

IJSST

International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow

Published by **SPIRI** (*Society For Promoting International Research and Innovation*)



The Policy of the USA and EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

Dejan Marolov, Goce Delcev University, Stip, Republic of Macedonia

Abstract

The dissolution of former Yugoslav federation was a specific challenge for the whole international community and especially for USA and EU. This was the time period right after the end of the cold war and a period of establishing a new international system. The USA and EU were in a kind of process of redefining their foreign policy priorities. The dissolution of Yugoslavia occurred in this complicated time period. This paper uses qualitative methods and literature units. The results shows that EU did not handle this process the best and the USA was a little more successful in bringing the peace but was also quite hesitant to act.

Keywords: EU, USA, Yugoslavia, Dissolution, Policy

1. Introduction

The process of disintegration of Yugoslavia was a challenge to the entire international community. The reason for this is quite simple, Yugoslavia was a multinational and multi religious background federation in which several nations and nationalities¹ lived. Some nations, such as the Serbian people, despite having been concentrated in their home republic, also lived in large numbers in neighboring republics. So many Serbs lived in the neighboring Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the same time, a large number of the population of the Republic of Montenegro declare themselves as Serbs. This was not just an isolated case with the Serbs in Yugoslavia. Many Croats lived outside the Republic of Croatia and especially in the neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. But also inside the republics of Serbia and Croatia, there were members of other peoples and

¹according to the terminology of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution

nations. So, Croatia had a huge number of Serbian minorities and Serbia had large number of Albanian and Hungarian minorities. The Yugoslav federation also had republics such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had a very mixed composition of its population. Thus, the population in B&H itself was composed of Muslims, Serbs and Croats and neither of these communities constituted over 50% of the total population. Certainly, we should not forget that nearly 50 years of common living contributed for many mixed marriages, which resulted with their children, declared themselves simply as Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia was also and multi-confessional state with parallel existence of three major religions. The orthodoxy, stretching mainly across the eastern and southern parts of Yugoslavia, i.e. through the republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and of course parts of B&H and Croatia where Serbs lived. The population with Islam religion was mainly concentrated near the Yugoslavia borders with Albania i.e. western Macedonia, Sandjak, and the autonomous Kosovo in the southern parts of Yugoslavia, and mainly in the territory of B&H in central Yugoslavia. Western parts of Yugoslavia were mainly inhabited with a population of Catholic religion - Republic of Slovenia, Croatia, and parts of B&H where Croats lived. This situation in Yugoslavia was not a significant problem almost 50 years. The hard hand ruling of the Marshal, the relatively good economic growth of Yugoslavia and thus the good life standard of its citizens, combined with the existence of a common communist ideology that successfully held back all the division based on ethnicity or religion, was a solid basis for peaceful coexistence of several national Yugoslavia. That is why the fall of communism directly contributed to the emergence of surface of the divisions on national and religious grounds that almost half a century were pressed down. Hence, the possibility for disintegration of Yugoslav federation was a challenge for the entire international community. The challenge consisted of the obviously consequences that may occur with the breakup of the federation that managed to stick together so many nations and nationalities. There was a real threat that this may raise questions about the future of each of the republics, minority issues, the existing boundaries and so on. The opening of such sensitive issues on this geo-strategic area of historical significance in itself was a challenge for the entire international community. Historically looking the geographical place that takes Yugoslavia represents an area where the various interests and policies of the big powers are crossing. Therefore, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the possibility for redefining the boundaries in this sensitive area was a special challenge for the entire international community. At the same time, the breakup of Yugoslavia was a special challenge for the United States as the most powerful and the only superpower after the Cold War, and for the European Community (EU after the Maastricht Treaty) as a regional economic power with growing claims for political power.

2. The Policy of EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

In this section there will be an attempt made to present the role of EU (in that time still EC) and the way that the Union have chosen to deal with the biggest war since the World War II on the European continent.

Most of the authors generally consider that the EU did not deal well with the Yugoslav crisis and further more in most of the time just seemed like paralyzed and powerless observer. This section will be started with Pond (2006) according to the dissolution of the state was a tragedy for both, Yugoslavia itself and Europe. The previous sentence may sound a bit confusing and opens several dilemmas. Thus, it is clear that the way the disintegration of Yugoslavia happened was undoubtedly tragedy for Yugoslavia, but why would this be also a tragedy for Europe as well? Have Europe done enough to prevent this tragedy and whether it was obliged to do anything at all? We believe that the initial quoted sentence of this section is entirely correct. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was equally tragedy for Europe (i.e. EU) as well as for Yugoslavia itself. Namely, after half a century repetition of the phrase "never again Auschwitz" new camps have emerged on the territory of Europe. The passivity of EU, but also of the entire international community in general, can be illustrated through the example of Srebrenica. Simply, we can say that EU remained paralyzed and practically just watched as the Bosnian war took over 100,000 (including many civilian) victims and more than 1.8 million displaced.

However, maybe someone will claim that this war was not a war of the EU, and accordingly the EU did not have to do anything about it. We do not agree with this assertion. EU had to do more, if not for a moral reasons, then because of the fact that the one of the EU three main pillars is the common foreign and security policy pillar. This pillar policy had long-term goals for making EU a visible player in the international relations. However, the case of the breakup of Yugoslavia inevitably poses the dilemma whether it is possible for the Union to be a world player when it cannot deal with the problems in its own yard, which includes the Balkans? In addition to all mentioned is the quote from the former UK Prime Minister Margaret "I am ashamed of the EC, as this (war in B&H) is happening in the heart of Europe and they have not done anything else to stop it. It is within Europe's sphere of influence; it should be within Europe's sphere of conscience. There is no conscience." (Mass 1993, p.24)

So, we can conclude that undisputedly, the breakup of Yugoslavia was a tragedy for Europe, which failed on the moral test in one hand, but also this was terrible start of the common foreign and security policy project on the other hand. In similar position is one of the most famous European Commission president - Jacques Delors "I

see in the Yugoslav tragedy the proof that Europe does not exist as a foreign policy actor."(Jacques 1994) (Translation by D.M.)

But, why this was the case? To answer this question we must go back in the early 1990s and analyze the reasons for such behavior of the EU. Simply put, the EC was busy with itself. In 1991, its member states set ambitious goals for the future the EC. They began with the process of transformation in the European Union and also the process of creating a common European currency. But the member states were also busy with themselves. The German government acknowledged that the process of unification of both blocs of Germany would be a process that is terribly costly². In 1993, the common European market finally entered into force, but the German economy was still weak. On the other hand, France and Great Britain did not look too favorably of the German unification. Part of the French political elites were not happy that after a half-century Germany will again be a strong state with full sovereignty, and somehow did not like the fact that the days when France was the only continental power with its own sector in Berlin are definitely over. Certainly, we should not forget the whole context of the Post-Cold War period, which brought completely new rules. For example, France and Britain entered the Post-Cold War period as nuclear powers. Now when the cold war is over, its nuclear weapons became too expensive and politically not very useful. However, not only have the nuclear weapons become a luxury. The trend of budget cuts for their own armies and redirect into this money into domestic projects has become generally accepted for all EC members. So, none of the EU countries did not like the idea for re-allocates funds from the budgets for military purposes once the cold war was over.

However, these were not the only reasons. The existence of different national interests and visions for the future of Yugoslavia was reason that is even more important. This situation reflected in the failure to build a common foreign and security policy towards the Yugoslav issue. If we consider the foreign policies of the three most powerful states in the EU, regarding the Yugoslav crisis, we can see the following.

For the German foreign policy, we can say that it was directed to support the creating of independent states of Slovenia and Croatia, and with this, to an end for Yugoslavia or an end to the great Serbian projects, according to the German policy views. Therefore, the German foreign policy was quite active in the field of providing support for Croatia and Slovenia from one hand and accusation for the outbreak of conflict to Serbia, on other hand.

Unlike Germany, the UK in its policy towards the Yugoslav issue had not built on so black and white picture of what was happening in Yugoslavia. Thus, unlike Germany, the UK was not so favored of the creation of independent states of Slovenia and Croatia, and did not see Serbia as the only initiator of the war. According to the UK policy, there can be only one, which his curve for the outbreak of conflict, and in accordance with this view, all the sides was equally guilty. According to certain authors, Pond (2006) UK had developed tactic by which an action by the West is not necessary because what was going on in Yugoslavia it would inevitably result in war between the Balkan "tribes" and finally with the creation of one hegemony (Serbian) which Britain would later easily handle ...*"To justify their inaction, statesmen and diplomats chose to interpret the war as a peculiarly Balkan phenomenon. It was allegedly the result of ancient and irrational animosities, inherent in Balkan peoples, who had seemingly been at each others' throats since time immemorial and were all as bad as each other."*(Bennett 1995, p.194).It seems that the use of terminology like "Balkan tribes" had specific role for creating a kind of justification why UK should stay out and do not involve in the Yugoslav war. Opposite of this would be also both military and economically costly.

The French foreign policy toward Yugoslavia was much closer to the UK policy rather than to the German policy. Thus, France in a way was still seeing Serbia as its ally from the Balkans and therefore oppose any position by which they are the only solely responsible for the war. Similar like UK, France too, chose to have a passive view by which the West should not interfere too much in Yugoslavia. This would have meant a swift victory of the Serbian forces to the rest of Yugoslavia. France did not look favorably toward the creation of an independent Croatia and Slovenia. This France - UK policy reflected in the Security Council where the only thing for which they were willing to do about Yugoslavia was the introduction of sanctions on imports of arms for entire Yugoslavia. By this, they have indirectly helped the Serbs and YNA, which was mostly under Serbian control and which already owned the bulk of existing weapons.

Some of the reasons for this France-UK positions could be searched in some fears that may exist concerning the recently unification of Germany which once again, was becoming one of the most powerful European states. This was used from the Serbian propaganda according to which Germany was working on its fourth Reich that under its control would have the territory from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Such claims were exaggeration of reality, but definitely, Germany had a particular interest in recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and by this an

²About 100 billion dollars yearly were being used for equalization between the west and east German economy

end to the existence of Yugoslavia. Certainly that these fears justified or not, rational or not, had some degree in the formation of the foreign policy of UK and especially France which in the two world wars was the one of the first that sensed the German militarism.

The existence of such different approaches and policies by the three most powerful members of the EC could not result in a creation of a common policy of the EU towards the Yugoslav issue. However, despite the existence of different views, we can still speak about a common position of the EU towards the Yugoslav issue. EU had a common policy from the period before the referendum in Slovenia until the military intervention from YNA. Thus, in the period before the referendum in Slovenia, the policy of the EU was common in a way of ignorance of the possibility for potential problem in Yugoslavia, despite the existence of many indications of a possible disaster. However, it must be emphasized that this applies only to the policy of the EU because if we claim the same for the individual European powers it would be naive. However according to some definitions of foreign policy, even the decision not to do anything is still a foreign policy³. Accordingly, we believe that ignoring the Yugoslav problem i.e. was actually a decision and a common position in the foreign policy the EU.

After the referendum in Slovenia, the EU could no longer ignore the potential problem in Yugoslavia. From this point EU is changing the direction of its foreign policy from inactive to active, i.e. taking a position on the Yugoslav issue. EU based its policy on the territorial integrity principle versus the self-determination principle. According to the principle of territorial integrity, EU initially identified Slovenia and Croatia as a threat to stability and peace in Southeast Europe and the federal government and the YNA as a stabilizing factor. *"In the first such crisis in Europe after the end of the cold war, the EC countries quickly identified two new threats to European stability in Croatia and Slovenia, which they saw as responsible for destabilizing of the new international order in Europe. The communist Yugoslav government and its federal Army, in this view, stood for European stability. This preference for the status quo in the Balkans, even if it meant maintaining a communist government in power against widespread popular resistance, served as the basis for early Western policy towards the breakaway Republics."*(Lukic& Lynch 1996, p.253).The reasons for this original and perhaps ironic attitude of EU towards the Yugoslav question can be sought in the fear for possible creation of a vacuum space in Europe. This means that there was a possibility to create a secessionist mess that could not be controlled. The possibility that what happens in Yugoslavia can also be copied in other places too and maybe even to encourage some of this secessionist movements within the EU countries themselves, was the basic fear. So, the separatist threats to Spain with the areas of Catalonia and the Basque, for UK it was the Northern Ireland, for Italy its developed north, and for France it was Corsica. But in the same time the possibility for destabilization of Yugoslavia was also a possible refugee problem for the EU. Especially concerned with this was Italy, which shared part of its border with Yugoslavia. In France for example, beside the fear of the separatist movement in Corsica, we should not forget the imperial past of France and its resistance to the colonialism. In support to this is the statement by the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas *"The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would mean throwing gasoline on the flames and tomorrow what we will do in Yugoslavia will be done for other cases too."*(Riding 1991, p.4).So, these kinds of reasons were the basis for building a common foreign policy towards Yugoslavia based on the support of the principle of territorial integrity. This policy of the EU became crystal clear during the voting on 23 June, just two days before the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. At this meeting, it was unanimously voted that the EC would not recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia if they do it unilaterally. Interesting is the fact that Germany too attached to this common policy position and despite the possible existence of its different views, did not dare to act unilaterally. Beside this verbal support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the EC offered something else too, but did not achieve the desired effect because it came too late. *"(...) at the end of May, an EC delegation to Belgrade headed by Commission President Jacques Delors promised Prime Minister Ante Markovic generous financial aid if the country remain together, though by this stage Markovic no longer had any influence."*(Bennett 1995, p.175).Specifically there have been 4 billion loans offered for stabilization of the Yugoslav economy with a precondition that Yugoslavia remains one country. Yet, apparently, this promise of generous financial aid came too late and had no real influence on the processes of disintegration of the country. As we know, this policy of the EU did not bear fruit and instead of achieving its goal, i.e. survival of the Yugoslav federation or some form of peaceful transformation into a confederation, the Yugoslav state completely disintegrates.

So, already in June Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. After the proclamation of independence, YNA made a clumsy military action. The result was a waning of the sympathy of the western public for Slovenia that was opposing the powerful Yugoslav army. Exactly the fact of the military intervention by the YNA in Slovenia was the reason for the change of the policy of the EU in respect of the principle of territorial integrity.

³The foreign policy is a strategy of approach chosen by the national government to achieve its objectives in relations with external entities. This includes the decision not to do anything. By Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Timothy Dunne (2008)

Unlike the previous period after the YNA intervention in Slovenia, the EU common position was no more. The YNA intervention referred to an official change in the German policy, which replaced the support of the principle of territorial integrity (which was an official policy of the EU) with the open support for the principle of self-determination. At the meeting held on 15 September 1991 in Venice, the foreign ministers of Italy and Germany, for the first time openly mentioned the possibility of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, despite the positions of the other EC members. So, the start of the military conflict in Slovenia was used by Germany to open up the agenda for the possibility for recognition of the secessionist republics. This was justified as the only and unique option in order to preclude the conduct of the further spillover conflict. Those German positions that appeared as a raised voices, have encouraged some other countries, outside the Union, which shared similar views, but were afraid publicly to say it, in order not to be charged as a separatism supporters. Primarily this was Austria. In the context of its imperial past, it must be mentioned that approximately half the territory of Yugoslavia has been incorporated in it (i.e. the territories of Slovenia, Croatia and later B&H). Another was Hungary from which the Croatian government secretly purchased weapons for the independence war.

So the YNA action was a crucial moment that was the turning point that made the EU common policy toward Yugoslavia nonexistent. The EU found itself divided between the German and the UK-France positions. The different visions for Yugoslavia, even found its reflection on the traditional German-French friendship as a historical pillar that held the EC together. For this issue France even changed its traditional EC partner - Germany with UK. This strong Franco-British couple tried to shape the EU common policy and this was also support from several EU member states especially Greece, Spain and the Netherlands, while Germany was pretty lonely inside the EU. However, Ireland and Denmark had some sympathy to the right for self-determination too. With this combination of the power within the EU, we can conclude that the Franco-British couple in a significant extent has shaped the overall EC policy towards Yugoslavia. Confirmation of the above it found in the literature that deals with the common foreign and security policy. According to Lukic& Lynch(1996, p.259) *“in sum, France and the UK have been rather successful in shaping the foreign policy of the EC as a whole. Thus the aggregate supranational interest of the EC in the Yugoslav conflict in fact closely reflected the national interests of France and the UK.”* If we just look at the EU diplomats involved directly in the process of Yugoslavia issue, we will notice that the diplomats were hidden supporters of the national interests of Britain and France. One such example is Lord Carrington. While the German foreign policy tends to blame the Serbs for the war, the British and French foreign policy have seen all side as equally guilty. So, Lord Carrington(Carrington 1995) is against what he calls black and white picture and consider that the Serbs have a case too. The very statement is in the context of UK and France positions.

With the existence of such divisions within the EU, becomes virtually impossible for EU to undertake any serious action about the situation in Yugoslavia. However, one thing was commonly accepted by all sides (inside EU and even from USA), and that was the definition of the Yugoslav problem as a European problem. For this attitude largely contributed, the pressure created in the media but also USA, which refused to engage in to the direct resolution of the Yugoslavian issue in its in early stages. Therefore, EU had to do something. In a situation in which we have de facto started military conflict on the Yugoslav territory, particularly in Slovenia, with realistic chances to expand, the EU sends a mission in Yugoslavia. *“After talks with the federal and republic’s leadership, the EC delegation obtained a cease-fire on 28 June 1991, ending troop movement by all sides. The EC delegation pressured Croatia and Slovenia to suspend their declarations of independence for three months The EC delegation also extracted an agreement from Milosevic to withdraw his veto of the Croatian leader Stipe Mesic as the new (and duly scheduled) chairman of Yugoslavia’s collective Presidency”.*(Lukic& Lynch 1996 p.256)

Let us do a little analysis of what were the main objectives of EC with this mission. The first objective is obviously an immediate ceasefire and the second goal was an attempt to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia through the resurrection of the Yugoslav federal presidency as one of the most important federal institutions. The meeting was held in Croatia, where the Croats and the Slovenes accepted to put their declarations of independence on hold three months and the federal Army accepts three-month cease-fire in Slovenia. Three-month cease-fire plan according to the EC has been enough time for peaceful discussions without violence. After this EC mission, Jacques Poos, the foreign Minister of Luxembourg (*“The Death of Yugoslavia”* 1995) declares that the main goal of the EC mission have been achieved –immediate ceasefire and stopping the further escalations of the situation.

The facts given in the literature are divided over whether this mission was a success or was not a success of the EC. We are more sympathetic to the second view and justify it with the fact that the long-term EC goal i.e. stopping the further escalation of the situation has not been accomplished. This is so because the fires very soon expanded in to the territories of Croatia and B&H. Therefore, the statements of a certain politicians, declaring great success of EC, were simply premature. Still, it is not denied the success that the EC has had over Slovenia in which the violent stopped. Finally, by cooperating with the EC, Slovenia has become an independent state. At

the same time, this success is not glorified, taking into account the fact that Slovenia was not in the sphere of interest of Serbia and it was relatively easy allowed to leave Yugoslavia.

After the expiration of two months from the Jacques Poos statement in which he declared success of the EC mission, the war started to move in Croatia and the tensions in B&H were growing. In response to the Yugoslav tinderbox, EC placed conference organized under the bat of Lord Carrington⁴. It is significant that this Hague Peace Conference had approach to Yugoslavia as a whole instead of dealing with current crisis areas. So according to this conference concept there were representatives of all Yugoslav nations and nationalities invited, including Albanians of Kosovo and Vojvodina Hungarians. This conference represents a new stage in the EU approach to the Yugoslav question. Until this moment, the EU enforced ad hoc tactics for solving current problems as the conflict in Slovenia. However, from this moment its strategy changes and puts all Yugoslav problems on the table for discussion. This approach is considered as more appropriate because the instability and the tensions were overlooked all over Yugoslavia and partial solving was unable to extinguish the whole fire. Still this concept had a little too ambitious goal, which consisted in addressing any potential conflicts in Yugoslavia. The decision suggested from this conference was peaceful transformation of the Yugoslav federation in some sort of loose confederation consisting of autonomy republics and a peaceful transformation of the previous republic boundaries into inter-state boundaries. This solution was accepted by all the republics except Serbia.

Soon it became perfectly clear that without a solid military support this kind of peace conference could not be considered for anything more than a round table. The EU attempts to conclude new ceasefire that were not respected on the ground have only confirmed this.

This led to the question about the actual capabilities and instruments of the EU. If the military capabilities of member states are considered then the following conclusion could be drawn. EU has no defense and military organization counterpart of the NATO pact⁵. Although there were certain attempts for the creation of a common EU defense army, all this projects failed as too ambitious. The only common defense alliance that EU countries have been in and are in is the NATO alliance. However, in the NATO alliance the main player was the US, which apparently had no intention to intervene in the Yugoslav war at this early stage. On the other side, the EU itself, with the exception of France and Britain, had no military basis for such a major operation as intervention in the Yugoslav wars. It should be mentioned that Germany had the necessary capacity but this was not possible in accordance with its post World War II Constitution. So we can conclude that the situation with the military capacity of the EU-NATO looked like this - there was no will for NATO alliance to intervene. The two EU countries that had a military and financial capacity for intervention (France and UK) refused to do it, while Germany, which possess the capacity to intervene could not do it and all the other EU members simply did not have the capacity to do so.

So, if the EU was unwilling or unable to use military methods, then which were the available instruments of EU? As we already mentioned, there was an offer for financial help from EU to Yugoslavia if the country stay together. Accordingly, it is obvious that one of the EU instruments is with the economic nature. The use of the instruments of economic character is not something that is unseen in the EU tactics and is part of the so-called policy of stick and carrot. This in this concrete situation would have meant that if Yugoslavia remains together or peacefully transform into a loose federation, than it would get the "carrot" – great financial assistance. On the other hand, the stick was – not signing any new trade agreements, suspension of existing treaties agreements, introduction of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia... The use of the financial instrument as a tool for persuasion seemed very logical, especially because the EC was the largest trading partner of Yugoslavia. That is why this approach should have been used much earlier. Unfortunately, now when the EU began seriously to use this instrument it was unable to produce any important effect, because in those moments the nationalism in Yugoslavia was already irreversibly inflamed.

This, as it seems that in those moments much more effective EU instrument had political rather than economic character. The political power of the EU arises mainly in the power of its members to recognize or not the new states. Recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand or their non-recognition of on the other hand, was the instrument that the EU had in conducting various negotiations with them. The same instrument was applied as for the Serbs too, thus the recognition or not, of the parts that are seceding from Yugoslavia was used as a means to made the Serbs negotiate. What EU writes about the uses of these instruments fully applies on dealing with what was happening in Slovenia and Croatia but also in B&H too. Overall, the policy of the EU was not much more successful in terms of dealing with the war in B&H, although now, EU already had Slovenia and Croatia as an experience. When it became obvious that the tensions in B&H

⁴former general NATO secretary and former British foreign secretary

⁵With exception of the WEU which is non-functional

can escalate in to a real war, EU organized and mediated a meeting⁶ between Radovan Karadzic, Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic—the leaders and representatives of three communities in B&H. The EU mediator presented its plan for reconstruction of B&H in to a three regions with great autonomy. According to the plan each region would have a majority of one of the existing three nations of the Republic. All regions would have had an equal role in the central government in Sarajevo. Regarding the external borders it was stressed that they will remain the same and unchanged, which practically means that it is not possible secession and annexation of parts of B&H towards the neighboring countries. However, the B&H design presented at the Lisbon meeting was not supported by the Muslim side, along with the United States, which considered that this agreement opens the door to divide the country. After the collapse of this meeting, the violence irreversibly starts in B&H, after which EU withdrew its observers from the ground. This initial failure of the EC is also repeated in the next steps that will be undertaken by EU in order to resolve the Bosnian issue.

Therefore, in August 1992 the EC together with the United Nations organized the London conference with a working agenda dedicated to Yugoslavia. During this conference, some basic positions for the solution of Bosnian war have been set up. It have been said that any solution for B&H must respect its external borders, as fast as possible disbandment of the concentration camps, non-recognition of the territory acquired by the use of force etc. These positions were base for the work of the international Conference on Former Yugoslavia held in Geneva in September 1992. Namely, on this conference the first version of the Vans-Oven plan was drafted. This plan suggested creation of 10 provinces in B&H, which, although it would have been ethnically heterogeneous, it would also have a clear majority from one of the three communities living in B&H. For Sarajevo was suggested to be a separate province and Capital which would also reflect the multiethnic character of B&H. Official proponents of the plan were EC and UN. This plan was signed on May 1993 by all warring sides. What initially seemed like a great success for EC and possibility for peace in B&H will very soon turn into its complete failure. Thus, although the plan was originally signed by the Bosnian Serbs, it still has not been ratified in the Parliament of the self-declared Serbian Republic of B&H. This event represents a key challenge for the EU. The Union was in a position to demonstrate whether it has a credibility to implement what it had proposed and was accepted by all parties. Eventually the Parliament of the Republic of Srpska did not give its ratification the peace plan. After this event the EU was unable to implement the plan and with this in a way recognized the self-proclaimed Republic of Srpska acknowledging the decision of its institutions. After this event the EC leadership role in resolving the Yugoslav issues has been definitely lost.

In terms of the conflicting interests within the Union, i.e. the France-British couple on one hand and Germany on the other hand, it could be concluded as a sort of victory on the side that looked weaker - Germany. This is confirmed by the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the members of the Union. Simply, the preferences of Franco-British couple were not assessed high enough for them to openly confront its powerful German partner. The Yugoslav crisis was very important for Europe because it actually meant a change in the balance of power in Europe. After the Yugoslav crisis, France and the UK had to, on one way; recognize that the re-united Germany is once again a powerful factor in Europe whose voice cannot be ignored.

3. The Foreign Policy of the USA towards the Disintegration Process in Yugoslavia

The relations between United States and Yugoslavia have relatively deep roots. Although at first may seems quite uncommon, yet almost half a century the USA maintained excellent relations with the communist Yugoslavia. For nearly 50 years of existence of the AVNOJ Yugoslavia, the USA were friendly credit donor and strong supporter of the Yugoslav economy. At the same time the USA have been strong supporters of the Yugoslav unity and wholeness. Gradually, the policy of the USA began slowly to change after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In order to explain the logic behind this chance i.e. the policy of the USA shifting from a strong supporter of the Yugoslavia unity to the policy that recognizes the independence of the republics emerging from Yugoslavia, it will be helpful to make a historical review of the relations between the USA and Yugoslavia.

3. 1. The policy of the USA towards Yugoslavia during the Second World War

On 17 April 1941, the royal Yugoslavia ceases to exist and its royalist government went it to an exile in Britain. After this, the days of the occupation have followed and the Yugoslavian territory has been divided into the occupation zones between Germany and its allies. However, the occupied territory of Yugoslavia was not a peaceful area during the years of World War II. Namely, such a thing was hardly expected on a territory where simultaneously several organized military formations existed. So apart from the official occupation forces, there

⁶held on 23 February 1991

was an underground existence of the Yugoslav Partisans and the Draža Mihajlović Chetniks and other paramilitary groups. Both movements emerged as resistance and opposition to the occupation of Yugoslavia. Although, seemingly, they both had a common goal - liberation of Yugoslavia, which was supposed to be a unification element between these two movements, this was not the case. Their common goal actually had very little in common. Thus, they had obvious differences for the future projection of Yugoslavia. While the Yugoslav partisans led by Tito saw the future of Yugoslavia as a communist state, the Chetniks of Draža Mihajlović wanted the return of a royalist system. Another important difference between the two movements was contained in their support by the masses. So, while the partisan movement launched an all-Yugoslav spirit, the Chetniks movement, in many ways, was purely pro-Serb movement. This difference contributed for the Tito movement to be more supported among the masses. Over time, the Chetnik movement fought less and less against the Germans, more and more against the partisans. Eventually, it transformed into an ally of the Germans in the fight against Tito's partisans.

These were the circumstances in which the USA laid the foundations of their policy toward Yugoslavia. Based purely on pragmatic reasons, the USA supported the only movement that now openly and directly fought with the Germans on the territory of Yugoslavia. This consisted of the partisans and their leader Tito. The fact that Tito had communistic views for the future of Yugoslavia was placed under the carpet in time when Nazi Germany was at the peak of its power. Thus, the USA foreign policy oriented for support of the future leader of Yugoslavia - Josip Broz Tito. This certainly was an excellent foundation for further construction and improvement of the USA - Yugoslavia relations.

3. 2. The Policy of the USA towards Yugoslavia during the Cold War Period

The end of the Second World War was the beginning of the new world order. The relations in the world and especially in Europe had to be re-composed in the circumstances where the pre-war powerful German state was now practically nonexistent, and the other powerful states like France and Britain were exhausted by the Second World War. The USSR and the USA have taken the primacy of the most powerful states after World War II. Their competition inevitably led the world to the new world order of the Cold War and the creation of what Winston Churchill described as, "iron curtain" and the division of Europe into zones of influence. Thus, Eastern European countries fell in to the Soviet zone of influence. They had to establish communism and entrance the Warsaw Pact as their military alliance. Western European countries to a lesser extent fell below the USA zone of influence and kept capitalism. The NATO Alliance emerged as against gravity of the military power from the Soviet Union. In such a strict division of the spheres of influence, Yugoslavia was a unique example in Europe. Thus, although initially it was expected that Yugoslavia will be part of Eastern Europe and thus under the Soviet sphere of influence, this never actually happened. Yugoslavia led by Tito managed to keep its independent policy and not to join either one of two military blocs. Exactly this Yugoslav policy was used for building the USA foreign policy toward Yugoslavia. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia was seen as an excellent opportunity for promotion of the American interests, and thus the American foreign policy began to treat Yugoslavia as a country of strategic importance. According to the policy of the USA, Yugoslavia was a country, which could be used as a buffer zone between NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliance, as well as an obstacle for the access of the Soviet Union to the Mediterranean via the Adriatic. In this way, NATO's southern wing comprising Italy and Greece has been strengthened through the reduction of direct military threat from the USSR. At the same time, the independent policy of Yugoslavia could have been used as a kind of model and example for all other East European communist states. The message that the USA wanted to send was that countries that would dare to oppose Stalin would be able to rely on USA support. This is the reason why the USA supported Yugoslavia, mostly financially. Because of this, Yugoslavia was able to have a significantly better economic position and an open kind of country than unlike any other country in the Eastern Europe. According to the previously stated views for the importance of Yugoslavia for the USA interests, American foreign policy was fully supporting Yugoslavia and its President Tito, despite the Yugoslavia's internal communist system. Accordingly, all the issues concerning the violation of human rights, more democracy inside the country and so on were simply ignored as issues that could compromise if not threaten the rule of the President Tito. Thus, according to Lukic&Lznch(1996, p.2303) "*During the period 1949-90, the USA government rarely mentioned concerns over human rights violations in Yugoslavi and carefully avoided any comments that might destabilize President Josip Tito's the rule.*"

However, we should emphasize that this foreign policy of the USA was not built exclusively for Yugoslavia. Such a policy was essentially part of a wider strategy of the USA during the Cold War, which was guided primarily by whether a country can be a USA ally, while it was not necessarily have to be a democratic country.

3. 3. The Policy of the USA towards Yugoslavia in the Early Period after the End of the Cold War. "Maintaining Yugoslavia But Not By All Means" Policy

It is a very astonishing the continuity of the policy of the USA toward Yugoslavia, during the entire period of the Cold War. However, this should not be a surprise if one's bears in mind the strategic importance of

Yugoslavia during the bloc division in Europe. However, Yugoslavia, out of the Cold War system, had no longer such importance for the interests of, now, the only world superpower - the United States of America. Therefore, the end of the Cold War brought a possibility for a change in the policy of the USA toward Yugoslavia. So, some criticism that during the Cold War was kept away now has been publicly expressed. Such example is the 1991 USA Report⁷ in which (Lukic&Lynch 1996) concerns about the human rights situation in Yugoslavia, especially expressed in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

The major change in the policy of the USA was expected to go along with the line for giving clear and open support for the non-communist movements and governments elected in free elections instead of the old Communist leadership. However, in reality, the USA was much more concerned about the way they would have to deal with the new security vacuum in Eastern Europe. Therefore, instead of exclusive support for the democratic movements, in some cases, the USA decided to cooperate with the old communist official leaderships. This was also the case with Yugoslavia where the USA initially has opted for cooperation and gave its support to the Prime Minister Ante Markovic, instead of the elected on free elections governments in Slovenia and Croatia.

The reasons for this early of the policy USA can be searched in several factors that have influenced the shaping of USA foreign policy toward Yugoslavia after the fall of the Berlin wall.

It is believed that the USA constant policy toward Yugoslavia, which consisted in support for the Yugoslav unity and economy (during the Cold War), was the first factor that influenced the formation of the policy of the USA in the Post-Cold War period. Simply, the USA by inertia (in the absence of newly built policy) continued to advocate these positions after the fall of the Berlin wall.

Another factor is undoubtedly the CIA report from November 1990. The report gives a very precise and horrific warning - CIA issued a "National Intelligence Estimate" predicting that *"the Yugoslav experiment has failed, that the country will break up"* and that *"this is likely to be accomplished by ethnic violence and unrest which could lead to civil war"* (Binder 1990).

According to the predictions of the CIA, the end of the "Yugoslav experiment" will come very quickly and probably through the civil War. However, this same "Yugoslav experiment" has been used and been receiving strong USA support during the entire period of the Cold War. This CIA prediction hides a danger for breakup of Yugoslavia in a way that has significant potential to disrupt the status quo situation in the southeast Europe and the USA simply did not want it or were not willing to deal with the possible consequences at that particular moment.

There is also a third factor, along with the previous two, that had influenced the shaping of policy of the USA toward Yugoslavia. Namely, USA is a traditionally incurable believer in the federalism as the best form for organization of the state. So according to the scientific theory of the federalism, there is a constant competition conflict between the different levels of government. According to this, maybe a little naive certain circles in the USA saw what was happening in Yugoslavia through the prism of pure competition between both, the central government level with the republic's levels of government. So according to this view, what was happening was just a normal occurrence in a federal country that is usually resolved between the institutions themselves. Despite all of this, what was happening in Yugoslavia was much more than just an institution competition. Yet, even if the explanation of the theory of federalism is totally accept, eventually will have to admit that, the competition between the various levels of government in Yugoslavia, was of such a scale that directly threatened to the survival of the federation. In addition, there was a military factor, so we cannot just classify this as a normal phenomenon that occurs constantly in federal states.

So, there was no clearly built USA foreign policy, not just toward Yugoslavia, but also toward Eastern Europe in general, in the early period after the fall of the Berlin wall. In this situation, the previous three elements had their influences in shaping the USA foreign policy toward Yugoslavia, thus the combination of firstly, the support for the unity (by inertia), secondly, the CIA's warning Report (the possible collapse of Yugoslavia through the civil war) and thirdly, the USA traditional positive view of the federalism.

Confirming that this was the case can be seen from the event that has occurred on 21 February 1990. Namely, Mr. Dobbins, USA assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs, on this date, for the first time officially announces the tenets of the American policy toward Yugoslavia. Dobbins states that the USA foreign policy will relay on supporting *"democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reforms and unity."* (Lukic& Lynch 1996, p.310). Therefore, the policy of the USA keyword since the Cold War remains the same and that is -

⁷ by Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for human rights and humanitarian affairs

Unity. The importance that the USA gave to the principle of Unity can be seen from the USA Secretary of State Baker visit to Belgrade held on 21 June 1991. According to the USA ambassador Zimmermann (1996) Baker especially emphasizes the unity, saying that the USA will oppose any action such as the Slovenia's preparation for declaration of independence, because that it would unable the negotiation and dialogue.

That is why the USA choose cooperation and favoring with the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic, instead of elected governments in Slovenia and Croatia. Accordingly, the USA gave its support to the pro-federal elements instead of the pro-secessionist elements in Yugoslavia. The Prime Minister Markovic and his views fit perfectly within the USA foreign policy. He also supported the further existence of the federation, through the market reforms. Indeed, Markovic, was not inventing something new, but merely copied certain elements on which the EC was based and that is its common economic interest. Markovic was also willing for certain talks with the Slovenian and Croatian leaderships and transformation of Yugoslavia into a softer and looser form of federation with a large autonomy to the republics but not their independence. As already mentioned these views on the future of Yugoslavia perfectly fit into USA foreign policy toward Yugoslavia. Thus, by maintaining the federation together, the principle of unity will be met and by giving greater autonomy to the republic, there will be no need of a civil war and finally the federalism once again would have triumphed. That is why the USA supported the Prime Minister Markovic.

So according to this kind of logic, it is suggested that the USA foreign policy towards Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, was oriented towards the preservation of Yugoslavia as a state and support for the principle of unity. However, we believe that there is a space to be a little skeptical of this claim and to ask whether indeed USA foreign policy aimed at survival of Yugoslavia? Ironically, the skepticism arises from the event that is often taken as one of the biggest arguments for the USA commitment to the principle of unity. Namely, we are talking about the above-mentioned Baker's visit to Belgrade on 21 June 1991. Namely as the above quote, at this particular meeting he emphasized the importance of the principle of unity and clearly states that the USA opposes preparations for the unilateral declaration of independence. But, in the same time, we must note that, this visit comes too late, in a period where the level of intolerance and nationalism had already reached such a degree that in a great extend already have done road to the breakup of the country. The former USA ambassador to Yugoslavia - Warren Zimmermann is having the same opinion. According to Zimmermann (1996) the Baker's visit may have been able to make a difference if it was headed six months earlier i.e. the visit comes too late in the game. Therefore, exactly this, stirs doubt on the sincerity of the USA for truly support of the principle of unity and survival for the Yugoslav federation.

Here, the logical dilemma will be - whether USA did this in purpose, or there were existence of objective circumstances and reasons for this. As a relatively objective reason we can consider the USA involvement with the war at bay. On this position is also the Ambassador Zimmermann (1996, p.8) who says, "*a great power should be able to handle more than one crisis at a time; in reality this is harder than it appears.*" This statement opens a new dilemma, i.e. whether the USA as a world's super power was not able to cope simultaneously with two parallel crises. Although these views may have seem little naive, the scientific papers gives support to the position of Ambassador about his doubts for the real capacity for the only superpower. Thus, especially interesting are the views of John J. Mearsheimer in his work "The hegemony limits".

Our opinion for the above dilemmas is that the USA was really preferred to see Yugoslavia as a federal state but not at any price. That is, the existence of Yugoslavia was a desirable outcome for the USA only if it not meant two things. That, if it does not breach with the principle of democracy and if that does not mean American military engagement. Thus, USA supported the principle of unity but they grade it not higher than the principle of democracy. The logic behind was that both principles "unity" and "democracy" are inseparable. Therefore, "(...) *the unity and democracy were inseparable. If unity was sacrificed on the altar of Slovenian or Croatian democratic self-determination, war would result, and democracy, as well as unity, would suffer*" (Zimmermann 1996, p.5).

Let us consider the second part of the claim regarding the price that USA was not ready to pay for keeping the Yugoslavian unity. As we mentioned the Yugoslavian, survival has been preferred but not by all means, especially not at the cost of military involvement of the USA. According to Zimmermann (1996, p.5), the USA were hoping that "(...) *that no constituent unit of Yugoslavia will seriously consider separation, just as we hope that no consideration will be given to using force to preserve unity.*" The previous reveals that the USA opted for the survival of Yugoslavia. However, at the same time USA stress its position that the use of force for maintaining the Unity will be not acceptable. So the USA were aware that if the moment comes when the unity can be obtained only by the use of force than this could lead to the initiation of a larger military conflict that would eventually require some sort of USA military involvement. This option was the price that was too high for the USA This was quite logical and guided by the principle of costs and expected benefit. What that actually means is that "(...) *before great powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about the balance of power*

and about how other states will react to their moves. They weight the costs and the risk of offence against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment." (Mearsheimer 2006, p.55). It is exactly what USA did. They did not include in military engagement until calculated that the expected benefits are bigger than the risks. This happened with the NATO intervention in B&H which demonstrated that they are the only ones who can bring peace. So although USA preferred further existence of Yugoslavia, yet it did not stand behind it at any price, especially not in the Post-Cold War system here Yugoslavia where lost much of the importance that have had it during the Cold War period. This policy of the USA can be called "Maintaining Yugoslavia but not by all means" policy. This policy period runs from the fall of the Berlin Wall until the USA official policy change in October 1991.

3. 4. The Change of the Foreign Policy of the USA

"Maintaining Yugoslavia but not by all means" policy was primarily aimed to keep Yugoslavia as one state. This initial policy of the USA toward Yugoslavia has shown as unsuccessful with the Slovenian and Croatian declaration of independence and the start of the military conflict in these republics. The beginning of armed conflicts minimized and even made the chances for any real dialogue impossible. With this, the principle of unity was practically dead. In this context is also Tupurkovski (according to Bennett 1995, p.156) "*Until the war broke out we could think about various options, even about whether some Yugoslav idea would succeed. But when war came it was clear to me that it was the end of it all.*" These realities on the ground, forced USA to build new positions in its foreign policy toward, now, the country where civil war rages. Some authors suggest that this new policy of the USA can be called "wait and see" policy. Thus according to Lukic& Lynch (1996) moving away from its emphasis on unity, the USA adopted a wait-and-see policy-approach for the period before adopting new principles of US policy. This view suggests that there was a new policy of the USA in the relations with Yugoslavia. Therefore, this new policy of the USA has been applied in the interim from the moment when it becomes obvious that the previous policy of the USA did not produce the desired results⁸ until the moment of the creation of a completely new policy of the USA⁹. This interim policy is called "wait and see" policy.

In our view the existence of the above-proposed policy in the USA – Yugoslavian relations are not entirely correct. We believed that the "wait and see" policy is nothing more than just continuation of the previous policy of the USA (instead of a new policy). We consider that the "wait and see" policy was not different from the previous policy of the USA (which we called "Maintaining Yugoslavia but not by all means" policy). The claim is based on the fact that in the "wait and see" policy, there was no special effort or activity of the USA (the same apply for the previous policy of the USA) the Americans, as well as in its previous policy, still refused to take some more concrete actions that would have made a difference in Yugoslavia. In "both" policies there was obvious absence for some visible and significant activities from the American diplomacy. So it cannot be really differentiated these two, quite passive, policies. In addition, the both policies, relatively speaking, had the element of neutrality regarding the future of Yugoslavia, as a basic element.

Some might contrast the given position arguing that even the new policy of the USA has been quite passive in many ways, so therefore it could not be claimed that "wait and see" policy was actually non-existent policy just because it had the element of passivity and neutrality as its basis. Namely, we agree that for a good time the USA foreign policy in relation to the Yugoslav question was quite passive. That is the period in which USA has left the management of the problem to the Europeans. On this line of thinking are also Lukic& Lynch (1996, p.313) "*Uncertain over the future direction of events (...) the USA demonstrated that it was still content to follow rather than lead on the issue of regional instability in south-eastern Europe.*" However, this is not a subject of argument. However, in order to have a new policy it is necessary to have at least new principles in the conduction and creation of foreign policy. In the suggested "wait and see" politics, we cannot see these new principles. Although we agree with the fact that there was some period between the previous policy of the USA and the completely new policy, we cannot agree that this interim is distinguished and has its own policy called "wait and see" politics.

We believe the USA officially introduced a new policy in October 1991 when a State Department official - Ralph Johnson stated, "*(...) the principles of self-determination, respect for borders, support of democracy, respect for human rights and respect for international law would now form the basis of the new USA approach towards Yugoslavia.*" (According to Lukic& Lynch 1996, p.313). If analyzing the previous statement it can be clearly seen that the USA withdraws from the principle of unity and replaced it by the principle of self-determination. This is definitely a new policy of the USA toward Yugoslavia. By accepting the principle of self-determination as one of the basis for the new policy of the USA, it looks like the USA completely accepted the idea dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. However, there are certain indications that the USA were hoping for

⁸ the moments of declaring independence and beginning of a war in Slovenia and Croatia

⁹ On October 1991 the State Department's representative Ralph Johnson, officially announced the principles on which the new USA policy toward Yugoslavia will be based.

survival of Yugoslavia in some form of loose federation or at least a part of it. According to the former USA Ambassador to Yugoslavia Zimmermann (Lukic& Lynch 1996, p.314) *"America's wishes are: complete cessation of hostilities, change of the political system and creation of a completely new Yugoslavia which would be without Slovenia. The new Yugoslavia would be a loose confederation of five republics. There would be no change in republican borders and (the Albanians in Kosovo as well as Serbs in Croatia) must get full autonomy."*

If analyzing the previous statement, several things would be discovered. First, the positions of the USA of the future of Yugoslavia are reduced to existence of only a "wishes". This in itself suggests the absence of strong positions on the future of the Yugoslav federation and a kind of passive approach to this issue. Second, the USA wants a ceasefire and then a change of political system. Thirdly, the final vision of the USA would be creating a new Yugoslavia that would work as "loose" federation. One of the main differences of this new Yugoslavia would be the USA would agree for Slovenia not to be its integral part. Thus, Slovenia had a tremendous desire to leave the federation, and this was not resisted not even by Milosevic. Fourthly, according to this USA vision the republic's borders would have remain intact as the guarantee for peace and fifth, the large national minorities in the republics would get great autonomy and remain in the existing republican borders. This refers to the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Croatia. Therefore, according to USA this was the way for a peaceful resolution in Yugoslavia. Yet this vision for the future of Yugoslavia was just an USA desire rather than some strong position. This position was reflecting the definition of the problem as a European, which practically meant that the USA does not have some big obligation to do something about it. Thus, exactly this kind of definition enabled USA to distinguish itself from liability when the war in Yugoslavia was gathering. Simply to put it, according to the USA view, they had no interest in entering in solving the problem that has, primarily, a European character. According to Zimmermann (1996) whenever they (the USA presidential administration) did know what to do, they have addressed the Bosnian war as a European problem.

So, the USA foreign policy toward Yugoslavia generally ranged from a policy that preferred the wholeness of Yugoslavia to a position, which accepts the reality on the ground and finally recognizes the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, B&H and Macedonia. The recognition of B&H can be interpreted as a move by which USA wanted to prevent further expansion of the violence. Thus, USA perhaps a little naively, believed that recognition of the independence of B&H would deter the aggressive Serbian policy about their claims in B&H. Apparently this was not the case. The war in B&H, not only that has not been prevented but it took a bigger swing. The recognition for B&H was one of two moves that USA undertake in this early phase of the Bosnian conflict.

Unlike the recognition of Bosnia, which can be seen as a reasonable move that had some justification and logic in achieving peace and deterrence of a possible aggression, the other major USA move was much more controversial. It was the USA encouragement that was given to the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic for the rejection of the plan presented by the EC for peaceful remodeling of B&H suggested during the Lisbon meeting. *"In this respect the United States committed what may have been the most portentous error in Western diplomacy surrounding the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina in encouraging the Bosnian leadership to reject a European-supported proposal for a con-federal Bosnian state in favor of unitary status."* (Lukic&Lznch 1996, p.315). The acceptance of this agreement would have mean avoidance of the war in Bosnia in which none of its ethnicity would have the right of separation and annexation to neighboring republics. Furthermore, what was offered at the Lisbon summit is not so greatly different from what was offered in the USA sponsored Dayton agreement. Therefore, this USA move is indeed questionable because in a way they have turned away Bosnian President from signing the EC proposed agreement. Exactly this USA move is used as one of the main arguments in the conspiracy theories about the role of the USA in Yugoslavia. At the same time, at first glance, this move, rather justifies the Serb's qualifications for the policy of the USA as pro-Muslim. But this is only at first glance, because after the USA successful lobbying for the Muslims not to sign the contract, for a long time did nothing else in their favor and stay quite passive while the militarily superior Serb have been winning one by one the battles in B&H. Thus, although USA vociferously spoke that the Serbs are the biggest culprits for the beginning of the war it is actually all they did. Whenever they were asked for more cornet involvement In B&H they simply gave answers as one of the USA Secretary of State Warren Christopher (research archive 2010) according to whom¹⁰ *"the USA had no moral obligation to protect Bosnian's Muslims because all three sides shared responsibility for the situation."* The statements by the USA officials were given as if they have never encouraged the Muslims for not signing the peace agreement. Thus, the State department Ralph Johnson (According to Lukic&Lznch 1996, p.313) said, *"The USA could not stop Yugoslav from killing one another so long as they are determined to do so."*

¹⁰ on his testimony in front of the House of Representatives

In this respect, there were some kinds of contradictions regarding the position of the USA towards the Yugoslav conflict (the war in B&H). According to Lukic&Lynch (1996), the position of the USA was that what was going on in Bosnia is a pure case of (Serbian) aggression on one hand but on the other hand, the Bosnian war was quite often defined as an internal civil war. Defining the war in B&H as a civil war was enabling them to continue with its passive foreign policy in relation to the Bosnian war. That is, if the war is defined as a civil one, than it should not be considered as such a danger to the existing international order in size as it would be if it were an interstate war and thus is not an American problem and it is primarily an internal issue of a particular state.

The logical question here is why the USA was so hesitant to act. The answer can be searched in USA interests i.e. USA simply did not have sufficient interest to include more directly in to the resolution of the Bosnian (and the Yugoslav secession war in general) at the time, and especially not to act unilaterally because this would meant to cause the anger of its NATO partners. Guided by the cost and benefits principle, the USA have decided not to act unilaterally if this means open confrontation with its NATO partners. Thus, the USA was quite hesitant and eventually gave up the idea of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on B&H, (which would have directly helped the Bosnian Muslims which were not as armed as the Bosnian Serbs) and the unilateral use of force has not even been concerned in this situation." *The Congress itself was divided. The reigning issue was whether to unilaterally lift the arms embargo--a move strongly backed by Senator Dole.*" (Zimmermann 1996, p.15).

In a situation where the USA unilateral actions were not an option, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO was the only one, which could act. But why NATO needed so long to act? An answer to this is offered by Pond (2006) according to which the West collectively had a great respect for the YNA as a successor of the partisans, which fought, with the German "Wehrmacht". On the other hand, the West in general stood and was not willing to deploy its own army in to Yugoslavia. Therefore, there are two answers offered. According to the first one, the reason is the historical respect that the most member states of NATO had towards YNA. We cannot entirely agree that this was the main reason simply because the respect and the morality are not the driving force in international relations. However, we agree with the second part of its claim regarding the general lack of will within the west (NATO) for an intervention. The situation was additionally complicated by the fact of the existence of a new world order in which NATO, as a kind of Cold War relic, was still searching for its place in it. In addition, the NATO as defense alliance has never before intervened outside the territory of its member states and such a move seemed particularly complicated and unpredictable.

However, at some point the USA have decided to act militarily through NATO. So, what was the reason for this change of the American policy? Did they see their own interests in such an action? The administration of President Bush at simply continued the policy of the USA for the support of the Unity principle by inertia from the Cold War period. However, latter the Bush administration withdrew from the support of the Yugoslav unity. What is astonishing is that the Bush administration found no interest to intervene in Slovenia, Croatia and even B&H but he did not exclude this possibility for Kosovo. *"Having retreated from the brink in Bosnia, President Bush near the end of his administration made a surprising move on Kosovo. He dispatched a message to Milosevic threatening forceful retaliation if the Serbian leader tried a power play in Kosovo."* (Zimmermann 1996, p.13)

But, unlike the Bush administration, which failed to find some more vital interests for a more active role of the USA in the Yugoslav war, the newly elected President Clinton has put the issue during his presidential campaign. Thus, the USA more active involvement has been determined as an American interest and given as a campaign promise. According to Lukic&Lynch (1996) during the first months of his term, the new President Clinton announced a new policy of the USA toward the now former Yugoslavia. Still in reality there has been some time before this actually happened.

Therefore, we are back aging on the questions about the interest of more active USA involvement in resolving this bitter issue. Most of the literature says the USA realized that the Bosnian issue (and Yugoslav in general) has such a capacity that could jeopardize the international order through the possible border changes in the region of Southeast Europe. According to Lukic& Lynch (1996, p.321) *"(...)USA national interest in preventing regional instability from becoming a larger Europe-wide problem (i.e., involving prominent NATO partners Greece and Turkey in fighting against one another, and possibly involving Albania as well."* This kind of fears for greater regional and even European instability was quite justified. Thus, the Bosnian war was a sort of religions war, in which for example, Turkey had sympathies for the Bosnians –the Muslim, whiles the Orthodox Greece, and was much more sympathetic to the Bosnian Orthodox Serbs. Not putting an end to the war in Bosnia could mean its overflow in the rest of the former Yugoslavia. This was already the case in previous wars. The possibility for spillover of the war in Kosovo was real. This could easily meant opening for new and more serious problem that will include Albania and Macedonia too. The outbreak of a war in this part of the Balkans

could mean the inclusion of Greece and Bulgaria who have already fought on Macedonian territory in the Balkan wars. The opening of a conflict of such magnitude would have been too hard to handle. This kind of situation would have not been in the USA interest.

However, the USA interests can also be search into something else. Thus, with the possible proactive and leading USA involvement in the Bosnian problem, America would have demonstrated a kind of superiority and tutorship over Europe that could not have been able to solve the issue. Also, dealing with the Bosnian problem that was both, religious and ethnic conflict, was supposed to be a model and example that USA is capable to deal with all similar and anticipated conflicts in the new world order after the Cold War. In this way the USA would have send the message that any change of the borders, without its blessing, will be impossible. In the administration's first comprehensive statement on Bosnia on 10 February 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher painted USA interests in wide brushstrokes. " *He said that the United States had "strategic concerns," that the principle of internationally recognized borders was at issue, that the United States wanted to avoid the spread of hostilities and a river of refugees, and that Bosnia was a test of how the world "will address the concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the Post-Cold War world."*(Zimmermann 1996, p.13)

Finally, the more active USA involving in to the Bosnian issue has become USA interest simply because this was promised during the campaign of the USA newly elected President Clinton. The Clinton administration had no doubts about the culprits. For them it was the Serbs, and accordingly the pressure needed to be directed to them. Thus, the USA under Clinton has been openly talking about three things, first lifting the embargo on arms to B&H, the adoption of tighter sanctions on Serbia by the UN and the use of limited air strikes. However, despite the initial euphoria, the Clinton administration failed to realize all of this in the first years of its mandate. There were several reasons for this. Primarily the reasons were located in the lack of support from its European partners, mostly France and UK. After these initial failures at the end of 1993, Clinton simply returns to the Bush policy toward the Bosnian issue i.e. the problem was once again defined as European and therefore assumed that the Europeans should keep trying to resolve it. So, under the Clinton leadership the Yugoslav crisis was re- characterized as a moral tragedy in which no vital USA interests is endangered and the USA itself cannot unilaterally act to stop it. In general, Clinton had strong rhetoric but little action. According to Ambassador Zimmermann, the reasons were mostly inside the USA. Thus, " *what made Clinton retreat from the muscular approach he had followed in the campaign and in the first few months of his presidency? (...). Clinton was simply not in a strong enough position to override the Pentagon's opposition to the commitment of USA military forces to Bosnia. (...) Clinton's advisers, a combination of hawks and doves, never reached consensus on a consistent policy line.*"(Zimmermann 1996, p.14)

The attack on the Sarajevo market in February 1994 was a turning point. This incident has caused many innocent victims and produced very strong public condemnation by the western media for the passivity of Europe, the USA and NATO. Because of this even, NATO seriously threatened the Bosnian Serbs and demanded the withdrawal of their troops around Sarajevo. After this threat, for the first time since the start of the Bosnian war, life in its capital returns to a normal condition. NATO wanted to present this event as a great success of the Alliance. However, we believe that the withdrawal of Serb forces around Sarajevo was equally success of Russian diplomacy too. " *Russia contributed significantly to the credibility of the threat by warning its Serbian friends that this time NATO was serious.*"(Zimmermann 1996, p.15).However, apparently this event by itself did not mean the end of the Bosnian war and the Clinton administration remained indecisive. This situation changes in mid-1995. According to Zimmermann (1996), the various elements of the administration finally united around a common policy in 1996. The reasons behind this change were due to at least two factors. First, new presidential elections were coming and the Clinton's promise was not yet realized i.e. he did not manage to bring peace in B&H. Secondly, at this point it became obvious that the EC leadership was unable to bring back the peace in Bosnia and therefore Bosnia will continue to bleed. This practically meant that the USA as the only superpower was the only one that can do something about Bosnia. Thus, the European character of the Bosnian war, could have been used no more as a justification in a situation in which the USA will be blamed by the media and the public that do not undertakes no action.

Two events in the summer of 1995 have opened the way for a concrete application of American power. The first was the action ordered by the Croatian President Tudjman, launched against the rebelled Krajina. The action practically resulted the living of the majority of Serbs from Croatia and a new balance of power in western Bosnia. The second event was the repeated shelling of the Sarajevo market, which resulted with 38 dead people. This time Clinton was ready. With the military equilibrium goal¹¹ approach, he got the support from his NATO allies for launching air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, their communications, commands and control. The campaign took place from 30 August to 14 September. According to Zimmermann (1996), this resulted in

¹¹Creating a balance of power (not an action for defeating but making the militarily superior Serbs negotiate)

Serbia's consent for negotiation and an end to the war. The USA diplomat Richard Holbrooke was in charge to mediate in signing the Dayton agreement, which to this day maintains the peace in B&H.

4. Concluding Observations on the Policy of the USA and Eutowards the Disintegration Process of Yugoslavia

The relations between USA and the EU in terms of their policies towards Yugoslavia were interdependent and intertwined. We can even claim that there was some degree of coordination between the actions of USA and EU always. Thus, there was mutual agreement that the EU should lead the process of finding a peaceful solution to the wars that raged in Yugoslavia. That is what happened. The EU was the flagship of the peace process during the war in Slovenia, Croatia and a good proportion of the time of the Bosnian war. However, in the final phase of the Bosnian war things have changed in the opposite direction. So now, the silent agreement was that the USA should be the main driving engine, and the EU should just follow, which actually was the case.

There was also a common definition of the Yugoslav problem as a problem with a purely European character. That definition was not disputed by EU or United States, at least not during most period of conflict. This kind of definition for the Yugoslav problem has mostly served the USA interests as kind of justification why was USA not dealing with the issue earlier... This kind of defining the problem has placed the burden of dealing with the Yugoslav wars on the back of the EU. Was this in EU's interests is another question. What is important is that the EU had to accept such defined character of the Yugoslav wars as inevitable for at least two things. First, the USA (most of the time) was not willing for more active role and secondly the EU as one of its goals for the future projected EU's growing in to the global political factor i.e. in the visible world political player.

Our third conclusion is that there was some confusion in the perception and definition of its own interests in the initial period in the Post-Cold War. This of course reflected in the way of dealing the Yugoslav crisis. This applies for both USA and EU member states. Namely, the Yugoslav crisis occurs relatively quickly after the Cold War end, with it some kind of an interim and a vacuum period, during the transition from the old to the new international system. Thus, for a long time the USA could not find its own interest in more active involvement with the dealing of the Yugoslav wars. "(...) *Germans correctly calculated that the United States would quickly adjust to the change.*" (Zimmermann 1996, p.10). The previous quotation reveals that Germany correctly calculated that the USA would just adapt to the change rather they will have some strong interest and position as part of its own policy toward Yugoslavia. Something similar happened to the other side of the ocean. Thus, the EC member states were not too active in prevention or stopping the Yugoslav conflict. Namely, many EC members simply hoped that the conflict would not expand rather than doing something about it. As it was already written, the period of Post-Cold War was a period where the European leaders, finally after many years, have reduced their military budgets and had no desire (and have seen no interest) to increase it again for sending its peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia or similar. Perhaps the only European country that have found a significant own interest was Germany.

The fourth conclusion is that the only organization that could seriously and militarily intervene was the North Atlantic Alliance. But, the Alliance was in the process of redefining the need of its own existence in the new world order where the Warsaw Pact no longer existed. Thus, NATO was a military organization - founded for the needs and interests in a previous international system and order. The situation was further complicated by the fact that NATO was primarily a defense organization and according to the principle of solidarity provides protection to its members. Accordingly, the imposition of the issue for NATO intervention outside of the territory of its member states was in itself a controversial topic and related to the discussions about the future role of NATO.

The fifth conclusion arises from the previous. All of them reflected in the official policies of the USA and EU that there was not long-term and not permanent foreign policy towards the Yugoslav issue. Thus, the original policy of USA and EU was built on the view that Yugoslavia should remain a one state that should be reformed. This policy attitude in the United States had its own evolution. Thus, American foreign policy has evolved from supporting the principle of unity in his direct replacement with the principle of self-determination. In the EU, something similar happened and the initial support for Yugoslavia was later a replacement as the lack of a common position of the EU, but in practice however, the EU members has supported the principle of self-determination by recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

Finally, we can conclude that the Yugoslav war was a sort of initial test of the CFSP on which it failed. With the involvement of the U.S and the end the war in Bosnia, the USA demonstrated superiority over the EU and had shown that it will take much more time for EU to become independent political power.

Dejan Marolov
Goce Delcev University,
Stip, Republic of Macedonia

References:

- Aron, R. (1966) *Peace and War: A Theory of Peace and War*, translated by Howard, R. & Fox, A.B. Garden City, NY, Doubleday
- Atila Hoare, M. (2010) *Central and southeast European politics since 1989. The war of Yugoslav succession*. New York, Cambridge University Press
- Bakke, E. (2010) Central and East European party systems since 1989. In Ramet, S.P.(ed.) *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press pp.64-90
- Bennett, C. (1995) *Yugoslav bloody collapse. Causes, Course and Consequences*. New York, University Press Washington Square
- Berridge, G. R. (2009) *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, third Edition. London, Antony Rowe Ltd
- Bieber, F. (2010) Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1990 In Ramet, S.P.(ed.) *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press pp. 311-327
- Braun, A. (2010) Facing the twenty-first century: lessons, questions and tendencies (a conclusion). In Ramet, S.P.(ed.) *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press pp.536-552
- Bugajski, J. (1995) *Ethnic Politics of Eastern Europe*. New York, London, The Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Chatam, H.P. (1991) *The European Community and the Eastern Europe*. London, Royal Institute for International Affairs
- Cohen Lenard, J. & Dragović Soso, J. (2008) *State collapse in South-Eastern Europe: new perspectives on Yugoslavia's disintegration*. West Lafayette, Purdue University Press
- Cohen Lenard, J. (1995) *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, 2nd ed. Boulder Westview Press
- Frckoski, Lj. (2006) Emphasizes on European and Regional Affairs. In Mirčev, D. (ed.) *The Macedonian Foreign Policy 1991-2006*. Skopje, Az-Buki pp.35-37
- Friedman, T. & Krieger J. (2006) *Globalization and state power: Competing paradigms, The new System*. NY, San Francisco etc. Wellesley College
- Gallagher, T. (2003) *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*. London, Routledge
- Gallagher, T. (2005) *The Balkans in the New Millenium, in the Shadow of War and Peace*. London, Routledge
- Gaw, J. (2004) *Triumph of the Leck of Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslavia War*. London, Hurst&Co
- Hayward, R. A., Gurr, T.R. & Rupesinghe, K. (2001) *Journeys through conflict narratives and lessons*. Boston, Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Hill, C. (2003) *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York, Palgrave MacMillan
- Huntington, S. (1992) *The Third Wave*. Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press
- Kaplan, R.D. (1994) *Balkan Ghosts: A journey trough history*. New York, Vintage books a division of random house, inc.
- Lampe, J. (2003) *Yugoslavia as history: twice there was a country*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Lucarelli, S. (2000) *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. A political failure of a scholarly explanation*. Hague, Kluwer Law International
- Lukic, R. & Lznych, A. (1996) *Europe from the balkans to the Urals, The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*. New York, Oxford University Press
- Lukic, R. (2010) The emergence of the nation-state in East-Central Europe and the Balcans in historical perspective. In Ramet, S.P.(ed.) *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press pp.39-63
- Magas, B. (1992) *Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking Yugoslavia's Break-up 1980-1992*. London, Verso
- Mahncke, D. , Ambos, A. & Reynolds, C. (2004) *European foreign policy: from rhetoric to reality?* Brussels, Presses Interuniversitaires Europeennes
- Noel, M. (1994) *Bosnia: A short history*. New York, New York University Press
- Norton Moore, J. (2003) *Solving the war Puzzle: Beyond the democratic peace*. American Journal of International Law
- Pleština, D. (1992) *Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences*. Boulder, Westview Press
- Pond, E. (2006) *Endgame in the Balkans regime change, European style*. Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press
- Ramet, S. (2006) *The three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005*. Washington D.C, Indiana University Press
- Reiter, D. & Stam, A. (2002) *Democracies at war*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Rogel, C. (2004) *The breakup of Yugoslavia and its aftermath*. USA, Library of Congress publication data
- Rouke, J. & Boyer, T. (2002) *World Politics, International politics on the world stage. Brief*. Guilford, CT, MacGraw-Hill/Duhkin
- Spencer, M. *The lessons of Yugoslavia*. New York, Library of Congress publication data
- Sperber, J. (2005) *The European Revolutions 1848-1851*. New York, Cambridge University Press
- Todorova, M. (2004) *Balkan Identities, Nation and Memory*. London, Hurst&Co
- Trifunovska, S. (1994) *Yugoslavia through documents: from its creation to its dissolution*. Netherlands, MartinusNijhoff Publishers
- Vjekoslav, P. (2002) *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*. Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Vukadinović, R. (1998) *Megunarodni politički odnosi*. Zagreb, Barbat
- Woodward, S. (1995) *Balkan tragedy: chaos and dissolution after the Cold War* Washington DC, The Brookings Institution
- Mass, D. (1993) Bosnia crisis stzmies Western policy makers. *Washington post*. (internet) april 15, p.A24. Available from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/>> (Accessed 02.08.2010)
- Carton, D. & Jarreau P. (1994) Un entertien avec Jacques Delors. *Le Monde*. (internet) November 15, p.1. Available from <<http://www.louischauvel.org/delors.html>> (Accessed 02.14.2010)
- Riding, A. (1991) European Community freezes arms sales and aid. *New York times*. July 3, pA4. Available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/>> (Accessed 01.15.2010)
- Zimmermann, W. (1996) Yugoslavia 1989-1996. Available from <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter11.html> (Accessed on 19.10.2009)