is not achieved.

Kenichi Ohmae states in his book *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy* that *the political map, borders among states is clear as they have always have been. But in the competition map, which shows the flow of financial and industrial activity, the borders have considerably vanished.*

Even the national territory and its borders should be conceived as another wider and more complicated category than simply the geographic area of the physical territory or the length of the border line. *Thurow* concludes that *sentimental ties with any particular geographical part are not part of the new system.*⁴

Globalization has imposed fundamental changes in the way it should be conceptualized and protects national interest in its complete spectrum. Expansion of the notion on borders, territory and role of the state, brings as a result a new meaning to national

³ Ibid, p. 54.

⁴ Lester Thurow, *The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World* (New York: William Morrow), 1996, p. 114.

interest itself. National interest in the era of globalization has become much more complex and interdependent to extra national factors. In a way, the range of national interests is considerably narrowed; while a significant part of the national interests are “internationalized”. This means that interests of individuals, groups and people of different nations and countries are becoming increasingly globally interdependent to the extent that traditional meaning of national interest itself has radically changed.

The changes that have occurred and the tendency of those expected to change, calls for a “revision of territory and borders”. With the review, we should understand a review of the meaning of these categories. Certainly that should not imply devaluation, but their re-evaluation.

It seems that the reduction of the role and the extensive re-conceptualization of the meaning of borders are accompanied by the parallel trend of increasing the role of diversified services networks, which facilitate communication and exchange of information, knowledge, goods and various services.

New and very important entities are simultaneously emerging on the world stage as multinational concerns and other stakeholders, along with national states and other bodies associated with them. It seems that the trend is a shift of balances from states to other actors, mainly to global players.

International scene has undergone significant changes as well. The birth of new states is an effect of globalization. It represents a product of the freedom of peoples to choose new ways of managing their fates and interests. Along with the increase of the number of independent states, it has happened also the increase of the number of partly free and free countries and the decrease of the number of countries without freedom. This is regarded as another major effect that globalization has brought on a global level. It can be generally concluded that globalization and freedom constitute a symbiosis; they are two phenomena mutually supporting each other.

The change that has occurred in the whole world, the economy, society, culture, system of international relations has changed the same as the concept of security defence, fighting for peace etc. The dynamics of change has affected many things while it is true that it cannot affect some of the basic principles. Unlike the Cold War, the globalization system has one overarching feature-and that is *integration*. The symbol of this system is a single word-*Web*, World Wide Web.⁵

“The Cold War was a drama of states confronting states, balancing states, and aligning with states. And, as a system, the cold war was balanced at the centre by two super states, two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The globalization system, by contrast, is built around three balances, which overlap and affect one another. The first is the traditional balance of power between nation-states.... The second important power balance in the globalization system is between nation-states and global markets.... The third balance that you have to pay attention to.... is the balance between individuals and nation-states.... globalization can be an incredible force-multiplier for individuals. Individuals can increasingly act on the world stage

⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Understanding Globalization*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 2000, p. 7. Ibid. p. 8.

*directly, unmediated by a state. So you have today not only a superpower, not only Supermarkets, but also what I call “super-empowered individuals”. Some of these super-empowered individuals are quite angry, some of them quite wonderful-but all of them are now able to act much more directly and much more powerfully on the world stage.”*⁶

Globalization is a phenomenon that acts against the centralizing tendencies. Through the expansion of the scale of freedom and democracy, globalization inspires and nourishes the spirit of individualism and personal independence. In the same measure, globalization also increases the level of individual knowledge, level of professional competence by involving even the hierarchical structures, by increasing at the same time the ambition of the people for decision-making.

*The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly adopted by the world’s major powers, was dominated by firepower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced third-generation warfare, characterized by manoeuvre. That type of combat is still largely the focus of U.S. forces. Fourth-generation wars, or 4GW, have now evolved, taking advantage of the political, social, economic and technical changes since World War II. In short, 4GW has evolved along with society to make use of the opportunities it provides.*⁷

Technical and technological progress increases significantly the opportunities of superior to control and intervene in domains of subordinate units, bringing in this way another captivating effect for more centralization. Simultaneously, this progress greatly increases the volume of information (in real facts and data) available to superiors. Unfortunately, the tide of data only enhances the illusion of superiors for more information. In fact, this tide of data and facts presents a serious pitfall rather than a chance for supervisors who believe that people can already do everything, or anything.

*The effect of the information-age technology has been not only to increase the tempo of the operations but also to provide images of operations that begin to condition the strategic plans and define time limits of operations.*⁸

During the period of big changes after the fall of the Iron Curtain, different states have realized differently transformation to the new era. A complex series of factors have influenced states to deviate from their natural role, bringing often quite severe consequences for their societies and often also for all humankind. Sometimes the problem has been the excesses of the state, or the state’s attempt to play the role of others; by getting out of area of responsibility. Thus, for example, the communist state’s efforts to take over almost all resulted in a real disaster. Equally problematic

⁶ Thomas Friedman, *Longitudes and Attitudes, Exploring the World Before and After September 11*, Penguin Books, London 2003, p. 4-5.

⁷ Thomas X. Hammes, “4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths,” *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2004, p. 40-44.

⁸ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5*, Washington, DC, 14 June 1993, p. 6-5.

is the lack of state. Excessive contraction of state and forming a vacuum in the area of its natural responsibility also led to catastrophic consequences. Albania's experience has shown the consequences of each of the phenomena in question. Even Albania the same way as other countries, has experienced dramatically and with serious consequences the "excess" the same as the "contraction" of the state.

When an alysing Albanian in the above cited book, Friedman writes: "*Albania of the 1990's is the poorest country I have ever encountered and among the Cleptocracies of the free trade. Albania was one of the most isolated countries for over fifty years, having adopted a Maoist pro Chinese attitude during the Cold War. After he fall of the Berlin Wall, the communist regime in Albania fell down in 1991. Lastly, Albanian thought that they could have everything the other already had: hardware of the free trade. Unfortunately, this was all they got. Albania became full of hardware, but with no software and with no operation system.*⁹ *The above example is used as an illustration to present to the world a typical case of globalism area.*"¹⁰

"Implementation of leadership through mission requires a somewhat authentic recreation of the army. Recreation may seem a difficult, tedious, costly, tedious and perhaps unnecessary undertaking, and so on. But recreation is the only option. Albanian Armed Forces cannot continue to strain towards true modernization, as the modern army of Albania's new century, by attempting in vain to repair an edifice based on old and uncertain foundations. The modern army of the new Albania should be based on a new philosophy, not the Marxist one, in a new strategy, not the isolation, in a new doctrine, not the bunkerization; in a new education, not in indoctrination, in a new spirit, not the distrust, in a new organization, not the centralization, in a new mission of freedom, not that of slavery".

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⁹ Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁰ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Understanding Globalization*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 200, p. 245.

The role of “Soft Security” in the traditional security framework

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Short commentary. *International environment of the early twenty-first century is characterized by uncertainty, instability, rapid changes of situations, less employment of old rules and their substitution with new ones, which require enhancement of the decision-makers’ assessment skills in order to timely and effectively respond to such situations. Analysts argue that today’s world is more chaotic and future developments are more unpredictable than in any other period of history*

Security can be defined in general terms as security or freedom from fear and danger. Studies have focused traditionally mainly on the security threats, use and control of military forces. However, since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has expanded, including state security, societal and human security¹.

The mix and method regarding how hard and soft security policies are implemented in times of crisis and conflict are still contentious issues. There is a substantive amount of discussion among scholars and experts on how to make the best use of these policies. The common denominator in such discussions seems to be that the elements of soft security are of a rather preventive nature and best employed to reinstitute stability and introduce normalcy in afflicted areas.

It is argued today that through enhancing cooperation and dialogue, as well as extending financial assistance and development programs, the aim now is to neutralize the potential violent nature of soft threats and prevent them from becoming “hard threats” in the long run.

¹ **State Security** is related primarily to the traditional security of the country: the defence of sovereignty, defence of the territorial integrity and independence.

Social Security is closely related to security and defence of the civilian population and societal groups from the emergencies caused by nature, industrial calamities or human errors, as well as terrorism, etc. **Human Security** aims at the defence of the Human Rights in conformity with the UN Resolution 1674 in the framework of “the responsibility to protect” the population from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, etc.

Debates in this field today, aims to articulate the overall policy and “negotiations” on planning and suggests as well the possible strategies of regulation and mitigation. The ultimate goal is to create a sustainable system in the region/state, so that external assistance is not required and all forms of “soft” and “hard” threats become irrelevant.

Soft Security: A conceptual framework

Soft Security vs. Hard Security

Security is defined in terms of perceived threats and risks. Particularly in today’s complex environment, it is surely a multifaceted and evasive issue.

In essence, security deals with preventing or containing threats. There are two categories that can be used to define threats: (a) *Hard* threats and (b) *Soft* threats. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are generally accepted as *hard* threats, whereas extreme poverty, disparity among and within societies, and the spread of infectious diseases or climate change and environmental degradation fall under the category of soft threats.² This list is by no means exhaustive. One can add, for example, inter-ethnic conflicts, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings to the list of soft threats. Cyber threats, which can inflict enormous damage to the economic and social infrastructure of countries, are also considered as soft threats.

In reality, there are no clear-cut dividing lines between *hard* and *soft* threats. They are inter-linked and require a comprehensive and inter-disciplinary approach.³ In fact, a soft threat can easily turn into a *hard* one. Making profit from illegal migration in order to finance their illicit activities is a good example of how terrorist organizations transform a *soft* threat into a *hard* one.

Role of “Soft Security” in the traditional security framework

A substantial difference between hard and soft security policies is that states traditionally resort to conventional methods such as deploying military forces to provide hard security. In soft security policies, however, the use of conventional military force is neither automatic nor preferable. However, the availability and use of soft security policy options is a function of the situation. For instance, if there is room for interacting with the local/central authority, non-military means, including social and financial assistance can be utilized with a view to prevent a spiral of instability. Such methods vary depending on the political and social fabric of the region/state, as well as its level of economic and financial development.

In *hard* security issues, although there is an increased role for civilians,⁴ they are mostly complementary, whereas in *soft* security missions, civilians pioneer the effort. Participation of the civilian sector and effective inter-agency cooperation in

² Kofi Annan, “Secretary General’s address to the UN General Assembly,” 23 September 2003, New York. <http://www.un.org>

³ Kofi Annan, “AIDS is the real weapon of mass destruction” Africa Recovery, United Nations News Releases, December 2003, <http://www.un.org>

⁴ “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” S/PRST/1999/34, 30 November 1999.

implementing *soft* security policies are indispensable. The value of civilian expertise, particularly in the fields of public information and other non-military activities in general is of indispensable nature. It is the civilians that maintain daily contact with the local people and play a primary role in the implementation of *soft* security policies. As to inter-agency cooperation, civilian components of security policies are both developed and implemented with the expertise of the relevant government institutions and agencies. Therefore, apart from the need for well-trained personnel and infrastructure, a constant and effective consultation mechanism must be in place.

The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is crucial, yet this role depends crucially on their area of interest and capabilities. The end-goal is to create a sustainable system in the targeted region/state, such that outside assistance is no longer required and all forms of threats, soft and hard, have been rendered insignificant. Some concrete examples of soft security missions are NATO’s operation in Afghanistan and EU police operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The KFOR (Kosovo Force) and SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina) operations, as well as the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, however, are hard security missions of a military nature.

Within this framework, international organizations have reviewed their structures and procedures vis-à-vis conflicts. The United Nations, having the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as enshrined in its Charter, has begun to focus mostly on conflict prevention strategies. As elements of soft security policies, building national capacities and supporting the role of civil societies with the help of specialized UN Agencies, have been the priority areas of action for the UN. The guiding principle therein has been its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States.⁵

The UN was also active in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, in which the responsibilities of civilians increased significantly. Among these responsibilities are the following:

- Enabling former adversaries to implement complex peace agreements by liaising with a range of political and civil actors,
- Coordinating the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
- Assisting with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants,
- Supervising and conducting elections,
- Strengthening the rule of law, including assistance with judicial reform and training of civilian police,
- Promoting respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations,
- Assisting with post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation, and
- Setting up a transnational administration of a territory as it moves towards independence.

⁵ UN Security Council Resolution No. 1366 (2001).

- These tasks also serve as guiding principles for other international organizations conducting soft security missions as well as their civilian components.

NATO, on the other hand, which was conventionally characterized as a static, hard security and defence organization, has undertaken an ambitious transformation agenda. It has also included soft security policies in its portfolio. NATO's role in Afghanistan is a case in point. The Alliance took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on 11 August 2003. This is NATO's first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. With the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1510, ISAF's mandate was extended beyond Kabul. NATO is in Afghanistan in order to help bring peace and stability throughout the country. To this end, NATO developed the "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" (PRT) concept, a practical tool of interaction between the Allied countries and the Afghan people in theatre.

The European Union, for its part, also has a comprehensive and inclusive soft security policy, based on the understanding that no region is immune to the effects of conflicts.⁶ The EU Security Strategy Document 14 is illuminating in this respect. The EU soft security policies are based on the assumption that "conflicts destroy social and normal infrastructure; encourage criminality; deter investments and make normal economic life impossible." The EU also finds that key threats are both hard and soft in nature: Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the Eurasian-Atlantic space, with 55 participating States, covering an area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The concept of "cooperative security," which is based upon the understanding that common security in the context of globalization can only be achieved through increased cooperation between participating states, is yet another notion developed within the fold of the OSCE long ago.

Culture as a "Soft Security" component

One of the sayings about culture, among many related to it, is that culture is related to "the ways in which human beings overcome their original barbarism... to become fully humane".⁷ Imagine what happened in the Cold War. Each military bloc, namely due to a residue of barbarism in the 20th century, spent hundreds of billions of dollars to be ready to extinguish each other. This was the perception of risk and threat.

Surprisingly, in 1990s, the Cold War ended without any military battle taking place. In fact, the battle took place, but it did not occur in regions of defence, or with an offensive deployment. It was held in another field: in the economic race, competition

⁶ Uđur Ziyal, *Re-conceptualization of soft security and Turkey's civilian contributions to international security*. www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2004-02-globalsecurityTPQ2004-2-ziyal.pdf, 09.06.2013.

⁷ Velkley, Richard (2002). "The Tension in the Beautiful: On Culture and Civilization in Rousseau and German Philosophy". *Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question*. The University of Chicago Press. pp. 11-30.

of development, the race of opposing perceptions. Understanding this second way is the competition of minds compared to the competition of guns, competition to look ahead toward culture instead of being left behind in the mindsets of barbarism.

All of this victory, the biggest victory in the history of the world, was as such, not only because it faded away the tension of thousands of nuclear warheads, but it moved away firstly the tension of militarized minds that held anxious humankind for nearly five decades.

Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, still tell us more about this rainbow leap between war to destroy every culture and the culture of avoiding every war. Imagine the Balkans, whose culture has been historically only of conflicts, today, after twenty years, we have diametrically another Balkans. Its peoples are also other people. “Rooted for centuries in this region of Europe, the existence of any of them cannot be conditioned by the other. In the case of complexities, willingly or unwillingly, we are forced to agree. Does it seem a bleak vision? I think what we experienced a few years ago there was not less scary. To return to a more hopeful vision, it must be said that a balance has been established historically in the Balkans however. Today, the European Union in terms of a tutor accepted by everyone, this balance multiply secured.”⁸

In international relations, culture has a different vision, a vision which assigns priority to cooperation and communication channels and not the iron curtain that had taken place between nations and people. In such cases, considered as crucial, such as defence and security, instead of the culture of keeping the opponent targeted, it was established culture of friendly meetings, joint consultations of finding ways to overcome security challenges together. In this sense, culture is transformed into force, representing a core dimension of power that shapes the concept of the supremacy of what is meant by the concept of “security”.

Culture is another way of solving out differences. The differences are always natural, not only between people, but more especially between countries in a region like the Balkans, where the differences were so profound, that very Europeans have lost patience, and why not, even confidence in the Balkans. There is an objective reason why these differences exist: Balkans has been the biggest point of clash between civilizations, religions, cultures and civilizations, among the most powerful clashes of humanity. Due to these cultures, issues of post-Cold War Balkan began to be solved by methods that were used nearly a century ago, with those of the Balkan wars. But, finally, the culture of modern civilization and the values of the smoothing over differences gained advantage over the severing the differences used in the nationalist garb.

Education as a “Soft Security” component

To relate the term “education” with the term “security” seems somewhat strange, extraneous and irrelevant. But we should not forget that the concept of “education”

⁸ Kadare Ismail, Interview: “Ethnic cleansing of Albanian people was projected, Serbs were not punished. What a shame!” www.balkanweb.com/ 2012-05-25.

has to do not only simply with the formal schooling cycle or completion of a course or certification of student with a diploma, or getting some technical knowledge and skills to practice a profession. Education is an life-long background investment. Education cultivates more technical skills, illuminates the mind, opens horizons of thought and critical judgement, increases the logic of reason, cultivates personality values, love and friendship, and cultivates recognition of people, cultures, their languages and civilizations. Thus, the educated person breaks the vicious circle of hatred, according to which “*I don't love you because I don't know you, and not knowing you, I do not love you*” to be replaced with a modern vision under whose fellowship “*I know you and therefore I love you, by knowing, I will love you even more.*”

Education in itself, with its goals, constitutes an investment in security in the sense that it prepares people with broad thought capabilities, multiple choice solutions, and great richness of feelings. These values are those that precisely, do not promote confrontation, but peace and freedom. On the other hand, these values are a ready instrument of the mind in the psyche of cultivated people that, in case of danger, to weigh alternatives and not to fall prey to the instruments of force, myopia and fatalistic solutions. It is no accident that the most powerful international initiatives to support peace were undertaken firstly, by nations that have good indicators of higher education.

The modern world, especially after the end of the Cold War, has created numerous opportunities and has implemented practices intense exchange of educating young people and women in different countries. Such a reality is perhaps unique to the Albanian youngsters, a large percentage of them, is not just those immigrants but schooled in Europe or in U.S. This is a real revolution, because it creates powerful exchanges currents, networks and friendships which are based on the security of each country. All these young people are the best ambassadors, soldiers who better to convey safety, namely through the soft power of education.

Transformation of culture and education-the most important investment in “*Soft Security*”

Before the 90s, Albania, although spent ten times more funds compared to today, although there were more soldiers and weaponry, again there was a war situation in the region and Albanians lived thinking of only one choice: war. Albania is now a NATO member. Not only Albania, but each country after the accession, normally needs about a decade to become fully integrated. Why? Precisely because the formal act of acceptance is not at the same time the act that shows how much integrated is a country in terms of standards and especially the culture of the cooperation in planning and operations.

Since September 1996, until February 2013, Albania has committed about 6.000 military troops to military operations led by NATO, EU and UN. Albania is also included, and even has a broad activity in regional security initiatives such as “*Adriatic 3*”, which has become “*Adriatic 5*”. Under this initiative, the Albanian side has started “*The Senior Security and Defence Course*” in Tirana, to strengthen cooperation between countries of the region through joint education and training of staff senior civil and military from the region, on issues of security and defence policies. The

course shall provide the opportunity for participants to promote in their places of work. Referring curricula in this course are those of “*George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies*”, “*NATO College*” in Rome, “*The Baltic Defence College*”, “*USA War College*” etc, therefore, an elite training culture.

Similarly, as part of the initiative *Southeastern European Defence Ministerial* (SEDM) which was established in Tirana since 1996, actually express cultural trends cooperation and regional integration, including the *Multinational Peace Force of South Eastern Europe* (MPFSEE) or the *South-Eastern Europe Brigade* (SEEBRIG) and a number of other projects. SEDM joins region countries in a variety of activities embodied in joint projects and commitments in the field of arms control, border security, fight against terrorism, militarization, military technology sharing, joint exercises, operations for the prevention of natural disasters, to undertake peacekeeping missions outside the region, bringing a spirit of loyalty and mutual respect. Member states see each other in the light of friendship and partnership, away of the lack of confidence and opposing spirit. On the other hand, except for the purpose of strengthening the ties of cooperation and interaction between the SEDM countries, this process has played a major role in bringing non-member countries of the Euro-Atlantic structures to these structures, thus making culture of cooperation a regional culture.

Albania has established a bilateral cooperation in the field of defence and military with all NATO member and partner countries. Collaboration consists of fields of education, training and military qualifications. Albania has sent for 20 years to these countries a relatively large number of military to obtain educational qualifications. The successful collaboration is developed through joint exercises, joint commitments in operations within NATO, exchange of experiences and expertise in different fields, courtesy visits, etc. All these developments have had a significant resultant: Albania has already developed a culture different from what we inherited from the past: the culture of initiative and responsibility for culture of working together according to NATO standards and education in conformity to these standards.

Certainly, as we mentioned above, we still cannot assess ourselves that we are fully integrated. But let us remember that integration is a process, not a date. All members of the Alliance have passed through this process, in different time lines. It is important for us to have this culture: a culture that processes never end. Even the oldest members of NATO today require new conceptions such as that of “*Smart Defence*”. Therefore still there is much to be done to develop further on this culture.

Culture and education come into play in that part of the arsenal of security of a country that not only guarantee security, but the philosophy of security. Transition in different historical stages of human development and at different stages of changing international relations, starting from World War II, the Cold War and finally the Fourth Generation War, have revealed the changes in perception of threats and risks as well as elements that affect participants in this process .

Cultural differences, as mentioned above, reflect in a tangible way the deviation from a reflection into another. The past and current conflict resolution and building of relations (until the end of the Cold War) is replaced with regional and global multilateralism. It

has remained just in the annals of history study. The current culture does not reflect points of divisions but the meeting points in the direction of strengthening to a higher degree of the security. So, in essence, we change the way of thinking and acting, or a different culture of communication and coherence in cooperation.

The first starting point to reflect a different culture in the approach to security is undoubtedly, education. It provides visibility in solving differences, not in the traditional way, but in otherwise receiving display of behaviour and manner of judgement, replacing conflict with different ways of thinking, characteristic of the higher level of education.

Albania and the Armed Forces are continuing to pursue the fulfilling of the criteria toward full NATO forces are supporting military operations in the framework of the UN, NATO, EU and regional initiatives such as “Adriatic 5”. Besides these areas of cooperation, our Armed Forces are involved in various education and training programs, as member and candidate countries of these organizations.

In this way, interaction of culture and education becomes possible, transforming them from individual into partners, from regional to global. Completion of the initiatives of organizations where our country is part, such as “Smart Defence”, seek by the participating countries, “surrender” a part of individual sovereignty and this means that the current culture of cooperation has changed in content and the concept, as a result of growth to a higher degree of culture and education by collaboration.

Cooperation in “Smart Defence” framework

In general terms, one can define security as security or freedom from fear and danger. Traditionally, studies have focused mainly on the security threat, use and control of military forces. However, since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has expanded to include some of the new challenges of the sovereignty of states and corporate integrity. Today’s security threats involving organized crime, ethnic and ideological conflicts, corruption, insecure borders, illegal immigration, climate change, cyber attacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of course terrorism. A feature of the next decades will be the increase in the power of non-state actors as a result of globalization, which can empower individual fanatics, giving access to the tools and showed more devastating as the events of 11 September 2001.

Climate change will be accompanied by a wide range of unpleasant developments which no nation-state has only the power to contain. These are the threats that will shape the future security environment of the next decades. But the future security environment will naturally face economic and financial crisis, as a result of which, all the countries of the alliance will face budgetary constraints that cannot be understood without financial constraints and in defence budgets. Naturally the question arises how to develop alliances in order to bring its members a maximum security and a maximum impact on the shaping of this new environment? This requires new solutions, to provide more capacity at a lower cost. This is the reason from which derived the concept of “Smart Defence”, which originates in the *European Policy Centre* in Brussels, on 30 September 2011.

The NATO Secretary General, when explaining the concept of “Smart Defence” notes: “I know that in the period of financial constraints one cannot spend more but cannot spend even less. The answer is to spend better and spend money to achieve the best. Let us help countries preserve their capacity and provide new capacities. This means that we need to better define priorities, specialize in certain capacities and seek multinational solutions. This is what I call “Smart Defence.”⁹

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⁹ Speech of the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen in the Centre of European Policies in Brussels, on September 30, 2011, Military Review, December 2011, p.10.

Are we facing the clash of civilizations?

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Short commentary. *The question, are we facing clash of civilizations, cannot be answered without going through the history. During most of human existence, civilizations were irregular or nonexistent. With the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions: the nation states of the West (Europe and the US), and others, which interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, and decisively influenced every other civilization. During the Cold War global politics became bipolar with a world was divided into three parts.*

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political, or economic, but cultural. 20 years after the publication of 'Clash of Civilizations' by Samuel Huntington, all of the individual arguments about the specifics are differently. He declared a new phase to world politics, which consists to the fundamental source of conflict in this new world, will not be primarily ideological, politic or primarily economic but cultural. This book has become a classic work of international relations and one of the most influential books ever written about foreign affairs.

The current situation, accounts also the real divergences in economic growth, democratization and religion. The present Islam v/s West narrative, the climb of a monolithic China, isolation of Japan, rise of trade blocs, current economical crisis, water and other natural resources shortages will follow with Clash of Civilization. As a conclusion, the essential reason that we are facing the Clash of civilization is the differences in views between cultural groups.

What is civilization?

The word “civilization” comes from the Latin word *civitas* which literally means city-state. It has been found for the first time in a French book (*L'Ami des hommes*, 1756) by *Victor de Riqueti*. It has been defined as “An advanced state of human society, in which a high level of culture, science, industry and government has been reached”.

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The civilization has changed from primitive existence into a complex world. Each new civilization established itself by building on the legacy of its predecessor and raising itself to new stature. It has been started from Mesopotamia and Egypt, continued in 5th century BC by classical Greece which brought its democracy, art, philosophy and science. In addition Athens, later Rome, spread civilization throughout the Mediterranean Sea, that changed the face of Europe forever. This classical legacy built the foundations of the modern Western civilization, initially fostered in Europe and later carried further by America.


There are too many definitions of civilizations such are: a type of culture and society developed by a particular nation in a particular period; a human society that has highly developed resources and a complex cultural, political, and legal organization in social development; or a stage of human social development that is considered most advanced.

As a result of those mention above the most appropriate meaning of civilization is written in the international dictionary: “An advanced state of intellectual, cultural, and material development in human society, marked by progress in the arts and sciences, the extensive use of record-keeping, including writing, and the appearance of complex political and social institutions”.


The main characteristics of civilizations

To describe the characteristics of civilization, first we need to make a distinction between directionality and progress. Directionality is change over time, the forward movement of history, without judging the value of that change. Progress, on the other hand, is directionality toward improvement, or movement in a desirable direction. Another approach to value-free historical descriptions of civilization is to think through the process by which some human groups moved from agricultural villages and towns into cities and states. By clarifying this process we can arrive at a more nearly neutral think that reflects the complexity of this process.

One of the most famous theorists of civilization in the Western world was a professor of prehistoric archaeology, V. Gordon Childe (1892-1957). He listed for what constitutes a civilization still influences our thinking: from large urban centres; monumental architecture; system for recording information; development of exact and practical sciences; interdependence of classes to state religion/ideology. Based on this list, some other professors and students used different terms to describe other forms of human communities, which show that civilization represented progress. I highlighted the most important characteristics of civilizations, as follows: cultural



system (religion, learning and written language, art, architecture); central government (class structure with satisfied social one); science with advanced technology and transportation; a high degree of occupational specialization; the growth of region/nation and stable food supply.



It seems clear that any given civilization need have maybe all of those explained above as a core of common characteristics of civilization. It helps to think through the process of how town turned into cities and civilizations. Civilizations may consist of a large population e.g. China (“A civilization pretending to be a state” - Lucian Pyle), many countries e.g. Latin America or a single country with a (relatively) small population e.g. Japanese. In historical research, 21 civilizations have been identified, however not all of them exist till this day. Twenty years ago, the political scientist Samuel Huntington declared a new phase to world politics. The fundamental source of conflict in this new world, he wrote, will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic, the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union was finished.

On Huntington’s map of the world’s civilizations shows the major groups of existing civilizations, among them in which there exist respective core states and can be grouped into six poles:

While there is no such core state in a Islamic civilization, not to mention South America and the sub-Sahara Africa which do not yet possess the conditions necessary for being major civilizations with implications that they do have a potential to become distinct civilizations of their own.

From latest to next model of civilization conflicts

For a century and a half, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes-emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, “The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun”. The nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations gave up to the conflict of ideologies, first among Communism, Fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. Communism demonstrates clearly:

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this workers' paradise was a totalitarian state that created its own imperialist policy all around the globe and was involved in several major wars from 1917 upon to 1991.

During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, nei-ther of which was a nation. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world.

Talking on '90th the Clash of civilizations truly became political world. The 19th century has been considered as a clash of nations, the 20th century as a clash of ideologies and 21st century predicted as a clash civilization with a fundamental religions concept, based upon religions. Currently, the balance of power among civilizations is changing: the West is going to have a virtual influence; Asian civilizations are growing their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences; and other civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.

Are we facing the clash of civilizations?

The work of Samuel P. Huntington is a key source for my exploration of the civilization exclusivity topic question. His piece "The Clash of Civilizations?" analyzes contemporary and projected conflicts, suggesting that the clash of civilizations will create the fodder for all conflict to follow. He proposes that prior warfare and conflict transition from the work of monarchies, to the stuff of nation states, to the result of ideological differences. Huntington concludes his article with a prediction that civilization divisions and misunderstandings will fuel all debates to come.

According to Huntington theory, the civilization will clash because of five main reasons: real and basic *differences among civilizations; the world is becoming a smaller place; the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West*; cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and eco-nomic ones, finally, *economic regionalism is increasing*.

Two decades after Huntington's "clash of civilization"

We are now 20 years after Huntington issued his thoughts about clash of civilizations. I tried to draw together the most important kinds of critics, concentrated in three different powerful prisms which history confirmed:

- Inter civilization conflicts, which means not between civilizations but within civilizations conflicts, like: the real ethnic conflicts (1990); the conflict remains between nations/centuries and between secularism and Islam/*Sunnis* and *Shiai*'ts.
- Super civilizations, which consist in spreading globalizations; increasing Universal Norms of Human Rights.
- Multiple of ideas, focused not in or under different civilizations, but as a fact that civilization is a mental construct, just a matter what you think: your identity is.

What does the history tells us through last twenty years about five main civilizations:

Islamic civilization. Overall, the realities of today confirm intra conflicts are ongoing.

Referring to the latest attacks, like 9/11 tragedy, Afghanistan and Iraqi wars, US invention focused on its effort and democracy promotion, further confirmed the clash of civilization even US forced to promote an ideology of liberal democracy.

- Today Iraq (US is out now), Intra civilization conflict is continuing there between the Sunnis and the *Shias* sect, which is religions basis conflicts.
- Arab spring, which rapidly becoming an Islam Atom. Islam Brotherhood takes power in Egypt. What is going on there have been reflected in Syria, which is just not only conflict between liberal democracy and secularism, but it is also a conflict between the *Sunnis/Shias* and it has the similarities with conflict in Iraq.
- Apparently, it will happen in the future when Iran gets nuclear weapons, this is going to sharpen the conflict between West and Islam.

Confucian/ Chinese civilization. During 1990-2000, the Olympics gave a chance to develop China. It was modernizing, globalizing, and liberalizing. It was sharp offensive and responsible as a stake holder in the global economy design by US in yearly decades. It largely confirms the Fukuyama thoughts, which Beijing consensus, to replace Washington consensus, which was so dominant 1990, focused on economic development dominant with increasing popular prosperity under moral hierarchal authority. The situation in China shows that South China people think differently with north China; people in Hon Kong think different than people in Beijing. There is a different mentality, which ones making Chinese policy, ones Chinese ideology, once making shaping Chinese future updates the 21st century. Looking of the future, shows the clash between Chinese and Islamic civilization, the continuation of West and Islamic civilization.

Chinese population thinks and talks about 100 years of Affiliation (1842-1949). Today they are talking about for next 100 years of whole redemption, preparing for next Affiliation 2049-Redemption of China to be proclamation (the celebration of the full world power-as Chin dynasty during 18 century). A Chinese view is that: 18 century is Chinese century, 19 century as an England century, 20 century American century and 21st the full redemption of proclamation as a Chinese century (2049). The Chinese civilization is going to shrink based on “one child policy” projected to be revised.

Western civilization. What has happened to at third of civilization/west itself? In 1990th, under leadership of US where peripheral conflicts, which there are still ongoing. Western remains western and America will remain America. Based on an American Ideology as Washington Consensus, the question will be what are these values? Huntington believed that the core values of 21st century had been as core principles through 21st century called as the American creed with 6 principals: Liberty under low; equality of opportunity for all; limited Government, institutionalized with three other principals: constitutionalism, liberal democracy and market economy.

Going back in 1950, West versus to East in this age of ideology there was a great

deal of many ideas which seem to be national state of affairs and they will retain next 50 years. In 1990 sustained too many concepts: Multiculturalism, Post Modernism, Post America, Post west. The western civilization is virtually in America and in Europe. No one talked about Western civilization in America and Europe today, but others are talking about west, the rest talked about "One time powerful are still arrogant oppressive" that is a term west means most the time used. Instead East and Europe do not talk about West, but talk globalization and human rights.

Too many in America believe in globalization and universal human rights. People are identifying each other as US, but as one state of US (Pennsylvania, etc). People in America are not equipped by moral between civilizations, which is a cultural reality. The economic crisis began in 2010, which is better in America than Europe. It happens in Europe, but America is incapable to help Europe, what it did before to take leadership like 1945. What is infecting in daily life of people in west and in Europe and America, a concept of western civilization is not operational. The reality of today does not feel nicely like in 1990. We can certainly see inter civilization conflicts much greater any time since 1930 (class conflict) and since 1910 (ethnic conflict of emigration) the conflict of congress) which is more divided than any time since 1850 (the politic conflict over slavery).

The people still believe to spread the west culture, however, Huntington perspective (2004, who are we?) has been changed the challenge to America identity. He talked how the American lead had become to define the globalism, how the American population extremely of individualism. He would be confirmed with the reality today, by developments Islamic and Chinese civilizations, expressing individualism. The best alternative is to believe in principals as Huntington believed in deeply in principals to practice and promote them (6 principles). As a long there are people that practice and promote based on principals there will be a clash of civilization

Hindu Civilization. It is growing relatively normal. There was a Hindu nationalist party came to power, which present Hindu state. They were very western and presented Hinduism (Indian Ocean and South/South East Asia) but this party has been corrupted and it left the government and the congress party replace it. The real Hindu civilization stands up with the distinctively Hindu characteristics and Hindu foreign policy which is different than traditional Chinese and west policies. There is a Hindu strategic policy and it is advantage for US. America can split Islam between *Sunny* and *Shias*, which can certainly split the civilizations and Chinese and Islamic both can make in conflict and the both are in conflict with Indian. Americans can support the rising Hindu civilizations that can help contains Islamic civilization to the West and Chinese civilization to the East.

Eastern Orthodox Civilization in Russia. We can believe in the civilization of dynamic, which one of them is orthodox. Russian civilization, Eastern orthodox are different. Russians are truly believers, which have enemies around. They see all sides a clash of civilization. Regarding any clash of civilization, Russia would push to west (Baltic's), East (solidify the Russian Far East), and South (not just beyond Georgia and Armenia but Azerbaijan, Iran and beyond). The Russian population has had the greatest planet of any society in peace time recording in History. They

simply do not have demographic strength/graphics to sustain a clash of civilization.

As a conclusion, Huntington stretched very well, number of important things between now and then including the future: the continuing bloody borders between Islam and West; Iraq and US invasion; armed conflicts military/ incidents; or what is going happen between US navy and China Navy which will be a catastrophic for the future. Significant Conflicts with Islam's, the next strange conflict will be in the middle Este will be between Sunnis and *Shia's*

With all great intellections and theorist, he never wrote systemically about economics, which are extremely important. Today we are facing the Financial Crisis, which happened as an economic crisis before, and this one. This one has far more effect which different with yearly crisis. In the earlier crisis are testified the economy: Agriculture (1890), Economy (1930 and 1970) and Finance which started in 2010. Financial crises and is different one.

Based on eight sorts of civilization (African, Eastern Orthodox, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin American, *Confucian/Sinic & Western*) rather than the bipolar power structure of the last half of the 20th Century, now it is multi polar and multi civilisation. The statistics show that, the West is and will remain the most powerful civilization for next 25 years.

The main reasons that we are facing the clash of civilizations

It's always a clash of civilizations in, since we have many differences in culture, religions, economy, natural recourses, mentality, etc. Let point out some of them:

From basic differences to highest one

Humans are the same, but civilizations in their basics values differ. Civilizations are fundamentally unique from one to another. Today we are facing increasing trade, travel, immigration and cultural exchanges. Also foreigners are competing for jobs, social services, and cultural superiority. Europe observers a rise in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim feeling. In one side, the civilization gives the world democracy: the concept of rights, scientists, perspective in art, modern science, and technology. On the other side, the civilization which gives to the world chaos. It is supporting by different groups of extremists that use or exactly abuse with people which mostly are poor and uneducated. Usually it comes from the mentality, the level of life styling or education which makes the confrontation.

The difference is also between country's cultures and believers. We know that people get a privilege to meet each other from over the world. All are similar with the same dreams and they wish to live with dignity and freedom. However they are living in many different levels of reality (reach & poor education or not). The differences to be avoided are colour, belief, music, language, etc.

Usually is a human tendency to look for others in times of difficulty. The prosperity, not adversity is the real test of how we define community. The prosperity, not adversity, is the real test of how we define community. E.g. South Africa, Central America, Afghanistan testifies to this tendency. In additional 'West' rises to the peak of its power and shows a confronting all non-western civilizations through economics and warfare.

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Another examples of differences is considering the world in two parts, first one is how to increase one's sphere of influence, and second si Thinking is how to increase surviving. Till we learn that more may not be better, or development does not mean destruction of the planet, rather than you using money, money uses us.

Differences in economy. China has become the USA's biggest trade partner; Western investments in Arab countries are significant. Huntington had foreseen an unclear continuation of the post-WW2. Alliance between the Westerns, produced global trade, however we are facing financial and banking crises today. Some nations are paying the economic cost of not participating in a global economy.

If wars are an extension of politics, and politics an extension of economics-it is economics that will fuel international agendas & alliances of the future.

Proliferation of technology, social-media and other trends that challenge civilization prescriptions

Ideas and technology have always spread attractively which shows that the modern communications technology allows change cultures. It supports sharing of information and ideas, which go through national and civilization boundaries. In the same time globalization gives a huge impact that makes borders porous & trade allow culture to spread up. All these seem to bring the civilizations together and reschedule differences.

Today media is informing us for everything and it is one of object that needs to be looked into. Instead of being separated, media is linked with the political sides and also instead of integrating them, we are splitting them. All generates a lot of fear from both sides.

Other events that challenges clash are: the constant infighting in Africa, regional leadership struggle (Egypt vs. Turkey), China's no-conflict policy, growth of substantial, enfranchised diasporas communities in the West, collaboration to protect overseas investments. In additional, fault lines have also exploded into conflict between Hindus and Muslims, Chinese and Buddhist Tibetans, Japan and the European and American West, and in the "new Cold War" between China and the United States. Although not all of these clashes will be characterized by violence, the conflicts occurring along Islamic fault lines appear most threatening.

How we can avoid the clash of civilizations?

"In order to create a happy century, a peaceful century we must promote the concept of dialogue." has said Dalai Lama.

What can we do to reaching the concept of this dialogue?

- A need to act together, see each other eyes to eyes and arrange meeting with a good discussion. Instead of debate needs to have a dialogue furthermore it is a need bringing together intellectuals, and the sustained discussions of critical issues
- Those events should be a subject of finding which tasks we are facing from East & West, time and place to solve problems and finding a good solution for relationship of religion and the state.

- The goal is instead of clash of civilizations to reach a global civil society. It takes time with hard work to be done to reach a shared understanding of civil society and the human rights.
- Making real progress toward the global civil society by giving suggestions from both sides understanding each other to be more consistent when it comes to advocate democracy and human rights.
- The most important to be maintain is providing and promoting the modern education for the new generation.
- No needs required for underestimating or overestimating of influence in our societies, but looking for building and contributing to the democracy and civil society together.
- The world should have a new civilization which connects with its other members.

All will have an effect to make this great change in our world: “Replacing the clash of civilizations with a global civil society leading by universal human principles and using tolerance.



Finally, it is simple to understand this picture. When we shake hands, first, we can think in the same direction, understand and respect each other to protect our life; second, we should overcome all clashes, whatever they are, to avoid destruction of our planet and third, only together, we can produce peace and stability and make our life enjoyable.

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Influence of the Cold War on the realism

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Short commentary. *The end of the Cold War represents the beginning of the period of modern research of security issues and theories of modern warfare. End of the Cold War, led to an emphasis of a large number of military-security and political issues related to the survival of the state and the region, establishing a regime change in political arrangements, regional cooperation, the Euro Atlantic integration and many other. Studies of this period coincided with some very important events in geo-strategic map of the world, especially in south-east Europe, with emphasis as most important: decomposition Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the wars in Africa, the crisis in the Balkans and the Middle East, terrorist attack the U.S., beginning of the global war against terrorism, the Arab Spring and other.*

In such circumstances, the current security theories point to characteristics of national security crises in period of its existence. On the basis of that, to compile time analysis for the period before the war, during and after performances periods wars, which shall be established strategy of the modern world. One of the contemporary security theories is a theory of realism. It is believed that realism in the relations between strategy, security studies, international relations and political science. At the end of the paper, will be definite the impact on the development of modern realism and determination of society, confirming or rejecting the possibility of external influence and the effects of the interior effects to the national interests and security, in general.

The realism as a contemporary security theory

Twentieth Century raised two important issues in International Relations: Cold War and decolonization. It seems, the consequences of the Cold War are still feeling because most union still exists, some conflicts are still ongoing threat posed by the end of the Cold War, are threatened worldwide. The world entered the process of globalization, where underdeveloped countries become smaller and the bigger bite. Era characterized by two key events, the Cold War and the beginning of the creation of the democratic process, weaken the influence of realism, but strengthened the need for a national awakening, which entered the order today. World

decided to not work for the majority, but for us privileged minority, and many other practical theories have influenced the development of democratic processes, in particular, scientific and technological development, in search of safety between political entities, such as the theory of realism¹.

Realism as a theory, teaching and ideology, has become a necessity, which reflect the will of the peoples, the nations desire, determination of national interests of states, and the world meant “balance of power”, as well as many other wars in human history. The impact of “global realism” in the Cold War refutes radical developments, establishing new modern security theories and new security schools, for which weakened the influence of the theory of realism. The discipline of international relations, leading to progressive thinking, because it was realism prefix “irealistichen”. Access points to the new rules regarding the theory of strength, standing on the side of power, representing the interests of power². In such circumstances, academic relationships are redefined, because if there is no crisis, no academic discipline³. Sub-discipline of security studies dominated realists, was created during the Cold War.

It is impossible to write about the theory of realism, not to touch a security study that emerged from the Cold War. Modern security theory, that left as the only proven, in practice was the theory of realism, which represents the theory and ideology. Discussions concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the theory of realism play a key role in international academic circles. Authors that are more contemporary elaborate theory of realism in connection with international relations in the past fifty years⁴. At the same time, security processes and theories of realism are also important for studies that are studied this problem, emphasizing the important role of security studies. Any interested in safety factor should be given to or familiar with realism, because of his influence, but because of his contact with direct involvement in the practice. Realism in practice is treated as a family of ideas, because of similarities and the distinctive expression. Key positions of realism focused on governmental structure and its diversity in practice, separating the two sides’ authors as defensive realists and offensive realists. Defensive realism emphasizes the ability level of security in the anarchy, while offensive realism is represented by the use of maximum force. Between these two types of realism, there is a line-oriented material realist.

During the Cold War, realism was greatly criticized. But realism has never left the scene, neither turned in another direction. Good realists do not allow them self to become a target of unnecessary, illegal and unpopular war. Realism requires careful use of military power in accordance with the political orientation of the state.

¹ William Mc Neill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), and Geoffrey Blainey, *A Very Short History of the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2004).

² Ken Booth, ‘Critical Explorations’, in Ken Booth (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), pp. 4–10.

³ Fred Halliday, ‘The Future of International Relations: Fears and Hopes’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁴ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 5.

Therefore, realism does not permit generalization complex tradition and connection with the three important elements: existing, doing and knowing. For realists, the first references object characteristics and the existence of the states existence, as an actor in international politics and was the biggest champion of the people, the citizens. One of the important aspects of realisms knowledge, as the dominant method of positivism (understanding as a empirical qualification). Practice knowledge is created by the theory, such as the politic is created from ethics. This contributes to the development of ideas concerning the security of countries, types of threats, the participation of people and another. The third aspect achieves the objective, at the moment of creating a compatible environment for defining the necessary policies.

Realism. The emergence of true realism is the period when the world decided to redefine under existing international rules, norms and regulations on the one hand and development, power and influence of the state on the other. The period of influence and creating contemporary realism, are 50s of last century, when its representatives Herman Kan, Bernard Broody, Henri Kissinger, Albert Volesteler, Tomas Shelling, and other experts, state leaders and representatives of security schools are agreed that the basis of the theory and politics of realism, lies in the lack of a guiding force and maintaining the “balance of power”. The period, in which states retained their positions and created a traditional approach to reality, researchers allow this matter to be called “traditionalists”. Modern realism, exist over 50 years ago, when after the Cold War, not to allow the world to lead one country, or one superpower.

By recognizing the effects of growth conditions, opportunities, development processes and “the politics of globalization”, the main goal of the theory of realism and countries in the real world has become a “national interest”. This approach led to a redefinition of many security and political issues, especially after the Cold War. The real view of world order and the interests of the world are upset with their thinking that the end of the Cold War has weakened the influence of realism. The theory of realism is a reflection of the time, so this conclusion could be based on the results slowed and inefficient respond to threats around the world, where the results after the Cold War: persecution of about 5,000,000 people every year; about 600,000 die from various reason; each year, depleting 10-11,000,000 people; around 25,000,000 people mass displacement worldwide. The number of cases is increasing and it is difficult to determine, and the dark figure of crime is on the rise. World faces new face of terrorism, “suicide attacks”⁵.

The basis of the theory of realism in safety studies as part of the science of international relations, which was mostly interested in maintaining security between actors and people, traditional domestic political concerns, health and rights of people, the global political agenda and developments in other countries, disasters and massacres. Alternative views are pointing to the fact that the subject of research of realism should go beyond the scope of threats⁶. Many of the realists, the idea of national

⁵ <http://www.cdnpecekeeping.ns.ca>

⁶ Classical realism comes from the 40s of the 20th century, which dominated the young subject “International Relations”, where actors were states. But states interacted with each other through non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations that are considered relevant. World in a political

interest seeing in foreign policy, which as reality, continues after the Second World War to the present. Every government act according to the interests of their people. His influence realism reduces with the theories, ideas, understanding, that, the national interest declines if signed agreements with countries and governments who oppress their own people. As a supporter of this theory and author of the concept, Morgenthau in 1982 was behind the fact that the main goal of a state should be the integrity of the state, "its political institutions and culture".

However, this concept does not coincide with the European policy for "pooling of sovereignty"⁷. However, this concept today defended many governments in the world using the term "national interest"⁸. Realism in the post-Cold War has different approaches and perspectives. Each approach to modern views on the reality of the world and its definition provides various assumptions and explanations about the consequences and assumptions. Thus, realism is transformed into pursuing types and periods: classical realism, neoclassical "realism of rise and fall" and "neo-realism" (offensive structural and defensive structural)⁹. Each one is different and distinctive, but most pessimistic realists see international relations, although they are part of their research and interest.

Classical Realism. Classical realism in 20th century dates from a time when in 1939 marked the first works. Classical realism is characterized by answering the then-liberalism on issues of international politics and widely widespread liberalism in the period between the two world wars. The essence of classical realism is fighting states to increase their capabilities and power. On the other hand, classical realism explores conflicts about human weaknesses. For classical realists, politics is characterized as the devil, for evil actions that people do in implementing the policy.

Neorealism. The theory of Kenneth Waltz in 1979¹⁰, replaced the theory of Morgenthau as an obstacle to the implementation of realism. Theory of International Politics argues that systems are composed of structure and related units interact. This results in the phrase "what states want" and "what states have".

Defensive structural realism. Defensive structural realism originates from neo-realism, after the Cold War, but apart from him. This type of realism argues that states all their own way provide protection in international frames, but the biggest threats come from other countries.

Offensive structural realism. This theory arguing that states can still take advantage of their potential for participation in the international politics and used his position

sense pretsatvuvasha a political system. Realism was expanding at the expense of pessimism, with either very quickly understood that the world may not exist leading countries to increase their power and protecting the most powerful among themselves.

⁷ As an example, Morgenthau and Kissinger openly debated for U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam, "whether it is in the national interest of the country".

⁸ Foreign Minister Downer of Australia, in 2002 said, "The government is confident that the national interest of Australia has increased the ambitious and reasonable manner ... If you did not raise yourself, nobody will increase".

⁹ Colin Elman, Michael A. Jensen, "Realism" (unknown publication).

¹⁰ Kenneth Waltz's 1979 *Theory of International Politics*.

and power, against another state¹¹. Such approach draws five assumptions pertaining to the following: the international system is anarchic; great powers inherently possess offensive military capability that can harm one another, states can never be identically directed toward another; survival is the primary goal of large powers and great powers are rational actors in the world. From these assumptions it can be concluded that the great powers fear each other because they devote greater attention to safety and build better strategy for their survival.

Realism of rise and fall. This species occurs in the theory of time, the, “balance of power” in 1950¹². The interest of theory is facing the problem of money-power in international relations, in which the dominant role played politics of hegemony as a basis for peace. In this way, only the dominant states are in a position to shape the rules and policies of the international community, with the addition of other appetites will be satisfied and their own. When the state becomes indifferent, various factors affecting the threat of war. In the absence of preventive actions and efforts, the threat of war can be more certain. The “rise and fall” of realism, depicts human reality and history or a significant part of it. This theory suggests the need for programs to promote events in different ways and at different times. And this type of realistic points of internal developments in the states, which can be positive and negative (industrialization, social issues, economic system, military, technological and economic innovation, and more. Programs rise and fall causing many transition theories and research models beginnings and the possibility of wars¹³.

Neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is based on developing solutions and analysis relating to foreign policy and implemented for internal use. Implement segments for monitoring of foreign policy. The reason for the need of such a theory is ambiguous picture to the States comes from within. The outer scene is hard to see threats and opportunities, because the agenda to meet strategic purposes is infinite.

Previous chapter suggests on tradition of realism as showcases for his outstanding adaptation of important events. Along with realism, its place we find theorists, politicians, researchers and all other factors expert and political scene. The development of realism is implemented through several areas, the most important being: 1. Object of interest of the realism are predictions and threats, which means different realistic theories worked out different things. For example, structural realism suggests a joint action with respect to threats, while defensive structural realism suggests peaceful means of distracting the existence of a threat and refrain from use of offensive assets. 2. The capacity to change the realism opens the possibility of some criticism. Realists squabbled over the newly created theories for application anomalies obtained from empirical results. Consequently, theories of realism became

¹¹ John Mearsheimer’s (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

¹² A.F.K. Organski’s classic 1958 volume, *World Politics*.

¹³ Organski 1958, 1968a, 1968b, Organski and Kugler 1980, Kugler and Organski 1989, Kugler and Lemke 1996, 2000, Lemke 1995, 1996, DiCicco and Levy 1999, 2003), hegemonic war theory (Gilpin 1981, 1988), power cycle theory (Doran 1983, 1989, 2000, Doran and Parsons 1980), leadership long cycle theory (Modelski 1978, Modelski and Morgan 1985, Thompson 1983,1986, 1990, Rasler and Thompson 1983, 1985, 1991, 1994, 2000).

vague, coherent and specific. 3. Despite internal divisions among realists, this theory continues to be a central contributor to the building of national policy and development of safety and security studies. Realism as a theory emerges as the winner in the security environment, especially after the Cold War had significant explanations and understanding the causes of conflict and war.

Does weakening the impact of realism have a lasting effect?

Twentieth century was the period in which the state came to the fore because of the relationship between people and countries, which appear in the twenty-first century, went into history. States today have lost the care for people and are focused on other routes. But we must not forget that security as a term has a complex meaning. In Latin, the word security is written as “sine cura”, which means “without care”. The total release from care is impractical and undesirable, because life without worry is imagined and eliminates any scientific progress. As such, the theory in real life (safety) in international studies and global politics, focusing on the biggest fears, cares and threats to people. If there is no danger, no security, institutions will not exist, the theory will not have, will not the practice, will not science. Not only realism but also other pyramids cleared the possibility of war. In the new global order after the Cold War, realism turned to survey the security issues sidelined myriad world powers began to throw them on the table. National interests of states are looking at the actions of the threats to the state. The theory of realism accepts narrowing the focus of interest, especially after the Cold War. Representatives of this theory claim that just war threats prevailed during the Cold War. But realism is the only theory that fights for the concept of national interests and national security¹⁴. The U.S. government has dominated since the use of the prefix “national” government rhetoric always persuaded people to stand behind the government¹⁵. Reason for a nuclear threat during the Cold War, has contributed to awaken the national interest, to unite people and make security shield.

Realism constantly sticks to the term security, access and the state is key to securing the lives of citizens¹⁶. The term security has huge significance in actual political work, as threats to the state and people. Real is the need for security at a global level, recognized before the end of the Cold War. Defining the issue of security, but there are theoretical and realistic significance. Realistic way of defining security suggests that military issues are security and as such should be given priority by governments in terms of some “low-politics” issues¹⁷. Security known to be due to differences in

¹⁴ Walter Lipman 1943: Preliminary creator of the term “Cold War”, said, “A country is safe when not sacrifice legitimate interests to avoid war and is willing to hold through the war”.

¹⁵ Hans Morgentau: American Academy (father of realism) in the 50s, said: “The situation of the state is high, its power and sovereignty are joining the biggest concerns in external affairs”.

¹⁶ Meksvini 1999: claims that security will become an adjective. He believes that military power and the application of national interest can be positive and negative factors of safety. The concept of national interest came to the fore because of the freezing of international relations in the period 1945-1990.

¹⁷ World Health Organization: in 2002 published research on the causes of deaths in the world in which the order is as follows: 91% diseases, accidents 4.1%, 2.1% traffic accidents, suicides 1.5%, 0.9% killing, collective violence, 0.4% and 0.5% natural disasters.

subjective estimates with actual threats. In international relations, traditional real opinion leads to the claim that the greatest value is state sovereignty (domestic and foreign policy). It is clear that the priority is given to public safety. In democratic countries is the most important individual security. Questions of life and death on a global level are treated as priority because it does not fit into national policy.

The search for profit, enrich ones, depletes others. Realism is the basis for state interests, and ensuring the security and military issues. Realist paradigm will continue to dominate the global level, and will extend across all areas of society, especially the non-military issues and interests of the individual. The last two decades of the 20th century, are essential for mankind in order to comply with the world of theory of the current situation. However, the impact of modern warfare, leave traces on theories about the causes of conflicts and the negative development of the international community. In the modern world, there are three main groups of causes globally enabling warfare, including:

1. During the “Cold War” (anti-colonial reasons, ideological confrontation, socialist revolution, territorial and national distinction).
2. The period of the Cold War to the present (continuity of unsolved problems-causes, conflict in post-socialism republics, war against the dictatorial and totalitarian systems, international military interventions under the UN).
3. Conflicts in the near future (continuity of unsolved problems - causes, conflict with future superpowers and establishing a new world order, fight for vital living space and natural resources, civilization conflicts, opposition to various civilizations).

Conclusion

The theory of realism and its impact on humanity will never fade, but that over the time, will continually transform to another form, which will allow the foundation to last. The concept of realism after the Cold War, its weakening becomes the new approach, which provides a new beginning, a new design, contemporary transformation. The previous “national interests” realism transform into new evolutionary approaches that are identified as military security, security societies, political security, economic security, and others. After the Cold War, the realism, use security studies as a tool for monitoring and opposition to the new, with appropriate safety concept. Thus, the focus of interest rather than traditional threats are now asymmetric threats and risks and fourth-generation warfare, rather than military might arise economic and diplomatic aspects, rather than individual security apply collective security, or “Smart Defence” concept. The realism in a future will presents contemporary direction, strategy, foundation for further development and modernization of national capacities, particularly the implementation of the national interests of countries at local and global level, as well.

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Leadership and its social responsibility

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Short commentary. *Not only for the outstanding history personalities, but even nowadays in everyday life we can hear people singing praises to individuals or certain groups of people from different fields of activity. For instance, we hear people say for a group of young skilful students, “they will be the leaders of the future”; for a number of soldiers tested in difficult missions that “they are the future leaders of the Armed Forces” etc. You can hear people express in the same way for other fields of life like politics, economy, science, art etc.*

The question arises: are there any fundamental elements present in leadership in all historical periods, regardless of the fact that their appearance in each stage bears the modifications of the time? That is, can you just explain the phenomenon of leadership within Weber’s dichotomy – leader-disciple, or leadership is a social phenomenon, whose content is the resultant of the action of many variables like social and historical forces, which a real leader takes into account, as the product of historical era he belongs to, including the so-called process of socialization?

Sociological studies indicate that in the composition of the leadership phenomenon should we should distinguish: a) the leadership and management process, b) the individual as leader or manager, and c) the function or role of management, its products. As rightly pointed out, leadership is a delicate combination of process management techniques, with specific gifts, outstanding peculiarities of the leader’s personality, as well as the general social requirements for the fulfilment of this function.¹ From this perspective we understand that the concept of leadership can and should be distinguished from our own subjective judgments, we can understand what leadership is and who it is in a given moment, even though the phenomenon of leadership is better studied in close connection with the execution of tasks and function by certain people in a certain time.

¹ Al Gini, Moral Leadership: An Overview, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Feb., 1997), p. 323-330.

This paper intends to study the phenomenon of leadership despite the different areas of activity where it leads, by focusing on social type of leader, on one of the most essential features that it should embody to meet the expectations that current Albanian society has for its role and achievements and its social responsibility as well.

On social determining elements of leadership

The phenomenon of leadership has attracted the attention of researchers and there are numerous sociological, political, psychological and managerial studies in this field. Suffice to say that the deeper explanation of leadership issue does not seem difficult due to lack of research and studies in this field, but rather the general lack of approval on what are the inherent fundamental elements that each leader should bear; what are his essential leadership functions. However, sociological studies on leadership in various fields of human activity distinguish some social elements that are found at all leaders during all times in modern history, in their relations with other groups of people. In the context of relations of the leader with the people that follow him, leaders are classified in this way: first, leaders who push people for action; secondly, come those who are defined as exponents among people. Through their influence and sympathy they enjoy among people they personify experiences, desires, ambitions and their goals for a certain period of time; thirdly, there are the so-called representatives of the masses, elected by them in a legal way as representatives of a certain social group and; finally, there are leaders who 'build' the masses themselves, the so-called constructive leaders who group, organize, inspire and lead their followers to achieve certain social objectives.²

The fourth type of leader best meets the features that the current Albanian leadership should embody in various fields of social, political, scientific, business activity, and in management of processes of civil society organizations and military ones. This type of leader is presented as a social product, aware that he is not an entity based on the self, or appointed to that role by himself, but rather it is a denial of his ego. For such kind of leader the idea of a centralized autocratic authority is alien.

Nowadays for our democratic societies, the emergence of a leader who builds his personality not only in the political field, but also in other areas, through techniques of oppression and coercion, through imposing his illegitimate thought and will, creates shocking effects. Such assessments like "charismatic leader" or "leader of the nation" that have circulated in recent decades-typical for traditional societies of a distant past-are primitive and authoritarian reminiscences, inconsistent with the spirit of the ongoing process of rationalization in the modern capitalist society, the essence of which was widely discussed in the early 20's of last century by the German sociologist Max Weber. While he considered typical the types of rational legitimacy for the modern capitalist society, he considered the kinds of traditional and charismatic legitimacy as something related to backward and traditional societies, whose vindication is achieved by blind obedience to the old customs and traditions, or to the alleged extraordinary qualities and almost mystical of an autocratic leader. Given

² F. Stuart Chapin, *Socialized Leadership*, The Journal of Social Forces, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Nov., 1924), published by Oxford University Press 2013, p. 57.

Weber's concept of rationalization as a global process of development of life in all its sectors in the political field rationalization outlines the substantial difference between autocracy and democracy, because the first relies on the assumption of the divine or mystical will embodied in a ruler, and the second, relies on the expression of the popular will of the nation. Regarding formal rationalization, autocracy and democracy are respectively distinguished by the fact that the first assumption is based on the presence of the leader's charisma, while the second in legality, i.e. the legitimacy of democratic procedures of elections, both in the political field and other areas of social activity.³

Charismatic leader of the undemocratic past was typical in a social environment that did not impose him any sense of responsibility to his followers or to the society in general. That kind of leader mainly did not address the rationality of the crowd that followed him, but their blind instincts and passions generally dazzled by the effect of his charisma. In today's democratic society one of the inherent features of a leader's and constructive leadership is the responsibility, understood as responsibility toward the followers for honest leadership in order to protect their interests and the fulfill the major goals of the community and society, at the same time as a liability to the tasks of the time and its claims that go beyond the interests of particular communities.

The 22 years experience of pluralism in our country shows numerous cases of positive achievements that have been accomplished thanks to the role of the Albanian leadership, regardless of any political party. We are all aware that Albania of 2013 differs from Albania of 1990. However, the repeated failures of the Albanian leadership to implement the required reforms for the country's integration into the European Union, the third rejection by the European institutions responsible for giving Albania the candidate status for EU member during 2012,⁴ shed light on the lack of a very important aspect in the activity of the Albanian leadership and on its internal constitution-in terms of responsibility. All surveys and sociological studies in the last two decades have shown that the vast majority of the Albanian population, regardless of political orientation and political affiliation, has claimed the country's membership in the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures. From this perspective, it should be highlighted that the responsibility of the Albanian leadership to achieve this major objective as soon as possible by carrying out the required reforms had to be much greater. Apparently we seem to be in a paradoxical situation-should the horses pull the cart, or the cart should push the horses ahead.

Low level of responsibility in leadership to the extent really perceived by the common Albanian deserves to be examined more completely. Actually this low level of responsibility should be regarded as a deficit of rational leadership in the Albanian

³ Fatmir Zanaj, *Sociologjia e së Drejtës*, Publishing House "Naim Frashëri", Tiranë 2010, p. 70, 74.

⁴ Communication from the commission to the european parliament and the council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, Brussels, 10.10. 2012, COM(2012) 600, where attention is drawn to the Albanian political leadership for blocking the required reforms because of the strained relations between the parties and notes specifically that for the future it will be essential to sustain the pace of the reforms being focused particularly on the implementation of the legislation and policies on the areas of the law's rule."(p. 15)

society? For the true and constructive leader is accountable not only to the narrow political group of his close devotees, who do not resemble the followers of autocratic charismatic leader, overwhelmed by the fever of blind passions, by hatred for the political opponents, and the greed of direct gain through methods of corruption, nepotism and clientelism. When it comes to constructive and rational leader, leadership should not be confused with the practice of construction and utilization of clientelism. Constructive political leader is accountable not only to the followers of his narrow circle but he must be accountable to the country for the achievement and non-achievement of the objectives that his country has at the time he is a leader. In this sense political leader should not estimate as his followers only separate factions within the mass of the people, but within the certain time limits of the mandate attained democratically; he should lead the whole masses of the country; render account to them; he must express and protect their fundamental interests, aspirations and expectations.

Today's constructive leader of the democratic society is not immune from the possible infections by the manifestation of what the French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville called the "tyranny of the majority" which is manifested through efforts made by certain leaders or political forces "to artificially increase the natural strength of the majority".⁵ Nowadays, as illustrated by the political experience of many countries in our region, clientelism and nepotism in the political and administrative leadership are two instruments to increase the power of artificial political majorities out of contested elections. The concern expressed in the Progress Report of European Commission October 2012 on Albania is a testimony of this. This report highlights the occurrences of a partial implementation of the laws and decisions of the Council of Ministers on the organizational structure of public administration institutions, refusal by central government of the requirements of Public Administration Department, numerous cases of employment in these institutions of party militants on temporary work contracts, in violation of the laws and professional criteria for employment, or the phenomenon of political-party split of local authorities association, alongside with a lack of transparency and consultation practice of local authorities with civil society and other relevant groups of interest (stakeholders) etc.⁶

Accountability of leadership to its followers is an important aspect of his moral integrity in the implementation of its steering function. Research shows that this feature is present in all social, political, economic organizations etc. Scholars argue that constructive and responsible leadership contributes to building and increase of social capital;⁷ that in business field his contribution serves the common good not only to the so-called "shareholder" (as we call those who own a share of the property

⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition*, 4 Vols., Vol. 2, Chapter 7: Of the Omnipotence of the Majority in the United States and its Effects. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/>

⁶ Albania 2012 Progress Report, European Commission. Brussels 10. 10. 2012 SED (2012) 334, p. 9, 10.

⁷ Thomas Maak, *Responsible Leadership, Stakeholder Engagement, and the Emergence of Social Capital*, *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 74, No. 4, Ethics in and of Global Organizations: The EBEN 19th Annual Conference in Vienna (Sep., 2007), p. 329-343

in a business company), but also to the so-called stakeholders (people who do not actually own a share of the capital of that company, but are interested in its success). If figuratively the followers of the closest circle and clientelist of the authoritarian leader would be called “shareholder” of its business policy, his autocratic view prevents it to see and protect the interests of other strata and groups of interest throughout society, that we would be called groups “stakeholders” in the framework of the achievement of the strategic objectives of national policy.

Given the treatment of leadership as a social phenomenon, business management theoreticians in terms of the current global crisis of capitalism, are focused on a better understanding of the ways, means and methods of social impact on the increase of leadership responsibility in a global pluralist society, which is called the “the society of interested groups for its welfare and success”, or otherwise, - “global stakeholder society”. This kind of society appeals to all interested parties for a proactive commitment to its progress, requires from the leaders to educate comprehensive engagement and dialogue, urges them to facilitate the development of the legitimate debate and assist in achieving a balance between different interests in the process of making sound decisions in morale terms.⁸

Hence, it is understandable that social events of every kind , as well as their leaders , face with the challenge of creating a network of sustainable and complex relationships, and by acting within them attract in the creative activity of interested groups, namely stakeholder, in a dialogue that creates resonance, trust and ultimately, collaborative social capital. Based on this conception, if we go back to the repeated failure Albanian leadership to quickly integrate the country into the European Union, we understand that the symmetry of the refusal to take into account the interests of the other party, when the necessary responsibility to make mutual concessions on behalf of national interests, is the most visible expression of deficit the deficit of leadership in the political elite of the Albanian society nowadays. This situation has created the impression in large segment of our society that the repeated symmetry of refusal can be repeated even if we rotate political power, thus strengthening sentiments of sceptics at home and in Europe, whether the current Albanian political class wants to integrate the country into the European Union or not.

Certainly, even in an advanced democratic society, when it comes to leadership we mean the totality of the relationships between the leader and his followers at different levels of social organization. But in cases when the leader organizes his followers, he must take into account the interests, engagements and expectations even of other socially organized groups that in a more or less democratic society are not considered hostile groups that should be suppressed and destroyed. A leader with democratic formation first of all awakens in the group he leads the desire to express their opinion and attitude and does not exert force or does not try to manipulate to suppress the individual tendencies of his followers. His word is varies and stimulates the expression of various impulsive and instinct elements in the original nature of his followers, for the benefit of their mobilization in order to achieve important social objectives of the community he leads.

⁸ Thomas Maak, Ibid p. 330.

Property of community life and unity of his action in this way can go through strengthening the impulsive tendencies for a change at each individual. Under this kind of leadership, the followers being encouraged in their impulses towards building a community life, as an expression of participation in the construction of the group, is likely to enjoy the pleasure and stimulation of several other trends, the impact on competitive groups in the way of self-affirmation of ideals and interests of the community. In short, mutual harassment of impulsive tendencies of individuals within the group, even those between competing groups, takes the right track and gains the awareness for change. In such a case they say that group members are allowed to “learn by doing”, and therefore their sound judgment learns from mistakes, which a social visionary and responsible leader highlights, explains and then guides his followers to avoid them in the future.

Secondly, such a leader organizes the emotions and will of his followers about the plan or program of the movement he leads, and not about his narrow and selfish wishes or interests. He is convinced that loyalty to the cause is worth more than just loyalty to his person. The natural result of this kind of leadership is that group members experience the richness of group feeling and the consciousness of belonging to the group due to their identification with the program that the leader unfolds, where each member of the community that he leads has given a certain type of contribution and not just with his personality traits. Self-estimation and self-respect are controlled and disciplined by group-estimation and group-respect and, in this way, it comes to the highest level of self-respect, be that individual or collective. If this is carried out by all the leaders of organizations of different competing groups in a democratic society, then it results in the addition of cooperative social capital, which is a prerequisite for achieving political, economic, cultural and other common strategic objectives from all the competing groups in a democratic society.

The deficit of leadership in the current Albanian society has led to a lack of cooperation and constructive dialogue among all competitive political and social forces. This deficit is no longer secret or unknown. Evidences of this leadership deficit are reflected in the entire progress report of European Commission on Albania in the period 2006-2012: “Periods of political deadlock in the spring summer 2006 hampered parliament’s efforts to agree on important reforms issues, especially those that require broad political consensus”⁹; “the culture of dialogue between the main political parties deteriorated before the election; ...in general, political dialogue, a key European Partnership priority, should be reestablished on track”¹⁰; “...despite constitutional provisions, there is enough evidence about the lack of parliamentary supervision over the executive (government) and the parliament does not function as an independent institution ... parliamentary work for the adoption of laws and surveillance functions bears the evident stamp of difficult political dialogue and often not constructive. Since June 2009, parliamentary work is overshadowed and undermined by political stalemate”¹¹; “violent incidents of 21 January 2011 that led to the murder

⁹ Albania 2006 Progress Report, Brussels, 08.11.2006, SEC (2006) 1383, (COM (2006) 649 final)

¹⁰ Albania 2009 Progress Report, Brussels, 14.10.2009, SEC(2009) 1337.

¹¹ Commission Opinion on Albania ‘s application for membership of the European Union, Brussels, 09 November 2010, SEC(2010) 1335.

of four protesters, further added to the climate of distrust not only between political forces, but also between state institutions...; All this situation diverted the attention from the so much wanted political reforms for integration into the European Union”¹².

Modern leader, expertise and leadership structure

Any type of organization, whether economic, political, scientific, administrative, etc., has its own structure. At the top of each structure, even in the composing units, normally there are certain people. But that does not mean that the person designated at top of these structures should have the qualities required from a leader nowadays. John Gardner is right when he states: “leadership should never be confused with status, power, position, rank or title. Even in large corporations and government agencies the person of the highest position may be the bureaucrat number one.”¹³

The question is: Does the leader emerge spontaneously and as an isolated person and takes the lead of a given or emerging organization or the leader is moulded, tempered and formed as a social phenomenon? There are two approaches regarding the answer to this question: determinism and non-determinism. If by non-determinism, the emergence of a leader is totally spontaneous, according to determinism, at a given moment of social development, when before a company or an organization there are major challenges to face, when that company or organization has succeeded and failed several times fighting to overcome the obstacles that lie ahead, when gradually the conditions and means are created for surmounting them, that is the time when the leaders emerge to guide their followers in a given society or organization to achieve success and meet their strategic objectives.

But they do not emerge completely in a given moment; they are groomed and grown gradually. This growth means not just collecting experience and leadership skills, but also expertise in various fields of activity. The leader of the large size organizations should first be distinguished and become known in public, in smaller organizations. It is exactly these small organizations that mould the future leaders of large organizations. Leadership in these professional, economic, military organizations, etc. is more associated with the expertise in key areas of action of those organizations. Anyway, expertise is one side of the coin; certainly it should be supplemented with some other inherent qualities of a leader. In the Armed Forces, for example, alongside with expertise leadership requires, loyalty to the profession, vision, integrity and respect for colleagues and subordinates, strong character and, ability to make decisions under stress and difficult conditions; the same can be said for organizations like those of lawyers where scrupulous honesty, tranquillity and balance in decision-making, cooperation with colleagues and other people are crucial. Lawyers know that to be leaders in their profession, they need to be professionally good lawyers, capable, honest and independent in thoughts and decision-making.

The appropriate expertise makes of a professional organization leader to identify and set in motion the best energies and skills of his subordinates. This is one of the important responsibilities of a leader. He should rely on this knowledge to build

¹² Albania 2011 Progress Report, Brussels, 12.10.201, SEC(2011) 1205 final.

¹³ J. W. Gardner, *On Leadership*, The Free Press, New York 1990, f. 2.

priorities of effective usage of these energies, especially at a time when their resources are limited. Leadership is manifested as an ability to provide leadership and example of “what to do”, while the administration or management skills more appear as skill to show “how to do it.” The combination of expertise, vision and management skills are vital for nowadays leadership, not only in small, partial and professional, but also in the context of political parties and in the society. If such a thing does not happen, if this combination does not function, then there are deficits in leadership, as noted by social political developments in Albania and in our region.

Leadership in social and political life is not an isolated individualistic phenomenon. As rightly emphasized by Brian J. Cook, though theoretically leadership is something exercised only by individuals, it should not be allowed that individualist orientation or a single actor completely dominate all our explanatory vision on this phenomenon. For the construction of a particular social regime “is ultimately a collective process ...Large institutions and formal organizations exercise their direct impact on the character of the regime. They constitute the largest part of the social substance of that regime itself.”¹⁴

The leader or manager of a democratic society does not embody the organization in various areas of social activities, does not give his “face” to each member of organization, but tries to institutionalize it by encouraging his followers to express themselves within it. He paves the way for the groundbreaking and creative spirit at each ordinary member to give their contribution to community life, in order that they see how their ideas are included in the life of the organization. Generally, the most appropriate form of management is the creation of governing bodies - as an executive committee or a board of directors, of an assembly of a steering committee etc., as examples of this type of organization, comprised of individuals who represent the elementary or functional interests of different parts of a larger social group. In this way can be represented locality of origin, occupations, religious beliefs, gender, etc., giving the opportunity to all the different elements of the larger inclusive group to give their respective contribution in its favour.

Nowadays leader or manager adjusts the old organizational structures or machine with the new needs, and tries to avoid the creation of new structures in response to the birth of every new need. This technique of organization is of great value because it allows exploiting in the most comprehensive way the social values and motivating driving forces, inherent in existing forms and teamwork skills. Modern leader or manager does not seek here and there to invent new organizational projects that will fit his feelings, tastes and pleasures of, or designed to create jobs for friends and build around him a supportive clientele. He adapts forms and organizational structures of existing agencies to cope with the new problems. Much of that impatience and haste to create new structures seems to emanate from the reaction of those who seek escape from the need to deal with reality and honest commitment to deal with the fundamental issues. This is the hidden motive that often constitutes the base for the organizational activity of the so-called leaders. Running after new structures, the

¹⁴ Brian J. Cook, Politics, Political Leadership, and Public Management, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1998), f. 225-230 (226).

demagogic and noisy rhetoric about their usefulness and effectiveness mainly aims at attracting the attention from the most basic needs that often require drastic solutions and might have unpleasant consequences, if not catastrophic consequences for friends. Thus, energies for real progress of the organization or community are diverted and they are towards superficial and actions and reforms.

However, as the researchers point out, "Leadership is one of those qualities that are better seen than heard. Those who lead do not talk much, and those who speak more, lead less. As Shakespeare wrote, "A ship without goods makes the most noise." Albanians are fed up with politicians' statements that their country is becoming a "regional superpower" in this or that sector of economy, that the contract of X party with the electorate is over fulfilled several times, while in reality Albania remains the poorest country the region, the last country in the integration processes into the European Union, one of the most obnoxious countries to join European family by those who answer the survey questions of Euro Barometer.

Recent examples from our country and the region indicate that often, in different fields of activity, emerge and have emerged leaders who rush to invent new organizational structures to avoid the reorganization of their inner life, their habits of thought and their customary sentimental experiences, by replacing them with the external organization of new structures. Such persons who are presume that they are "leaders" simply from the fact that they are firmly attached to the seat of government and party leadership structures have become the most conservative and restrictive force for the progress of their political entity and for the whole society. If this analysis is correct, such individuals manage to deceive themselves and to convey this misleading idea onto their followers. Even when their followers react, they suppress the opposing voices by anti-democratic methods.

"There is a reason for everything", King Solomon preached, there is a time you should lead, there is also a time when you should follow somebody else. This applies not only for the leader of an organization, but also for a business leader, for a party leader, for a cabinet leader, etc. When success is achieved, power and glory are both for him and for the entire organization. "There is also a time when the often ignored expression "I do not know" should be said."¹⁵

Handling of the content of leadership as a social phenomenon is inseparable from the principle of promoting education for faithful and intelligent followers for positions that generally execute that function. For this reason, modern leadership should use such a technique that is based on the policy of education and training of subordinates and followers. Basic principles of organizational activity of nowadays leader should include the realization of self-expression of his followers, the organization of the emotions group members about the plan or cause in a given case, in the interest of development of a sense of loyalty, the institutionalization of the organization rather than its personification; the use of smart methods of education for the creation of human capacities like conferences, workshops and other forms of education in group.

¹⁵ Brian D. Farrow, *Lawyers and Leadership*, *The Business Lawyer*, Vol. 44, No. 4 1989, f. 1699-1705 (1703)

Activities organized in groups can easily bring about the expansion and growth of the group. Therefore, many organizations become ineffective. In any case, we have to do with significant increase of the role of parts within these groups or large structures. The effective management of the large group cannot rely on personal contact of the leader with every member. The modern and skillful leader deems it necessary, in various stages of group development activities, to delegate management powers to his subordinates. It is indispensable that the leader must rely on the opinions of experts and his subordinates accountable to him. The most valuable principle here is to respect the opinion of a specialist, who in turn should not be trusted or over estimated beyond his field of expertise. Beyond the perimeter of his special professional knowledge, his opinion is rarely more reliable than that of any other uninformed person, because it is unorganized. The great need in nowadays democratic countries of our region is the development of leadership in all spheres of life - and not a leadership concentrated on a few people, but a distributed and spontaneous leadership among the broad masses of our people.

Scientific literature on the phenomenon of leadership distinguishes between formal and informal leadership. Formal leadership is related with the leading activity of people vested with power, i.e. with official authority, while informal leadership implies the accumulated power and the convincing-inspiring skills of different individuals within social communities.¹⁶ Recognition and identification of these individuals is not simply a matter of their personal career, but a social need for the cultivation of the visionary leadership. Social development needs in periods of great historical turning points, as our region has experienced in the last two to three decades, encourage the emergence of leaders who guide the masses to their fulfilment. These are visionary leaders, who if do not exist, should be created by forces that support democratic development in societies in transition. Recommendations for the creation and education of such capable visionary leaders who in turn will mobilize and guide masses to participate in the democratic process, by promoting the required inspiration for change, are especially valuable to societies as those in Western Balkans, which has experienced and still experiences periods of visionary leadership crisis.

The pressure and constant assistance of the international community such as the EU and the U.S. towards the heads of states and societies of this region have served and serve this purpose, i.e. the building and cultivation of visionary leaders. Nowadays most countries should engage in the activities that require efforts to build and cultivate such leaders. This is necessary to overcome situations created in many fields like economy, politics etc. by the global crisis of capitalism. This is more imperative in terms of competition between democratic societies and various forms of hybrid and undemocratic regimes. The latter convey messages that contain the potential risk of the distortion of democracy, due to the lack of will and authority that true visionary leaders should demonstrate. This is at the same time a manifestation of their lack of accountability. Therefore, as different scholars note, the recommendation to strengthen

¹⁶ Robert L. Peabody, "Leadership in Legislatures: Evolution, Selection, Functions", *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), f. 441-473 (443).

and cultivate social and political visionary leadership is currently very important.¹⁷

Some conclusions

Firstly, in our changing democratic societies, the need to cultivate visionary and responsible social leadership is present in all fields of life. These needs become more urgent in terms of capitalism's crisis, which seems to be long and impedes the process of democratic changes that are taking place in our societies in the region and beyond.

Secondly, our societies are going through the preliminary stages of cultivation of strategic leadership, in the stage of leader formation in all areas of social, economic, political, administrative, business, and science life etc. in order to ensure the indomitability of democratic process and accelerate the pace of democratic change in the country's integration into the European family, the European Union, after the accession to NATO. This means that it is necessary to increase the social capital in leadership, to institutionalize the process of rotation in leadership in organizations and structures that affect the destiny of people in the country. Therefore, the overcome of the deficit in leadership makes it necessary to build mechanisms that guarantee free circulation without tension, i.e. the democratic circulation of elites in power, by guaranteeing the stability of the political and social system and promoting the cultivation of independent professional elites in all areas of economic, administrative, scientific, military life etc.

Thirdly, the development of civilization, the infinite increase of the volume of knowledge and expertise, and the democratization of the education process, require new vision from constructive and rational leadership in a political and social viewpoint, because political institutions are institutions of a particular type. They are instruments of system construction, and its component parts at the same time. They are the main tool, through which a social community can achieve common goals. Because of their composition, structure and their functioning, of goals they have and laws they adopt on behalf of the society (in the context of representing institutions), they have a lasting impact on the character of the society and state, on the way they will evolve in the future.

Fourthly, in the balance of power between the visionary leader and masses that follow him in a democratic society, there are frequently changes of positions, which again bring us to the question "should the horses pull the cart, or the cart should push the horses ahead? Nowadays, when it comes to the fourth wave of global democratization; a visionary leadership is required, which implies leadership that clearly defines the role of each of the above two factors in the development of society. Overestimating the role of leader and putting into question the role of masses that follow him, which constitute the reservoir of preparing new leaders, can be regarded as a failure of the definition of leadership mission and manifestation of its absence.

¹⁷ Yehezkel Dror, Visionary Political Leadership: On Improving a Risky Requisite, International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.9, No. 1, Visionary Realism and Political Leadership/ Dirigeants, grands desseins, et réalités politiques (Jan., 1988), f. 7-22 (9).

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Public Communication as an important element of the Armed Forces activity

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Short commentary. *In the information age and the rapid technological development, the armed forces as part of NATO structures are facing new challenges that arise from the rapid global developments, NATO New Strategic Concept, from requirements for implementation into practice of the ‘smart defence’ and the peculiarities of our country. In the framework of the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept and its strategic communication, public diplomacy as part of it has undergone significant changes. In the opinion of some people it seems as if public diplomacy is not connected with the Armed Forces (AF), because there are other institutions and actors responsible to deal with this important element of international communication. Such an approach is not only outdated but also counterproductive because in the context of the battle to ‘win hearts and minds’, which constitutes one of the pillars of ‘soft power’, the AF today conduct an asymmetric war which requires the contributions of public diplomacy in their activity. In this context, the AF should not be considered a simple mechanism of ‘strong power’ but also as a valuable contributor to our national public diplomacy.*

Keywords: NATO, AF, strategic communication, public diplomacy, ‘soft power’.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War increased expectations for the existence of a permanent peace in the entire world, but the revival of terrorism with its peak on September 11th and the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chad, and recently in Middle East show that the achievement of a lasting peace across the globe is difficult. They also showed that the end of the Cold War was accompanied by a change in the nature of threats from symmetric threats to asymmetric ones.

In her paper “Public Diplomacy: Remedy for NATO’s Image Problem” E. Akçada” (2012:106) notes that:

“...as a result of a paradigm shift, the merely military issues which were the responsibility of AF have been replaced by new security threats that are centred

upon the individual and society. One of the main characteristic features of the new security threats is their being international in nature. In other words, these threats neither appear just because of the actions of a certain state nor pose a threat for a single state. Thus, in the world where “insecurity gets globalized”, security issues have gained a significant importance.”¹

In a world that changes very quickly and which is built by the revolution in information and communication, the most effective means to create a positive image, to update the existing image, to provide prestige and credibility or to convey messages to the public in other countries is public diplomacy. Hence, the considering public diplomacy with the appropriate attention in AF as well as the construction of an effective activity in this direction by partnering with institutions and other stakeholders would be a salient aspect of the efforts to further integration into NATO structures.

As a NATO member it is necessary for the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) to know well the Alliance’s policy of Strategic Communications which in particular highlights the requirements for an effective public diplomacy. ACO Directive (ad) 95-2, ACO Strategic Communications presented in April 2012 define strategic communication of the Alliance as follows:

“...the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities-Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate-in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims”.²

This definition indicates that Public Diplomacy ranks as one of the key components of the Strategic Communication therefore the AF of every member country should assess this component not only politically, but also from the practical and operational standpoint. For the AAF which has no heritage in this area, this is not only a novelty but also a necessity. On the other hand, as part of the Alliance we are an active participant in peacekeeping operations, joint exercises, training activities or NATO staffs, we need to give special attention to issues of Strategic Communications in general and those of Public Diplomacy in particular, in the strategic documents of the AAF, in the education system and in priority units.

Strategic approach to Public Diplomacy

Bruce Gregory, in his paper “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication:

Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms” delivered at the Conference organized by the American Association of Political Science on “International Communication and Conflict”, besides other points highlight that:

“Strategy is a term that answers the question “how.”⁷ Interests and values describe the goals of strategy and answer the question “why.” A strategy is a plan for action

¹ Akçada”, E. (2012). “Public Diplomacy: a Remedy for NATO’s Image Problem”, *Bilge Strateji, Cilt 4, Sayı 6, p.106.*


² ACO Directive (ad) 95-2, ACO Strategic Communications (2012), p.4. www.carlisle.army.mil

Public Communication, an important element of the AF activity _____

*that sets priorities and uses resources to achieve goals. Strategic logic in any endeavour involves determination of specific ends and choices among instruments needed to achieve them. Public diplomacy is one of the important instruments among a variety of persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments available to strategists.”*³

But what is Public Diplomacy and why it is an effective instrument in the fight to win ‘hearts and minds’? The term Public Diplomacy was used for the first time by the former U.S. diplomat Edmund Gullion in 1965, who at the time was the dean of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tuft University. According to Gullion Public Diplomacy “...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy”.⁴ Public diplomacy at its core is negotiation. If, before the Cold War it was a means in East-West conflict as opposed to heavy machinery of communist propaganda against Western values, modern public diplomacy has changed the ways of conducting negotiations. Today it serves a dual purpose: it is used as a negotiating tool and as an instrument for the development of unconventional war, i.e. part of ‘soft power’.

Referring to the following scheme, built by Allied Command Transformation (2012), Public diplomacy is a political level tool along with Public Affairs. The first communicating with foreign audiences and the second communicating with audiences inside the country. According to the Allied Command Operations Directive on Public Affairs (2008) “Public



³ Gregory, B. (2005). “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms”, paper presented at American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict. <http://www8.georgetown.edu>

⁴ As cited in Akçada, E. (2012). “Public Diplomacy: a Remedy for NATO’s Image Problem”, *Bilge Strateji, Cilt 4, Sayı 6, p.108*.

*support for NATO's missions and tasks follows from public understanding of how the Alliance makes a difference to international peace and security"*⁵

A diagram depicting the relationship between various components of NATO's strategic communications efforts.⁶

As it can easily be noted, both political and military instruments, are part of the same scheme that constitutes the essence of the content of NATO Strategic Communication. These elements are complementary and interact with each other in compliance with Alliance's strategy. The fact that public diplomacy as an instrument is included in the political level does not imply that it will be used by NATO political leaders or leaders of member states only. Every member of the Armed Forces, first of all should understand the essence of NATO policy for strategic communication, intentions and practical ways to use these communication instruments.

This necessity arises first and foremost from the Alliance's major interests which should address the audiences with a unified message. It also arises from our narrow national interests and yet from the interests of the AF. According to Akçada" (2012:108):

*"In a globalized world, public opinion matters more than ever. Yet, because of communication and information revolutions, publics have become more distrustful of the governments and the international organizations. That is why the ability to influence public opinions (in other words, public diplomacy), has become one of the most crucial elements of foreign policy. This feature of public diplomacy can be found in Huns Tuch' definition: "...a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies."*⁷

Unlike traditional diplomacy which conducts this kind of communication through elites engaged in diplomatic service and top state leaders, public diplomacy accomplishes it through experts of various fields such as officers, engineers, artists, actors, sportsmen, retired diplomats etc., who are engaged in public diplomacy through missions, projects, business exchanges, training, cultural, artistic and sports activities; through non-governmental organizations; through various printed or audio-visual media.

From this perspective the question arises: What kind of contribution can the AF give in the field of public diplomacy?

Public Diplomacy as a novelty and necessity for the AAF

The request for inclusion of the Armed Forces in the activities of public diplomacy is a novelty in terms of our country because it is a more or less fresh ground and for

⁵ Allied Command Operations (ACO) Public Affairs, ACO Directive Number 95-1, (2008), p.1-1.

⁶Public Intelligence (2012). Strategic Communications: How NATO Shapes and Manipulates Public Opinion", <http://publicintelligence.net/nato-stratcom-shaping-public-opinion/>

⁷ Akçada", E. (2012). "Public Diplomacy: a Remedy for NATO's Image Problem", *Bilge Strateji, Cilt 4, Sayı 6, p.108.*

historical reasons we inherited lack of experience in this area. Activities such as the various campaigns about the necessity of NATO membership in the press, especially in the military press and in audio-visual media, joint training activities and exercises with bilateral or multilateral context, the intense political activity of state leaders and key institutions to convince the public at home and abroad on the determination of the Albania to be part of the Alliance, various publications on the role and importance of NATO and other activities, in character, have been contributions to public diplomacy.

However, we have reached a new stage. From April 2009, Albania is a full NATO member. This change in status has a great significance for the AAF. Politically, we are part of an alliance which as stated by the former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright is “...an Alliance of democracies which is the basis of the Alliance itself, which obviously means that our publics need to understand what this is all about in the 21st century.”⁸ From this point of view NATO’s public diplomacy rests on two pillars: first, on the work to convince and clarify the public of its member countries on the role and importance of the Alliance for peace and security not only for the member states and; for a stable democratic order in the Euro-Atlantic space; secondly, working with foreign audiences to display NATO’s values and contributions to peace and security. The second pillar is closely related to the first one because without trust and the blessing of the public within the borders of the Alliance public diplomacy outside this space may not be successful.

In the battle to win ‘minds and hearts’ and as part of the Alliance AAF can increase its contributions in public diplomacy. To do this it is important:

First, to understand NATO’s policy about public diplomacy. Reconsidering the importance of working with its image NATO has started to conduct a more effective public diplomacy based on new Strategic Communication that derives from the new Strategic Concept. Alliance has now a certain institution that deals with the policy and management of public diplomacy. All this activity is based on a particular strategy which in turn is built on six principles set out very clearly by Stefanie Babst, Deputy /Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy (2009:4-7) in her remarks at “NATO PFP Symposium”.

Public diplomacy is about listening. According to Babst “... Listening is important for two reasons: *firstly*, collecting and analyzing the opinions of your respective target groups or segments of the public is a MUST. Unfortunately, not many governments and organizations systematically invest in surveying public trends. If at all, they often prefer to rely on snapshots offering little in-depth knowledge of the sort that could help them understand their target groups and shape their public diplomacy approach accordingly; *secondly*, however, the listening must be genuine. It must be a serious effort to understand the motives and beliefs of your interlocutors.”⁹

⁸ As cited in Robert Helbig (2011). “Defining its future, engaging its public: NATO’s new Strategic Concept as a tool for survival”, ISU Conference Paper, p.19.

⁹ Babst, S. (2009). “Public Diplomacy – the art of engaging and influencing”. Speech delivered at the NATO PFP Symposium, p. 4-7. <http://www.atlantic-community.org>

Public diplomacy must be connected to policy. This is a crucial issue because there is no substitute for a sound policy. There is no successful public diplomacy without a balanced and transparent policy. Babst stresses that: *“What counts is not what you say, but what you do. That is why public diplomacy cannot and should not attempt to portray a serious crisis or war in rosy colours. You can never communicate a problem away. You may try, but experience tells us that most attempts are bound to fail.”*¹⁰ Examples of failure in Iraq and Afghanistan show that haste in politics and declaring victory prematurely brought damage which required investments of energy, large forces and resources later. Referring to these examples Babst asks: *“What does this tell us about an effective public diplomacy effort? In the first place, it tells us how imperative it is to be clear about your political goal. Often it is better for a government to admit that it is still trying to find the best solution, and that making progress takes time. Secondly, it tells us that communication efforts-no matter how skillfully designed-are likely to fail if you insist on portraying something as a success story if it is not-as in the case of Afghanistan.”*¹¹

Public diplomacy must be credible to be effective. Babst elaborates this principle stating that: *“What applies to dealings with the media should apply to all public partners: if you try to manipulate or lie, you will immediately lose credibility. Unfortunately, there are numerous examples of how much damage a dishonest public diplomacy effort can do to a government or even an entire country. In times of crisis or war it may seem particularly tempting to turn the truth upside down or at least twist it as much as possible. But despite the overflow of information in today’s round-the-clock media environment, the public’s memory still works and deception and lies are not easily forgiven.”*¹² Nowadays you cannot keep things unrevealed due to communication technologies and open societies globally. You are permanently under the eyes and scope of social media and civil society has become a very important player in molding public opinion and attitudes.

Public Diplomacy is not always about you. This principle relates to the role of key leaders, the mentality and the sense that they should have to contribute to public diplomacy. According to Babst: *“Sometimes the most effective public diplomacy will be conducted under the media spotlights, but at other times, policy issues are better communicated by third parties, such as think tanks and academics, than through official statements. Facilitating and supporting discussions among political networks or groups of foreign policy professionals can be an excellent public diplomacy strategy if the aim is to introduce and bring to the public attention a specific policy issue.”*¹³ The core of this principle is that nowadays a better cooperation with experts of different fields and the construction of an environment where responsibilities are shared for the mutual interest, remains as one of the cornerstones for the success of public diplomacy. From this point of view, there is an indispensable need for AF to get rid of some of traditional mentalities that military issues, even at political level are a domain simply belonging to military people.

¹⁰ Ibid. p.4.

¹¹ Ibid. p.5.

¹² Ibid, p.6.

¹³ Ibid, p.6.

Public Diplomacy needs to respond to the challenges of the 2.0 web world. To be effective public diplomacy must use the entire arsenal of communication tools ranging from face-to-face communication to participation in online social networks. This is a challenge imposed by the information society and global trend.

Public diplomacy requires proper planning, training and resources. This principle requires a new mentality. This is because, according to Babst, “... *for a long time public diplomacy was not seen as a core business, and public diplomacy experts had to sit at the end of the production line, far from the centre where policy is made and implemented. That needs to change. Public diplomacy must become an integral part of national policy planning and, ultimately, decision-making. Understanding public diplomacy as a serious political instrument also means providing the necessary financial resources. As designing and executing a public diplomacy campaign does not come for free, governments need to mobilize the necessary funds to get public diplomacy rolling.*”¹⁴

These principles and all the strategy and policy of NATO’s Strategic Communication should be well understood by all levels of the chain of command in the Armed Forces. This is necessary in order to achieve what experts call the ‘unification of the message within the Alliance’. In this context all commands of forces and units have their own responsibilities, in particular the Academy of the Armed Forces, especially the Department of Strategy. In different courses, ranging from Senior Course for Security and Defence and to the basic course, according to the course level, topics which clarify the concept of strategic communication and public diplomacy might be part of training programs. The High Course for Security and Defense might have as part of its program a module entitled “Strategic Communication” which includes public diplomacy, public affairs, military public affairs, information operations, psychological operations and cyber war. Nowadays AAF has sufficient human and material resources to organize conferences, seminars and debates on public diplomacy by inviting experts from institutions outside the armed forces. OMLT courses or other pre-deployment courses need to include some basic knowledge on general strategic communication and public diplomacy in particular. These courses should cover some more practical guidelines on how to increase our forces contribution to missions in the framework of the Alliance.

Second, our Armed Forces have established a good reputation while participating in NATO peacekeeping operations. Ministry of Defence and the General Staff have reflected the activity of our forces in their web pages to make it known to the public. Articles and stories in the press, and not only, have written about the contribution of our armed forces in missions abroad. However, there is still much room for a better reflection of this image. As a contribution in the context of public diplomacy in the Armed Forces could be publications in magazines of NATO member countries or articles written by officers of various ranks, reports from deployments places our forces in missions, military portraits who stand for professionalism and high integrity in missions. Our military attachés can play the role of a catalyst and coordinator for this purpose. Nowadays there are several well-educated and visionary military people

¹⁴ Ibid, p.7.

in our armed forces who have a good command of NATO languages so they should participate in discussions and various blogs organized by the major social networks on Facebook, Twitter, Google+, YouTube and Flickr. AAF also has the right capacities to be active in NATO's television NATOChannel.tv, in NATO official website and the new interactive Web platform WE-NATO. By addressing this issue in her article "Redesigning the NATO Public Diplomacy, Stephanie Babst (2008:5) writes:

*"Delivering NATO's messages about its policies and operations via web-based videos and other audio-visual and new media tools will be key to reaching out to younger demographic groups. It would be equally important to communicate with the under-40 generation via web 2.0. technologies, for example through blogs and chat rooms. In order to do so effectively, NATO must come rapidly up to speed in understanding the communications technologies of the 21st century – and then decide how best to turn the new tools to its advantage."*¹⁵

Concerting the preparatory work of our troops for missions or joint exercises, in terms of public diplomacy, with those of other allied countries is also of great importance. This requires that prior to deploying our troops the commands must be familiar with public diplomacy priorities, i.e. in ISAF mission in order that public diplomacy topics planned for these troops should be harmonized with the specific conditions of Afghanistan and ISAF priorities. Every soldier and officer who goes on a mission in a given country is seen by the population of that country, first as a representative of the Alliance, and secondly, as a representative of our country. In this regard through his attitudes, behaviours and communication he creates the reputation for the Alliance and the country. This is one of the reasons that participation in missions abroad should be considered as a great responsibility.

There are a number of Albanian officers that nowadays work at various NATO staffs or are being trained in different training centres abroad. Along with their role in the military headquarters, they are points of contact with the public of the countries where they work or are being trained. Thus, they can and must contribute through publications, participation in discussions in social networks or on various NATO blogs. Their contribution would be welcome in the area of installation of cooperation between our forces commands with the commands of allied forces in the field of public diplomacy.

Finally, increasing the effectiveness of public diplomacy in the AF raises the need for better cooperation with many other actors such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Education, State Police, Non-Governmental Organizations, NATO country embassies accredited in our country, with various printed and audio-visual media, especially national ones, and why not with prestigious media such as CNN, BBC, Reuters, CBS, etc.. as well as with all the experts of different areas of life that can make contributions to enhance the effectiveness of public diplomacy of the Armed Forces.

¹⁵ Babst, S. (2008). "Reinventing NATO's Public Diplomacy", Research Paper, NATO Defense College, Rome.

Conclusions

In the context of the work to apply New NATO Strategic Concept in the daily activity, an important aspect in the activity of the Armed Forces is to know well Alliance's policies for Strategic Communication in general and public diplomacy in particular. The conditions of our country, which had no legacy in the field of public diplomacy, such a thing is not only a novice but also a necessity arising from the dynamics of further integration into NATO. Although in terms of the global crisis financial constraints do not allow giving the required priority to public diplomacy in the activity of AF, there are possibilities to give new pace to it by using the existing resources.

It is the right time to include the AF in public diplomacy activities. This is not a subjective desire. It should become an important component in the entire chain of command of the AF.

Above all we should create the belief that within the frame of the asymmetrical war at the beginning of the 21st century, in the battle to 'win minds and hearts'; public diplomacy is one of the most effective instruments.

Hence, first it is necessary to intensify activities that would clarify NATO requirements for effective public diplomacy. This requires that all commands and force staffs, especially the Armed Forces Academy create the necessary environment for public diplomacy activities and review the curricula to include Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy in different training modules. Another requirement is the reflection of NATO standards for Strategic Communications in the strategy documents of the Armed Forces; organization of activities like conferences, seminars, debates and discussions about public diplomacy; a better co-ordination of work with all other relevant stakeholders that are interested in an effective public diplomacy. This would help us as a NATO member while addressing foreign audiences be in the same 'wavelength' with the Alliance's messages.

Second, the human resources within the AF should be better guided for the benefit of public diplomacy by contributing to the reputation of the AF and the country in general by publications in printed or audio-visual media abroad, especially in NATO member countries -s; by their personal example as professionals and people of integrity; by active participation in social networks used by NATO and; by being more present in the official Web site of NATO and its TV channel.

Finally, public diplomacy should be considered as a weapon to win the battle without taking lives but winning the hearts of people. Today, in the era of the information society, this weapon can be used effectively if we know its secrets and importance.

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AAF Challenges - Full integration in the NATO's security system and collective defence

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Short commentary. *The globalization of security threats has transformed the nature and scope of NATO's operations and missions involved in combat, peace preservation, education and training, logistical support and humanitarian operations, etc.*

The country's integration in the Euro-Atlantic zone is not only a national priority, but more than that, a great opportunity for development and prosperity, security and peace. The process of Albania's accession to NATO has produced a change of the entire political environment, constitutional, administrative and infrastructure of the country. Participation in larger organizations has contributed, among others, to create the image of our country as a stabilizing factor in the region and a security source. Integration into other structures and coalitions within the regional and global efforts to intensify economic and social development is the right way for our country to achieve prosperity and sustainable security within the wider international security system. Already, the coexistence of prosperity aspirations, integration and security are mandatory, because we cannot talk about progress and social welfare without individual and collective security¹.

All countries and nations remain subjects of international law, but, considering the complexity of the world around us, it is difficult for each country to provide adequate answers to all the problems that they face today. This is why there are associated problems in the long term, in order to solve common issues. This is why safety and security are a well-defined area.

¹ Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement, regional or global, in which each country agrees that the security system is one concern of everyone and therefore committed to a collective response to threats to peace and touch. Collective security is more ambitious than the security systems or collective defence alliance, which seeks to include the entirety of a region or country within the global and handle a wide range of potential threats. While collective security is an idea with a long history, its implementation in practice has proved problematic.

The Relationship between national and collective defence

We live in an era with a future hard to predict. People, nations, states, international organizations cannot be untouched by several armed conflicts, whether not such, if they have a low intensity or they are frozen.

National defence is one of the most important state functions. This results from the dynamics of defence, as a complex social phenomenon, with its determinations to manage it. National defence functions are represented by political, military, economic measures adopted by a state, in order to protect its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Endangering these aspirations shows the inability of the state; which suffers from a lack of promotion of national interests.

The Armed Forces are at the core of our national security. They make a unique and vital contribution; above all, they provide the use of force when the country needs protecting vital national interests.

Even today, in the era of globalization, our national defence will continue to have two essential aspects: Individual defense against aggressions from other political states; inclusion in coalitions with other states (especially Western countries and NATO) to achieve the proposed objectives, i.e. collective defence.

As above, the sizes of national defence are not sectarian and unchanging. On the contrary, they become more flexible, transparent and convincing due to increased complexity and hostility of the security environment in the region and beyond.

This happens when the national dimension of internationalization imposes its defence, collective movement, in formats expressed by the formula of alliances, coalitions, partnerships, etc.

Our visions for national defence, as opposed to the collective are: national defence is considered and evaluated as an inalienable attribute of the State; national Defence is considered as a support, generation of collective defence, as the meaning and reason of common or collective defence, which are related to ensuring the inviolability of borders, security and defence, with joint participation; collective defence is complementary to national defence, as we face a risk assumed or required, imposed, given the emergence of global risks and threats; collective defence² is a product of globalization, as globalization of risks, threats and vulnerabilities require globalization to protect the state and the international community against them.

Current legislation for national and collective defence in accordance with the framework of protecting the dimensions and implications that arise in the common way of our allies. The Albanian Constitution defines the role of the Armed Forces, providing the legal framework for national and collective defence, Article 12 states:

1. The organization of national defence Armed Forces ensure the independence of the country and protect its territorial integrity and constitutional order.

² Collective defence is an agreement, usually formatizohet by a treaty and an organization among participating states commit support in defence of a member state, if it is attacked by another country outside the organization. NATO is known organization and collective defence.

2. Armed Forces maintain neutrality in political matters and subject to civilian control.
3. No foreign military force cannot be established, or pass on Albanian territory, and no military forces could be sent out, except by a law adopted by a majority of all members of Parliament.

The organization of national defense is an attribute of state and cannot be considered outside the collective defence. As a member of NATO, we have obligations to allies and those who impose this obligation towards us.

In all major documents is understandable that reading them in the general context shows that collective defence does not replace national defence will not reduce the requirements, duties and responsibilities of the state, otherwise they grow and expand to a larger dimension international, surpassing national.

The UN Charter supports and encourages the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. The experience of major international treaties on defence provisions imposed as a form of collective defence complex, very different, adapted to the concrete historical realities. Summarizing, its essence can be defined as "...a formalized agreement, usually by a treaty and an organization among participating states commit support in defence of a member state, if it is attacked by another country outside the organization".

There is a correlation between national defence and collective defence, as they condition each-other. The purpose and objective of national defence can be achieved efficiently within the collective defence. National defence can be a part of collective defence, when all its objectives can be found in collective defence, as when we talk about the moments before launching an aggression, to design the main forces of the Alliance (coalition) in conflict zones, to start the war. This is why national defence within an alliance (coalition) is designed and integrated plan based on the principles established in the normative documents, agreed by the countries participating in the coalition.

Now our experience as a member of NATO has shown complete willingness to overcome the challenges of defense and the commitment of our state structures, particularly the Armed Forces of capacity building for collective defence. The five-year-old period as NATO members has shown progress and problems in reforming the defence planning issues in the planning of NATO. At the core of the defense objectives has been the set of force objectives, not only as an obligation of the Armed Forces, but also the request of other departments and agencies of the state with special focus on stabilization operations-post-conflict reconstruction.

The already known path traversed by our country as an ally in the most important organization for regional and global security which has issued records obligations and requirements in terms of defense and evaluation system integrated within NATO.

An important requirement of the document of Strategic Defence Review is the implementation of the Operational Capabilities Concept of NATO. Its application enables increased capabilities of the Armed Forces and structures related to the ongoing development of operational capacity, based on standards and best practices

provided by the member countries of the coalition, especially in the wide spectrum of NATO's experience.

Also, the Operational Requirements has made it possible to ascertain the elements of reform procedures for protecting key areas of education, personnel, logistics, training, assessments, etc. Their application has increased our experience in terms of information and analysis. So the result is close to reality enabling the unification of procedures for capacity development in all types of structures.

At the current stage is examined carefully the building of a functional and efficient organizational structure. The application of the defence review is the transformation of organizational structures with a view to adapting and adopting structures depending on the continuous evolution of the strategic concept of NATO and in accordance with the changing security environment.

As a benefit of implementing a functional organizational structure can be considered eliminating unnecessary units, to improve the chain of Command and Control, etc. Its application is necessity stems from the need to apply high standards oriented, comparable to the best standards applied by NATO countries.

The missions of Armed Forces in collective defence

Collective protection is a coordinated response to a common security problem from two or more locations. The essence of collective defence policy: a commitment from various nations to assist each other if attacked.

The basic principles of safety and security of our country and the credibility of the system is involved in the collective defence of NATO. They are based on a strong relationship and cooperation with partner countries. Membership in NATO and EU membership ambition of bringing the advantages of collective defence and security, on the other hand require the implementation of commitments and contributions to our country.

Growing ambitions of global and regional actors have a fundamental impact on the balance of the security environment of our country. The Strategic Concept of NATO from November 2010 defines its role in an environment where the main threats to the Euro-Atlantic have originated beyond its borders and are not simply of a military nature. Emphasis is placed in a special way in building the skills that can look at the whole area of crisis prevention and conflict in achieving stability in post - contradictory situations.

In the dimension of the collective defence of our country there are some important areas that require more development to the role and mission of actors operating on security and defence of the country, such as: Active involvement in the collective defence of NATO based on a strong transatlantic link which is vital to the defence of the country. Albania supports measures defined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the development of skills Alliance; our understanding of the concept of NATO's operation depends on a sufficient contribution as one of its members. Therefore, in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty of Washington, develops its capacity to ensure the defense of its territory, including the system of collective defence of NATO. Solidarity between allies and reliability in respect of commitments is crucial to the ability of NATO to meet its commitments

Our country participates, on a permanent basis, in the Integrated Air Defence NATO system (NATINADS), which is one of the fundamental pillars of air defence. It contributes to the collective defence of NATO through its inclusion in the system, in particular through tactical and operational strength. This enterprise has shown that the FA have taken an active role in promoting the value of the Alliance, as part of joint and multinational operations more difficult as Afghanistan, led by NATO, America or other coalitions such as the war in Iraq. This value is increased as political-military decision-making, which has continuously depth analysis of real skills over the years, have come to the conclusion that the Albanian army can participate at the same time ensuring the protection of the national territory and fulfillment of commitments to NATO, EU, regional organizations and other coalitions.

We have created the conditions for participation in NATO, EU and UN missions, to address the full range of crises-before, during and after conflicts. In the process of implementation of the commitments, it maintains a comprehensive approach to crisis management operations. One such example is the involvement of the international community in Afghanistan.

In crisis management activities of international organizations, the Republic of Albania contributes to the training and development of defence and security forces in crisis areas, in particular by providing military and civilian experts to help local authorities and assist in reforming the security sector defense. Currently, AAF participate in NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan as Herat in some regions (the Italian contingent), Kabul (the Turkish contingent), Kandahar (on special missions with the U.S. contingent, etc.). Armed Forces participation in peacekeeping missions and combat mission stems from Constitutional and Legal Basis Armed Forces set for each contribution to peacekeeping or combat missions.

Within NATO, the Republic of Albania supports building partnerships with relevant countries and other international organizations, as well as adheres to the term open-door policy, the policy of membership for all European democratic states in meeting NATO standards.

We actively support the fight against all forms of terrorism, including the negotiation and implementation of treaties of anti-terrorist, to help support the fight against terrorism, sharing intelligence information and the development of response capabilities by expanding consultations with partners in NATO and partner countries. Since Albania's formal membership in NATO has begun to implement the integration plan, which means deep reform of the security sector with the aim of protecting the full interoperability with NATO. Part of this plan is the objective force packages, which were taken over by the AAF as operational capabilities available to NATO for current and future missions. Their essence is "the battalion group" which represents a "Task Force". At its core is a battalion of light infantry, motorized, backed by smaller units (company or platoon level) for reconnaissance, fire support, air cover, military police service etc.

The fact that Albania is a NATO member offers not only guarantee the security and stability of the state, but also new responsibilities arising from it. Protecting the country benefits from a support Euro-Atlantic and reaches the level that defines collective defence.

So our country's participation effectively in NATO and EU missions abroad , performing the functions and attributes of national defence significantly expand the global space crisis and conflict management skills and capabilities shows collective defence . To participate in crisis management and conflict, to fight terrorism obviously means taking part in the prevention of war, conflict check to ensure regional and global stability. All these indicators show that safety and environmental protection, economic development and social progress, increased prosperity and consolidate democracy efficiency factors for national defence. Under these circumstances, there is no other national defence and collective commitment out international responsibilities.

Given the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, dominated by efforts to find effective solutions to eradicate threats to the Euro-Atlantic community and other states are compulsory liability and with broad international field. Our country has long understood this right and responsibility, by moving towards the concept of joint work with a clear and clever enabled the throne stand right coalition of progressive and largest alliance in the world, NATO 's³.

One of the most important missions of defence, as each national army, is represented by a confrontation of armed aggression. This has always been the fundamental mission of the Armed Forces. This means that when it comes to national defence, Albania will have the full support of the Alliance. This perspective has implications: the benefits of national defence of collective defence and the prospect of joining the national and collective defence is a strong feature persuasive and compelling as any military action against Albania is considered as an attack against the Alliance.

Of course, such a reality discourages potential aggressors, but also terrorist organizations, targeting all countries that are members of the North- Atlantic Alliance and the European Union are members. As a real issue, it is connected with missions that can be performed: rejection of an armed aggression on the national territory. In that aggression becomes surprise, the defence of the country operates on its own, in order to stop the attack preserver and then take part in group allied to reject and destroy the opponent; the second method refers to the participation of Albania, in a territory of a member state of NATO or the EU, to face an armed aggression against the State, group of States or EU alliance.

In both situations, modes of action, intervention procedures, rules of engagement are established strictly within the Alliance and CSDP and permanently updated⁴.

³ **NATO Strategic Concept.** In order to guarantee the security of the territory and population of the NATO countries, the Alliance will continue to meet the high efficient audits show its basic tasks, always in accordance with international law. Collective defence of NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This commitment remains immutable and binding.

⁴ Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), is a major element of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU) and is the responsibility of the EU policy the covering defence and military aspects, and civilian crisis management. ESDP was the successor of the European Security and Defence Identity under NATO, but differs in that it comes under the jurisdiction of the European Union itself, including countries that are not members of NATO . Formally , Common Security and Defence Policy is the

Also, strategic planning and the whole system of military training are in line with NATO standards and is rigorously collective needs and national defence. Another set of missions are those related to collective defence and refer to the fulfilment of the commitments associated with NATO, EU, regional organizations and other international coalitions or created. These missions emanating from an objective necessity and are the most effective way to build, manage and stabilize the security environment, able to prevent war and armed conflict and to keep under control situations of crisis and tension. Therefore, collective defence, and strictly in key documents are located in NATO and the EU, as the centre of gravity of collective security and common security. This process included strategies aimed at coping with difficult situations that generate crises and conflicts.

This is why our army takes part in the whole spectrum of missions within NATO, EU and OKB: participation in collective defence within NATO and/or EU area and for each member of the Alliance, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as this is the traditional meaning of the concept.

Participation in defence against terrorism, as they imply that counter-terrorism measures, protection of civil and military systems, states, infrastructures, institutions and persons against any terrorist attack and action to combat terrorist networks and to eliminate the causes generating processes;

As new risks and security threats, national and international, which have been the most visible missions are built in accordance with the process of transformation of the Alliance Policy and European Security and Defence.

This is why our military has created the capacity to respond as NATO force: capacity to act as a force for: non-military actions to help in emergencies and evacuations; support of civil authorities when it relates to natural disasters, human, chemical or biological, etc.

Ability to act as a force faces initial situation, until the arrival of the main forces of reaction in the joint operation, with or without-Host Nation Support, ensuring the lines of communication and strategic points. The ability to undertake missions that are specific to the armed forces in support of the constitutional requirements for the defense and support of the constitutional order.

According to the commitments in the Strategic Defence Review Document⁵, Albania has the ambition level: defense of the country in collaboration with allied forces, under Article 5, is to be a Reinforced Brigade (Brigade Task Force) or up to three battalions of Reinforced group, while our contribution to the collective security of Alliance territory is one tactical group “group of light infantry battalion of motorized”.

responsibility of the European Council, which is an institution of the EU, where the heads of member states meet. However, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, plays an important role. In her position as head of external relations configuration of the Council, she prepares and reviews decisions made to prepare before the Council meets.

⁵ SRM, Chapter II. 4, level of ambition (NIA) of RA implies the desired capabilities for military and civilian simultaneous participation in national and international operations, alone or with allies, based on the life and further their rotations.

Also, to participate in responding to non-Article 5 Crisis (NA5CRO), on the basis of the concept of “a single grouping of forces” to NATO / EU / UN / or possible coalitions, beyond national borders and allied to three companies simultaneously in operation. Within our country’s ambition to cope with civil emergencies (EC), is the support of an emergency at the Reinforced Battalion (Battalion Task Force), or two simultaneous emergencies at Reinforced Company (Company Task Force).

With a wide range and with a proper international cooperation , AF participate and continue to participate in coalition operations inside the stabilization of disturbed areas and tense , in order to fight terrorism and to fulfil missions specific re-establishment and consolidation of peace.

Our experience in multinational operations has shown a large range of missions can accomplish. Efforts on the battlefield forces, disarmament, weapons collection, ammunition and explosives, participation in security operations for the defense and freedom of movement of political decision makers, international authorities, protecting people against insurgent attacks, providing defense and support economic policy objectives in conflict states, all these are some of the activities that we can perform alone or as part of coalitions .

Even the coalition forces and Albania offers its services, responsibilities. If we increasingly deal with a very wide range of missions that are close to the national defence and increased reliability to the collective NATO, UN , EU and other coalitions to fulfil their role to ensure stability and European security and defence in the Euro-Atlantic area location in our country .

In conclusion, national defence and collective defence-as real and major conceptual record two historical epochs, referring achievement and consolidation of states in terms of globalization, states are interdependent - are complementary and fully justified in fulfilling their obligations towards each other. Therefore, the spectrum of missions must meet to become larger, more modern and constantly adapt to political decisions on the right, on time by the state. Result of this process is the transformation of the military in order to ensure the reliability of national defence, the fulfilment of commitments under collective defence and participation in international missions, in accordance with the priorities and policy requirements related to the defense of Albania.

The level of ambition of Albania in NATO is the balance between obligations and non-military contributions within the Alliance military, political goals and ambitions for our country presence and capacity available, to realize these ambitions. It is particularly important to ensure the maintenance of the balance between declarations policies for determining the level of national scope available to the Alliance forces and support them with the necessary financial resources for the human being as an efficient solution to the equation with two unknown liabilities and benefits.

Besides other things, it developed an elite military and civilian defence professionals, who are able to participate, compete, represent and negotiate with all counterparts of other countries and organizations allied NATO. This requires increasing the reliability of state bodies to ensure not only the preservation of this group of intellectuals but

also increasing perfection aiming to multiply numeric values. This approach will enhance the image and effectiveness of the Armed Forces at home and abroad, from a consumer force a contributing force in the service of citizens.

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Discretion and Deontology of National Intelligence Agencies

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“When the government activities are studied, we must use idealistic manner”

Max Weber

Short commentary. *Based on my academic knowledge and experience in intelligence agencies, I have been attracted from the idea that if we can remove all things that our class and niftiness would see as unnecessary, related to most fundamental, important and current then what would remain for the states intelligence as it is itself? According to my point of view it is intelligence discretion and deontology in relation discretion versus deontology even though they can be considered and used in a bipolar form. On the other hand states’ intelligence discretion has its exclusivity and no one has it, while its deontology is the need of public interests and no other interest.*

The intention of this paper which is a part of a longer one is to create a new module of Advanced Course of Intelligence Officer. The main theses are written with the intention of having new referential dimensions in this field and considering as a new source that complete an old vacuum for this item.

States’ Discretion and Deontology

States’ reason” was born from community relationships and it is accepted as necessity of human relations even though frequently it has been subject of discussions and contests in the direct applications; especially in human rights domain but, and for its efficiencies and effectively in problem solving. Sometimes in an exaggerated way these words are used as “*saint*” words. Now “states’ reason” is wanted to be considered as “*reasonable state*”, which knows its capabilities and “*scruples*” to do the things that should be done for the public interest; and knows its limits in efficiency and affectivity context. “*States’ scruples*” are related with states’ discretion, using as good as possible of foreign and home functions. “States’ limits” are related with the necessity to be efficient and effective as more as possible.

Discretion of states' activity is legitimating of government, but not only the perimeter and deepness of allowed things, but even the borders and walls that should serve as an obstacle not to enter where it is forbidden, which is another thing, which the state has the necessary clarity not to aspire.

Deontology of states' activity is the quality of public application through problem solving for which individuals pay the taxes and request "*fair*" services. The necessity for the state includes the basis of its deontology. It is the necessity to be served and to realize problem solving without attack to privacy and those things which people do not want to be part of public environment. This is the deontology of states' activity.

States' significance is not anymore the states' reason of Cardinal Richelieu, but reasonable state that knows very well and applies its scruples and limits in the right way. States' significance is necessity for a qualitative and "*fair*" public administration of home and foreign government functions for the individuals that are administered altogether and discretion is the way of applying this administration remaining in the public sphere. The request is not to pass to the other domain, human rights, which are a wide and complicated to be understood and then to keep in mind in practice.

Significance of intelligences' discretion and deontology is included in the word "*statecraft*", when the craft of states job have to summarize and accomplish two things: first thing is the government necessity for public administration and the second thing is quantity and quality of application of foreign and home functions.

States' intelligence discretion and deontology

Intelligence Agencies are states' organizations and institutions as others are. The point of view for transformation from "states' reason" to "reasonable state" is valid for them too. To be reasonable the focus, spectrum and deepness of "problem solving" application need to be clear.

What is the intelligence agency discretion? It is its exclusivities, activities and issues which belong only to it and no other government institutions. The exclusivities are subject matter of intelligence production for the threats which are posed to the states' security. For instance problem solving of espionage and CI is domain of subject matter agency. In this way counterterrorism problems even though the first (espionage and CI) is a symmetric problem, where states' intelligence agencies are adversaries, meanwhile the second (terrorism) is an asymmetric problem where the threats do not come only from specific states but even from organizations, groups and individuals. The important difference is the fact that espionage exclusivity (foreign intelligence and CI) is absolute, while in the case of terrorism (counterterrorism) the exclusivity exist but it is relative, because the terrorism is a threat where participate even law enforcement institutions. The most important thing is work dissemination, where should be identified the meaning of discretion: the work of intelligence agency, the work of law enforcement institutions and collaborating work. But there is another domain, human rights domain which should be defended by the governments' interference.

Today intelligence agencies face with two immediate risks:

- a. Overlap with law enforcement institutions

- b. Exit from their discretion and being there where do not have exclusive competencies.

Overlap comes from needs of random administration. Daily problems bring in evidence “break of rules”, which cannot be avoided in real life dynamics from usage of systems, processes, cycles of raw information in intelligence collection. If they are administered as intelligence problems then we will be faced with overlap because two different institutions of the state work on the same problem that belongs to only one of them. We have overlapping even when two intelligence agencies take each other’s exclusivities. For example, according to personal jurisdiction the Defence Intelligence Agency have in administration threats posed to military personnel and civilians that are related to defence and in the case when civilian agencies take this exclusivity we face with overlapping.

If an intelligence agency deals with not exclusive problems then it will be out of its competencies, because problems of intelligence agencies are “desk” problems where in an explicit way are counted as procedural treatment. These issues are related to “statement to define”, “procedure to follow” and “good practice to accomplish”. All these can be named as “standards of performance”. Standards of performance are related to subject matter of intelligence production. They are as legacy problems of intelligence agencies as competence professional problems related to education and training of intelligence officers.

The intelligence officer concept stands for the intelligence staff member responsible for the direction, collection, processing and dissemination of the intelligence process. Standards of performance are decided by intelligence officers “seignior”, who are leaders of professional structures in the responsibility and interest areas and in the function directions for the intelligence production.

Setting of standards of performance is related to intelligence officer seignior’s education and training who has experience and knowledge. The most important moment for them is their conceptual work in researches and problem solving. Education and training of intelligence officers in our country is still a supplementary problem and not a fundamental or basic. Every intelligence seignior should have professional ideas and believes that should be clear, consistent and to be used for public interest.

Having seignior people in the intelligence agencies who “know how” is an necessity that is solved with a modern education and training system, even through a fair human resources policy based on decision-making commissions and important managers. The most important thing that prohibits creation and promotion of seignior levels is lack of traditions, culture problems, and weak sense of selection and negative factors of the current situation. It is an immediate necessity the work for creation of an intelligence seignior literature and foundation of faithful instances which are able to admit, appraise and stimulate them. I suggest restarting a set of intelligence officer advanced course and some intelligence field researches with a double scope:

- a. Fair identification of an intelligence seignior group from the current human resources.

- b. Foundation of a special intelligence literature from the intelligence seigniors' abilities.

These intentions and projects that we own and are written in strategies and programs need to be supported with human capacities and financial support. We already have capacities but the support is a cultural problem that should be over passed.

When Jurgen Habermas talks for the modern realities he underlines an interesting division of existence in two worlds: "World of System" and "World of Life". World of system is the world which functions from institutional states buildings based on rules and norms. World of life is the world that functions in real life through, above and below the rules and norms, where every individual has a specific way with different situations.

States' intelligence deontology is all the activity to complete the public interest based on mentality, traditions, positive regulation and functioning of real life and system world. In our country except modest traditions of system world our "positive" reality (constitution, codes, laws, procedures, instances, powers etc) are standards and analogy taken from other countries mostly from western countries. But they have roots, stems, branches and leaves in their cultures and this is the biggest problem for us. It has been always in this way. As cultural "*meme*" their application for a long time brings development of the country but in overall the development will be gradually.

In my point of view states' intelligence deontology is related with each of the stages of classic cycle of intelligence production:

- (i) The way how is directed the states' intelligence.
- (ii) The way how is collected the information.
- (iii) The way how is processed the information and intelligence including and operational aspect of home and foreign activities.
- (iv) The way how intelligence is disseminated to decision-makers with all foreign and home complications.
- (v) The way how feedback and priority intelligence requirements are written and administered.

Who are the intelligence seigniors?

My opinion is the intelligence seignior is obligated to have some distinct features related to two "V" and one "W": Virtue-Values-Will. These are needed to harvest the experience fruits in statecraft and high level of cognitive process as it is written in Bloom' taxonomy.

Virtue is the most important element for the seignior intelligence officer because it is the main gate that guarantees the quality of public service. Being fair and loyal to public interest is fundamental.

Values that make the difference are: problem solving and researching.

Will is another important aspect in the distinct features of intelligence seignior. The will to become "*gray eminence*" and to "*sublimate in silence*".

Knowing and stimulating intelligence seigniors in the state agencies and in the other functions included in this domain is the only way and the best way to build and function a qualitative statecraft in our country. I agree with an opinion of researchers that states' elite in our country suffer from two features which are:

1. Their superficial character.
2. Their instable character.

I think that superficial character comes from the reason of being isolated in a globalised world related to values. Meanwhile instable character comes from identity dilemma which determines the elite way of thinking.

Two main parameters which should dominate the seigniors mind are:

- universality
- consistency

I suggest this way to do things that improve this situation:

- Current seigniors should write their ideas and believes for the context phenomena and intelligence problem solving in the branches where they are working. These will be an intelligence seignior literature and foundation of faithful instances which are able to admit, appraise and stimulate them
- Foundation of a small structure with 4-5 members as professional staff of States' Intelligence Community inside government structures.

Conclusion

The most important suggestion in my paper is necessity for the States' Intelligence Community as a new institute and instance that would help the modernization of the intelligence agencies in our country. For this we can do:

1. Preparation of a law "For the States' Intelligence Community", where will be addressed the duties and responsibilities of this instance and ways of collaboration between intelligence agencies.
2. Functioning of a set of seignior level in every agency and staff of States' Intelligence Community need to know about "Virtue-Values-Will"-status for them now and in the future.
3. The above mentioned seigniors thought about intelligence standards of performance should be important and with access in decision-making for the intelligence community problems.
4. Intelligence structures should have a distinct hierarchy with five actors in its activity: (i) Political leaders (customers, requesters and intelligence users) (ii) Intelligence managers (Director, Vice Director), (iii) Seigniors (Chief of territorial/ functional structures), (iv) Experts and (v) Specialists. It is important to rewrite the job descriptions for everyone.
5. To be organized a set of Advanced Intelligence Course in cooperation with Academic level of the country and with NATO strategic partners.
6. States' Intelligence Community Staff should invest and help the similar structures in different agencies and may organize cooperation with them.

7. In our country we have two agencies: SHISH and AIM which have different salaries for the same functions. This is not fair! And the last but not least, in intelligence literature is a quote: “If you don’t have money you can buy mediocrity.”

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Language, a vital factor of national geopolitics

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Short commentary. *Language is one of the fundamental components of the people’s identity and ethnicities. It is one of their distinctive characteristics and henceforth it may be the main feature of establishing their identity. When it comes to language, we are considering a geopolitical dimension of internal states. Language can also be an external dimension of geopolitics, being a factor of power and influence on nations, by transforming likewise into a factor of hegemony.*

A nation that loses its language loses not only the soul but also its distinction as people. But what is the way leading from ethnicity to the nation and the nation state? It is a long way that passes through a common language for the population living within the state borders. Thus, language is also a means of building national projects.

Language as a national power instrument

When they asked Chancellor Otto von Bismarck about the most significant event in history, he answered enigmatically: “North America speaks English”. The message conveyed by the greatest mind of the European diplomacy was crystal clear: language is power. Bismarck’s judgment which belongs to the 1890s, unveiled its accuracy only a few years later, with the entry of the United States in the First World War alongside Britain and against Germany and the Austro-Hungary, an empire united by a common German language.

The power of the language originates in the myth of the “Babel Tower”, which makes us comprehend that having a single language implies and constitutes an extraordinary power. According to the myth, 5 generations had passed since the Great Flood, when they said: “*Let us raise a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth*”. God came down to see what they did and confused their languages, and God “*there confounded the languages of all the Earth*”, leaving people in a chaos of communication.

The history of civilizations is also the history of the languages that follow each other in their hegemonic role. Greek and Latin are thanks to Greece and Rome, the world’s

major languages of their antique existence. In the VII century, Arabs sought to impose by their religion and language their hegemony over the world. They managed to do this in the entire Middle East, North Africa and in the southern European peninsula. In the sixteenth century, the time of the great extra European discoveries, the hegemony seemed to be divided between Portuguese and Spanish. Seventeenth century is the century of Russian and French¹. English begins its ascent starting from the eighteenth century. It is the hegemonic language of the twentieth century².

The German geopolitical scholar Carl Haushofer related the German domain with the scope of extension of the German language. When these great changes occur in the map of states, often the language coherences are privileged to the detriment of any other criterion. The case of Magyar population is a typical example how it constituted the basis of the Hungarian nationalism. After the Treaty of Trianon (1918), the Magyar state was stripped of all provinces where the majority language was not the Magyar language³. Some multi-ethnic states were faced with the problem of linguistic dispersion. This is the case of Papuasie-New Guinea, divided between Melanesian world and the Papu world and there are in the oriental island more than 400 distinct spoken languages⁴.

Language is an internal identity factor and an instrument of the power abroad. Linguistic unity is often necessary for a state to set the internal stability and project itself in the world. But despite its importance, language is not the only geopolitical factor. In the former Yugoslavia, Serbian-Croatian language, 90 years ago, seemed to give unity to the Federal State. This unity was merely a facade; deep identity tensions linked to ethnic and religious differences stirred the country and provoked the outburst of country turbulences. Geopolitics is an interdisciplinary science which must reject monism: its reflections should summarize the data and the determining factors. Collection of factors is not enough: one should know as well how to put them together in an innovative way, by establishing a link to any situation which is an object of study.

“Geopolitics of languages” in the international arena

There are many ways of studying the interrelated issue of the relationship between languages and policies. Geopolitics is just one of them. If geopolitics deals with the study of political processes in a spatial context, the political role of language is an important element of geopolitics and geopolitics itself is an instrument through which we study the interrelated issue of the relationship between language and policies, not

¹ C. Hagege, *Le français et les siècles*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1987; J. L. Trister, *Histoire de la langue française*, Paris, Ellipses, 1999.

² A. Chauprade, *L'espace économique francophone*, Paris, Ellipses, 1996; D. Noguez, *La colonisation douce...*, Paris, ed. du Rocher, 1991.

³ A. Chauprade, F. Thual, *Dictionnaire de géopolitique*, 2^e ed., Ellipses, 1999, articles « Italie », « Hongrie ».

P. Renouvin, *Histoire des relations internationales*, Paris, Hachette, 1957, t. VII, *Les crises du XX^e siècle*, I, De 1914 à 1929. « Le règlement de la paix », pp. 154-191.

⁴ Y. Lacoste, *Dictionnaire de géopolitique*, Paris, Flammarion, 1993, articles Papouasie-Nouvelle Guinée, p. 1197-1199 et papous (peuples et langues), p. 119.

only in political institutions, but also in political behaviour between states and within the state itself. The issue of language or language acquisition policy has a significant impact on the process of forming the state geopolitical structures, but also in establishing the basic foundations of international relations of the state.

Language is not only a major defining characteristic of the political identity of individuals, groups or states, but also the most natural element of political behaviour. Choice of a language for use in a wider communication, the choice of which language is studied, bilingualism or the decision not to learn other languages comprise the best examples of our political behaviour. The study of these aspects can tell us much about internal and international policies while it is also an indicator in the analysis of political institutions.

The spread of languages is not based only in the number of its speakers, but also in the economic, technological and political strength which lies behind the decision to use a language. Therefore, the expansion of the territory where the language is spoken, decrease or increase of rivalries among languages is mostly a product of geopolitical processes and changes. Study of the bilateral relationship among language, politics and territory helps us in understanding the development of global, regional and local development.

Language geopolitics at the global level: English and French

Supranational languages are languages that are not related to a political nation. Such languages are spoken in more than a political nation. Speakers of these languages can be further divided into three groups: speakers of the language as mother tongue, speakers of the language as a second language and language speakers as a foreign language. This typology is widely used by sociolinguists, but this division is possible to use also in geopolitical categories⁵.

It is possible to include in the first category states in which are spoken mostly supranational languages, or the language is spoken as their mother tongue by an essential part of the citizens of the state. The second category includes countries where the language is not widely spoken as a supranational language by the citizens as their mother tongue, but it is used as a lingua franca and it has an official status in these countries. There are countries in which supranational languages constitute a second language. The third category includes states where the supranational language has no official status, but the state education policy encourages the spread of this language as a language of wider communication, especially at the international level. In this category it is possible to include countries where there is an education policy to promote the spread of a concrete supranational language as a language of wider international communication, but most of the population of a country uses the supranational language as a foreign language and more often, as the first foreign language.

In the category of supranational global languages can be included a language that is not only widely spoken as a native language, but is also widely spoken, especially as

⁵ Kachru, B. (1986): *The Alchemy of English*. Oxford: Pergamon.

a second language and as a foreign language in various macro-regions of the world. Only two languages can be included in this category, English and French.

The international status of language in geopolitical terms

The reasons why a language takes the status of international language is not related to only the number of people who speak it, but much more it is related to those who are "its speakers". Latin became an international language through the Roman Empire and it did not come because the Romans were more numerous than the peoples they conquered. They were simply more powerful. Later, when the Roman military power declined, Latin language remained for a millennium as the international language of education, thanks to a different kind of power, that of Roman Catholicism.

However, a language does not become an international language because of its structural qualities, or because of the size of its vocabulary, or because it was the means of creating a great literature in the past, or because it was associated with a great culture or religion. Obviously, such factors might motivate someone to learn a language, but cannot possibly provide the cause for the global spread of a language. Indeed, such factors cannot even guarantee the survival of a language as a living one and in use, and we have the case of Latin, as a language that is studied today simply as a classical language by a small number of researchers⁶.

There is a very close connection between dominance of a language and economic, technological cultural power and that this relation becomes increasingly clear if we refer to the history of the English language. Without possession of a strong government and a force of any kind, no language can make progress as a means of international communication. Language does not exist in a kind of mystical space, separate and independent from the people who speak it. Language exists only in the brains, mouths, ears, hands and eyes of its users. When they are successful in the international arena, their language also succeed, when they fail, their language also fails.

English as the first global language

English is definitely in the category of global supranational languages. Current status that English language enjoys in the world today is largely the result of two factors: the expansion of British colonial power, which peaked towards the end of the nineteenth century and the emergence of the United States as the leading economic power of the twentieth century. The last factor is exactly the one to explain the global position of English today.

According to another approach, status of English as a global language is explained referring to two aspects: its geographic-historical and socio-cultural aspect as well. Geo-historical perspective shows how English reached a primary position in the world and he explains why the socio-cultural aspect explains why such domination remains as such. This was a language spread which followed the colonial expansions of the nineteenth century in Africa and the South Pacific and received a significant increase when this language was adopted as the official language or semi-official

⁶ Bailey, Richard W. 1991. *Images of English: a cultural history of the language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

language in the mid-twentieth century by many countries that became new newly independent states. English is already represented on every continent, as well as in the islands of the three major oceans.

In 1960s, the ascendancy of this language was increasing, but since that time one could not describe it as a truly international language. Since then, two events have ensured its international status. The first was the movement towards political independence of some countries, in which English emerged as a language with special status. In most of these countries, the role of English was so great that no other language could compete with it. The second event was the electronic revolution, and in this case, English was in the right place (the U.S.) at the right time (the 70's of last century).

The socio-cultural aspect explains how people across the world, in many areas of life, are dependent on English for their economic and social wellbeing. The development of computers, in the twentieth century, has been almost entirely an American business. The first computer operating systems were in English, and as one can see the instructions in MSDOS systems, but also to the later operating systems who replaced DOS, which are affected by the influence of English, although there alternatives in other languages. It is precisely this hegemony and distribution that makes English labelled as “global language” in reality. It is also known that English has a dominant position in the Internet, while about 80 percent of information stored electronically is in English, and in doing, English is the first “Lingua franca” of the Internet. This language has penetrated deeply into the areas of international politics, business, security, communications, entertainment, media and education. The ease of having a lingua franca available to human relations and global needs is estimated by millions of people.

Geopolitical scenarios of English language

The “English prevails” scenario

“English prevails” is a term that presents the world with a simple scenario which suggests the spread of this language in the entire world and it embodies the likelihood constant spread or the prevalence of English also in the future. A language achieves a truly global status when it plays a special role that is recognized in every country. Such a role is more apparent in countries where a large number of people speak the language as their mother tongue. In the case of English, the countries include U.S, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, some countries in the Caribbean and several other territories of the world. No other language is spoken as “native language” by such a great a number of people scattered in so many territories/countries around the globe (Only Spanish leads in this sense since it is spoken in 20 countries mainly in Latin America). The use as native language only in a country, however large population numbers is, fails to give to it the global language status. In order to achieve such a status, a language should be used by other countries around the world who decide to give it a special place and role within their communities, even though the number they may have, consists of few speakers who use this language as their mother tongue

English achieved this status through two main ways: first, it managed to become the official language of several countries being used as a communication tool in institutions such as government, courts, media and the educational system. In order to enter in such lines it is extremely important that the language is possessed as early as possible in the life of the individual. Such language is often described as a “second language”, since it is considered as complementing the native language or the first language of the individual. English today enjoys a special status in over seventy countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, India, Singapore, etc. Secondly, a language can become a priority as part of the educational program in foreign language learning in a place, even though this language has no official status in the respective country, thus becoming the language which children are more likely to learn when they enter school. English is now the language most widely taught as a foreign language, in over 100 countries, such as China, Russia, Germany, Spain, Egypt and Brazil and in most of these countries emerges as the main foreign language encountered in schools, thus displacing another language. In 1996, for example, English moved or replaced French as a foreign language in primary schools in Algeria (a former French colony). Here we can mention the case of Albania, where very soon Russian was replaced by English but also in French as a foreign language taught in state schools, while in accordance with a Governmental decision, English is introduced as part of the Matura state exams in higher schools.

Due to the development of this multirole language as “first”, “second” and “foreign” language, this language is used today by a much larger number of people around the world, compared to any other language used before. English has already reached the stage of a global language. About a quarter of the world population is fluent speakers or competent speakers of English and the figure at the beginning of the new millennium was steadily increasing, which means about 1.5 billion of the world population.

Scenario of the fall of English as a global language

The history of the languages used as the “*lingua franca*” has shown us repeatedly that we must be careful when we make predictions about the future of a language. If in middle Ages, anyone would dare to predict the decline of the Latin language as the language of education, people will not take those people seriously. Similarly, in the eighteenth century, if someone would have suggested that a language other than French would be used in the future as the language of politics and high society, no one would have taken this seriously.

The “time: factor is conceived differently in politics and differently in linguistics. A week for politics can be an even longer period, while a century in linguistics is considered as a short period. However, there are scenarios considering the decline of a language from the global language status. In the submission and analysis of scenarios that could affect the decline of English as the “*lingua franca*” can be defined some options. A change in the balance of power political, economic, technological or cultural, can affect the establishment of the status of other languages that English enjoys today. If the dominance of a language is a matter of political influence, and especially economic influence, then just after a revolution in the balance of power in the globe, there may have consequences for the choice of the global language.

Despite the remarkable growth in the number of users of English, at least two-thirds of the world's population still does not use it. In some parts of the world (in most states of the former Soviet Union, for example), English still has a limited presence. In some other countries, there are increasing financial resources to keep the role of other languages (such as French, in some African countries).

The “translation machine scenario” as a global communication method

Another scenario is much more reliable is the emergence of another alternative method of communication which can eliminate the need for global languages. Here we can mention the translating automatic “translation machine”. If progress in this area continues to be as fast as in the past decade, there is a possibility that, within a generation or two, this method will become a routine for people to communicate with each other directly, using their first languages.

Anyway, given the speed with which it was developed the scenario of the emergence of English, it is impossible to make predictions about the emergence of another language so worldwide. Within more than a generation, we have moved from a situation where the existence of a world language appeared as a theoretical possibility, into a situation where it is a visible reality.

Given that the U.S. has become the most dominant element in almost all areas of activity, the future of English depends to some extent on the future of this country. The greatest power that has fuelled the growth and strengthening of this language during the twentieth century has come from United States of America.

French as a supranational global language: Francophone

French has also the geopolitical ambition to be a global supranational language. As a native language, it is certainly widely spoken in France, while as minority language it is spoken in Canada, Belgium and Switzerland. French is the official language in Luxembourg, in many African countries, of which the largest number of speakers of French as a second language is in Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Senegal and Congo (Brazzaville). In the group of countries that recognize French as a language of international communication, the largest numbers of French speakers are in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon. Francophone space is a cultural, political and economic weight that lies on five continents. It encompasses 53 member states and governments and 10 observers, representing more than 10 % of the world population-less than 1 % of the world population is French. Member States belong to five continents and meet every two years at the Francophone summit.

Francophone space that extends to five continents is constantly expanding. And this space is also an important macro-economic reality. 90 %, of this economic wealth of this area is concentrated in four countries-France, Canada, Switzerland and Belgium, but macro-economic dimension of the Francophone is already a reality: 10 % of the world population, 12 % of world production and 17 % of international commercial exchanges.

The francophone project, since it extends in five continents, sometimes runs counter to the dynamics of regionalization and the formation of integrated continental blocks.

In a geographical viewpoint, it is ascertained that many countries in central Europe, Eastern Asia and aspire to integrate into Francophone. In France, the Francophone project protected by partisans of a France that is a world power and balance. This is a Francophone that is based on the pillars of this worldwide France. Francophone offers a flourishing geopolitical, economic and cultural potential⁷. And when France doubts about herself, when European project is undergoing a profound identity crisis, when many people are wondering about the meaning of mondialism, it is time that the French elites do not smile anymore when it comes to talk about Francophone⁸. Some states recognize internal language borders. It is the case of Commonwealth member states or the Francophone in the African continent (Cameroon and Mauritius). The internal geopolitical analysis of states is related to the fact of drawing the lines of division in determining the identity and defining the internal linguistic boundaries.

Geopolitics of languages at the regional and sub-regional level: the Case of the European Union

The complicated problem of the roles of the national European languages within the EU is perhaps the biggest obstacle to further economic and political integration. First of all, it is necessary to keep in mind the special position of national languages in the political cultures of the Europeans. Historians are wondering about the nineteenth century as an era of nationalism, but it is true that the majority of European nation-states are a product of the twentieth century and this process has probably not finished yet as suggested by some national movements in certain parts of Europe.

Despite the circumstances, the position of supranational languages in the European integration process is even more complicated because of poor language policies in the EU. Results vary widely in different countries and are much better in countries with “small” national languages, but statistics show that only half of the population of the EU is able to communicate in a language other than the mother tongue. The best position is that of English, with 40 % of non-native speakers in the EU, followed by French with 20%, German with 10 % and Spanish with 6 %.

In order to understand the position of English in the EU, it is necessary to note that this is a language which began to dominate in the EU administration, only after enlargement in 1995⁹. The second factor limiting the role of the position of English is “special” role of French, since the beginning of the integration process, until at least 1995, as the first EU language and the preservation of the special position mainly due to the EU “capitals” (Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg) which are in a francophone area. An eastern expansion can improve the position of English, but will also strengthen the position of the German language, which is now the language most widely spoken as a native language after the unification of Germany and Austria’s entry into the EU.

Linguistic diversity is an important element of the cultural wealth of European culture, but in geopolitical view, it is one of the most important factors towards the creation

⁷Michel Gouillou, *Francophonie puissance*, coll. “Références géopolitique”. Ellipses, 2005.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹Time International. June 24, 2002, p.47.

of a single economic market, with a trans-national work toward the establishment of a European political identity. In comparison to other macro-regional groups, we can say that the EU, without admission of “a language policy of a single official language”, is by having a smaller chance of creating a unified geopolitical unit, a chance that is to smaller than let us say The Arab League .

Central Europe is probably the most debated traditionally sub-region in the geopolitical perspective. In a geopolitical discourse on this region, there are different theories. One of them is a theory according to which Central Europe serves as a “bridge” between Central and Eastern Europe, a concept of “*Mitteleuropa*”. Another idea is that Central Europe is like a “periphery” of the West¹⁰. All these concepts work with the important role of a lingua franca which helps in communication between the peoples of the sub-region. Germany is the country that has traditionally played this role. This has not changed with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the establishment of the “Iron Curtain”.

France was not successful in her bid to replace Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, and the same thing happened with the Russian language during the Cold War era. Only after the fall of communism in this sub-region, doors were opened for massive use of English. It is too early to predict that English will completely replace the traditional role of German language. For the moment it seems that this is likely to happen more in some places of this area as Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Poland than in countries such as Hungary and Slovakia. Even with this scenario, it is possible to expect that Germany will remain in a strong position in all these countries, especially in border areas with Germany and Austria.

In general, it is possible to say that at in a sub-regional level there are more linguistic international organizations or organizations with a main communication language than there are in a macro-regional level. In the geopolitical perspective, it means that in global politics, an international sub-regional cooperation can be more frequent, more concrete and more effective than at the macro-regional level. Europe is a good example in this case.

It is hard to predict that English will be accepted fully in all areas of the EU as the only main language of communication. This will be the main problem for the EU, the inability to fully function as a fully integrated geopolitical unit in economic, cultural and political terms. But some EU countries are already recognizing the role of English, especially in countries with “smaller” national languages. As a result of different approaches to the role of English, a kind of gap between these countries and other countries maybe created, especially regarding those countries having the ambitions that their national languages play a wider role in linguistic communication with the EU.

We have a very different situation if Europe is considered in a sub-regional perspective. At this level, these sub-regions are clearly unified by a language. Not only British

¹⁰Hnízdo, B. (2002): Střední Evropa v geopolitických proměnách kontinentu (Central Europe in geopolitical changes of the Continent). In: Kabele, J., Mlèoch, I., Pscheidt, S. (ed.). Konsolidace vládnutí a podnikání v České republice a v Evropské unii. Praha: Matfyzpress.

Isles, a francophone Europe and German speaking countries, but in this category are included such regions but also Spain can be included as a regional state (Portugal, in areas where people have difficulty understanding the Spanish) Italy is another example of a regional state and Benelux Dutch speaking areas. In other parts of Europe (Nordic countries, Central Europe, the Balkans) sub-regional cooperation can be transformed to create a geopolitically unified integration with the acceptance of a common lingua franca.

The very close economic, cultural and political sub-regional integration is possible among countries that mutually understand each other's languages. This happens in the case of the three Scandinavian countries, Finland and Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria and Macedonia, but also, perhaps in cooperation between the countries of former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia). Consequently, it can be foreseen that the EU, in geopolitical terms, is likely to be a complex of mutual cooperation (but competitive) of sub-regions within the EU, more than a unified player on the global stage.

If in the sub-regional level of international policies, supranational languages play a limited role, only in special occasions, multi-linguistics clusters at the level of the nation-state the role of supranational languages has traditionally been always important and continues to be so.

Languages at national level: Albanian language

Geographical extension of the Albanian language

The Albanian language is spoken by over six million people in the south-western Balkans, primarily in the Republic of Albania and in the neighbouring countries which once formed part of the Yugoslav federation (Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). In Albania itself, the language is spoken by the entire population of 3,087,159 inhabitants (census of April 2001), including some bilingual ethnic minorities.

In Kosovo, where there are as yet no reliable population statistics, Albanian is spoken by almost the entire population of about two million individuals, including some bilingual minorities: Bosnians, Turks, Croats and Roma. Ethnic Serbs in Kosovo (now about five percent of the population) have traditionally refused to learn or speak Albanian, but attitudes may change once traditional hostilities and ethnic tensions subside.

The Republic of Macedonia is estimated to have at least half a million Albanian speakers, equalling about twenty-five percent of the total population of the republic, although there are no reliable statistics. The Albanian population is to be found in and around Skopje (Alb. *Shkup*), where it constitutes a substantial minority, Kumanova and, in particular, in western Macedonia from Tetova, Gostivar and Dibra down to Struga, where it forms the majority.

A minority of about 50,000 Albanian speakers is also to be found in Montenegro, mostly along the Albanian border (Ulqin-Ulcinj, Tuz and Gucia/Gusinje). There are also at least 70,000 to 100,000 Albanian speakers scattered throughout southern Serbia, primarily in the Presheva Valley near the borders of Macedonia and Kosovo.

To the south of Albania, in Greece, there are traditional settlements of Çamëria dialect speakers, in particular around Parga and Igoumenitsa in Epirus. Despite border changes and deportations to Albania, the Albanian population here may be as high as 100,000, although they are highly assimilated. In central Greece, the Albanian language, known in Albanian as *Arbërisht* and in Greek as *Arvanitika*, languishes in about 320 villages, primarily those of Boeotia (especially around Levadhia), southern Euboea, Attica, Corinth and northern Andros. These speakers are the descendants of large-scale Albanian emigration to Greece during the late middle Ages. No official statistics exist as to their numbers. This exceptionally archaic form of Albanian is dying out rapidly¹¹.

In southern Italy, there is a small but well-established Albanian-speaking minority, the so-called *Arbëresh*, or Italo-Albanians. These are the descendants of refugees who fled Albania after the death of Scanderbeg in 1468. As a linguistic group, the Arbëresh now consist of about 90,000 speakers, most of who live in the mountain villages of Cosenza in Calabria and in the vicinity of Palermo in Sicily. The Arbëresh speak an archaic dialect of Albanian, which differs substantially from the Albanian now spoken in the Balkans, to the extent that communication is difficult if Arbëresh speakers are not familiar with standard literary Albanian.

Traditional Albanian settlements can be encountered sporadically elsewhere in the Balkans: in Arbanasi, a suburb of Zadar on the Dalmatian coast of Croatia; in some villages in the Sandjak in Serbia and in the Bulgarian-Greek-Turkish border region, notably in the Bulgarian village of Mandrica. A few Albanian speakers are also to be found in the Ukraine, notably in villages in the regions of Melitopol and Odessa.

Little remains of the once extensive colonies of Albanians scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire. The Albanian minority in Egypt has now dissipated, though Albanian communities still exist in large numbers in Turkey (Istanbul, Bursa and elsewhere) and to an extent in Syria, notably in Damascus.

Since the late 1980s in Kosovo and since the opening of Albania in 1990-1991, there has been a substantial emigration of Albanian speakers from their traditional areas of settlement to other countries, in particular to Greece and Italy. There are also large numbers of Albanian emigrants to be found in Western Europe (esp. Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia and London) and in North America (New York, Boston, Detroit, Toronto)¹².

Ban of writing Albanian language, an instrument of Albanian identity dissolution

The French geopolitical scholar Jacques Ancel notes that in nineteenth-century Europe, language played a determining role in the building of new nations. This was the case of Albania, located in the area of the common influence of Latin, Greek and Turkish, and which based its uniqueness in an original Albanian language¹³.

¹¹ Robert Elsie, The Albanian language, <http://www.albanianlanguage.net/>

¹² Robert Elsie, The Albanian language, <http://www.albanianlanguage.net/>

¹³ Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique, Constantes et changements dans l'histoire*, Ellipses, p. 276.

“A nation lives with his language,” says a Hungarian proverb. Among all the major languages of the Balkan Peninsula, Albanian language is the only language, whose writing was banned for five hundred years. I do not know any other country in the European continent, says Ismail Kadare, whose language has undergone such a horror. Why? How was this considered afterwards, why it wasn’t changed over the centuries, and how did this language survive till the end of the Ottoman Empire, will the last moments of the dying empire? Albanians were allowed many things: they were allowed to have churches, properties, high ranks in the army of the administration, even imperial post of the vizier (Prime minister), which they had several times, but they were never allowed to have only one right: writing the Albanian language. This was a real ban, dramatic and irreversible. I do not believe that you can find in the world history of education, such times when the teachers and kids, when caught secretly writing or teaching a language, they were immediately massacred without mercy and without remorse.

Exactly at that time, the impetus of self-protection mechanism in action put again into use an older mechanism: oral literature. Up in the mountains, there where it remained a budding light, ancient machines were shaken again. This mechanism had always been there, but somehow it had been outside attention, especially since the time that the Albanians had learned to write, and to publish books in Latin, as all Europeans know. (One of them, the priest from Shkodra Marin Barleti, was already translated into all European languages). The mechanism had been there, except now, in the days of the apocalypse, it was obvious that the country needed it most¹⁴. Kadare goes back again to this unique action in the Ottoman Empire: the ban of writing the Albanian language, recalling the symbolism of the survival of the Albanian language which during this time period was not really alive, but without which one cannot imagine European civilization¹⁵.

“Linguistic hierarchy” geopolitics facing the Albanian language nowadays

Mastery of a foreign language has always been a priority for individuals and this is no exception also for the Albanian society. Contacts with the invaders, military service, seasonal employment in neighbouring countries and migrations have been some of the factors responsible for the bilingual reality Albanian- foreign language. Monolingualism has always been a characteristic of the closed societies. When it comes to bilingualism, one should distinguish between individual bilingualism and collective bilingualism. While collective bilingualism is characteristic of ethnic-linguistic minorities or border areas, individual bilingualism depends largely on the state’s language policies. Even in our country, the individual bilingualism has been fostered by the state, by introducing compulsory subjects in the school of foreign languages. Of course, the type of foreign language in the bilingual individual has changed. In the first half of the last century, Italian language was in the first place, in the second half, until the beginning of the 1970’s the first place belonged to Russian language, and afterwards Russian began to be marginalized from English and French. After 1990, this paradigm has changed significantly.

¹⁴ Ismail Kadare, *ibid.* *Hylli i Dritës*”, August 2009.

¹⁵ Ismail Kadare, *ibid.*

The results of the survey of young people in Albania show that some languages have lost significantly their position, as it occurs in the cases of Russian and French, while other languages like English, Italian and Greek have become more favourite. Thus, according to the Euro Barometer (1995) , in 1000 young people surveyed, 29 % of them spoke Italian, English was spoken by 22 % , 7 % and 6 % spoke Greek and French. In the study “Post-Communist Albanian Youth”, conducted by the Centre for Sociological Studies “EUREKA”, 2600 young people were surveyed, and 47 % of them preferred English, 34.6 % Italian, 10.3 % German, 5.3 % French and 1.5 % Greek. A little bit different data came out of another survey conducted in those years with 697 young people regarding foreign languages they understood and spoke, out of which the first place was held by Italian 40.3 % , then English 38.5 % , French 10% , Greek and German 3.6% 1%.

In terms of European wide integration, foreign language learning is gaining a new dimension. This is the reason why this issue occupies an important place in many conventions and documents of EU, EC, OSCE and the many organizations for protection of human rights. “White Paper on Education and Education” (1995) of the European Union, in its Chapter IV “Possession of three foreign languages” notes “Possession of several languages of the European Union has become a prerequisite for EU citizens in order to benefit from the personal and employment opportunities that were opened in the single borderless market. This mastery of language should result in the ability to adapt to working and living in different cultures. Languages are also the key to get to know the others. Mastering of languages helps the formation of a sense of being European, with all its diversity and cultural richness and understanding between citizens of Europe.

In accordance with the resolution dated 31.03.1995 of the EU Council of Ministers of Education, it is becoming a necessity for everyone, regardless of the ways adopted for education, to gain and retain the ability to communicate in at least two EU languages besides their mother tongue... In order to achieve mastery of three EU languages, it is desirable that the teaching of foreign languages since the elementary school. This education is necessary to be done on regular basis in the elementary education, and with the learning of a EU second foreign language in high school. It may not seem impossible that high school students study some subjects in the second foreign language. When ending school education everyone should speak fluently two EU foreign languages”.

This document, which must be implemented by Albania as a candidate to join the European Union, makes clear what are the foreign languages to be learned and what are the policies to be followed for their learning during undergraduate education. It leaves no room for improvisation or preferences of individuals. On the basis of this document we should also build our state language policies regarding foreign languages to be taught in school and the number of these languages.

Among international languages, undoubtedly priority should be given to English, which should be the first foreign language (L1). The teaching of English should start in elementary school. Other international languages should be the second languages (L2), while languages of neighbours such as Italian, Greek or German languages

must be L3, languages which are in the border areas with these countries could be L2, which means they could change places with L2 international languages, but in no case can be L1. This position will also stop the tendency of any country for a higher status of their language, even in special areas. Such long-term policies built on the basis of EU legislation and in consultation with the experts, are to be built also for the university and postgraduate education. They would also give assistance our Ministry of Education legal support in their implementation in practice¹⁶.

Conclusions

In conclusion, we can emphasize that the use and spread of languages constitutes a reliable indicator of geopolitical processes. This use can be explored in different kinds of tongues, in a language geopolitical perspective. Scattered languages, regional languages, languages of national or supranational languages, show and reflect the geopolitical dynamics of global politics. But the most visible role is played by supranational languages, especially in political processes at the sub-regional integration, macro-regional or international policies.

A unique role is played by global languages, English and to a lesser extent, French. These languages, the same as other supra-national languages, are helping to deepen cultural; economic and political integration and development among countries populated by speakers of the same language, but can also function as a “cementing” factor of the integration processes in the regions where these languages are not widely spoken as a mother tongue. English is playing this role in macro-regional level, i.e. in the Indian subcontinent or Southeast Asia, at the sub-regional level in South Africa or in the Nordic countries. French plays a similar role, e.g. in Western Equatorial Africa. Both languages can even be a component of the identity of several larger monolingual sub-regional groupings, since it is obvious the role of English in the Gulf or in the case of French in the Maghreb.

Globalization in economic, cultural and political terms does not mean only a deepening trend towards linguistic uniformity. Due to demographic trends and due to the regionalism processes in global politics, the geopolitical role of other supra-national global languages is increasingly growing. This is especially true with respect to the role of such languages as Mandarin language, Indian, Spanish or Arabic. Globalization is also associated more with bilingualism than with the monolingualism, which was, in geopolitical perspective, a product of the creation of the nation-state system and the product of nationalism and imperialism. Decentralization of political power within a nation-state, as a by-product of the process of supranational integration of global politics, fostering of the regional bilingualism, due to the use and knowledge of a local language as well as a supranational language is very significant in regions of the world to the political identity of citizens as much as the use and knowledge of the “national” language in itself.

Governments that wish to play their part in influencing the future of the world language must consider the policy decisions and allocation of resources for language planning.

¹⁶ Prof. Dr. Rami Memushaj, “*Language Policies in the epoch of globalization*”, Newspaper “Shqip”, 2012-02-19.

Now, more than ever in the language history, they need to adopt long-term platform and plan to advance their interests and to promote the development of their language or the use of other languages in their community. If this linguistic chance is not used properly, there may not be another chance anymore.

Language, being the main tool of cultural expression, is also one of its basic dimensions. The role of languages grows even more in the context of European integration. In terms of an open society, language is facing the same risks and problems as well as the culture it carries. This because the responsible state levels are not aware of the imperative necessity of developing such policies and legislation that would protect the Albanian language from the pressure of foreign languages within and outside their ethnic territories and in the Diaspora, where the Albanian language is in contact with different languages. This approach would ensure that the intact status of the first language within state borders and would help the Albanian government to ensure an acceptable status of Albanian in areas where it is in contact with other languages. Not only efforts are not being made to draft an appropriate language policy for an open society, but it is now recognized well also the European and international legislation on issues of minority native languages, although it is almost entirely translated in our language and published by the Council of Europe .

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SECTION TWO

RESEARCH PAPERS

The Armed Forces Academy is always present in the Military Review pages, with the best research papers, introducing outstanding topics.

“The Albanian Military Strategic Thought and the Organization of the Armed Forces of Republic of Albania, during 1945-1991” is the topic addressed by PhD Ahmet Leka, trying to give answers to the following questions: Why a study for the development of the strategic doctrinal thought of AF in the post war period, mostly during Cold War period is important? How the strategic concepts for the defence and the security environment in the global and regional context have evolved? What was the impact of political and ideological rapport of that era in the development of military strategy? Why do we study the organization, modernization and development of military theory of that period and what is its value nowadays? How is the future reflected in the present, in terms of security for small countries like our country?

The paper of PhD Eduart Bala focuses on the relationships and cooperation between Al Qaeda, other international terrorist organizations, Islamic NGOs, and Islamic legal businesses in Albania, and how the Albania government has responded to this activity. It provides a brief overview of Albania setting at the beginning of the post communist period, followed by a description of the various Islamic NGOs, emerging in this period and their involvement in support of terrorist activities in the country, and concludes with a discussion of how the Albanian government has reacted to this threat, based on the case study.

Col (R) Thimi Hudhra emphasizes that the fulfilment of the strategic goal of membership in the Alliance, is not the end of our efforts. This does not mean that the integration process is closed. In this context, the key question is how to become one of the respected members of the Alliance, with both the benefits and the obligations stemming from the membership.

Albanian Military Strategic Thought and the organization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania 1945-1991

Col. PhD. Ahmet Leka
Chief of Doctrines Centre

Short commentary. *This paper addresses and provides comprehensive knowledge about the track followed by our Armed Forces after World War II, for their development and evolution until 90-ies. During this period the development of military strategy and the Armed Forces has been an entire process of evolution and improvement, of quantitative and qualitative changes through permanent efforts and by facing many difficulties and obstacles of the time.*

Questions that arise are: Why a study for the development of the strategic doctrinal thought of AF in the post war period, mostly during Cold War period? How has the strategic concept for the defence evolved? How has the security environment in the global and regional context evolved? What was the impact of political and ideological rapport of that era in the development of military strategy? Why do we study the organization, modernization and development of military theory of that period and what is its value nowadays? How is the future reflected in the present in terms of security for small countries like our country? Such questions were and still are part of the research work of different scholars, policymakers and military theoreticians. In this paper I try to give some answers to these questions.

The answers to these questions were not so simple, for it is a past period full of values in regard to historical prospect, but from the point of view of research related to military thought, it is valid for the present and for the future.

This paper analyzes the impact of military strategic thoughts in different periods and based on it highlights the need for conceptual, doctrinal and structural improvements in order to reflect and attain the best values in military field. There are some tendencies in military theory, there is also a history of development, consequently there is a practical terrain to judge about that period of establishment, organization and modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania (AFRA) during the whole period of post war until the establishment of democracy in 1990. The purpose of the paper can be clearly stated by the saying "There is no ready-made solution for human kind despite understanding the past".

Albania has a rich military tradition

Information on the history of the wars of the Albanian people from antiquity until nowadays comes from foreign authors, and particularly from the Roman and Greek scholars, especially from Herodotus, Polybius, Livy, Pliny, Strabo, Barleti etc. In the following lines the paper will present some highlights of developments in the field of strategic thinking and concepts of the Albanian armed forces, from antiquity until today, creating the so-called "Albanian military tradition". Illyrian armies were some of the most remarkable armies of that time, and their military organization represents the most characteristic features of the Illyrian state." Agron, king of the Illyrians and son of Peurat, commanded a navy and infantry much larger than previous kings of Illyria." Illyrian military tradition was enriched further in the VII century and later in the state of Arber where the army consisted of feudal lords and along with this there existed the institution of "people into military service", which consisted of free peasants. If we come much later in the period of Skanderbeg, we notice the peak of the history of wars in the period of country conquest by the Ottoman Empire. Skanderbeg organized the permanent army of peacetime and temporary army for wartime. The regular and permanent army which had to be ready any time, gained prominence.¹

League of Prizren in the period 1878-1881 is a culmination of the history of Albania, therefore, it is considered as such for its Armed Forces. League created a volunteer army, based on the principle "one man for each family." In this period, the Mohammedans and Christians were closely related and were all soldiers. Each tribe had its fortified place, each fighter had his rifle on the shoulder..."² Another period of military developments is the time of the Declaration of Independence. At that time, only 6 days after the proclamation of independence the National Army was established. Its main constituent structures were: active forces, reserve forces, volunteer forces, gendarmerie with 12,000 people.³ In October 1913, by a Decision of the Conference of Ambassadors in London, a group of Dutch military people (Dutch officers Deweer and Thomson, as well as 15 other officers) helped to restructure, prepare and establish the Albanian gendarmerie.

During the monarchy, the Armed Forces carried out internal changes that were positively estimated for the time, as in terms of military thought, and in organization. The army remained divided into infantry, navy, and air force but the most important was infantry. Despite the continuous projects and the laws of 1929, 1930, 1931, 1934 and 1937 Army organization remained at the size of the group.⁴ During this period the growth of the military budget was considerable, as well. With the occupation of Albania by fascist Italy on 7 April 1939, the state together with the Armed Forces became non-existent. In such circumstances, new armed forces emerged belonging

¹ F.Noli, Oeuvre IV, Tiranë 1998, p.266.

² A. Duma, "Ali Pasha", translation of Miço Gubera, Printing House "Globus R", Tiranë, year 2002, p. 99-106.

³ Historia e Ushtrisë Shqiptare, Military Printing House, Tiranë, p.51-52.

⁴ Ibid, p. 233.

to different political groups of the time and they faced the invaders. The greatest force, with a stable organizational scheme and very willing, with disciplined offensive formations, with a progressive numerical increase and with a General Staff, was the Antifascist Volunteer National Liberation Army. This Army succeeded to have 24 army brigades, 8 divisions and 3 armycorps, approximately with 45.000 fighters and is considered the most successful army after 1912. The main basic formation was brigade, while the division was a formation of operational level, able to perform the operations separately.⁵ In November 1944 together with the territorial forces this army had 70.000 people. This figure consisted of 7 % of the Albanian population of that period.

Manifestations of the development of the military thought and organization of Armed Forces in the period 1945-1960

After the liberation of the country attention was concentrated on those components that constitute not only the establishment and the qualitative organization of the Armed Forces but also the continuous and qualitative development of strategical and doctrinal concepts. According to the strategical concept of the time, defense of the just liberated country, the organization and preparation of AF, and the development of theoretical thought on military strategy, should respond to the real conditions and circumstances of the progress of the country.

At the same time, the political leadership of the country, fearing not only “the foreign enemies”, but also the “home reaction”, followed the course of arming both the AF and the whole “soldier people”, relying on and executing Lenin’s teachings, who stressed that: “As long as there are oppressed and exploited people in the world we should require not the disarmament of the people, but the general armament of them. Only this will fully ensure the freedom. Only this will repress reaction.”⁶

Following these steps, the main directions of development of the AF were: establishment and constant perfection of organizational forms; creation and constant perfection of kinds of forces and services and the best harmonized rapports among them; equipment with modern technique and armament responding to the cohesive requirements of a feasible war and the progress of science and technology; high level of preparation of commands, staffs and leading personnel; education and training of the entire manpower with the love for their country and people; the use of rational, efficient and original forms for the highest level of activation of reserve forces and their role at the same level with active forces, etc.

The Albanian Army of the post war was mainly composed of infantry forces inherited from the National Liberation Army. Its contingents were mostly those of the war time, who in general lacked military culture, professional and management skills and especially the required theoretical and military level, as a necessity for a modern and contemporary army.


⁵ Proletar Hasani, Dissertation “Organizimi i UNÇL”, Academy of Defense, Tiranë, year 1989.

⁶ V.I.Lenin, “Mbi luftën, ushtrinë e mbrojtjen”, V-1, Tiranë 1986, p.254.

Apart from other things, to transform this army that just had left war, into a modern army, it was necessary to fulfill some essential criteria in altered conditions. Different military scholars have made efforts to “find” and highlight the values of an “original” military art, and like their civilian colleagues, have greatly respected historical logic of “traditional Albanian resistance for survival”.⁷ Thus, in the new conditions of the country, in case of a feasible confrontation, our army had to confront adversaries and modern armies that relied on advanced concepts, tactics and strategies of battling. “The zeal reaches its peak in the moment an adventure starts; it is a habit of mankind to have even the tiniest hope for what they desire and easily avoid what they do not like.”⁸

Development of the Albanian military strategic concept 1961-1975

This phase can be considered as the phase of development, improvement and perfection of the establishment of AF and their military strategy. Psychology of Cold War, elaborated for the first time by the well known American publicist Walter Lipman⁹ was based on the so-called theory of “filed of zero sum”. According to this theory, “Advantage of one pole of power meant disadvantage for other pole. Thus, both poles, Soviet Union and USA started an unprecedented race of armament with each other, with the final objective, weakening of the adversary and winning over it by no means.



Political divergences between Tirana and Moscow, attested in the Conference of 81 communist parties in 1960 in Moscow, brought about the first big crack between our country and Soviet Union, consequently with Warsaw Treaty.

In this period, the party-state ideologists began to elaborate a new ideological, political and military strategy, which covered all party and state levels, to adapt to the new situation created, which just like all other components of life in the country strongly influenced the Albanian Armed Forces. Armed Forces began to think about a new concept of Defence of the territorial integrity of the country with those resources that they possessed at that time. So we can say that here is the origin of the subsequent strategic platform for the army.

⁷“Vështrim kritik i ecurisë dhe motivimit të punës shkencore”, presented in the anniversary session “50 years Academy of Defense”, p.39, year 2008.

⁸ Thucydides, military historian which knew deeply and in details the society of the time. “Flori-Press”: Mendimtarët ushtarakë gjatë historisë, year 2006.

⁹ Walter Lipman, The Cold War: A study of the United States Foreign Policy, New York, 1947.

After breaking off with the Warsaw Pact, the military-political situation changed significantly and abruptly. The party-state at that time was trying to create a new system of dogmas and principles, which would also serve as the “tracks” which our country would follow in the future. As Albania remained without allies and was under the threat of two powerful military blocks, solution was sought from within the country, without denying the overwhelming desire of senior party leaders for new alliances. And the solution was found very quickly: *the principle of total reliance on our forces and internal resources.*

The military experts also reacted immediately to create and develop new strategic concepts, which would be the basis for the country's defence directive from any possible aggression from land, sea or air. The foundation of the theoretical thought at that time was the development of the general concepts and tactics which would be used in the battlefield, to be successful over every adversary no matter how much prepared they were. Given the superiority of the enemy in forces and equipment and the increase of devastating and demolishing power of their weapons in the battlefield; the Albanian tactical thought sought for more efficient ways to minimize the losses by ensuring the greatest possible protection of the personnel, equipment, weapons and material stocks.

As important development of the concepts of this period, we can mention the reassessment of the general tactics concept “*tactical success led to operational and strategic success*” or “*The sum of tactical successes led to operational success,*” “*the tactic for protection against air and sea desana*”, “*protection of the territory*” “*inch by inch*” starting from the state border”, etc.

After 60s reserves were assigned close to the units. Ready units were set up, units were brought near combat duties, the security belt was created which until 1981 depended from the Corps and later it would serve the First Echelon of the Infantry Brigade.

Distribution of active military in more than 1500 garrisons and 2800 supply points formed the so-called popular way of organization from army barracks and near the people. All this was part of the Albanian authenticity, where *problems of military and defence were an integral part of every citizen.* A special prominence at that time was given to the maintenance of the reserve at any cost, a principle that was implemented in three levels: tactical, operational and strategic.

During the second stage of the organization of AF in 1960, which coincides with the construction of the Armed Forces, second echelons were used as reserves. In tactical units and garrisons the combined arms reserve was 25-33%. While within the AF the combined arms reserve constituted 16%. There were also reserves for the kinds of weapons and services. It was a characteristic that since the first period and steadily the reserve kept increasing. In Ground Artillery, the reserve of the General Command, which in the first period was 28 %, at the end of the second period amounted to 33%; and in communication, chemistry and engineering it was even greater. While the Navy and Air Force, as the Reserve of General Command increased greatly during the second phase of construction of the AF. With the growth and expansion of the Armed Forces during the third period of their construction ('60 - '75), there was a quite noticeable increase in reserves.

What were some of the essential differences between the Albanian military tactical art and military art of war of the armies surrounding our country in some of the typical indicators?

First. Drastic changes in strategy and tactics. Albania was almost the only country in the world that had widely and practically included the strategy and tactics of partisan warfare in its military art.

Second. There were essential changes in the organization of the Armed Forces. The Albanian Army, like some other countries such as Israel, Switzerland, etc., experimented and materialized the theory of “people-soldier”.

Third. Military ideologists in the early 60s and later after 1970 designed and required the implementation of the theory of fortification or to be more precise the tunnelling theory.

After breaking off with the Soviet Union and our separation from the Warsaw Treaty, the problem was how to ensure the defence of the country in the newly created situation?

In such a situation there were also thoughts in regard to the country’s defence strategy, which was raised for discussion. There were thoughts about the procession of the military art, the structure of the army, for defence views and concepts, for armament issues etc. At this time, around the year 1966, a “top secret” working paper drafted by a group of senior officers of the Ministry of Defence, was titled by the communist leadership of the time as the “skidding theory” and as an “anti-national theory”. In order to put under control the concepts of superior military leaders that were against the dictator, he came up with the Theses of the Council of Defence, which according to Major General Ernest Jakova were “...A conglomerate of foreign military regulations, mixed with some concepts of our cadres ... , These theses were introduced as their creative work, as an evolution for the army, in order to tell the Army that it is us at the head and your senior officers are nothing if compared to political leadership” The years ‘61-’70 were the years of the theoretical processing and practical affirmation of the Albanian military thought materialized in the training process, as well as in numerous regulations related to combat. *During that time the attention was focused on:*

First: The new political and ideological balances and our inexistence in Warsaw Treaty brought a new attitude and assessment by the political and state leadership of the time regarding security and defence environment of the country and challenges of the future. Albanian political and military leadership really assessed as possible the turning of our territory into an arena of combat operations between the two blocks. In such conditions they thought of the entire people engagement in the probable war according to the slogan “Every citizen a soldier and every soldier a citizen”. The rapid developments and independence of the Albanian Army, after the separation from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty, forced the country’s military leadership to be more responsible for their mission of country’s defence. With their sense of duty to the country, military cadres did their best for the organization and preparation of the “soldier people”.

Second: Based on the concept “Defend the country inch by inch, from the edge of the border”, whole people were armed according to a clear protective platform to fulfil the constitutional mission. With the intention to face a probable aggression, at the core of the Albanian Army, was the “reserve army” “organized on the basis of territory, under the concept “soldier people”. Units and garrisons appeared at military basis and were ready for their duty at the regions where they lived near their protection belts. Military training was conducted in the so-called “Free Schools”. Years ‘60-‘75 marked the time of expansion and construction of the Armed Forces, according to the concept “all people soldier” and “finding the self”, formation of the original independent tactical doctrinal concepts which were materialized with the emergence of Thesis of the Council Defence. The processed Albanian doctrinal thought, escalating from small tactics to operational and strategic concepts took shape and it opened the way to the institutionalized scientific military thought.

Third. Thesis of the Council of Defence as mindset and generalization of both Albanian and world experience adapted to the conditions and possibilities of our country started to be tested immediately into practice in exercises with small tactical formations in designated training areas and then in large scale exercises at corps level and beyond. Training, experimental and generalizing progress, created a favourable terrain to process the doctrinal concept for the strategy and tactics of the Armed Forces in all structures, types of forces, services, ranging from soldier (volunteer) to the largest tactical unit. About 212 tactical regulations, various texts and instructions were processed, approved and put into use in the years ‘70-‘75.

Fourth. Building and perfection of AF was conceived and implemented in such a way to involve people nationwide. The culmination was the sending of weapons closer to the contingents, according to the principle of mobilization based on territory. This system provided a tactical level rise across large contingents of reserves, or all soldier people, as a guarantee to protect the country from the state border, leaving no empty spaces for the potential enemy. During this time, recognizing the advantages of our enemies, in coalition or separately, in technique, weaponry, and the demolishing firing power, political and military command of the country focused its attention on the *fortification of the theatre of military operations* including the battlefield.

Fifth. At this stage of the development of the military, theoretical and practical thought of Albania, the way how offensive and defensive combat was assessed should be underlined. As the main kind of combat was considered the offensive one, while the defensive combat was considered as one of the main kinds of combat. It should be stressed that the withdrawing combat was treated in various ways. This kind of combat was very much conditioned in relevant regulations and was conducted only by special order. It is not treated as a special type of combat, but simply as “a form of tactical manoeuvre” only temporary and within the defence tactic framework. Military theorists of the time considered tactical combat in its complexity, not only in terms of military organization, the technical equipment and weaponry used in different kinds of tactics, but also the types of combat. Defence combat, offensive combat, withdrawing combat, combat while marching, chasing combat, combat in special conditions, combat in dwelled areas, in forests, conducting offensive actions while marching etc. and the fight against air and sea desana and other peculiarities of the

Albanian tactics were widely treated in the combat regulations.

Finally: We can say that the Albanian military thought held in mind and carefully considered the partisan war tactic, i.e. the mastery of fighting with partisan ways and methods behind the rear lines of the enemy as part of the entire tactics.

Development of new concepts and strategies in the years 1976-1991

Deterioration and break of relations with China, forced the leadership of that time to multiply measures and attempts to fully respond to the rapport of the international political relations of our country with other powers, as well as the country's defence needs.



The new situation laid as a basic task the necessity of a strong and sure defence in the main operational and operational-strategic directions, particularly in the northern, north-eastern and coastal areas. Alongside with the existing effective units and detachments, machine gun units were set up in the visible areas of air desana and they were mainly composed of regular forces.


In general, fortification gained an unprecedented prominence. Strategic concept of fortification was conceived as an idea to fortify the regions of military tasks, initially the first echelons and further deep in the country, and around 1980 started the fortification of the whole country which meant fortification even of the areas between the location of the unit that in a combat situation could be occupied by the reserve units of the General Command according to the operational and strategic directions.

There has been a lot of noise and speculation about the number of bunkers; hence it is necessary to remind that there were guiding norms. Thus, at the beginning the aim was to ensure a firing centre (bunker) for the squad (for its machine gun) and later the plan passed on garrison system with 2,3 and 5 such firing centres. On these basis the directive was that an infantry battalion should have 140-170 firing centres, while a machine gun battalion around 250. The cost of a firing centre was supposed to be 250 000 to 300 000 Albanian lek (old currency), so the expenditure for the construction of all bunkers was 225 billion lek (old currency). One of the protagonists of fortification like Alfred Moisiu in his book of recollections on his military life states that: *“In Albania, from 1945 to 1985 there were built 250-300 thousand bunkers of all types”*, but the recent research shows that their approximate number is 176 thousand¹⁰.

Budget: According to the “Annual Statistical Book of Albania”, published in 1991 by the Department of Statistics at the Ministry of Economy and exactly the income and expenditure of the state budget, in the chapter “Finance, Banking, Insurance”, we learn that for defence the country spent 9.6 % of the state budget in 1975, in 1980

¹⁰ Major General Prof.PhD Kostaq Karoli Gazeta “Shekulli”, date 17.10.2013.

this figure was 11.8 % of the budget, in 1985 it was 11.4 % and in 1990 it was 8.1 % of the state budget. So, military expenditures for the period 1975 onwards, made up 10-11 % of the state budget. This was a heavy burden for the Albanian economy, which was either progressing very slowly, or not progressing at all.



What were some of the most typical features of the development of military strategic concept, of the doctrinal and organizational thought AF for that period?

Organization of the whole the people to defend the country. This organization ensured a broad participation of the masses in defence issues, training and their all round military preparation, rapid mobilization and simultaneous protection of all possible directions from enemy attack.

Independence. Units and garrisons were organized in such a way that with their manpower and means they could carry out tasks by being autonomous during combat operations. This organization did not exclude mutual cooperation and coordination between the military actions of our forces.

Providing high level of manoeuvre. Successful accomplishment of the combat task forces by organic forces and equipments is closely related to the need to have a high level of manoeuvre in the battlefield, in order to cope with situations that arise. Subunits and units should not necessarily connect their mobility with a road. Very important for the increase of the level of manoeuvre was animal or shoulder transportation.

Creation of reserves. To cope with the circumstances that could be created in times of war, division command in defence operation usually held in the second echelon or reserve one third to two fifths of infantry and tank units that depended on it; while in assault the operational structuring was made at least in two echelons. The command of the infantry brigade in defence combat kept in its second echelon or reserve 1/3 up to 1/2 of infantry units. Great importance was given for wartime reserves of the General Command.

Providing all kinds of forces, weapons and services, in right proportion with each other. War in general, requires different types of armed forces, weapons and services. The success of every kind of operation is achieved through mutual interaction among them.

Mobilization, rapid and organized opening of the Armed Forces. Mobilization and opening system in the regions of combat tasks ensured the reporting, arming, equipping, getting the military task and going to defence positions in a quick and organized way. For this purpose all military structures carried out call to arm tests along with reserve structures, in order to get the positions in time.

Under the Cold War psychosis and in accordance with the political concept of the time and self-isolation, the Albanian army increased immensely. So until the early 90s , only the army, surpassing even the ratio applied by the Warsaw Treaty, had 61.000 military people in uniform or over 2 % of the population, 360.000 reservists and over 200.000 territorial volunteers, without mentioning the mobilization of the armed youth of high schools and universities. While in accordance with the main principles of the protection of the country “inch by inch”, the army left its barracks and located in nearly 2.200 armouries across the country. Starting from 1975 the army had the most extensive capabilities of the Albanian military history up to that time.

Conclusions

- Historical logic of “traditional Albanian resistance to survive” has defined and influenced to a large extent on the development of the “original” Albanian military art.
- Development of defence strategy of Republic of Albania is always related with the security environment in the region and beyond.
- As a small country Albania should always rely on alliances, be they regional or European programs and initiatives or beyond.
- Elaboration of the Albanian strategic concept and military thought has been conducted at any time in full agreement with a certain political and ideological pillar. Opposing ideas often have brought about bad consequences to their bearers (1974) and this shows that politics has always influenced the military field.
- Viewing the moral, physical and conceptual aspects the Albanian Army was coherent and able to fight.
- Until '66, the Albanian strategy and military thought was entirely based on viewpoints, concepts and principles of Russian military art. The focus at this time was on the issues of organization, structuring and modernization of the Albanian Army.
- Defence strategic concept and doctrinal thought started to be shaped after '70-ies (the establishment of the Institute of Military Studies), as “authentic” Albanian, enabling the compilation of the Popular Military Art (PMA) in 1975 and later in 1985.

- The principle of “independence”, i.e. “the principle of self-reliance” led to economic collapse, stopping the development of weapons technology and technique and consequently weakening the country’s defence strategy.
- The approval of the new Strategic Concept (NATO Summit in Rome, November 1991), was a decisive step for a new institutionalized cooperation in defence and security issues for the Republic of Albania.
- After the Cold War, the nature of the Armed Forces and their use for political purposes changed radically. The prospect of major conventional war between industrially developed countries had already become meaningless. Military structures, organization and development of doctrinal concepts of the Armed Forces, the definition of their long-term development, modernization and transformation strategies, were conducted in full compliance with the requirements of the time.

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Financing of Terrorism-Case study, Albania

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Short commentary. *In Albania, radical and militant Islamic groups have proliferated since the fall of communism. The case presented here is an example of how the ideology of radical Islam is spread in various places by Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and how weak states have become fertile recruiting grounds and safe havens for Islamic militants. Using the case study Albania, this paper describes the relationships and cooperation between Al Qaeda, other international terrorist organizations, Islamic NGOs, and Islamic legal businesses in Albania, and how the Albania government has responded to this activity. First, it provides brief overview of Albania setting at the begging of the post communist period, followed by a description of the various Islamic NGOs emerging in this period and their involvement in support of terrorist activities in the country, and concludes with a discussion of how the Albanian government has reacted to this threat.*

Overview

After the fall of communism in the early 1990s, Albania has gone through political, economic, legal and social changes. The country was in poor economic condition, had a high rate of unemployment, weak rule of law, and was exploited by Islamic NGOs related to terrorist organizations. Those NGO's gained the cover of legitimacy by claiming their mission was one of charity and spreading Islam. In fact, their aim was to promote Islamic radicalism and to use Albania as a safe haven for their operations.

There were several facilitating factors which made Albania a welcoming place for these Islamic NGOs and affiliated terrorist groups that allowed them to make use of the relevant conditions and location to build a wide logistic base for financing and supporting their activities. Among these factors are: Albania's geography, its mix of religions, its poor economic conditions, and the weakness of its legal system and government agencies.

First, the location of Albania in the Balkan region of Eastern Europe allows an easy flow to Western European countries. This has been exploited by organized crime groups for human trafficking and smuggling drugs, weapons, etc. For example, the

distance between the Albanian city of Valona and the Italian city of Bari is 35 miles which can be covered within an hour using the speedy boat.¹

Second, the majority of the population of Albania is Muslim. Much of the Albanian Islamic community welcomed the Islamic NGOs, which allowed them to gradually influence the faith of this community and push it towards extremism and radicalism. This turn to a more radical version of Islam is part of a broader movement of Islamic revivalism in Albania.

Islam in Albania dates from the time of the arrival of the Ottomans during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.² At the independence of the country in November 1912, Albania was 50% Sunni Muslim, 20% Bektashi Muslims (Shiia), 20% Roman Catholic, and 10% Orthodox Christian. During the period 1924-1933, King Zog I established Albania as a secular kingdom and forced Muslims congregations to end their relations with Istanbul after 1921. The Sunni elected the mufti with his residence in Tirana, together with the High Council of Shariah. Meanwhile, the Shiia (Bektashi) community was banned in Turkey in 1925, moved its world centre to Tirana, and was officially recognized as a separate community upon a decree issued in 1925.³

After the liberation from the nazi-fascist occupation that lasted from 1939-1944, Albania was ruled as a totalitarian communist regime for more than 46 years by Enver Hoxha,⁴ a xenophobic Communist leader who turned the country into the most isolated place in Europe.⁵ The distaste for religion was strongly promoted by the Communist ideology, which saw religion as a conservative custom and an obstacle to the socialist "Cultural Revolution." The communists' final blow against religion came in 1967 with the banning of any religious practices and literature; for about 25 years the Albania was the only declared atheist country in the world.⁶

The rebirth of religion in Albania was not affiliated only with the Islam but with all religions, including Roman Catholic and Orthodox Catholic groups. Religious tolerance was a precondition for being a democratic society and for joining European society.⁷ Freedom of religion was one of the main issues in the transition period for the ex-communist countries of East Europe and especially for Albania. Therefore, the ban on religious practices came to an end, resulting in a gradual revival of religious practice, together with the restoration and rebuilding of religious institutions.

The third factor making Albania especially attractive to Islamic NGOs and terrorist groups was the poor economic condition that many Albanian families were

¹ Fatos Klosi, Head of State Intelligence Service from 1997 to 2002, quoted in Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*, 297.

² Marvin Gettleman and Stuar Schaar "The middle East and Islamic World" Grove Press, New York 2003, p. 40-41.

³ See www.shqiperia.com/tr/besimet_fetare.php (accessed October 20, 2007).

⁴ Enver Hoxha was the leader of the Albanian Communist Party and the Dictator of the Albanian Communist regime.

⁵ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?=15> (accessed October 20, 2007).

⁶ Isa Blumi "*Hoxha's class war: The Cultural Revolution and state reformation, 1961-1971*" East European Quarterly. Boulder: Fall 1999. Vol. 33, Is. 3, p.303-326.

⁷ <http://ec.europa.eu> (accessed October 20, 2007).

experiencing, particularly in rural areas. Unlike the other religious groups that flocked to Albania during this period, the Islamic charities and businesses claimed their intent was to foster the economy of Albania.⁸

Fourth, the gaps in and lack of legal infrastructure in post communist Albania also made the country particularly attractive to Islamic charity foundations. The new democratic system which came into power after the communist regime was legally and politically weak and had many other problems, such as widespread corruption, porous borders, and a reluctance to rigorously scrutinize foreign investment and foreign companies, especially Islamic NGOs operating within Albania.⁹ Additionally, Albanian officials and agencies lacked the experience and skills, which made it difficult for the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor the activity of these Islamic charity NGOs and extremist groups and individuals coming into the country and working in and for these charity foundations.

Islamic humanitarian organizations and charities

Within this operational context, many radical Islamic organizations and affiliated NGOs moved into Albania to use it as a safe haven, recruiting ground, and logistical base. As we have seen elsewhere, one of the sources of terrorism financing is through charities, where the inadvertent or intentional diversion of funds finances terror instead of benevolent activities. The Islamic charities collect millions of dollars every year. The majority of this funding is used for benevolent causes, such as building mosques and Islamic centres, educating and helping the poor, and selecting and sponsoring young Albanians and sending them to study in Islamic countries. Some of the funds, unfortunately, are diverted to terrorists, either by design or through the exploitation of otherwise legitimate organizations.

In the case of supporting and financing terrorist activities, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Islamic Armed Islamic Group (GIA), used the cover of NGOs and charities to raise and distribute funds.

These extremist organizations managed to infiltrate their people into the organizations and manipulated their activities by: (1) controlling the funds and using them for their terrorist activities; (2) using the advantages provided by the legitimate status of these organizations; (3) using the cover of Islam to polarize and radicalize young Albanians and to bring them into the political extremist movements against the Albanian government and its institutions; (4) conducting an effective propaganda and recruitment role through their offices, schools, cultural centres, newspapers, magazines, and videotapes to disseminate their Wahhabi and Salafi extremist ideology; (5) using Albania as a bridge to promote their terrorist activities and operations abroad, especially in other Balkan countries (Bosnia and Kosovo), Afghanistan, Iraq, and Europe.¹⁰ The following is a description of some of the Islamic NGOs that have been

⁸ Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, *Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 10-32.

⁹ Robert Looney, March 2006.

¹⁰ Sheikh al-Mujahedeen Abu Abdel Aziz, quoted by Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press 2002), p. 132.

working in Albania and how they have been used for terrorist purposes. Much of the information is based on the author's professional experience dealing with these organizations.

The International Humanitarian Islamic Organization (IIRO) is the first Islamic NGO that was established in Albania in the beginning of 1990 when the new democratic government allowed freedom of religion. This foundation is a Wahhabi organization and is sponsored and supported by Saudi Arabia.¹¹ This NGO had supported Al-Qaeda and their terrorist activities around the globe.¹² The IIRO has been the main umbrella for the other Islamic NGOs that later came to Albania and during the first period of its activity played an important role in helping the mujahedeen in Bosnia with money and logistics.¹³ It also supported al-Qaeda and other terrorist organization such as the GIA and FIS.¹⁴ Muhammad al Zawahiri, the brother of Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was employed by the Albanian office of IIRO where he assisted al-Qaeda's efforts in the Balkans.¹⁵ During the Kosovo crisis (1999-2000), this organization played an active role in supporting Kosovo refugees in Albania and Kosovo.¹⁶ However, the main aim was to establish the Wahhabi theology in Kosovo's Muslim community and later to create the possibility for mujahedeen and terrorist activities.¹⁷

The Al Haramain Association,¹⁸ an Islamic charity, based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was established in Albania in 1992. From the beginning, the Al Haramain Association was active in building the Wahhabi mosques around the country,¹⁹ opening the Islamic cultural centres, supporting orphans and poor families by helping the children attend Wahhabi theological schools in Saudi Arabia. It has been one of the most active Islamic NGO in Albania in indoctrinating the young Albanian imams with Salafi ideology and has provided them with financial help. Also this charity has provided financial and logistic support for the mujahedeen in Bosnia (mujahedeen battalion in Zenica) and Chechnya.²⁰ From 1993 until 1998, the Al Haramain Albanian branch had been penetrated by Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) members associated with al-Qaeda. The mission of the EIJ cell in Albania was to create many sub-cells by recruiting young Albanians, training them in forging documents, and preparing them

¹¹ http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/CIA_Report_on_NGOs_With_Terror_Links.

¹² http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing3/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-07-09.htm.

¹³ http://jcb.blogs.com/jcb_blog/2006/08/the_us_designat.html.

¹⁴ U.S. Treasury Department, "*Treasury Designates Director, Branches, of Charity Bankrolling Al Qaeda Network*," Press release HP-45, August 3, 2006, at <http://www.treas.gov/press/release/hp45.htm>.

¹⁵ Dore Gold "*The Kingdom of Incitement*" The Wall Street Journal April 14, 2003 see www.jcpa.org/art/wsj-dg14apr03.htm - 9k. (accessed October 10, 2007) .

¹⁶ <http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/1999/news/page230.aspx>.

¹⁷ <http://www.wvnews.net/story.php?id=1273>.

¹⁸ 9/11 Commission – Terrorist financing Ch.7 "Al Haramain case study" www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch7.pdf.

¹⁹ Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., *The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). p 121.

²⁰ Rohan Gunaratna "Inside Al Qaeda : Global network of terror" Columbia University press, New York, 2002. p 133.

in terrorist activities and acts of violence in Kosovo to further to destabilize the internal situation in Albania by fomenting conflict among the different religious groups in the country.²¹ The head of EIJ's Albanian cell, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Nagar, a.k.a Mohamed Ragab Foudah, worked as head of the office, while Mohamed Hasan Mahmoud Hassan, a.k.a Abu Omar, used to be the director of the foundation. After they were arrested and deported to Egypt, the Al Haramain headquarters decided to continue to support the branch but they assigned young Muslim Albanian extremists to lead it. From 1999 until 2005 (when this NGO in Albania was declared closed by the Albania government), it was led by young Wahhabi and Salafi former students who were trained in Saudi Arabia.²²

The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) is an Islamic NGO which is sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Kuwait and opened an office in Tirana in 1992. Just as with Al Haramain, from 1993 until the end of 1998 the Revival of Islamic Heritage Foundation was penetrated by EIJ and al-Qaeda. Specifically, it was taken over by several operatives, including Ahmed Ismail Othman Saleh, a.k.a. Abu Anas, who lived in Albania with a false Sudanese passport under the name of Mohammed Khaled Ahmed Moussa, and who used to work as the representative of this NGO in the urban areas where he was devoted to recruiting the young Albanian students to Wahhabi and Salafi ideology. He was arrested in an attempt to escape from Albania and during the arrest the police found a blueprint of the U.S. embassy in Albania made by him.²³ Also involved was Mosbah Ali Hassannein Azab, a.k.a. Saif or Abdel Rahman, a Yemeni national who lived with a false passport under the name of Fahd Ali Saleh. He was the head of the NGO for North Albania. When the police forces tried to arrest him, he escaped to Montenegro and from there moved to Milan with the help of the organised crime groups involved in human smuggling and were subsequently arrested.²⁴ The final operative from EIJ/AQ to penetrate this NGO was Hossam Ezzat Hossam Nour El Din, a.k.a. Alaa, who used an Egyptian passport under the name Salah Mohammed Omar el Sayed. He was killed during a confrontation with police forces.²⁵ The other EIJ members were arrested and deported to their countries of origin in 1998. In 2005, the Revival of Islamic Heritage NGO was closed by the Albanian government. The young Albanian Islamic extremists that had been recruited and trained by it reopened it, but this time under a different name, "Call for Wisdom." This young Albanian Salafi group was financed illegally by the RIHS headquarter in Kuwait, until the police shut it down.²⁶

The Muwafaq Foundation (or Blessed Relief Foundation) was established in Albania in 1993 as an Islamic charity. This NGO was sponsored by Yassin Abdullah al-Qadi who is on a list of 39 individuals and groups accused by the United States Treasury

²¹http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/charities_execorder_13224-a.shtml#ahalbania

²² http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/486.pdf

²³ For more on this issue see *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, Albania: Internal Affairs.

²⁴ <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1999/03/990306-cairo-4.htm>

²⁵ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, Albania: Internal Affairs.

²⁶ <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1023.htm>

Department of financing Osama bin Laden and his organization, al-Qaeda.²⁷ This foundation was very active during the Bosnia war by supporting the mujahidin and Kosovo refugees in Albania.²⁸ In 1994 the Albanian office of the Muwafaq Foundation was visited by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, one of Osama bin Laden's brother-in-laws with deep roots in al-Qaeda as a financier.²⁹ Al-Qadi closed the Muwafaq Foundation in 1998 following reports of its ties to terrorism.³⁰ He changed the destination of the investments from charities to businesses. He opened several business including a sugar importing business, a medical enterprise, and a construction business, as well as a number of commercial companies called "Medicare", "Loxhall", "Karavan", "Alintid Beton", "Albanian Snacks", "Loks Holl", "Cavallo", "Waleed for general Trade", "Emane" and "Kambel."³¹ The Albanian government then closed the activities of these companies and froze the investments. They were closed not only because they were connected with him and al-Qaeda, but also because they were fictitious companies with limited commercial activity.³²

The Project of Benefaction of the Gulf Foundation was established in Albania in 1997. This is a Kuwaiti NGO financed and sponsored by Kuwaiti Brotherhood extremists. The founder and director of the foundation was Dr. Abdul Latif Saleh. Saleh was born a Palestinian and has Jordanian citizenship. He was the first director of Al Haramain and the first Arab to take Albanian citizenship. Saleh is closely associated with a number of NGOs in Albania with links to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In 2000, Albanian authorities expelled Dr Abdyl Latif Saleh from Albania on suspicion of membership in a "radical Islamic Jihad group",³³ and for closely associating with Osama bin Laden, who provided Saleh with \$600,000 to encourage the establishment of extremist groups in Albania.³⁴

The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) has its centre in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and is financed by the Saudi King. "WAMY was co-founded by Kamal Helwabi, a former senior member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and by Osama bin Laden's nephew Abdullah bin Laden (who served as WAMY's President through 2002 and is now its Treasurer)."³⁵ This foundation is active worldwide and the WAMY branch in Albania was registered as a legal organization on November 1, 1993 with the aim to construct mosques and provide humanitarian aid. This charity was active

²⁷ UN List of suspected terrorist organization and individuals.

www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8102.doc.htm - 61k (accessed November 10, 2007).

²⁸ Rachel Ehrenfeld, *Funding Evil*, Bonus Books, 2003, "Preface to the Expanded Edition" p xiv.

²⁹ http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=muwafaq_foundation.

³⁰ Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., *The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006), p. 121.

³¹ The Albanians seized Al-Qadi's properties in their country, see www.dafka.org/news/index.php?pid=4&id=85 (accessed October 15, 2007).

³² Yasinn al-Qadi is on the US list of al-Qaeda suspects. At the request of the US, Albanian authorities sequestered his investments and blocked his assets. The issue is still under legal review, yet al-Qadi has fled from the country.

³³ http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=abdul_latif_saleh

³⁴ <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2727.htm>;

³⁵ <http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/groupProfile.asp?grpId=6425>

in bringing to Albania the Wahhabi and Salafi ideology and in recruiting and sending the Albanian students to Saudi Arabia for study in madrassas or other schools where they learn only Wahhabi and Salafi theology. After the raid by police forces in 1999 and the deportation of the suspected terrorist elements from Albania, the WAMY sponsors in Saudi Arabia continued and still continue to support the new Albanian leaders of the WAMY Albanian branch with money and propaganda material.

The Islamic Relief Foundation was registered as a legal organization in Albania court on December 12, 1991. Like the other Islamic charities, it engages in humanitarian activities like providing aid for poor people and orphans, building mosques, and spreading religious propaganda. In reality, however, its activity was used as a base for Islamic extremists and especially for the members of the Algerian Front of Islamic Salvation (FIS) and its armed branch, the GIA, to hide from Algerian forces. For instance, Qamar-el-din Kharban, a former officer in the Algerian army and a senior Arab mujahidin commander in Afghanistan, was a cofounder and a key leader in FIS. He stayed for a year in Albania and afterwards went to Bosnia, while other member of the FIS, like Adnan I. Habib and Grinat Belhout, also Algerian nationalists, came to Albania at the beginning of 1993 and were deported in 1999 after special operations from law enforcement.³⁶

Taibah International was an Islamic organization headquartered in and sponsored by Saudi Arabia. The Albania office was established in 1993. Its espoused mission was to support poor Albanian families and orphans, and to build schools. However, Taibah International was penetrated by extremist Islamic members of the Egyptian Brotherhood. They opened one school in Tirana, called Drita (or "The Light"), which was in reality a class for boys under fifteen where they learned Islam, especially Wahhabism and Salafi theology. The other school was in North Albania and was called "Abu Hanife Insitute." Students of this "institute" were under the leadership of the Egyptian extremists and instigated violent conflicts with the members of other religions (Christians and Shiia Muslims), not only in the areas where they studied, but after their graduation in the places where they went to live and promote Islam. After 2005 when the police forces shut down this organization,³⁷ this foundation changed its name to the Albanian name "Jeta" translated in English as "The Life." The new managers of this Islamic NGO were young Albanian extremists students of the Taibah schools and were supported by the same headquarters. As a result of this connection to the original Taibah International NGO, the government also closed down this new organization.³⁸

Al Waqf al Islamia was established in 1992 in Albania. Sponsored by Saudi Arabia, the headquarters is in the Netherlands. It has been penetrated by extremist elements of the EIJ and al-Qaeda. Al Waqf has built madrassas in the Albanian cities of Berati and Gjirokaster and its aim was to recruit young people into the ideology of extremist

³⁶ Compass Media. "Arab veterans of Afghanistan war lead new Islamic Holy War." October 28, 1994.

³⁷ <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm>

³⁸ http://fint.gov.al/doc/Rap.%20Vjetor%202005-2006%20perfundimtar-final%20me%20foto_revised%20-%201.pdf

Islam. This foundation has closed its activity in Albania, but still exists in Kosovo.³⁹

The Qatari Charitable Society was based in Doha and it was financed and supported by the Emirs of Qatar. The office in Albania was established in 1993. Its activities have been fairly limited, but it has sponsored and supported the mujahedin in Bosnia during the Bosnia war.⁴⁰

The Joint Saudi Committee for Kosovo was established in 1999 in Albania with the main aim to build a terrorist network in Kosovo during the Kosovo War. It was sponsored by the Saudis, Osama bin Laden, and al-Qaeda affiliates. This NGO took the leading role among all the Saudi NGOs in Kosovo (IIRO, Al-Haramain, WAMY, Al Waqf al Islamia). The director, Wael Hamza Julaidan, and secretary, Abdal Sadek Kathum, were also representatives of the Rabita Trust Company in Albania. In 2000 both of them were declared “persona non grata” because they had Saudi Arabia diplomatic passports and were deported from Albania, and the NGO was closed.⁴¹

Global Relief Foundation (a.k.a Fondation Secours Mondial) is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium and had an office in Albania. Its officers and directors have connections to, and have provided support for and assistance to, Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban.⁴² The bank accounts belonging to the Lebanese national Nabil Abdul Salam Sayadi, a member of this organization, were frozen by the Albanian government upon an order issued on 10 March 2005.⁴³

The Islamic World Committee is sponsored by Muslim Brotherhood extremists in Kuwait and it was established in Albania in 1993. The foundation was penetrated by extremist elements of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The foundation has been used as an umbrella for the extremists Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members who left the Egypt and were looking to enter clandestinely in Europe.⁴⁴

The Kuwait Joint Relief Committee for Charity, (KJRC) has its headquarters in Kuwait and in it are included some humanitarian associations such as the International Islamic Charitable Organization and House of Zekat. In Albania this foundation has been active since 1993. The funds for this foundation come from assistance from Kuwait and from selling books and magazines that promote the Wahhabi and Salafi theology. Within this organization is the institute called El Hagri in Elbasan, Albania, where young Albanian students learn the extremist Wahhabi and Salafi theology. During the Kosovo war the foundation opened a branch in Kosovo. Overall, this foundation

³⁹http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/special/csrc_mpf-2005-10-17/WP-CIST-CEE2.pdf/.

⁴⁰ U.S .Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Progress since 9/11: The Effectiveness of the U.S. Anti-Terrorist Financing Efforts*, 108th Cong. 1st sess., 11 March 2003

⁴¹ http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=wa_el_hamza_julaidan

⁴² “Secutiry Council Committee Adds Name of an Entity to Its Lists”, available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7543.doc.htm, (accessed October 1,2007).

⁴³ http://fint.gov.al/doc/Rap.%20Vjetor%202005-2006%20perfundimtar-final%20me%20foto_revised%20-%201.pdf

⁴⁴ http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=islamic_world_committee_1

is reducing its activity in Albania and is going to transfer its main focus to Kosovo.⁴⁵

There were also several small Islamic NGO which were not very active and did not openly support terrorists but they have played a significant role in spreading the Wahhabi and Salafi theology among the young Albanians, helping them with money to attend Wahhabi and Salafi schools and courses in countries as Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya.

Counterterrorism policies of the Albanian Government

Originally, Albania lacked a counterterrorism strategy or even the organizational structures for countering terrorism. Over time, however, the Albanian government has responded to this threat in various ways and with varying degrees of success. One task critical to any success is to identify the role of the Islamic NGOs in supporting and financing the terrorist activities of al-Qaeda and other groups.⁴⁶ Since the late 1990s, Albania has taken many steps to identify these NGOs and curtail their activities.

In 1998 the new Albanian political leadership that came into power after the 1997 crisis, clearly understood the perils of the passive policy against terrorism. The new policy that the government started was also encouraged by international actors, and in particular, U.S. intelligence services, which in cooperation with the Albanian secret services, and police, marked the change in the official counter-terrorism policy. As a result of this cooperation during 1998 and 1999, a number of suspected international terrorists were arrested and extradited from Albania, and a number of NGOs came under the scrutiny of the law.

Moreover, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 some international media outlets and neighbouring governments portrayed Albania as a haven of terrorism and made allegations of links between ethnic Albanian insurgents and Islamic terrorism. However, the Albanian government worked to demonstrate its commitment to fighting terrorism. In close cooperation with different western partners, including the U.S., U.K., France, Italy, and Germany, a number of raids were launched against Islamic NGOs that used to be the bases for the terrorists. A number of their principal officers were deported and, in the meantime, the government revoked visa privileges to the Arab nationals suspected of terrorist or extremist activities. Criminal processes against terrorist finances were also initiated.

The identification of the existence of money laundering, a large informal sector, a cash economy, coupled with a fragile financial system in Albania, which led NGO-s and the terrorist elements to bring many in cash or electronic wire transfers pushed the Albanian government to take some radical measurement to bring it under control. So, the government suggested amendments to the existing legal framework related to terrorism and terrorist financing and came up with a new law in 2004 to upgrade the national infrastructure on the fight against terrorism, titled "The Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of International Terrorism."⁴⁷ The law is the

⁴⁵ <http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20080613.shtml>

⁴⁶ Mark Basile, "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 27:169-185, 2004.

⁴⁷ <http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05274.pdf>

necessary legal basis for the fight economic informality (informal cash-based transactions), money laundering and the financing of terrorism, in accordance with the directive and other international standards in this field New entities were established, like Directorate General Prevention of Money Laundering which is the Financial Intelligence Unit, governmental interagency cooperation became more flexible, and additional training was provided on the job to the newly hired and existing personnel.⁴⁸

In the framework of the implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, the government of Albania took up action to freeze/sequester the assets and bank accounts belonging to individuals enlisted in the “Consolidated List”, like the Saudi national Yassin al-Qadi,⁴⁹ Palestinian-Jordanian Abdul Latif Saleh,⁵⁰ and Belgian nationals Nabil Abdul Salam Sayadi and Patricia Rosa Vinck (both of Global Relief Foundation). Foreign Islamic NGOs were shut down; assets and bank accounts belonging to the following groups were frozen: Al-Haramein, Global Relief Foundation, Taibah International, and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society. The Albanian Government has frozen around \$20 million in total.⁵¹ The Albanian government is doing its best to ensure that its actions targeting international terrorism and terrorist financing are consistent with international laws and with the norms of liberal democracy.

Conclusion

The experience of al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations associated with it show how non-state actors and global networks can support and finance terrorist activities. In the Albanian case, NGOs used the country to build their operations, to raise money to support mujahedin, to recruit new Albanian radicals, to gain legal cover for their operations, and to serve as a springboard for their operations in Europe. Some terrorists have already infiltrated other parts of Europe from bases in Albania through the traffic of illegal immigrants by speedboats across the Adriatic Sea to Italy.

Also, this case shows how NGOs adapt their operations as circumstances dictate. They changed their leadership from Arab citizens to the young Albanian students recruited by them after the Arab leaders were arrested and/or deported; they changed the name of the NGOs from Arabic to Albanian; and in the case of al-Qadi, we saw how he closed the NGO and transferred the money to different shadow businesses. Also, a large number of the personnel of these NGOs got married with Albanian girls

⁴⁸ <http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/europe/Albania.aspx>.

⁴⁹ Victor D. Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” *Terrorist Financing and State Responses in Comparative Perspective*, Giraldo and Trinkunus, eds, Stanford University Press, 2006. p 121-122.

⁵⁰ Qadi is thought to support Al-Qaeda and have links with a Saudi suspected terrorist, Abdyl Latifi Saleh, who was extradited from Albania in November 1999. See Kristin Archick and Paul Galles, *Europe and Counterterrorism* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), p 41-42.

⁵¹ http://fint.gov.al/doc/Rap.%20Vjetor%202005-2006%20përfundimtar-final%20me%20foto_revised%20-%201.pdf

to become citizens, or used fake identities to make them hard to be reached or identified.

The experience gained from this case highlights the need to not only freeze and seize the terrorist-linked assets, but also to detect and follow them as the best way to stop and disrupt their criminal actions in Albania and beyond as part of a global effort against terrorism.

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“A Defence Planning System for Albania under the NATO Collective Defence”

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Short commentary. *The Defence Planning System under the NATO Collective Defence is one of the major current subjects under discussions in the agenda of the national defence and security institutions of the country, closely connected with the great historic event of four years ago, in April, 2009: Albania's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.*

The fulfilment of the strategic goal of membership in the Alliance is not the end of our efforts. This does not mean that the integration process is closed. In this context, the key question of my motivation in this topic is how to become respected members of the Alliance, with both the benefits and the obligations stemming from the membership. This quality transformation of the country defence concept will be associated with complex reforms in the security and defence.

The object of this paper is to analyze what has changed since the day of our country's membership in the NATO summit of Strasbourg-Kehl, and to identify what needs to be further changed ahead until full integration into the Alliance. In other words, what has changed from Albania's "de jure" membership and what is expected to be changed until full "de facto" integration?

In my view, there is a significant difference between the definition of *membership* and that of *integration*. In addition to things in common, these two notions cannot be fully identified with each other. While "de jure" membership relates to the accession date of our country in the Alliance, the "de facto" integration is a longer process associated with a sustainable progress in the political, economic, financial and military areas of the allied country, in order for it to normally exercise both benefits and contributions of collective security and defence, which are not necessarily achieved in the accession day.

My purpose has less to do with the progress achieved during the pre-accession period and more with the challenges ahead. It has to do with the development of a strategic

planning system to ensure the security and defence of the Republic of Albania, now as a member of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and part of the collective defence.

Through the “lessons learned” approach of our country and other countries in this period, I tried to give answers to questions in the agenda of reforms of state security institutions, and particularly the Ministry of Defence and General Staff, such as: What are the changes required by the membership in the Alliance? Beyond the “de jure” membership, which are some of further “de facto” integration challenges? What are the benefits and obligations in the defence planning area? What should be the Level of Ambition of our country in NATO? What authority should be delegated to collective defence planning, and what contribution should be produced for collective defence? How much military forces are now enough for our country to accomplish the constitutional mission as a NATO ally? Can we get rid of the development of the armed forces as sometimes claimed by some sceptical and nihilistic views? If not, what are some of the main characteristics of the future force compared with the traditional one? How could they differ in size and quality from the current armed forces? What recommendations can be given in support of the capability priorities developed by the NATO Strategic Concept? What is the current system of national defence planning and how can it be further harmonized with the collective defence system? What are those elements that can measure such a thing? What civilian capabilities are needed to be together alongside the military ones? What are the mechanisms and structures to be used for the harmonization of our national defence planning system with that of the Alliance? Why should we be active in this process? The above questions are only some of the total bunch of questions ahead.

In my opinion, Albania is lucky to be a NATO member, at a time when the Alliance itself is going through a period of transformation. Its Strategic Concept 2010 and Lisbon Critical Capability Package, together with the “Smart Defence” package of projects of Chicago Summit in 2012, have given transformation messages for all allied countries for the ten coming years. With this in mind, the transformation of the Alliance is and will be conducted by each allied country through the long-term planning or the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Albania cannot be excluded from this process.

I believe that this qualitative change in the defence policy of our country cannot be easily completed; it requires knowledge, expertise, and professional engagement. Alliance is a giant mechanism of collective security and defence, with a history of over 60 years, with known and unknown paths and labyrinths, with unclassified and classified information, and under continuous transformation. Collective defence mechanisms are complex, very complicated and moving often with difficulties. In this sense, the transition from superficial understanding to deep knowledge of the Alliance’s collective defence remains a fundamental issue for us. It is time now to develop our policies, articulate our positions, and formulate our approaches on various issues of the collective defence agenda.

Also, this paper has resulted in the conclusion that, in order to build a national strategic defence planning system in harmony with the Alliance, we need to develop a strategic planning community of experts, which requires a period of at least 5 years. The

Integration Conference Report, Albania-NATO 2011 stated that “...Albania’s National Defence Planning System should be aligned with NATO Collective Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Decision-makers lack the knowledge of NDPP, and there are few national experts in the NDPP area. The modification of the defence planning process of RA should be taken into consideration... as well as training of experts in this field”.

Four year later, we have the Final Integration Conference, where the new Albanian Minister of Defence stated again that, and I quote: “the priority areas for the Ministry of Defence in the short term ahead are: first, the harmonization of the national defence planning process with NATO collective defence planning process; second, increase of interoperability with allied forces; third, maintaining of acceptable levels of defence budgets to meet national and international obligations; and fourth, contribution to regional security and stability”¹.

To support this goal, the author has taught about 48 classes each year since 2010, with the Senior Officer Courses of the Academy of Defence, which have shown both positive interest of the attendees and contributed to the gradual development of this strategic defence planning “pool of experts”.

The current defence planning system of our country under the collective defence system is still under development. With findings and recommendations, I consider myself part of its development, both the strength and weaknesses. However, this system is undergoing significant improvements to reflect the new reality of collective defence. One of the central conclusions is the fact that, in order to enjoy all the benefits of collective defence planning system, Albania should continue to harmonize timelines, processes, methodologies, documentation, disciplines, capacities, systems and main end-products of the Alliance collective defence. This still remains a major challenge for the post-accession period in the Alliance, which is being successfully managed, but also associated with many difficulties since 2010, assisted by NATO Strategic Commands, through Annual Integration Conferences.

Through facts, arguments, analysis and perspective views, I have drawn the conclusion that the period 2013-2020 will continue to be a period of reforms and transformation of Albania and AAF to meet NATO and EU standards. It will be a hard process, but not unknown. Since 1999, eight new NATO member countries have followed this process, so together the original values and characteristics which should show, we should also benefit from the lessons learned and best practices of NATO member countries in the past 20 years. The current practice of the period from membership to integration of new member states after 1999 has extended and continues to extend from 5 to 10 years from the date of their accession, which means that our country will continue this process at least until 2015. Also, five more years will be required for the consolidation of our country as an ally country, by 2020². This period also coincides with the national efforts to join the EU. This makes the study even more

¹ Speech of Minister of Defence, Mrs. Mimi Kodheli in the NATO-Albania Final Integration Conference, in 25 Oct 2013.

² The data are given under a ‘de facto’ format, because the ‘de jure’ status is reached at 25 Oct 2013.

interesting, especially for the obligations of the Ministry of Defence; to meet simultaneously the criteria of the equation of full NATO integration and EU membership.

Although this subject is of primary interest for specialists and leaders at strategic level, I have tried to make it simple for the military experts of military operational and tactical level, as well as for civilian specialists in the area of civil protection planning.

I have specifically addressed the Defence Planning theory during the Cold War and especially after the Cold War. Through introduction of a comparative study method, I have identified the differences between the Defence Planning, the Force Planning and Operational Planning. Further, I have described main classic/traditional and modern methods of Defence Planning. Key focus is given to the Capability Based Planning method (CBP) as the most modern planning method of the 21st century. I have then reviewed the methodology and process of Long Term Defence Planning. Although this chapter is characterized more by theory, it is illustrated with many practical examples of Defence Planning in the twentieth century, and this century. My purpose is that, after a detailed explanation of the theoretical foundations of the Strategic Defence Planning, this chapter will normally bring the reader to the next chapters, dealing with the collective defence planning, and the defence planning in the Republic of Albania as part of collective defence. I think this approach makes the paper more understandable and logical in its reading.

I have addressed the NATO collective defence planning, analyzed key Disciplines of Defence Planning together with their related Authorities. Further, I have provided a synthesis of the Defence Planning Capability Survey (NATO-DPCS), and described the concept of Level of Ambition of the Alliance. Also, the chapter is further focused on NATO types of missions, Collective Defence Planning scenarios, Essential Operational Capabilities (EOC), NATO Task List document (NTL), and Capability Codes and Statements. I have also explained the Types, Categories and Readiness Levels of the Alliance Forces, as well as the methodology of transition from the Defence Planning to Operations Planning in NATO. All this information, together with an analysis, synthesis, statistics and arguments given in this chapter directly serve the strategic level planners to understand the role of national defence planning in collective defence, along with benefits and contributions to it.

In this research study, I address the current Defence Planning system in RoA, the changes it has experienced after NATO membership and the efforts being made to further harmonize the collective defence system of the Alliance. Based on the conclusions of first and second Chapters, the Chapter three has inside plenty of research, analysis and recommendations for the actualization of our defence planning system. I have also address the key Defence Planning documents of the RoA, as an ally country and the potential disciplines of Defence Planning in RA, provides an original option of the Level of Ambition of RA; formulates a set of Planning Scenarios/Situations of RA as an allied country; recommends a Capability Based Planning in the RA; gives an option of the necessary capabilities of the Future Force 2020; develops a concept of specialized “niche” capabilities in the RA; formulates a conceptual framework of a “Volunteer Reserve” force in AAF; and generates ideas for the institutionalization of a periodic process of Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in RA.

- In my research I have been focused on the issue of the process of Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and its relations with Defence Planning. I have treated the approach, goals, methods and national-wide engagement in SDR; analysis of the experience of current national SDR progress 2013, as well as the articulation of a 'Smart Defence' concept as a new approach to national and regional defence planning.
- I have listed more than 30 findings and recommendations, which are coming as a logical result of the analysis, lessons learned, facts, arguments, and personal experience. Findings and recommendations are associated with an implementation action plan to develop a defence planning system as an allied country. I recommend these findings are of great interest for the defence planning experts and management staffs. Also, they can also serve the students of the Academy of Defence, research centres, and other interested researchers.

The Key Findings and Recommendations

The research paper has identified 25 findings which give answers to the key questions for the development of a national defence planning system for Albania harmonized with the NATO Collective Defence Planning System (NDPP). The findings are shortly described as follows:

1. **Harmonize our national defence planning system with that of NATO collective defence.** This includes harmonization of methodology, content, timelines, responsible authorities, and products of the 5 steps of collective defence planning process of the Alliance (NDPP) with our defence planning system. This finding can be implemented in accordance with the assessments and recommendations given, based on a National Defence Planning directive. This document, which shows '*who does what*' in defence planning system, can be approved by the Minister of Defence every four years.
2. **Adopt a Capability Based Planning System in Albania (CBP).** In the context of CBP, I support the development of a national professional military force based not simply on the numbers, but first of all, on the quality of capabilities it develops. Therefore, among the ten traditional systems of defence planning, I recommend the Capability Based Planning Based method (CBP) as the most appropriate method for our country, as a method that naturally integrates all positive aspects of 10 defence planning methods, and better guarantees the harmonization with the collective defence planning of the Alliance. In distinction from the traditional term "*force*", the term "*capability*" integrates 8 essential elements of DOTMLPFI system: doctrine, organization, training, equipment, leadership, personnel, infrastructure and interoperability.
3. **Develop a AAF Priority Plan to meet the goals of 'Capability Targets of Blue Book - 2013'.** Capability development will be the key reform of the Armed Forces until 2020 and beyond. I recommend our country and AAF should plan and implement with priority the 44 capability targets of the package of '*Capability Targets of the Blue Book- 2013*', regarding our country's obligations with the Alliance. To accomplish these targets, we should relate to the term "*capability*",

i.e. meet their eight constituent elements. The Capability Based Planning (CBP) relies on the comprehensive approach of “a single set of forces” concept. It is linked both with national and international led operations by NATO/EU/UN or ad-hoc coalitions.

4. **Adopt a Set of 12 planning disciplines in our national defence planning system, as recommended.** For this purpose, my research has designated relevant institutions/ departments responsible for each of the 12 planning disciplines and the respective Boards established in their support. These boards can be activated through a separate directive of the MOD, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers on the boards.
5. **Approve a Package/ Set of Planning Scenarios in AAF.** I have recommended a Package/ Set of 5 strategic scenarios themes with 23 operational scenarios, which can be reduced to 12-15 representative scenarios. For each scenario, it is decided the role the national security institutions will play; considering options such as the leading role, the supporting role, the coordinating role, or the informative role. Planning scenarios are considered as a basic link between force planning and operational planning.
6. **Review the AAF operational planning system at the strategic, operational and tactical level.** It is natural and logical that the adoption of the new set of planning scenarios as an allied country at the strategic level should be used for the actualization of full spectrum operational plans down to tactical level units. My recommendation is to establish cooperation with the Alliance for the development, in due time, of all strategic plans for the collective defence of the Republic of Albania, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as our contribution to the Alliance to Article 5 ‘out of area’ operations. In my understanding, the operational planning approach could be also followed by other institutions of national security, especially related to planning scenarios where they play a leading or supportive role.
7. **Establish a continuous and constructive dialogue between policy makers and strategic military planners in the interest of national defence planning.** Special role in finalizing the fundamental issues of defence planning must be played by MOD Defence Policy Council, Security Policy Committee of the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council of the President of the Republic. I also recommend the inclusion in the process of representatives of other interest groups, stakeholders and civil society, to make this process transparent with regard to spending of taxpayers’ money.
8. **Build a community of highly skilled civilian and military experts of all disciplines of defence planning at MOD, Force level, and national representatives at NATO headquarters and force structure.** My recommendation is that this community should be managed, develop their career, and possibly move within their planning discipline. Highly skilled and experienced early retired officers and civilians can be successfully used in these positions.
9. **Formulate the Level of Ambition (LoA) of RA, which means the number of**

simultaneous participation in national and international operations. This LoA should be stated in a political directive at the highest level, i.e., the Strategic Defence Review document in process. The level of ambition of the country should be more realistic and consistent with the economic and financial possibilities of the country, with the capability targets of Article 5 and Non-Article 5 operations, as well as with the AAF commitment to national civil emergencies. I recommended a rational Level of Ambition and specific conditions applicable in our country, which can be taken into consideration by the relevant authorities.

10. **Reach the MoD target to support a defence budget of 1,5-2% of GDP by allocating up to 20% for AAF modernization.** These figures are minimal to conduct qualitative reforms in the development of midterm capabilities for the full spectrum of mission at home and abroad. These budget levels are based on the Ministerial Directive of the Alliance, on the development of modern military capabilities, deployable, sustainable and interoperable with allied standards. Priorities of the defence budget will be focused on motivation of personnel, modernization, individual and unit training, as well as contribution to national and international operations.
11. **Formulate a new National Security Strategy, Military Strategy and Long Term Development Plan (PAZH) as an allied country.** These documents should be based on principles of collective defence, the Alliance Strategic Concept, as well as the EU's ESDP. In my mind, we have to complete as soon as possible these strategic documents in accordance with the recently updated strategic documents and policy of the Alliance, such as NATO Strategic Concept 2010. Also, my recommendation is to follow the approach of equivalence of all national security and defence documents with the respective collective defence documents. In this context, in order to avoid the production of excessive traditional security and defence documents, I recommend a realistic approach for the integration of some of strategic documents, such as the national security strategy/policy and defence policy/military strategy etc. Also, I recommend that PAZH is normally approved at the highest possible political decision, in order to survive to rotations of political powers.
12. **Institutionalize a periodic process of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in support of defence planning.** In my judgment, only through a periodic analytic SDR process we can conduct qualitative reforms in the Armed Forces. For many reasons, many '*reforms*' in the last 20 years have been conducted simply on the empirical basis and not based on such analytical processes. My recommendation is that SDR should be conducted every 4-6 years including other security institutions, interest groups and civil society. The SDR is following an assessment of the necessary capabilities for the defence of the RA as a member of NATO, especially in the context of the Alliance's Strategic Concept and NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) of 2009.
13. **Update the teaching curricula of senior officers' courses of AAF Academy and other schools with the theory and practice of defence planning.** This research emphasises that all educational institutions and units of AAF Academy and other schools should update their training curricula, education programs

with Article 5/ Non-Article 5 operations with the Alliance, as well as national civil emergency and asymmetric operations. It has also concluded that all AAF staff unit training should be oriented to new tactical tasks based on the new Planning Scenarios Package as an ally country. Also, the fundamental issues of defence planning should be subject to strategic and operational research studies of MoD research centres.

14. **Continue the ratification and implementation of STANAGs in AAF according to the annual and long-term standardization plan in AAF.** These Standardization Plans are based on the AAF operations under collective defence, starting with the ‘capstone’ doctrines and then the main doctrines of operations within and outside Article 5. Also, build the AAF doctrinal hierarchy, taking into account that the doctrinal basis for operations outside Article 5 or Article 5, will be the Alliance doctrinal basis. Main efforts on doctrinal development should be focused on Armed Forces operations in national civil emergency and national independent operations, according to Sets of Planning Scenarios recommended.
15. **Develop the Mission Essential Tasks List for the three levels of AAF tasks: strategic, operational and tactical (ST, OT, TT),** based on the experience of the NATO Task List’s (NTL) and Capability Codes and Statements of 2010. List the three types of missions of AAF based on their constitutional mission and types of NATO mission.
16. **Establish a Readiness Unit System in AAF, based on the readiness category system expressed in the Alliance Force Standards (AFS - HRF / FLR / LTBF)** for land forces, air force, navy, and unit staffs and other special units. This readiness unit system should be also based on the types of units we have declared and committed in the Capability Target Package CT-2013, Capability Codes and Statements, and the relevant Alliance Forces Standards (AFS-1 and AFS-9) and units for national typical missions. We should keep in consideration that the units declared for international operations should be deployable and sustainable (*ie, have the capacity of strategic deployment and logistic support, etc.*), beyond the area of responsibility, within 10% to 50% of the total of AAF.
17. **Adopt the Alliance TEEP system (ACT) for training, education, exercises and evaluation process in AAF units (individual and collective).** My study supports the application of the 75-2,3,7 Directive for individual and collective training and education. For this purpose, I recommend the introduction and implementation of unit evaluation system CREVAL, TACEVAL, MAREVAL for land, air and maritime units, according to their mission essential task lists.
18. **Consider a ‘comprehensive approach’ concept at national level. In addition to military capabilities, we should also take into consideration the civilian capabilities required by the CT-2013 package for stabilization and reconstruction purposes.** Civilian contributions can be identified by the capability target package. NATO collective defence is not simply an issue of military capabilities; it is also an issue of civilian capabilities.
19. **Develop a revision of the legal, organizational and doctrinal framework,**

and all state capabilities required for civil emergencies. This review should be conducted according to the SDR best practice, and aimed at further improvement of coordination of inter-institutional efforts and a better management of the entire national capabilities in the future, based on the findings of the *'lessons learned'* system.

20. **Consider the development of a specialized role “niche” capability concept in AAF, according to the recommendations in this study.** Participation in national and international operations will become more flexible in the future; in addition to the traditional units we can make available non-traditional specialized ‘niche’ modules with high level ranking need in the NATO system.
21. **Build a national concept for the development of a voluntary reserve component in the future AAF structure.** This paper recommends the establishment of a experienced working group in the above matters to prepare a set of conceptual, legal, organizational, motivational, training, financial for a volunteer reserve component in AAF. Volunteer reserve component can focus on civil emergencies and peace support operations of AAF, according to the needs of commanders of forces / units. To do that, the Personnel and Recruiting Centre can have an additional reserve component sector.
22. **Develop a national document named “Assessment of Security Environment”** by a joint working group of all intelligence agencies, equivalent with the allied document MC-161 “Intelligence Estimate”. This document can serve the Strategic Defence Review and other documents of national security.
23. **Adopt an integrated approach of ‘Smart Defence’ in the Defence Planning of RA, based on the Lisbon Strategic Concept.** Capability development under the ‘smart’ concept will consider national, bilateral, multilateral and regional options. This approach is in accordance and cooperation initiatives with countries in the region, in particular with Kosovo, as well as other regional forms, with the aim to develop *'more capabilities with fewer resources'*.
24. **Introduce a C2 system based on the allied concept of “force user” and “force provider”, created with the modules / packages of capability targets.** Priority of the defence reforms of small countries, our country included, will be focused on the development of modular forces. Force modules based on the concept of the modular force should be the basis for the Task Force concept. The development of such a force is a relatively new culture and concept in AAF versus the traditional force concept. Capability Based Planning (CBP) in our case will be primarily focused on the employment of battalion/ company task forces and sometimes even platoon level task force. These task force units, tailored to the specific mission, will be the basis of future missions of AAF. Priority in future scenarios will be given to training in the ‘task force’ format, either at battalion or company/platoon level.
25. **Develop a more rational and practical structure for the Future Force 2020 based on the findings of the Strategic Defence Review.** My paper outlines the recommendation that AAF priority should be on future force capabilities. Based

on the capabilities generated by the Set of 13 SDR Scenarios our strategic planners should identify *surpluses* and *shortfalls* of AAF capabilities, parallel structures, and duplication of capabilities between the services of the Armed Forces, as well as between different state institutions, in land, air and sea. My recommendation is to avoid, if possible, the traditional structure of commands of land, maritime, and air forces, and adopt a Joint Operational Command in the General Staff, as a “force user” for the directly subordinate battalion level units serving as “force providers”. With a target of 8500 force strength we cannot act with the concepts of traditional forces. The concept of “force user” and ‘force provider’ treated by the author may serve as “food for thoughts” on this issue. There is also more place for a more integrated Ministry of Defence with General Staff, in concept, management and organization structure.

As a conclusion, I think that, besides the cognitive, comparative and analytical values of this doctorate thesis, it also promotes applicative values to be applied in the mid and long term. So, besides the retrospective analysis, this research study provides a development platform with over 25 findings, recommendations offering specific solutions for high civilian and military authorities regarding to issues of national defence planning in the coming years.

I believe that my study can also serve strategic planners of Kosovo Security Force to begin designing the Future Force of the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. They are welcome to learn from the progress we have made and the lessons we have learned in the area of strategic defence planning.

Last but not least, I want you to know that I have used a broad literature of over 250 best authors in the area of national and international strategic planning, with some 9000 pages altogether. In addition to this broad literature, I think I have integrated here my modest creativity based on knowledge, expertise and personal experience of more than 20 years in this field.

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SECTION THREE

HISTORICAL STUDIES

Among the contributions in field of military history is the paper of PhD. Bernard Zotaj, who draws some important conclusions on the impact of Lezha Convention on the political and military Albanian life at that historical period. Creation of the Albanian state under the leadership of Skanderbeg was a great historical victory of the Albanian people and the outcome of that legal process for the creation of independent state formations in the Middle Ages. Unification of Albanian people in a single state under the leadership of Skanderbeg helped in forging political unity of the people in the struggle against the ottoman invaders as well as consolidation of Albanian nationality, on the basis of language, territory and psycho-cultural unity.

In *Albanian Stradiots and their historical contribution*, presented by Fotaq Andrea, researcher, translator and former Ambassador of Republic of Albania to European Parliament, the author states that the Stradiot phenomenon or the Albanian estradotia, viewed in the historical context, the same as the Albanua phenomenon, is not a coincidence. Above all, it must be considered as part of the certain historical of economic and social conditions, as well as closely related to the nature and character of the Albanians, the tribal organization, its legal rights and attributes that explain the essence of these phenomena themselves.

The researcher emphasizes that the period of the peak of Albanian estradiots, before, after and during Scanderbeg time, crowned in a way with the prominent Albanuaja, the Albanian coat of arms of the middle Ages, held even by the King of France, is a valuable contribution of the Albanian people in European history. This was made possible by a resistance for a quarter of a century against the Ottoman Empire and with the bloodshed by the Albanian stradiots for two centuries and “the flourishing of the European Renaissance, reformation, exploration of the western world, where later would be housed hundreds of thousands of his (Scanderbeg) offsprings.”

Lezha Convention, a major event in the national history of Albania

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Short commentary. *The great Ottoman-Albanian War under Scanderbeg sped the development of a legal and very important process, like that of the unification of the country in a single and concentrated state. Overcoming the feudal fragmentation and creating concentrated state formations is a phenomenon that occurred in the period of developed feudalism. At this time the central government, based on the support of cities, broke the feudal particularism and opened the way to greater political formations where social forces interested in further development and progress of the country could move. Not only Albania, but all the Adriatic- Balkan area of XV century had reached such an internal development that could objectively lead to the liquidation of feudal disunity and the formation of concentrated states.*

In Albania, this objective process was hampered for a long time by foreign invaders, but the great war of the Albanian people under the leadership of Skanderbeg created new opportunities for resolving of this historical task, even though not completely, which was prepared by the whole previous development in the country.

“...After the uprising against Timar regime, the main problem for the nation was to unite political, military and economic forces in a single joint anti ottoman front. Common people who suffered from burden of Ottoman oppression and exploitation were primarily interested in this unification. Even the Albanian feudal lords were already convinced due to their experience that staying detached from each other, they could not stop the invasion of the country by the Ottoman armies and loss of their feudal holdings”¹.

In order to solve the historic task of unification of the Albanian people and the feudal class in a single anti ottoman front, Skanderbeg organized a national convention. This convention has gone down in history as the “Lezha Convention”. To this end, prior to the convention, a series of consultations with the Albanian

¹. Biçoku, K.. Studime për epokën e Skënderbeut, Tiranë, 1989, vol. 3, p. 19.

feudal lords and other leaders of the country were held to prepare the convention and remove the obstacles from the road of unification².

Convention took place on March 2, 1444 in Lezha which at that time was under Venetian rule. The organization of the Convention in Lezha intended to avoid any misunderstanding among participants regarding the respect of feudal honours. On the other hand it provided support or at least neutrality of Venice towards the great Ottoman-Albanian war. That was the reason why the Republic of Venice and Ragusa were invited to participate in the proceedings of the Convention.

Lezha convention was organized on the basis of the earliest Albanian tradition, to address important problems in joint assemblies.

Lezha convention, convened and organized by Skanderbeg, marked the further development of this tradition, because it was a nationally organized assembly. Representatives from the most powerful feudal families participated in the convention. Feudal rulers of principalities were present in the convention, accompanied by their sons or their grandsons. Less important feudal rulers and other leaders, who represented the free peasantry of Albanian Alps, took part in the convention

In his work "History of Skanderbeg",³ the contemporary and historian of Skanderbeg, the Albanian humanist Marin Barleti, introduces the names of the Albanian rulers who took part in the proceedings of the Convention. Among them was the initiator and organizer of the Convention, Gjergj Kastrioti Scanderbeg, as the representative of Kastrioti principality, Gjergj Araniti, Andrea Topia with his two sons, Komini and Muzaka with his grandson Tanush Topia, Gjergj Stres Balsha, Teodor Korona Muzaka with other members from Muzakaj family, Pal and Nikollë Dukagjini, Lek Zaharia, Pjetër Spani with his four sons, together with some less influential feudal lords near his principality etc. Participants in the Convention came from the Albanian-speaking territories. The only exception was Stefan Cernojevic, the ruler of Zeta (Montenegro), whose possessions, inhabited mostly by Albanians, were near Shkodra Lake. He also had family ties with Skanderbeg, because he was married to one Scanderbeg's sisters.

The representative of Venice also participated the Convention with the status of the observer. Republic of Ragusa refused to take part in order not to complicate its relationships with the Sultan of Ottoman Empire.

After numerous discussions Lezha Convention, made important decisions, this defined the political nature of this event. Despite differences dictated by the narrow interests, the feudal lords of the gathered in the Convention expressed their will to unite in the war against the Ottoman occupation.

The idea of joining all political, military and economic forces in a common front was materialized in several decisions it made. The most important among them was decision for the creation of an Albanian feudal covenant, which was named "League of Albanian princes" (League of Lezha). As the organizer and leader of the liberating

² Biçoku, K. Ibid, p. 19.

³ M. Barleti, *Historia e Skënderbeut*, Tiranë, 1967, p. 96-99, as well as Fan S. Noli, *Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu*.

uprising against the regime of Timars, and because of the important position that Kastrioti principality had, Skanderbeg was unanimously elected its chairman.

Barleti gives very rich information on Lezha Convention and its decisions. He says that Skanderbeg “first of all decided that it was necessary to create an alliance and establish a sort of permanent covenant with the neighbouring princes and rulers...”⁴. In the following pages, after describing the proceedings of this convention, he states that all of them (the feudal lords) “... after passing almost voluntarily the power, people of their principalities, the armies, and after trusted him the supreme leadership of all the people and the care for the war, they elected him as their only chairman and captain”⁵.

Although the chairman and Commander-in-Chief, Skanderbeg was at that time a “first among equals”. However, the assignment of a single political and military leader had a great importance and was a step forward in overcoming feudal disunity⁶.

The data that Barleti brings are confirmed and completed by the memories of the Albanian boyar Gjon Muzaka, one of the members of Muzakaj family, a contemporary of Skanderbeg. He writes: “...then these rulers of Albania convened in an assembly in Lezha. Someone went himself, someone sent viceroys. So the aforementioned Skanderbeg became the overlord of Albania, and each sent people and money according to the quantity he had to. Progeny of some of those rulers fought under his command as well to learn the craft of the war that would help them defend their principalities. Being so much hardened at war and very brave, he (Scanderbeg) was elected as Commander-in-Chief and everybody had to obey him”⁷.

Participation in the League guaranteed to every feudal lord the right of protection from invaders and the obligation to contribute to the creation of the army and the common funds. Two important decisions of Lezha Convention are associated with these liabilities: the decision to create an army of “League of Albanian princes” as well as provision of funds for the war expenses of with joint efforts.

Lezha Convention decided to create an Albanian army, which will be recruited by Scanderbeg in Kastrioti principality and from other feudal lords in their possessions. Each member of the League voluntarily determined the number of soldiers he would contribute for the establishment of the common army. Scanderbeg was elected Commander-in-Chief of the League army, while the commanders of the units were to be appointed by boyards themselves.

In order to meet the expenses of the war, Lezha Convention decided to establish a special fund in cash, which would be provided partly by the contribution of the Albanian feudal lords and partly from the incomes of Shën Kolli salt-works in the

⁴ M. Barleti, *Ibid*, p. 94.

⁵ M. Barleti, *Ibid*, p. 104.

⁶ Shahin Leka, *Strateg e komandant legjendar, Skënderbeu*, Military Printing House, Tiranë, 1994, p 34-35.

⁷ Musachio, G., *Historia e genealogia della casa Musachia (1510)*, cited by Burime të zgjedhura për Historinë e Shqipërisë, v.p. p. 289; as well as Gjon Muzaka, *Memorie*, translated and completed with notes by Dhori Qiriaz, Editions Toena, Tiranë, 1996, p. 20-21.

north of Durres, which belonged to Kastriots⁸. Financial means, and the army would be administered by Skanderbeg, who, among other boyards, gave the major contribution for the cause of liberating war in soldiers and money. Skanderbeg was charged by the Lezha Convention with many leading and commanding tasks. Thus, he had the main responsibility in conducting the war.

Strategically "League of Albanian princes" was the most powerful political-military alliance (covenant) between the Albanian boyards with each other to protect their feudal holdings with joint forces. In their possessions, Albanian boyards participating in the Convention were independent rulers and possess any absolute power holders.

Regardless of his leading and commanding role of Scanderbeg in the "League of Albanian princes", his leading position in the first years of League's existence was not that of a monarch, but that of a military leader. His leadership consisted only in the organization of country's defence, without affecting the privileges of particular feudal lords and their power within their holdings. In comparison with other members of the League Scanderbeg enjoyed the right to convene the Albanian princes whenever he deemed it right for the country's defence. League's members had the right to leave it whenever they thought it necessary. Scanderbeg as the chairman of the League and the league itself had no right to prevent him or take measures against him.

In League feudal boyards maintained the right to enter into international relations independently. In later years, a good part of the Albanian princes concluded international treaties with Italian states, regardless of Skanderbeg and League. Gjergj Araniti concluded a special treaty with Alfonso of Naples (1451), and another with Venice. Other boyards behaved in the same way.

Common war against the Ottoman Empire and Venice imposed the need that in the decisions about the issues of international relations it was the "League of Albanian princes" the representing authority, not any particular boyard. During the war with Venice in 1448, after the death of Lek Zaharia, Skanderbeg requested Danja city on behalf of the League. Victory was achieved by the joint efforts of the Albanian feudal lords. Whereas the Peace Treaty (October 4, 1448) was completed by "League of Albanian princes" as a party, represented by Scanderbeg and Nikollë Dukagjini and Republic of Venice. In the history of the League of Lezha this is the first case when it appears as a single authority in face of two dangerous enemies, the Ottoman Empire and Venice. The League fought and won to defend the country and its territorial integrity, and acted with full political personality in international relations.

Lezha Convention and decisions made by it, had historical significance for the fate of the great war of Albania against Ottoman Empire in the XV century.

League of Lezha and its Commander-in-Chief, Skanderbeg, enjoyed unlimited support from the people. In these circumstances the war took the typical features of a popular war. It was exactly this factor that enabled our country to face the attacks of the Ottoman army, the most powerful of that time, though with relatively limited human and economic resources. Victories of wars and battles that took place for twenty-five

⁸ Aleks Luarasi, Shteti dhe e drejta shqiptare në epokën e Skënderbeut, Tiranë, 1998, p. 126.

years against the hordes of Ottoman army, relied on the freedom-loving spirit of the people, on his moral and combat qualities, on the experience of centuries of wars, as well as on the commanding and ingenious military skills of the Chief Commander Gjergj Kastrioti-Scanderbeg⁹.

Politically, Lezha Convention was the only body at national level within which the unity of the Albanian people and the Albanian feudal class in the war against the Ottoman occupation was carried out. With the feudal basis and decisions made Lezha Convention objectively expresses the interests of the Albanian people who, more than anyone else required protection against severe consequences caused by Ottoman occupation.

Strategically Lezha Convention was a constitutional body, which proceeded with the creation of such bodies of general importance like "League of Albanian princes", unique command of the army under the leadership of Skanderbeg and common funds to afford war expenses. Creation of joint bodies was of great importance. It marked the first step towards strengthening the central government and going beyond the tight framework of feudal fragmentation.

In the Great War between Albania and the Ottoman Empire took place the process of state formation. This state included a good part of the Albanian territory. "League of Albanian princes" and bodies that emerged from Lezha Convention underwent significant changes, which led to the change of their political and military nature.

With the creation of the League of Lezha first and very important step on the road to unification was made. In the early years of the war, it gave a good support to Skanderbeg in facing the Ottoman conquest and the hostile policy of Venice¹⁰. Over the years other forces that weakened its unity started to act within the League. League of Lezha, was created as a political and military alliance of Albanian boyards in the common fight against Ottoman occupation. It stood on the basis of feudal fragmentation that implied respect for sovereignty and privileges of particular boyards.

Based on these privileges, the Albanian feudal lords kept troops that acted under their orders out of the frame of the army. They often did not meet the obligations imposed by Lezha Convention to help with soldiers and money. There were times that they left the League, like the case of Pjetër Spani and Lek Dushmani in 1447 during the conflict with Venice and later the Dukagjins did the same¹¹.

The wavering attitude of the Albanian feudal lords was encouraged and used by the Ottomans and the Venetians. By dividing the Albanian boyards they aimed at achieving their interests. In a decision of Venice Senate, dated October 10, 1448, which provided guidance for its province in Albania, it is underlined "If you do not come to terms with Skanderbeg, meet Pal and Nikollë Dukagjini and promise them money, villages, etc... and thus separating them from Scanderbeg and join them with us ... for we are

⁹ Shahin Leka, *Strateg e komandant legjendar, Skënderbeu*, Military Printing House, Tiranë, 1994, p.34-35.

¹⁰ K. Biçoku, *Ibid.* p. 22.

¹¹ K. Biçoku, *Ibid.* p 23.

informed that Skanderbeg without Dukagjins is not capable of doing anything ...”¹².

The Great War between Ottomans and Albania was a total war. It sought the unification of all forces by strengthening the central government. Higher interests of the country’s defence dictated the necessity of overcoming feudal fragmentation and the creation of the Albanian state. In realization of this historical process Skanderbeg had a broad support by the people, who were interested in the successful conduct and crowning of the war; he relied on the permanent that he had at his disposal as the Commander-in-Chief.

The Albanian Army, created for the country’s defence needs, both in Kastrioti possessions and possessions of other boyards, was a powerful and effective tool against feudal particularism. Pursuant of his policy, Skanderbeg relied especially on small feudal lords, who served as army commanders and political officials in his state. They found at the central government not only an effective defence from the Ottoman scourge, but also from the permanent threat of the most powerful feudal lords¹³.

To further connect the ruling class with the liberation struggle of the Albanian people, on behalf of the central government, Skanderbeg, pursued a policy of distributing ownership for the benefit of boyards that were serving to him or reducing tributes they had to pay for the state. He defined the rule that they had to participate personally in the war together with a certain number of soldiers. For instance, he gave such possessions and lands to Vrana Konti, Hamza Kastrioti, Moisi Golemi and other boyards.

M. Barleti notes this political act of Skanderbeg and reflects it on the pages of his work. He writes: “We should not be surprised about the immediate raise and about almost incredible speed of ours concerning the levy of soldiers, because Skanderbeg, either due to his desire ... or as bravery reward, had released a great amount of taxes for his nobles, especially properties, on the condition that when the war needed it they would be obligated by his order to contribute with troops, everyone according to his capacity and be engaged themselves for everything that had to be done”¹⁴. An important factor in strengthening the power and authority was Skanderbeg’s prestige among the people and his boyard allies. Skanderbeg used this to increase the authority of the central bodies and the command of the army. Another supporting element was the multiple marriage links among the most powerful feudal lords with Kastriots which had started since the time of Gjon Kastrioti and continued during the time of Skanderbeg in order to ensure a tighter unification of the Albanian feudal class.

For the sake of the interests of the defence of the country, Skanderbeg, as the representative of the central government, began to violate the sovereignty of particular feudal lords within their principalities, making them there not independent lords, but obedient government officials that depended directly on him in their castles and

¹² Burime të zgjedhura për Historinë e Shqipërisë, Ibid. p. 294.

¹³ K. Biçoku, Ibid. p. 23-24.

¹⁴ M. Barleti, Historia e Skënderbeut, v.p. p. 304.

violated the boundaries of their possessions during combat operations. The need to fill the army with young warriors forced him to mobilize recruits on his own initiative even in other feudal holdings, etc.¹⁵.

These actions were not only a violation of sovereignty of ally boyards, but also an exercise of the attributes of power in the territories that did not belong to Kastrioti principality. In this way, the power of particular feudal lords gradually began to be shunned and weakened, as the central government, represented by Skanderbeg became stronger. Their possessions began to merge with the principality of Kastrioti.

Reflecting this process of historical importance for the fate of the great war of Albania against Ottomans the boyard Gjon Muzaka writes in his memoirs that Skanderbeg “after becoming the chief commander of the Albanian feudal lords... decided to seize the whole country ... He imprisoned the nobles Gjon and Gojko Balsha...and put under his control their ‘state’ that was between Kruja and Lezha; he got the ‘state’ of Moisi Komnei in Dibra...and after the death of my father took Tomorrishta, i.e. *Myzeqeja e Vogël* and he did so with other boyards...but they could not do anything because he had the warriors with him and the Ottomans were present at every moment...”¹⁶.

Gjon Muzaka openly expresses that these were violent measures and hopes of Skanderbeg increased after Pope Piu II declared a crusade against the Ottomans and promised him the crown of Albania.

Testimony of the boyard Gjon Muzaka, who was disappointed by this policy of Skanderbeg, is confirmed and supplemented diplomatically by M. Barleti, who states that “he (Skanderbeg) had included in his kingdom the two Dibras with their will”¹⁷. In addition to that, M. Barleti testifies that Skanderbeg “put under his control and expanded the boundaries of his kingdom more than his father, Gjon”¹⁸, that part of his principality became even “Mokra which he had never experienced Kastrioti’s rule”¹⁹.

The strengthening of power and the creation of state was a process that did not occur immediately. It started before the year 1450 and continued rapidly over the years 1450-1460. Of particular significance in this respect was the great victory achieved by the Albanian people under the leadership of Skanderbeg during the first siege of Kruja (1450), which further increased the authority of Skanderbeg, both domestically and abroad. During this difficult test a part of the ally boyards left the League of Lezha which once again showed the necessity of overcoming feudal fragmentation as a serious threat to the fate of the liberation war. After the first siege of Kruja, as a result of coercion measures that Skanderbeg took, not just less important feudal lords, but also the great ones, as Muzakajt, Topiajt, Balshajt gradually lost their

¹⁵ Gj. K. Skënderbeu dhe lufta shqiptaro-turke e shek. XV, Tiranë, 1967, p. 61.

¹⁶ Dh. Qiriazi, published in Albanian, Muzaka, memorie, translated, Tiranë, 1996, p. 50.

¹⁷ M. Barleti, Historia e Skënderbeut, Ibid. p. 94.

¹⁸ Ibid, p 93.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 94.

position as independent feudal lords and their principalities were joined with that of Skanderbeg.

Despite the efforts of Skanderbeg, two of the most powerful feudal possessions of the country, that of Dukagjin in the north and that of Gjergj Araniti in the south, for a long time did not join the Albanian state, but remained as separate feudal principalities.

Aranits considered Skanderbeg only as an ally, without subduing to his will. However, with the death of Gjergj Araniti (Skanderbeg's father-in-law), he managed to unite this powerful principality with the state. In 1463 Skanderbeg concluded a ceasefire agreement with the Ottoman Empire. Among the obligations that the Albanian party took as part of this agreement is was to send one of Gjergj Araniti's sons in Sultan's army whenever the need arose. Unable to oppose her groom, Gjergj Araniti's widow, on September 3, 1463 went to the Venetian Senate and urged them to influence over the Skanderbeg not to send her son to Sultan's army. The Venetian Senate replied that such a thing would not happen, because "although his majesty Mr. Skanderbeg made peace with the Ottomans, however, we could hope that he would take up arms against Sultan."²⁰ This fact shows that in that period Skanderbeg had extended his power over Araniti's principality as he imposed liabilities on its rulers without their prior consent.

Dukagjins in the north maintained their position as independent lords. Urged by Venice for a long time they kept a hostile policy towards Skanderbeg and his policy sometimes by cooperating with Ottomans to the detriment of the issue of liberation. In 1463 Lekë Dukagjini addressed a series of requests and proposals to the Republic of Venice. Among other things, he stated that "I should not be under Skanderbeg, but I am very glad to be under every rector or proveditor of that Milady and always stay under its orders. I also require that if Skanderbeg declares war on me, or I declare war on him, her majesty Milady help me." And Venice responded, "We are pleased to fulfil his request, i.e. that he should not be under his majesty, Skanderbeg, but under our provisory or rector of those regions"²¹. As result of Skanderbeg's coercive policy a part of the Albanian feudal lords left the League of Lezha and began searching support at foreign powers, such as Venice or Naples or openly betrayed Skanderbeg, like Hamza Kastrioti, Moisi Golemo, Gjergj Stres Balsha or any other. Relying on popular support and the army available, Skanderbeg took energetic violent measures against feudal treason and imprisoned the offenders, without even sparing his close relatives, like Hamza Kastrioti, Gjergj Stres Balsha or any other. Measures taken by Skanderbeg on behalf of the power, in the name of utter defeat of the feudal treason, directly served to the unity and strengthening of the country's defence capability and further unification of the Albanian lands in a single state.

With the leave of some of the Albanian boyards from the League of Lezha it lost the previous character and importance as a political and military alliance of the Albanian feudal lords to protect their holdings with joint forces.

Governing bodies of the army and finance that functioned within the framework of the League of Lezha, were merged with those of Kastrioti principality, gaining the

²⁰ Burime të zgjedhura për Historinë e Shqipërisë, Ibid. p 337.

importance of the central state organs. State administration bodies of particular boyards, continued to exercise their functions, but now subordinated to the central government. Vassal feudal lords, who lost their position as separate rulers, became the central government officials and depended directly from Skanderbeg.

The old feudal principalities lost their character as separate state formations as they extended and equalized with the Albanian state²². Their former boundaries no longer existed; instead the Albanian state extended from the Adriatic coast to Prizren and from Devol and Seman River in the south, including the holdings of Aranits in Central Albania up to Dibër and Pollog.

Skanderbeg's state could not include within its borders all Albanian-speaking territories. Outside these borders remained areas occupied by the Ottomans and cities conquered by Venice and the principality of Dukagjin in the North. From territorial point of view the state unification of Albania was not fully achieved. However, the state of Skanderbeg was concentrated because of its internal organization. From vassal way of governing, which was an outdated form, typical for the period of feudal fragmentation Skanderbeg organized country governance by officials, who acted on behalf of the government.

The Albanian state, founded and led for a quarter of a century by Skanderbeg (1443-1468), continued to exist even after the death of National Hero, until 1478, when Kruja its capital and main stronghold of the country's defence. Throughout this decade, although with incomplete territories gradually cut off by Ottoman invaders, it continued to carry out its main functions in the unequal struggle between the small Albania and the Ottoman Empire. At the announcement of Sultan Mehmet II dedicated to the collapse of Kruja (1478), after the description of invaders' atrocities against its defenders, we find the defined goals for the destruction of the political and military organization created during that historical era. "Calls from their crushed breasts reached up to the ceiling of Saturn. A total of about five thousand infidels, who were each a devil oil and lightning launchers, were cut by a sword so sharp and the striking arrow ... thereafter will begin the destruction of churches, the construction of medresses, prohibition of bells and ruin of laws"²³.

Creation of the Albanian state under the leadership of Skanderbeg was a great historical victory of the Albanian people and the outcome of that legal process for the creation of independent state formations in the Middle Ages. Unification of Albanian people in a single state under the leadership of Skanderbeg helped in forging political unity of the people in the struggle against the ottoman invaders as well as consolidation of Albanian nationality, on the basis of language, territory and psycho-cultural unity²⁴.

²¹ J. Radoniç, Gj. K. Skënderbeg i Arbanija u XV veku, Beograd, 1942, Document No. 259, Dt. 13 December 1463.

²² K. Biçoku, p.v. p 23

²³ "Lufta shqiptaro-turke në shek. XV" (Osman resources), prepared by Selami Pulaha, Tiranë, 1968, p 382.

²⁴ A. Buda, F. S. Noli, historian i Skënderbeut, preface of the F. S. Noli's book Historia e Skënderbeut, Tiranë, 1967, p 23.

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Albanian Stradiots and their historical contribution

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Short commentary. The same as for Albanua, the historic Albanian coat of arms, Albanian historiography* has been, we would say, somewhat limited on the subject of Albanian Stradiots. However, it must be admitted that the topic was recently elaborated by numerous Albanian researchers, among others by Father Zef Valentine, Irakli Koçollari, Aristidh Kola, Moikom Zeqo, Ferid Hudhri, etc. In this study, despite referring to the authors already mentioned above, we will focus primarily on foreign authors, especially on French authors, to give a somewhat more complete picture of Albanian Stradiots, although the topic is broad and goes beyond the limits of this study .

Since the outset, it must be said that the Stradiot phenomenon or the Albanian estradotia, viewed in the historical context, the same as the Albanua phenomenon, is not a coincidence. It must be considered above all as part of the certain historical of economic and social conditions, as well as closely related to the nature and character of the Albanians, the tribal organization, its legal rights and attributes that explain the essence of these phenomena themselves. Let us look on the following issues:

Firstly, the phenomenon emerged in the early eleventh century as a result of foreign threat, when Albanians faced attacks of Normans, Serbs, Bulgarians, Venetians, Catalans, etc. Albanians were forced to descend in mass to the South in the territories of the continental Greece and islands. In these conditions, the Byzantine Empire which was growing weaker, took measures to strengthen its military machine, by setting up new settlements or military colonies that were called “Stratopia”. Residents of these colonies, or military settlements in Greece (Stratopias were formed entirely by people coming from Arbëria (later called “Albanian) territories, selected with clear goals and criteria for combat skills, being called by the Greek term “Stratiots”¹

* Albanuaja, the Albanian historic coat of arms-paper presented by Fotaq Andrea in the Third Annual Meeting of the Research Institution “Alb-Science”, Tirana 2008, published in the journal “Pearl”, 2008/4.

¹ Irakli Koçollari, “Arvanitët” Albin, Tirana,1994, p. 36, 38.

It is precisely the creation of stratopis with Albanian stradiots which not only explains the measures taken by the Byzantine Empire for its strengthening, but peacefully the settlement of Albanian tribes among indigenous Greek populations², thus appearing as a “driving factor for qualitative progress and development” of Greece itself, as it will happen in other subsequent historical analogue cases. Residents of Stratopis not only filled the ranks of war units, but also gained the privilege of possessing the land ownership, a privilege that in fact, was enjoyed by a common population, which was forced to work in the lands of the local feudals.

The contemporary scholar Edwin Jacques, quoting the Byzantine historian *Kantek*, notes that in the period 1202-1204, Byzantine quarrels between nobles and Latin lords, after the Fourth Crusade, had deserted the Greek village. “Arvanitas or the Albanian newcomers, he says, were placed in the deserted lands, cut forests and opened new lands. Thanks to the work of these experienced farmers, lands were ploughed and planted with different cereals. These Albanians came not as conquerors, but as refugees, who would be living and working in Greece’s progress and would give their lives for independence from Turkey”.³

Regarding the Albanian origin of Stratopis, the researcher Koçollari cites a letter of the last Byzantine Emperor M. Paleologu in the XII century, addressed to his brother Theodore, prince of Morea, in which is considered as one of the greatest successes, the settlement of Arvanites (Albanians) in the principality of of Morea: “...With this army (Albanians)-states the Emperor Paleologos-which has never before suffered losses, but on the contrary is considered as a highly skilled and successful army, has not spent anything, but are already making excellent impressions everywhere ... If you come with this army to Peloponnesus (Prince Theodore writes to him), the army is not small, but big enough and powerful, versatile and very capable, and we did everything that was necessary on our part”⁴. In this period dates a document of 1295, the sevastocrate of Phanar (Thessaly), sent to his subordinates, in which it is mentioned the settling of the Albanians in Greek lands on the basis of laws and empire orders. “... I will not allow, coming here Albanians besides those located in land heritages about castles (the lantern), or those that have been deployed on the basis of guides and imperial orders...”⁵.

Referring to the well-known orientalist N. Sathas, Father Zef Valentine on his part, notes that in the early eleventh century, emerged as Stradiots, four members of the

² George Guillet would emphasise in this regard: “However, out of all the people of Greece, only Epirotes, called today Albanoi, and maniots, the miserable remnant of lakedemonas, could hinder the progress of the Turks. Albanoi were defeated in 1466 when the famous Skanderbeg died, their undefeated prince. And then spread that became the subjects of his troops, a good part pulled between maniots, who were received with joy and gave their shelters in the craggy mountains. As far as religion is concerned, they still preserve the religion of the other Greeks. They have among them many callogers,” cited according to the book “Athènes ancienne et nouvelle”, Paris, 1657, p. 32-33.

³ Edwin Jacques, “Albanians”, Tirana, 1995, p. 220.

⁴ Costas I. Biris, “Arvanites” the dori to neoteru elenizmu, Athens 1967; Irakli Koçollari, ac. quoted, p. 39.

⁵ Ibid.

prominent Basta military Dynasty, among which continued to be born other famous military.

Another evidence of this period on the emergence of Stradiots is brought also by the Frenchman *Andre-Grasset Saint Sauveur Jr.* when speaking about albanoise incursions in the states of Naples in 1258-1309. Philip, Charles' brother, marched to stop them. "Albanoi took advantage of the occasion when Charles was busy in Sicily, to make frequent incursions into the provinces of his country. Philip, Prince of Tarentes, brother of the king of Naples, marches to halt their progress ... progressed against albanoi who were commanded by someone called Spatafori. He attacked them by surprise, disbanded them and penetrated deeply in the territories of Greece". He continues: "As Rober, under whose rule Corfu people were happy, would die ... , but at that time, Bajazit, sovereign of the Turks, had just expelled and plagued the father of Depan, the leader of Albanoi, who took refuge in Corfu, where they were welcomed and stayed until Bajazit himself fell dead in combats with Timurleng"⁶.

Meanwhile, we note that the Albanian knights were in service of Venice in XII-XIII centuries, having special missions to maintain order in the Venetian dominions. This is proved by some Venetian documents, and a decree of the Senate that seeks "to encourage as much as possible to the island inhabitants the weapons' sale in order to maintain order in the island. Governors of Parga, Butrint (Buthrotus) and Bastia were ordered to form a corps of soldiers drawn from the island (Corfu) and put in the service of the republic. They avoided the mercenary troops from Albania, because they had interest as their only goal".⁷ An interesting proof is found also in an order issued by the King of Cyprus in Nicosia for maintaining the Kaputi fords in 1468, in which it written that the Venetians, since the time of Luzinjans, a troop of Albanian Stradiots were kept with the special mission of protecting and preserving the seashores.⁸

The Count Arthur de Gobineau, who spoke frequently and with sympathy for the Albanians and their ancient ethnicity, would point out: "All the armies know and use (stradiots). In the twelfth century, the Germans, the French, the Spanish, the Pope, Fiorentins and Duke of Milan have been in their service. The Venetian Signor recruited stradiots in the thirteenth century and the British of the Seven Islands have them still in service today. Although *Bayard*, highly evaluates Captain Merkurio and his

⁶. André-Grasset Saint Sauveur Jr., Consul of the French Republic in the Levant, "Voyage historique, littéraire des Iles de la République française dans le Levant", Paris 1798, p. 257-258, 283-284.

⁷. Ibid, p. 484.

⁸. M.L.de Mas Latrie, "Histoire de l'île de Chypres," Paris 1855, p. 238, 464-465. In the note we read: "Albanoj were over a thousand in number, and traveled by horse the entire coast, in groups of two, and so did the surveillance. If they discovered anything (pirate ship arrivals), they would burn alarm fires. They used to talk in the island for a "Societas ad stradiotum", a building society or militia in the stradiot manner. Venetians had all their possessions in the east, and especially in More, Albanians with horses, armed with shields, spears and swords would receive a payment from the republic to protect the country. These knights would name themselves as stradiots, the name by which the Knights were named in Albania. They were organized in companies and often became part of them also the citizens of the country where they would stay.

Albanians, even he did not agree in any case with their severity and the redemption methods used by them, the light cavalry companies were soon filled with such people and some of these war masters were settled in France, where they lived like honest people. But most of them, after long campaigns, returned to their homes, in Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, More...”⁹

Secondly, the full blooming stage of Albanian estradiots is the period before, during and after the blooming of the Arber Albanian state under the leadership of Gjergj Kastrioti (George Castriot), in the period 1400-1600. Thus, for over two centuries Albanian stradiots were at their peak of existence, emerging as flag-bearers and activists leading the European light cavalry, the first theoretical “manifesto” which would be created by later by an Albanian General, Gjergj Basta.

Birth and development of the Albanian estradiots was conducted, as noted by Father Valentine, on the basis of legal features of the tribe in the Albanian community, which marked it with “a perfect individuality”, with the right to have a degree of certain autonomy and its armed forces, as well as the right for the village to make alliances, wars and establish pacts with others, the right to make foreign policy and finally, the right to have their leader.

Father Valentine’s analysis of the legal features of the tribe in the Albanian community, their qualities and rights of their military nature on one hand and on their movement in the North-South axis (Albania-Greece), on the other hand, supports the conclusion of the Researcher Koçollari that military settlements in Greece (stratopias), as highlighted above, were “completely formed by people coming from the region Arbëria”. Furthermore, the researcher Koçollari insists that these settlements “were called upon this day in their own “village” language.¹⁰ Inhabitants of stratopias not only filled the ranks of war units, but also earned the privilege of taking possession of land, a privilege in fact, not enjoyed by the common population, which was forced to labour in local feudal lands.

On the basis of these phenomena and characteristics, as well as on the basis of the data presented by Father Valentine, inhabitants of populated areas, we understand the collective displacement of the large Albanian stradiot families, who have followed geographically the moving north-south axis, and very rarely the South-North axis. Then, starting from the South of Albania, this movement has continued until Greece, and one can note the large historical displacements of Albanian tribes, which followed the direction of Italy, whether in South (Sicily, Calabria, Naples), either in North (mainly in the Venetian area and in Lombardia).

Based on the toponomy of populated areas, but also on the as well as on the names of the Stradiot inhabitants (while the name Gjin, is typical), Father Valentine notes that often the last name “Stradiot” is used either in the Gheg or the Tosk areas, always based on the moving axis of the Albanian tribes moving from North to South, to South-Greece, Italy and North Greece-Italy. Understandably, then, from Italy, Albanian Stradiots would travel towards Spain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and beyond.

⁹. A.de Gobineau, “Deux études sur la Grèce moderne”, Paris 1905, p. 98.

¹⁰. Irakli Koçollari, cited, p. 38.

Toponyms of the same tribal surname are used in the North (the regions of Mat and Lura), as well as in the Middle Albania, as in the case of the surname Buziki or Buzhuqi. The surname Dara is found in the region of Rrjoll, as well as in Italy and Greece (Arkadi); the surname Dorëza (coupled with the name “Gjin”), is found in the regions of Peza, Peqin, Korce, Çermenika, Tepelena, as well as in Italy, Greece (Arkadi, Cephalonia). The most typical surname in those regions is the Albanian surname Jonima, which was very widespread in North-South toponymy (in the regions of Rrjoll Gruemira, Grizhja, Dajç, Lura, Kurbin, Durres, Elbasan, Dukat, historically found also in Naples, Italy. The same can be said about the surname “Kelmendi” so widespread among Albanian stradiots, cited as well by foreign authors, and found in Albania, as well as in Greece (More) or in Italy (*Piana degli Albanesi* of Sicily).

On the other hand, in the work of Father Valentine, we also note that generally in XVII-XVIII centuries, an Albanian village, be it large or small, of averagely 100 residents, and 21-23 armed men in uniforms. I think that this figure must have been even greater during the peak of the Albanian estradiots one or two centuries ago, given their military mobilization under “village” way, under their leader or master. Hence, averagely an estradiot family having 12-14 members should have had 3-4 armed men, which meant that the person who was the head of the family, followed by two, three or four men, must have necessarily been stradiots, or people who exercise “the craft” of war.

Thirdly, the Albanian military element transformed into Stradiot military, in this flourishing period of Albanian estradiots, were forced to emigrate en masse to the west, especially when facing Ottoman conquest, after a quarter century of active and lonely resistance, while the Albanian Janissaries, forced by law, would operate with as much vehemence in the East performing great services to sultans¹¹. Evidence for this massive forced migration are numerous and painful including Albanian and foreign authors, ranging from Pope Paul II who describes the plight of refugees in 1466: “No man is able to see without shedding tears, these tormented refugees passing through the ports of Italy Ureta, naked, displaced from their homes, while lie along the sea and raise hands to the sky and cry in a language that nobody understands.”¹²

The scholar Dh.S. Shuteriqi describes two serious exodus episodes suffered by the “tormented people from Shkodra” as he would name them, guerrillas of the Albanian heroic resistance: in the years 1479 and 1501, and the latter just after the Turkish-Venetian peace that began on April 25, St. Mark’s day as it was ironically for the Albanians. The exodus of 1479, he writes: “... people were overwhelmingly common people, anonymous homeland defence, together with women, children and the elderly, had escaped from the target of the Ottoman and hunger, which had forced them to eat

¹¹ The researcher Mihail Dimitri Strudza, giving a full definition on stradiots, notes that there are “organized military units from the republic of Venice and Naples kings in order to fight the Turks, and vice versa, unit placed by the Ottoman Empire for protection against Christian Balkans powers, consisting of different elements and different ethnic origin. Albania supplied most of these fighters with people who were given names and region different from names and religion they had had before” (*Grandes familles de Grèce, d’ Albanie et de Constantinople*, Paris, 1999, p. 83.)

¹² Noli, “Work III, Historia e Skënderbeut” p. 440.

whatever they found, as Marin Barleti tells us. According to Beçikemi, the population of Shkodra suffered the exodus which to their knowledge consisted of the social categories: the nobles, the owners (middle class once serving as Roman knights) and the middle class”.¹³

As quoted above, the French historian *Fernand Braudel* described how Albanian fighters fled in the sixteenth century, followed by women, children and their priests. “Regents of Algiers and Tunis did not accept them, says Braudel, and then neither the Moldovan nor Bojard countries. Then they flocked to the service of the Sublime Gate ... Neither wondering what camp to defend, “Where is the Sword, there is the religion.” “We are with those who keep us alive.”

The researcher Edwin Jacques notes that during nearly a century (1448-1535) only in southern Italy are known eight influxes of Albanians, namely:

- 1443, Alfonso V of Naples hired to fight Albanian troops under the command of Dhimiter Rera (who founded the 13 Albanian villages near Katanzaro in Sicily);
- 1462, in the Italian lands given to Scanderbeg, settled some of the veterans tired of numerous battles;
- In 1467, two Catholics from Shkodra due to the fear of advance of Turks took with themselves the picture of the Good Lady (Lady of Shkodra) and crossed over the Adriatic in Genacano near Rome. Her image became very famous in popular Arbëresh religion;
- 1468-1479, after the death of Skanderbeg and fall of Kruja and Shkodra, the painful exile following afterwards, Pope Pius II describes their arrival in Italy. It is mentioned at this time the settlement of the Albania family in Rome who would win fame and fortune in the art world. Albanians settled in Calabria and Sicily, where they founded their towns
- In 1487, after the suppression of the uprising, Gjergj Kastriot (George Castriot) and his followers were not sheltered neither in Palermo nor in Naples due to fear that the Turks would get angry and declare war. Pope intervened to shelter refugees in Calabria and Sicily. Since these newcomers from southern Albania were Orthodox, they were mistakenly thought to be Greeks and their the province was called “*Piana dei Greci*”. The error was corrected later, in the time of Mussolini, by being called “*Piana degli Albanesi*”
- 1502, the wave of refugees was increased after the Turkish invasion across Albania. The more Turks conquered lands in the Greek territory, particularly after 1535, the greater got the number of arvanit people who escaped across the Adriatic;
- Migration ended in 1774. Many of the refugees embraced the Greek rituals more than Roman rites. They had two bishops, one in Calabria and one in

¹³. Dh. S. Shuteriqi, “Mbi Barletin dhe shkrime të tjera”, Tirana, 1979, p. 58.

Sicily in *Piana degli Albanesi*. To ease their transition to the Latin rite, on 1576, Pope Gregory XIII established the Greek College in Rome.

Fourthly, the Albanian estradiot phenomenon is an expression of the qualities and traits of Albanian nature itself, which comply with the spirit and energy of his determined character, with its military capability and organizational qualities, as Prof. Çabej witnesses: "Military skills is inborn of this race, and it has put the seal of the Albanian soldier." "*Est enim (hec) Albania regio satis lata et magna, habens homines belliscosos ualde, sunt enim optimi sagitarii et lancearii*", says the Anonymous *descriptio Europae Orientalis* in 1308. The nature of the soldier is a common trait of character, a constant attribute of this nation"¹⁴

Voltaire, mentioning Albanoi soldiers, would synthesize perfectly, historically speaking, the Albanian combatant character: "...used to fighting among the rocks, since they are those ancient Epirus who have made †a name for being god fighters the same as their ancestors".¹⁵

Among the physic-moral- military traits of the Albanian, that would directly affect the image of Albanoi estradiot, in his fame and European contribution paid with the price of blood, we highlight among others, their bravery, honesty in alliances, zeal and loyalty to serve, the prediction of danger and of complex situations, especially in the field of war, the extraordinary wisdom of the mind, the courage deriving from a of life full of risks, having a strong initiative spirit at the proper time and place. And to complete this portrait, Professor Çabej would continue with other features of Albanians, noting that "his soul is mature, reserved, especially with the strangers, but this reservation does not preclude the opened nature, the inborn skilfulness of the resident of the mountains, and the individualist mark which in special cases turns into wild stubborn attitude." But above all, he cites unbridled pride, honesty as "friend of the truth".¹⁶

Among other features that complement the portrait of Albanian, are also the desire for migration and the desire and longing for the left land, the insistence in life and the power of the personality. Faced with the wild daily occupation of the country, Barleti doesn't forget to mention the Great War spirit of the Albanian, by ploughing the field with one hand and holding a sword in the other hand. A special and beautiful assessment for the Albanian is given in *Glossary of conversation and reading*, 1833, when it's written about Albanians: "Their value is their proverbial ... their value makes them to earnestly be welcomed by the Turks,¹⁷ who have started due to this reason, to call them Arnaut. We note here that *arnaodh* in the Gallic language means brave, courageous, deriving from *naodh*, which means "value"¹⁸.

¹⁴. Fernand Braudel, cit, p. 25-26.

¹⁵. Eqerem Çabej "Shqiptarët midis Perëndimit dhe Lindjes", MÇM, Tirana 1994, p. 27.

¹⁶. Voltaire, "Përmbledhje për shekullin e Luigjit XV", Chapter 21, Genovas revolution, the beginning of the century. XVIII., cited. al.

¹⁷. E. Çabej, ac. cited. p. 27.

¹⁸. This is the period when Albanians, while they got tired of expecting the West to intervene in Albania and the Balkans, large numbers of people changed religion in the nineteenth century, by becoming the Muslims.

Very significant in this regard were the words of another distinguished French historian *J.C.L. Sismonde de Sismondi*, who, for the period 1454-1470, notes: “Albanians, Illyrians, were quite different from Greeks, refused to be harassed or taken up quietly to work, but were energetic and courageous. (Venetian) Republic would have found to them its best soldiers, the best sailors, if it had wanted to deal with full equality in its armies and fleets.”¹⁹ Researcher *Edouard Laboulaye* would say: “War (for them) is the only tool that provides wealth and honour...Europe itself has been in her service more than once; Mirdita has been serving the Naples and Austria, there was in France at the time of Henry IV”²⁰ The monk *Jean Claude Faveyrial*, who wrote the first “History of Albania”, talking about the qualities of the Albanians, says that under Louis XIII, French missionaries who visited Albania “were seized by admiration to this race which showed strong spirit, high stature, sharp features, decorated weapons”.²¹

Fifthly, the Albanian estradiote phenomenon is an expression of the ancient Albanian military which was perfected during the period of Scanderbeg, is a valuable contribution to the martial European arts by introducing for the first time, tactics and strategies of Albanian light cavalry, synthesized in two works of the general commissioner of cavalry, Albanian *Gjergj Basta*, “On the governance of light cavalry” (1612) and “The duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (1606).

The Greek prominent orientalist *N. Sathas*, with more courage and fair, would exactly point out that “their martial art was the foundation of the subsequent European strategy, however odd it seems”²² The contemporary scholar *Nicholas C.J.Pappas* sees estradiots, “in the most part originating from Albania, as pioneers of light cavalry tactics in modern European armies”²³ *Aristidh Kola*, mentioned among the great stradiots, *Merkur Buan* and *Manol Blesh*, who like *Marco Boçari* centuries later, studied the battles of *Skanderbeg*, and books for the Hero of *Arbëria* and of *Epirus*, were generally among the most common among Albanian estradiots²⁴. And it was exactly the elite of his army, the *Skenderbeyan guard*, what possessed perfectly the strategy and tactics of surprising war; she had known only victory for a quarter century facing countless imperial Ottoman armies, which would become later Albanian estradiot army spread across European West.

R.P. Daniel, of the Association of Jesus, in his *History of the French Militia* (1721), gives this definition for stradiots: “In the light cavalry aspect they were e Militia ... In France this Milita was called the Albanian *light cavalry*”²⁵, quotes chronicler *De Brantôme*, which states that King *Louis XII* appointed to *Sir De Fontrailles* the rank

¹⁹. “Dictionnaire de la Conversation et de la lecture”, vol. 3, Paris, 1833 p. 167.

²⁰. R.P.F. Henry Castell, “Le saint voyage de Herusalem et Mont Sinai, 1600”, Bordeau, 1603, p. 56.

²¹. N. works Bonaparte, vol.13,1821, letter to the 30 year, 7, 19 April 1799. doc. al.

²². J.C.L. Sismonde de Sismondi, “Histoire de la Renaissance de la liberté en Italie”, vol. 1, Paris 1835, p. 92 .

²³. Edouard Laboulaye, “Etude contemporaine sur l’Allemagne et les pays slaves”, Paris 1856, p. 200-2001.

²⁴. J.C. Faveyrial, “Histoire de l’Albanie” designed in edition presented by R. Elsie, Peja 2001, p. 219.

²⁵. *Aristidh Kola*, “Arvanites”, 55 Publishing House, Tirana 2002, p.148.

and position of the General Colonel of the albanoj under his service (2.000 troops commanded by the Albanian Captain Merkur Bua) and that “they are the ones who brought us the Light Cavalry, which by that time was not valued in France.” On the other hand, Nobel *De Langey* says that they could be used in combat also as infantry troops.

When explaining the term “lightly armed”, Father Daniel highlight the ancient origins of the concept itself through the figure of Alexander the Great, armed just with a spear and shield atop his horse (*Chronicon Comariense an ad. 1.298*).²⁶ But besides the son of the Albanian woman Olimbia, the same thing can be said for Pirro of Epirus, who introduced for the first time the light cavalry in the Roman empire, for Scanderbeg and his Guard, part of which the hero himself gave as a gift to kingdom of Naples, which indicates that Albanian light cavalry of all the times has been excellent over centuries and it was therefore logical foundation of European modernised light cavalry, one of the most valuable contributions of ancient Albanian nation to European and world history.

In conclusion, we can say that the period of the peak of Albanian estradiots, before, after and during Scanderbeg time, crowned in a way with the prominent Albanuaja, the Albanian coat of arms of the middle Ages, held even by the King of France, is a valuable contribution of the Albanian people in European history. This was made possible by a resistance for a quarter of a century against the Ottoman Empire and with the bloodshed by the Albanian stradiots for two centuries and “the flourishing of the European Renaissance, reformation, exploration of the western world, where would be housed later hundreds of thousands of his (Scanderbeg) offspring.”²⁷

We would like to conclude with the words of the great Albanian scholar Eqerem Çabej: “The same as in ancient times, as well as in later periods, this strong mountaineer nation sheds his blood for creation of new Balkan nations, not only by ethnic mixture, but also in a political sense, as Balkan warrior caste, with gun in hand” and further on, as the warrior caste spread throughout Europe with the outstanding Albanian estradiots.

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SHORT GUIDANCE

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